ML20248D173

Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of South Texas Project,Unit 2.Docket No. 50-499.(Houston Lighting and Power Company)

ML20248D173
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	03/31/1989
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0781, NUREG-0781-S07, NUREG-781, NUREG-781-S7, NUDOCS 8904110402
Download: ML20248D173 (58)

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NUREG-0781 l:- Supplement No. 7. )

't Safety Evaluation Report related to the; operation of South 1 Texas Project, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-499 ,

t Houston Lighting & Power Company.

I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

. Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 1989

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AVAILABILITY NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the icilowing sources:

1, The NRC Public Document Aoom, 2120 L Street, NW, Lower Level, Washington, DC 20555

2. The Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082 l

l 3. The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cit'ed in NRC publica-l tions, it is not . intended to be exhaustive.

Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the'NRC Public Document Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investi-gatien notices; Licensee Event Reports; vender reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and licensee documents and correspondence.

The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the GPO Sales Program: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceed-ings, and NRC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regula-tions in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission issuances.

Documents available from the National Technical Information Service include NUREG series reports and technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy C,ommission, forerunner agency to tne Nuclear Regulatory Commission.'

Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all open literature items, such as books, journal and periodical articles, and trarr3 actions. Federal Register notices, federal and state legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.

Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non-NRC conference proceedings are available for purchase from the organization sponsoring the publication c"ed.

Single copies of NRC draft reports are available free, to the extent of supply, upon written request to the Office of Inforrnation Resources Management Distribution Section, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

Copies of industry codes enri standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are maintainLd at the NRC Library, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, and are available there for reference use by the public. Codes t.:nd standards are usually copy-righted and may be purchased from the originating organization or, if they are American National Standards, from the American National Standards Institute,1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018.

^

f l NUREG-0781 Supplement No. 7 l

l .-

Safety Evaketion Report '

related to the operation of South Texas Project, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-499 Houston Lighting & Power Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation March 1989 ga neev 1

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+l ABSTRACT j

In April 1986 the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission' issued its Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0781) regarding the' application of Houston Light-ing & Power Company (applicant and agent for the owners) for a license to operate South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos.'50-498 and 50-499). The facility is located in'Matagorda County, Texas, west of the Colorado River, 8 miles north- l northwest of the town of Matagorda and about 89 miles southwest of Houston. The i first supplement to NUREG-0781 was issued in September 1986, the second supple- i ment in January 1987, the third supplement in May 1987, the fourth supplement in {

July 1987, the fifth supplement in March 1988,.and the sixth supplement in Janu-ary 1989. This seventh supplement, which supports the issuance of a full power license for Unit 2, provides updated information on the issues that had been con-sidered previously as well as the evaluation of issues that have arisen since the sixth supplement was issued. The. evaluation resolves all the issues necessary to j

support the issuance of a full power license for Unit 2. '!

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i South Texas SSER 7 iii

a TABLE OF CONTENTS l

l tm ABSTRACT ................................................................. iii )

1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT ...................... 1-1 1.1 ~ Introduction ................................................. 1-1 1.11 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ............................. 1-2 1.12 Items Resolved in Support of Full-Power Licensing ............ 1-2 1.13 Status of Responses to Generic Letters Since Issuance of Full-Power License for South-Texas Project, Unit 1 ........ 1-2 2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS ............................................... 2-1

2.4 Hydrologic Engineering ....................................... 2-1 2.4.10 Flood Protection Requirements ........................ 2-1 <

2.4.11 Cooling Water Supply ................................. 2-1 l l 2.5 Geology and Seismology ....................................... 2-1 2.5.1 Basic Geologic and Seismic Information ............... I l 2-1 1 2.5.7 Reevaluation of Completed Main Cooling Reservoir...... 2-1 l

1 3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMP 0NENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS ........... 3-1  !

3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design ................................... 3-1 3.4.1 Flood Protection ...................................... 3-1 3.5 M i s s i l e P ro te c ti o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3- 1 [

3.5.1 Missile Selection and Description .................... 3-1 3.6 Protection Against Dynamic Effects A'ssociated With the Postulated Rupture of Piping ................................. 3-1 3.6.2 Determination of Rupture Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated With the Postulated Ru of Piping ...............................pture ............. 3-1 3.7 Seismic Design ............................................... 3-1 3.7.3 Seismic Subsystem Analysis ........................... 3-1 4 3.7.4 Seismic Instrumentation .............................. 3-2 >

South Texas SSER 7 v l

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u.m l TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) t

_P, age 3.9f Mechanical Systems and Components ............................. 3-2 l 3.9.2 . Dynamic Testing;and Analysis of- Systems, Components, and Equipment ...............................'......... 3-2 ,

3.9.3 ASME Code Class l'2,'and 3 Components, Component-Supports,'and Core Support Structures .~............... 3-3 3.9.6 Inservice. Testing of Pumps and Valves ................. 3-3.

3.11- Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important:

to Safety and:. Safety-Related Mechanical Equipment..............-3 3.11.3 Completeness of Environmental Qualification Program .. 3 4' j

REACTOR ............................................................

4 1 4-1 4.2 Fuel Design ................................................... 4-1:

4.2.4 Testing, Inspection, and Surveil 1ance Plans .......... 4-1 4.4 Thermal Hydraulic Design ..........'........................... 4-1 4.4.3 Design Abnormalities ................................. 4-1 4.4.6 NUREG-0737 Item'II.F.2 ............................... 4-1 5

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ............................................. 5-1 5.2 Integri ty of. Reactor Coolant Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

5. 2.1 Compliance With Codes and Code Cases ................. 5-1 5.2.2 Overpressure Protection .............................. 5-3

5. 2. 4 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar Inspection and Testing ........................y ...................... 5-3 5.3 Reactor Vessel ...................................... ........ . 5-4 5.3.2 Pressure-Temperature Limits .......................... 5-4 5.4 Component and Subsystem Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4 5.4.12 Reactor Coolant System High Point Vents .............. 5-4 6

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES .......................................... 6-1 1 6.2 Containment' Systems .......................................... 6-1 6.2.4 Containment Isolation. System ......................... 6-1 6.2.5 Combustible Gas Control in Containment ............... 6-1 6.2.6 Contai nment Leakage Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 South Texas SSER 7 vi

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) l

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6.3 Emergency Core Cooling System ................................ 6-1 6.3.5 Performance Evaluation ............................... 6-1 7

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTR0LS ....................................... 7-1 7.2 Reactor Trip System .......................................... 7-1 1 7.2.2 Specific Findings ....................................

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7. 3 Engineered Safety Features System ............................ 7-1 7.3.1 7.3.2 Description .......................................... 7-1 Specific Findings .................................... 7-3 7.5 Information Systems Important to Safety ................... .. 7-3 7.5.2 Specific Findings .................................... 7-3 8

ELECTRIC POWER ..................................................... 8-1 8.1 Introduction ................................................. 8-1 8.1.5 Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Br -

Bulletin 88-10 .....................eakers .................. 8-1

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8.3 Onsite Power System .......................................... i 8-2 i 8.3.1 AC Power System ......................................

8-2 9

AUXILIARY SYSTEMS .................................................. 9-1 9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling ....................................

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9.1. 2 Spent Fuel Storage .................................... 9-1 1

9.4 Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems ........... 9-1 9.4.2 Spent Fuel Pool. Area Ventilation System (Fuel ~

Handling Building Ventilation Systems) ............... 9-1 9.5 Othe r Auxi l i a ry Sys tems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2 i 9.5.1 Fire Protection ..............................

9.5.2 9-2 Communications Systems ................................ ......z.. 9-2 9.5.5 Emergency Diesel Cooling Water System ................ 9-3 <

South Texas SSER 7 vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continu:d)

.Page 11 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ...................................... 11-1 11.4 Solid Waste Management System ............................... 11-1 11.4.1 Sy s tem De s c r i p t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11- 1 11.5 Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring Instrumentation and Sampling Systems ........................ 11-1 13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1 ....

1 13.1 Organizational Structure of Applicant ....................... 13-1 '

I 13.1.1 Management and Technical Support Organization ....... 13-1 13.1.2 Operating Organizati'on .............................. 13-1 13.2 Training .................................................... 13-2 13.2.1 Reactor Operator Training ........................... 13-2 13.4 Operational Review .......................................... 13-3 13.4.2 Independent Review .................................. 13-3 13.6 I nd u s tri a l S ec ur i ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13- 3 13.6.1 Introduction ........................................ 13-3 14 15 INITIAL TEST PROGRAM .......................... 14-1 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS ............................. ...................

................... 15-1 15.4 Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies ................. 15-1 15.4.6 Inadvertent Boron Dilution .......................... 15-1 t 15.8 Anticipated Transients Without Scram ........................ 15-1 i 15.8.1 ATWS Rule - ATWS Mitigation System .................. 15-1 15.8.2 Generic Letter 83 Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1 16 18 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .......................................... 16-1 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING ......................................... 18-1 18.2 Safety Parameter Display System ............................. 18-1 I 22 FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY REQUIREMENTS ................... 22-1

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22.1 Onsite Property Damage Insurance ............................ 22-1 22.2 Funds f or Decommi s s ion ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-1 i South Texas SSER 7 viii

TABLE.OF. CONTENTS (Continued)

I APPENDIX A CONTINUATION OF CHRONOLOGY OF NRC STAFF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW 0F THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT APPENDIX B REFERENCES.

APPENDIX D . ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS APPENDIX E NRC STAFF CONTRIBUTORS AND CONSULTANTS 4

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1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT 1.1 Introduction In April 1986 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0781) on the application filed by Houston 1ighting

& Power Company (HL&P) (hereafter referred to as HL&P or the licensee) acting on behalf of itself and the other owners (City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company, and City of Aust-in) for a license to operate South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499. At that time the staff identified items that had not been resolved with the licensee. The  ;

first supplement to the SER (SSER 1), published in September 1986, presented the '

status of unten Tved items and comments made by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in 4 e letter dated June 10, 1986.

The second supplement (SSER 2),

published in January 1987, reported on the status of the unresolved items and j

indicated those that had been resolved. The third supplement (SSER 3), published i in May 1987, reported on the continuing process of resolving the remaining items .

