ML20238A883

Rev 1 to Comanche Peak Rept Review Group Task 2 Rept for 870120-0227

ML20238A883
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	02/27/1987
From:	Cerne A, Elsasser T, Eugene Kelly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237K807	List: IR 05000445/1985007 IR 05000445/1985014 IR 05000445/1986008 IR 05000446/1985011 ML20237K804 ML20237L110 ML20237L125 ML20237L136 ML20237L151 ML20237L159 ML20237L179 ML20237L203 ML20237L268 ML20237L298 ML20237L321 ML20237L367 ML20237L407 ML20237L453 ML20237L464 ML20237L493 ML20237L577 ML20237L797 ML20238A290 ML20238A390 ML20238A485 ML20238A535 ML20238A548 ML20238A573 ML20238A583 ML20238A596 ML20238A609 ML20238A642 ML20238A654 ML20238A667 ML20238A719 ML20238A749 ML20238A782 ML20238A833 ML20238A839 ML20238A868 ML20238A883 ML20238A903 ML20238A923 ML20238A966 ML20238A974 ML20238B015 ML20238B131 ML20238B210 ML20238B251 ML20238B352 ... further results
References
NUDOCS 8708210110
Download: ML20238A883 (207)

Text

_ _ - _ _ - _ - - - _ _ - _ - - - - _ - . - _ _ - _ - _ ___ ___ - _ -__- _ __

REV. I 2/27/87 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Report No. Comanche Peak Report Review Group - Task 2 Conducted At: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I Period: January 20 - February 27, 1987 Task Group Members: J' vMt. O Antone C. Cerne, Senior Resident date Inspector for Construction and Operations, Seabrook Station

/

Eugene / Kelly,SeniorRgdent 'da te InspecWr for Operations, Limerick Stat on Unit I /

Task Group /2 Supervisor: / -

/ 3/ -I 8

/date/

Thom's a C. Elsas/erf,Ehief, Reactor Projects Section, No. W3_

L ader bb, 3 1 87 l Samuel J. Collins, ['eputy Director, 'dnte Division of Reactor Projects 1

~

8708210110 870312 5 Dn ADOCK 0500

REV. 1 2/27/87 i

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1.1 Background...................................................... 1 1.2 Task Group...................................................... 2 1.3 Task Group Review Method........................................ 3 1.4 Summary and Conclusion.......................................... 5 1.5 Inspection and Enforcement Process.............................. 7 1.6 Lessons Learned................................................. 10 1.7 Recommendations................................................. 15 1.8 One Page Summary Analysis for Each of the 34 Items.......... ... 19

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Persons Contacted....................... ............... ...... 43 2.2 Report Organization............................................. 44 3.0 ISSUES No. Subject Page 3.1 and 3.2 Control of Design Criteria and Design Changes......... 46 3.3 Audit of RPV Installation Activities.................. 51 3.4 CVCS Spool Piece Traceability......................... 56 3.5 Hydrostatic Test for the Cold Leg Piping Subassembly.. 60 3.6 Concrete Truck Mixing Blade Inspection Records........ 63 3.7 Failure of FSAR to Describe TUGC0 Records System. . . . . . 67 3.8 QA Manual Does Not Address ANSI N45.2.9 Requirements and Commitments....................................... 71 i

[

REV. 1 2/27/87 Subject Page No.

3.9 Procedure Control of Offsite Shipment of Original Engineering Design Records............................ 75-3.10 Original Design Records Shipped in Cardboard Boxes to SWEC.................................................. 78 l

3.11 No Backup Copy of Records Shipped in Cardboard Boxes to SWEC............................................... 78 3.12 Failure to Control and Account for Records Shipp'ed to SWEC.................................................. 78 3.13 Site Records of Chicago Bridge and Iron Shipped to Houston, Texas in Cardboard Boxes..................... 81 3.14 No Backup Copy of Records Shipped to Chicago Bridge and Iron.............................................. 81 3.15 Failure to Inventory Records Sent to Chicago Bridge and Iron.............................................. 81 3.16 TUGC0 Did Not Document Audit of CBI Records;.......... 85 3.17 Failure to Preclude Rain from Entering QA Intermediate Records Vau1t......................................... 89 3.18 Failure to Preclude Food and Coffee Pot from QA Intermediate Records Vau1t............................ 89 3.19 Failure to Install Fire Suppression System, Drains, and a Sloped Floor at Records Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 3.20 Plant Records Stored in Folders or Binders in Open Cabinets at Records Center.................... ....... 93 3.21 Failure to Provide Temporary or Permanent Storage for Records Co-Mingled with In-Process Documents in Paper Flow Group............................................ 97 3.22 Weld Rod Identification.............................. 102 ii ,

( i i

REV. 1 2/27/87 I No. Subject Page l

3.23 Failure to Develop / Implement Procedure to Demonstrate 50.55(e) Deficiencies are Corrected.................. 106 3.24 Failure to Revise Implementing Procedures Containing 50.55(e) Reporting................................... 106 3.25 Failure to Maintain Retrievable 10 CFR 50.55(o) Files.113 3.27 TUGC0 10 CFR 50.55(e) Files Not Auditable............ 113 3.26 Corrective Action Commitments in 10 CFR 50.55(e)

Reports.............................................. 119 3.28 and 3.33 IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-14 Concerns..................... 124 3.29 Incomplete IE Bulletin Files......................... 128 3.30 NAMCO Switches (IEB 79-28) Identification Problem.... 132 3.31 Inadequate Procedures for Processing NRC-IE Bulletins. 135 3.32 No Focal Point in TUGC0 Construction for Tracking NRC IE Bu11etins..................................... 135 3.34 BISCO Fire Barrier Seal Certification................ 139 4.0 APPENDICES 4.1 Task Group 2 Resumes.......................................... 4.1-1 4.2 Task Group 2 Charter.......................................... 4.2-1 4.3 Criteria for Analyzing RIV Disposition........................ 4.3-1 4.4 Documents Reviewed............................................ 4.4-1 4.5 CPRRG Task Group 2 Results Matrix............................. 4.5-1 4.6 Inspectors Apparent Safety Concern and Task Group 2 Evaluation.................................................... 4.6-1 l

iii

1 REV. 1 2/27/87 1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

1.1 Background

On March 19, 1986, an NRC Commissioner met with the Acting Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA), to refer to 0IA a number of allegations of wrongdoing concerning the handling of safety issues at COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES). These allegations had been brought to the Commissioner's attention by current and former NRC employees and NRC contractors. OIA was concurrently informed of the allegations from sources outside NRC.

On March 19, 1986, OIA interviewed the Senior Resident Inspector at CPSES, regarding concerns about the way Region IV was regulating the construction of CPSES. Allegations were received that Region IV inspectors were being pressured, harassed and intimidated by Region IV management to delete or reclassification proposed findings in draft inspection reports to make the TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY (TUGCO), the applicant for CPSES, look better.

Specific instances were discussed which allegedly resulted in viola-tions proposed by inspectors in draft inspection reports being unjus-tifiably reclassified in final reports. After reviewing the informa-tion provided, 01A combined the specific instances of alleged wrong-doing into a general allegation that:

Region IV management harassed and intimidated inspectors to pressure them to reclassification or delete proposed inspection findings at CPSES.

Additionally, OIA identified other issues that will be handled by OIA in separate reports. During the interview, two other issues involving CPSES were raised which OIA determined warranted review in conjunc-tion with the investigation:

1 The Region IV Quality Assurance (QA) Inspection Program at CPSES j was inadequate; and i 1

-- Data documented in Region IV's NRC Form 766, Inspector's Report, was inaccurate.

In response to these concerns the Office of Inspector and Auditor conducted an investigation, issued in November 1986 as the Report of Investigation File No. 86-10. On January 15, 1987, the Commission approved the formulation of the Comanche Peak Report Review Group (CPRRG) resulting in the memorandum dated January 21, 1987 from V. i Stello, Jr. to J. G. Davis assigning CPRRG task responsibilities and l a preliminary schedule. The task of the CPRRG is to review the tech-nical issues identified in 01A 86-10, and to determine and document in a report:

l l

2 REV. 1

, 2/27/87

• Task 1: Whether the current augmented review and inspection effort at Comanche Peak is sufficient to compensats for any identified weakness in Region IV's QA inspec-tion programs.

• Task 2: Whether the issues when identified were appropriately handled as to process and disposition.

• Task 3: The safety significance of the thirty-four issues-identified in 0IA Report 86-10.

• Task 4: A review of the purpose and significance of NRC Form 766 and appropriate. recommendations concerning its use.

• Task 5: Without expanding the specific tasks above, to office to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) any judgement on whether it is likely that there are broader implications in Region IV.

In order to facilitate the timely accomplishment of CPRRG goals, Task Groups were established with appointed leaders and Group Charters were proposed to address the specifics of Tasks I thru 4 above, and provide input to the CPRRG relative to Task 5. Each Task Group was provided reference material (Appendix 4.4) and the opportunity to finalize.the proposed Group Charters.

CPRRG meetings were held on January 27 and February 5,1987 to confer with the Task Groups and approve the charters. During the course of the Task Group reviews, discussions were held between the CPRRG mem-bers and Task Groups in order to coordinate activities and address the needs of the CPRRG final report.

1.2 Task Group f

An interdisciplinary Task Group team was established by the Group Leader to review the process and disposition of the thirty-four items using the methodology described in Report Section 1.3. The team mem-bers were appointed based on background, engineering discipline, and experience which correlated directly with the technical and program-matic issues identified in the OIA 86-10 report. Each team member has extensive experience in the NRC field inspection program, experi-ence on the team include construction senior resident inspector (1),

operations senior resident inspector (3), reactor projects inspection program supervision on a section chief level (3), inspection program management on 'a branch chief and division level (1), and national industry inspection experience on an NRC consultant level (1) (see Appendix 4.1 for Task Group Resumes). Team members were authorized to expend whatever resources were required to resolve the issues. The review group activities were conducted from January 20 - February 27, i 1987 and resulted in 745 hours0.00862 days <br />0.207 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.834725e-4 months <br /> task effort.

3 REV. I 2/27/87 1.3 Task Group Review Method The technical and philosophical approach taken by the members of Task Group 2 in reaching an independent consensus on the thirty-four items in Attachment I to Attachment MM of OIA, Report 86-10 is pertinent in achieving an understanding of the groups findings and conclusions.

In order to achieve the mandate of the Task Group 2 Charter (Appendix 4.2) the following were established:

1. A record was compiled consisting of the references in Appendix 4.4.

2. The task group supervisor reviewed the record and established files containing information or documentation pertinent to each of the thirty-four issues.

3. A standardized methodology was developed to insure consistency in the review approach and documentation of each item (Appendix 4.3).

4. Based on discipline expertise, experience and interest, items were assigned to the task group members with the item file as a work package, the compiled records as reference material and the criteria as work method guidance.

5. Each draf t item package was reviewed by the task force super-visor, technical and editorial comments were resolved to insure consistency, technical accuracy and a common focal point to appreciate the " broader issue" implications.

6. Upon completion of the technical reviews, the task force super-visor and task group leader reviewed the results of the item dispositions and conducted discussions with task group members to provide for the analysis, summary and conclusions mandated by the Task Group 2 charter. These are documented in Summary and Conclusion (1.4), Inspection and Enforcement Process (1.5),

Lessons Learned (1.6) and Recommendations (1.7).

In order to provide consistency and to enable the task group objec-tives to be accomplished, basic assumptions were made as noted below:

1. The independent assessment of each item was conducted as if the issue arose in the daily inspection effort at a new construction facility. The issue was approached utilizing the assigned task group reviewer as the inspector who presents his findings to the Projects Section Chief (task group supervisor) and the findings are ultimately approved as an agency position by the Branch 7

j Chief (task group leader) by sign-out of the inspection report.

I

4 REV. 1 2/27/87

2. Although an attempt was made to provide a complete record of Task Group 2 activities, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the 01A Report 86-10 record and able to appreciate the basic technical significance of the thirty-four items.

3. The task group utilized the available information in the record to perform an independent assessment and an analysis of the Region IV disposition. Where appropriate, consideration was given to the development of information and the sequence of events which could have affected the Region IV disposition of the issue (s). .

It is important to note that on several issues, considerable debate occurred within the group in order to arrive at the "best" technical resolution, as with most inspection findings various options are available to qualify the concerns and effect the appropriate correc-tive action. On every issue a consensus was reached utilizing the task group methodology depicted in item 1. above.

5 REV. 1 2/27/87 1.4 Summary and Conclusion To the maximum extent possible, the Task Group focused its effort on the two major tasks defined in its charter. First, perform a rigor-ous independent assessment of the technical aspects of the 34 items presented. Second, trace and evaluate the development of the indi-vidual issues by Region IV from the initial finding by the inspectors to their ultimate disposition in the issued final report. The re-sults of this effort is provided in Section 3 of the report. A brief one page summary of the results of the evaluations provided in Sec-tion 3 for each of the 34 items is included in the Executive Summary as Section 1.8. However, for a rigorous treatment of any individual issue, Section 3 must be consulted.

The Task Group used existing NRC guidance as the foundation upon which to proceed. However, recognizing that the available documented guidance in many cases is non-specific by design, common sense field experience and judgement were important ingredients in the approach taken by the Task Group in resolving the issues. During the course of its efforts, the Task Group did develop findings and opinions that bear on the overall issue of what went wrong with NRC's internal pro-cesses in dealing with the issues at question. These broader impli-cations are more appropriately addressed in Sections 3.5, Inspection and Enforcement Process and 1.6, Lessons Learned. Items which should be considered for additional NRC attention are explained in Section 1.7, Recommendations.

The Task Group found that there was a reasonable basis which war-ranted management action in the dispositioning of each of the 34 items as they were originally presented in the draft inspection re-ports. In all cases where reclassification occurred, the items were not initially sufficiently developed by the inspectors to support the proposed enforcement action. There were no instances where viola-tions were improperly reclassified by management based on the infor-mation available at the time the Inspection Report was issued. In several instances, later information developed by the inspectors sup-ports the issuance of violations, but in these instances, a defini-tive safety concern is not apparent.

Within the scope of the review conducted by the Task Group, no major safety significance can be attached to any of the 34 items. There is basis for further inspection or analysis of selected issues; these are addressed in Section 1.7. The lack of safety significance of the items, particularly as initially presented by the inspectors, appears to be a major contributor to the inspector / management interface prob-lems that subsequently developed. The inspector (s) consistently pro-posed inappropriate enforcement for undeveloped items of minor or

6 REV. 1 2/27/87 negligible safety significance. It was apparent to the Task Gr'oup that in several instances, an attempt was made to propose an inordi-nate number of violations which dealt with the same programmatic licensee deficiency. The most apparent application of this philos-ophy was in dealing with the licensee's program for 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting. These observations are further developed in Section 1.6, Lessons Learned.

The record indicates that immediate supervision was not successful in redirecting the enforcement posture adopted by the inspectors or correcting the insufficient development of inspection findings. As a result, a philosophical gap developed between the inspectors and management which apparently widened as the issues compounded. Region IV upper management apparently did not recognize the seriousness of this problem and protracted debate continued between the inspectors and their immediate supervision over issues with negligible bonafide technical concern, resulting in the overall goal of the inspection program becoming secondary.

A brief overview of inspection and enforcement program guidance is provided in Section 1.5. As explained, IE MC 0400 and 0610 describes the process necessary to implement the program. The Task Group did identify deviations from the guidance provided which may have con-tributed to the continued failure of the inspectors and supervision to resolve their conflicts. The Task Group's most significant find-ing from a process standpoint was the lack of formal discretionary guidance provided to supervisors and management when dealing with non-escalated enforcement (Severity Levels 4 and 5). An expanded discussion of process problems can be found in Section 1.6, Lessons Learned.

In the opinion of the Task Group, circumstances which complicated the resolution of these issues included: the assignment of a new inspector to the site; the fragmented inspection and enforcement program history at Comanche Peak and the turnover in responsible NRC staff which resulted in a lack of continuity in the application of NRC programs.

In summary, the inspector (s) presented poorly developed inspection findings and proposed inappropriate enforcement action. Management recognized this, but was unsuccessful in refocusing the inspectors efforts. No significant technical concerns persist as a result of the Task Group's analysis of the individual issues; however, some issues should be further evaluated to determine, as a minimum, if additional review effort needs to be expended in these areas to insure that the goals of the inspection program have been met.

l l

i i

7 REV. 1 2/27/87 1.5 The Inspection and Enforcement Process )

The NRC inspection of licensee / applicant activities and reporting thereof is explained in the Inspection and Enforcement Manual.

Chapters 0400 (Enforcement) and 0610 (Inspection Reports) are partic-ularly relevant. What to inspect is documented in Manual Chapter (MC) 2512 for projects in the construction phase. In this chapter, there are numerous modules which direct the inspectors to review and ,

evaluate licensee activities in designated areas. The modules give reasonably specific guidance on the depth and nature of the activi-ties to be evaluated.

By design, there is not a large body of information on "How to Inspect." Instead, a reliance is placed on previous inspector exper-ience, NRC training, the inspector qualification process and super-visory direction to play a very large role in determining how the inspector goes about the process of inspecting. The documentation of these efforts in. Inspection Reports is explained in MC 0610; the process and disposition of violations of NRC requirements is ex-plained in MC 0400. Enforcement philosophy is closely associated with the inspection report process, since documentation of violations is normally an integral part of the final inspection report.

Manual Chapters 0400 and 0610 do not go into great detail on how in-spections are to be conducted and it is not feasible to provide guid-ante to cover the numerous specific situations that might arise in the ' routine inspection and enforcement process. However, the Manual Chapter;, do provide adequate general guidance to properly implement the inspection program. This guidance, coupled with inspector exper-1ence and qualification, supervisory direction and past enforcement have historically been adequate to implement an effective inspection program.

The inspection and enforcement concept is not complicated and is based to a large degree on the competency of the parties involved.

For routine enforcement, the parties involved include the inspec-tor (s), immediate supervision (usually the section chief), and upper management (branch chief and/or division director). Inspection periods and schedules are established, and the inspectors review licensee activities in accordance with the program requirements (listed in MC 2512). An exit meeting is held with the the licensee to discuss preliminary findings, inspectors document their findings in inspection reports (MC 0610) and submit their draf t reports to immediate supervision for review. If noncompliance with NRC requirements were thought to occur, appropriate enforcement action is I recommended (MC 0400). The immediate supervisor then reviews the l

l l

8 REV. 1 2/27/87 draft report and discusses the findings with the inspectors. It is entirely appropriate after this discussion that the inspection report be revised if the supervisor considers it appropriate. The super-visor will normally discuss the changes with the inspector and actively attempt to solicit his agreement. With regard to recom-mended enforcement, the role of the supervisor is clear. It is his responsibility to determine if a notice of violation should be issued and to determine the severity level of that violation. The common goal in this process is to provide a technically accurate inspection report which presents credible, legally sound issues for licensee action.

Manual chapter guidance assumes active cooperation between inspector and supervision in resolving differences over inspection findings and recommended enforcement. The manual is silent on the course of action to be taken if disagreement continues and a consensus can not be reached. However, it is clearly supervision and management's responsibility to issue the final inspection report in a condition that most accurately reflects current NRC technical guidance and inspection and enforcement policy. If the inspector persists in his disagreement, the Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) process is available to him (NRC MC 4125). This process is designed to deal with disagreements on technical, management, legal or policy issues, and is appropriate to raise concerns to higher management for review and resolution.

1.5.1 Process Application to Events at Comanche Peak Sufficient process guidance existed to prevent many of the inspection finding disposition problems which occurred at Comanche Peak. Fail-ure to follow guidance provided in the manual chapters and its impact on various aspects of inspection and enforcement is addressed in the Lessons Learned, Section 1.6 of this report. In particular, the guidance on development of inspection findings to support violations (1.6.1, the 14 points) and the responsibilities of inspectors / super-vision (1.6.2) has universal application in resolving the type of issues chich arose in this case.

However, once the issues entered into a protracted stage of disagree-ment, the current guidance in the manual chapters was unable to direct a course of action that would ef fect resolution. The draft manual chapter recently issued, MC 0612, dated February 4, 1987, is directed toward dealing with the specific problem of what to do when inspectors aad supervision absolutely can not agree, However, in this case, the remedies offered, i.e., raising the inspector's con-cern to the next highest management level and the DP0 process, were available to the parties involved. The failure to provide the writ- .

ten guidance now available in draft MC 0612 should not be viewed as a l l

4

9 REV. 1 2/27/87 shortcoming which caused or even contributed to the problems which occurred at Comanche Peak. The failure to follow other guidance in the manual chapters explained in Lessons Learned, and the failure to follow the available DP0 process indicates that it is questionable whether MC 0612, if it existed, would have been effective in resolv-ing inspector / management differences. Supporting this conclusion is the failure of the inspector to use the DP0 process, and the apparent lack of resolution of inspector / supervisor differences by upper management.

1.5.2 Conclusion The general guidance provided in MC 0400 and 0610 is adequate to direct implementation of the inspection and enforcement program.

However, it appears that the role of inspector and supervisory dis-cretion in dealing with routine violations (Levels 4 and 5) should be made more definitive (Lessons Learned 1.6.4). Consideration should be given to explaining when a " noncompliance" qualifies to become a

" violation." Since it is clear that it is the supervisor's rerponsi-bility to evaluate inspector proposed violations to determine if they should be issued as violations, clearer guidance on the role of supervisory discretion is needed. It can be inferred from MC 0400 that all " noncompliance" are not required to be issued as " viola-tions" [05.01); however, the exercise of this discretion, although common practice in field enforcement, is not specifically addressed.

Further, MC 0400 and 0610 establish the role of significance (safety significance) when determining the severity level of violations. The implications of no safety significance, i.e., guidance regarding trivial violations, is implied but not addressed. Since it is implied that the supervisor in evaluating proposed violations does in fact have discretionary judgement with respect to safety significance as well as discretion to not issue a " violation" for every " noncom-pliance," then MC 0400 and 0610 should be expanded accordingly.

If these supervisory discretions were more clearly defined at the time the problems developed at Comanche Peak, they might have pro-vided suf ficient impetus to resolve the inspector / supervisor con-flicts. This is not inconsistent with the conclusions reached in 1.5.1 regarding the potential effectiveness that draft MC 0612 might have had in resolving the problems that occurred. The initiating problem in this case was a failure to resolve inspector / supervision conflicts. Additional guidance which more clearly defines the duties and responsibilities of each could have had some impact on resolving i those conflicts. In this case, it would have been easier for the l supervisor to effect resolution if written guidance existed regarding l

his discretionary role in evaluating recommended violations.

