ML18106A793

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Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Acceptance Criteria for CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys from Maintaining CR at 1/8-inch Positive Pressure W/Respect to Adjacent Areas to Stated Phrase
ML18106A793
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/30/1998
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML18106A792 List:
References
NUDOCS 9808070106
Download: ML18106A793 (8)


Text

Document Control Des"9

  • 9N970738 LCR S97-07 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1AND2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES WITH PROPOSED CHANGES The following Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License No. DPR-70 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification Page 3/4.7.6. 3/4 7-20 B 3/4.7.6 B 3/4 7-5 B 3/4 7-5b The following Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification Page 3/4.7.6 3/4 7-17 B 3/4.7.6 B 3/4 7-5 B 3/4 7-5b 1

Document Control Desi9 9-N970738 LCR 897-07 Insert 1:

relative to all areas directly accessible (Work Control Center and Control Room Equipment Rooms) from the control room and a positive pressure to all other areas adjacent to the control room 2

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQ~IREMENTS

========asc**22a****=2======~========*===========================a

4.7.6.l Each control room emergency air conditioning system filtration train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by initiating flow through the HEPA filter aind charcoal adsorber train(s) and verifying that the train(s) operates with each fan operating for at least 15 minutes.
b. At least once per 18 months or prior to return to service (l) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system, by:
l. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 299\ of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 8000 cfm
t lOli.
2. Verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove 299\ of the DOP when th~y are tested in-place while operating the ventilation system at

~ flov ratG ~f 8000 cfm +/- 10\.

3. Verifying w;.thin 31 days after removal that. a laboratory analysis of c. Cil.rbon sample from on*~ of the charcoal adsorbers demonstrates a r.__111,.,v:~l efficiency of a99t for radioactive methyl iodide when the sample ia '.;i..)stod a;,; 30°C, 95\ relative humidity.
c. r.*::,*~:r e.:very no h..Jurs of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 cia70 aft~r remov.,,l that a laboratory analysis of a carbon sa~H ... obtained from a test canister demonstrates a removal efficiency of ~ 9S~ for r~dio&ctive m~thyl iodide when the sample is tested at 30°C, 95~ rela\:ive hW'liidity.
d. At lt;ast once per l8 n*~nths by:
l. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filter and charcoal aclsorber bank is s 3.5 inches water gauge while operGting the ventilation system at a flow rate of 8000 cfm +/- 10\.
2. Verifying that on a. s1~*.fc.:ty injection test signal or control room int.~ba high radiation t~st signal, the system automatically actuatea in the presrurization mode by opening the outside air .

supply and diverting air flow through the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber bank.

3. Verifying that the system can maint.ai room at a positive pressure 2 l/8" water gauge o the adjacect a5eae during system op,.eration with makeup air being supplied through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers at the design makeup flow rate of :a 2200 cfm.

SALEM - UNIT l 3/4 7-20 Amendment No.190

i? LAN"!' SYSTEM.§.

I I ~ <

BASES z~*zaa*****************===**~=m================c======================

3/4.i.5 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 10.5' Mean Sea Level is based on the elevation above which-facility flood control measures are required to provide protection to safety related equipment.

3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS) ensures that 1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.

The CREACS is a shared system between Unit 1 d 2 supplying a common Control Room Envelope (CRE) . During emergency ope ation following receipt of a Safety Injection or High Radiation actuation si al, for areas inside the CRE, .one lOOt capacity fan in each Unit's CREACS ~-ill operate in a press'Lµ"ization mode with a constant amount of ou ide air supplied for continued CRE pressurization to 1/8" wat~r gauge. One fan from each train will automatically start upon receipt of an initiation signal, with one fan in each train in standby. A failure of one fan will r~sult in the standby fan automatically starting.

Each CR.EACS train has two 100\ capacity fans, such that any one of the four fans is sized to provide the required flow for CRE pressurization to 1/8" water gauge positive pressure within the common CRE during an emergency.

A failure of one CREACS filtration train requires manual actions to properly reposition dampers in support of single filtration train operation.

To minimize control room radiological doses; the CREACS outside air is supplied from else non-accident unit's emergency air intake through the cross-connected *upply duct (as determined by which unit received an accident sign~l). Outside air i* mixbd with recirculated air, passed through each CREACS filter b&nJc (p1'e-filter, HEPA filter, and charcoal filter) and coo.ling coil, and distributed to the common CRE.

CREACS will be manually initiated in the recirculation mode only in the event of a fire outside the CRE, a toxic chemical release, delivery of Ammonium Hydroxide or testing.

PLANT SYSTEMS

~*,

,' I BASES

====z=****================================================

CAACS and CREACS interface isolation dampers: 1(2)CAA14 and 1(2)CAA20 These two dampers are normally open and do not have associated redundant dampers. These dampers serve a boundary function by isolating the CR.EACS from the CA.ACS during emergency operation of the CREACS.

