ML18092B437

NUREG-0737,Suppl 1 Emergency Response Capability Integrated Project Plan.

ML18092B437
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/31/1987
From:	GENERAL PHYSICS CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML18092B432	List: ML18092B430 ML18092B437
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 GL-82-33, GP-R-212207, NUDOCS 8702260257
Download: ML18092B437 (70)

Text

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BOREG-0737 SDPPLEllEHT 1 EMERGEHC!' RESP<IllSE CAPABILITY Prepared for:

Public Service Electric

• Gas

. Salem Nuclear Generating Station units 1

• 2 GP-R-212207 January 1987 Prepared by:

General Physics Corporation 10650 Hickory Ridge Road Columbia r MD .21044

. * . 8702260257 870220 ------ -----.,

PDR ADOCK 05000272 p ; PDR . .

..

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECT I ON 1 PURPOSE .*.*************************************..* **. * ******** 1-1 SECTION 2 DEFINITIONS *********************************.*************

• 2-1 SECTION 3 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ********** ~ *******-***************** 3-1 SECTION 4 SALEM BACKGROUND ON ERC INTEGRATION *********************** 4-1 SECTION 5 ERC TASK ACTIVITIES AND PSE&G RESPONSIBILITIES ************ 5-1 5.1 ERC Task Activities and PSE&G Responsibilities ******* 5-1 5.2 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) ********** 5-1 5.2.1 DCRDR Program Plan and Team Staffing ********** 5-1 5.2.2 Develop Salem-specific Human Factors Guidelines . .........*..*............. ." ....... 5-3 5.2.3 Prepare for NRC Briefing and NRC Audit ******** 5-4 5.2.4 Perform Operating Experience Review *********** 5-5 5.2.5 Per form Control Room Survey **** **************** 5-6 5.2.6 Perform DCRDR Verification ******************** 5-7 5.2.7 Assess Human Engineering Discrepancies ******* ~5-8 5.2.8 Perform HED.Reconunendation and Resolution ...........*.....*...... *.......... 5-9 5.2.9 Schedule Control Room Modifications ********** ~-10 5.2.10 Prepare DCRDR Summary Report ***************** 5-11 5.3 Emergency Operating Precedure (EOP) Upgrade ********* 5-12 5.3.1 Prepare and Submit EOP Procedures

• Generation Package (PGP) ******************* 5-12 5.3.2 Develop Plant Specific Technical Guidelines (PSTG) ********* _**** ~ ************ 5-13

5. 3.'. 3 Perform PSTG-Verification ******************** 5-14 5.3.4 Develop Draft EOPs *************************** 5-15 5.3.5 Perform EOP Verification ******* ~*************5-16 5.3.6 Perform System Functions Review and Task Analysis . ...**....*..*.....*......*...*. 5-1 7 5.3.7 Perform DCRDR/EOP Validation ***************** 5-18 5.3.8 Perform EOP Modifications *************.******* 5-19

5. 3. 9 Implement EOPs *** **** * ********************* , ** 5-20 5.4 Regulatory Guide (R.G.) l.97 ************** ~*********5-20 5.4.1 Prepare R.G 1.97 (Rev 2) Compliance/

Position Report **************************** 5-29 5.4.2 Perform R.G. 1.97 Control Room

• Interface ******************* ~ ************* ~5~22 5.4.3 Prepare for R.G. 1.97 NRC

. Comment/Audit ................................ s-23 .

• i

• u TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 5.4.4 Prepare Design Modifications for R.G. l.97**********************************5-24 5.4.5 Procure Equipment for Instrumentation Modification .....................**......... S-24 5.4.6 Implement R. G. 1.97 Modifications ******** ~ ** 5-25 5.5 Emergency Response Capability Training ************** 5-25 5.5.1 Establish Systematic Training Requirements ******************************* 5-25 5.5.2 Develop ERC Integrated Training Plan ********* 5-27 5.5.3 Develop SPDS Simulator Hardware/

Software ...**..*..*..************...***.*.*.. S-28 5.5.4 Perform.EOP Training ********** ~ ************** 5-28 5.5.5 Perform SPDS Operator Training *************** 5-29 5.6 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) ************** 5-30 5.6.l Perform SPDS Functional Analysis ************* 5-30 5.6.2 Perform SPDS Parameter Set Selection ********* 5-31 5.6.3 Perpare and Submit SPDS Safety Analysis -

. Report and Implementation Plan ***** : ******* 5-32 5.6.4 Prepare Functional Requirement Document ***************************** * ***** 5-34 5~6.5 Develop Static SPDS Displays ***************** 5-35_

5.6.6 Prepare SPDS Human Factors Program and Per~orm Review .*..**...*....*..*........... S-3.6 5.6.7 Determine Process for Signal Validation *******************.*********.*** 5-37 5.6.8 Develop Software Design Specification ******** 5-38 5.6.9 Determine Parameter Use and

• Proce~sing ********************************* 5-38 5.6.10 Develop Dypamic Display Software ************* 5-39 5.6.11 Perform SPDS Hardware Installation *********** 5-40 5.6.12 Perform SPDS Verification/Validation (V&V) ** -** ********************************* * *.S-41 S.6.13 Perform Man/Machine Validation of SPDS Displays **************************.*** 5-42

5. 6 .14 Prepare for NRC Audit ***********.************* 5-43 SECTION 6 EMERGENCY RESPONCE CAPABILITY TASK INTEGRATION ************ 6-1

. .

6.1 Task Integration Step No 11 PSTG Development for Task Integration **.***************.**************** 6-1 6.2 Task Integration Step No 21 ERG/PSTG Functi~nal Analysis Development .......... *_........*. ~ .... ~ ..... 6-3

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 6.3 Task Integration Ste~ No 3i SPDS Parameter Set Selectioo .......................... *.......... *. 6-4 6.4 Task Integration Step No 4i control Room ijuman Factors Guideline Development ***** ****************** 6-6 6.5 Task Integration Step No Si Performing DCRDR **

and EOP Validation ********************************* 6-7 6.6 Task Integration Step No 6i R.G. 1.97/Control Room Interface ************************************* 6-a*

6.7 Task Integration Step No 7i SPDS Verification and-Validation *.****************************** ~***6-10 6.8 - Task Integration Step No Si Salem ERC Integrated Trainirig Plan ...............*.....*............... i-11 SECTION 7.0 ERC PROJECT MANAGEMENT/ORGANIZATI~ ****************** 7-1 7.1 ERC Project Division of Responsibility *************** 7-1 7.2 ERC Project Co_ordina tor *** ******** ~ ******************* 7~ 2 7.3 Project Overview/Management ************************** 7-3 7.4 ERC Project Documentation and Reporting ************** 7-4 7.5 E:Rc Action Tracking ..***...**....****.****** ~********7-5

• iii

• SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The purpose of this plan is to establish an effective means for the integratiai of tasks necessary to meet NRC Generic Letter 82-33 (NUREG-0737 supplement 1) and to enhance control room operations for Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem) Units 1 & 2. The Emergency Response Capability (ERC) task integration will involve the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) implementation, Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR), Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) Upgrade, Regulatory Guide 1.97 implementation for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, systematic operating training, and the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) implementation only as they relate to the other task activities *

• ~l

SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Definitions CSF Critical Safety Function

.DCRDR Detailed Control Room Design Review EOF Emergency Operations Facility EbPs Emergency Operating Procedures EPP Emergency Plan Procedures EPRI Electric Power Research Institute ERC Emergency Response Capability ERFs Emergency Response Facilities ERFIS Emergency Response Facility Information System ERG Emergency Respons~ Guidelines HED Human Engineering Discrepancy I&C Instrumentation and Coritrol.