1

( __ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _- _

i 10 REV. I 2/27/87 4 1.6 Lessons Learned 1.6.1 Insufficient Development of Inspection Findings Leads to Insupportable Notices of Violation Inspection findings which proposed issuance of a notice of violation must be fully developed in consideration with the 14 points in IE MC 0400-05.02a. Failure to do so results-in violations which may not be legally insupportable. In this case, there were many instan-ces of findings insufficiently developed to support violations. If both the inspectors and the immediate supervisors had directed their efforts toward addressing the 14 points in MC 400, the validity of the same proposed violations could have been readily established.

1.6.2 Failure to Maintain Clear Lines of Responsibility Regarding the Disposition of Inspectior Findings Adversely Impacts on Inspection Report Timeliness and Content Regional inspectors have the responsibility to identify proposed vio-lations, prepare appropriate documentation and recommended enforce-ment action. Supervision and management have the responsibility to review inspection findings and recommendations of regional inspec-tions to determine whether and what enforcement action should be taken [IE MC 0400-04.02]. In this case, these two disc. ete respon-sibilities (i.e., recommending vs. determining enforcement action) were not kept sufficiently separate. As a result, the inspector /

supervisor relationship was not effectively maintained and the time-liness and content of inspection reports were adversely affected.

1.6.3 Regional Philosophy Toward Inspection and Enforcement Must Be Consistent and Communicated Effectively to Inspectors and Immediate Supervision ,

Philosophical differences which may arise between inspectors and j their immediate supervisors with respect to inspection and enforce-  !

ment program implementation need to be promptly and effectively '

resolved. Otherwise, these differences will adversely impact on overall inspection program implementation. In this case, there was disagreement on two fundamental issues. First, should inspections focus on " hardware" or QA program implementation through document reviews. Second, when the NRC issues a violation, should it be  ;

developed as completely as possible or should the buroen be on the licensee / applicant to refute those items which are not sufficiently developed. In this case, these differences were not adequately resolved, and correspondingly continued to impact on the focus of the j inspection program. j l

1 l

11 REV. 1 2/27/87 1.6.4 Failure to Provide Definitive Written Guidance Concerning Supervisory / Management Discretionary Responsibilities With I Respect to Dispositioning Severity Level 4 and 5 Violations i Can Lead to Ineffective Resolution of Inspection Findings According to MC 0400-05.01b, a Notice of Violation should be issued when a licensee " fails to comply with a requirement."

• What constitutes a " failure to comply" with a requirement is not clearly defined. For example, if there is a procedural require-ment to mark all weld rod cans with a particularly label, and in 1999 out of 2000 cases, it was found by the inspector that the cans were so marked, does the fact that one can was missing a label u nstitute a " failure to comply" on the part of the licen-see? There is no definitive written policy in this case that would allow supervisory discretion to not issue a notice of violation.

• Safety significance and its association with violation severity level are addressed in IE MC 0400-05.03. Safety significance depends on the actual or potential to increase the risk tc public health and safety. This establishes the relationship of safety significance to enforcement. However, in cases where a failure to comply exists and no safety significance can be established, can supervisory discretion be exercised and a notice of violation not issued?

In inspection report examples provided with MC 0610, it is implied that the intent is to permit inspectors / supervisors the above discretion. A written policy should be clearly established that formalizes this discretion.

1.6.5 A Failure to Place Emphasis on the Safety Significance of Inspection Findings Diminishes the Effectiveness of the Inspection Program IE MC 0610-05.4 states the emphasis on inspection details in the inspection report should be on ". . . . . significant findings that may have an impact on safety or safeguards and/or represent noncompliance with NRC Regulations or License Conditions." In this case, the issues of contention between inspector and supervisor focused mainly on areas of inspection which had little or no safety significance and/or were not clearly tied to NRC regulatory requirements. This approach, in conjunction with the problems identified in 1.6.1, did not reflect current NRC guidance and led to protracted debate between the inspectors and immediate supervisors. It appears that the effec-tiveness of the inspection program was correspondingly diminished because of a f ailure to develop findings with an emphasis on the  ;

potential impact on safety. j l

(-

12 REV. I 2/27/87 1.6.6 When Proposing Citations Against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criteria, a Failure to Comprehensively Review Potential Safety Significance As Well As All Aspects of the Licensees Quality Program Can Lead to Incomplete or Inappropriate Violations While MC 0400 addresses enforcement actions with respect to viola-tioris s of " requirements," it notes such examples as a " Rule, Order, License Condition, or Technical Specification." At a construction site, violations are typically written against Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 because these criteria represent the only regulatory " requirement" available for enforcement. This may unduly focus inspector's atten-tion to compliance with Appendix B as the ultimate goal. Instead, the recognition that Appendix B provides the means of assuring the real goal (i.e. , that all involved activities will lead to quality construction) should be emphasized. i Appendix B is written in a manner which leads to broad interpretation and varying levels of rigor in inspection application, depending upon the knowledge and experience of the particular inspectors. Without proper management direction or other compensating guidance, an inspector can lose sight of the fact that ultimately the construction (i.e., hardware) itself is the objective product being measured. The relative merit of any item of noncompliance with Appendix B should always attempt to establish a direct relationship to the quality of .

the construction itself and ultimately its potential to increase the risk to public health and safety.

In this case, certain violations of Appendix B (without safety significance) were proposed. Some of these could have been legally issued, but the nonconformances foui,d had no bearing on the potential to increase the risk to public health'and safety.

The guidance in MC 0400 does not emphasize the need to review and document all applicable licensee procedures which bear on an issue in question and which support the violation of a specific cri:erion of Appendix B. In this case, the inspectors wrote violations directly against Appendix B criteria without appropriately documenting the failure to comply with licensee lower tier procedures. These violations as documented, were invalid because a clear link was not established to applicable licensee procedures.

1.6.7 Inability to Resolve Inspector / Management Differences Concerning the Reclassification of Inspection Findings Led to the Escalation of Inspector Concerns to the Office of Inspector and Auditor Management acted appropriately in all instances when reclassifying proposed violations as unresolved items when the inspectors presented insufficiently developed inspection findings. "An item of noncompli-ance may be considered a violation or may be treated as an unresolved item." [IE MC 0400-05.01] However, immediate supervision failed to

13 REV. 1 2/27/87 convince the inspectors that the reclassification was appropriate and within management's prerogative. [IE MC 0400-04.02.b.1] Because of a failure to resolve these issues through active cooperation, the inspector alleged harassment and intimidation by management during an investigation by OIA. Upper Region IV management apparently failed to either recognize or deal effectively with the conflict, nor did the inspector exercise the option to initiate a Differing Professional Opinion (NRC MC 4125) to address the technical issues of Concern.

1.6.8 Improper Use of Unresolved Items Can Result in Inappropriate Inspection Report Findings An unresolved .sem is a matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a i deviation, or a violation [IE MC 0610-03.07]. In this case, management reclassified inappropriate violations as unresolved in order to appease the inspector in some instances. Since the items did not meet the test of an unresolved item, this resulted in the issuance of an inspection report without clear definition of the action needed to disposition the unresolved items.

1.6.9 Improper Explanation of Unresolved Items in Inspection Reports Results in a Lack of Proper Direction to Resolve the Issues in Question When documenting an unresolved item in an inspection raport, a reason should be stated [IE MC 0610-05.4c]. The inspection report should explain why the item is unresolved, what further review is necessary, and who is responsible for taking the needed action. In this case, I management appropriately reclassified inspection findings as unre- l solved but did not provide the above explanations in several l instances. This failed to direct either the inspectors or the )

licensee to the actions needed to properly resolve the finding, l 1.6.10 Failure to Group Multiple. Examples of Violations Presents a Fragmented Approach Toward Enforcement Multiple examples of a particular violation should be addressed, if applicable [IE MC0400-05.02a.8]. A group of violations may be evaluated in the aggregate and assigned a single severity level if all arise from the same underlying cause or programmatic deficiencies

[IE MC 0400-05.03d]. In this case, the inspectors failed to follow this guidance and proposed multiple violations for the same under-lying cause in several instances. This was evident in their approach to the records storage issue and perceived 10 C.~P SJ.55(e) reporting deficiencies. The initial proposed violations presented a fragmented approach toward enforcement and did not provide the licensee a focused issue to correct programmatic deficiencies.

t

14 REV. I 2/27/87 1.6.11 Improper Interpretation of I&E Guidance on Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Can Lead to Inappropriate Recommendations for Notices of Violation Chapter 9900 of the Inspection and Enforcement Manual provides guid-ance on certain sections of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.

The introduction to this Manual Chapter states, "Although not official interpretations, the guidance presented should be used in determining whether a person's activities constitute noncompliance with the regulations." This guidance is provided as an aid to the inspector, but does not constitute written interpretations by the Office of the General Counsel. In this case, the Enforcement Section (Section 7) of the guidance on 10 CFR 50.55(e) focuses entirely on whether the licensee's evaluation process supports the ultimate decision with respect to deportability. It is silent on any relation between required evaluation records and the applicability of those records to Appendix B Criteria. The Enforcement Section discusses only noncompliance with the requirements of 50.55(e).

Section 8 of the guidance discusses the relation of significant deficiency reporting to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. It indicates that procedures and records are necessary to support 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting and that the means to do this should be an integral part of each licensee's QA program. Since 50.55(e) reportable deficiencies are intimately related to the licensee's program to identify and correct all construction deficiencies, this relationship is properly addressed in the licensee's QA program. However, the guidance does not provide rational for bringing the entire 50.55(e) process under the various criteria of Appendix B.

The inspector applied the criteria of Appendix B to 50.55(e) report-ing without sufficient basis, particularly in light of the fact that 1

Section 7 (Enforcement) of the guidance is completely silent on the applicability of violations to Appendix B requirements. The multiple violations of Appendix B criteria proposed by the inspector were arrived at through unsupported interpretation of the MC 9900 guidance.

L-------_________.--_-__________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______________ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1 15 REV. 1 2/27/87 1.7 Recommendations Recommendations Regarding the Comanche Peak Inspection Program 1.7.1 Since the programmatic impact of Operations Traveler usage is j central to the question of whether the RPV installation activ-ities were adequately controlled, further review of Operations Traveler criteria, control and effectiveness is warranted if it has not been done as a part of inspection activities completed to date. Specifically, an inspection of how design information and design changes were handled by the Traveler Program may be warranted, particularly with consideration of ANSI.N45.2.11

guidance on the design verification process. Also, the sample size for inspection of the Operations Traveler usage at CPSES may need to be expanded to cover other NSSS components (besides l

I the RPV) and to check more recent wod. activities. Evidence that recent work activities have been adequately controlled by Traveler utilization would confirm, with a greater measure of confidence, that earlier work was also properly implemented.

1.7.2 Both the TRT and CPRT have conducted reviews of certain aspects of the CPSES audit program. These may not have been suffic-iently specific to form overall conclusions on the NSSS compo-nent installation and assurance process. Since it is apparent that records of audits and surveillance were not available for the RPV installation, a need to verify the adequacy of Level I QC inspection of this important activity may exist. Further-more, since QC was the only rigorous form of QA in evidence, further NRC review of the completeness of QC coverage and tech-nical acceptability of the actual inspection criteria for the installation of all the major NSSS components is possibly war-ranted. The nature of previous TRT and CPRT sctivities should be taken into account when making that determination.

1.7.3 Since there is evidence in the OIA 86-10 testimony that a ques-tion existed as to when the CVCS spool piece was marked with the number (i.e., 301) which ultimately established traceability, inspection of other installed field-fabricated spool pieces, should be considered. Verification of the existence of an ade-quate material identification and traceability program for

earlier work can be accomplished through an expanded sample of field inspection for this activity. Another valid approach to this same concern would be a review of the procurement and con-trol program for the bulk piping stock at CPSES with further inspection directed to the checks and balances which would have precluded installation of the wrong material.

s

(

16 REV. 1 2/27/87 1.7.4 Even .though the lack of concrete truck mixing blade inspection records represented an issue of minor safety significance, the philosophical position as stated- by Region IV (that although 'a procedure required blade inspections, it did not require docu-mentation of such inspections) requires careful consideration.

It is common inspection and QA implementation practice to assume that if a quality inspection is required, documentation of such an inspection is also required.

1.7.5 As a quality records control question, consideration should be given to further review of the TRT position that " permanent" records removed from storage- fer use .or revision revert to an "in process" status, which do not require application of. the full ANSI N45.2.9 provisions. While it is recognized that a practical interpretation of the guidance is appropriate, prud-ency dictates that records do not lose significance as "documen-tary evidence.of the quality of. items" merely because they have changed storage locations. Since Region IV appears to have reviewed the adequacy of licensee controls in this area, based in some measure upon the TRT position, further review of exactly how this . position is being applied to the records control pro-gram at the CpSES may be warranted.

! 1.7.6 Analysis of the NAMC0 Switch Identification Problem (IEB 79-28)

I identified a related point of inspection which requires further clarification. The question of why the nonsafety-related switch received QA inspection was explained by the licensee without apparent reference to USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.97 requirements.

Since the CPSES FSAR documents commitment to USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, it appears that QA inspection was required because the subject switch provides a Type 0 variable monitoring func-tion which implies Category = 2 QA implementation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97. This question should be further reviewed to determine if the Regulatory Guide 1.97 QA commit-ments have been properly implemented at the CPSES and whether regional inspection has monitored such implementation.

The protracted delay in delivering the updated travelers cover-ing NAMC0 switch replacement to the permanent record storage location is also of concern. The adequacy of the licensee's program to update permanent installation documentation when com-ponents are changed or replaced should be reviewed, if not al-ready evaluated in inspections completed to date.

Recommendations Regarding NRC Guidance 1.7.7 Consideration should be given to amplifying IE MC 9900 guidance on 10 CFR 50.55e to clarify its relationship w~ith respect to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criteria. See Lessons Learned 1.6.11.

1

(

17 REV. I 2/27/87 1.7.8 Consideration should be given to providing more definitive supervisory discretion in IE MC 0400 with respect to disposi- '

tioning Level 4 and 5 violations. See Lessons Learned 1.6.5.

1.7.9 Consideration should be given to amplifying MC 0400 and MC 0610 regarding how to develop and document violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criteria. The need to evaluate safety significance and all pertinent aspects of the licensees' quality assurance program may need to be emphasized: , See Lessons Learned 1.6.6.

1.7.10 Consideration should be given to recommending to DIA that a peer review or similar in-depth technical evaluation be conducted prior to accepting cases where technical issues are central to the matters in question. In cases where disagreement over tech-nical issues form the basis for allegations of harassment and intimidation, a comprehensive technical evaluation may be appro-priate in determining the need for further investigation. ,

Recommendations Regarding the OIA Findings 1.7.11 The conclusion for Allegation I,in OIA Report 86-10 states:

Region IV Management Harassed and Intimidated Inspectors to Pressure Them to Downgrade Proposed Inspection Findings at l CPSES.

/

(,)T In performing its evaluation of the record regarding the disposition-ing of the 34 items raised by PHILLIPS, the Task Group identified several issues that .nay have relevance to the above OIA conclusion.

These should be considered when evaluating broader implications for Region IV.

• OIA Report 86-10 address only 16 of the 34 issues. Attachment MM indicates that these were the only issues discussed by l PHILLIPS during his DIA interview. This tends to provide an I incomplete picture of the technical issues at question. If more than one half of the issues (18 of 34) contested by PHILLIPS and WESTERMAN were considered less significant by PHILLIPS, this could have relevance to a'. legations of harassment and intimida-tion. By not analyzing all contested 34 issues, the OIA report does not present a complete analysis of the technical merit of the issues.

• OIA interviews of PHILLIPS, Ind E do not focus to any significant degree on the tecnn Eal aspects of the 16 items reviewed to the extent the interviews of WESTERMAN and BARNES do. HUNICUTT, although in the initial concurrence chain for Inspection Report 85-07/05, apoarently was not interviewed.

GOLDBERG was not present when PHILLIPS was initially inter-viewed; accordingly, the technical aspects of the issues were not addressed in depth.

w)

?

i

18 REV. 1 2/27/87 j

'

• Based on the Task Group 2 independent assessment of the 34 inspection findings, lengthy involvement and discussion between management and the inspector was warranted to achieve dispost-tion of the findings. The compliance threshold established by Region IV management was found to be appropriate based on the The significance of the findings and status of plant licensing.

Task Group 2 technical reviews do not support the contention that the inspection findings were " unjustifiably downgraded."

• The technical review by OIA was not consistent. The failure of GOLDBERG to interview PHILLIPS regarding the technical aspects of the issues, the general lack of technical focus in M[

interview, and the failure to interview HUNICUTT tend to support this view. Further, WESTERMAN was questioned at length on the technical issues, and in more detail than PHILLIPS (approximate

( length of testimony 700 pages for WESTERMAN, 200 pages for i

PHILLIPS.) The demeanor of the investigators when interviewing WESTERMAN, particularly on the second day, was inconsistent with the approacn taken when interviewing PHILLIPS. Finally, the OIA analysis and conclusions for Allegation I do not address PHILLIPS' initial failure to deyelop the proposed violations along the lines of the 14 points in MC 0400. Rather, the point is n;ade that WESTERMAN failed to subsequently provide guidance to the inspector (s) to provide additional information.

4 I

)

\

l l

h _

l 19 REV. 1 2/27/87 l

l l

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

- SECTION 1.8 One Page Summary Analysis for Each of the 34 Items i

1 l

_ ._ ---___________-_-a

1 20 REV. 1 2/27/87

1. & 2. Control of Design and Design Changes for RPV Installation (IR 85-07/05)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Issue 1

- Violation of, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III (Design).

Issue 2 - Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV (Nonconform-ances),

b. Region IV Disposition: Each issue was reclassified as a separate unresolved item.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: In both cases, reclassification was' appropriate, because the findings, as documented, did not support violations.

d. Independent Assessment: As stated in the OIA interview, manage-ment's reason for the unresolved items was questionable. The unresolved item, as stated, in the inspection report lacked reasons and expected follow-up.

Correspondingly, neither the inspector, nor management sought to pursue the central question as to whether the sub-ject Westinghouse tolerances were design information. If the unresolved item had been properly documented, and pursued accordingly, a valid violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III could have been issued.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1-2, 1.6.4, 1.6.6 through 10.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: See 1.7.1 l

.1 f

l 1

I

_ b

3 l '.

21- .

REV. 1 2/27/67

3. Audit'of RPt. Installation Activities (IR 85-07/05) )

i

a. Inspector Recommendation: Violation- of 10 CFR S0, Appendix B, l Criterion .XVIII (Audits).

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassified as a r. unresolved item, i

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Reclassification was appropriate be-cause the finding, as documented, did not support a violation.

d. Independent Assessment: An unacceptable situation had indeed existed at the time of the finding be- i cause without- audits or surveillance, level I QA controls (i .e. , QC inspec-tion) v:. e totally relied upon to pro-vide to. requisite quality assurance.

As stated in the OIA interview, manage - ,

ment's reason for the unresolved item I was questionable. The unresolved item,-

as stated in the inspection report,-

lacked reasons and expected . follow-up.

Further inspection of the audit plan requirements and follow-up of the lack 4 of audits / surveillance - of the. NSSS-components in general should have been directed in the inspection report as

part of the resolution of this ' item.

Such a review could have led to a' valid violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, I Criterion XVIII, since specific Brown & l Root requirements for the conduct of audits of major NSSS components had apparently been violated.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 2, 1.6.4, 1.6.6 through 9.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: See 1.7.2.

(

r 22 REV. 1 2/27/87

) 4. CVCS Spool Piece Traceability (IR 85-07/05)

J '

= a. Inspector Recommendation: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII (Control of Material).

Region IV Disposition: Finding deleted from final inspection b.

report; no discussion of a traceability problem. j

}

) c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Deleting the finding was appropriate; f

e it was based upon an incorrect inter-p pretation of the code by the inspector.

d. Independent Assessment: The spool piece as marked had the

} requisite matnial traceability. Sub-sequent review determinad that the licensee's own internal procedures had not been followed in the marking pro-cess; however, since the subject Brown

& Root procedure required more informa-tion than the code specified, no direct hardware or adverse safety impact was evident. In the disposition of this issue, the inspection goal (i.e., to determine the adequacy of the licensee material ic;ecti fication program) Jost its significance ca to the prolonged discussion on differences in code interpretation.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1-2, 1.6.4, 1.6.6.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: See 1.7.3.

.l 23 REV4 1 ,

2/27/87 )

, 5. Hydrostatic Test for the Cold Leg Piping Subassembly (IR 85-07/05) 1

a. Inspector Recommendation: Unresolved item pending clarification (

of the code requirements.

b. Region IV Disposition: Item deleted from the final inspection report; no discussion of inspector question on this subject.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Deleting the unresolved item was appro-priate; it was based upon an incorrect interpretation of the code by the inspector.

d. Independent Assessident: Deferral of the hydrostatic test on the subject piping subassembly was proper and ria real safety concern existed.

Regional management correctly scught a

" third party" opinion on code require-ments from an NRR expert. This effec-tively resolved the issue. While re-mcyal of the inspector's entire section of the report on this issue can be con-sidered management prerogative, cus-tomary practice would have been to retain the record of inspection activ-ity, documenting the inspector's initial concerns and then explain satisfactory resolution.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.2.

f. Recommendation fo'. Further NRC Action: None.

i

24 REV. I y 2/27/87

6. Concrete Truck Mixing Blade Inspection Records (IR 85-07/05)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures), require response from licensee,

b. Region IV Disposition: Violation issued; no response required from licensee.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Licensee corrective action and mitiga-ting reasons as to why a response to the violation was not required were properly documented in the transmittal letter. This was appropriate to the circumstances.

d. Independent Assessment: A violation of minor safety signifi-cance was identified, documented and correctly. issued. Requiring licensee response to the violation would have added nothing to the resolution of this issue. Analysis of this finding from the standpoint of both the inspector ,

and management revealed technical 1 shortcomings on both sides with respect to knowledge of ACI requirements and the need for records to document licen-see quality inspection. activities.

i

e. Process Controls / Lessons  ;

Learned: See 1.6.3 and 1.6.5-6. l

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: See 1.7.4. l l

l l

f

__=_____________________.

25 REV. I  !

2/27/87

7. Failure of FSAR to Describe TUGC0 Records System (IR 85-14/11)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Violation of 10 CFR 50.34 (FSAR Revision).