The fourth supplement (SSER 4), published in July 1987, documented the resolution of all remaining outstanding open and confirmatory items and license conditions identified in the SER and its suppleme y and supported the license for initial ,

criticality and power ascension to 5 peicent power operation for Unit 1. The fifth supplement (SSER 5), published in March 1988, provided all documentation necessary to support the issuance of a full power license for Unit 1. The sixth supplement (SSER 6), published in January 1989, provided all documentation neces-sary +o support the issuance of a license for initial criticality and power atcen-sion to b percent power operation for Unit 2. The present report, Supplement 7 to the SER (SSER 7), provides all documentation necessary to support the issuance of a full power license for Unit 2. Additionally, SSER 7 includes discussions regard-ing licensee commitments reported in the SER and previous supplements, in parti-cular those commitments not previously closed out in earlier supplements. Items to be closed out at future dates (e.g., first refuri,w- outage) are still in effect.

Each of the following sections or appendices is numbered the same as the corre-

' sponding SER section or appendix that is being supplemented. Each section is supplementary to and not in lieu of the discussion in the SER unless otherwise noted. Appendix A continues the chronology of the staff's actions related to the processing of the South Texas Project application. Appendix B lists refer-ences other than NRC documents cited in this supplement.* Appendix 0 Tists the acronyms used in this supplement. Appendix E lists the principal staff members and consultants who contributed to this supplement.

Copies of this SER supplement are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room at 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the local Public Document Rooms located at the Wharton County Junior College Library, Availability this report.

of all material cited is described on the inside front cover of i

South Texas SSER 7 1-1 l

J.M. Hodges Learning Center, 911 Boling Highway, Wharton, Texas 77488.and the Austin Public Library, 810 Guadalupe Street, Austin, Texas 78701.

The NRC Project Manager for South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, is George F.

Dick, Jr. Mr. Dick may be contacted by calling (301) 492-1326 or by writing to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555.

1.11 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 Section 3D2(b) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 states that the NRC shall not issue or renew a license for a nuclear power reactor unless the utility has signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Energy for disposal services. The licensee has signed a contractual agreement with the Department of Energy dated February 26, 1987. This agreement is applicable to South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2.

L 12 Items Resolved in Support of Full-Power Licensing SER Sections 1.7 and 1.8 indicated items that were considered in the staff's review, and SSER'4 provided resolution o 'f all items. Table 1.7 of this supple-ment lists the issues most recently considered by the staff in support of the full power license for Unit 2 and indicates the section number in which the evaluation is documented.

1.13 Status of Responses to Generic Letters Since Issuance of Full-Power License for South Texas Project, Unit 1 Generic Letter Response 88-01, IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Not applicable - BWR specific Stainless Steel 88-02, Integrated Safety Assessment Response dated February 19, 1988 -

Program II (ISAP II) stated that licensee had no interest in participating in program 88-03, Steam Binding of Auxiliary Response dated May 31, 1988 -

Feedwat?r Pumps described design features of system to reduce the potential of steam binding 88-04, Distribution o' Gems Irradiated Not applicable '!

in Research Reactors 88-05, Boric Acid Corrosicq of Carbon Response dated May 31, 1988 -

Steel Reactor Pressure Boutdary identified areas susceptible to Components in PWRs boric acid corrosion  ;

Response dated March 9, 1989 -

stated that procedures are in place to respond to leaks of reactor cool-ant and to instances of boric acid South Texas SSER 7 1-2 l

corrosion of reactor coolant pressure boundary components  ;

88-06, Removal of Organizational Response dated June 22, 1988 -

Charts From Technical Specifications l requested amendment that rem)ved the organizational charts cited in the generic letter 88-07, Enforcement Policy Relating None required to 10 CFR 50.49 88-08, Mail Sent or Delivered to the None required Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 88-09, Pilot Testing of Fundamental Not applicable - BWR specific Examination 88-10, Purchase of GSA Approved None required Security Containers 88-11, Radiation Embrittlement of Response dated November 22, 1988 -

Reactor Vessel Materials stated that pressure-temperature curves are more conservative than those of Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.99 88-12, Removal of Fire Protection None required Requirements From Technical Specifications 88-13, Operator Licensing Examination Response dated October 12, 1988 -

identified the number and dates of proposed operator license examina-tions 88-14, Instrument Air Supply System Response dated December 13, 1988 -

Problems Affecting Safety-Related stated that problems are mitigated Equipment at South Texas through design and maintenance of components 88-15, Electric Power Systems - None required Inadequate Control Over Design '

Processes 88-16, Removal of Cycle-Specific None required Parameter Limits From Technical Specifications 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal Response dated December 9, 1988 -

stated that engineering analysis was still ongoing; no reduced inven-tory operations will be conducted South Texas SSER 7 1-3

with irradiated fuel'in'the reactor until generic letter actions are completed' Additional response dated January 17,-  ;

1989 - outlined commitments and pro-posed actions to resolve generic letter; additional information to  ;

be submitted December 1, 1989 88-18, Plant Record Storage on Optical None required Disks t

88-19, Use of Deadly Force by Licensee None required Guards To Prevent Theft of Special l- Nuclear Material 88-20, Individual Plant Examination for- In process Severe Accident Vulnerabilities ,

89-01, Implementation of Programmatic None required Controls for Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications [RETS) in the Administrative Controls Section of the Technical Specifications and the Relocation of the Procedural Details of RETS to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.or to the Process Control Program 1

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r Table 1.7 -Listing of items resolved in support of full power licensing

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Item Status I Section*

(1) Review'of HL&P commitments Resolved in SSER 7 Numerous

-sections (2) Bottom-mounted instrument Resolved in SSER 7 3.9.2.3 thimble tubes (3) Pressurizer surge line Resolved in SSER 7 .5.2.1 stratification (4) Changes to the toxic gas Resolved in SSER 7 7.3.1.12

-monitor logic (5) Molded-case circuit breakers - Resolved in SSER 7 8.1.5 Bulletin 88-10 (6) Fuel handling building heating, Resolved in SSER 7 9.4 ventilation, and air conditioning heaters (7) Corporate and plant Resolved in SSER 7 13.1 organizational structure 4 (8) Testing of main steam isolation Resolved in SSER 7 14 valves (9) Pressurizer spray line test Resolved in SSER 7 14 (10) Decommissioning rule schedular Resolved in SSER 7 l exemption 22.2

• Section of this' supplement where item is discussed.

t South Texas SSER 7 1-5

2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2.4 Hydrologic Engineering 2.4.10 Flood Prote'ction Requirements In the SER, the staff stated that emergency procedures'for the filling and op-eration of the main cooling reservoir would require that watertight doors be closed and knockout panels be in place. By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P 4 informed the staff that these two requirements will be incorporated into Plant Surveillance Procedure 1 PSP 03-ZQ-0001, which is being revised.

2.4.11 Cooling Water Supply 2.4.11.2 Emergency Cooling Water In SSER 5, the staff recommended that an abbreviated seepage monitoring program )

be performed at 5 year intervals. By letter dated January 22, 1988, HL&P made a j commitment to perform a simple water balance of the emergency cooling pond once every 5 years. This item is closed.

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2.5 -Geology and Seismology 2.5.1 Basic Geologic and Seismic Information i

2.5.1.2 Site Geology As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to develop procedures and monitor horizontal and vertical movements to detect subsidence, tilting, etc. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that the geotechnical monitoring program has been established. The geotechnical procedure will be issued the first quarter of 1989.

As stated in SSER 1, HL&P committed to update the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) each year for 5 years, then once every 5 years. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that the initial update of 1988 data will be included in the initial FSAR update scheduled to be submitted in December 1989.

2.5.7 Reevaluation of Completed Main Cooling Rbservoir t i

In the SER, SSER 2, and SSER 4, the staff discussed.the stability and integrity of the main cooling reservoir (MCR) as well as the commitments made by HL&P regarding the evaluation of remedial work and observation following filling of the MCR. In a letter dated March 15, 1988,'HL&P committed to interrupt filling.

of the MCR at 45 feet for an observational period before filling the MCR to 49 feet and more. The 49-foot level has not yet been reached.

South Texas SSER 7 2-1

t 3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS 3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design 3.4.1 Flood Protection As stated in SSER 3, HL&P. indicated that the results of an analysis of the consequences resulting from internal flooding caused by rainfall associated with tornadoes would be incorporated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

The results were added to FSAR Section 3.4.4. This item is considered closed.

3.5 Missile Protection 3.5.1 Missile Selection and Description 3.5.1.3 Turbine Missiles As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to submit a turbine system maintenance program based on the manufacturer's' calculations of missile generation probabilities within 3 years of obtaining.an operating license. In a. letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that the program is scheduled to be.sub-mitted by August 1, 1990.

3.6 Protection Against Dynamic Effects Associated With the Postulated Rupture of Piping 3.6.2 Determination of Rupture Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated With the Postulated Rupture of Piping ,

3.6.2.1 Additional Arbitrary Intermediate Breaks As stated in SSER 3, HL&P committed to have any future modification to the piping system in which arbitrary intermediate breaks are eliminated reviewed by the staff. As stated in a letter dated February 17, 1989, these requirements have been incorporated into Procedures EI6.03 and OEP 3.05 Q. This-item is considered closed.

3.7 Seismic Design 3.7.3 Seismic Subsystem Analysis As stated in the SER, HL&P committed, in a letter dated October 31, 1985, to {

implement frequency criteria based on the elastic half-space method as basic design criteria for the floor subsystem. The changes were incorporated in FSAR Amendment 53. This item is considered closed.

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South Texas SSER 7

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3-1  !

3.7.4 Seismic Instrumentation In the SER, the staff stated that a seismic instrumentation surveillance scheme would be incorporated in the Technical Specifications (TS). The surveillance scheme has been incorporated in TS Table 4.3-4. This item is considered closed.

3. 9 Mechanical Systems and Components 3.9.2 Oynamic Testing and Analysis of Systems, Components, and Equipment 3.9.2.1 Piping Preoperational Vibration and Dynamic Effects Testing l

In SSER 2, the staff required that HL&P make a committment to perform preopera-tional vibration and dynamics effects testing on the diesel generator feel oil piping in Unit 2. By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P informed the staff that the testing in Unit 2 was completed on December 8, 1988. This iter is  !

considered closed. I 3.9.2.3 Preoperational Flow-Induced Vibration Testing of Reactor Internals j I

In SSER 6, the staff discussed the results through December 16, 1988, regarding the wear of the bottom-mounted instrument thimble tubes in Unit 1. The staff also noted the corrective actions proposed for Unit 2 and proposed a license condition requiring that HL&P perform a thimble tube inspection at' Unit 2 after 21 weeks of three- or four-reactor-coolant pump operation. l In January 1989, the sfaff reviewed HL&P laboratory test data. The tests measured the vibration response of thimble tubes when subjected to a range of flows. The configurations that were tested included 0.313-inch (original thim-  !

i ble size used in Units 1 and 2), 0.339-inch, and 0.385-inch (the size of future  ;

replacement tubes at Units 1 and 2) thimble tubes; various tube support condi-tions; main flow only; thimble flow only; and balanced flow. Tests were per- l formed both with and without flow limiters. Conditions that were tested that had not been taken into consideration in the design of flow limiters were reduced preloads, gaps, and misaligned and tilted configurations. The tests showed that  !

the 0.385-inch thimble tube is expected to perform better than the original 0.313-inch tube. <

Additionally, in a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that removal of the flow-limiting devices, installation of the thicker walled thimble tubes, and installation of magnetic and manual isolation valves were complete for Unit i 2 and that the work for Unit 1 is scheduled to be completed during the first refueling outage.  !

