ML20247B785

Acrs/Seabrook Station Emergency Planning.* Responds to ACRS Subcommittee 890817 Meeting Issues.Matl Info Not Disclosed by Parties Favoring Licensing of Plant & Matl Disclosed Presented in Misleading Manner.Related Correspondence

ML20247B785
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/06/1989
From:	Brock M MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:	Fraley R NRC
Shared Package
ML20247B740	List: ML20247B732 ML20247B785 ML20247B820
References
OL, NUDOCS 8909130145
Download: ML20247B785 (13)

Text

. _ _ -. -

_ r, ,

i l

. .'- j A THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS j 3

$ . DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN W McCoRMACK STATE OFFICE BUILDING )

oNE ASHBURTON PLACE. BOSTON 02108 1698

< JAMES M SHANNON a rvonNEv GE*eEmag September 6, 1989 l BY FAX Raymond F. Fraley Phillips Building, Room P-404 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 RE: ACRS/Seabrook Station Emercency Plannino

Dear Mr. Fraley:

This statement by the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office is intended to respond to issues raised at the ACR$-

subcommittee meeting on August 17, 1989. This also supplements the documents provided by this office to ACRS on September 5, for consideration in formulating the ACRS' recommendation to the-Commission on.Seabrook emergency planning and preparedness.

OVERVIEW As. represented by NRC to the subcommittee at the August 17 meeting, the purpose of that meeting was "to provide the subcommittee information needed to. complete the review of the emergency plans." .T. 11 3 / Having reviewed the transcript of the meeting, it is apparent that material information'was not disclosed by those favoring Seabrook licensing, or if disclosed, was presented in a manner that may have misled the ACRS. The more significant of these issues may be summarized as follows:

Seabrook Sita2/

In 1981, following promulgation of emergency planning regulations in response to TMI, the Fcderal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recognized that Seabrook is a "special case" for purposes of emergency planning, in FEMA's assessment of evacuation time estimates (ETEs) at 12 reactor sites.

1/ Citations are to August 17 transcript of ACRS subcommittee meeting.

1/ The site specific character!ctics which pose unique obstacles to emergency planning are addressed more fully in Enclosure 2 of Mass AG's letter of September 5 (Town of l Hampton's Brief).

8909130145 890907 PDR ADOCK 050004431 r.

L O PDR L

d . - ~-

.e

(:

p.f Mr. Fraley September 6, 1989 Page Two Because Seabrook became a special case, a separate statement of work was developed.

nee The main distingu'ishing feature is the high beach population . . . (with) the high degree of concern on the part of many local officials.

l During the summer months, the population of the EPZ is greatly increased by seasonal residents and transient persons visiting the area for short periods of time,. overnight and day trips. ..

This additiona. population is concentrated in the beach towns.

The basic conclusions are:

The evacuation time for the Summer Sunday case is determined almost totally by the rate at which the. beaches can be evacuated . . .

The behavior of drivers who are caught in congestion within direct sight of the Seabrook Station can only be guessed at this time. . . .

Total evacuation times could range from 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes to 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes for an evacuation in which traffic control is generally ineffective.

FEMA-REP-3.1/

J In its Partial Initial Decision (PID), the Seabrook l Licensing Board adopted FEMA's conclusion as to the uniqueness of the Seabrook site.

. . . the Board agrees that there are certain factors specific to the Seabrook EPZ that should be considered  ;

regarding protection of the summer beach population.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has q stated with respect to its consideration of this issue that:

1/ During the licensing hearings in the Spring of 1988, FEMA (

acknowledged that REP-3 remains an operative guidance document within the agency. .

j

=

r. .

f ;+ : m ls 0 Mr. Fraley-I' September 6, 1989 i Page Three (F) actors unicue at least in maanitude to Sgahrs.pk csnggIpina orotection of the Sg3 brook beach oooulation are the size of the transient (" day triocer") beach _nos.uLit. ion; ~ siin of the beach oooulation; number of unwinterized

. hqusino / comme rci a l buildinas; volume of corridor type road traffic; comolexity of_rogi network; number of local governments involved-in the ggiercency olannina orocess; and larae oeocrachic

. size of the EPZ.

PID TT8.47, 9.11-9.13. (Emphasis supplied.)

Consistent with these views, Intervenor experts have concluded, in a comparison of facility sites,i/

Eeghttpk is particularly distinguished by three*

factors:

2.1) Size of peak transient populations 2.2) The unpredictable and unique difficulty of evacuating transient populations 2.3) Size of peak combined transient and permanent populations at a radius of five miles and under.