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassification as an unresolved item.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Reclassification was appropriate; how-ever, since there was no potential for ,

enforcement, categorization instead as an open item would have been more proper.

d. ' Independent Assessment: Although some differences existed be-tween the FSAR description and licensee practice, the lack of specific regula-tory guidance and criteria appropriate to this issue permits the licensee sub-stantial latitude in the development of detailed procedures and practices. The finding, as presented by the inspector was not supported oy either his devel-opnient of specific examples or suffi-ciently prescriptive regulatory cri-teria. The inspector also failed ,o recognize or acknowledge the need for resolution of the licensing issues separately from any compliance issues.

In this. case, the questions of licensee program adequacy and specific requests /

recommendation for regulatory guidance should have been appropriately for-warded to NRC HQ for action.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .5, 1.6.7 through .10.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC A: tion: None.

l l

26 REV. 1 2/27/87

d. QA Manual Does Not Address ANSI N45.2.9 Requirements and Commitments l (IR 85-14/11)

a. Inspector Recomrrendation: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII-(Records).

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassification as an unresolved item.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Reclassification was appropriate, since the item was indeed unresolved pending-completion- of an evaluation of the licensee's lower tier procedures to determine whether the subject regula-tory criteria had been addressed.

1.

d. Independent Assessment: The docurrentation provided by the in-spector did not evidence rigorous eval -

uation of both upper and lower tier procedures. The scope of the inspec-tor's initial review was not expanded to determine if the procedural omiss-ions were functionally. significant or whether lower tier procedures provided equivalent guidance. Since the licen-see QA manual was undergoing revision and there were no identified signifi-cant programmatic deficiencies, delay l of further in-depth inspection of this_

issue was appropriate pending comple-tion of the QA Manual revision. How-ever, the final inspection report did not effectively direct any such action or review necessary to resolve this item.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .7 and 1.6.10.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

1

l i

27 REV. I 2/27/87

9. Procedure Control of Offsite Shipment of Original Engineering / Design Records (IR 85-14/11)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures).

b. Region IV Disposition: The violation, as written, was issued  !

in the final. inspection report, f

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: With the issuance of the violation, there was no conflict between inspector recommendation and the regional dispo-sition. However, issuance of this-violation was subsequently used by regional management to reclassify other related findings,

d. Independent Assessment: The violation was valid since ANSI N45.29 implies that the licensee imple-ment prudent controls for such unde-fined or ambiguous situations as were in evidence with this issue. The pro-cedure to implement such controls had been inadvertently cancelled. It ap-pears that Region IV took effective, I

immediate action to terminate record shipments and obtain licensee action to correct the identified problem.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.2 through .5.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

i 28 REV. 1 2/27/87 10., 11. & 12. Multiple Concerns on Records Shipped to SWEC (IR 85-14/11)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Issues 10 & 11 - Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII (Records).

Issue 12 -

Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII (Records).

b. Region IV Disposition: Each of these items were dropped from the final inspection report, based upon regional belief that the previous issue

. (No. 9 - issued as a violation), also bounded these three issues.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Dropping these individual items was appropriate, because they represented the effects (i.e., shortcomings) di-rectly caused by the insufficient pro-cedural control already cited by Issue No. 9. Specific regulatory guidance was also lacking to support individual violations.

d. Independent Assessment: These three ' issues represent observed implementation failures resulting from the problem cited as a violation in Issue No. 9. The issuance of separate violations for these items was inappro-priate and contrary to MC 0400. The cause-effect relationship of the fail-ure to apply a control procedure resulted in these observed deficiencies and should have been cited at examples, in the violations for Item 9, to ensure that the licensee not only understood, but could respond to the entire problem.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .5 and 1.6.10.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

I

-29 REV. 1 1

2/27/87 13., 14. &'15. Multiple Concerns on Records Shipped to CB&I (IR 85-14/11)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Issues 13 & 14 - Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII (Records).

Issue 15 - Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII (Records).

b. Region IV Disposition: Issue 13 was dropped as a violation.  :

Issue 14 was reclassified as an unre- I solved item.

Issue 15 was reclassified as an open item,

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: The above Region IV dispositions were appropriate, since the regulatory re- l quirements and guidance available for-records in transit are generally'ambig-uous and do not support violations.

d. Independent Assessment: These findings were originally proposed as additional examples of previously identified problems (Issues 10-12).

Because of the similarity in concerns, regional management initiated a refer-ral cf the subject matter to NRC HQ, seeking further guidance. Overall  ;

regulatory requirements in this area '

were lacking and these items were ini-tially developed by the inspector based ,

upon his perception of what the re- I quirements should be. In reclassifying the issues, the existence and applica-tion of a detailed, reasonably prudent CBI procedure was considered by Region IV. Thus, regional management's hand-ling of the issues was consistert. The unresolved item directing TUGC0 to pro-vide records demonstrating CBI controls was appropriate,

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .7 and 1.6.10.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

. 1 l

I 30 REV. 1 2/27/87

16. TUGC0 Did Not Document Audit of CBI Records (IR 85-14/11)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII-(Audits).

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassification as an unresolved item l

(in an interim draft version of the -

IR.) Issue was not discussed in the final report, apparently based upon the decision of the inspector.

c. Evaluation of Regional-Disposition: Reclassification was appropriate in that insufficient basis for a violation existed. However, the need for the proposed unresolved item is even ques-tioned since the identified discrepancy was so minor.

d. Independent Assessment: Practically, audit summary reports are intended to be succinct and brief. In this case, since no adverse findings were identified by the audit, the noted omission from the report had little bearing on the quality of the actual audit documentation. Even if fully developed, this finding had negligible safety significance. Therefore, the decision to drop the item entirely was appropriate,

e. Process Controls / Lessons

• Learned: See 1.6.1 through .8,

f. Recommendation for Further i NRC Action: None.

--__-_-__-a

31 REV. 1 '

2/27/87

17. Failure to Preclude Rain from Entering QA Intermediate Records Vault i

18. '

Failure to Preclude Food and Coffee Pot from QA Intermediate Records Vault (IR 85-14/11) .

a. Irispector Recommendation: Issues 17 & 18 - A single violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVII (Records) was initially proposed for both issues. I

b. Region IV Disposition: Issue 17 was reclassified as an open item. Issue 18 was reclassified as a routine inspection observation.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: For Issue 17, a clear violation of regulatory requirements did not exi;t-Therefore, reclassification was neces-sary. An inspector observation for Issue 18 was proper.

d. Independent Assessment: For Issue 17, reclassification as unre-solved was more appropriate; more infor-mation was needed to evaluate the ef-festiveness of the licensee's correc-tive actions to deal with the long term issue of rain in-leakage.

Issue 18 was handled in accordance with current NRC practice [see examples in MC 0610]. Basea on its insignificant nature, and immediate corrective action by the licensee, reporting as an inspector observation was appropriate.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .7 and 1.6.10.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

t I

l

)

1

32 REV. 1 2/27/87

19. Failure to Install Fire Suppression System, Drains, and a Sloped Floor at Records l Center (IR 85-14/11)

20. Plant Records Stand in Fc'ders or Binders in Open Cabinets at Records Center (IR 85-14/11)

a. Inspector Recommendation. A deviation from FSAR and ANSI N45.2.9 commitments was preposed for the TUGC0 records center. The issues at question were the adequacy of storage (open cabinets) and fire extinguishing systems (sprinklers vs. CO2 )'

l A deviation from the FSAR and ANSI N45.2.9 was also <

proposed for the Permanent Plant Records Vault l (PPRV). The issue at question was the adequacy of I tN facility since there was no installed fire sq pression syster.

b. Region IV Disposition: The TUGC0 records center issue was reclassified as unresolved, but the only concern referenced was that of storage in open cabinets. The PPRV issue 3 was reclassified as unresolved. )

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Two versions of the ANSI Standard (1973 and 1974) had different requiremer.ts, with the 1974 version being less restrictive. Apparently, the 1974 ver-sion applied as a result of commitments in the most recent " TAR. Therefore, an unresolved item was apprn s:e s; a deviation fr e ANSI requirements was at q- ,.

The PPRV was const ructed as described in FSAR 17.1.17. However, the failure to have al installed suppression system apparently deviated from ANSI N45.2.9. Therefore, creation of an unresolved item, with referral to IE:HQ QA Branch for clarif-ication, was appropriate.

d. Independent Assessment: The minor significance of these issues, coupled with the apparent conflict in applicable require-ments justified the ' issuance of these items as, unresolved. However, the distinction between the 1973 and 1574 versions of ANSI N45.2.9 -

" suppression system versus adequate system" - was not addressed IR 85-14/11. It would have been appropriate to do so in order to properly focus efforts to resolve this item.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .5 and 1.6.7.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

33 REV. 1 2/27/87

21. Failure to Provide Temporary or Permanent Storage for Records Co-Mingled With In-Process Documents in Paper Flow Group (IR 85-14/11)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII (Records).

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassified as an unresolved item.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Reclassification was appropriate; how-ever, the rationale for such reclass-ification based upon the perception that records revert to an "in process"

. status once removed from a storage vault is incorrect.

d. Independent Assessment: Neither the inspector nor regional management appear to have completely evaluated this issue with respect to the adequacy of the licensee's program.

Further, management's disposition and documentation of the finding did not adequately address completion of licen-see preventive action, due in part to regional management's posture on the item (i.e., that the records in ques-tion did not require fire proof storage at the time.) This handling of the situation then led to the documentation of insufficient information on this issue in the final inspection report and the failure to address the need for programmatic preventive action by the licensee.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .7, 1.6.9 and .10.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: See 1.7.5.

l

/

l t

f

/

.I.

34 REV. I 2/27/87

)

22. Weld Rod Identification (IR 86-14/11)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Originally a Deviation, revised to a Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures).

b. Region IV Disposition: Finding deleted from, but original inspector observations retained in final inspection report; referral of the concern to licensee for follow-up documented.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Decision not to issue a violation, but referral of problem to licensee was proper, particularly, if as was stated, inspector input into this decision process was solicited.

d. Independent Assessment: While a violation of Brown

& Root procedures could have been issued, this item did not raise weld rod filler identification and trace-ability concerns. Significance and hardware impact were negligible. The record indicates that the inspectors were involved in the decision to remove the violation from the final report, in order to avoid conflict with the clos-ure of a related open item. The reso-it; tion of this issue, with apparent inspector concurrence, was proper.

e. Prccess Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .6.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None, f

35 REV. 1 2/27/87

23. Failure to Develop / Implement Procedures to Demonstrate 50.55(e)

Deficiencies are Corrected (IR 85-16/13)

24. Failure to Revise Implementing procedures Containing 50.55(e) Reporting (IR 85-16/13)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Unresolved item from previous month's inspection (IR 85-14/11) was proposed as two violations of Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (Procedures.)

b. Region IV Disposition: Neither item appeared as violations in the final report. The previous unre-solved item was left unchanged. One new unresolved item was created and a TUGC0 commitment was elicited by Region IV management.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Reclassification as unresolved items was appropriate. Appendix B violations against Criteria V are not appropriate if based solely on perceived deficien-cies in 50.55(e) evaluation, reporting.

and adequacy of records to support those activities.

d. Independent Assessment: Inadequacies in the 50.55(e) deficiency 6 evaluation and reporting were not iden-tified. The new unresolved item was unnecessary; all concerns could have been addressed in one broad unresolved item. The use of the unresolved item ( s) brought about appropriate ac-tion by the licensee to disposition the inspector's concerns with re!pect to ,

the licensee's E0.55(e) program and '

file content.

l

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .8, 1.6.10 and .11.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: See 1.7.7.

f

36 REV. I 2/27/87

25. Failure to Maintain Retrievable 50.55(e) Files

27. TUGC0 50.55(e) Files Not Auditable (IR 85-16/13)

a. Inspector Recommendation: One violation of Appendix 8 Criterion XVII,(Records). )

b. Region IV Disposition: Two previous associated unresolved  ;

items (from.IR 85-14/11) were left open; two new unresolved items were -

opened in IR 85-16/13. '

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Reclassification was appropriate; new l

unresolved items need not have been created. The evaluation / closure of all reportable significant construction deficiencies would - as held by Region IV - be required prior to fuel load and reactor operations. The timeliness of that effort to support final licensing requires interaction between the-licen-see and NRC management, not enforcement.

d. Independent Assessment: Proposing violations was an inappro-priate use of enforcement in an area requiring management interaction to resolve the issues in question. The unresolved item caused the licensee to set a course of action to deal with the inspector's concern. The inspector made an inappropriate interpretation with respect to IE guidance in Manual Chapter 9900 regarding 50.55(e).

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .8, 1.6.10 and .11.

f. Recommendation for Further I NRC Action: See 1.7.7.

1 I

i

l 37 REV. 1 2/27/87

26. Corrective Action Commitment Oates in 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report (IR 85-16/13)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Previous month's inspection (IR 85-14/ l

13) unresolved item proposed as a vio-lation of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassified as a new unresolved item.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: The reclassification was appropriate because of the broad concerns related to the licensee overall program to comply with 50.55(e) requirements.

d. Independent Assessment: The creation of a specific unresolved item to address the commitment date issue was not necessary since NRC questions could have been included in one broad unresolved item directing the licensee to address 50.55(e) program concerns. 10 CFR 50.55(e) states: ". . . The report shall include

... sufficient information to permit

- analysis and evaluation of the deficiency and of the corrective action." Although commitment dates have customarily been a part of the licensee's report, there exists no regulatory basis for a violation if a licensee is considered to be deficient in some aspect of meeting or tracking commitment dates,

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .5,1.6.7 and .8 and 1.6.10.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

38 REV. 1 2/27/87

28. & 33. IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-14 Concerns (IR 85-16/13)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Unresolved Item with respect to the completeness of the licensee response to IEB 79-14.

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassified as an open item, in recog-nition of reopening the bulletin file based upon the analyses and engineering effort in progress by Stone and Webster.

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Reclassification was appropriate; the inspector misinterpreted the IEB 79-14 requirements and this issue did not raise questions of an enforcement nature.

d. Independent Assessment: The inspector apparently did not under-stand the technical aspects of IEB 79-14 to the degree necessary to judge the adequacy of the licensee response on the in progress Stone and Webster engineering activities. The bulletin response, with respect to the scope of the 79-14 program, was adequate. Fur-ther NRC inspection to review and track the status of ongoing 79-14 activities was recognized as necessary and the documentation of the need for such follow-up as an open item was appropriate,

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.2 through .5.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

l

(

\

l

.________-________________,__a

39 REV. 1 2/27/87 l

)

29. Incomplete IE Bulletin Files (IR 85-16/13)

]

a. Inspector Recommendation: Unresolved item,

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassified to an open item,

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Open item unnecessary; however, a TUGC0 commitment was elicited by Region IV to disposition the item.

d. Independent Assessment: No regulatory requirement exists for-the administrative content of bulletin files, although TUGC0 did commit through a-licensing procedure to main-tain station re:ords related to IE Bulletin responses. No case was de-veloped where those files were defici-ent; only that file closure was pre-mature and the records were decentral-ized. The pertinent issue was the ability of the NRC to evaluate the adequacy of TUGC0 IEB commitments. On a case-by-case basis, individual IEB's stand on their own, and open or unre-solved items are unnecessary until specific valid technical concerns are raised.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.2 through .5.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

I

(

p

40 REV. 1 2/27/87

'30. NAMCO Switches (IEB 79-28) Identification Problem (IR 85-16/13)

.a. Inspector Recommendation: Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII- (Control of Material).

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassification as an unresolved item; the licensee had provided clarification of the inconsistent records on one switch and was continuing review of the other switch inconsistency.

l

c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Reclassification was appropriate be-l cause of the subsequent development of l evidence that hardware adequacy was not in question. Further, the inspector had not developed the finding from the perspective of a records deficiency,

d. Independent Assessment: Hardware acceptability for the switches in question could have been resolved during the 85-16/13 inspection and documented in the final inspection report. The timeliness of providing the correct travelers to the QA records vault could have been developed as a document / records control issue (e.g.,

l Criterion XVII) but was not pursued from this standpoint by the inspector,

e. Process Controls / Lessons l Learned: See 1.6.1 through .4 and 1.6.7.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: See 1.7.6.

(

41-REV. 1

) 2/27/87

31. & 32.; Inadequate Procedures for Processing and Lack of a TUGC0 Construction Focal Point for Tracking NRC IE Bulletins (IR 85-16/13)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Verbally suggested (prior- to first written draf t of. IR 85-16/13) viola-tions, presumably of 10 CFR 50, Appen-dix B.

b. Region IV Disposition: Unresolved item.

c. Evaluation of. Regional Disposition: Unresolved item was unnecessary since TUGC0 management commitment had already been established.

d. Independent Assessment: No clear regulatory basis exists for administrative 1y assuring IEB responses themselves and related correspondence are processed and documented as quality activities. There were no cases developed within IR 85-16/13 (6 IEB's) where IEB commitments were determined conclusively to be either insufficient or not properly implemented. There-fore, no enforcement action was appro-priate.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .8.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

42 REV. 1 2/27/87

34. B_ISCO Fire Barrier Seal Certification (IR 85-16/13)

a. Inspector Recommendation: Violations of Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV (Nonconforming Material) and Part 50.55(e), and a recommendation I (via separate memo) for possible OI investigation and IE Vendor Branch inspection.

b. Region IV Disposition: Reclassification to two unresolved items; issuance 5 months later of a i memo (revised twice) to IE recommending generic consideration. RIV-01 review concluded that more substantial infor-mation was necessary to support an investigation.

1 c. Evaluation of Regional Disposition: Unresolved items were appropriate.

Criterion XV violation was improper; Part 50.55(e) violation apparently dropped voluntarily by inspector. Re-commendation for generic consideration was delayed unnecessarily by manage-ment, but technically sound. RIV-0I determined that the issues required further development prior to initiation of an investigation.

d. Independent Assessment: The hardware implications at Comanche Peak were being adequately addressed by TUGC0; therefore, the inspector pre-maturely proposed violations. The significance of the issue as a con-struction deficiency was limited and later evaluated correctly by TUGC0 to be non-reportable. The inspector's original open item (one year previous) sufficiently embodied the concerns and should have been pursued accordingly.

Region IV management's delay in escala-ting the generic implications was un-warranted. Resolution of the referral to RIV-0I was determined to be outside the Task Group Charter.

e. Process Controls / Lessons Learned: See 1.6.1 through .7.

f. Recommendation for Further NRC Action: None.

43 REV. I 2/27/87

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Persons Contact (d U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A. Krasopoulos, Reactor Engineer, Plant Systems section, Region I K. Manoly, Lead Reactor Engineer, Materials and Process Section, Region I H. Miller, Quality Assurance, IE G. Napuda, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer, Region I J. Petrosino, QA Specialist, DQAVT/IE J. Spraul, Quality Assurance, IE A. Vietti-Cook, Project Manager, NRR t,

l i

_________________d

i l

44 REV. I 2/27/87 {

2.2 Report Organization The thirty-four items contained in Attachment 1 to Attachment MM of OIA Report 86-10 were researched using the methodology depicted in Report Section 1.3. Base documents and NRC resources used to conduct the assessment are referenced in Appendix 4.4 and Report Section 2.1.

The technical issues were reviewed using Appendix 4.4 standardized criteria to insure consistency in the assessment approach and docu-mentation of Task Group efforts.

The Report Section 3.0, ISSUES, is structured as follows:

Detail Detail Number Title Purpose 3._ Item Title Item number, where there are dup-licates or similar concerns they are grouped together.

3._. i Backgr-ound Describes origin of item in 01A 86-10.

3._.1.1 Summary of Issue How the item was originally pre-sented by the reporting inspectors through disposition of the issue by Region IV management. Where appropriate additional information made known subsequent to inspec-tion report issuance is also described.

3._ .1.2 References Applicable documents used in de-veloping, researching, and analyz-ing the issue (s).

3._.2 Independent Assessment Disposition of item by Task Group 2 performed on the basis of as-sessing the item, determining in-dependently the regulatory concern identified by the issue regardless of the Region IV approach and dis-position.

3._. 3 Analyzing RIV RIV inspector finding as originally Disposition presented either verbally or in draft 3.1 Statement of Inspector's Inspection Report with Task Group Finding and Regulatory presentation of the intended primary Concern regulatory concern.

l 1

45 j REV. 1 '

2/27/87 Detail Detail Number Title purpose '

3._ .3.2 Characterization of Characterization of the safety intent Finding of the RIV inspection by the Task Grc up.

Task Group evaluation of the de-velopment of the inspection find-ing' including assessment of pro-

-grammatic consideration 3._.3.3 Nature of Reclassifica- Narrative description of RIV manage- i tion of Inspection ment disposition of the inspection Findind as it Appeared finding based on the OIA report in Final Draft with record.

Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning 3._.3.4 Management's Role in Task Group analysis of the appropri-Achieving Final Dispo- ateness of the RIV management dis-sition position of the inspection finding including, where appropriate, recommendations for further action.

3._ 3.5 If Item was Determined Task Group analysis of whether to be Unresolved, was appropriate focus or commitments there Sufficient Infor- were made to insure eventual mation in the Inspection resolution of the issue.

Report to Focus Activi-ties of the Licensee /

Inspector to Effective Resolution 3._.4 Conclusions Narrative discussion of P.IV dispo-sition as compared to Task Group findings; including, where appro-priate, potential safety signifi-cance, additional actions warran-ted, and broader implications.

Sections 1.4 through 1.8 of this report provides the Task Group 2 Overall Summary and Conclusions based on the Task Charter goals.

1 46 REV. I 1 2/27/87 3.0 ISSUES 1

h~ 1. and 2. Control _of Design Criteria and Design Changes for RPV Installation j L

1/2.1 Background These items were identified in DIA 86-10 as 85-07/05, Issues 1&2. l These were " highlighted" items in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to 0IA ]

86-10. They are combined for analysis and assessment because of a their similarity and their joint review in Attachment HM.

1/2.1.1 Summary of Issue During the conduct of inspection 85-07/05, a Region IV inspector f identified two findings which were initially documented as proposed {

violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III (Design Control) and XV (Nonconforming Items). The first concern involved the ques-tionable licensee prccessing of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) installation design criteria and the second issue concerned the .

f ailure to document a deviation f rom these RPV design criteria as a i nonconforming condition. Both of these findings were commented upon by the NRR consultant assigned to review Region IV draf t reports on CPSES. Based in part upon these comments, and further Region IV management review, both proposed violations were reclassified as unresolved items in the final inspection report.

1/2.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 85-07/05 (two draft versions and final report)

.2 OIA 86-10, pp. 9-10 and Attachment MM

.3 CPRRG-15, Enclosures 1&2

.4 CPRRG-16, pp. 1-27 and Exhibits 2-6

.5 CPRRG-17, 85-07/05 Inspection Report (Items 1&2) and Attachments 1, 2, 6 and 6a.