In view of the laboratory test results and the corrective actions, the staff believes that a license condition requiring the inspection of thimble tubes after 21 weeks of operation is no longer required. However, performance of the thimble tubes must be proven in actual reactor service. Therefore, the staff requires that HL&P conduct an inspection before the plant has completed 40 weeks l

' of three or four pump operation and provide the results of the inspection and associated data analyses to the staff.

f South Texas SSER 7 3-2 l

3.9.3 .ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components, Component Supports, and Core Support Structures 3.9.3.1 Loading Combinations, Design Transients, and Stress Limits 3.9.3.1.1 Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to the RCS - Bulletin 88-08 In SSER 6, the staff stated that HL&P intended to develop a program to provide the required continued assurance that piping connected to the reactor coolant system (RCS) will not be subjected to unacceptable thermal stresses. In a letter dated February 17,1989, 0 1P stated that the program has been developed and will be implemented for Unit 2 before criticality and for Unit 1 before the first refueling outage.

The staff also stated that HL&P intended to perform a nondestructive examina- i tion of sections of the RCS that cannot be isolated to verify that there are no {

existing flaws before Unit 2 achieves criticality. This has been completed for l i Unit 2. The Unit 1 examinations are scheduled to be completed during the first refueling outage.

3.9.3.3 Component Supports In the SER, the staff requested that HL&P provide additional information regard-ing the design of nuclear steam supply system ASME Code (American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel. Code) Class 1, 2, and 3 component supports. As stated in SSER 3, HL&P responded to the request in a letter dated March 2, 1987. In that letter, HL&P stated that the supports had been evaluated and were acceptable and that the information would be incorporated in a future FSAR amendment. The information was incorporated in FSAR Amendment 58. This item is considered closed.

3.9.6 Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves i

{

i In the SER, the staff stated that limiting conditions for operations must be  !

added to the TS when approved leakage limits are not met and that the TS must j

include surveillance requirements that state the frequency of leak rate testing.

These requirements were incorporated in TS Section 3.4.6.2. This item is ,

considered closed.  !

}

As stated in SSER 6, HL&P committed to incorporate the valve stroke time criteria in the Unit 2 inservice testing (IST) program as data were obtained. By letter i dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that the valve stroke time criteria will be incorporated in subsequent revisions of the IST program as baseline data are obtained.  !

Additionally, HL&P committed to incorporate valves FV-1025, -1026, -1027, and

-1028 into the Unit 1 IST program. In the letter of February 17, 1989, HL&P ,

stated that the valves have been incorporated in Revision 4 of the IST Plan.

The valves are currently leak tested and full-stroke exercised in accordance with Procedure 1 PSP 03-XC-0003.

}

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South Texas SSER 7 3-3 i

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3.11 Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety and Safety-Related Mechanical Equipment ,

3.11.3 Completeness of Environmental Qualification Program .

In SSER 4, the staff stated that HL&P would' implement a maintenance / surveillance program pertaining to electrical equipment aging before fuel loading. In its-letter of February 17, 1989, HL&P informed'the-staff that it has implemented  !

-Procedure OPGP03-ZC-0010 to address the program. This item is considered closed.

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South Texas SSER 7 3-4 1

1 1 i.

4 REACTOR T4.2 Fuel Design 4.2.'4- Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans 4.2.4.11 Testing and Inspection of New Fuel In the SER,.the staff stated that the Final. Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).'should

' describe the programs for onsite inspection.of new fuel and control assemblies-after they have been delivered to the site. The program description is found in FSAR Section 4.2.4.6. This item is considered closed.

4.4 Thermal Hydraulic Design 4.4.3.. Design Abnormalities Rod Cluster Control Assembly Thinning and Swelling As' stated in SSER 6, HL&P committed, in a letter dated December 2, 1988, to perform control rod inspections and, with the results of the inspections, evalu-ate the lifetime limits for hafnium control rod usage at South Texas. HL&P;

' informed the staff that the inspections would be performed during the third refueling outage for Unit 1, which is scheduled for-July 1992.

4.4.3.2 Crud Deposition and Flow Uncertainty As stated in SSER 2, HL&P committed to. provide information regarding the accuracy of hot-leg temperature measurement in the reactor coolant system flow measure uncertainty analysis. By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that the information is scheduled to be submitted to the staff by March 31, 1989.

4.4.6 NUREG-0737 Item II.F.2 4.4.6.2 Implementation Schedule In the SER, the staff stated that installation *of the instrumentation for the detection of inadequate core cooling would be completed before fuel loading. By lettercompleted.

been dated February 17, 1989, HL&P informed the staff that the actions have the system. The NRC staff will perform a site audit to verify operation of South Texas SSER 7 4-1

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5 REACTOR CCOLANT SYSTEM l

5.2 Integrity of Reactor Coolant Boundary

5. 2.1 Compliance With Codes and Code Cases In SSER 6, the staff evaluated information provided by HL&P on thermal stratifi-  !

cation in the pressurizer surge line (PSL). The staff concluded that a sufficient  ;

basis existed for issuing the low power operating license. However, additional information was required before the full power review could be completed. The j staff also imposed a license condition that the PSL thermal stratification issue had to be resolved before the full power license was issued.

HL&P submitted additional information by letters dated January 27, February 1, i and February 15, 1989. Furthermore, the staff reviewed the licensee's response to NRC Bulletin 88-11 regarding PSL thermal stratification. The staff conducted a detailed review of the piping stress calculation packages, which included West-l inghouse and Bechtel calculations, to ascertain ASME Code compliance and a walk-

' down of the pressurizer surge line to observe any evidence of thermal interfer-ence and discernible distress. This review was conducted as a followup to the l discussion in SSER 6. The staff's evaluation and findings are summarized below.

The staff performed a review of design thermal transients that were based on j

enveloping the best known data from several Westinghouse plants. The approach  ;

is conservative and acceptable for providing input to the bounding analysis per- I formed by HL&P. HL&P has instrumented the surge line in Unit 1.

As indicated in a letter dated February 1, 1989, the monitoring program wiil continue until the first refueling outage in Unit 1. Once the program is completed, HL&P will review the data from South Texas and available industry data to confirm the acceptability of the currently used data on transients.

The staff discussed the basis for defining amplitude, duration, and oscillation

) frequency of thermal striping with Westinghouse personnel. It also reviewed the results of several flow tests conducted by Westinghouse in its Waltz Mill Laboratory. Westinghouse also provided a detailed description of its flow tests in Revision 1 to WCAP-12067. The amplitude used by Westinghouse was conservative in comparison with amplitudes actually observed.in flow tests. The durations were adequately defined to account for the decaying of striping effects on stress and fatigue calculations. The staff found the approaches acceptable.

The stratification induced by global bending of the surge line in the South Texas plant was calculated by Westinghouse using both the WECAN and ANSYS com-puter codes. For the WECAN computation, a finite element piping structural model with step-change thermal profiles was used. For the ANSYS computation, a conventional pipe element model with linear thermal profiles was used to calcu-late equivalent nonlinear effects. The staff reviewed sample calculations and discussed the analysis techniques with Westinghouse personnel. The staff's re-view verified that the results of both computations were similar in regard to calculated surge line displacements, which compared favorably with displacement South Texas SSER 7 5-1

data obtained by measurements in South Texas Unit 1. Westinghouse indicated that it will continue to compare linearly calculated results with data obtained by measurements for the first few Westinghouse plants when the monitoring pro-gram is implemented in these plants. The staff concludes the calculated results and those obtained by measurements are adequate and acceptable for the surge line in the South Texas piant.

The staff found that HL&P's response regarding the effects of mean stress on fatigue calculations for thermal striping was inadequately described in WCAP-12067, Supplement 1 to Revision 1. Additional information was provided in a letter dated February 9, 1989. HL&P indicated that the maximum effect of the mean stress was included in a curve in the ASME Code. Although any value of a mean stress above the curve values was not considered in the striping analysis, it was judged not to be necessary because of the various conservatism involved ,

in the striping analysis process and the fatigue calculations process. The staff j has reviewed the additional information and found it acceptable.

l The staff reviewed the surge line piping analysis performed by Westinghouse and Bechtel - the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) supplier and the architect-engineer (AE), respectively, for the South Texas plant. The review included a detailed review of the calculation packages and verification of the proper handling of the interface between the NSSS supplier and the AE during various phases of the analysis. The staff found that all the required loadings had been considered in the calculations. The stresses were properly combined to meet the limits delineated in ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NB-3650. The staff found that the design calculations and piping isometric drawings had been updated to reflect design changes. In addition, it found that the interface between the NSSS and the AE was appropriate.

The staff performed a detailed audit of the pipe support calculations. There is only one support in the surge line. The support was designed by Bechtel with the required stiffness specifiM by Westinghouse. The review showed that the support stiffness conforms with the requirements and is acceptable.

The staff conducted a walkdown along the entire surge line in Unit 2 and a detailed review of the as-built piping isometric drawings. The staff found that the clearances at the wall penetrations are adequate to accommodate thermal expansion of the surge line. The as-built configuration appeared to be correctly reflected in the isometric drawing. The removal of one support was properly in-dicated. In addition, although the surge line had experienced heatup transients, the staff found no discernible distress in the piping and pipe supports.

In the letter dated February 15, 1989, HL&P submitted additional information on the reevaluation of the pressurizer surge lines using " leak-before-break" (LBB) i technology as permitted by revised General Design Criterion 4 (GDC 4) of Appen-dix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The additional information was submitted in response to the staff's request for additional information, dated January 12, 1989, and was provided in Westinghouse's Supplement 1 to Revision 1 of WCAP-12067.

Previously, the staff had found the pressurizer surge lines in compliance with revised GDC 4 using LBB technology. However, the recently reported phenomenon of thermal stratification in pressurizer surge lines necessitated a reevalua-tion of the pressurizer surge lines as discussed in NRC Bulletin 88-11.