Seabrook is distinguished from all other observed pre- and post- new regulations nuclear power stations by the sizeable and dense omak transient copulations within five miles from the plant.

Under " Summer Sunday" worst-case evacuation scenarios, transient population surrounding Seabrook at a two-mile radius is estimated at 40,593 individuals (Maguire, 1983, Figure 3-7).

4/ Egg Enclosure 5 (Comparing Emergency Response potential at Seabrook With That of Other U.S. Nuclear plant Sites), to this letter. While certain data may require update, the basic l comparisons should be helpful in addressing questions posed by the subcommittee on August 17. Egg, e.g., T. 186-187.

t Mr. Fraley September 6, 1989 Page Four l'ata on transient populations requiring ovacuation at five miles are available from two sources. Maguire's five-mile estimates-~is 105,128 individuals. The utility's Final Safety Analysis Report places five-mile transient population at 84,366 people (FSAR, 1982, Table 4.1).

2.lb) Table 1 offers the best available comparative data on trar.lient populations at a two mile and at a five : ale radius. The data suggests that at two miles, Seabrook's peak transient population is 5.3 times that of pilgrim's and 10.3 times as great as San Onofre's, its next runner-up. At five miles--

and= depending on which set of data are used-- ,

Seat, rook's transient population is 2-2.5 times that of next runner up pilgrim-(Maguire 1983, Figure'3-7, FSAR, 1982, Table 4.1).

Also noteworthy is Seabrook's ceak " combined" pqoulation within a five mile radius (consisting of transient and permanent residents).

population estimates at five miles vary from 138,694 (Maguire, 1983 Figure 3.1 & 3.7) to 119,116 (FSAR, 1982, Figure 4.1 & 4.4).

2.3b) Table 2 shows comparative combined population figures at five miles. Zion is the first runner-up with 94,255 people, (Urbanik, L 1981, pg. 102) followed by Millstone with 82.401, (Urbanik, 1981, Vol. II. pg. 52) and-Pilgrim with 62,419 individuals (Urbanik, 1981, Vol. II,l/

l 1/ Cf NUREG-1210, Vol. 4, p. 46: ,

"It must also be remembered that few people live close to most nuclear power reactors. Figure 5.1, adapted from Qemoaraphic Statistics Pertainino to Nurlear power Reactot Sites (NUREG-0348), illustrates the number of people within 1 and 5. miles of 111 nuclear pc.wer plant sites (actual or proposed in 1979). Evidently. evacuations of everyone within a circular area of radius somewhere between 1 and 5 miles of these sites would be below the 10,000-person figure. At most sites, in fact, fewer than 300 oecole live within 2 miles of the site." (Emphasis supplied.)

g; - - - - --

t * .

n .

4 Mr. Fraley September 6, 1989 page Five The Staff therefore was not candid with the subcommittee when it failed to disclose material information as to Seabrook's unique site, as found by Seabrook's own Licensing Board. Instead the Staff responded: "(t)he Staff does not feel that this plant is much different than any other plants either in times or difficulties of evacuation." T.21.

FEMA "Flio-Floo" By executive order, FEMA was designated to have " lead responsibility for off-site preparedness around nuclear facilities." 45 Fed. Reg. 55406 (8/19/80). In evaluating whether Seabrook emergency plans are adequate, NRC must base its finding, in part, upon FEMA's findings and determinations.

10 CFR 50.47 (a)(2).

• As of 1981, FEMA recognized that Seabrook was a "special case" for emergency planning purposes. Discussed anora. This represented a considered agency position which led to FEMA's testimony in the Seabrook proceeding, prefiled in September, 1987, that emergency planning for Seabrook was n21 adequate to protect the public, including the beach population.

Therefore, using the standard guidance for the initiation and duration of radiological releases, and the current New Hampshire RERp i including ETE, it appears that thousands of people could be unable to leave during an accident at Seabrook involving a major release of radioactivity without adequate shelter for as much as the entire duration of that release.

Therefore, until these issues are resolved, even if all the other inadequacies and deficiencies cited in the RAC reviews of the New Hampshire plans, and the review of the exercise of these Pl ans were to be corrected, FEMA would not be l

able to conclude that the New Hampshire State and Local plans to protect the public in the event of an accident at the Seabrook Nuclear power plant are adequate to meet our regulatory standard, that such plans " adequately protect the public health and safety by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken off-site in the event of a radiological emergency." [Sgg, 44 CFR 350.5(b)]

(FEMA pre-filed testimony 9/11/87, p. 39).