.6 American National Standards, ANSI N45.2.8 and N45.2.11 1/2.2 Independent Assessmeg With additional inspectior review, a violation could have been devel-oped and supported concerning the failure to control the design information ecnveyed bv the Westinghouse Procedure for Setting of Major NSES Components (CPRRG-17, Attachment 2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. The existing controls provided by the Brown & Root Procedure for the Preparation, Approval and Control of Operation Travelers, CP-CPM-6.3 (GR,T-17 Attachment G) were adequate to control changes to the traveler which .tered performance of work. The Operations Travelers, in of themselves, did not corsti-tute records which would be subject to 10'CFR 50, Appendix B controls

(

1 47 REV. 1 2/27/87 for design documents. However, common industry and architech engi-neering practice would dictate control of certain installation toler-ances as design information, for which changes must be treated more '

rigorously than is directed by CP-CPM-6.3. The Westinghouse proced-ure which provided the installation tclerances should have been con-trolled as a design document.

1/2.3 A_n_a_1yzino RIV Di sposition 1/2.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Fincing and Regulatory Concern With regard to the RPV installation, the inspector documented two proposed violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III & XV respectively.

(1) Failure to translate design r.riteria into installation specif-ications and failure to control deviation from these criteria.

(2) Failure to maintain tolerances and report deviations on a non-conformance report.

. The inspector's primary regulatory concern involved design and design change. control and its programmatic application in the handling of tolerance changes for.the RPV installation.

1/2.3.2 Charagerization of Finding

- Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Grcup's evaluation.

Design information must be properly controlled, otherwise installation of safety. related components may occur cutside parameters of the design envelope.

The Task Group considers this item to have moderate potential safety impact in that the inspector and his management did not ensure that the licensee's program for control of design infor-mation in the RpV installation instructions was rigorously con-trolled. This had the potential to result in actual hardware quality cefects; however, with the evidence that the Operations Traveler system was fully functioning at the time of the instal-lation, any concern of . adverse hardware impact is c!iminished.

- Should it have been pursued for more examples of progran.matic significance; was it?

Programmatic impact of the Operations Traveler program and usage, with respect to the adequacy of design control, should have been pursued further, particularly as it pertained to more recent work activity.

1 w________-_. . _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _.

i

i 48 I

REV. 1 2/27/87 Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

Expansion of the inspection sample (regarding design control for Operations Traveler usage) to cover more recent activities was warranted.

1/2.3.3 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning Region IV management concluded that the Operations Traveler procedure adequately controlled reactor vessel installation, that the proced-ures were followed, and that QA criteria were complied with and no additional controls were required. Reportedly the review of these issues by the NRR consultant precipitated the belief that violations were inappropriate classifications fc- these concerns. Unresolved items were created in the inspection report to permit additional review by the inspectors.

1/2.3.4 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition  !

Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes, reclassification was correct at the time because of the way findings were developed by the inspector. Howevet,, Region IV management indicated that no additional controls or checks of the Operations Traveler program were required because the subject controlling procedure (CP-CPM-6.3) professed compliance with the required QA criteria. This appears to be an incorrect inter-pretation of how design changes should be controlled.

- What fut .her action should have been directed to proper resolu-tion.

Direction should have been provided the inspector to expand the inspection of Operations Traveler usage to more recent work activities.

The reclassified unresolved item could have requested a Westing-house position as to how their installation tolerances should be perceived as design information (i.e. which information on the traveler should have been treated as design information).

The NRR consultant's comments on the proposed violation should have been clarified. The consultant indicated he was asking a question, while Reg;on IV management perceived his comments to mean he disagreed with the proposed violation.

49 REV. 1 2/27/87 1/2.3.5 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution No specific guidance was provided to direct the subject of these con-cerns to effective follow-up inspection. The inspection report writeups remained the same as that which supported the proposed vio-lations, but the findings were reclassified as unresobed items.

Without further inspection into the underlying concern for control of design changes in Operations Travelers, the validity of the findings remains in question. The item, as expressed in the final report, did not meet the criterion for an unresolved item.

1/2.4 Conclusions These two concerns represent a sample of inspection points which I merited additional attention to determine whether the CPSES QA Pro-gram commitment on design control (CPRRG-16, Exhibit 2) and therefore 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III had been violated. In deter-mining whether such inspection findings now require the expenditure of additional inspection resources, the timeframe of the activities (i.e.. RPV installation in 1979 versus record inspection in 1985) must be considered. As developed, CP-CPM-6.3 and the usociated Operations Travelers appear to represent adequate co.-;rols to have assured proper RPV installation.

The reclassification of Items 1&2 was correct at the time because the issues had not been fully developed by the inspector to support pro-posed violations. However, Region IV management's justification for the reclassification indicates a lack of understanding of certain QA principles, particularly those discussed in ANSI N45.2.11 for design change control. Neither the inspector nor management sought to fol-low-up the central question raised by these two concerns, which was whether the Westinghouse technical information (tolerances and clear-1ces provided in its Reactor Vessel Setting Procedure) was in fact design information. The Westinghouse procedure (CPRRG-17, Attach-ment 2) should therefore have been controlled as design documentation

- to meet the full intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III -

and a violation for failure to do so should have been written.

However, the RPV installation took place six years prior to this sub-ject inspection activity. Also, the Operations Traveler program, while questionably meeting design change control standards, did exhibit enough cor. trol to confirm the adequacy of the RPV installa-tion itself. With regard to the cold gap concern, a Westinghouse letter (CPRRG-17, Attachment 6a) indicates the existence of no ad-verse design or hardware impact. The very fact such a cold gap devia-tion had to be analyzed, however, provides af ter-the-fact evidence that design information was in question.

50 REV. I 2/27/87 The inspectors never fully developed the issue as to whether the questioned tolerances did or did not represent design information.

They assumed that it did, and wrote the violation. The importance of such inspection to activities which occurred six years earlier and for which no hardware problems were identified minimized the finding.

While Region IV management properly reclassified the proposed viola-tions based on the information provided by the inspectors, it appears they did so for an incorrect reason and thus negatively impacted future inspection of these valid concerns.

Handling of the Unresolved Item The reclassification of the item to unresolved was proper; however, the final disposition stated the item was unresolved to allow the inspectors to determine if the changed information violated Westing-house's design criteria. (0IA 86-10, Attachment D, p. 179). This provides an improper focus, in that it would have been appropriate to make the item unresolved (with guidance as indicated above) pending a determination of whether the information changed was considered Westinghouse design information, not whether it violated Westinghouse design criteria as opined by management. Actual violation of design criteria gives rise to an entirely separate issue. It is the Task

~

Group's conclusion that the Westinghouse Reactor Vessel Setting pro-cedure was design information and should have been controlled (changed) as such. If this determination was made by the inspectors, the unresolved item could then have been developed into a violation.

e i

51 REV. 1 2/27/87

3. Audit of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Installation Activities

3.1 Background

This item was identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-07/05, Issue 3. This was a " highlighted" item in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to OIA 86-10. l 3.1.1 Summary of Issue During the conduct of inspection 85-07/05, a Region It' inspector identified as a finding the failure of the licensee to perform audits of the Unit 2 RPV installation activities, procedures and. records.

This was initially documented in the draft $nspection report as a proposed audits violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII.

Since the licensee did not make available to the inspector any audit or surveillance reports on the RPV work, the lack of evidence to sup-port these QA activities was +aken by the inspector as a failure to perform the audits or surveillance.

Region IV management's review of this finding resulted in reclassif-ication to an unresolved item in the second draf t and issuance as an unresolved item in the final inspection report.

3.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 85-07/05

.2 OIA 86-10, page 8 and Attachment MM

.3 CPRRG-15, Enclosure 3

.4 CPRRG-16, pp 27-42 and Exhibits 10, 17-19, & 40

.5 CPRRG-17, 85-07/05 Inspection Report (Item 3) and Attachments 3 thru 9

.6 ANSI Standard N45.2.12 3.2 Independent Assessment With reference to the initial draft inspection report (CPRRG-17, Attachment 3), it is stated that the licensee "did not make available any audit or surveillance reports of specifications for placement criteria, placement procedures, hardware placement, or as-built records" relative to the Unit 2 RPV installation. This issue in and of itself does not constitute a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII.

In CPRRG-16 (p. 29) reference is made to the Brown & Root (B&R) QAM Section 19.0 and implementing procedure QAP-19.1. This reference implies that B&R had QA Program and procedural responsibility to audit the insf .llation of major nuclear steam suppy system (NSSS) components. If this were not accomplished (and the lack of records t

52 REV. 1 2/27/87 of such activity is evidence that it was not accomplished), a valid violation against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII could have been cited. It should be noted that this information was uncovered by the inspectors af ter final issuance of the report in an effort to respond to the findings in 01A 86-10.

3.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition ,

1 3.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern The inspector was concerned that QA audits or surveillance of the Unit 2 RPV installation had not been performed because objective evidence of such QA activity was not available for review. His init-ial finding documented this failure to perform audits or surveil-lances as a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, C. iterion XVIII.

3.3.2 Development of Finding It appears that in the development of the original finding, the inspector did not review the audit plan or the licensee's audit pro-gram to determine if audit of this activity was programmatically required. Thus, the violation was technically suppceted, as ini-tially documented, only by the inspector's belief that Appendix B requires an audit of the RPV installation because it is an activity of safety significance. This development of the violation was incom-plete and Region IV management's reclassification of this item to an unresolved item was appropriate. As discussed below, however, Region IV appears to have not recognized the valid concern raised by the inspector regarding audit conduct for critical activities.

The development of this finding by the inspector utilizes IE Inspec-tion Module Guidance (CPRRG-16, Exhibit 10) as partial justification for the position that audits of the RPV installation were required.

However, IE Inspection Modules are not regulatory requirements and do not impose requirements, rather they provide general inspection pro-cess requirements to the inspector.

3.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern anc! Task Group's evaluation.

On the broad scale the potential failure to implement a meaning-ful audit program would represent a failure of an important part of the licensee's QA program, t

l 53 REV. I 2/27/87 The Task Group cor.cludes that, for this specific case, the fail- J ure to avdit the RPV installation, when coupled with the design control issues documented by Concerns 1 & 2, represents examples or over-reliance on the contractor procedure and program to assure quality work which has moderate potential to impact safety. However, this finding is sufficiently removed from the actual quality relatsd equipment activities to have not had direct safety impan., particularly since Level 1 QC activities for this activity w;re evident.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

The generic implications of audit problems ai, the CPSES were already being addressed by Inspection Specific Action Plan VII.a.4 (CPRRG-17, Attachment 8). Therefore, expanding the inspectir n sample beyond NSSS component installation was not warranted.

Was it reasonable to expect further vadirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, wh-st action should have been taken?

Yes; the inspr:ctors could have developed the initial finding to include review of the audit plan requirements. Had this been extended tc the B&R responsibilities under QAM, Section 19.0 and QAP-10.1, a valid violation could have been develuped.

3.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Reoort with Orief Statement of Management's Reasoning Based upon the facts as documented in the initial draft inspection report, reclassifying the concern to an unresolved item was appropri-ate. As related by Region IV management, their belief that the ISAP VII.a.4 program had already initiated acticos to assess and correct the known problems with the licensee's audit program would support this position.

3.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes, because the initial finding as developed by the inspectors was insufficient to support the proposed violation.

What further action should have been directed to proper resolu-tion.

54 REV. I 2/27/87 4

The inspectors should have been directed to review the audit plan, particularly with respect to NSSS components, to determine the scope of audit plan implementation. Additionally, based upon three concerns (Items 1, 2 & 3 above) all related to RPV installation, further review to confirm that the licensee had assurances of adequate controls by their contractors for this l activity would have been appropriate.

l 3.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was There Sufficient l Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the '

Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution No; as documented in Attachment MM (OIA 86-10), p. 5, Region IV management did not appear to appreciate the basis of the concern since it was stated that " surveillance for the installation of the vessel" could have substituted for audits. In fact the inspection report itself indicatea that neitner audits nor surveillance were conducted. It appears that the unresolved item was not initiated for meaningful follow-up inspection, but to demonstrate the issue had not been avoided by management.

3.4 Conclusion Region IV management's reclassification of this issue appears appro-priate, based upon insufficient development of the initial finding by the inspector. However, documentation of an unresolved item without clear understanding or diref. tion of what was needed to resolve the item was an inappropriate use of this categorization.

A valid unresolved item could have been generated to pursue audit plan requirements or to followup the lack of audit / surveillance of NSSS components in general. Such direction could have led to the determination, as documented in CPRRG-16 by another inspector, that B&R audits of the major NSSS components were required. Further re-view then could have led to the basis for issuance of a valid viola-tion of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII.

While it is true that the regulatory requirements for audits and the pertinent guidance (e.g. , ANSI N45.2.12) do not prescribe what spec-ific activities must be audited, it does not necessarily follow that important activities (such as installing the NSSS components) should nyt have been audited. In fact, the inspectors document the fact that surveillance activities were not conducted for this work. This results in a situation where Level I QA controls (i.e., QC inspec-tion) are totally relied upon to provide the requisite quality assur-ance.

55 REV. I 2/27/87 i

The existence of the ISAP VII.a.4 program and regional management's l intent to evaluate licensee corrective action in response to the ISAP provided some justification for minimizing the inspector's initial finding, since a broader generic concern with respect to audits was already being pursued. However, other inspector concerns (Nos. 1 &

2) were noted in the same inspection report about the RPV installa-tion and that the regional MC 2512 program had apparently not been fully in:plemented to inspect this activity at the time it was in progress. Therefore, further Region IV reviews in the area of NSSS component installation would have been appropriate.

HarJling of the Unresolved Item Tiu.re was justification for classifying this as an unresolved item; however, the manner in which it was addressed in the final inspection report and tht: lack of managerial guidance given to the inspectors did not provide for an effective resolution. It is clear that the vessel installation was not audited; however, this in of itself was not a violation. The larger concern should have been on whether there were already existing requirements in the audit plan or the Brown and Root (B&R) quality assurance procedures which were not met. As pre-viously stated, further review by the inspectors in response to 0IA 86-10 did identify a B&R requirement to audit the vessel installa-tion. If the initial finding had been properly developed by the inspectors at the time, a violation could have been proposed.

However, the adeouacy of the audit plan with respect to major NSSS components needs to be resolved. Management's belief that this need not be pursued by the inspectors because of ongoing ISAP or CPRT activities may be inappropriate in that there was no guarantee this specific area would have been reviewed adeauately by those ongoing efforts. Management could have directed the inspectors to conduct an in-depth review of the audit plan, particularly as it pertained to major NSSS mechanical components, by documentation in the final inspection report as the means to pursue the unresolved item. An alternative resolution would have been for management to contact the personnel involved with the ISAP effort to ensure this issue was addressed, with appropriate documentation in the inspection report.

There were valid concerns regarding the edequacy of the audit and surveillance program. However, neither the inspectors or management set upon a course of action to resolve this concern for the specific activity in question (RPV installation). The categorization of this as an unresolved item provided the mechanism to do this, but it was not properly qualified to provide for subsequent resolution.

l l

1 i

i I

)

56 REV. 1 2/27/87 1

4. CVCS Spool Piece Traceability ,

4.1 Background

l

.This item was identified in 0IA 86-10 as 85-07/05, Issue 4. This was a " highlighted" item in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to OIA 86-10.

l 4.1.1 Summary of Issue During the conduct of inspection 85-07/05, an inspector identified a finding which was initially documented as a proposed material iden-tification violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII. An installed piping spool piece was inspected for marking and trace-ability. Although the spool piece number and the Brown and Root drawing . number were found on the subject spool piece (3Q1), other inarkings as required by subsection NA-3766.6 of Section III of the ASME Soiler & Pressure Vessel Code -(S74 addenda) were not noted; hence the apparent violation. Subsequent review of this issue by Region IV management indicated that the requisite traceability was provided by the existing markings (e.g. , 3Q1) as noted. Therefore, management dropped the proposed violation and nc, discussion of a traceability problem was included in the final 85-07/05 inspection report.

4.1.2 References

.1 OIA 86-10, page 12 and Attachment MM

.2 CPRRG-01

.3 CPRRG-15, Enclosure 4

.4 CPRRG-16, pp. 43-51 and Exhibits 32 through 37

.5 CPRRG-17, 85-07/05 Inspection Report (Item 4) and Attachments 3-5

.6 ASME B&PV Coce, 1974 edition (S74 Addenda); Section III, 4

Articles NA-3000 and NB-4000 4.2 Independent Assessment The markings noted on the subject piping spool piece (e.g. 3Q1) meets ,

the ASME B&PV Code with respect to material identification. The requisite traceability was provided and the finding documented ir, the draft 85-07/05 inspection report (CPRRG-15, Exhibit 32) did not con-stitute a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII.

However, further review by the Task Group concluded that a procedures violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V did exist in the failure of the licensee to follow approved precedures with regard to material identification and marking (CPPRG-15, Exhibit 37). This failure to follow procedures had no direct ha:dware or adverse safety impact since the Brown and Root procedure for narking of field fabri-cated material went beyond the Code requirements.

i

57 REV. I 2/27/87 4.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition 1

4.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern A piping spool piece fabricated on-site from bulk piping material was identified to be in noncompliance with the ASME B&PV Code, Section '

III (NA-3766.6). Marking with the material specification, grade and heat number had not been accomplished. Even though traceability could later be established through the piping spool piece number, the inspector's concern remained that a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII had been identified. The inspector con-sidered the marking of the spool piece insufficient to meet the requirement of the ASME Code and a proposed violation was written.

4.3.2 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

Without proper traceability, the potential existed for the in-

.stallation of non-controlled Code material in safety related systems.

Further examples or evidence that the licensee's programs had failed to provide the requisite traceability could provide a safety concern of generic applicability to the site.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

Expanded inspection would have further evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's overall material identification and traceability program. Inspection of additional on-site fabricated spool pieces for proper marking would have been appropriate to address this issue.

Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

Yes; the proposed violation as originally documented in the draft inspection report attempted to connect the perceived lack of adequate markings directly to an ASME Code violation. Had the development of this issue proceeded through review of the licensee's program and applicable procedure requirements, a violation could have been developed.

(

l l

58 REV. 1 2/27/87 l 4.3.3 Timeliness Was communication between inspectors and RIV Management on final resolution timely?

No, in addition to the seven month delay in the inspection re-port issuatice, it appears that the Region IV technical expert was not made aware of the pertinent fact that the subject spool piece was fabricated from bulk material and conversely, the original inspector did not learn until he later reviewed OIA l testimony of the specifics of the Code interpretation ultimately l made by the technical expert. 1 Was lack of timeliness a detriment to effective resolution?

Yes, since the semantics of Code interpretation were being argued for a spool piece which indeed was traceable.

4.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning Management dropped the violation because acceptable traceability could be established for the spool piece. Ultimately, Region IV's interpretation of the Code (subsection NB-4122) was correct and the violation, as proposed by the inspector, was not valid.

4.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes, as the facts were provided to them, their interpretation of the Code was correct and a violation did not exist.

4.4 Conclusion Material traceability was provided, therefore there is no safety significance of this finding with respect to the inspected spool piece. The fact that a procedural violation did exist was not iden-tified until later because of the apparent focus on Code questions, rather than the adequacy of the overall licensee program for material identification. The late processing of the report, and apparent lack of communication among concerned individuals, contributed to the problems in dispositioning the inspection finding. The original pro-posed violation, as documented, was not valid. Region IV management reasoning, for dropping the violation, was ultimately correct.

59 REV. I 2/27/87 A violation of the licensee's own internal procedures did exist, as later identified by the reporting inspector in his response to OIA 86-10, (CPRRG-16, Exhibit 37). The safety significance of this is minimized by the fact that component traceability was indeed estab-lished. The intent of safety inspection in this area (to determine l the adequacy of the licensee material identification program) appears to have lost its significance to the prolonged discussion on differ- j ences in Code interpretations. '

There is evidence in the OIA 86-10 testimony that a question existed as to when the "301" marking was placed on the pipe. The task group considered the resolution of this question to be beyond the scope of its task. However this question, coupled with the inspector's ini-tial concern that a material traceability problem existed, should have been sufficient cause for increasins the sample size of the inspection. The pertinent issue should have rseen whether the licen- 1 see's program to provide traceability of field-fabricated material was adequate. If an examination of this program has not been ade-quately addressed in other NRC inspection directed activities, con-sideration should be given to doing so. If the spool piece initially did not have the required marking when viewed by the inspector, this could raise larger issues of potential safety impact related to traceability of on-site fabricated material.

60 REV. 1 2/27/87

5. Hydrostatic Test for the Cold Leg Piping Subassembly

5.1 Background

q This item was identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-07/05, Issue 5. This was I not a " highlighted" item in Attachment I to Attachment HM to OIA 86-10.

5.1.1, Summary of Issue 1

During the conduct of inspection 85-07/05, a Region IV inspector questioned the deferral of a hydrostatic test on the Loop 3 reactor coolant cold leg piping subassembly until the system hydrostatic test conducted after installation was completed. This issue was documen- ,

ted as an unresolved item pending clarification of the Code require-ments by NRC headquarters. After review by regional management, the unresolved item and the entire section of the inspection report dis-cussing the inspector's question on'this subject was deleted from the second draft report. The final report was issued with no mention of this item.

5.1 2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 85-07/05

.2 OIA 86-10, pp. 8-9 & 12, and Attachment MM (Attachment 1)

.3 CPRRG-15, Enclosure 5

.4 CPRRG-17, 85-07/05 Inspection Report (Item 5) & Attachments-3-5, i 11 and 14-18 i

.5 ASME B&PV Code, 1974 edition (S74 Addenda);Section III, General i Requirements (NA) and Articles NB-4000 and 6000.

5.2 Independent Assessment Deferral of the hydrostatic test on the piping subassembly by the licensee was proper. This situation was allowed by the ASME Code and i constitutes the normal practice for hydrostatically testing piping subassemblies. Since piping subassemblies are sections of piping systems, and systems themselves are components, the hydrostatic test for the piping system serves as the requisite test for all of the {

included subassemblies and parts. No unresolved item or safety con- i cern existed as a result of this inspection activity.

5.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition 5.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern Based upon the inspection of records relative to the hydrostatic testing of one ASME Section III, Class I piping subassembly, the inspector believed the Code had been violated. He documented this concern as unresolved pending further NRC review, and later opined that this raised a " serious question. . . as to the validity of tests being performed on the piping" (CPRRG-15, Enclosure 5).