South Texas SSER 7 5-2 '

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The surgestaff had two concerns relative to HL&P's LBB reevaluation of the pressurizer lines. The first concern was that there was a discrepancy between the staff estimations and HL&P's estimations of the size of the leakage flaw in the LBB evaluation (SSER 6).

used did provide conservative best-estimate results.HL&P provided information that sho This was done by comparing predicted mental crack sizes with both plant data obtained by measurements and experi-results.

The staff finds the additional information provided by HL&P adequate for resolving this issue for South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2. The second concern related to the stability of a flaw in the pressurizer surge line during a forced cooldown on the discovery of a leak in the surge line. This con-cern was raised because the loads on the surgc line would increase during depres-surization, which would be necessary in order to repair the leak. The staff finds (1) the additional information provided by HL&P and (2) HL&P's commitment to revise plant operating procedures to provide prompt depressurization in the event of leaks adequate for resolving this issue for South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2.

On the basis of the above regarding the LBB reevaluation, the staff finds that Units 1 and 2, were in compliance with revised GDC 4) is still valid.the p On the basis of the review and inspection, the staff concludes that HL&P has made acceptable efforts to meet Action Items 1.a and 1.b as delineated in NRC Bulletin 88-11.

The efforts demonstrate that, on the basis of the available stratification data, the surge line meets the applicable design codes. Pipe movements of the pressurizer surge line also will be reviewed and verified during the next plant heatup, scheduled to be part of the bottom mounted instrument inspection outage, to ensure that clearances have been considered. Additionally, HL&P will verify the stress and fatigue analyses to ensure compliance with the ASME Code when the plant-specific first refueling data from the Unit 1 monitoring program are completed during its outage.

5.2.2 Overpressure Protection 5.2.2.3 Conclusions In the SER, the staff stated that the overpressure protection for normal and low-temperature operation was acceptable subject to the incorporation of the requirements stated in Section 5.2.2 of the SER into the Technical Specifica-tions.

The requirements were included in Section 3.4.9.3 of the Technical Specifications.

This item is considered closed.

5.2.4 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Inspection and Testing In the SER and SSER 6, the staff stated that the initial inservice inspection (ISI) program had not yet been submitted and that it must comply with the re-quirements of the latest edition and addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code ainletter effectdated 12 months before the date of issuance of the operating license. In February 17, 1989, program for Unit 2 is scheduled for JuneHL&P stated that the submittal of the ISI requirements. 16, 1989, and would meet the code South Texas SSER 7 5-3

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5.2.4.1 Evaluation of Compliance With 10 CFR 55a(g) for South Texas Project, Unit 2 As stated in SSER 6, HL&P committed to examine the welds with 50 /70 refracted longitudinal waves to detect underclad cracking and flaws in the near-surface area of the weld and adjacent base material. Additionally, HL&P committed to perform flange-to-upper shell weld examinations from the seal surface using 1.5 , 5 , and 9 refracted longitudinal waves for detecting reflectors in the weld and base material. By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P informed the NRC staff that these examinations have been incorporated into the Preservice Inspection Examination Plan. These items are considered closed.

l As stated in SSER 6 (Appendix AA), since ASME Code, Subsection IWC-1220(b), was '

not applicable to Relief Request RR-ENG-01 in regard to the containment spray system, HL&P committed to perform augmented examinations. HL&P notified the staff in a letter dated May 14, 1987, that the augmented examinations had been incorporated in the South Texas Project Unit 2 Examination Plan. Augmented volumetric examinations of nonexempt piping welds discussed in Relief Request RR-ENG-07 also were incorporated in the plan. These items are considered closed.

5. 3 Reactor Vessel 5.3.2 Pressure-Temperature Limits  !

In SSER 6, the staff requested that HL&P reevaluate the pressure-temperature limits after each reactor vessel surveillance capsule is withdrawn. In its letter of February 17, 1989, HL&P informed the staff that it has developed Oper-ational Plant Support (0PS) Procedure OPSP10-RX-0001 to address the evaluation.

This item is considered closed.

5.4 Component and Subsystem Design 5.4.12 Reactor Coolant System High Point Vents In the SER, the staff stated that the Technical Specifications must include operability requirements for the reactor vessel head vent system (RVHVS). The requirements have been incorporated in Section 3.4.11 of the Technical Speci-fications. This item is considered closed.

Additionally, HL&P committed to include the RVHVS in the inservice testing (IST) program. By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that the RVHVS has been incorporated into Revision 1 of the IST program, which was submitted on October 22, 1987.

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1 South Texas SSER 7 5-4 l

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6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6.2 . Containment-Systems.-

6.2.4 Containment Isolation System

~As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to keep the 48-inch containment purge valves closed during operating modes 1 through 4-and to verify that the valves are closed; as specified in the Technical Specifications.

Section 3.6.1.7a of the Technical Specifications.The commitment was incorporated in ,

This item is considered closed. 1 As stated in SSER 4, HL&P committed to either install additional isolation valves in the component cooling water system outside the containment or undertake other L measures to satisfy General Design Criterion 56'of Appendix A to 10.CFR Part 50.

In a letter dated November 1, 1988, HL&P stated that the additional containment isolation valves have been installed in Unit 2. The valves are scheduled to be installed in Unit 1 during the first refueling outage.

As stated in SSER 5, HL&P committed to modify the containment personnel airlock solenoid valve circuitry to allow automated closure on containment isolation.

By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that the modifications have been completed.

6.2.5 Combustible Gas Control in Containment In the SER, the staff stated that HL&P was required to develop procedures to ensure the recombiner system is actuated in time following an accident. In its-letter of February 17, 1989, HL&P informed the staff that this action has been.

This item is considered closed. incorporated'into Procedures IP0P05-E0-E01l i

6.2.6 Containment Leakage Testing As stated in the SER, HL&P committed, in a letter dated October 31, 1985, to con-duct a type C test on the penetrations discussed in the SER and to revise the  !

Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to reflect the testing to be performed. The inservice testing program and FSAR Amendment 53 were revised accordingly.

item is considered closed. This 6.3 Emergency Core Cooling System i

6.3.5 Performance Evaluation '

6.3.5.3 LOCA During Shutdown As stated in SSER 4, HL&P committed to prepare a specific procedure pertaining to the plant's response to a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in modes 3 and 4 and to incorporate it in the plant's offnormal procedures. Additionally, HL&P committed to conform with the generic resolution of the shutdown-LOCA issue. In a letter s

South Texas SSER 7 6-1 u

dated' February 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that it-is participating in the Westinghouse 0wners Group program to resolve the LOCA issue and that'it has devel-oped Procedure IP0P04-RC-0006 to meet'the commitment. This item is considered closed.

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I South Texas SSER 7 6-2

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7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 7.2 Reactor Trip System 7.2.2 Specific Findings ,

u 7.2.2.5 Nuclear Instrumentation Source-Range Preamplifier Modification j As stated in SSER 6, HL&P commir.ted to install a second new model preamplifier in  !

the Unit 2 source-range channel before fuel loading. The new model preamplifier was installed in Unit 2 on December 15, 1988. 'This item is considered closed.

l Additionally, HL&P committed to incorporate the methodology for the channel cal-ibration of the new model source-range preamplifiers in the Technical Specifica-tions (TS). The methodology has been incorporated in:TS Table 4.3-1. This item is considered closed.

7.3 Engineered Safety Features System 7.3.1 Description 7.3.1.12 Control Room Envelope Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning System (HVAC) Actuation Radiation Monitor Logic i l

As stated in SSER 6, HL&P committed to provide operating procedures to address the TS action statements in response to failures of radiation monitors. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that a procedere had b9en developed and'will 4 be implemented once the modifications have been made. .The actions are scheduled i to be completed by June 1, 1989. I Toxic Jas Monitoring System By letter dated March 8, 1988, HL&P proposed eight TS changes pertaining to the operation and surveillance of the toxic gas monitoring system. Four of these changes (revised actuation logic, separate power supply, split annunciator, and  :

relocation of the sample point) were evaluated by the staff in SSER 6 (dated j January 1989) and found acceptable. The remaining four proposed changes (delet- '

ing of hydrazine, increasing the ammonia channel alarm setpoint, revising the high toxic gas response time, and acetaldehyde monitoring) have been reviewed and evaluated by the staff and are. discussed below.

(1) Deleting hydrazine from the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and TS as a monitored isolated actuation ~ chemical.

The staff independently analyzed the control room habitability with respect to maintaining the control room in a safe and habitable condition following South Texas SSER 7 7-1 4

b __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ .

a postulated spill of the entire amount (4000 pounds) of hydrazine stored at the site using the methodology described in NUREG-0570, " Toxic Vapor Concentrations in the Control Room Following a Postulated Accidental Re-lease." The staff concluded that the postulated hydrazine spill would pose no significant hazard to the control room operators.

(2) Increasing the setpoint for the ammonia channel in the'FSAR and TS to' 25 parts per million The staff determined, by analysis using the methodology' described in NUREG-0570, that raising the setpoint of the ammonia channel to 25 parts per mil-lion (ppm) would pose no significant hazard to the control room operators.

The proposed change does not involve an increase in the probability of an accident and would not create the possibility of a new type of hazard, but would reduce the margin of safety from the existing setpoint of 5 ppm. How-ever, the staff determined that, with the setpoint at 25 ppm for ammonia, the control room operators would still have ample time to take protective actions when necessary, in accordance with the guidelines provided in Regula-tory Guides 1.78 and 1.95. Accordingly, raising the setpoint for ammonia to 25 ppm would not' adversely affect the control room habitability.

(3) Revising the TS response time for isolation upon a high toxic gas signal from 25 seconds to 5 seconds The staff determined that the proposed change would pose no significant 1 hazard to the control room operators, does not involve an increase in the probability of an accident, would not create the possibility of a<new type of hazard, and does not reduce the margin of safety provided by the TS.

Accordingly, this modification would not adversely affect the control room habitability. j i

(4) Revising the FSAR to add acetaldehyde as a monitored chemical (automatic '

isolation of the control room is not provided)

The staff determined, by analysis using the methodology described in NUREG-0570, that the proposed change would pose no significant hazard to the con-trol room operators, does not involve an increase in the probability of an accident, would not create the possibility of a new type of hazard, and do'es not reduce the margin of safety provided in the TS. Accordingly,sthis ,

modification would not adversely affect the control room habitability.  !

On the basis of the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the four changes will not adversely affect the control room habitability and, therefore, are acceptable. The bases for acceptance are that the results of the staff's inde-pendent analyses using the methodology described in NUREG-0570 meet (1) the re-quirements specified in Task Action Plan Item III.D.3.4 of NUREG-0737 and (2) the acceptance criteria provided in Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 6.4 (NUREG-0800).