INPO Institute of Nuclear Power* Operations ITP Integrated Training Program M/M Man/Machine NLS Nuclear Licensing and Safety NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSAC Nuclear Safety Analysis Center NUTAC Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee PDA Preliminary Design Assessment PGP Procedures Generation Package PLS Plant Staff

. PSTGs Plant Specific Technical Guidelines

• PWR Pressurized Water Reactor Salem Salem Nuclear Generating Station SPDS safety Parametr Display System SRO Senior Reactor Operator

• TSC V&V WOG Technical Support Center verification arid Validation Westinghouse Owners Group 2-1 Guidelines for the EOP' s *are WOG ERG' s with a -conrparisofi.

• Record developed for Salem procedures

SECTION 3. REGULATORY ~QUIREMENTS 3.1 Regulatory Requirements The specific regulatory requirements for performing the ERC tasks including integration are contained in Generic Letter 82-33, which issued NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 entitled, "Requirements for Emergency Response Capability." *All other previously issued NUREGs and Regulatory Guides are only to be used as sources of guidance for providing acceptable means of meeting the requirements of Generic Letter 82-33.

The requirements contained in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 replace the qorresponding requirements in the following sections of*NUREG-0737:

I.C. l Guidance for the Evaluation and Development of Procedures for Transients and Accidents I.D.l Control Room Design Reviews I.D.2 Plant Safety Parameter Display Console iII .A. l. 2 Meteorolbgi.cal oat.a The requirements of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 are referenced for each of the Salem specific requirements discussed in Section 5 of this document. In addition, pertinent support provided byNRCand industry guidance documents is also referenced.

Since the integration of the ERC task activities require plant specific

• effort coordination, task completion dates could not be dictated uniformly for all plants. Instead, Generic Letter. 82-33 allowed for scheduie negotiations between the NRC and the licensee based on the plant specific needs of each utility *

• 3-1

The schedule requirements for Salem Nuclear Generating Station are as follows:

Task Schedule SPDS Safety Analysis Complete (submitted 1/30/84)

SPDS Operability 6/30/87 EOP Procedures Generation Package Complete (submitted 5/20/83)

EOP Implementation * -:No'~later*~i:h.~{i_* 6. -mopt'h!s -of NRC

• • approval of*w~i-t~r~~ -i~ide DCRDR Program Plan Complete (submitted 2/14/83)

DCRDR Summary Report Complete (submitted 12/31/S3)

R.G. 1. 97 Position. Report Complete .;. NRC SER 6/17/85 R.G. 1.97 Implementation Complete - NRC SER 6/17/85 ERF Completion TSC Complete 12/85 OSC Complete 12/85 EOF 12/86

• • 3-2

SECTION 4. SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BACKGROUND ON ERC INTEGRATION 4 .1 Salem Background on ERC Integration The initial ERC task integration philosophy was reflected in t~e NRC's SECY-82-111, developed in early 1982. Based on this NRC Commission docwnent, Salem deferred implementati6n of several activities (including SPDS implementation and. R.G. 1.97 position report) until the final NRC integration plan was developed. On December 17, 1982 Generic Letter 82.;..33 was issued, which extracted the information in SECY-82-111 to develop NUREG-0737-Supplement 1.

Generic Letter 82-33 required that by April 15, 1983, the utility's plans and proposed schedule be submitted to the NRC for review and schedule negotiations. On April 15, 1983 PSE&G submitted the ERC plans and proposed*

schedule for Salem Nuclear Generating Station. In addition, a complete discussion on the background and status of each ERC task *effqrts and the integration process was discussed. Subsequently, the final schedule was negotiated with the_ NRC and documented as previously discussed in Section 3 *

• • 4-1

SECTION 5. ERC TASK ACTIVITIES AND PSE&G* RESPONSIBILITIES 5.1 ERC Task Activities and PSE&G Responsibilities The primary task and PSE&G Division of Responsibility involved in implementing the ERC project tasks are discussed below. The overall responsibility for each of the ERC projects .are discussed in section 7.1.

The requirements for performing the ERC tasks are defined by NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 and are referenced under "Requirements" in each of the following task acti"vities. The ERC tasks activities for the emergency response facilities (ERF's) are not discussed in this report.

5.2 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)

• 5.2.1

• DCRDR Program Plan and Team Staffing - The DCRDR Program Plan will be prepared for NRC review on the Proposed PSE&G planning*

phase, review phase, and assessment and implementation phase for DCRDR implementation. The program will include staffing and qualification of th.e review team, DCRDR task analysis, operating experience review, the verification and validatfon processes, the

_control room survey", and the methodology for assessing and resolving human engineering discrepancies. This program plan was submitted to the NRC on 2/14/83 for review as discribed in Confirmatory Order dated.6/12/84 and 7/26/84.

A DCRDR Review Team will be established to work together to perform all of the required DCRDR related activities. This team will be used throughout the review and assessment phase of the DCRDR program. The typical review team consists of a systems engineer, a senior reactor operator (SRO), and I&C/Electrical engineer and a human factors specialist.

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• 5.2.1.1 Requirements - N~G-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.2.a states that all licensees shall submit a program plan within two months of the start of the control room review that describes the CRDR process.

NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.b.i requires that a qualified multidisciplinary review team and review program be established.

5.2.1.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Assure Plan development and contract of DCRDR human factors expertise. Manage and provide the team leapership for the DCRDR efforts *

• Secondary Responsibilities:

• Aid in program scoping and development and provide a DCRDR team member as necessary.

• Operations - Provide necessary team support (SRO's) and review DCRDR Program Plan.

• Training - Provide DCRDR team support as necessary.

5.2.1.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.1, NRC SRP on DCRDR, Sept.

1984 *

• 5-2

• NUREG-0801, Evaluation Creiteria for DCRDR, Oct.

1981.

s.2.2 Develop Salem Specific Human Factors Guidelines - Human Factors Criteria will be developed to document the human engineering criteria and conventions specifically applicable to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Control Room. All applicable requirements will be identified in a manner that permits easy r.eference for convenient project use. After the DCRDR, the Human Factors Guideline will be adapted for ongoing reviews and docu-mentation of future changes to the Salem Control Rooms. This criteria will also be applied for SPDS development on CRT displays as discussed in Section 6.4 of this plan.

s.2.2.1 Requirements - No NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements specified.

5.2.2.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Develop or assure development of Human Factors Guidelines Secondary Responsibility:

• None identified 5.2.2.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981

• 5-3

• 5.2.3 Prepare for NRC Briefing and NRC Audit - An NRC briefing will be

• required by the NRC upon their review of the DCRDR Program Plan. The briefing will respond to their specifc comments on the Program Plan.

An NRC audit or results review will be conducted by the NRC upon submittal of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station DCRDR Summary Report. This audit/review will analyze the results and documentation to assure adequate resolution of identified Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs).

5.2.3.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Sections 5.1.a,c,d, and e state that the NRC review of the DCRDR Program Plan and Summary Report will result in either an inprogress audit, preimplementation audit, or a HED implementation review.

5.2.3.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility

• Coordinate NRC audit or question responses with plant engineering.

Secondary Responsibility

• Provide technical support for NRC audit or responses.

5.2.3.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981 *

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.1 SRP on CRDR, Sept. 1984.

5-4

• 5.2.4 Perform Operating Experience Review The operating experience review will identify factors or conditions that could cause and/or have previously caused human performance problems and could be alleviated by improved human engineering. This review will provide information on potential problem areas by studying documented occurrences of human engineering related problems that have occurred at Salem and at similar plants. This will consist of a historical review (i.e.

LERs) and operator interviews.

5.2.4.1 Requirements - Even though no requirement to perform this review is stated in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, the NRC has required this review in all DCRDR program plans per NUREG-0700 *

• 5.2.4.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Conduct or direct the operating experience review with human factors consultant support.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - To participate in the operator surveys.

5.2.4.3 Guidance e NUREG-0800, Section 18.1, SRP on CRDR, Sept. 1984.

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Oct. 1981 *

• 5...:5

• 5.2.5 Perform Control Room Survey The purpose of the Control Room *survey is to identify characteristics of I&C, equipment, physical layout, and environ-mental conditions that do not conform to precepts of good human engineering practice, regardless of the particular system or specific task requirements. This survey is accomplished by conducting a systematic comparison of existing Control Room design features with documented human engineering guidelines.