I l

61 REV. I 2/27/87 5.3.2 _ Development of Finding How issue was researched ' and analyzed, including' supportive bases; applicable. documents consulted- and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

Region IV review of this unresolved item, which includtd major input by the technical specialist and ASME Code expert, deter-mined _ that the Code had not beei, violated and the issue was j resolved. . Region IV management was correct in their technical f position and apparently further attempted to convince the in-  !

spector of this by seeking a " third party" opinion from an NRR

,. Code expert. The inspector had documented the original concern as unresolved pending " clarification of Code requirements by NRC headquarters". Since the expert technical opinion of both Region IV and NRR had been sought with respect to thb Code interpretation, it is not clear what additional information the

[

inspector felt was pertinent to resolve this issue.

5.3.3 -Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and. Task Group's evaluation.

The inspector's only concern was that an ASME Code requirement had been violated and it then followed that the ASME Code stamp for the subject piping subsequently had been improperly applied.

The Task Group considers. this item to have no direct safety significance in that the technical concern was not valid for the identified example, i.e., the spool piece' would be subjected to a system-level hydrostatic test and this fully complied with the

ASME Code requirements.

l l

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

No programmatic significance was identified.

5.3.4 Timeliness Was communication between inspectors and RIV Management on final resolution timely?

Efforts were made by RIV Management to address the inspector's concerns by seeking an NRR technical position on this matter.

The decision making process on this item took this into timely j consideration.

I I

. J

62 REV. 1 t.

2/27/87 5.3.5 Nature of Reclassification o.f Inspection Fir. ding as it Appeared in the Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning Since the technical issue was invalid, no unresolved item existed and removal .of the concern from the inspection report was proper. How-ever, the entire paragraph documenting the inspector's review of this issue was also deleted. Since valid inspection effort in this area had taken place, consideration should have been given to document the inspector's reviews.

5.3.6 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were ' management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes; the Code question was pursued and utilized to resolve the item. Technical expertise both inside and outside of Region IV was solicited to confirm this position.

5.4 Conclusion Region IV management was correct for deleting this unresolved item from the inspection report. The issue had been resolved by Code interpretation which allowed deferral of the subject hydrostatic test following interpretation confirmation with NRR.  ;

Deletion of the entire inspection detail resulted in an incomplete inspection record. It is customary practice for inspectors to docu-ment their inspection activities in inspection reports and to track how the inspection effort was developed and the time that was expen-ded. If the particular question is resolved, the inspection report should document how issues are developed and questions resolved.

This is particularly important if the item was presented as unre-solved at the exit meeting (as assumed by the Task Group) but subse-quently reclassified in a final report to the licensee.

o I

i k

63 l REV. 1 )

2/27/87 ]

I

6. Concrete Truck Mixing Blade Inspection Records

6.1 Background

This item was identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-07/05, Issue 6. This was a " highlighted" item in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to OIA 86-10.

6.1.1 Summary of Issue During the conduct of inspection 85-07/05, the inspector identified 3 that a Brown and Root (B&R) procedural requirement for concrete truck l mixer blades to be checked quarterly was violated in that no licensee '

records were available to document the performance of such inspec- ,

tions. The initial draft inspection report documented this finding as a proposed procedures violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criter-ion V. The pertinent details of the inspection report did recognize that "the mixing blades were periodically inspected" and that

" strength and uniformity tests have consistently been within the acceptable range ... even though mixing blade inspection was not documented."

Region IV management, in their review, 'did not cause substantial alteration to either the proposed violation or. the pertinent inspec-tion report section (e.g., reference to an ACI 304 Standard commit-ment in the FSAR was added to the final report). However, the trans-mittal letter, dated February 3, 1986, transmitting the final inspec- ,

tion report to TUGC0 required no response to the proposed violation i and stated the reasons behind this position, as provided for by NRC IE Manual Chapter 0610 guidance.

6.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 85-07/05

.2 OIA 86-10, pp.5 and 11 and Attachment MM

.3 CPRRG-16, pp. 51-55

.4 CPRRG-17, 85-07/05 Inspection Report (Item 6) and Attachment 19

.5 American Concrete Institute ( ACI) Standards; ACI-301-72, Specification for Structural Concrete for Building l l ACI-304-73, Recommended Practice for Measuring, Mixing, Trans- l porting and Placing Concrete i I

6.2 Independent Assessment A violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V was correctly iden-tified and documented. Also documented were corrective action and mitigating reasons why TUGC0 response to this proposed violation was not required. These were appropriately placed in the cover letter transmitting the final inspection report, since the violation pro-posed was valid and had remained as originally written.

(

I

l 64 REV. 1 2/27/87 6.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition 6.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern While the inspector acknowledged no evidence of a significant tech-nical concern, he objected to the decision to not require a licensee response to the proposed violation. He inferred that other inspec-tion procedures could similarly have problems with their implementa-tion and documentation.

6.3.2 Development of Finding How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

The report detail and proposed violation did not change as a result of Region IV review. Management required the inspector to provide a reference to the standard (ACI-304) requiring mixer blade mainten-ance. Input received from the NRR consultant apparently questioned the need for such a citation, but this did not affect the decision to issue a proposed violation.

In subsequent analysis of this issue (CPRRG-17, 85-07/05 IR, Item 6),

Region Iv~ implies that documentation of the mixer blade inspections was not in fact required by the B&R procedure in question (reference CPRRG-17, Attachment 19). Also discussed at length is the fact that ACI-304 does not require blade inspection.

However, ACI 301-72, which is also a valid reference requires in Chapter 7.2.2.6 that " mixer blades shall be replaced when they have lost 10 percent of their original height." Therefore, ACI-301, and not ACI-304, provides the basis for the procedural requirement to inspect mixer blades. Since such an inspection requirement has its origin in a national standard, the Region IV position that actual documentation of this inspection was not required is incorrect. Not-withstanding subsequent Region IV after-the-fact analysis of this issue, issuance of the proposed violation was correct.

6.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The implied safety concern was that the absence of the proced-urally-required quarterly mixer blade inspections could permit blade degradation, which could produce defective concrete for placement in safety related structures. Since this was not apparent from the concrete test results, the inspector assumed this issue represented a failure to document required inspec-tions.

i 4

65 REV. I 2/27/87 Given the report statement that the mixing blades had been per-iodically inspected and that strength and uniformity tests of 4 the resulting concrete were consistently acceptable, the Task Group concludes that the lack of required documentation is of negligible safety significance.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

No; programmatic significance was not evident to assume that this example represents a larger problem that procedurally-required inspections were not being accomplished or documented.

6.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in the Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning The proposed violation was issued, basically, as originally documen-ted. Because corrective action had already been implemented prior to report issuance, the response to the proposed violation was not re-quired as provided for by IE MC 0610 guidance. The reasoning for this decision was documented in the cover letter of the report.

6.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant decision not to require a licensee response to the violation 7 i Yes; corrective action on a proposed records violation with little safety significance had been completed.

6.4 Conclusion A violation of minor safety significance (correctly classified as Severity Level V) was issued. The decision not to require licensee response was soundly based, with the reasoning documented in the cover letter transmitting the inspection report to the licensee.

The significance of this issue was minimized by the lack of evidence that construction itself or safety-related work were adversely affec-ted. Lack of the documentation for the required inspection activity was not, of itself, indicative of a larger generic problem that a licensee response would have been expected to address. If, as expressed, the inspector believed a broader issue of inspection con-l duct and documentation existed, he could have documented this posi- i tion in the inspection findings to raise and support that position. l l

l l

l

\

f l

\ _ ___-_-_ _ -

l 66 REV. I 2/27/87 While Region IV management's action on this issue was correct, their subsequent response to this item in CPRRG-17 creates additional ques-tions. Region IV stated that while the B&R procedure required quar-terly blade checks, it did not procedurally specify .that documenta-tion of such inspection - was required. Such a position is not con- i sistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII which implies that I if the activity itself (eg., a blade inspection) affects gaa11ty, sufficient records shall be maintained to furnish evidence of such an activity. The philosophical arguments with regard to the ACI-304 re-quirements, while having merit in determining the minor safety sig-nificance of this issue, do not reflect Region IV knowledge that ACI-301 provided the technical basis for the procedural requirement. 1 Research of this issue from the standpoint of inspection preparation and management analysis demonstrated technical shortcomings. 4 l

l

67 REV. I 2/27/87

7. Failure of FSAR to Describe TUGC0 Records System

7.1 Background

The item was identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-14/11, Issue 1. It was not a " highlighted" item in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to OIA 86-10.

7.1.1 Summary of Issue The licensee's records management system uses several " interim" or temporary storage and processing facilities for handling records prior to their transfer to permanent (life-of plant) storage facil-ities. The inspector asserted that the interim facilities: a) did not meet the licensee's FSAR commitment to ANSI N45.2.9 and, b) were not otherwtse addressed by the FSAR as exceptions to commitments.

The inspector believed the above to constitute a failure of the licensee to revise the FSAR to describe current practices as required by 10 CFR 50.34(a)(7). The proposed violation against 10 CFR Part 50 in the draft inspection report was reclassified by management to an unresolved item.

7.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 50-445/85-14/11

.2 CPRRG-17, RIV Management Positions on Attachment MM, IR 85-14/11

.3 OI File 86-10

.4 CPSES FSAR, Section 17.1

.5 NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan, Section 17

.6 Transcript, Investigative Interview, T. Westerman, July 10-12, 1986

.7 Transcript, Investigative Interview, H. S. Phillips, March 19, 1986

.8 Memo, B. K. Grimes, DIE, to V. S. Noonan, NRR, January 15, 1986, QA Review, Commanche Peak (Att. 6 to CPRRG-17)

.9 NRC Comanche Peak Technical Review Team (TRT) Results, Allega-tion AQ-45, Permanent Records Not Stored in a Fireproof Vault

.10 CPRRG-16, Notes of H. Phillips, Report Draf t la 7.2 Independent Assessment of Inspection Finding Reference .8 established that the FSAR met current standards of acceptability for licensing. Although some dif ferences existed be-tween the FSAR description and licensee practice, the lack of spec-ific regulatory guidance and criteria appropriate to these observa-tions allows latitude in the development of detailed procedures and practices which implement FSAR commitments. In this case, the ques-tions of TUGC0 licensee program adequacy and specific requests /

recommendation for regulatory guidance should have been tasked to an NRC program office for action, and carried as an open item for track-ing purposes pending resolution.

68 REV. I 2/27/87 7.3 Analysis of RIV Disposition 7.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Findings and Regulatory Concern The initially proposed violation stated: "... contrary to 10 CFR 50.34, FSAR Section 17 was not revised to describe and reflect as-pects of the current QA record system, including satellite storage areas, the Interim Record Vault, Permanent Plant Record Vault, and the Procurement Records Storage Area." The inspector indicated that the level of protection afforded records being processed through the temporary facilities was inadequate and outside the latitude permit-ted by FSAR Subsection 17.1.1.17.

~7.3.2 Development of Finding How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases-; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

Development of this finding was inadequate, with respect to both the inspector and first line management. The inspector contends that the interim facilities do not meet conimitments to ANSI N45.2.9, but provides no specific examples or evidence of same to support this issue. Inspection history (per reference .9) indicates that this subject had been reviewed in depth and found acceptable and, in the absence of specific examples in the inspection report, enforcement was not deemed appropriate.

Investigative Interviews (reference .6 and .7) indicate that much discussion revolved around the requirements for reference

.4 provided by reference .5. Further, while the investigative interviews indicate a general knowledge of the NRC's TRT find-ings (reference .9), the parties appear to have not specifically reviewed these findings or had a first-hand knowledge of the basis of acceptance applied by the TRT. Additionally, the in-spector's initially proposed violation referenced the incorrect section of 10 CFR Part 50, as noted by reference .2.

7.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspec-tor. He apparently believed the licensee did not meet minimum standards for record storage facilities, which could jeopardize l quality records and prevent substantiation of performance / l characteristics of quality activities and hardware. .

l l

i J

69 REV. I 2/27/87 The Task Group concludes that no direct safety significance car be attached to this item; however, potential major economic significance could occur should record reconstruction be neces- .

sary. The only postulated element of safety significance in- '

volves both the licensee and NRC accepting less than optimum data / records due to the inability to reconstruct lost records to original qua;ity.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it? i The programmatic significance is the ultimate acceptability (with IE and NRR) of the FSAR and the licensee's practices, in light of licensing requirements. However, this activity was interrupted b/ the ongoing investigation.

Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

Yes. Neither the draft inspection report nor the references provide specific examples which demonstrate noncompliance with l the existing FSAR commitments or requirements. Although the report draft text implies that the facilities do not comply with the FSAR commitments, apparently no evidence of substance was developed.

7.3.4 Timeliness Was communication between inspectors and RIV Management on final resolutions (in so far as an effective exchange of ideas) timely?

Initial discussions between the inspector and immediate super-vision apparently occurred while the inspection was in progress (references .6 and .7). This' appears appropriate but was inef-fective. The references, however, indicate that escalation through the Region IV management chain was handled routinely, with no highlighting of the contentious nature of the findings.

7.3.5 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with a Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning The proposed violation was reclassified by management to an un-resolved item in the final report (reference .2) based upon a lack of specific example (s) of concern and that the FSAR de-scription had been previously reviewed by the NRC Staff and found acceptable in a supplemental safety evaluation report.

Management had, however, intended to refer the matter to NRC HQ for further review.

70 REV. 1 2/27/87 7.3.6 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes. Reclassification and proposed handling was consistent with past practices at Region IV and other Regional Offices. The in-spector apparently accepted this position based on his personal revision (reference .10, Report Draft la) and omission of this item from the inspector's listing of " highlighted" concerns (reference .3).

What further action should have been directed to proper resolution.

The inspector implied inadequacy in the licensee's practices without specifying examples. To judge the acceptability, of interim facilities, additional inspection could have been per-formed to assure that the level of adequacy of records manage-ment cs documented in the TRT findings was maintained.

7.3.7 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution The final report ties resolution of this item to resolution of Item 8 below (regarding TUGC0 rewrite of QA procedures) but does not provide sufficient guidance as to TUGCO's committed actions, these desired by Region IV, or the existence of the proposed Regional referral to NRC HQ.

7.4 Conclusions The finding as presented by the inspector was not supported by either his development of specific examples or regulatory criteria. The inspector also failed to recognize or acknowledge the need for reso-lution of the licensing issues separately from any compliance issues.

From a technical and enforcement perspective, Regional management's reclassification of the item was appropriate, l

l

71 REV. 1 2/27/87

8. QA Manual Does Not Address ANSI N45.2.9 Requirements and Commitments

8.1 Background

This item was identified in 01A 86-10 as 85-14/11, issue 2. It was not a " highlighted" item in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to 01A 86-10.

8.1.1 Summary of Issue A violation was proposed by the inspector in the draft report (85-14/

11) citing that the QA Manual did not address certain provisions of ANSI N45.2.9 as committed by the FSAR. The proposed violation was reclassified by management in the final report to an unresolved item.

8.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR-50-445/85-14/11

.2 CPRRG-17, RIV Management Positions on Attachment MM

.3 01 File 86-10, Page 14

.4 CPSES FSAR, Section 17.1

.5 NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan, Section 17

.6 Transcript, Investigative Interview, T. Westerman, July 10-12, 1986

.7 Transcript, Investigative Interview, H.S. Phillips, March 19, l 1986 i

.8 Memo, B. K. Grimes, 01E, to V. S. Noonan, NRR, January 15, 1986, QA Review, Commanche Peak (Att. 6 to CPRRG-17)

.9 NRC Comanche Peak Technical Review Team (TRT) Results, Allega-tion AQ-45, Permanent Records Not Stored in a Fireproof Vault

.10 CPPRG-16, Notes of H. Phillips

.11 TUGC0 Procedure CP-QP-18.4, Quality Assurance Record Receipt Control and Storage 8.2 Independent Assessment of Inspection Finding T'he finding identifies an omission of certain provisions of ANSI N45.2.9 from QA Program procedures. The inspection, as documented, did not establish with specific evidence or examples whether the omission (s) actually resulted in defects in program procedures and implementation. Although seven topics of omission are documented, the inspection data identifies only one case which appears to have resulted in actual violation of functional records management re-quirements (f ailure to control offsite shipment of QA records). In that one case, the licensee had previously had an acceptable lower-tier procedure but it had inadvertently been rescinded.

- _- -__=___ -_

b 72 REV. 1 2/27/87 If equivalent lower-tier procedures exist for the other omissions cited, enforcement action should be based on the programmatic signif- .

icance of the issue rather than the editorial exclusion error. Iden-

' tification of the isolated issue to the licensee, with appropriate implementation of corrective action, would warrant documentation of the finding without citation of the deviation per IE MC 0610. Refer-ence .9 indicates that a substantial body of other Records Management Manual (RMM) procedures exist that were found responsive to FSAR com-mitments. This inspection (85-14/11) is silent on review or adequacy of the RNM procedures. Without an assessment of those procedures, the apparent contradiction of this finding with the acceptable find-ings of reference .9. cannot be resolved and the functional accept-ability of the licensee's program cannot be determined.

Therefore, the item is appropriately categorized as unresolved pend-ing completion of an evaluation of the overall licensee procedures program to determine whether an editorial error existed or whether procedures failed to address the other six " missing regulatory cri-teria. The Task Group arrived at this conclusion as if they were in the supervisor's position at the time the item was presented by the inspector. In reality, this item would never have become a point of discussion between inspector and management if the inspector had re~

viewed lower-tier procedures to determine whether the regulatory cri-teria were addressed. If they were, then an inspection finding ad-dressing the need for the licensee to address the editorial error would have been appropriate.

8.3 Analysis of RIV Disposition 8.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern The inspector found that reference .11. did not include specific pro-visions of ANSI N45.2.9 committed to by the FSAR. The provisions are related to other violations proposed by the inspector (Items 9-15 below). The inspector apparently viewed this item as a central issue to the licensee's overall performance.

8.3.2 Development of Finding How was issue researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

The inspector's development of the finding appears to be a re-sult of other related findings regarding the shipment and con-trol of records and records facilities. Evidence exists that a substantial portion of the licensee's program represented by a Records Management Manual (RMM, reviewed in reference .9.) was not involved in the research. Regional supervision relied on i

l l

73 REV. I 2/27/87 the precedent inspection by TRT as a primary basis for their decision. The significance of these apparent omissions could have been determined by expanding the scope of the inspector's initial review to determine if the procedural omissions were functionally significant or whether lower-tier procedures pro-vided equivalent guidance.

8.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspec-tor. He concluded that, since the licensee did not address all committed minimum standards for record storage facilities, this could jeopardize quality records and ultimately prevent substan-t1ation of performance / characteristics of quality activities and hardware.

The Task Group concludes that there was negligible direct safety impact. This item appears to be an editorial issue with no example of a programmatic implication.

Should it have pursued for more examples of programmatic signif-icance; was it?

See Independent Assessment, 8.2 above.

8.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning The proposed violation was reclassified to an unresolved item in the final report. Management's (reference 2.) basis was: 1) the inspec-tor's findings were subjective and 2) were in conflict with the find-ings of reference .9. The justification stated in the final inspec-tion report was that the licensee was rewriting all of their QA man-uals to improve their written program and that the item would be re-l viewed as part of that activity.

8.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition What further action should have been directed to ensure proper resolution.

The documentation provided by the inspector did not address evaluation of both upper and lower-tier procedures. As dis-cussed above, regional management could have required either l

l l

l l

l l

74 REV. I 2/27/87 additional inspection or documentation of inspection already performed. Further, management's position did not acknowledge the relationship between this item, the lower-tier procedures, and the other findings related to the omitted provisions of N45.2.9. Specific direction was warranted for further develop-ment of the issues to support the initial proposed violation. .

i 8.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution No. The '.nspection report does not reflect the actions considered necessary to resolve the item on the part of either the licensee or i the NRC (eg. at the conclusion of the ongoing licensee QA Manual re- 1 write, that a determination would be made with respect to adequacy of the revised manuals and the overall program).

8.4 Conclusions Reclassification of the item by management was appropriate based on the insufficient inspection development as to the availability of re-lated, lower-tier procedures / implementation and relevant potential violations (Items 9-15 below). The issue had potential for being the

" root cause" of the several related implementation problems; however, this significance was not developed by either the inspector or super-visor to fully support the issues.

The or going effort by TUGC0 to revise the QA Manual bears signifi-cantly on this issue. There were no identified issues which sugges-ted existing significant programmatic deficiencies. It would be appropriate that further in-depth inspection effort be delayed until the review of the QA Manual was completed. This was handled through the reclassification of the issue to an unresolved item; however, it was not documented in the final inspection report as to what actions specifically were required to resolve the item.

As noted in the Independent Assessment (8.2), the Task Group con-cludes that the inspectors did not sufficiently develop the specifics of this issue and supervision did not properly direct the inspectors to focus their attention to fully develop the issue before final i issuance of the report.

l l

p ,

75 REV. 1 2/27/87 9.0 Procedure Control of Offsite Shipment of Original Engineering / Design Record's L

9.1 Background

This item was identified in DIA 86-10 as 85-14/11, Issue 3. It was a

" highlighted" item ' in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to OIA 86-10.

9.1.1 Summary of Issue A proposed procedures violation against 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V was issued in Report 85-14/11 for failure to have/use procedures to control shipment of single-copy, original records to Stone and Webster, N.Y. A prior procedure existed which controlled those activities, but when an organizational re-alignment occurred, the prior procedure was cancelled and never reissued with pertinence to the newly responsible organization. This matter was the subject of protracted discussion between inspector and management. In the final analysis, the proposed violation was left to stand, but impacted on subsequent management decisions regarding Issues 10 through 15 dis-cussed below. It has continued to be carried as a centested item, apparently because of its overall pertinence to the records control issue.

9.1.2 References

.1. CPSES Combined IR 50-445/85-14/11

.2 CPRRG-17, RIV Management Positions on Attachment MM, IR 85-14/11

.3 01 File 86-10

.4 Transcript, In"estigative Interview, T Westerman, July 10-12, 1986

.5 Transcript, Investigative Interview, H.S. Phillips, March 19, 1986

.6 NRC Comanche Peak Technical Review Team (TRT) Results, Allegation AQ-45, Permanent Records Not Stored in a Fire-proof Vault

.7 CPPRG-16, Notes of H. Phillips 9.2 Independent Assessment of Inspection Finding The violation is valid as written. The fact that ANSI N45.2.9 is silent on shipping records is pertinent in that a regulatory position should be formulated by NRC staff (i.e., controls to be exercised during transfer of records among organizations is addressed as a general line item) if deemed necessary.