South Texas SSER 7 7-2 l

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7.3.2 Specific Findings 7.3.2.8 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls (IE Bulletin 80-06  !

Concerns)

As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to perform a confirmatory test that would verify the conclusions pertaining to the status of the reset controls. HL&P has revised FSAR Section 14.2.12 and developed Confirmatory Test Procedures 1-SF-P-01 and 1-SF-P-02. This item is considered closed.

7.3.2.13 Solid State Logic Protection System Test Circuit Modification As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to make a circuit modification developed by  !

the equipment vendor to resolve a problem identified in the solid state logic j protection system test circuits concerning slave relays. The commitment was made in a letter dated July 18, 1985. By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P  ;

l notified the staff that the field change notices had been completed for Units 1 and 2. The modifications were reviewed by the NRC regional office and are dis-cussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-498/87-11 and 50-499/87-11. This item is considered closed.

7.5 Information Systems Important to Safety 7.5.2 Specific Findings (

As stated in SSER 4, HL&P proposed that FSAR Tables 7.5-1 and 78.7-1 be modified i to show reactor containment fan cooler fan status and component coolant water flow as the Category 2 variables used to monitor containment heat removal. The tables were revised in FSAR Amendment 60. (

This item is considered closed.

7.5.2.5 Qualified Display Processing System Software Verification and Validation Program Issue 9 - Final Summary of Trouble Reports As stated in SSER 3, HL&P committed to resolve several trouble reports. By letter dated March 19, 1987, HL&P provided the final report on the closure of the trouble reports. This item is considered closed.

7.5.2.9 Qualified Display Processing System (QDPS)

As stated in SSER 6, HL&P committed to validate the programming modifications to the QDPS by using a test jig that was a replica of the modifications and was traceable to the hardware and software actually installed. By letter dated January 30, 1989, HL&P submitted its final. report on the QDPS verification and validation program. The report included a discussion of the commitments made in SSER 6. This item is considered closed.

EMI Susceptibility i

As stated in SSER 4, HL&P committed to zone the QDPS equipment rooms so that the use of transceivers in the frequency range of susceptibility will be prohibited  !

I South Texas SSER 7 7-3

during plant operation. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that it had not made this commitment.

There are no transmitters in the 50- to 76-MHz.

range of susceptibility for database processing unit to display datalinks. Any specific effects encountered will be addressed on an individual basis. This item l is considered closed.

South Texas SSER 7 7-4

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8 ELECTRIC POWER

• i 8.1 Introduction  !

Independence of Offsite Power Circuit _s As stated in SSER 3, HL&P committed, in a letter dated March 27, 1987, to supply  !

redundant sources of control power to the 13.8-kV switchgear. In a letter dated {

February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 modifications were complete. This item is considered closed.

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8.1.5 Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers - Bulletin 88-10 )

In its initial response (dated December 2, 1988) to Bulletin 88-10, HL&P re-quested that the date for the submittal of the complete response be extended to April 1, 1989. The staff evaluated this request in SSER 6 and concluded that the health and safety of the public would not be affected by allowing Unit 2 to proceed with fuel loading. The staff's conclusion was based on the following: {

HL&P requires that circuit breakers used in Class 1E applications be tested in accordance with general prerequisite procedures (SG-E-01),  !

plant maintenance procedures (0PMP05-NA-0004), or plant station pro- '

cedures (IPSP06-NZ-0006) before startup. The staff has reviewed these procedures and finds that they are acceptable for verifying the func-tional capability and performance of the circuit breakers.

By letters dated February 20 and March 14, 1989, HL&P informed the staff of the progress that has been made in the review. HL&P's review of Class IE circuit  !

breakers stored in warehouses as spare parts entailed matching each circuit i breaker to a purchase order and then reviewing each receiving package that con-tained the certificate of conformance (C of C) for the respective circuit break- i ers. Each C of C was reviewed to determine whether it was from the supplier or i j

the actual circuit breaker manufacturer (CBM). 1 The documentation suppliers review of Class 1E discussed circuit above resulted in the identification of 12 breakers. l Each of these suppliers was contacted to determine if it could trace breakers purchased by HL&P and Bechtel to the  !

CBM.

pliers.

HL&P stated that satisfactory responses had been received from the sup-  !

HL&P has also undertaken-a review to identify any circuit breakers that may have been upgraded from commercial grade.

In addition, HL&P performed a sample review of the methodology used by the pri- i mary supplier (Telemecanique) for tracing breakers to the CBM. HL&P stated that l

the primary supplier could adequately trace the breakers to the CBM for all of j the packages audited. The audit was done on a population that represented 84 percent of the breakers. { '

HL&P is continuing to develop its response to the bulletin. As a followup to  !

its sample audit of the primary supplier, HL&P will ensure that traceability is j ensured through an audit of each purchase order that included circuit breakers I

i South Texas SSER 7 8-1 ,

identified in accordance with the bulletin. This purchase order audit is also under way for the other suppliers. Further, if the circuit breakers were pro-cured from intermediary suppliers, the intermediary suppliers will be audited to ensure that their breakers are consistently traceable to the CBM. An inserv-ice breaker determined by the audit to have inadequate traceability will be re-placed with a breaker for which satisfactory documentation exists, or continued operation with the installed breaker will be justified until it can be replaced no later than startup after the first refueling outage.

Item 7 of the bulletin requires that the molded-case circuit breakers installed af ter August 1,1988, for safety-related applications be traceable to the CBM and appropriately upgraded or manufactured by and procured from a CBM under a 10 CFR 50, Appendix B program. HL&P has addressed Item 7 of the bulletin by re-1 l

viewing procurement records for Class 1E molded case circuit breakers purchased and received from August 1 ability in the same way as,was done for the warehouseHL&P spares.1983, stated that through D satisfactory responses had been received from the suppliers. HL&P is contin-uing its review using the same method for establishing traceability to the CBMs as that described earlier for the warehouse spares. To ensure that suppliers do not supply refurbished circuit breakers to South Texas, HL&P and Bechtel have i j

modified their purchasing documentation to highlight that only new circuit breakers are to be supplied.

HL&P has conducted an audit on a population representing 84 percent of the Class 1E breakers in the warehouse and those purchased since August 1983. No irregularities have been identified. Although the test program and record re-view performed by HL&P do not provide complete verification of all the perform-ance requirements and characteristics of molded case circuit breakers, the NRC staff believes that the test program that all Class 1E breakers receive at South Texas and the record review provide a reasonable assurance that they meet the  !

performance safety. This,requirements and characteristics most important to ensuring reactor considered in conjunction with (1) the limited number of noncon-forming breakers that may remain installed in safety-related systems following implementation of the actions requested by the bulletin, (2) the existence of redundant safety-related systems in nuclear power reactors that are required by NRC regulations, (3) the license-required inservice testing of installed circuit breakers performed to demonstrate their functional performance, and (4) the low frequency of occurrence of seismic events and severe electrical faults, provides a reasonable assurance that South Texas can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

HL&P has committed to complete the actions requested in Bulletin 88-10 and sub-mit to the NRC staff by April 1, 1989, the information requested in the bulle-tin along with a schedule for the expeditious completion of the remaining ac-tions.

Although complete traceability may not have been established by April 1, 1989, the assurance.

current status combined with ongoing efforts provides acceptable 8.3 Onsite Power System 8.3.1 AC Power System As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to take corrective action in regard to all transformers that was consistent with the vendor's technical bulletin. In a South Texas SSER 7 8-2

letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that corrective actions had been taken in accordance with the vendor's recommendations and those specified by the NRC in Information Notice 84-84. The actions were reviewed by the staff and are discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-498/87-19 and 50-499/87-19.

This item is considered closed.

As stated in SSER 4, HL&P committed to verify that the analytical methods used for calculating the voltages at all distribution levels were valid and to per-form a test before full power operation.

In a letter dated August 2, 1988, HL&P stated it had performed the required testing at Unit 1 and submitted the results of the analysis of the voltage ver-ification test to substantiate the accuracy of the South Texas voltage analysis.

The test was performed in accordance with the guidance of Position 4 of Branch Technical Position (BTP) PSB-1 (NUREG-0800). The results indicate that the measured voltages are no more than 2.23 percent (steady state) and 2.99 percent (transient) below the analytically derived voltages. These values are less than the maximum value of 3 percent allowed by Position 4 of BTP PSB-1. The staff l therefore considers the verification test results to be satisfactory, i

The testing was performed at Unit 1. The results, however, were applicable to both units. In a conference call, the staff requested that HL&P provide addi-tional information to clarify the applicability of the test results for Unit 1 to Unit 2. By letter dated February 14, 1989, HL&P provided the following justification for using Unit 1 test results for Unit 2:

(1) One mathematical model was used for both units.

(2) The power system capacity and voltages are essentially identical for both units.

(3) The transformers for both units have been purchased under the same specifi-cation with the same specified impedance.

(4) The physical layout of the equipment for both units is virtually identical, resulting in essentially similar cable lengths for both units.

(5) The loads for both units are basically the same.

On the basis of the above, the staff concludes that the mathematical model, design, and physical layout for Unit 2 are basically identical to those for Unit 1, and, therefore, the successful verification tests conducted satisfy the requirement of BTP PSB-1 regarding voltage verification testing for South Texas Units 1 and 2.

I South Texas SSER 7 8-3 L - .

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9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling j

9.1. 2 Spent Fuel Storage As stated on page 36 of Appendix BB to SSER 6, HL&P committed to modify plant procedures to include a requirement to inspect the rack configuration in the  ;

spent fuel pool after a seismic event. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P ~

stated that Plant Procedures IP0P04-SY-0001 and 2P0P04-SY-0001 have been revised to include the inspections. This item is considered closed.

9.4 Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems f

i 9.4.2 Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation System (Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Systems)

By letter dated January 25, 1989, HL&P proposed changing the fuel handling build-ing exhaust air subsystem electric heater capacity from 50 kW to 38 kW. This

• change was requested in order to permit the heaters to operate without damage at i the air flow rates that occur when both of the exhaust filter trains are operat-ing. Originally, a flow switch provided in each filter unit automatically turned  !

off the heating element to prevent damage to the element when the air flow rate dropped because of the operation of both trains.