5.2.S.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.b.iv states that a control room survey will be conducted to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles.

5.2.S.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

• Primary Responsibility:

• Assure proper conduct of control room survey along with providing appropriate PSE&G and human factors exper~lse~

Secondary Responsibility:

• Provide historical preliminary design assessment input and integration coordination *.

5.2.5.3 Guidance

\

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.i

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981 5-6

-- - - ----------~-:------------------

5.2.6 Perform DCRDR Verification The DCRDR Verification is to systematically verify that the I&C identified in the Task Analysis as being required by the operator are present in the Control Room and effectively designed to support correct task performance.

5. 2. 6.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 5. Lb. iii states that the display and control requirements will be compared with the inventory to identify missing displays -

and controls. Para. 5.Ld requires that selected design improvements be verified to assure that no new HEDs are created.

5.2.6.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility

• Conduct DCRDR Verification along with human factors consultant support.

_Secondary Responsibility

• None identified.

s. 2. 6. 3, Guidance'

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.l

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept~ 1981 5-7

'}

s.2.1 Assess Human Engineering Discrepancies Upon identification of the Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs), they will be assessed for their relative importance to plant safety and operation. This assessment is accomplished by analyzing and eval ua t;ing the problems that~ could arise from the.

failure to correct the discrepancy. Each HED must be categorized for later consideration for resolution.

S.2.7.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.c states that assessment of HEDs based on significance must be performed.

5.2.7.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Repsonsibility:

• Assure (and participate in) HED assessment with human factors consultant support.

Secondary Responsibility:

e Training/Operations Participate in HED assessment process.

S.2.7.3 Guidance e NUREG-0801.

e - NUREG-0700 *

• • 5-8

5.2.8 Perform HED Recommendation and Resolution Upon final assessment of all HED~, the recoinmended resolutions, if.any, .must be determined. Resolution or the extent of corrective action is dependent on the level of safety significance and overall control room modification difficulty.

In addition, the recommended HED resolutions must be evaluted to assure that no new deviations will result from the improvement.

5.2.8.l Requirements - NURE_G-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.c states that design improvements will be selected to.

correct analyzed discrepancies, Section 5.1.d states that recommended improvements will not create new discrepancies on unreviewed safety questions and that they should be coordinated with other control room improvements (i.e. 1 R.G. 1:97 and NUREG-0737).

5.2.8.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Assure and participate in the HED resolution process with support from a human factors specialist.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Training/Operations Participate in HED resolution.

process.

S.2.8.3 Guidance e NUREG-0801.

• e NUREG-0700.

5-9

• 5.2.9 Schedule Control Room Modifications._ During.implementation scheduling, approved modifications to resolve HEDs will be integrated with other enhancement programs. These changes will be scheduled consitent with PSE&G existing work scheduling program, with consideration given the possible HED safety consequence, plant operating status, procurement time, and plant outages. Modifications that can be performed by simple enhancements will be performed expeditiously.

5.2.9.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 5.1.c states that improvements that can be accomplished with an enhancement program should be done promptly. Section 5.1.d. states that improvements should be coordinated with other changes resulting from other improvement programs such as SPDS, R.G. 1.97, operator training, etc.

5.2.9.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Determine initial schedule for approved HED modification and prepare or assure preparation of necessary design change packages.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Coordinate modification scheduling with other improvement programs and negotiate final schedule with the. NRC.

• Assure modification scheduling is consistent with available manpower, budget and outages.

5-10

5.-2. 9. 3 Guidance

• NUREG-0700 5.2.10 Prepare DCRDR sununary Report - At the completion of the DCRDR, a Final Summary Report will be prepared for submittal to the.NRC for review and comment. This report will document in summary form the processes and activities utilized in the DCRDR. Any departures from the methodologies described in .the Program Plan will be noted and justified.

The Final Summary Report will also describe the results of the DCRDR Review Phase. All HEDs identified during the DCRDR will be included, along with the determinations for correction and/or resolution for each HED. A proposed implementation schedule will be provided.

5.2.10.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 5~2.b states that all licensees shall submit a summary report of the completed review outlining proposed control room changes including their schedule for implementation.

Additionally, summa~y justification for HEDs with no or only partial correction will be provided.

5.2.10.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare Final Summary Report for submittal to the NRC.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Licensing - Review and submit report to NRC for review.

.5-11

5.2.10.3 Guidance e NUREG-0700

• • NUREG-0801 5.3 Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP} Upgrade 5.3.1 Prepare and Submit EOPProcedures Generation Package (PGP) - This document includes the Salem Nuclear Generating Station EOP plant specific technical guidelines, writers guide, EOP validation program and EOP trainning program description. The PGP must be transmitted to the NRC for review.

5.3.1.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.2.b states that each licensee shall submit to the NRC a Procedures Generation Package at least three months prior to the date it plans to begin formal operator training on the EOPs.

5.3.1.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare or assure preparation of the technical content of EOP PGP.

• Assure package development and timely submittal to the NRC.

Secondary Responsibility:

e Operations - Provide operations input and package review as necessary.

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\

5.3.1.3 Guidance

• EOP Generation Package Guideline (INPO EOPIA)

Feb. 1983.

• NUREG-0899, Guidelines for Preparation of EOPs, August 1982.

• Review Criteria for Evaluation of PGPs (Batelle)

Nov. 1983.

5.3.2 Develop Plant Specific Technical Guidelines - The development of the plant specific .technical guidelines (PSTGs) will consist of converting the WOG ERGs into Salem specific guidance for develop-ment of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station EOPs in accordance with the PGP. This will involve providing .Salem systems data (including informational and control requirements) along with any Salem specific non-ERG information. Any deviations from the ERGs must be described and justified.

5.3.2.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.2.b.i requir.es that the method for developing plant specific EOPs from the generic technical guidelines including plant specific information* be developed.

5.3.2.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare or assure preparation of the PSTGs based on the WOG ERGs including the calculational methodology.

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• )

• Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Provide operations expertise arid support as necessary. Review draft PSTGs.

5.3.2.3 Guidance e NUREG-0899.

5.3.3 Perform PSTG Verification - The PSTG verification process will evaluate the correctness and technical accuracy of the PSTGs.

Static aspects of the PSTGs, such as plant specific functions and setpoints, will be confirmed to be in accordance with the WOG ERGs and Salems PSTG Peparation Guide. The existence of adequate documentation for the PSTG and EOP verification will be confirmed. This will be performed by individuals not involved in the initial PSTG preparation.

5.3.3.l Requirements ~ NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.2.b.iii states that a program for EOP (PSTG~ verification must identify operator- tasks: a_nd information and control requirements .during emergency operations.

5.3.3.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

• Primary Responsibility:

• Assure proper verification of the PSTGs is performed.

Secondary Resi;x>nsi_bili ty

• Operat_ions - Revise PSTG verification process and

• results for adequacy.

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5.3.3.3 Guidance

• INPO NUTAC EOP Verification (INPO 83-004).

• NUREG-0899 5.3.4 Develop Draft EOPs After preparation of the PSTGs and their verificqtion, the draft Saiem Nuclear Generating Station EOPs will be developed. The draft EOPs will use the information contained in the PSTGs for functional requirements. The EOP development process must be

-

consistent with the Salem Nuclear Generatin~ Station PGP Writers Guide.

5~3.4.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.1.c states that upgraded EOPs must be consistent with the PSTGs and an appropriate writers guide.

5.3.4.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare draft EOPs in accordance with Salem EOP Writers Guide.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Review draft EOPs for acceptability.

S.3.4.3 Guidance e NUREG-0899.

• Salem EOP Writers Guide. *

• *

• NUREG/CR-875, Evalµation of EOPs, April 1981.

NUREG/CR-2005, Checklist for Evaluating EOPs, April 1983.