I i

i 76 REV. I 2/27/87 9~ 3 Analysis of RIV Disposition 9.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern TUGC0 failed. to have/use issued procedures to control shipment of original records to SWEC. The inspector's regulatory concerns ap-peared to be addressed by the immediate and followup Region IV ac-tion. (Note that Phillip's " matrix of draf ts", Attachment K to Referer.ce .2, incorrectly indicates this ' item was reclassified to unresolved).

9.3.2 Development of Finding This finding was developed via licensee interviews and inspector pro-cedure reviews, and is reasonably founded. The inspector determined that the absence of a procedure was due 'to inadvertent deletion of the previously available procedure as a result of a licensee reorganization.

9.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

Original single-copy design records were being shipped from Texas to New York to support a major reanalysis effort. A post-ulated loss of records would have substantially reduced the con-fidence level in the data available for reanalysis.

The Task Group concludes that no safety significance can be attached to this item; however, potential major economic signif-icance could occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

Development of related issues are discussed separately in Items 10-15 herein.

9.3.4 Timeliness Was communication between inspectors and RI V Management on final resolutions.

Although it appears that some issues remained active between the inspector and his management following the end of the inspec-tion, Region IV took effective, immediate action to terminate record shipments and obtain licensee action to correct the iden-tified situation. The remaining related issues (Items 10 to 15) involve the detailed aspects of this concern, e.g., the licen-see's motivation for not duplicating shipped records, the defin-ition of a final vs. in pror.ess record, etc.

77 REV. 1

2/27/87 9.3.5 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with a Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning

-The proposed violation was not reclassified. It appears that manage- i

. ment. issued the proposed violation as the essence of the various con- '

cerns identified in Items 10-15, thereby supporting their position . i for reclassification of the other items.

9.4 Conclusions The proposed violation remained as originally written when issued in the final report. There is no safety significance or unresolved con-cerns that temain outstanding. This violation is related to Items 10-15 and was intended by management to serve as the central issue to focus licensee corrective actions in the area of records storage.

78 REV. 1 2/27/87 10.0 Original Design Records Shipped in Cardboard Boxes to SWEC.

11.0 No Backup Copy of Records Shipped in Cardboard Boxes to SWEC.

12.0 Failure to Control and Account for Records Shipped to SWEC.

10/11/12.1 Background These items were identified in OIA 86-10, as Issues 4, 5, and 6.

They were " highlighted" items in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to 0IA 86-10. Items 10, 11, 12 have been grouped together due to their -

similarities.

10/11/12.1.1 Summary of Issue-These three issues, as stated above, are the purported implementation failures resulting from Issue 9 above (Inspection Report 85-14/11).

They represent the specific aspects of the licensee's failure to ,

safeguard records highlighted by the inspectors. The inspector (and a consultant) asserted that the records in transit required protec-tion and accountability commensurate with the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9 and, based on statements attributed to licensee staff mem-bers, considered the licensee to have overtly permitted shipment of the records without proper safeguards to avoid the costs involved with providing such safeguards. '

The proposed violations and pertinent details (which lacked specific citation to a regulatory requirement) were deleted from the inspec-tion report by management.

10/11/12.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 50-445/85-14/11

.2 CPRRG-17, RI V Management positions on Attachment MM,

.3 01 File 86-10

.4 Transcript, Investigative Interview, T Westerman, July 10-12, 1986

.5 Transcript, Investigative Interview, H.S. phillips, March 19, 1986

.6 Transcript, Investigative Interview, J. Gilray, July 17, 1986 10/11/12.2 Independent Assessment of Inspection Finding The proposed violations result from the licensee's failure to have/ '

use a procedure for control of the shipments as cited in the viola-tion discussed in Item 9 above. On the basis that Item 9 was the subject of an issued violation, issuance of a separate violation for these items is inappropriate and contrary to the normal practice of grouping issues to provide a single focus for enforcement with mul-tiple examples, if they exist (as specified in IE Manual Chapter 0400, 05.03.d). The cause-effect relationship of the failure to apply a procedure for records control (resulting in the above defic-

, fencies) should have been incorporated, by examples, in the violation for Item 9.

l i

. _______-.______________.____U

79 REV. 1

, 2/27/87 10/11/12.3 Analysis of RIV Disposition 10/11/12.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern The inspector found that the licensee had not applied sufficient con-trols to the shipment of records to SWEC to safeguard the information from potential loss or damage. The cause was the absence of a lic-ensee procedure discussed in Item 9 above. The specific shortcomings identified by Items 10-12 were failure to provide for inventory /

accountability, shipment in containers which afforded minimal protec-tion, and failure to provide duplicate copies to act as replacements if the shipped records were lost. The findings represent the inspec-tor's opinion of the deficient conditions as examples of failure 'to safeguard records. Based on the record, the underlying inspector concerns, which became inspector / management contentions, involved the inspector's perception that the licensee intentionally failed to safeguard the records and assumed the risk of their loss as an ac-ceptable alternative.to the costs associated with providing the safe-guards.

10/11/12.3.2 Development of Finding The inspector's report draft presents the problem based partially on hearsay statements attributed to licensee personnel regarding the licensee's actions and motivation for not safeguarding the records.

The proposed violations in the report narrative lack specific cita-tion of regulatory requirements, applicable licensee program require-ments, or licensee procedures. Further, no acknowledgement is made of the relationship of these issues with the programmatic issue of Issue 9 above. ,

Followup of the finding by the inspector's supervisor (reference .4) provides substantial discussion of supervision's rationale and ac-tions. Additional NRC:HQ support was informally sought (reference

.6), and the findings were deleted.

10/11/12.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspec-tor. He contends that the licensee (and a contractor) did not meet minimum standards for record shipments which could jeopar-dize quality records and ultimately prevent substantiation of performance / characteristics of quality activities and hardware.

i

80 REV. I 2/27/87 The Task Group concludes that no direct safety significance can be attached to this item; however, potential economic signif- .

icance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

No, except to incorporate the issues by example into the viola-tion of Issue 9 above as stated in the Independent Assessment.

10/11/12.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with a Brief Statement of-Management's Reasoning All of the items were deleted from the report (sequence provided in reference .2). Region IV management considered that the violation issued per Item 9 bounded each of the issues 10-12. Further, manage-ment's position in reference .2 indicates that the absence of spec-ific regulatory requirements / guidance also bore on their disposition of the issues.

[ 10/11/12.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-

tion? If yes, explain.

+

4 Although some ,of the regional management positions presented in 4 L references .2 and .4 are shallow, the underlying principles dis-L; cussed above (lack of regulatory guidance / specific requirements, l 2 root cause identification, etc.) remain valid. Regional manage-l  ;

ment struggled to elaborate on a basically sound position when 1

i it was unnecessary.

f 10/11/12.4 Conclusions

• Regional management handling of the tech..ical issues and reclassifi-

cation of the proposed violations ' was consistent with the Task i Group's independent assessment, except that these items were not i sufficien*1y linked to tha. root cause finding (Item 9) to ensure com-

prehensin corrective and preventive action by the licensee. Group-ing these issues as exampler which arise from the programmatic defic-

iency issued under Item 9 would have been appropriate. A significant i issue was the interaction between the inspector and his management.

i The Task G' r oup found the amount of time spent by all parties con-

, cerned debating the issues discussed here to be disproportionate when

, viewed from the perspective of the low potential safety significance of the issues involved.

\

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ 1

81 REV. 1 2/27/87

13. Site Records of Chicago Bridge and Iron Shipped to Houston, Texas in Csrdboard Boxes

14. No Backup Copy of Records Shipped to Chicago Bridge and Iron

15. Failure to Inventory Records Sent to Chicago Bridge and Iron 13/14/15.1 Background These items were identified in OIA 86-10 as Issues 7-9. They were

" highlighted" items in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to OIA 86-10.

Items 13,14, and 15 have been combined because of their similarity.

13/14/15.1.1 Summary of Issue As documented in Inspection Report 85-14/11, Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB1) erected the CP Unit 2 containment liner as a subcontractor to the construction manager, Brown & Root (B&R). As a result of an inspection several months earlier, the inspectors became aware of an offsite shipment of records similar to those discussed in Items 9-12.

The original CBI containment construction records were shipped from the site to the CBI Houston offices in accordance with CBI's nuclear records procedures. The inspectors asserted that the records should have been handled in accordance with TUGC0 procedures, inventoried l

and afforded protection in transit equal to temporary storage re-quirements of the TUGC0 QA program or that backup, duplicate records be maintained (at the site).

i These findings were proposed as additional violations similar to Items 10-12. The findings were reclassified by management.

13/14/15.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 50-445/85-14/11

.2 CPRRG-17, RIV Management Positions on Attachment MM

.3 01 File 86-10

.4 Transcript, Investigative Interview, T Westerman, July 10-12, 1986

.5 Transcript, Investigative Interview, H.S. Phillips, March 19, 1986 13/14/15.2 Independent Assessment of Inspection Finding The key aspects of these issues are: 1) did TUGC0 fulfill its QA re-sponsibility for the records shipment; 2) did CBI fulfill the re-quirements specific to their TUGC0/B&R approved QA program; and 3) were both the TUGC0 and CBI programs responsive to ANSI N45.2,9 as implemented by the FSAR?

82 REV. I 2/27/87 First, as a subcontractor, CBI was operating under its own QA program within the umbrella of the B&R and TUGC0 QA programs and the FSAR.

Duplication of administrative controls by TUGC0 such as those desired by the inspectors (application of TUGC0 procedures, inventory, etc.)

is not required if the TUGC0 and B&R vendor surveillance and control programs are in effect. With no evidence to the contrary, CBI had been found to have an acceptably established and implemented QA pro-gram by the licensee. Prior TUGC0 audits of CBI activities documen-ted acceptable CBI performance (see Item 16 below). Further, the CBI program, as approved by the applicant, provided for CBI to retain custody of the records until a point of reasonable project comple-tion. Regardless of the consideration of "cenership" or owner sub-contractor relationships, the applicable procedures clearly held CBI responsible for the custody of the records until the time of turnover.

Second, the draft inspection report identifies no CBI noncompliance with its procedures (to the extent observed and/or documented by the inspectors).

Third, notwithstanding the above, the regulato ry requirements and guidance available for records in transit has been identified throughout the investigative process as nonspecific. In conjunction with Item 9, regional management had initiated a referral of this general subject to NRC HQ for elaboration.

Except as further discussed in Items 9 above and 14 below, no pro-posed violations or unresolved items are considered appropriate.

13/14/15.3 Analysis of RIV Disposition 13/14/15.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern t

The inspector considered that the licensee had not applied sufficient controls to the CBI shipment of records to safeguard the information from loss or damage. The root program.natic deficiency of insuffic-ient control was the absence of a licensee procedure (discussed in Item 9 above) and TUGCO's failure to directly participate in the activity. The inspector's concerns, which became inspector / manage- I ment contentions, again involved the perception that the licensee l intentionally failed to safeguard the records and assumed the risk of their loss as an acceptable alternative to the costs associated with providing the safeguards and the magnitude of the potential records ]

loss. The draft narrative on these subjects was deleted from the i final report. I I

___m _____________

l 1

1 83 J

REV. 1 2/27/87 l 13/14/15.3.2 Development of Finding The initial draft inspection report indicates that the inspectors J conducted multiple procedure reviews and personnel interviews to research these items. Except for an apparent refusal to accept the concept of CBI's responsibility for custody and turnover of the records, the . scope of the inspection, as documented appears reasonable.

Followup of the finding by the inspector's supervisor is contained in reference .4 which provides substantial discussion of super-l vision's rationale and actions. Although additional NRC HQ support (

was sought by telephone (reference .6), available evidence indicates that the consultation was informal and generalized.

13/14/15.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspec-tor, although he felt the licensee (and contractor) did not meet minimum standards for records shipments which could jeopardize quality records and could prevent substantiation of performance /

characteristics of quality ar.tivities and hardware.

The Task Group concludes that no direct safety significance can be attached to this item; however, potential economic signif-icance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

) -

Should the item have been pursued for more examples of program-matic significance; was it?

Additional development of the issues appears unnecessary. See Independent Assessment above.

13/14/15.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with a Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning Item 13 was dropped as a proposed violation; Item 14 was dropped as a proposed violation but left as an unresolved item pending demonstra-tion by TUGC0 that CBI record controls were implemented; and, Item 15 was dropped as a proposed violation but left as an open item pending

, Region IV inspection of TUGCO's eventual receipt of CBI records. The ,

report text was also condensed by Region IV management, i

84 REV. 1 i

2/27/87 Region ' IV management rationale for the technical acceptability of these items was CBI's responsibility for custody and maintenance of the records under TUGC0 and CBI QA Programs (See 13.2 above), as well as the unresolved status (previously discussed) of regulatory cri-teria to be applied to records in transit.

13/14/15.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-  ;

tion? If yes, explain.

Items 13-15 were developed by the inspector based on his per-ception of the regulatory requirements (which were addressed by CBI's procedures). Management's rationale for reclassification addressed the salient points of the issue and was conservative.

Items 14 and 15 were reclassified to unresolved items requiring followup of implementation of the CBI and TUGC0 QA programs and final records transfer to TUGCO. The inspection results do not appear to warrant followup.

13/14/15.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution j The final report distilled the issues into two brief paragraphs, each l

addressing one of the unresolved items. The report does not provide any sensitivity to the inspector's original concerns, nor the rein-spection perspective desired by regional management.

13/14/15.4 Conclusions Regional management's handling of the technical and enforcement issues was consistent and conservative.

Regional management correctly objected to the inspector's contention that TUGC0 had direct responsibility for " supervising" their subcon-tractor's activities in lieu of QA Program overview. Further, the existence and application of a detailed, prudent CBI procedure in the absence of specific regulatory requirements was recognized by regional management. The reclassification of potential violations for failures to inventory records shipped, provide backup copies, and shipping in inappropriate boxes was appropriate.

l

85 REV. 1 2/27/87

16. TUGC0 Did Not Document Audit of CBI Rec 3rds 16.1 Background This item was identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-14/11, Issue 10. It was not a " highlighted" item in Attachment 1, Attachment MM to OIA 86-10.

I 16.1.1 Summary of Issue 4

In conjunction with inspection of Items 13-15 above, the inspector reviewed portions of the licensee's vendor audit program applied to Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBI). The text of the initial draft inspec-tion report indicates that the inspector was attempting to obtain additional assurance that the CBI records management program was functioning acceptably as determined by the licensee in his audit of CBI activities. One of the two TUGC0 QA audit summary reports re-viewed stated, in the " Audit Scope," that QA records activities were one of numerous area audited; however, documentation of the records  !

audit activities was not provided in the narrative " Audit Summary" portion of the report.

The inspector telephoned the corporate (HQ) audit group to determine I the reason for the omission from the audit report as well as obtain additional information regarding the adequacy of the CBI records pro-gram. The draft report (85-14/11) indicates that no responsive in-formation was obtained and a violation was proposed for the failure to adequately document the audit results. The proposed violation was reclassified by management to an unresolved item in draft 3a of the inspection, and eventually eliminated from draft 4a of the report (ostensibly by the inspector, per reference .2). The final report did not discuss the issue. Subsequently, the inspector's supervisor contacted the licensee who provided reference .8 defining the scope of records audit activities conducted.

16.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined Inspection Report 50-445/85-14/11.

.2 CPRRG-17, RIV Management Positions on Attachment MM.

.3 01 File 86-10, Page 14.

.4 Transcript, Investigative Interview, T. Westerman, July 10-12, 1986.

.5 Transcript, Investigative Interview, H. S. Phillips, March 19, 1986.

.6 CPRRG-17, Attachment 15, TUGC0 Audit Summary Report TCB-6, CBI Audit.

.7 CPRRG-16, Notes of H. Phillips. {

CPRRG-17, Attachment 16, TUGC0 Speedletter Memo, Clarification

.8 of CBI Audit TCB-6 Criterion XVII Record,1/9/86, l

1 1

I

_________l

i

[- 86 l REV. 1 2/27/87, l i

l 16.2 Independent Assessment Typically, audit summary reports (such as reference .6) are succinct and.brief. No adverse findings were identified during the . audit in question and the TUGC0 Audit Summary Report executive summary (a 4-8 line paragraph for each audit scope area) provided for the informa-tion of . the audited organization's management. The omission of one L

(or more) summary paragraphs from such a report has little bearing on j the quality of the actual audit documentation. The Task Group does

! not consider this to represent the credible basis for a violation unless conditions adverse to quality or recommendations for improve-ment requiring action were identified in the omitted portions, which l apparently was not the case.

). In addition to the inspector identified omission, discussion of pro-l curement document control was also omitted. Further procedure con- i trol, not listed in the audit scope, was discussed with its own sum-mary paragraph. These anomalies were not identified by the reporting inspector. Additional minor discrepancies such as these do not alter the Task Groups' conclusion that the omission does not constitute violation of a regulatory requirement. In order to fully evaluate the adequacy of audit documentation, as a minimum, the detailed audit file including the audit checklist, results of each audit element, and the auditors conclusions must be reviewed in light of the licen-

.!' see's audit program requirements and implementing procedures. This i.

apparently was not done by the reporting inspector to substantiate i

actual audit scope and performance adequacy.

16.3 Analysis of RIV Disposition 16.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Findings and Regulatory Concern See 16.1.1 above for statement of finding. The inspector's concern, as inferred from the draf t inspection report and related references, was that CBI's records management program was inadequate in light of Items 13-15 above and that the TUGCO's QA program was not effective as it applied to CBI activities.

16.3.2 Development of Finding The inspector appeared to conduct a " spot" review of the audits in ,

conjunction with Items 13-15. It is.not apparent that a review of TUGC0 audit program requirements or procedures was conducted to establish any criteria for the inspection. Further, when the initial discrepancy was identified by the inspector, similar existing dis-crepancies were missed or ignored and no obvious effort was made to obtain additional relevant documentation during the inspection. In-sufficient basis existed at the close of the inspection to support the proposed violation.

87 REV. 1

. 2/27/87 i

After management reclassified the item to unresolved, the in'spector planned to visit the Dallas, Texas TUGC0 offices for followup (refer-ence .2). No additional followup is evident except that' conducted by regional management. Reference .2 further indicates that the item was " dropped" from the report prior to final issue, apparently by the inspector. The report was issued on March 6,1986 without the item, even though questions concerning the licensee's audit records seemed to still exist. l 16.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The omission of the records management area audit summary para-graph represented a potential programmatic breakdown which evidences TUGCO's lack of control over contractors.

The Task Group. concluded that there is no apparent safety sig- i nificance to this item since the audit findings did not iden- l tify any condition adverse to quality. The comments missing l from the report ostensibly addressed an executive summary of the areas inspected, not the adequacy of the audit or specific deficiencies.

16.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with a Brief Statement of Management The item was reclassified from a proposed violation to an unre-solved item pending "further followup." Reference .2 states that the functional impact cf the finding was " moot" in that no adverse findings were identified by the audit and that addition-al inspection of the matter was not necessary.

16.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

The Task Group's opinion is that this item did not meet the cri-teria for an unresolved item. The discrepancy was minor and a proposed violation could not have been justified unless signif-icant audit findings were omitted, which was apparently not the case, i

16.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, Was There Sufficient l

Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effect Resolution This is not applicable, because, although the item was initially categorized as unresolved, it was deleted before the final i report was issued.

88 REV. I 2/27/87 f

16.4 Conclusion Although not initially fully developed, this finding has negligible safety significance and appears to be an attempt by the inspector to provide further examples of the ineffectiveness of CBI's and TUGCO's QA programs in support of other issues (Items 9-15). Both regional management and the inspector did not focus on completing all inspec- -

tion necessary to completely disposition the item during the inspection.

This item appears 'to have been handled as part of the group of Items 7-15. The item was deleted from the inspection report details (apparently by the inspector) before final issue.

i l

l l

\

89  !

REV. I 2/27/87 17.0 Failure to Preclude Rain from Entering QA Intermediate Records Vault 18.0 Failure to Preclude Food and Coffee Pot from QA Intermediate Records Vault j i 17/18.1 Background i

These items were identified in 01A 86-10 as 85-14/11, Ifr.ues 11 and 1

12. They were " highlighted" items in Attachment 1 Attachment MM to j OIA 86-10.

17/18.1.1 Summary of Issue i

The interim or intermediate record vault is an area contained within (separated by a wall) the permanent plant record vault area. During an inspection, water leaking through the ventilation system was observed in a container and the relative humidity had been recorded as abnormally high for about a week. Vault personnel reportedly indicated the roof -and vent system had been leaking for'about two years. The inspectors also observed a coffee pot, sugar and food crumbs in the vault area.

The inspector proposed a violation citing the above as two examples of inadequate protection of records. In the final inspection report (85-14/11), the proposed water leakage violation was reclassified by '

management to an unresolved item. The second example was reclass-ified to a routine inspection observation based upon the spot cor-rective action by the licensee.

17/18.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 50-445/85-14/11

.2 CPRRG-17, RI V Management Positions on Attachment MM

.3 OI File 86-10

.4 Transcript, Investigative Interview, T Westerman, July 10-12, 1986

.5 Transcript, investigative Interview, H.S. Phillips, March 19, 1986 17/18.2 Independent Assessment of Inspection Finding The water inleakage had apparently been a chronic problem with per-iodic licensee attention required and provided. Unconfirmed state-ments made by vault personnel indicate that the leak had persisted for "more than two years". Although the draft inspection report does not mention it, reference .2 indicates that steps were being taken to reseal the ventilation system and that no actual records damage had occurred. Previous licensee attention to the matter is indicated by  !

the statement in reference .2 that the licensee had previously re-placed the entire roof. No assessment was provided by the report or the references as to the true exposure of records to the leakage nor I

90 REV.- 1

, 2/27/87

-the. timeliness and extent of the licensee's remedial measures. The licensee's' actions appear prudent and the actual / potential conte-quences of the problem insignificant. Therefore, without additional assessment of ~ the licensee's aggressiveness in pursuing the problem and example (s) of an impact on regulatory requirements, enforcement action is inappropriate. ' An unresolved item could have been issued to further evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's past and cur- 1 rent efforts and results, and to evaluate the appropriateness of past ineffective actions to correct the persistent leakage. The item was reclassified as an open item.

The food and coffee pot issue represents a minor example of noncom-pliance with the principles of ANSI N45.2.9 and therefore could cited as a procedural inadequacy. However, the Jicensee took immediate corrective action to have the offending items removed and NRC prac-tice permits such items to be documented as observations. in inspec-tion reports without enforcement action if they are of minor safety significance and the licensee's actions are comprehensive -and effec-tive (IE MC 0610 Exhibit 4. The Task Group considers this course of action prudent in this case. However, further action appeared neces-sary to prevent recurrence, e.g., verification by the inspectors that procedures prohibited such practices, that personnel were aware of the prohibition, etc. An unresolved item would be considered in-appropriate in this instance since the decision not to cite this as a violation would not be changed by any later developed information.