The fuel handling building (FHB) exhaust air (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) subsystem exhausts air from the interior of the FHB to the plant {

main vent stack. This subsystem is designed as safety related and seismic Cate-gory I and consists of two 100 percent-capacity exhaust filter trains, three 50 percent-capacity exhaust booster fans', three 50 percent-capacity main exhaust i i

fans, and associated dampers and instrumentation. The system design exhaust air flow capacity is 29,000 1 10 percent cubic feet per minute.

Each redundant exhaust filter train consists of three 33-1/3 percent-capacity filter units. Each filter unit contains an electric heating element, prefilters, high efficiency particulate air filters, and carbon absorbers. The electric heating elements are provided to decrease the relative humidity of the incoming air, since the efficiency of iodine removal by the charcoal absorbers is adversely affected by high humidity in the air stream.

A flow switch provided downstream of each exhaust filter unit automatically turns off the heating element to prevent damage to the element when the air flow rate drops below a minimum flow value. Currently, the minimum flow set)oint is 9330 cubic feet per minute. When all three trains are actuated, the ex1aust flow is split between the six operating filter units (two filter trains, each composed of three filter units). Therefore, the flow through each unit is 4833 cubic feet per minute (29,000 cubic feet per minute divided by 6). Since this flow rate is less than the setpoint, the flow switch prevented the heater from energizing.

I South Texas SSER 7 9-1

The offsite and control room dose calculations for the loss-of-coolant accident and fuel-handling accident are based on an iodine removal efficiency assuming that the relative humidity of the incoming air is maintained at or below 70 per-cent. The proposed solution to this problem is to derate the heaters from 50 kW to 38 kW. At 38 kW the heaters can operate at the lower flow rate (assum-ing all trains are operating) without damage. The incoming air to the charcoal filters will be maintained at or below 70 percent relative humidity with various combinations of trains operating; therefore, the existing dose calculation assumptions relative to iodine removal efficiencies will be maintained.

The staff concurs in HL&P's evaluation and further finds, on the basis of the review, that the proposed change is consistent with SRP Section 6.5.1 (NUREG-0800), Regulatory Guide 1.52, General Design Criterion 61 of Appendix A to '

10 CFR Part 50 as it relates to the design of systems for radioactivity control under normal and postulated accident conditions, and the Technical Specifica-tions. Therefore, the modification is acceptable.

9. 5 Other Auxiliary Systems 9.5.1 Fire Protection 9.5.1.4 General Plant Guidelines l Building Design j As stated in SSER 3, HL&P informed the staff that the seismic gap penetration seals were being replaced with approved fire rated seals. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that the seals had been replaced.

This item is considered closed.

Lighting and Communication As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to conduct a preoperational test to ensure that portable radio frequencies would not affect the actuation of protective relays. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated the preoperational radio-frequency test had been completed on October 27, 1987. This item is considered closed.

9.5.1.5 Fire Detection and Suppression Portable Fire Extinguishers As stated in SSER 4, HL&P committed to install portable fire extinguishers in the intake structure. By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that the fire extinguishers had been installed and are addressed in Procedure OPEP03-FP-0020. This item is considered closed.

9.5.2 Communications Systems 9.5.2.2 Interplant (Plant-to-Of fsite) Communication Systems As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to have procedures covering preventive main-tenance and operability checks to ensure reliable operation of site emergency communications available before fuel loading. By letter dated February 17, 1989, South Texas SSER 7 9-2

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-4

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HL&P stated the activities were covered in Interdepartmental Procedure 1.'41Q. l This item is considered closed.

j 9.5.5~. Emergency Diesel Cooling Water System I Conclusions I

As stated in SSER 6, HL&P, in a letter dated December 9, 1988, committed to per-form the analysis and testing described in that supplement. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P informed the staff that thee corrective actions had been incorporated in the procedures.

the first and second refueling outages. The Hydrostatic testing Unit 1 seal will betest pressure performed will be during completed during the first refueling outage.

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South Texas SSER 7 9-3 '

11 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 11.4 Solid Waste Management System 11.4.1 System Description.

1 As stated storage of in thewaste.

solid SER, HL&P committed to construct an onsite staging facility for By letter dated December 3, 1988, HL&P stated that low-level waste will be stored on site in approved containers awaiting shipment to an approved repository.

11.5 Process Systems and Effluent Radiological Monitoring Instrumentation and Sampling As stated Class in SSER 3, seismic 4, HL&P Category committed to upgrade the purge duct to ASME Code Sa I criteria.

is complete for Unit 2 and that for Unit 1 the work is scheduled to be during the first refueling outage.

In addition, HL&P committed to install limit switches on the sample selection  ;

valves and provide indication in the control room of the engineered safety fea-ture bypass / inoperable status monitoring system. These changes have been com- l i pleted outage. for Unit 2; the changes for Unit 1 will be made during the first refueling 4

i South Texas SSER 7 11-1 i

m _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - -

13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13.1 Organizational Structure of Applicant By letter dated November 12, 1988, Analysis Report (FSAR) for the South Texas Project.HL&P submitted Amendment 62 to the Amendment 62 revised the corporate and plant organization. Subsequently, by letter dated December 7, 1988, HL&P provided annotated page changes to Chapter 13 of the FSAR that clarified the plant org6nizational changes. HL&P has stated that the revised organizational structure discussed below will be incorporated in a future FSAR amendment.

13.1.1 Management and Technical Support Organization 13.1.1.2 Organizational Arrangements The following changes have been implemented at the South Texas Project:

(1) The Manager-Environmental Department reports to the Vice President-Energy Production and is responsible for the areas of environmental licensing, air and water handling. quality, ecology, water resources, and nonradioactive waste (2) The Vice President-Engineering & Construction is responsible for the manage-ment, coordination, scheduli,g, cost control, engineering, construction, material handling, nuclear engineering, and startup of the South Texas Proj-ect. Reporting to the Vice President-Engineering & Construction are'the General ect. Manager-0perations Support and the General Manager-South Texas Proj-Reporting to the General Manager-0perations Support are the Manager-Unit 1 Operations Support and the Manager-Nuclear Engineering. Reporting to the General Manager-South Texas Project is the Manager-Nuclear Purchasing and Materials Management. (See Figure 13.1.)

The staff has reviewed these changes and finds them acceptable because they meet the appropriate acceptance criteria of Section 13.1.1 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) (NUREG-0800).

13.1.2 Operating Organization 13.1.2.1 Plant Organization The organization has been changed as follows:

Reporting directly to the Plant Manager are the Unit 1 Plant Superintendent, Unit (see 2Figure Plant 13.2).

Superintendent, and the Integrated Planning & Scheduling Manager (1) Unit 1 Plant Superintencenti The Unit 1 Plant Superintendent has direct responsibility for the oper-ation, maintenance, plant engineering, and technical services functions South Texas SSER 7 13-1

=

for Unit 1 and has functional responsibility for the Plant Operations Department cnd the Maintenance Department.

(2) Unit 2 Plant Superintendent The Unit 2 Plant Superintendent has direct responsibility for the opera-tions, maintenance, plant engineering, and technical services functions for Unit 2 and has functional responsibility for the Plant Engineering Department and Technical Services Department.

(3) Integrated Planning & Scheduling Manager The Integrated Planning & Scheduling Manager is responsible for the overall coordination and management of planning and scheduling and outage activities.

(4) ' Maintenance Department Manager The Maintenance Department Manager reports to the respective Plant Superin-tendent regarding the day-to-day activities on the affected unit and receives programmatic and administrative direction from the Unit 1 Plant Superinten-dent. The Maintenance Department Manager is also responsible for corrective and preventive maintenance for both units and the common support facilities of the South Texas units.

(5) Plant Engineering Department Manager The Plant Engineering Department Manager reports to the respective Plant Superintendent and receives programmatic and administrative direction from the Unit 2 Plant Superintendent and is responsible for testing of plant equipment and for providing technical support for plant operation and main-tenance. The Plant Engineering Department Manager also directs the develop-ment and implementation of the initial startup test program.

(6) Technical Services Department Manager The Technical Services Department Manager reports to the respective Plant Superintendent and receives programmatic and administrative direction from the Unit 2 Plant Superintendent and is directly responsible for all station chemical operations, chemical analysis, and health' physics activities.

The staff has reviewed the revised organization and finds it acceptable because it meets the appropriate acceptance criteria of Sections 13.1.2 and 13.1.3 of the SRP.

13.2 Training 13.2.1 Reactor Operator Training 13.2.1.1 Training Program for SR0 and R0 Candidates 13.2.1.1.3 Conclusions As stated in the SER, HL&P committed to have the South Texas simulator meet Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.149, Revision 0, as of July 1988. By letter dated South Texas SSER 7 13-2

February 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that it will apply for certification of the simulator within 46 months of the effective date of RG 1.149, Revision 1.

13.4 Operational Review 13.4.2 Independent Review 13.4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Review Board As stated in the SER, HL&P informed the staff that the Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) would be in place 6 months before fuel loading. By letter dated February ber 12, 1986, 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that NSRB activities began on Novem-and the first meeting was held on December 1, 1986. This item is considered closed.

13.6 Industrial Security 13.6.1 Introduction As stated in SSER 5, HL&P committed to implement various actions in regard to security.

In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that the only re-maining systems.

action is a comparison of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 intrusion detection The action is scheduled to be completed by June 1, 1989.

South Texas SSER 7 13-3

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14 INITIAL TEST PROGRAM In SSER 6, the staff reported that two of three resolved items relating to the initial test program required incorporatiori into the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The items have been closed out as follows:

(1) Chapter 14.2 By letter dated February 22, 1989, HL&P committed to update

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l its response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) 423.22, Items 5.u and 5,mm, with respect to the testing of main steam isolation valves, to reflect changes already made to the FSAR and its response to RAI 640.08N, Items 5.u and 5.mm.

(2) Chapter 14.2.12.3.10 - By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P committed to incorporate into the acceptance criteria for the pressurizer spray and heater response tests the statement that the initial startup test procedure will compare the test results with predicted responses in the Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system startup procedure.

The staff has determined that, on the basis of the commitments, the initial test program 1s acceptable.

South Texas SSER 7 14-1

15 ACCIDENT Ai4ALYSIS 15.4 Reactivity and Power Distribution Anomalies 15.4.6 Inadvertent Boron Dilution As stated in the SER, HL&P indicated that all valves that result in boron dilu-tion during mode 6 will be locked and that this will be specified in the Tech-nical Specifications. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated the re-quit ont has been included in Technical Specification Sections 3/4.1 and 3/4.2.

This ..em is considered closed.