Note: Dampers 1(2)CAAS, CAACS recirculation damper will receive an accident alignment signal to ensure proper accident configuration of CA.ACS. This damper, however, is not required for the OPERABILITY of CREACS as defined in the LCO.

The control room envelope is considered intact and able to support operation of the CREACS when the emergency air conditioning system is capable of maintaining a l/8" water gauge positive pressure with the control room boundary door(s) closed.

J:Nl~~ 1. l Filter testing will be in accordance with the applicable sertions of ANSI NSlO (i975) with the exception that laboratory testing of activated caLbon will be in accordance with ASTM 03803 (1989) .

TS surveillance Requirement verifies that each fan is capable of optl::ct.i11g for at least 15 minutes by initiating flow through the.HEPA filter c.._11.* 1.:1.:,zcoal adsorbers train (sl to ensure that the system is available in a st ;:i:~it:;hy mode *

!!:~.:&.1 0\ACS normal air intake ductwork will have an additional radiation

<l'":~,_.,\.:c.i' t;iiannel installed for a total of two detectors per intake. The t\:o cl,wt:.:;c;>~o;; channels from Unit l and Unit 2 CA.ACS air intake provide input to conr.~".1n radiation monitor processors. Each radiation monitor processor (one for :.rn:i.;i-1/lRlB-2 anJ. one for 2RlB-l/2RlB-2l *provides a signal to initiate cru;;;,:_cs in. thiii pressurization mode should high radiation be detected. A min.fmur.1 of one out of two .detectors in either intake will initiate the pru*suri~ation mode. With two detector channels inoperable on a Unit, operation may continue as long as CREACS is placed inservice in the preP~lll'ization or recirculation mode. Pressurization mode will be initiated aft;:;;i.. 7 days with one inoperabl'-i detector. Radiological releases during a fud, h.ruldling accident while operating in the recirculation mode could result in 'L'ti~i:ceptabl* rcdiation levels in the CRE since the automatic initiation capdJiJ:ity M.a been defeated for high radiation due to isolation of the deteC";f~o~*;;.*. *Therefore, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies or Core Alt&rctions at either unit will not be permitted when in the recirculation mod(i; .

. Iniiilt;diate action(s), in accordance with the LCO Action Statements, means that t;h~ required action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.

SALEM - UNIT l

1

PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILL.~C.>~ REQUIREMENTS 4.7.6.l The control room emergency air conditioning system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by initiating flow through the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train(s) and verifying that the train(s) operates with each fan operating for at least 15 minutes.
b. At least one~ per 18 months or prior to return to service (1) after any struclural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system, by:
l. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 2 99\ of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas ~hen they are tested in-place while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 8000 cfm

+/- 10\.

2. Ve1ifying that the HEPA filter banks rem.eve 2 99\ of the DOP when tli~y &r~ tested in-place while operating the ventilation system at

~ Ltnv ~~t~ of 8000 cfm +/- lOt.

3. v** *.::i ;~y; n~ ~Jj.l.~iin 31 r.l.o.ys after removal that a laboratory analysis o~*: r'. c-:,.o,i*b(ln G'.'\ITll:llo from one of th~ charcoal adsorbers demonstrates

~. :* .;111.i,r~l. S>~'.tic:V-:.nc;;y of ~ 99r; for radioactive methyl iodide when I

tl*.r:; W'ili;i\"1 :i.*:. tt;s~C4d .;-.t 30°C, 95~ relativ.a humidity.

c. Ai\.:~r (.:V'::lr.y *1~11 hrin1,~ o~ c.h~rcoal adsorber operation by verifying

~i-L.:hi, ...H ~:-.y:J .:i~*ter .:'a1n6val that a laboratory analysis of a carbon sanipJ,e ol:lto.inod

  • i;':..*om ~l i::C!ttl: canis*;;;er demonstrates a removal ef.ficiency of .;a;:* 9si:: f""'~' i*t\cI.it.J:.:cciv~ rnethyl iodide* uhen the sample is tested at 30°C, 9!;(; ~*~:iU*~.W-'! hltlitidity.

d .. At least once pcT. lC: fii'.)liths by:

l. Verifying th&t the pre~sure drop across the combined HEPA filter an4 ch.1J.rco1;1l {itlzot"biii!r .bruik is t.: 3. s inches Water Gauge while ope:s-l)ting tlle v~nt:Uc.t:ion syftem at a flow rate of 8000 cfm +/- l'Ot.
2. Ve~ifying th.:lc Ok'~ ,~ ~<:ffol~Y injection test signal or control room int~r.l high lf\c".ie.it::i..~m c*c:it signal, the system automatically acluat:f;;L. in tlic pi.C':~~urization mode by opening the outside air supp} y and divc,;~'ti?ig air flow through th6 HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber bank.
3. Verifying that the system can maintai th(*
  • contrtil room at a
  • positive pressur~ z 1/8" water gaugeft.* 1 ativa~o tb.e adjaeaa~ awaas during system operation with makeup air being ~upplied through the HEPA filt~rs and charcoal adsorbers at the design makeup flow rate of .s 2200 cfm.