5.3.5 Perform EOP Verification - The EOP verification process will evaluate the correctness, technical accuracy and proper conversion of the Salem PSTGs for EOP d~velopment. s*~attusi aspects of the EOPs such as plant-specific valve numbers, setpoints, footnotes, and format will be confirmed to be in accordance with the PSTGS and the Salem EOP Writer's Guide. Supporting procedures that are referenced or utilized will be verified and evaluated to ensure that the intended fllllctions referenced by an EOP can be accomplished. In addition, the EOPs will be partially-evaluated for usability and compatibility with the minimum number, qualifications, training, and experience of the Salem Nuclear Generating Statioo operating staf_f. Finally, the existence of adequate .documentation for the EOP verification will be confirmed.

5.3.5.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7. 2. b. iii states that a program for EOP verification must be prepared.

5.3.5.2

• PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Assure proper verification of the EOPs are performed.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Review PSE&G verification process and

• results for adequacy.

5-16

5.3.5.3 Guidance

• INPO NUTAC EOP Verification, (INPO 83-004).

• NUREG-0899.

5.3.6 Perform System Functions Review and Task Analysis - The system functions review and task. analysis process of the DCRDR and EOP upgrade is to determine the input and output requirements of the Control Room crew for emergency operation and to ensure that required systems can be efficiently and reliably operated during emergency operations by available personnel. This will be accomplished by performing an analysis of tasks contained in the Salem draft EOPs.

5.3.6.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 5.1.b.ii states that a system function and task analysis be conducted to identify control room op~rator tasks and

• information and control requirements during *emergency operations.

5.3.6.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Assure proper conduct of task analysis including training needs and human factors expertise.

Secondary Reponsibility:

• Operations .... Provide operator support and input to the task analysis.

5-17

5.3.6.3 Guidance e NUREG-0800.

• CRDR.Task Analysis Guideline (INPO NUTAC) Dec. 1983.

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981.

• NUREG/CR-3371, Task Analysis of Control Room Crews, Vol .* 1 and 2, Sept. 1983.

• NRC Memorandum of May 14,_1984.

5.3.7 Perform DCRDR/EOP Validation - the DCRDR/EOP Validation is to

. determine whether the functions allocated to. the Control Room operating crew can be accomplished effectively within (1) the structure of the Salem EOPs and (2) .the design of the Control Room as it exists. Ad~itionally, this step provides ari opportunity to identify HEDs that may not have becom*e evident in the static processes of the DCRDR, and the EOP development. The DCRDR/EOP validation process will use predefined accident scenarios to drive the walkthroughs or simulator exercises. This process will require a Salem operating crew.

5.3.7.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.2.b.iii states that a program for validation of the EOPs be prepared.

5.3.7.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Participate iri and assure proper conduct of the DCRDR/EOP validation.

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I I

• Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Provide an operating crew for performing DCRDR/EOP Validation.

• Training - Provide simualtor time and expertise as required.

5.3.7.3 *Guidance

• INPO 83-006, EOP Validation Guidelines I July 1983.

e NUREG-0899.

e NUREG-0700.

5.3.8 Perform EOP Modifications - EOP discrepancies discovered during the DCRDR/EOP Validation' phase will be evaluated and resolutions will be incorporated into the draft EOPs. This feedback process will better assure that the EOPs are usable. The* EOP modifica-ti6ns resulting at this time will create the human factored EOPs required.

5.3.8.1 Requirements - No specific NUREG-0,737 Supplement 1 requirements identifed.

. 5.3.8.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility .*

Primary Responsibility:

• Ensure EOP modifications as determined necessary are performed.

5-19

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Input and review EOP modifications.

5.3.9 Implement EOPs Upon completion of the EOPs and EOP operator training (see Section 5.5.4) the EOPs will be implemented.

5.3.9.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.1.e states that upgraded EOPs will be implemented.

5.3.9.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Operations - Implement upgraded Salem Nuclear Generating Station EOPs.

Secondary Responsibility:

• No secondary responsibilities identified.

5.3.9.3 Guidance

• . INPO 82-013, EDP Implementation Ass~stance Program, April 19825.

5.4 Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.97 5.4.1. Prepare R.G. 1.97 (Rev 2) Compliance/Position Report - This report will consist of 1) a compliance summary on how Salem presently

-. meets the post accident monitoring instrumentation requirements of R.G. 1.97 (Rev. 2) including instrument rangesi qualification, power supply, redundancy, _etc., 2) the PSE&G position to -further 5-20

meet the requirements of R.G. 1.97 and justification for deviation from the requirements, and 3) i-ts application to emergency response facilities. This report will ~e developed using the existing Salem instrumentation design and the EOP/EP require- .

ments. The R.G *. 1.97 Position Report was sumitted to the NRC in accordance with.the O.L. Condition on 4/2/81.

5.4.1.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Section 6.2 states that the licensee shall submit a report describing how it meets the R.G. 1.97 requirements.

5.4.1.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Determine appropriate R.G. 1.97 instrumentation and prepare basis for the R.G. 1.97 Position Report.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Input into R.G. 1.97 instrumentation rieeds and develop final position report for NRC submittal.

5.4.1.3 Guidance e R.G. 1.97 (Rev. 3).

• Recommendations for Changes to R.G. 1. 97 (INEL)

(Sept. 1982) *

• 5-21

5.4.2 Perform R.G. 1.97 Control Room Interface - Accident monitoring instrumentation which are required for specific operator action (primarily Type A/Technical Specification variables) will be identified and given special consideration during other emergency response capability task activities. This will include preferred instrumentation selection on the SPDS, recognition of operator usage during the DCRDR/EOP Validation, and the control panel instrumentation identification for usage during an accident.

5.4.2.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.d states that .DCRDR improvements should be coordinated with other improvement programs including R.G. 1.97.

5.4.2.2 PSE&G Divisions of Responsibility Primary.Responsibiiity:

• Review and input into R.G. 1.97 instrumentation identification philosophy.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Establish ERC philosophy for instrumentation identification on the control panels.

• Review and input into instrumentation identification philosophy and evaluate review results of DCRDR validation.

• SPDS Project Manager - Evaluated R.G. 1.97 instrumentation list for use on SPDS displays *

• 5-22

• 5.4.2.3 Guidance e NUREG-0700.

• R.G. 1.97 (Rev. 2) Section 1.4.6.

5.4.3. Prepare for R.G. 1.97 NRC Commen.t/Audit - The NRC will perform a review of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station R.G *. 1.97 Position Report and will either accept or request additional information on each of the exceptions taken to the Regulatory Guide by PSE&G.

PSE&G will be required to prepare and submit anyadditional information as required to support the Salem Nuclear Generating Station positions. The NRC may also perform an audit to verify implementation of the R.G. 1.97 instrumentation modifications.

5.4.3.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737, Supplement l Section 6.2 states that staff review will be in the form of an audit that will include a review of the licensees method of implementing R.G. l.97.

5. 4. 3. 2. PSE&G Di vision of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Coordinate NRC responses and/or audit.

• Provide technical support NRC responses and/9r audit.

5.4.3.3 Guidance None identified *

• 5-23

'-

5.4."4. Prepare Design Modifications for R.G. 1.97 """ Design Change Package (DCP) for all instrumentation modifications as determined necessary for Salem per R.G. 1.97 must be prepared for meeting the implementation schedule of O.L. Condition c. (7) - Unit 2_ - L:Lcens~'*

5.4.4.1 Requirements - No NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements specified.

5.4.4.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare design change packages for R.G. 1.97

_ instrumentation modifications.

5.4.4.3 Guidance None identified.-

5.4.5. Procure Equipment for Instrumentation Modification - The R.G. 1.97 -

equipment-required per the approved DCPs must be procured on a schedule to meet the implementation requirements.

-5.4.5.1 Requirements - No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements identified.

5.4.5.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Resp6nsibility:

• Procure R.G. 1.97 equipment iri timely manner for implementation.

Secondary Responsibility:

• None identified.

5_;24

• 5.4.5.3 Guidance None identified.