However, the inspector could have followed-up on the continued ade-I quacy of the corrective actions in a later inspection, an open item, Lubject to tracking , would provide a mechanism for this action.

17/18.3 Analysis of Region IV Disposition 17/18.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern i The inspector concluded that: chronic water leakage into the vault had not received adequate licensee ren.edial action (over a several year period); foodstuffs found in the vault could attract rodents; and, a coffee pot in the vault represented a fire hazard. Each of these items were considered an example of f ailure ' to protect QA records in violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVII.

The inspectors regulatory concern, in addition to those represented above, appeared to follow the general line represented by the prior items involving records, i.e., the licensee's records management program was ineffectively implemented and records were at risk.

l l

l 91 REV. 1 2/27/87 17/18.3.2 Development of Finding As in previous examples, the regulatory aspects of the findings are l clear but the corroborating information is weak with respect to per- I mitting evaluation of licensee actions and enforcement action (See 17.2 above). No development of specific site procedure requirements ]

(or inadequacies) is provided.

17/18.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspec-tor. He found that the licensee did not meet minimum standards for record storage facilities and thereby was potentially jeop-ardizing quality records which could prevent substantiation of performance / characteristics of quality activities and hardware.

The Task Group concludes that no safety significance can be attached to this item; however, potential major economic signif-icance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

Except to the extent that the inspector did not address the adequacy and vigor of the licensee's prior actions and the con-trolling procedures, no programmatic implications are evident.

Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken.

The inspector's development of the issues was incomplete as discussed in 17.3.2.

17/18.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in the Final Report with a Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning See 17.1.1 above. With respect to water inleakage, management deter-mined that licensee action was reasonable and no damage had occurred to records. The food / fire hazard issue was found acceptable based on immediate licensee corrective action.

17/18.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If not, what further action should have been directed to proper resolution.

92 REV. I

y. 2/27/87 The actions for the water inleakage item was appropriate for the status of the item at the close of inspection. See 17.3.2, re:

rodent / fire hazards and adequacy of the licensee's program.

17/18.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution The final report does not contain sufficient information to charac-terize tne unresolved item on water leakage. Additional guidance should have been provided in the inspection report to indicate what action was necessary to resolve the item and assure corrective ac-tions were effective.

7.4 Conclusions Regional management's handling was consistent with the Tesk Group's independent assessment except for the emphasis applied to tne fol-lowup of unresolved items. In particular, insufficient followup was assigned to the adequacy of the licensee's existing procedures and preventive actions. The inspector's development of the issues was l incomplete.

l l

i

_____________a

93 REV. 1 2/27/87

19. Failure to Install Fire Suppression System, Drains, and a Sloped Flo'or at Records Center

20. Plant Records Stand in Folders or Binders in Open Cabinets at Records Center 19/20.1 Summary <of Issue The issues as stated in reference .3 are misstated with respect to the items as written in the draft and final versions of reference .1 (Inspection Report 85-14/11). Two issues were actually addressed by Item 19 involving two different vault facilities. -Issue .20 was a part of 19 throughout the multiple draft inspection reports prepared.

FSAR Section 17.1.17 states that the records storage facility will have dry chemical or gas fire extinguishers provided (not a suppress-ion system). Section 5.6 of ANSI N45.2.9 (1973 version endorsed by the FSAR) requires.that a dry chemical or gas fire suppression system be provided. A 1974 version of ANSI N45.2.9 applicable to the opera-tions phase per FSAR Section 17.2.16 requires that an " adequate system" be provided. The report and reference .7 are silent on the distinction between the construction phase and operating phi e re-quirements and how they applied to the permanent and non pt inent facilities, indicating that the inspector did not consider the distinctions.

The initial draft report proposes a deviation from FSAR commitments for the use of a water sprinkler system instead of a dry chemical or gas fire suppression system in the _TUGC0 Records Center. An inter-mediate draft also identified the absence of a sloped floor or drain as a flooding hazard during sprinkler operation. The final draft report reclassified the sprinkler issue to an unresolved item, de-leted references to the floor slope / drain aspect, and combined the concern about records stored in open shelves / cabinets with the unre-solved item. Note that the open files issue, Item 20 was never a separate finding in the initial draft of the report. It is being tracked here to rigorously resolve pursue the items identified in 01A 86-10.

Another aspect discussed in the interim draft report (Ib) identified the use of fire extinguishers and an exterior hose station in lieu of an installed system for the permanent plant records vault to be a deviation with respect to the commitment to N45.2.9. The final re-port discussed the potential deviation, identified the conflict be-tween N45.2.9 the NRC approved FSAR, and reclassified the item to unresolved pending referral of the issue to IE:HQ.

L-94 REV. 1 2/27/87 19/20.1.2 Reference s

.1 CPSES Combined Inspection Report 50-445/85-14/11

.2 CPRRG-17, Region IV Management Positions on Attachment MM

.3 01 File 86-10

.4 CPSES FSAR, Section 17.1

.5 NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Section 17

.6 Transcript, Investigative Interview, T. Westerman, July 10-12, 1986

.7 Transcript, Investigative Interview, H. S. Phillips, March 19, 1986 19/20.2 Independent Assessment of Inspection Finding Although the first finding (water fire suppression) above is a sup-portable deviation from the construction phase licensee commitments and _ FSAR, enforcement is inappropriate in light of the superseding operations phase commitment to the most recent NRC endorsements of N45.2.9-1974 via Regulato ry Guide 1.88 (which specifies only an

" adequate" system). Nothing in those documents nor reference .5 pro-hibits the use of sprinkler systems. Reference .5 and the standards recommend against open shelf storage of records but NFPA 232, also endorsed by the Regulatory Guide permits it if the records are bound.

It is apparent, however, that a routine revision of the FSAR and sub-mittal to NRC per 10 CFR 50.34 chould be considered and tracked to account for the differences between the facility and its description in the FSAR.

Similarly, the description in the FSAR deviates substantially from the standards and reference .5 with respect to the use of fire extinguishers versus an installed system in the permanent plant records vault. This item should be referred to NRC:HQ by regional management and tracked.

The licensee subsequently found that the floor of the permanent vault was, in fact, sufficiently sloped to permit fire hose runoff (reference .2). A routine inspection observation should have been recorded to disposition this issue.

19/20.3 Analysis of RIV Disposition 19/20.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern See item 17.1.1 above. The inspectors overall regulatory concern in addition to those represented above appeared to follow the general line represented by the prior items involving records, i.e., the licensee's records management program was ineffectively implemented and records were at risk.

t 95 REV. 1 2/27/87 19/20.3.2 Development of Finding The inspector's initial development of the finding was adequate. As the draft reports were developed in sequence, additional aspects were added which contributed to the issues but were presented simplis-tically. The inspector appeared to take an aggressive enforcement posture where a functional problem was either not evident or of l little quality significance.

19/20.3.2 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspec-tor. He concluded that the licensee did not meet minimum stand-ards for record storage facilities and thereby was jeopardizing quality records which could prevent substantiation of perform-ance/ characteristics of quality activities and hardware.

The Task Group concludes that no direct safety significance can be attached to this item; however, potential major economic significance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

l No. The issues appeared to have no programmatic implications.

19/20.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with a Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning See Item 17.1.1 above. Management referred contradictory regulatory criteria to NRC:HQ for resolution.

19/20 3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If not, what further action should have been directed to proper resolution.

Management's actions appeared sufficient, were consistent with existing practices of the agency, and addressed each of the salient issues.

I i

)

l

96 REV. 1 l 2/27/87 l y

19/20.3.6' If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient 4 Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution i

The final report contained sufficient information to characterize the open items, particularly in conjunction with the. proposed referral to NRC:HQ.  !

i 19/20.4 Conclusions Regional management reclassification of the finding, pending resolu-tion of regulatory requirement questions, was consistent with the independent assessment of the Task Group. The inspector's develop-ment of the issues was incomplete to support the proposed violations.

l l

97 REV. 1 o

2/27/87

21. Failure to provide Temporary or Permanent Storage for Records Co-Mingled with In-Process Documents in Paper Flow Group 21.1 Background This item was identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-14/11, Issue 15. This j was a " highlighted" item in Attachment I to Attachment MM to OIA i 86-10. .

l 21.1.1 Summary of Issue The licensee had established " Paper Flow Groups" (PFGs) " and work facilities to assemble and administer various work record packages.

The groups were situated in trailers which did not have ANSI N45.2.9

" records vault" construction.

The typical paper flow process involved merging existing records re-moved from permanent storage with "new" records received from field forces to assemble a final, complete records package for eventual re-storage in the site's long term storage vaults. The TRT (refer-ence .7 below) had reviewed these activities and found them accept-able based on the TRT's interpretation of ANSI N45.2.9 for temporary storage requirements and in-process records. One of the salient determinations made by TRT was that when " permanent" records requir-

[ ing the full protection of ANSI N45.2.9 are removed fra storage for use/ revision, the records reverted to the status of "in process" records which TRT determined did not require treatment according to the record storage requirements of ANSI N45.2.9. TRT found that the PFG records were being stored in lockable, fire proof cabinets which was in accordance with the temporary storage facility provisions of ANSI N45.2.9.

During Inspection 85-14/11, the inspectors found that mechanical and electrical installation records (e.g., steam generator records pack-ages) had been removed from permanent storage to the PFG and were stored in both fire- and non-fire proof cabinets and a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII was proposed. The draft in-spection report stated that the previous (implied TRT) review had  !

only involved isolated QC records and that the problems identified l during the current inspection involved a number of records.

Regional management review determined that the licensee had taken prudent steps to safeguard the records based on the logic that, once removed from permanent storage for additional rework, the records reverted f rom being " quality records" to "in process records." The item was reclassified by management to unresolved (final issue form) in draft 4a of the report.

I 1

)

98 REV. 1

, 2/27/87 21.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined Inspection Report 50-445/85-14/11

.2 CPRRG-17, RIV Management Positions on Attachment MM

.3 OI File 86-10, Page 14

.4 CPSES FSAR, Section 17.1

.5 Transcript, Investigative Interview, T. Westerman, July 10-12, 1986

.6 Transcript, Investigative Interview, H. S. Phillips, March 19, 1986

.7 NRC Technical Review Team (TRT) Results, Allegation AQ-45, Permanent Records Not Stored in a Fire Proof Vault 21.2 Independent Assessment of Inspection Finding The key elements in determining the acceptability of storing plant records are: (1) the categorization of a document as a " quality record" and (2) the prudency of the record protection measures.

Regional management, the inspector, and. the TRT apparently held dir-ferent views 'on the distinction between " quality record" and "in-process record," and the risk exposure and consequences of the various levels of protection.

A QA record is defined in ANSI N45.2.9 as: "Those records which fur-nish documentary evidence of the quality of items and of activities affecting quality. ...a document is considered a quality assurance i' record when the document has been completed." Stated differently:

(1) if a document contains discrete unique information necessary to establish the quality of an item, and (2) no other documtnt can pro-vide equivalent information on a reasonably available and practical basis, and (3) reconstruction of the document would be impossible or impractical (e.g.,

the physical evidence is buried in concrete, etc.), then that document retains the status of a record until ulti-mate disposal. This logic can also be applied to document packages made up of many individual documents / records.

The sheer volume of records involved in nuclear projects precludes any attempt to classify individual records per the above logic, re-sulting in most licensees applying blanket protection per their QA program commitments without trying to discriminate between transient document status changes.

Based on the above, the licensee's actions with regard to defining and storing records in non-fire proof containers appear to be a devi-ation from the FSAR commitment to ANSI N45.2.9, Section 4.5 for stor-age containers and would require a licensee response. However, reference .2 indicates that the licensee took corrective action in the absence of enforcement action to place the records in fireproof containers.

J 99 4 REV. I

2/27/87 1

In summary, several enforcement options are available consiste'n t with I current agency practices: (1) confirmation of licensee preventive action adequacy resulting in no deviation or open item, or (2) issu- I ance of an unresolved item making acceptability contingent upon the licensee's presentation and Region IV's confirmation' of acceptable preventive action, or issuance of a deviation or violation.

I Afternote: No record was found as to whether either the inspector or his management evaluated the licensee's -detailed procedures for the <

above activities to address the potential issue of the adequacy of the procedures and their implementation.

21.3 Analysis of RIV Disposition 21.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Findings and Regulatory Concern The inspector proposed a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, ,

Criterion XVII for failure to protect. records in accordance with ANSI '

N45.2.9.

The inspector's regulatory concern appeared to follow the general line represented by the prior items involving records, i.e., the licensee's records management program was ineffectively implemented and records were at risk.

21.3.2 Development of Findings Although much effort was expended by both the inspector and regional management in developing a rationale for the acceptability of the licensee's activities, no evidence exists that any of the parties actually evaluated the instructions provided by the licensee's Records Management Manual (discussed in reference .7) to determine whether the program was defective or whether its implementation was defective and how their own rationale compared with the licensee's.

Further, regional management, in reference .2, appears to accept the licensee's placement of the records in fireproof cabinets as respon-sive corrective action but does not address preventive actions or programmatic considerations.

21.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspec-tor. He found that the licensee did not meet minimum standards for record storage facilities and thereby was jeopardizing qual- l ity records which could prevent substantiation of performance /

characteristics of quality activities and hardware.

100 REV. I 2/27/87 The Task Group concludes that no direct safety significance can be attached to this item; however, potential major economic sig-nificance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

See discussion 21.3.2 above regarding review of licensee imple-menting procedures. The conclusions drawn by the inspector and Region IV regarding program adequacy were not able to be sup-ported by documentation of their inspection for a determination that the program was in place and implemented.

21.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in the Final Report with a Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning See 17.1.1 above. Management's reclassification was based on (1) their rationale for record definition, (2) the action taken by the licensee to correct the storage conditions, and (3) the previous acceptable findings in the same area by TRT (reference .7).

21 3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition 1 -

Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If not, what further action sho0ld nave been directed to proper resolution.

As described in 21.3.2 and 21.3.3 above, management's actions were adequate even though the Task Group believes that manage-ment's rationale was incomplete with regard to definition of records status.

21.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution '

Insufficient information was provided in the final report. The re-port failed to address the items described in 21.3.2 and 21.3.3 above and provided no indication of the expected actions on the part of either NRC or the licensee necessary to close the item.

21.4 Conclusion Reclassification was appropriate, however, management's basis was marginal. Regional management's eventual disposition of the item as I an unresolved item was consistent with the independent assessment of i the Task Group and TRT findings. The overall direct safety signifi-cance was negligible, however, the development of appropriate program t

requirements and effective implementation was not fully developed.

101 REV. 1.

l[- 2/27/87 Neither the insp'ector ' nor regional management appear to ' have com-pletely evaluated the issue with respect to the adequacy of the licensee's program. Further, management's disposition and .documen-tation of the finding did not adequately' address completion of licen-

=see preventive action. . This was due in part to regional management's posture on the item (see 21.3.2 above), which did not address the need for programmatic / preventive action by the licensee. The Task Group concludes that additional followup is needed to determine if licensee action to protect the records is warranted.

Y l

J r

. . . - _ - _ . _ . - . . _ . . _ _ _ _ .____-.----.-_-.-_--__-__c... -_-__--_-

102 REV. I 2/27/87

22. Weld Rod Identification 22.1 Background-This item was identified in 01 86-10 as 86-14/11, Issue 16. This was not a. " highlighted" item in Attachment I, Attachment MM to 01 86-10.

22.1.1 Summary of Issue During the conduct cf inspection 85-14/11 a Region IV inspector noted f that several weld filler material containers in storage had loose or missing labels. While the material was still identifiable, the pro-cedural requirements specified marking of the subject containers dur-ing storage. In the original draft inspection report, this issue was proposed as a deviation from procedural requirements. In subseouent drafts, the item was changed to a proposed procedures violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V but later dropped. The final inspec-tion report documents the inspector's original observations, as noted, and deletes any discussion of a finding or open item. Refer-ral of the subject matter to Brown and Root "...B&R Weldirg Engineer-ing for followup" is documented in the final 85-14/11 inspection report.

22.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 85-14/11

.2 01 86-10, pp. 16 and 18 l

.3 CPRRG-17, 85-14/11 Inspection Report (Item 16) and Attachment 1, '

3, 4, 5 and 20 22.2 Independent Assessment No examples of a failure to control weld filler material are docu-mented, and the requirement for identification and traceability of weld rod filler material was met.

B&R controls at CPSES require that, "only authorized weld filler material is accepted into the weld rod storage areas". (CPRRG-17 IR 85-14/11, p. 40). However, as stated in all versions of the 85-14/11 inspection report, a B&R procedure (CP-CPM-6.98) requires that original containers be marked during storage. The inspector's finding that the marking labels fell off technically supports a pro-cedural noncompliance. 1 l

1 I

i l

?

?.

J 103 REV. 1 2/27/87 ]

\

Where the overall intent and function of regulatory and Code require-ments have been met (in this case with respect to identification and ,

traceability), but noncompliance with a licensee / contractor procedure {

is found, it is appropriate based on program and safety significance not to issue a violation / deviation, and to refer the problem to the licensee / contractor for resolution and document these actions in the ,

inspection report (IE MC 0610, Exhibit 4). This was done and docu-mented in the final inspection report.

22.3 Analyzing Region IV Disposition t

22.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern-The inspector believed the examples of missing labels on weld rod containers that he had noted during the 85-14/11 inspection repre-sented a violation of the applicable B&R procedure; thus, a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, had been identified.

22.3.2 Development of Finding How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

I It is unclear why this issue was raised as a concern, if, as is documented in Attachment 20 to CPRRG-17, the Regie IV special-

'ist/ reviewer is correct in the opinion that the inspectars them-selves chose to remove the violation from the report. If, as stated, there was a conflict in the inspection report between closure of an existing weld rod open item and reporting of a new weld rod violation, it appears that it was proper for Region IV management to correct this conflict. Based upon the decision to drop the violation, close the old item, and refer the new con-cern to B&R for followup, it appears that a proper consensus decision was reached. Thus, the statement of concern by the inspector to OIA on the handling of this issue is not understood by the Task Group.

22.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

Missing labels on weld rod potentially represents a material traceability problem whicn could result in improper filler mate-rial being used to make a weld joint; hewever, in this case the Task Group concludes there is no hardware or programmatic sig- <

nificance to this issue since weld rod identification was not really in question. A Criterion V procedural violation could have been written since the inspection finding was actually an example of a failure to follow procedure, but would have had no

( basis in safety or the need for further NRC followup.

I

_ - _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _J

104 REV. I 2/27/87 22.3.4 Timelines:-

Was communication between inspectors and RIV Management on final resolution timely?

Resolution of this issue during the report review cycle, as is indicated in Attachment 20 to CPRRG-17, would appear to have been entirely proper. The timeliness of this communication was also appropriate given the overall circumstances surrounding CPSES inspection reports at that time.

22.3.5 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Beief Statement of Management's Reasoning A supportable ' violation could have been written against procedure adherence, but would have had no safety significance. Apparently, the inspectors themselves were given the option to disposition the finding and, given that a proposed violation was not issued, referral of the problem to the licensee was appropriate.

22.3.6 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes; the conflict between the weld rod open item closure and the new proposed violation should have and did receive management attention. The lack of hardware safety significance justified

-the reclassification and in this case, the deletion of the find-ing was apparently an inspector decision.

22.4 Conclusions A deviation, as was originally proposed in the first draft report, was not appropriate because deviations are considered with respect to licensee commitments and not contractor procedures. The violation L occurred because the B&R procedure was not followed. However, the safety significance of such a violation was nonexistent with respect to hardware and minimal with respect to process controls.

Region IV management directed the proper action in asking the inspec-tors to resolve the apparent conflict in the 85-14/11 inspection report whereby closure of an old weld rod control unresolved item was inconsistent with the statement of the new concern as a proposed violation. It appears that the inspectors themselves reviewed this 1

i I

l

105 REV. I l 2/27/87 )

l conflict and determined the basis upon which to disposition the l issue. Management's suggestion to refer the problem to Brown & Root i (BIR) for review and followup was proper and was documented in the final inspection report as to how the issue was handled. Further NRC followup was not necessary unless additional similar concerns were l

identified or safety impact was suspected.

l l It is not clear why the handling of this issue was ever raised as a concern by the inspector to 01A, if in fact the inspectors ultimately determined how the item would be dispositioned.

l l

i

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l

106 REV. 1 l

2/27/87 Failure to Develop / Implement Procedure to Demonstrate 50.55(e) Deficiencies

~

23.

are Corrected

24. Failure to Revise Implementing Procedures Containing 50.55(e) Reporting 23/24.1 Background These items were identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-16/13, Issues.1 and

2. These were " highlighted" items in Attachment I to Attachment MM to 01 86-10. They are combined for analysis because of their similarity.

23/24.1.1 Summary of Issues An unresolved item was presented in the October 1985 monthly con-struction inspection report (85-14/11), concerning cross-referencing between the significant deficiency analysis report (SDAR) files and associated corrective action. The item was considered unresolved, pending the completion of NRC's review of the TUGCo SDAR system pro-cedural adequacy. The item resulted from the NRC inspector's (con-tractor) review of 20 SDAR's, eight of which were evaluated as re-portable (in letters to NRC Region IV) under 10 CFR 50.55(e). How-ever, the NRC inspector was unable to perform field verification of the corrected deficiencies because the SDAR files did not reference

( the location of documentation that supported the corrective action.

In the next monthly inspection report IR 85-16/13 (November 1985) the inspector initially proposed two violations of Appendix B, Criterion V as a disposition of the previous 85-14/11 unresolved item. The first proposed violation cited a failure to develop procedures that cross-referenced corrective action documentation within the SDAR files (i.e., NEO-CS-1 issued on November 1,1985 failed to address this issue). The second violation proposed that the licensee failed to revise icwer-tier implementing procedures that were now inconsis-tent with the newly issued TUGC0 governing corporate procedure, NEO-CS-1, which dealt with evaluation of deportability under 10 CFR 50.55(e).

The procedure described as inadequate in the initial & aft of IR 85-16/13 was the TUGC0 corporate policy described in NE0'*CS-1. The four lower-tier procedures that were not revised when NEO-CS-1 was issued were:

CP-QP-16.1 (Rev. 6.), Significant Construction Deficiencies TNE-AD-5 (Rev. 3.) Identification of Design Deficiencies DQP-QA-12 (Rev. 2.) Administration and Tracking of SDAR's CP-QP-15.6 (Rev. 3.) Status Tracking

107

REV. 1

. 2/27/87 i

The inconsistencies in these procedures included conflicting respon-sibilities, methods of evaluation, deportability criteria, notifica-tion policy and reporting instruction.