The factual basis for FEMA's opinion, including long ETEs, limited sheltering, and a narrow and congested road system has not been seriously challenged to this day.

c::; . -

l {, .'i?

-~

Ju i

Mr. Fraley

' September 6, 1989 page Six Nevertheless, six. months after prefiling this testimony, FEMA withdrew it and filed new testimony in_ March, 1988, contradicting its prior to;ition. FEMA now asserted that.New Hampshire emergency plans are adequate. The FEMA flip-flop occurred only. weeks after NRC, through Victor Stello, threatened FEMA with " war" unless it changed-its position, and following intimidation by Applicants, and ultimate removal, of FEMA's lead witness,. Edward Thomas.5/

Nominally, however, FEMA claimed that its shift in position was due to new " technical considerations."l/ These

" considerations," however, were based solely on a anneric analysis by Joseph Keller of time / distance release calculations for 38 accident sequences appearing in WASH-1400.

Q. And this is the only work you did on .

Seabrook in the fall of 1987 correct?

A. This was a non site specific analysis of accidents and timing out of WASH 1400. It was not specific to Seabrook.

5/ This issue is discussed more fully in Enclosures 1 and 2 to Mass AG's September 5 letter (NECNp proposed Findings),

Enclosure 1, pp. 44, 46; Egg aenerally, pp. 25-56; Enclosure 2 (Town of Hampton Brief), pp. 42-49.

2/ FEMA alternatively sought to jttstify its about f ace based upon " legal considerations." As deceribed by FEMA's own witness, these " legal considerations" included the extraordinary view that portions of FEMA's own regulations to measure plan adequacy were att legal. 44 CFR 350.5.

T-14086-88. In addition, notwithstanding the president's directive that FEMA "will take the lead in offsite planning and response," age, 51 Fed. Reg. 5265, et sea. (2/12/86), FEMA took the position that:

NRC has absolute authority to change any of those 16 planning standards (for plan adequacy) which were jointly adopted in 0654 and appear jointly in both agencies' rules without consulting FEMA, much less getting its concurrence. T-14100.

In FEMA's view, it is NRC, not FEMA, that has lead, indeed sole, responsibility for determining the adequacy of offsito emergency plans. FEMA thus completed its abdication of responsibility to NRC for assessing the adequacy of emergency plans. This is further apparent from FEMA's perfunctory review of the utility plan for Massachusetts Communities (SpMC). Egg Enclosure 4, (Mass AG proposed Findings), $1.

h ,, . s_.,

I' 1

Mr. Fraley September 6,'1989

. page Seven Q. -Right.

A.- It would have been generic to any pressurized water reactor in the country.

T-14163.

Q. But you don't know how many (number of people who have moved off the beaches before they are exposed to the plume)-that's correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And you don't know how far they would get,'

that's correct?

A. And I don't know where the plume would.be.

And I don't.know the width of the plume and all the things I don't know lead me to a generalized conclusion that there would be some dose savings in this portion of the accident spectrum.

T-14195.

Q. . . . I am accurate that Mr. Baldwin tracked the people as far as the edge of the beach, made no analysis of how far they would get by the time the plume arrived, whether they would be out-of the two miles or out of the EPZ, correct?

A. That's a correct statement.

T-14182.

FEMA therefore abandoned the view, under pressure from NRC and Applicants, of the "special case" of Seabrook for emergency planning. As justification for the flip-flop, FEMA siezed upon a generic study which, on its face, does not even purport to '-

address Seabrock's unique siting problems.

Even when pressed by the subcommittee on August 17, however, NRC and FEMA failed to disclose any of this material information.

--.----___.__U---- -

.g I

f . - --

~

u I

' (

i k Mr. Fraley' September 6, 1989 page Eight'

. . . if I can answer any questions on those roles respective to NRC and FEMA-participation I would be glad to-do-it now before introducing Mr. Donovan.

DR. KERR:- What happens if you disagree?

MR. TRAVERS: We meet and work it out. Basically, NRC

has final responsibility of-coming to a conclusion on emergency response preparedness capability. But there haven't been very many instances;where we have come to any. dramatic loggerheads on'these issues.