5.4.6 Implement R.G. 1.97 Modifications - In accordance with the requirements of Operating License Condition C.(7) - Unit 2, all R.G. 1.97 modifications as determined necessary must be imple-mented by the 1st or 2nd refueling outages.

5.4.6.l Requirements - Operating License Condition 5.4.6.2 PSE&G Division of Repsonsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Perform modifications based on approval DCPs

• Secondary Responsibility:

• Provide technical support as determined necessary.

5.4.6.3 Guidance None identified.

5.5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY TRAINING 5.5.1 Establish Systematic Training Requirements - Salem's systematic (performance based) training requirements will be established as determined necessary from the INPO accreditation program criteria along with any training related EP requirements* from the DCRDR/EOP Validation. The performance based training criteria will include

• how PSE&G proposes to 1) perform a systematic analysis to deter-mine discrete job performance requirements, 2) develop training 5-25

objectives from the systematic analysis and describe the desired trainee performance after training, 3) conduct training to meet the specified objectives, 4) ~valuate trainees' performance during training to demonstrate mastery of objectives, and Sf rev.ise training program based on trainee performance on the job.

5.5.1.1 *_Requirements_- NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 3.4.c, 3.8.d, and 7.1.d and Section 306 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and the proposed lOCFRS0.57 and 50.200 (SECY-84-76) requires that a systematic (task analysis) approach be developed to act as a basis for performing future operator training.

5.5.1.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Establish systematic training requirements.

Secondary Responsibility: .

• Provide necessary input from DCRD~/EOP validation for establishing training requirements.

5.5.1.3 Guidance

• _,,;,Proposed lOCFRSO. 55 rulemaking on training.

• INPO Job and Task Analysis Guides (3 Vol.) Sept.

1983 *

• 5-26

• 5.5.2 Develop ERC Integrated Training Plan - This plan will provide the systematic training process for developing operator knowledge in order to comprehend plant conditions and cope.with potential emergencies effectively. The scope of the training plan will involve overall emergency response capability training including use of the SPDS, EOPs, and use of post-accident instrumenta-tion. This plan should use criteria extracted from the Salem systematic requirements developed from the Salem program for complying with the INP*o Accreditation Program.

s.s.2.1 Requirements - The requirements of an Integrated Training Plan are not specified in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, however, the plan was called out by the NRC in the NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 NRC workshop tr~nscripts.

• s.5.2.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

• Primary Responsibility:

• Develop Integrated Training Plan.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Provide *document scope and input as necessary.

5.5.2~3 Guidance

• Prop6sed 10CFR50.55 rulemakirig~

• NUREG-0737 Supplement 1. NRC Workshop Transcript .

(Feb. 24, 1983) *

• 5-27

5.5.3 Develop SPDS Simulator Hardware/Software - The hardware and software for the SPDS needs to be incorporated into the Salem Simulator. This needs to be accomplished sufficiently ahead of SPDS implementation in order to conduct the SPDS man/machine validation and operator training.

5.5.3.1 Requirements - No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements.

5.S.3.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Develop SPDS software and install hardware on Salem Simulator *

• Secondary Responsibility:

• Aid the hardware installation as part of the Simulator update process.

s.s.3.3 Guidance

• Proposed R.G. 1.149, Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Operator Training.

5.5.4 Perform EOP Training - As part of the overall Salem training program, EOP training will be included to establish an operating staff that is capable and competent to respond to any off-normal plant situation. This training will consist of classroom instruction, simulator exercises, and/or walkthroughs, as appropriate *

• 5.S.4.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.1.d states that the licensee will provide operator training on the use of the upgraded EOPs prior to implementation.

5-28

5.5.4.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare training course and conduct operator training.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Provide background and support on EOP development.

5.5.4.3 Guidance

• IN.PO Accreditation Program.*

• 5.5.5 Perform SPDS Operator Training - Prior to implementing the*SPDS the control room operators must be fully trained in the use of the SPDS for normal and emergency conditions. Training will include use of the SPDS as (1) an aid for following the emergency procedures, (2) the means for estimating off-site dose levels, ( 3) an aid to declaring emergency action levels, and (4) as a means for providing plant status (post~accident monitoring information) to the TSC and EOF. SPDS training for the control room will use the SPDS added to the simulator.

5.5.5.1 Requirements - NUREG---0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.c states that SPDS. training will be performed to respond to accident conditions.

5.5.5.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare training course and conduct training.

5-29

• Secondary Responsibility:

• Aid or support training act{vities.

5.5.5.3 Guidance

• INPO SPDS Implementation Guideline.

5.6 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) 5.6.1 Perform SPDS Functional Analysis - This involves specification of the function(s) the SPDS is expected to perform. The functional analysis should identify the types of activities to be supported by the SPDS in the control room, TSC, and EOF, and the kinds of information required by prospective SPDS users. At a minimumn, the analysis should define the role of the SPDS in relation to the

• EOPs, the types of personnel who will be expected to use it, the location of the SPDS units in the control room. Consideration should also be given to design characteristics that will assure reliability and availability goals stated in NUREG-0696.

5.6.1.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.l~b, 4 .1. c, 4 .1. e and 4 .1. f states that the SPDS shall continuously display information to the operators, and shall provide sufficient information to determine plant safety status including reactivity control, core cooling, RCS integrity, radioactivity control, and containment conditions.

5.6.1.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility

• SPDS Project Manager - Assure preparation of the SPDS Functional Analysis for SPDS display development basis.

5-30

• Secondary Responsibilities

• Input to and review of information to be provided by SPDS for acceptability to operators and to assure accurate representation to SNGS EOPs.

• Help define, or review and cordinate these activities to assure licensing compliance .and task

. integration.

• Provide PSTG support for preparing Functional Analysis.

5.6.1.3

. . Guidance

• NUREG ~ 0696, Section 5

• NUREG - 0800, Standard Review Plan Section 18.2, Safety Parameter Display System, Rev. o, Nov. 1984

• Guidelines for an Effective SPDS Implementation Program. INPO 83-008 (NUTAC), Jan 1983 5.6.2 Perform SPDS Parameter Set Selection - This involves the selection of Salem specific parameters which shall be available on the SPDS displays that must be sufficient to indicate the ERG control functions. Thes.e parameters will be determined based on the requirements of the Salem PSTG' s and the functional analysis performed in 5.6.1. The parameter list must be verified by demonstrating that the proposed parameters are sufficient to monitor. plant status under different plant modes and meet the NRC Critical Safety Function (CSF) requirements for continuous moni taring.

5-31

..

• 5.6.2.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.l states that the minimum information to* be provided shall be sufficient to provide reactivity control, reactor core cooling, reactor coolant system integrity,*

radioactivity control, and containment conditions.

Section 4.2.a states that the selection should be based on a wide range of accident events including severe accidents.

5.6.2.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Develop Salem specific parameter list for SPDS using generic parameter sets and Salem specific SPDS monitoring requirements.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Aid parameter list development and provide in Salem SPDS safety analyses.

5.6.2.3 Guidance - No specific guidance documents identified.

5. 6. 3 J;'repare and Submit SPDS Safety Analysis Report and Implementation Plan - This SPDS Safety Analysis is conducted to assure that the SPDS design is sufficient to assess the safety status of each identified safety function for a wide range Of accident events.

This report was submitted to the NRC for review by 1/30/84 and the SPDS will be implemented by 6/87~

The Implementation Plan will describe the entire implementation process for the SPDS system. The plan will describe the design,

• development, installation,*

the system.

t~aining and functional operation of This plan.will be submitted to the NRC for review 5-32

with the SPDS Safety Analysis. The detailed info!mation to be included. in the SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan shall contain parameter selection, signal validation, human factors review, reliability, verification and validation, man/machine validation, and circuit isolation.

S.6.3.1 Requirements - NUREG -0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.2 states that a written safety analysis, describing the basis on which the selected SPDS parameters are sufficient to assess the safety status,and an implementation plan shall be submitted to the NRC for review.

S.6.3.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibilities:

• Develop SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan.