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 7-17 Amendment No.173

  • e PLANT SYS T~.M.§ BASES

**==*z=z==*****3a**=======z~================================================

3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION The limitation on flood protection ensures that facility protective actions will be taken and operation will be terminated in the event of flood conditions. The limit of elevation 10.5' Mean Sea Level is based on the elevation above which facility flood control measures are required to provide protection to safety-related equipment.

3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS) ensures that l) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.

!.NS~ i The CREACS is a shared system between Unit l nd 2 supplying a common control Room Envelope (CRE) . During emergency ope ation following receipt of a Safety Injection or High Radiation *actuation si l, for areas inside the CRB, one lOOt capacity fan i'.*1 each Unit's CREACS ill operate in a pressurization mode with a constant amount oi ou side air supplied for continued CRE pressurization to l/8" water gauge'. On~ fan from each train will automatically start upon receipt of an initiation signal, with one fan in each train in standby. A failu:..e of one fan will result in th~ standby fan automatically starting.

Each CREACS train has two ioot*capacity f..ns, such that any one of the four fans is sized to provide the required flow for CRE pressurization to l/8" water gauge positive p1essure within the coli"imon CRE during an emergency.

A failure of one CREACS fil~ration trajn ~equires manual actions to properly reposition dampers in support of single filtration train operation.

To minimize control room r.=gdiologir.~l !J~ses, th.' CREACS outside air is supplied from the non-accident uni L' ~; em'ergency ;;- ir i:.ilake through the cross-connected aupply duct (as di:~\'ermined J-;y *.:*hicJ't un.i.t received an accident signal). Out*id* air is mixed with recirculated *ir, pass~d through each CREACS filter bank (prei-filter, HEPA filt1..:.., a.nd ch:r.coal filter) and cooling coil, and distributed to the common CRE.

CREACS will be manually initiated in the recirculation mode only in the event of a fire outside the CRE, a toxic chemical release, delivery of Ammonium Hydroxide or testing.

.\

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES

~~=====~===*a*============================================================

CAA.CS and CREACS interface isolation dampers: l(2)CAAl4 and l(2)CAA20 These two dampers are normally open and do not have associated redundant dampers. These dampers serve a boundary function by isolating the CREACS from the CAACS during emergency operation of the CREACS.

Note: Dampers l(2)CAAS, CAACS recirculation damper will receive an accident alignment signal to ensure proper accident configuration of CAACS. This darupor, however, is not required for the OPERABILITY of CREACS as defined in the Leo*.

The control room envelope is considered intact and able to support op~r~tion of the CREACS when the emergency air conditioning system is capable of maintaining a 1/8" water gauge positive pressure with the control room boundary door(s) closed.

Filter testing ~rill be in accordance with* the applicable sections of ANSI NnO 0.975) \Ji.th the exception that laboratory testing of activated carbon vill b.:i in ac-.;:o,.d~ce with ASTM 03803 (1989) .

.-,..s Su;.;.,,-::;;i.llruic*; ~~quiroment verifies that each fan is capable of opari:;.ting fo~ at lease 15 minutes by initiating flow through the HEPA filter and ch~rco~l adsorber train(s) to ensure that the system is available in a sta:udby mod:'!.

Eacli C7\Ac;:; no:1.'Trl..:-.l ah intake ductwork will have an additional radiation 0

detector channel installQd for a total of two detectors per intake. The two detector channels from unit i and Unit 2 CAACS air intake provide input to common radiation mon;.tol' processors. Each radiation monitor processor (one .

fo~ lRlB*l/lRlB-2 and o"e for 2RlB-l/2RlB-2) provides a signal to initiate CREACS in the pres~urization mode should high radiation be detected. A minimum of one out of two detectors in either intake will initiate the pressurization.mode. With t~o detector channels inoperable on a Unit, operation may continue as long as CREACS is placed* inservice in the pressurization or recire\!lation mode. Pressurization mode will be initiated after 7 day* with one inoperable detector. Radiological releases during a fuel handling accident ~hile operating in the recircul~tion mode could result in unacceptable rQdiation levels iil the CRE since the automatic initiation capability has be~n defeat£d for high radiation due to isolation of the detectors. Therefore, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies or Core Alterations at either unit will not be permitted when in the recirculation mode.

Immediate action(s), in accordance with the LCO Action Statements, means that the required action should be pursued without delay and ~n a controlled manner.