15.8 Anticipated Transients Without Scram 15.8.1 ATWS Rule - ATWS Mitigation System Discussion and Evaluation (4) Quality Assurance As stated it SSER 6, HL&P committed to maintain.the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) mitigating system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) equipment in accordance with approved plant procedures. In a letter dated December 22, 1987, HL&P pro-vided additional information regarding the AMSAC equipment. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P noted that the procedural guidance will be developed before the AMSAC is declared operational.

(6) Operating Bypasses and (7) Means for Bypasses As stated in SSER 6, HL&P committed to conduct a human factors review of the oper-ating bypass indication and the bypass controls of the AMSAC consistent with the plant's detailed control room design process. By letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff ti at human factors were considered in the AMSAC design.

This item is considered c osed.

15.8.2 Generic Letter 83 Actions (4) Reactor Trip System Reliability Improvement Action Item 4.1: Vendor-Related Modifications and Action Item 4.2: Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance Program for Reactor Trip Breakers As stated in SSER 1, HL&P committed to have Westinghouse replace the undervoltage attachment on the reactor trip breaker and make all vendor-related modifications before fuel loading. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that these modifications had been made. This item is considered closed.

South Texas SSER 7 15-1

Additionally, HL&P committed to develop trending procedures for undervoltage trip and breaker insulation resistance. In a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P stated that Procedure OPMP05-ZA-0001 had'been developed. This item is considered closed.

Action Item 4.3: Automatic Actuation of Shunt Trip Attachment for Westinghouse and B&W Plants '

Item 4.2 requires modifications be miide to improve the reliability of an actuation of the shunt trip attachment on the reactor trip breakers.

HL&P had not specified the implementation date for these modifications.AsBy stated letterin SSER 1, dated February 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that the test panel had been in-stalled on October 14, 1985. This item is considered closed.

Additionally, HL&P committed to write test procedures that would verify the operability of control room manual reactor trip switch contacts and wiring before startup after each refueling. By a letter dated February 17, 1989, HL&P informed the staff that a test procedure was completed on June 16, 1987, that satisfies the requirement. This item is considered closed.

HL&P also committed to write test procedures to be used independently to verify operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip devices. By a letter dated Febru-ary 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that procedures to perform on-line func-tional testing were completed on June 16, 1987.

This item is considered closed.

South Texas SSER 7 15-2

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l 16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Monitoring of Component Cyclic or Transient Limits (Table 5.7-1)

As stated in SSER 6, HL&P committed to develop procedures to adequately track the transients listed in Table 3.9-8 in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The commit-ment was confirmed in a letter dated December 7, 1988. HL&P met the commitment developing Procedure OPEP2-ZE-0001.

This item is considered closed.

by (

The following two issues have been resolved in this supplement:

Toxic Gas Monitoring System In Section 7.3.1.12 of this supplement, the staff evaluated changes to the toxic tions. gas monitoring system that were reflected in the Technical Specifica-The changes were (1) deleting hydrazine as a monitored isolated actu-ation chemical, (2) increasing the setpoint for the ammonia channel to 25 parts per million, (3) revising the response time for isolation on a high toxic a gas signal monitoring chemical. from 25 seconds to 5 seconds, and (4) adding acetaldehyde as The staff concluded that the changes would not affect the control room habitability and were acceptable. The Technical Specifica-tion sections that were ch2nged were 3.3.3.7.b and 4.7.7.e.5. {

Heater Capacity Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Air System Filter Train In Section 9.4.2 of this supplement, the staff reviewed HL&P's request to derate the heaters in the filter train from 50kW to 38kW. The staff evalu-ated the change and concluded that it is consistent with SRP Section 6.5.1 (NUREG-0800), Regulatory Guide 1.52, and General Design Criterion 61 of Ap--

pendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as it relates to the design of systems for radio-activity control under normal and postulated accident conditions.

is reflected in Technical Specification Sections 4.7.8.d.4 and 4.9.12.d.4.The change South Texas SSER 7 16-1

18 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING 18.2 Safety Parameter Display System As stated in SSER 6, HL&P committed to make changes in Unit 2 concerning the By letter dated Februarysafety parameter display syster before startup from the first 17, 1989, HL&P notified the staff that the modifica- s r tions are scheduled to be completed by August 1, 1990, during the first refuel-ing outage.

South Texas SSER 7 18-1

22 FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND INDEMNITY REQUIREMENTS 22.1 Onsite Property Damage Insurance On December 16, 1988, the NRC issued Operating License NPF-78 authorizing opera-tion up to 5 percent of full power for Unit 2. A temporary exemption from the schedule requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(5)(i) until April 1, 1989, was contained in that license. The staff's evaluation of the temporary exemption was given in SSER 6.

On March 17, 1989, the NRC published in the _ Federal Register an immediately ef-fective final rule amending 10 CFR 50.54(w). The rule establishes April 4, 1990, as the date by which licensees are to obtain insurance policies that prioritize insurance proceeds for stabilization and decontamination after an accident and provide for payment of proceeds to an independent trustee who will disburse funds for decontamination and cleanup before any other purpose. Therefore, an exemption from the schedule requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(5)(i) is not needed to issue a full power license.

22.2 Funds for Decommissioning The licensee has been granted a temporary exemption, until July 27, 1990, from the requirement of 10 CFR 50.33(k) to provide decommissioning funding informa-tion for South Texas Unit 2.

financial report (s). The licensee The staff has reviewed the licensee's most recent has ample resources to safely maintain the facility in a shutdown condition in the event that for some unlikely unforeseen condition, the plant were to permanently cease oper,ation before July 27, 1990.

For the limited period of the exemption the licensee has adequate resources to accomplish the underlying purpose for the decommissioning funding rule.

South Texas SSER 7 22-1

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APPENDIX A CONTINUATION OF CHRONOLOGY OF NRC STAFF RADIOLOGICAL REVIEW 0F THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT December 6, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding schedules for responses to NRC generic correspondence.

December 6, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding Revision 2 to Bulletin 88-005 regarding investigation report for South Texas Unit 2.  !

);

December 6, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding draft proprietary WCAP-12067,  !

" South Texas Unit 2 Pressurizer Sur 4 Heat Removal] Line Stratification."ge Line and RHR [ Residual j

December 7, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding discussion of review of  !

j Technical Specification Table 5.7-1, regarding apparent dis-crepancies between Technical Specification table and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Table 3.9-8, concerning the monitoring of plant transients to ensure cyclic stress limits. l j

December 7, 1988 1 Letter from licensee forwarding annotated FSAR pa vide advance clarification of plant organization.ges to pro-December 7, 1988

. Letter to licensee forwarding environmental assessment and 1

finding of no significant impact concerning the January 15, l 1986, request for exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.

December 7, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact concerning the December 12, 1988, request for temporary exemption from the schedular requirements of the decommissioning rule.

December 7, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-77 and 50-499/88-77 for inspection conducted on November 14-18, 1988. '

December 8, 1988 Letter from licensee submitting additional information on the status of the equipment qualification program.

December 8, 1988 Letter from licensee responding to the November 8, 1988, request concerning specific disposition of preoperational test results review 2-SI-P-01 (safety injection system train Report M regvding urresolved item noted in Inspection 50-499/88-69.

South Texas SSER 7 1 Appendix A

December 8, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-71 and 50-499/88-71 for inspection conducted on October 31-November 4, 1988.

December 9, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding preliminary response to Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal."

December 9, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding response to NRC questions concerning corrective action to address microbiologically reduced corrosion in emergency diesel generator jacket water.

December 9, 1988 Letter from licensee certifying that enclosed final draft Technical Specifications are consistent with FSAR and as-built facilities.

December 9, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding proprietary WCAP-12067 and nonproprietary WCAP-12087 regarding South Texas Units 1 and 2 pressurizer surge line and RHR line stratification.

December 12, 1988 Letter from licensee informing the NRC staff that equipment covered by seismic and environmental qualification is qualified and installed.

December 13, 1988 Letter from licensee responding to Generic Letter 88-14,

" Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."

December 13, 1988 Letter from licensee discussing commitment to install low-noise preamplifier in remaining source-range channel before fuel loading.

December 13, 1988 Letter froa licensee documenting its commitment to submit inservice inspection program plan for first 10 year inspec-tion interval.

December 14, 1988 Letter from licensee providing supplemental response to NRC Bulletin 88-001, " Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breakers."

December 14, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding annotated FSAR text and re-vised figures concerning updated information on plant subsidence.

December 14, 1988 Letter from licensee responding to NRC November 15, 1988, letter concerning violations noted in Inspection Reports 50-498/88-46 and 50-499/88-46.

December 15, 1988 Letter from licensee submitting notification that all me-chanical equipment covered by seismic and environmental qualification is qualified and installed and that mainte-nance and surveillance programs to preserve qualification of equipment are in place.

South Texas SSER 7 2 Appendix A

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December 15, 1988 Letter to licensee granting waiver to NRC-administered ex-aminations on Unit 2 in response to August 31, 1988, request.

December 15, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding proprietary WCAP-11977 and nonproprietary WCAP-11978, " Row 1 and Row 2 Steam Generator Tube U-Bend Heat Treatment Licensing Report for South Texas Units 1 and 2."

December 15, 1988 Letter to licensee acknowledging receipt of October 14, 1988, letter informing NRC of steps taken to correct violations noted in Inspection Reports 50-498/88-11 and 50-499/88-11.

December 15, 1988 Letter to licensee acknowledging receipt of September 30, 1988, letter informing NRC of steps taken to correct violations noted in Inspection Reports 50-498/88-47 and 50-499/88-47.

December 15, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-78 and 50-499/88-78 for inspection conducted on November 14-18, 1988, and notice of violation.

Decemb(r 16, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding License No. NPF-76, authorizing operation at up to 5 percent of full power.

December 19, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding special report regarding inoperable meteorological towers' wind direction instruments.

December 20, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding report for South Texas Project regarding the City of Austin vs. Houston Lighting &

Power Litigation Record Review Program (Phase I).

December 20, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-74 and 50-499/88-74 for inspection conducted on November 14-18, 1988.

December 22, 1988 Letter to licensee advising that November 22, 1988, Revi-sion 22 to quality assurance program description is consist-ent with provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and is acceptable.

December 22, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-75 and 50-499/88-75 for inspection conducted on November 14-18 and 28-30, 1988.

December 22, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-67 and 50-499/88-67 for inspection conducted on October 1-31, 1988.

December 22, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-81 and 50-499/88-81 for inspection conducted on November 28-December 2, 1988.

South Texas SSER 7 3 Appendix A

December 22, 1988 Letter from licensee responding to NRC December 5, 1988, letter concerning violations noted in Investigation Report 4-88-004.