• Develop scope and assure proper Safety Analysis Report and Implementation Plan development for submittal to NRC.

Secondary Responsibility:

e . Provide appropriate input for report development.

s.6.3.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.2.

e* Guidelines for an Effective SPDS Implementation Program INPO 83-003 (NUTAC), January 1983.

5-33

5.6.4 Prepare Functional Requirement Document - The Salem Functional Requirements Document which is the design basis for the system .

will be revised with information completed/planned as a result of this phase of the ERFCS/SPDS development. This will include the parameter set, circuit isolation, Verification & Validation plari, human factors, Man/Machine validation and system reliability.

This document will not be submitted to the NRC, but must be prepared for baseline reference for future efforts.

5.6.4.1 Requirements ~ No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements.

5.6.4.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• To develop or assure proper development of the Functional Requirements Document for both software and hardware.

Secondary Responsibilities: _

• Review and provide input to Functional Requirements Document.

• Review design doc_ument to assure licensing requirements are incorporated.

5.6.4.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.2.

• NSAC-39, Verification and Validation for SPDS, December 1981. _

5-34

5.6.5 Develop Static SPDS Displays - Static displays will be designed and built on the SPDS IDT CRl's to assure display/CR!' configura-tion acceptability. The computer display conventions will be included at this time to assure htiman factors principles ai:e incorporated.

5.6.5.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, Sections 4.1.a and 4.1.b states that the SPDS should provide a concise display of critical plant variables and continuously display information from which plant status can be readily and reliably assessed by control room personnel.

5.6.5.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare or assure preparation of SPDS static*

displays.

Secondary Repsonsibility:

e Build displays on IDT SPDS CRTs.

• Provide direct input arid evaluation on the SPDS display development.

• Review SPDS displays to assure minimum NRC requirements are met.

5.6.5.3 Guidance

.* EPRI-NP-3701, Vols. 1 and II, Computer Generated Display System Guidelines, Sept. 1984~

5-35

5.6.6 Prepare SPDS Human Factors Program and Perform Review - The SPDS displays shall be designed to incorporate accepted human factors principles so that the displayed information can be readily perceived and comprehended by the SPDS operator. A SPDS human factors program will be prepared which includes readability, parameter responsiveness to the CSFs, glare, labeling, alarms, anthropometrics and SPDS location. A human factors review will be performed to assure proper human factors design application.

5.6.6.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, Section 4.1.e sta_tes that the SPDS shall be designed to incorporate accepted human factors principles.

5.6.6.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Develop SPDS human factors program. Perform and document HFE review based on survey guidance and established HFE computer conventions.

Secondary Responsibilities:

• Aid review and help establish HFE- computer con veri tiqn.

• Establish Salem computer conventions as part of DCRDR.

5.6.6.3 Guidance e NUREG-0700

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.2 5-36

5. 6. 7 Determine Process for Signal Validation - Signal validation is the process for assuring that *the input signals being displayed by the SPDS are valid and that the operator is alerted if a signal is suspect. This involves the use of algorithms for comparing multiple signals to a processed signal in order to remove a failed instrument channel as a signal input.

5.6.7~1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.b states that the SPDS will display information from which plant status can be reliably assessed.by control room personnel. NUREG-0696 states that displayed data shall be validated where practical on a real-time basis to ensure presentation of the most current and accurate plant status, not compromised by faulty processing or failed sensors.

5.6.7.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare or *assure preparation of the SPDS. signal validation algorithms Secondary Responsibility:

• Develop software routines for algorithms.

5.* 6. 7. 3 Guidance

• EPRI NP-210, *On-line Power Plant Signal Validation_

Technique, Nov. 1981.

5-37

5.6.8 Develop Software Design Specification - In order to effectively perform the SPDS Verification and Validation, a software specification must be developed. This specification is based on the system requirements established in the SPDS Functional Requirements Document; and will contain the actual system design specifications.

5.6.8.1 Requirements No specific requirement provided in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1.

5.6.8.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Develop software design specification for developing dynamic SPDS software.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Review software specification against Function Requirements Document for _complete conversion.

5.6.8.3 Guidance

• • No specific documents identified.

5.6.9 Determine Parameter Use and Processing - The specific instrumentation for acquiring SPDS parameter signals, including the number of singals to be used, must be determined. These should be selected from safety-related and normal post-accident

.monitoring instrumentation. The means of processing and averaging

• • (algorithms) the input data to the SPDS.must also. be determined.

5-38

5.6.9.l Requirements - No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements.

5~6.9.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Select SPDS .*instrumentation and determine signal processing algorithms*

Secondary Responsibility:

• Convert processing algorithms into SPDS subroutines.

• Compare instrumentation for consistency with DCRDR

• 5.6.9.3 identified and Regulatory Guide 1.97 tion, as necessary Guidance instrumenta~

• PSE&G Regulatory Guide 1.97 Position Report.

5.6.10 Develop Dynamic Display Software - Software for driving the static displays must be developed. The software package will also utilize the signal validation and the parameter selection and processing results. Verification and validation will be applied to the software package.to assure proper software.

development *.

5.6.10.1 Requirements - No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1.

requirements provided *

• 5-39

5.6.10.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility

• Develop all SPDS computer software Secondary Resp6nsibility

• Review software algorithms for proper translation.

• Review software algorithms for proper tr ans la ti on.

5.6.10.3 Guidance - No specific guidance documents

• identified *

• S.6.11 Perform SPDS Hardware Installation - The SPDS hardware along with al~ necessary cabling must be installed in the control room, EOF and TSC. Special attention must be paid to all interfaces between the SPDS and existing plant instrumentation to ensure that the integrity and reliability of existing instrumentation cannot be affected by any malfunction of the SPDS hardware.

5.6.11.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.c states that the SPDS shall be suitably isolated from electrical or electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are in use for safety systems *

• 5-40

• 5.6.11.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility

• Implement all ERFICs/SPDS hardware per approved DCPs.

Secondary Responsibilities:

• Issue all DCPs as necessary for installation*

hardware.

• Identify all hardware installation requirements and review instrument inputs for circuit isolation.

5. 6 .11. 3 Guidance - No specific guidance documents*

identified.

5.6.12 Perform SPDS Verification/Validation (V&V) - The verification process will be conducted to assure that the SPDS system is designed, tested and installed as described by the functional requirements. The validation process assures that once the system has been installed and is operational that it is functionally adequate. The evaluation wil_l demonstrate that the system actually accomplishes the role it is designed to perform. This involves the development of a V&V test plan and validation test procedures, conducting the actual software and hardware V&V in accordance with those procedures, and developing a final V&V test report. This process must be performed independent from the engineering/computer staff.

5~6.12.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.a requires that the SPDS be developed with a high degree of reliability.

5-41

• 5.6.12.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• To develop (or contract for) a verification and validatioo program including test plans and V&V implementation.

Secondary Responsibility: *

• Aid development of V&V program, review Validation Test Report summarizing the V&V efforts, and make document available for NRC review as necessary.

5.6.12.3 Guidance

• NSAC-39, Verification and Validation for SPDS, December 1981.

• Component verification and System Validation (INPO NUTAC) October 1983.

5.6.13 Perform Man/Machine Validation of SPDS Displays - During the DCRDR Validation of Control Room Functions, the SPDS 'displays

'

should be evaluated for their relationship to other control room

• '

_instrwnents and their ability to aid to the operators in use of the EOPs.

5.6~13.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 4.1.b states that the SPDS will provide plant status which can be readily and reliably assessed by control room personnel.

5-42

5.6.13.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare Man/Machine Validation program and arrange for appropriate personnel to be available during validation.

• Secondary Responsibility:

• Support Man/Machine Validation with simulator and validation crew support.

• Provide SPDS operating crew for validation *

• 5.6.13.3

• Provide scenario input and valida.tion experience to SPDS validation.

Guidance

• NUREG-0700.

• DCRDR Validation Results (to be conducted).

• NSAL-39 Verification and*Validation for Safety Parameter Display Systems, December 1981.