At.best, this response was misleading'.

Precautionary Beach Measures Before.the subcommittee, Applicants made much of thei'r

" precautionary measures" for the. beach population. Sta, e.g.,

T.44-90s These_ measures are based upon a false premise that-there wil! be adequate time to implement them in an emergency.

precautionary beach closing is simply another form of evacuation. However, this does not afford additional time to clear the beaches. Fast-breaking accidents have warning times ranging from'l/2 hour to several hours. NUREG 0654. These accidents need not proceed sequentially through the Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) but may begin at the Site Area or General Emergency ECL. Thus, the initiating conditions for an initial PAR may well be General Emergency conditions.

Under fast-break release scenarios within the planning basis, therefore, the " precautionary measures" may not afford any additional protection to the beach population.

Government Resoonse Governor Dukakis has summarized the rationale for the non-partic @ tion by the Commonwealth and many local governments in Seabrook emergency planning:

All the evidence I possess tells me that while there is room for reasonable disagreement on details, the unshakable fundamental truth is this: if a serious accident occurs as I am told to assume it would, the combination of conditions at Seabrook -- including principally weather, inadequate sheltering and exit routes, and the altitude of the radioactive plume -- either individually or more likely in combination create a foreseeable likelihood of high dosages of i

), / . - --

4' Mr. Fraley September 6, 1989 page Nine radioactive intake, against which emergency planning and evacuation cannot adequately protect.

Under such circumstances, I do not believe I, as Governor, can responsibly submit emergency plans, since they could not constitute appropriate protective measures adequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of a. radiological emergency, as federal law requires. I therefore do not intend to do so.

Enclosure 3.

The withdrawal of the Commonwealth and certain local governments does not create, but only. increases, the gulf between the Applicants' emergency plan for Massachusetts. ~

communities (SpMC) and its goal of achieving adequate protection for the public. 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1). Applicants acknowledge government non- participation as the " weakest link" in their' emergency preparedness. T. 44. This " weakest link" precludes an adequate, coordinated, and planned response to a Seabrook emergency.

A catalogue of significant issues and planning deficiencies arising from government non-participation has previously been provided to ACRS.A/ These include:

1) Since 1986, the Commonwealth and local Massachusetts EpZ governments have not trained, drilled, or exercised to respond to a radiological emergency at Seabrook. $10.1.1.A.

2) There is no state emergency plan, site specific to Seabrook, that is presently in place. 510.1.1.C

3) There is no evidence that state and local governments are familiar with Applicants' utility plan ("SpMC"),

3dand there is not time during fast-break accidents for the SpMC to be read, understood, and promptly implemented. $10.1.1.E.

4) The SpMC is designed to be implemented by Applicants' own response organization ("ORO"). The SpMC does not contain plans or procedures written for state or local governments to follow in an emergency, even if so inclined. S10.1.1.F.

1/ Egg Enclosure 4, (Mass AG proposed Findings) at $10.

e

(

I; Mr. Fraley l Septembqr.6, 1989 q page Ten  !

5) Applicants have put forward a utility plan seeking to cloak themselves in the regulatory presumption that state and local governments will follow that plan in an emergency. 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1). Yet on its face, the SpMC is not designed for governments to follow.

510.1.1.G.

6) Those SpMC " modes" which contemplate communication and coordination among ORO and Massachusetts governments have never been reviewed by FEMA for adequacy.

510.1.2.B.2/

7) Applicants have put forth the view that the emergency planning-is fungible, and that government planning at another site means that planning for Seabrook will be adequate. This ignores the findings of the Licensing Board as to the " factors unique at least in magnitude to Seabrook," S10.1.20.G. Outdated, unexercised, and rejected draft plans, or plans prepared for other facilities without attention to Seabrook's site-specific features, do not reasonably assure an adequate response to a radiological emergency. $10.1.29.

8) 10.1.32.A. Communication and coordination among state and local government officials and ORO were not demonstrated in the qualifying, " full participation" exercise. Egg Tr. 22929-32. Local EOCs did not participate, and were not involved in, initial notification procedures. The Commonwealth did not deploy representatives to the EOC. Local EOCs were not available for local liaisons to go to. The communication with the command structure in the Commonwealth, including with the Governor or his representatives, did not occur. "We (Applicants) were forced to do that through a FEMA control cell." Tr.