December 23, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-83 and 50-499/88-83 for inspection conducted on December 5-9, 1988.

December 28, 1988 Letter f rom licensee forwarding supplemental response to NRC Compliance Bulletin 88-002, " Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generator Tubes."

December 29, 1988 Letter from licensee requesting revision to service list for documents transmitted to utility.

December 29, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding annotated FSAR pages reflect-ing clarification and repositioning of containment isolation valve table from Chapter 6 to Chapter 16.

December 30, 1988 Letter from licensee forwarding proprietary slide presenta-tion material from NRC December 1,1988, meeting on bottom-mounted instrument thimble wear plan, description of how thimble tube wear rate is predicted, and comparison of September and May 1988 wear results.

December 30, 1988 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-84 and 50-499/88-84 for inspection conducted on December 12-16, 1988.

December 30, 1988 Letter to licensee acknowledging receipt of December 14, 1988, letter informing NRC of steps taken to correct violations noted in Inspection Reports 50-498/88-46 and 50-499/88-46.

December 30, 1988 Letter to licensee advising that November 21, 1988, Amend-ment 62 to quality assurance program description is consist-ent with provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and is acceptable.

January 3,1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-72 and 50-499/88-72 for inspection conducted on November 14-18, 1988, and notice of violation.

January 4, 1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-73 and 50-499/88-73 for inspection conducted on November 1-30, 1988, and notice of violation.

January 5, 1989 Letter to licensee requesting that it provide dates for completion of low power testing and request for full power license.

January 5, 1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-70 and 50-499/88-70 for inspection conducted on October 3-November 4,1988, and notice of violation.

South Texas SSER 7 4 Appendix A'

January 5,1989 Letter to licensee forwarding synopsis of October 20, 1988, i

report concerning allegations of discrimination against employee.

1 January 5, 1989 Letter to licensee requesting date at which all low power testing is expected to be completed and the date for which the licensee will request issuance of full power license for Unit 2.

January 12, 1989 Letter to licensee requesting additional information con-cerning pressurizer surge line thermal stratification for Unit 2.

January 13, 1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-85 and 50-499/88-85 for inspection conducted on December 12-15, 1988.

January 13, 1989 Letter to licensee requesting that it retain for at least 6 months all molded-case unacceptable for use. circuit breakers identified as January 13, 1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-82 and 50-499/88-82 for inspection conducted on December 5-9, 1988, and notice of violation.

January 13, 1989 Letter from fourth quarterlicensee forwarding Safeguards Event Log for the of 1988.

January 16, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding Licensee Event Report 88-001 regarding control room ventilation actuation to recirculation mode because of a high hydrogen chloride, ammonia, acetic acid, and vinyl acetate trip on a toxic gas monitor.

January 17, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding proposed modification to toxic gas monitoring technical specifications.

January 17, 1989 Letter from licensee concerning leakage of aluminum-bronze essential cooling water system.

January 17, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding additional information in support of the evaluation of thermal stratification of the pressurizer surge lines.

January 17, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding response to NRC Generic Letter 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal."

January 19, 1989 Letter to licensee confirming January 26, 1989 enforcement conference in NRC Region IV office to discuss o,peration without containment sump vortex suppressors.

January 19, 1989 Letter to licensee correcting Enclosure 1 reference to NPF-78 to NUREG-1344.

South Texas SSER 7 5 Appendix A

January 23, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding Revision 9 to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) OEPP01-ZA-0001, " Station Procedure - Non-Safety Related (Q) Emergency."

January 23, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding schedules for responses to NRC generic correspondence.

January 24, 1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-89 and 50-499/88-89 for inspection conducted on October 24, 198E, through January 1, 1989.

January 25, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding change in senior operator status.

January 25, 1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-86 and 50-499/88-86 for inspection conducted on December 1-31, 1988.

January 25, 1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Inspection Reports 50-498/88-87 and 50-499/88-87 for inspection conducted on December 19-22, 1988.

January 25, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding proposed amendment to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

January 27, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding test report on plant prompt notification system for fourth quarter of 1988.

January 27, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding " Evaluation of Thermal Stratification for South Texas Units 1 & 2 RHR Lines."

January 30, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding submittal of Supplement 2 to the qualified display processing system verification and validation program final report.

January 30, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding notification of change in senior operator status.

January 31, 1989 Letter from licensee advising that facility will be ready to operate above 5 percent power on March 15, 1989.

February 1, 1989 Letter from licensee responding to January 3, 1989, letter concerning violations noted in Inspection Report 50-499/88-72.

February 1,1989 Letter from licensee forwarding evaluation of thermal stratification for the South Texas Units 1 and 2 pressur-izer surge line.

February 2,1989 Letter from licensee forwarding notification of change in senior operator status.

February 2, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding modifications to the safety parameter display system (SPOS) for the first refueling outage.

South Texas SSER 7 6 Appendix A

V February 6,1989 Letter from licensee forwarding Licensee Event Report 89-001 regarding a partial loss of offsite power caused by actuation of fire protection system.

February 7, 1989 Letter to licensee forwarding withdrawal of request for review and approval of residual heat removal suction line analyses.

February 8,1989 Letter to licensee forwarding Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing.

February 9,1989 Letter to licensee concerning results of conference call held on January 26, 1989.

February 9, 1989 Letter from licensee concerning clarification of mean stress-effects and use of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Pressure and Vessel Code fatigue curves in analysis of the South Texas pressurizer surge line.

February 14, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding justification for not per-forming voltage verification test at Unit 2.

February 15, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding " Additional Information in Support of Evaluation for Thermal Stratification of the Pressurizer Surge Lines."

February 17, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding status of commitments made in SER.

February 20, 1989 ' Letter from licencee forwarding response to NRC Bulle-tin 88-10.

February,22, 1989 Letter from licensee clarifying status of commitments made in SER.

March 9, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding additional information re-garding response to Generic Letter 88-05.

March 10, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding clarification of Branch Technical Position PSB-1 test results.

March 14, 1989 Letter from licensee forwarding additional information regarding its response to NRC Bulletin 88-10.

South Texas SSER 7 7 Appendix A

APPENDIX B REFERENCES American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure. Vessel Code (ASME Code),Section III, " Nuclear Power Plant Components," Subsection NB-3650,

" Analysis of Piping Systeres," 1986 Edition.

Westinghouse Electric Corp. , WCAP-12067, " Evaluation of Thermal Stratification for,the South Texas Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Line,". December 6, 1988; Revision 1, February 1,1989; Supplement 1, February 15, 1989.

South Texar. S$liR 7 1 Appendix B

APPENDIX D ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS AE architect engineer AIB arbitrary intermediate break AMSAC ATWS mitigating system actuation circuitry ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ATWS anticipated transient (s) without scram BTB branch technical position B&W Babcock & Wilcox Co.

BWR boiling-water reactor CB circuit breaker CBM circuit breaker manufacturer C of C certificate of conformance EMI electromagnetic interference ESF engineered safety feature FHB fuel handling building FSAR final safety analysis report GDC general design criterion (a)

GSA General Services Administration HL&P Houston Lighting & Power Company HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning IGSCC ISAP intergranular stress corrosion cracking Integrated Safety Assessment Program ISI inservice inspection IST inservice testing LBB leak before break LCO limiting condition (s) for operation -

LOCA loss-of-coolant accident MCR main cooling reservoir NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSRB Nuclear Safety Review Board NSSS nuclear steam supply system ppm parts per million PSL pressurizer surge line PWR pressurized-water reactor South Texas SSER 7 1 Appendix 0

QDPS qualified display processing system RAI request for additional information RCS reactor coolant system RETS radiological environmental technical specification (s)

RG regulatory guide RO reactor operator RVHVS reactor vessel head vent system SER safety evaluation report SPDS. safety parameter display system SRO senior reactor operator SRP Standard Review Plan SSER supplemental safety evaluation report TS technical specification (s) i l

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South Texas SSER 7 2 Appendix 0

V . __ - - - - -

APPENDIX E NRC STAFF CONTRIBUTORS AND CONSULTANTS This Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report is the product of the NRC staff and its consultants. The NRC staff members and consultants listed below were principal contributors to this report.

NRC STAFF MEMBERS Name Branch C. Abbate Project Directorate IV F. A11enspach Performance Evaluation G. Dick Project Directorate IV S. Hou J. Lee Mechanical Engineering S. Lee Radiation Protection C. Liang Materials Engineering Reactor Systems C. Nichols Plant Systems 5 R. Ramirez J. Scinto Performance Evaluation J. Wing Office of the General Counsel-Radiation Protection CONSULTANTS Name Organization G. DeGrasse M. Plunkett Brookhaven National Laboratory Engineering Analysis Services, Inc.

South Texas SSER 7 1 Appendix E

=,x,c,,0=M u. U $ NUCuAR AEGULATOAV COMMIMeON t Rt POR 7 NUMet R (Amped 6y fiDCMed 49, af sq/

E'" '8 BIBUOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG-0781 us .NirauCT,0Ns ON T i aivias.

Supplement No. 7 2 TITL E # ND $v8 teTLS J(EAVES (ANE l

Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of South Texas Project, Unit 2 . dan ai Oar COM,anO MONT- .A.

.'"'"" l March 1989 6 DATE REPORT I$3U40 MONT- V8AA March 1989 4 PROJECT'T AsE/WOng UNIT NUMelm i 7 #888timMsiG Omf,ANil A f SON NAME ANO MAILING ADDngst stw4,se te coersDivis on of Reactor Projects IV, V and Special Projects . . N Oa ca A~ T NvM.ta Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 10 $h0kh0AsN6 ORGA84.lat104 NAME AND WAILING AOOnt55 tswei,ae to Caser ita TvegOsmapomT

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same as item 7 6 9t RIOD COvtRtO IIMosonme nneant 12 SUPPLEMENT ARY NOTil Docket No. 50-499 F

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s In April 1986 the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued its Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0781) regarding the application of Houston Lighting and Power Company (applicant and agent for the owners) for a license to operate South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499). The facility is located in Matagorda County, Texas, west of the Colorado River, 8 miles north-northwest of the town of Matagorda and about 89 miles southwest of Houston. The first supplement to NUREG-0781 was issued in September 1986, the second supplement in January 1987, the third supplement in May 1987, the fourth supplement in July 1987, the fif th supplement in March 1988, and the sixth supplement in January 1989. This seventh supplement provides uodated information on the issues that had been considered previously supplement was issued.

as well as the evaluation of issues that have arisen since the sixth The evaluation resolves all the issues necessary to support the issuance of a full-power license for Unit 2.

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