5.6.14 Prepare for NRC Audit - The NRC will either perform a second "Preimplementation Audit" or a "Validation (post-implementation)

Audit", but likely not both. The preimplementation audit will involve a review on how the NRC requirements are met. prior to SPDS implementation. The validation audit will look more

• heavily at the SPDS man/machine validatioo, operability and training aspects.

5-43

• 5.6.14.1 Requirements - No NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements specified.

5.6.14.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility Primary Responsibility:

• Coordinate NRC audit at SNGS.

• Provide the technical support and documentation for NRC audit.

• Support NRC audit as required.

5.6.14.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.2 *

• 5-44

SECTION 6. EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY TASK INTEGRATION Section 3, "Coordination and Integration of (ERC) Initiatives" of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 discusses the NRC's philosophy and suggested approach to the ERC task integration. The NRC does not dictate how ERC task integration will be accomplished, since every plant has different needs and various stages of task completion, but provides suggested methodologies to be considered. In addition, an: INPO NUTAC developed document "Guidance for an Integrated Implementation Plan for Emergency Response Capabilities" (INPO 83-048) also provides various methodologies for accomplishing this integration.

The following discussions elaborate on the methodology:

• 6.1 Task Integration Step No. l; PSTG Development for Task Integration WOG Technical Guidelines

'(ERG's, Rev. 1) l l I

I '

PSTGs /

!  !

SPDS R.G. 1.97 DCRDR EOP Parameter Compliance Information Development Set and Control .

Requirements 6.1.l Prerequisites -

a) PWR Technical Guidelines, WOG ERG's (Rev. 1)

• b) WOG ERG Calculational Procedures 6-1

• • c) Salem Nuclear Generating Station EOP Procedures Generation Package (PGP) d) Plant Specific design details 6.1.2 Integration Activities - The Plant Specific Technical Guidelines (PSTGs), are the base document for almost all ERC task develop-ment activities. As discussed in Section S.3.2, the PSTGs will be derived from the WOG ERGs using Salem Nuclear Generating Station specific design and system requirements and the action set-points. This document will be the basis for determining the DCRDR information and control requirements, the EOP upgrade development, the SPDS parameter set selection, and the R.G. 1.97 instrumentation requirements.

The EOP development process will use the PSTGs to acquire the basic plant specific information necessary for converting the function type statements of the ERGs to the task related actions of the EOPs. At this point in the EOP development process, the EOPs are rough draft and will require further human factoring and step refinement from information received during the task analysis and EOP Validation. The PSTGs can either be used directly in the DCRDR task analysis or can be enhanced by providing the EOP writers guide format and EOP design input. In either case, the Salem Nuclear Generating Station plant specific technical data will be in use, but no plant specific technical data will be included in order to prevent predetermining the adequacy of the existing control room instrumentation.

The DCRDR process will use the PSTGs/Draf t EOPs as a basis for identifying the information and control requirements to be determined during the DCRDR System Function Review and Task Analyses.* These information and control requirements will be

• compared against the Control Room Inventory to determine instrument deficiencies in the control room.

6-2

• The SPDS parameter set selection will be based on the PSTGs for determining the EOP entry conditions and the EOP monitoring and control requirements. This activity is further discussed in Task Integration Step No. 2.

The R.G. 1.97 post-accident monitoring instrumentation require-ments are also based on the PSTGs. Type A variables are based on the PSTG entry conditions and the monitoring and control requirements. Other R.G. 1.97 variable positions are based on their specific use and need as determined by the PSTGs.

6.2 Task Integration Step No. 2; ERG/PSTG Functional Analysis Development WOG ERG ERGs .FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS SALEM PSTG FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

.CONTROL ROOM SALEM SPDS SALEM INFORMATION PARAMETER EOPs CONTROL REQ

• SET 6.2.1 Prerequisites -

a) WOG Technical Guidelines, WOG ERGs (Rev. 1).

b) Salem PSTGs *

• 6-3

\.

• 6.2.2 The WOG ERGs and the Salem PSTGs are "function" based docurnen ts whe.re a function represents a higher order activity by which the EOP developer translates the objectives of the ERGS into the PSTGs.

6. 3 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 3 ~ SPDS Parameter* Set Selection Salem PSTGS Salem Functional Analysis SPDS Parameter Set

• e..3.1 Prerequisites -

a. PWR Technical Guidelines, WOG ERG's (Revision 1 or later)

b. Plant Specific Techrifoal Guidelines

c. Salem SPDS Function Analysis 6-4

• 6. 3.* 2 Integration Activities - Since the SPDS will be structured around the use of the Salem EOPs, the SPDS parameter set must be integrated closely with informational requirements of the EOP Upgrade process. The Salem PSTGs establish the basis for the informational needs of the EOPs and will therefore be used as the basis for selection of the SPDS parameters.

The Salem SPDS parameter set can then be determined by applying the PSTG entry condition and the monitor and control functions of the PSTGs.

This process requires close integration of the two programs and any major revisions to the PSTGs will need to be reviewed to assure that the SPDS Parameter Set and PSTGs are consistent *

• 6-5

')

• 6.4 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 4; CONTROL ROOM HUMAN FACTORS GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT NU REG Salem

-0700 Control Room I&C I

I>CRDR Human Factor~ Guideline Control Room SPDS R.G. 1. 97 Conventions Conventions Instrument Design 6 *. 4 .1 Prerequisites -

None.

6.4.2 Integration Activities - The control room human factors guideline being developed as discussed in section S.2.2 will be beneficial to several ERC task activities. It will primarily be used to establish specific Salem control room conventions that can be used to justify exception to the human factors engineering checklist requirements. Secondly, it will document

. the standard human engineering design characteristics of the existing computer systems in the control room. This will allow the SPDS display designers the ability to use the same or similar convention.s when. developing the SPDS displays. The human factors conventions can also be used to develop the R.G *

• 1.97 instrumentation modifications in the control room.

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• 6.5 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 5: PERFORMING DCRDR AND EOP VALIDATION CONTROL DRAFT SALEM ROOM EOPs SIMULATOR I&C SCENARIOS NEEDS I I l

DCRDR/EOP

'

VALIDATION SPDS SCENARIOS I I DCRDR '

VERIFICATION EDP TRAINING

• SPDS VALIDATION

• 6.5.l Prerequisites -

a. Draft Salem EOPs

b. Selected Accident Scenarios

c. Control Room Task Analysis

d. Control Room Inventory 6.5.2 Integration Activities - The DCRDR/EOP Validation primarily serves to determine whether the control room operating crew can effectively perform system functions within the structure of the*

EOPs and within the existing design of the Salem control room.

Accident scenarios will be selected that will exercise the Salem system functions and most of the EOP steps. This process assure that *under accident conditions the man/machine interface in the control room is more effective.

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• Additionally, *the methodology for validation of the EOPs and the scenario used in the validation will benefit a similar validation to be performed on the SPDS. This will further.

assure that the operators use of the EOPs are effective.

The DCRDR/EOP validation, through the videotaping of the scenarios, can benefit Salem EOP Operator training.

6.6 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 6: R.G. 1.97/CONTROL RoOM INTERFACE DCRDR/EOP VALIDATION WOG ERGS R.G. 1.97

• I I

I

.--~~~~~~~--4 TYPE A VARIABLES R.G. 1. 97 SALEM SPDS INSTR. TECH. SIGNAL

. I.D. in CR SPECS LIST 6.6.1 Prerequisites -

. a. R.G. 1.97. Position Report.

b. DCRDR/EOP validation.

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6.6.2 Integration Activities - As discussed in Section 5.4.1, the Salem R.G. 1.97 Position Report was submitted to the NRC *on 4/2/81. In this report, the Salem Type A variables (parameters) must be determined. Type A variables are those that provide primary information to the control room operators in order to take manually controlled action for which there is no.automatic control. Even though there are Type A, B, c, D and E variables required by R.G. 1.97, only those of Type A will be given special conSiderations for ERC integration, sinc*e these are the required Category l instruments.