22931. The briefing process, including information on Othe status of ORO and protective action

? recommendations, between ORO and Commonwealth

• ~o fficials was not demonstrated by these officials in the exercise. "(T)he process of requesting legal authority to implement ORO activities" did not occur, Tr. 22932, although Applicants recognized this as a "long procedure" involving the determination of the government's response. Massachusetts school districts did not participate in the exercise. Egg Tr. 22929-32..

E/ Only the utility organization (ORO) was reviewed. Id.

,m - . -

j Mr. Fraley September 6, 1989 page Eleven

9) 10.1.1.A.3. The Commission has recognized that-

" clearly it will be more difficult for_'a utility to satisfy the NRC-of.the adequacy of its plan in the absence of state and local participation but whether it would be impossible remains to be seen." 52 Fed.

Reg. 42081 (11/3/87).

In this case, regardless of other concerns, in view of the non-participation of Massachusetts governments, adequate

~

emergency planning at Seabrook is not possib1's.

Low-Power License Suspension Applicants represented to the subcommittee that:

the most significant lesson that I would have tp say about Chernobyl is that you can't allow your plant. staff or anybody working in a nucitar power facility to become complacent regarding the technology. You have to have a healthy resoect for...tbe technoloov and always be sharo and follow gour orocedures. T. 53.

Yet during low-power testing on June 22, 1989, senior-operator and management personnel willfully violated start-up procedures which required shutdown of the reactor, disregarded the directives of NRC observers, and initially refused to shut the reactor down. NRC therefore suspended Applicants' low-power license pending investigation and adequate corrective actions. Egg Enclosure 8 (AIT Report by NRC). That suspension remains in effect.1E/

Interveners have filed contentions on these issues and have requested a hearing before the Licensing Board. Enclosures 6 and 7.11/ That request remains pending. -

LQ/ The Staff claims that, although Applicants cannot restart the reactor without NRC approval, there is only an " agreement" not to restart. x 11/ Enclosures 5, 6, 7, and 8, discussed herein, including 6 and 7, which provide contentions and bases describing these .

events of. June 22, will be oxpress mailed today for receipt prior to the Friday ACRS meeting.

l L __

y ___=__,

iWC - ,

3 m w ,

[

r Mr. Fraley September.6, 1989 Page Twelve E

a In part, the contentions provide, u

On June 22, 1989, during low-power testing at Seabrook Station, plant personnel-revealed serious , deficiencies in their training and management procedures. Many plant personnel, including. Operators,.and New Hampshire' Yankee Management, deliberately disregarded test-procedures which required shut down of the reactor, when pressurizer. levels fell below test.

criteria due to a failed valve.

Even when repeatedly notified of the violation by NRC inspectors in the control room, plant .

operators and management continued to operate th's facility in violation of test procedures and initially refused to shut down-the reactor.

NRC therefore suspended Applicants' low-power license. That suspension remeins in effect . . .

Contention pp. 3-4.

t Plant personnel's willful disregard of test procedures as well as NRC notifications of a violation, demonstrates serious deficiencies in training and management; and raises serious safety. concerns due to the poor judgment of' plant personnel, their unwillingness to admit error, and refusal to properly and timely respond to abnormal plant conditions.

f) Subsequently, senior management personnel

' provided inaccurate and incomplete information to NRC~on the_ shut down, refused to acknowledge the

~

seriousness of the procedural non-compliance, and even suggested restarting.the reactor prior to resolution of these issues. Applicants' lack of candor in initially reporting on the shutdown to NRC raises additional, and fundamental, concerns as to Applicants' corporate character and management capability. j Having^ suspended Applicants' low-power license, the Staff, inconsistently, seeks to block an adjudicatory hearing involving Interveners to fully. explore the circumstances surrounding Applicants' willful violation of test procedures.

~f ,,

c 4-L Mr. Fraley

' September 6,1 1989~

Page Th6* teen The Staff thereby opposes public inquiry into the competence of Applicants' operators and management personnel, maintenance '

procedures, potential valve design problems, and related issues. Enclosures 6-and 7.

The subcommittee expressed concern over the " procedures violation" during low-power testing at the August 17 meeting.

T. 157-158. Interveners concur in these concerns:and request ACRS, consistent with its advisory capacity, to press for full and fair.public disclosure of these events prior to licensing.

Very truly your s

, \, 'M '

\ ..

Matthew T. Brock Assistant Attorney General Nuclear Safety Unit Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 (6t7) 727-2200 MTB/ tam Enclosures

.(

_. _