The R.G. 1.97 Type A variables will then be input into: 1) the Salem Technical Specifications, 2) the SPDS signal list, and 3) will be given special identification in the. control room.

Section 3.3 of the Salem Technical Specifications will be modified to reflect the Type A accident monitoring instrumenta-tion. This will be in accordance with the October 12, 1983 NRC interval memorandum from Mattson to Eisenhut entitled, "Technical Specifications for Post-accident Monit~ring Instrumentation".

The SPDS signal list for use in the SPDS entry conditions will,

• to the greatest extent, use the instrumentation specified as

_R.G. 1.97 Type A variable. This is due to their higher reliability and redundant'instrumentation.

The Type A variable instruments will also be specially marked to denote them as post-accident monitoring instruments for use with the EOPs *. The identification methodology will be consistent with the results of the DCRDR/EOP Validation and Control Room survey.

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6.7 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 7: SPDS VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION HUMAN FACTORS PSTG/EOP R.G. 1.97 GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT INTERFACE I . ~

I

~

DCRDR/EOP SPDS HEDs DEVELOPMENT I

I I

... - - - - __. '

I

• FUTURE SPDS SPDS MODS TRAINING 6.7.1 Prerequisites -

• a. Salem PSTGs/EOPs

b. Salem R.G *.1.97 Position Report

c. SPDS V&V Program Plan/Procedures 6.7.2 Integration Activities - The Salem SPDS verification and Validation (V&V) program is being expanded beyond the NSAC - 39 requirement*s to include other ERC integration activities. The SPDS development process is-dependent on other ERC activities including the EOP Upgrade,-R.G. 1.97 instrumentation, and the DCRDR (NUREG-0700) human factors conventions. In addition, resulting products of the SPDS development process include SPDS training, and potential future modification that may be necessary from the HEDs identified during the DCRDR/EOP Valida ti on process.*

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The SPDS V&V program will review the input documentation and results of the SPDS development process to additionally ensure that all ERC integration activities involving the SPDS are documented properly.

6.8 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 8: SALEM ERC INTEGRATED TRAINING PLAN INPO DCRDR ACCREDITATION TASK ANALYSIS PROGRAM VALIDATION RESULTS SALEM JOB/TASK INTEGRATED ANALYSIS TRAINING RESULTS PLAN EOP SPDS TRAINING TRAINING PLANS PLANS 6.8.l Prerequisites -

a. INPO Accreditation Program

b. DCRDR/EOP,Task Analysis and Validation results

c. Salem Training JOB/TASK Analysis Results 6-11

• 6.8.2 , Integration Activities - Ai; discussed in Section 5.5.2 the Salem ERC Integrated Training Program will be the basis for emergency resp0nse training including training on the EOPs, SPDS, and use of the control room instrumentation (i.e., R.G. 1.97 instrumen-tation). This program should be developed in conjunction with the INPO Accreditation Program as made Salem plant specific.

As part of the DCRDR/EOP Validation task, videotapes of operator actions during accident scenarios were recorded. These along with the INPO job/task analysis results* conducted for Salem can be used to support the performance based requirement of the ERC Integrated Training Program *

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• SECTION 7. ERC PROJECT MANAGEMENT/ORGANIZATION An Emergency Response Capability Project Management Organizat,ion will be established to assure that: l) specific ERC task activities are accomplished by defining PSE&G divisions of responsibility, 2) proper task integration is be~ng performed, 3) the ERC tasks are being performed on a schedule consistent with our Operating License Conditions, and 4) proper reporting and documentation is being accomplished. This will.be accomplished through an established PSE&G division of responsibility for each project, and ERC Coordinator, and an ERC management reporting process.

7.1 ERC PROJECT DIVISICJt1 OF RESPONSIBILITY The PSE&G responsibility for performing each of the overall projects required by NUREG-0737 Supplement l are as follows:

• Detailed Control Room Design Review - General Manager Eng.ineering &

• Plant Betterment

• Emergency Operating Procedured Upgrade - General ~anager Salem Operations

• Sa~ety Parameter Display System Development - General Manager Engineering & Plant Betterment

• Regulatory Guide l. 97 Implementation - General Manager Engineering &

Plant Betterment

• ERC Training General Manager Nuclear Services

• Emergency Response Facility Implementation - General Manager Nuclear

.services The PSE&G primary (lead) and secondary (support) responsibli ties for* each of the specific tasks activities are provided in Section 5 of this plan*,

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• Each of the lead projects organizations for performing the ERC tasks will be responsible for:

• Assuring.that their overall project (i.e., SPDS, DCRDR) is developed and implemented on a schedule consistent with Confirmatory Orders Dated 6/12/84 and 7/26/84.

• Assuring that each of their task activities required by NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 and as specified in Section 5 of this project plan are performed.

• Maintaining adequate documentation of their entire project ~evelopment and implementation to support NRC review and audit.

• Providing input on a regular basis to the ERC Coordinator for monthly

, reporting to PSE&G management. (See Section 7.2).

• Providing support and input, _as determined necessary, to other ERC project activities.

The ERC project will be coordinated from a single source within PSE&G which will enable a unified coordination and integration of ERC task activities.

ERC Project Coordinator Responsibilities - The ERC Project Coordinator will perform specific* res.ponsibili ties to assure proper integration and schedule coordination of activities. This will include the following activities:

e Coordinate all ERC task activities between the reponsible pSE&G organizations to assure proper integration of ERC activities.

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• Define and obtain proper guidance in order that the ERC integration is both licensable and beneficial to the project results. This may involve modifications to the previously established ERC project integration if individual task results or schedules are changed.

• Develop and maintain the overall ERC task integration schedule in order to coordinate individual task activities for timely input into task efforts.

• Provide proper NRC liaison on ERC status and activities.

• Provide review and maintain documentation of all ERC task activity reports.

7. 3 PROJECT OVERVIEW/MANAGEMENT The overall progress and coordination of the ERC projects will *be*

directed by Vice President Nuclear. His responsibilities will be to:

• Assure that all projects are being conducted on a schedule consistent with Confirmatory Order Dated 6/12/84 and 7/26/84.

• Resolve any "Management Attention" concern that are identified in the ERC monthly reports.

• Resolve any interdepartmental concerns and disagreements.

• Review overall ERC activities to assure proper project direction.

• Interface with either PSE&G or NRC upper management regarding ERC projects *

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7. 4 ERC PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AND REP.ORTING Proper reporting and documentation is necessary for review of project progress, concern identification, and retrieval of documentation of task activity accomplishments.

7.4.l Project Reporting ~ Monthly ERC project reports will be developed by the ERC Project Coordinator for PSE&G management and departmental review. The ERC monthly report will discuss the "Activities Completed" during the report month, the

. "Activities Planned" for the. upcoming month (s}, and any areqs of "Management Attention" that have been identified during the report month or that may occur .in. the forthcoming month (s) ~

Each of the ERC task activity lead engineers will be responsible for providing monthly input to the ERC Project Coordinator on a routine basis and no later than the first working day of the following month.

Activities or concerns on a more urgent basis will be brought to the immediate attention of the ERC Project Coordinator and to PSE&G Management, as necessary.

7.4.2 Documentation - All ERC related correspondence and reports will be filed in accordance with existing Salem project procedures.

Correspondence that is requesting action from other ERC or Salem disciplines should be documented in a central file and be given proper correspondence designators. All other ERC related correspondence should be determined by the originator as to whether it should be placed in the Salem file.

Correspondence distribution should consider both the direct and indirect involvement of Salem ERC disciplines.

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7.5 ERC ACTION TRACKING The specific activities or input requirements for completing the ERC task activities will be tracked and provided to each of the project lead or responsible organizations for actioning. The ERC action may consist of a NRC requirement, NRC commitment or an internal integration input for task completion. However, the ERC action tracking system will not be used to track all task commitments, but only those actions that require interdepartmental input or responsibility, such as a R.G. 1.97 commitment that requires a SPDS action *

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