' Region IV management disagreed with the proposed violations and in l the- final issuance of Inspection Report 85-16/13 on April 4,1986, i

~ dispositioned the procedural treatment of SDAR file contents as an unresolved item. This was resolved in the interim by a TUGC0 manage-ment commitment _to resolve 10 CFR 50.55(e) file tracking problems and procedural inconsistencies by March 1, 1986. The commitment was elicited by ' Region IV management at a site meeting (at whic, the inspector .was not present). Further, TUGC0 established a task force of 5-10. persons to develop the requested indexed SDAR infor <ation over the subsequent 10 months.

23/24.1.2 References

.1 CPRRG-17; Items law 2 (Pages 1-8) an Attachments 1-9

.2 CPRRG-16, Pages 74-89 and Exhibits 1,14,15, 50, 52 and 54

.3- 01 File 86-10 (Pages 20-22) and Attachments B (Pages 199-214),

(Pages 348-412), MM (Pages 14-16) and MM (Pages 23-27) 23/24.2 Independent Assessment f The purpose of 10 CFR 50.55(e) is to insure that significant con-struction deficiencies are reported to the NRC. This includes an assessment of the date by which the significant deficiencies would be corrected. In order to meet the intent of this regulation, some manageable form of control has to be established by the licensee to track the ultimate disposition of all 50.55(e) items to insure they i are closed out per their commitments and consistent with the schedule for system completion ' prior to NRC issuance of an operating license.

The licensee's prior system, and the newly implemented corporate policy (NEO-CS-1) were not designed for clearly reflecting or track-ing corrective actions as evidenced by the lack of cross-referencing in the SDAR files. Region IV management and the licensee agreed with l the inspectors that this issue required resolution; the SDAR files were inadequate only insofar as their ability to direct reviewers to the corrective action that had been, or was to be implemented (a non-regulatory requirement). The corrective actions themselves are separately regulated by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The inspectors made no case for the failure to implement corrective action for any of the identified significant deficiencies. There-fore, the issue from the regulator's standpoint is how to provide for the licensee to take the needed actions to provide linkage for track-ing 50.55(e) issues beyond the final report to the NRC. There is no clear-cut support for a violation of 50.55(e) requirements. The Task Group concluded that 50.55(e) reporting is not subjected to the requirements of Appendix B in order to meet the intent of 10 CFR '

( 50.55(e).

1

E REV. 1

( 2/27/87 Failure to revise the lower-tier procedures to match NE0-CS-1 is not a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V (procedure) ~ or VI (document control). Since no functional reporting problems were identified by the inspectors, the mismatched procedures apparently resulted in no actual program failures. The licensee also committed to correct the procedures promptly. Current agency pdicy permits documentation of the finding and licensee action; in ,:<.r ccses (IE MC 0610).

In this case, the Task Group considers the issuance or unresolved items to be appropriate. The inspectors'either failed to determine or failed to document whether the licensee's procedures and system were adequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e). No viola-tion of those requirements had been demonstrated by the inspectors.

By virtue of the unresolved items, the licensee is asked to review and correct the deficiencies in his program to demonstrate continuing and future compliance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Admittedly, it is un-likely that the licensee's efforts would result in the determination of noncompliance, but given the complexities of the regulatory as- l pects_ of this ' issue, this is not considered to be a misuse of the '

unresolved item.

23/24.3 Analyzing of RIV Disposition i 23/24.3.1. Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern Because of a concern for the licensee's ability to support inspector field verification and assess status of corrective action to 'close-out the SDAR's, violations of Appendix B Criterion V were proposed.  !

The proposed violations came one month following an unresolved item to assess procedural adequacy of 10 ' CFR 50.55(e) deportability.

23/24.3.2 Development of Finding  !

I -

How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

The inspector inappropriately focused upon a corporate procedure I NEO-CS-1 that was intended to ensure deportability under l 50.55(e). The purpose of the deficiency reporting system is to report - not, as assumed by the inspector, to "show objective { !

evidence that deficiencies are corrected.

i i

l i

(-

l l

l

109 REV. 1 2/27/87 23/24.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The inspector assumed the issue demonstrated a loss of TUGC0 management control over corrective actions which could result in direct safety consequences.

The Task Group concluded that no direct safety significance can be attached to 10 CFR 50.55(e) reporting. However, the implica-tions of a failure to identify, report, and correct could have significant consequences (at the affected site, or beyond). In this case, however, at issue was the ability of the licensee's program to track the disposition of the items. Therefore, there was not actual safety significance. l Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

No. The sample of 20 items was sufficient to identify that a problem existed.

Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

Yes, the inspector (or the NRC consultant) during the period 10/85-2/86 had the opportunity to pursue field verification of 50.55(e) issues. TUGC0 had previously offered to have TUGC0 personnel assist the inspectors trace to completion corrective action for the 50.55(e) issues in question.

23/24.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning Management reclassified the violation to an unresolved item because they reasoned the failure to have complete SDAR files was not a pro-cedural requirement governed by Criterion V.

23/24.3.5 Management's Role in At .g Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes. The issue was appropriately reclassified to an unresolved item since Criterion V and XVI violations did not exist. In resolution of the item, the licensee agreed to form a task force -

l and put the 50.55(e) tracking program in order as well as to I

achieve the required consistency among the lower-tier documents concerned with deportability.

l

\

1 1

1 1 l 1 )

L 110 l REV. I 2/27/87 What- further action should have been directed to proper resolution.

'From the aspect of corrective action review, Region IV manage-ment could have redirected the inspector to inspect beyond the SDAR files to track 50.55e item resolution. A notable weakness  !

in the development of this issue was the lack of aggressive  ;

pursuit beyond the SDAR files to ultimately ascertain if  ;

Appendix B problems existed in the licensee's corrective action 1 processes.

23/24.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution Yes; however, new unresolved items were not created, but management included these issues in the ongoing evaluation of unresolved items 85-14/U-02/U-03. There was a statement in the inspection report that the licensee committed to resolving the file track 1ng and procedural consistency problems by March 1, 1986. Also, new unresolved item 85-16-U-01 addressed the formation of a 4 to 5 person task force.

Was this done (i.e. how was the item resolved)?

-( As discussed, TUGC0 task force was assembled to improve track-ability of 50.55(e) items in the SDAR files and clarify report-ing requirements.

Current status of items.

The record indicates that a task force of 5-10 persons have been working over the last 10 months to put more complete pack-ages together in the SDAR files. Whether the existence of non-conformance reports and corrective action records was confirmed for the eight reportable SDAR's was unknown at the time of the Task Group's report.

23/24.4 Conclusions  !

The CPSES construction deficiency reporting system is not specif- l itally required by QA Program requirements but is established to meet the regulatory requirement of reporting to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The SDAR system was apparently adequate at Comanche Peak but not amenable to inspector follow-up. No evidence was pre-sented in inspection findings or later transcripts to support the inspector's assertion that the system was inadequately implemented.

l l

l

111 REV. 1 2/27/87

\

The purpose of 50.55(e) reporting is not, as stated by the inspector j to show objective evidence that deficiencies are corrected. Correc- l tion of deficiencies is a larger and more significant quality ques-tion associated with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, which encom-passes not only 50.55(e) reportable deficiencies, but all quality related deficiencies identified by the licensee's program.

Inappropriate emphasis was placed by the inspectors upon the status, j completeness, and usefulness of the SDAR files. This could be char- i acterized as an accounting problem, but was not sufficiently devel-  !

oped to establish a link to uncorrected design / construction defic- )

iencies. Corporate procedure NEO-CS-1 appropriately addressed the {

evaluation for deportability to the NRC of such deficiencies. {

While the previous report (October 1985; 85-14/11) did address the lack of a cross-reference between SDAR's and documentation of correc-tive action, no earnest attempt was apparently made to find the applicable quality docume.its (i.e., NCR's, DCA's, or TDR's) either on the part of the insper. tors or the licensee. Neither the October (85-14/11) nor November (85-16/13) inspection reports sufficiently developed the finding of the incomplete SDAR files to the point where meaningful issues regarding corrective action (Criterion XVI) con-cerns could be presented, i The pertinent issue reported in 85-14/11 (Appendix D, Detail 3b) is the fact that the consultant, in reviewing eight 50.55(e) reportable issues in the SDAR files, concluded that field verification of the associated hardware issues could not be performed because the files were not conveniently cross-referenced. The immediately preceding detail (3a in 85-14/11), made an unresolved item (445/8514-U-02; 446/8511-U-01) of the fact that none of the related site implementing procedures addressed the need to cross reference between an SDAR and its associated corrective actions. No regulatory concern was estab-lished with respect to the failure to properly implement corrective actions. I Region IV management's handling of this issue attempted to put the inspector's emphasis in the proper perspective. The Task Group con- i siders that the purpose of the initial inspection in 85-14/11 was to  !

evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's program for deficiency I reporting required by 10 CFR 50.55(e). When the inspectors became frustrated in their attempts to track the completion of the correc-tive actions, first an unresolved item was created in 85-14/11 and finally a procedure (Criterion V) violation was proposed in 85-16/13.

1 k

112 REV. I-

, 2/27/87 The failure to update lower-tier procedures affected by the issuance of NE0-CS-1 can be constructed as a violation, but is a minor paper-work issue that had no basis in safety or reporting significance, or a need for further NRC followup. The determination that no violation is appropriate is correct based on the Region IV actions. TUGC0 agreed to address the marginal nature of the tracking available through the SDAR files by forming a task force. Management and the inspectors had always agreed on the substance of the problem. How-ever, rather than promptly directing the licensee to resolve the issue, management and the inspectors engaged in a protracted dis-cussion about how to approach the problem. The debate of whether records which support 50.55(e) tracking must be controlled in accord- :

ance with QA Program requirements did not need to be resolved in order elicit action from the licensee to address the inspector's con-cern. This position applies equally to Items 25 to 27 discussed i below. l I

1

113 REV. I 2/27/87 0

25. Failure to Maintain Retrievable 50.55(e) Files

27. TUGC0 50.55(e) Files Not Auditable 25/27.1 Background These concerns were identified in OIA 86-10 as Inspection Report -

85-16/13, Items 3 and 5. Ite..i 3 was a " highlighted" item in Attach-ment I to Attachment MM to 0IA 86-10, Item 5 was not.

25/27.1.1 Summary of Issue As described in Issue 23, NRC review of significant deficiency analysis reporting (SDAR) in Inspection Report 85-14/11 identified concerns with the ability to identify and locate associated informa-tion referenced in TUGCO's evaluation process for evaluating poten-tially reportable significant construction deficiencies. These items are an expansion of Items 23 and 24 which deal with the broad issue of the adequacy of the licensee's overall 50.55(e) program. The inspector's concerns are the same; however, the licensee's program is viewed from the aspect of the inadequacy of control of QA records which support the 50.55(e) program.

The topic of SDAR evaluation and its relation to Appendix B is de-scribed in Issue 23; the evaluation of records required by Appendix B as opposed to those enabling TUGC0 tracking of licensing commitments is addressed in Issue 29, The topic of 50.55(e) Report details, specifically final corrective action dates, is described in Issue 26.

The eight SDAR files classified as " Licensee Action Complete" re-viewed by the NRC contractor were found to have no documentation of or reference to " final corrective action" (CPRRG-17, Inspection Report 85-16/13, Attachment 2 - first report draft and Attachment 8 - exit interview outline). The initial audit of the deficiency files by the contractor occurred on October 14-15; his subsequent

" request for completed record files" was made 50 days later on December 4, 1985, but the inspector was apparently told that "no additional information" had been placed in the deficiency files. At that point, the inspector proposed a violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVII for a failure to maintain readily retrievable QA records. The subsequent dratt of Inspection Report 85-16/13 dis-cussed difficulties in assessing the rationale for making the SDAR file " complete," including the lack of a cognizant TUGC0 individual to direct the inspector to the " documentation" (i.e., referenced quality records used to support the SDAR conclusion that the

" deficiencies had been completed").

i l

114 REV. I 2/27/87 Although 01 File 86-10 (Attachment MM, Enclosure 1) indicates that a separate violation was proposed concerning the auditability of the files, the' Task Group's review could not identify a separately pro-posed citation in any of the inspector's draft reports (CPRRG-17, Attachments 2-8), and concluded that a single violation combining Issues 25 and 27 was proposed.

Issues 25 and 27 were dispositioned by management as unresolved.

Unresolved items 85-14/U-02 and 03 pertain to this overall issue and were lef t open (see discussion in Items 23 and 24); two new unre-solved items were created in Report 85-16/13 as indicated below, i 85-16/13-01, TUGC0 formed a Task Force to review incomplete deficiency reports to resolve difficulty of documenting, meet-ing, and tracking corrective action dates.

85-16/13-05, TUGC0 was to complete a review of the program for storing SDAR files (i.e., difficulties were encountered in retrieval because records were not in a central location).

25/27.1.2 References

.1 ANSI N45.2.9-1973, Requirements for QA Records

.2 10 CFR 50.55(e), Construction Deficiency Reports j .3 CPRRG-16_(Pages 74-89) and Exhibits 14,15, 43 thru 48, and 54

.4 CPRRG-17, IR 85-16/13 (Pages 9-12) and Attachments 2-8a

.5 01 File 86-10 (Pages 19-26) and Attachments C, D, and MM 25/27.2 Independent Assessment The independent assessment of Items 23 and 24 has direct bearing on these issues. Records which demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) do not need to be controlled in accordance with Appendix B in order to satisfy. the requirements for reporting to the NRC and tracking of the final disposition. A licensee may choose to treat 50.55(e) reporting as an element of his QA program which is intended to satisfy the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion XVI with respect to corrective action. If this were the case, then an argument can be made for rigorous control of documents created solely to satisfy the requirements of 50.55(e) reporting.  !

The licensee addresses 50.55(e) reporting in Chapter 17 of the FSAR because of its association with the overall corrective action pro-gram. TUGC0 does address 50.55(e) reporting in Section 17.1 of the FSAR; however, it is not evidence that the licensee uses the 50.55(e) process to fulfill Appendix B requirements for corrective action program.

115 REV. 1

., 2/27/87 Q

As_ stated earlier in the -independent assessment of Items 23 and 24, all parties involved agreed there were multiple minor problems with .

TUGC0's 50.55(e) program that required resolution. . For the reasons stated, it is the Task Group's assessment that Items 25 and 27 are an extension of Items 23 and 24, and should have been resolved accord-ingly. Therefore, new unresolved items need not have been created, an effective means of focusing the 50.55(e) concern (s) would have been te consolidate the issues into one aggregate unresolved item which clearly defined all examples that needed to be addressed and resolved by the_ licensee.

25/27.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition 25/27.3.1 Statement of Inspector's F~inding and Regulatory Concern SDAR files were incomplete and lacked quality records which, in accordance with Appendix B, Criterion XVII, Records, should be iden-tifiable and retrievable.

25/27.3.2 Development of Finding CPSES Site and TUGC0 Corporate policies prior to November 1985 are not sufficiently described in CPRRG-16 or 17 information to enable proper assessment of the SDAR systems requirements as they existed prior to November 1, 1985.

_{

Little supportive basis was provided in the development of Inspection Report 85-16/13 ( e . g . , FSAR, ANSI N45.2.9, or related procedural details) other than that a single convenient file did not exist.

Some development is provided after the inspection (i.e., CPRRG-16) insofar as additional documentation, but no additional rationale.

25/27.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

Loss of management control over corrective actions can result in direct safety consequences.

No direct safety significance. The implications of a failure to identify, report, and correct could have significant consequen-ces (at the affected site, or beyond). In this case, however, l at issue was the ability of the licensee's program to track the I disposition of the items.

\

i

(

116-REV. 1

-! 2/27/87 25/27.3.4 Naturn of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning Management reclassified the proposed violation to two related unre-solved _ items (85-16/13 01 and 05). As previously explained, two prior pertinent . unresolved items from 85-14/11 were reviewed in inspection 85-16/13, and remained unresolved.

25/27.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes. The inspector's findings did not constitute a proposed records violation of Appendix B, Criterion XVII.

What further action should have been directed to proper resolution.

The NRC inspector did sufficiently develop the issue to deter-mine that a functional safety or compliance problem existed with the licensee's 50.55(e) program. However,. additional effort could have been expended by the inspector to track ultimate disposition 'of the eight items in question. TUGCO representa-

[' tives offered to take the NRC to the quality records associated with the SDARs, "one-by-one." Apparently, this was not pursued.

25/27.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution Yes. However, there were four outstanding unresolved items which i pertained to this issue which could have been more effectively con-solidated. Direction to the licensee was adequate.

25/27.4 Conclusions The inspector made an inappropriate application of an IE NRC Manual Chapter 9900 interpretation with respect to the guidance on construc-tion deficiency reporting (Exhibit 54 to CPRRG-16) by extending the Appendix B criteria for establishment of procedures and maintenance of records to the issues in question. This guidance may require i clarification. The existing TUGC0 QA Plan references the requisite procedures to document deficiencies (QAP Section 15.0) using a non-conformance report (NCR) or other specified method. Periodic evalua-tion and forwarding of NCRs to TUGC0 management are specified in i

f(

117 REV. I 2/27/87 order to identify adverse quality trends. Significant audit' items adverse to quality are required to be identified as well as to have the cause determined and corrective action taken (e.g. , Site Proce -

dures CP-QP-15.6, 16.1, and 17.0 - not provided as references in this Task) and, in accordance with Appendix B, should be documented and reported to appropriate-levels of management.

QAP Section 16.0, Corrective Action (CPRRG-16, Exhibit 15) addresses the corrective action procedures, requiring thorough investigation and documentation of those conditions. But in addition and, most importantly, separate from the procedures referenced in QAP Sections 15 and 16, a smaller subset of significant deficiencies are report-able to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Their evaluation for report-ability is intended to be a distinct process for the Appendix B Pro-gram outlined in the TUGC0 QA plan for CPSES, and is accomplished by a Corporate Policy outlined in NEO-CS-1 that has no basis in Appendix B. A restatement of this conclusion is described in FSAR Section 17.1.15:

Nonconformance reports and trend reports are reviewed upon issuance by TUGC0 QA for significant conditions adverse to quality...

If such conditions exist, procedures require additional action, l

l' as appropriate. This may include issuance of corrective action l requests...or reports to the NRC.

The Task Group concluded that the procedures and records required by l

Appendix B relative to resolving identified deficiencies are distinct from those used to determine deportability.

The overall Task Group conclusions of other related 50.55(e) concerns (Issues 23 and 24) raised during Inspection Report 85-16/13 apply equally to the retrievability and auditability of the SDAR files; closure by TUGC0 and NRC of reportable significant construction deficiencies is ultimately a licensing concern. Completeness and effectiveness of correctiva actions only a case-by-case (i.e.,

individually nonconforming conditions) bases - is a separate Appendix B, Criterion XVI issue. The closure of all reportable significant deficiencies at Comanche Peak will be, as stated by Region IV manage-ment, evaluated prior to operation or fuel loat. The timeliness of that effort is a management issue related to scheuule.

l 1

I

i-118 REV. 1 2/27/87 Proposing violations for Issues 25 and 27 was a premature use of enforcement in a situation requiring management discussions. The apparent inability of TUGC0 to assemble comprehensive files for their reportable deficiencies may be an indicator of larger problems such as the relatively high number of 50.55(e) reports (low threshold, inadequate engineering evaluations, or ineffective design and con-struction), an inadequately implemented corrective action program, or schedular and resource problems associated with the ASLB hearings and previous allegations. While unrelated to the issues of retrievable, auditable CDR files, the effectiveness of the corrective action pro-grams and the engineering evaluation of potentially reportable condi-tions were never assessed since the inspectors stopped with the SDAR files and Region IV management only considered the immediate issue of how to close out the reportable deficiencies while convincing the inspector that file content was not a regulatory issue.

The Task Group's conclusion as to how this issue is best addressed has been fully developed in the conclusion section of Items 23 and 24 (23/24.4), and the independent assessment section of for these items (25/27.2). This is clearly _ an NRC/TUGC0 management interface issue which could have been resolved in one broad, but clearly defined, unresolved item. Ar, of the writing of this report, it appears that the formulated TUGC0 task force is attempting to address this issue.

(

(

s

119 REV. 1 i 2/27/87

t. -

26. Corrective Action Commitment Dates in 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports 26.1 Background This item was identified in 0IA 86-10 as 85-16/13, Issue 4. It was not a " highlighted" item Attachment 1 to Attachment MM of OIA 86-10.

26.1.1 -Summary of Issue An interpretation of 10 CFR 50.55(e) deportability of significant construction deficiencies by the inspector led him to conclude that, for the eight reportable significant deficiencies reviewed by an NRC contractor on two occasions in October 1985 (unresolved item 85-14/

11-01), and later checked for status in a licensing open items status listing maintained by TUGC0 personnel, "a large number" of final reports did not meet the " report content requirements" of the regulations.

The inspectors first draft of IR 85-16/13 (Attachment 2a to CPRRG-17) suggested that a statement that corrective action "will be taken" (as opposed to "has' been taken") classified the reports as interim in-stead of final because of a lack of completed corrective action required by 10 CFR 50.55(e). Therefore, for three reportable defic-iencies with no corrective action date and four with overdue correc-( tive action dates' (i.e. , licensee submittals not corrected and no supplemental report received by NRC Region IV), a violation of 10 CFR.

50.55(e) .was proposed for failure to report on corrective a c ti on ..

The violation was dropped from subsequent drafts of Inspection Report 85-16/13 (CPRRG-17, Attachments 3-8) and final issuance of the report carried as an unresolved item to address the missing or incorrect corrective action dates.

26.1.2 References

.1 '10 CFR 50.55(e)

.2 IE Manual Guidance on 50.55(e) (issued 4/1/80)

.3 OI File 86-10 (Pages 74-89) and Attachments C, D, and MM

.4 CPRRG-16 (Pages 74-89) and Exhibits 54 thru 62

.5 CPRRG-17 (Pages 13-16) and Attachments 2-8, and 10 26.2 Independent Assessment Part 50.55(e) construction deficiency report (CDR) descriptions of

" corrective action" taken are not required to be updated when those actions are completed by the licensee. However, if the licensee is I

I 120 REV. 1 2/27/87 unable -to initially supply or later meet an action completion date, followup telephone notification and/or a supplemental report is war-ranted,- Unless chronic and resulting in hardware deficiencies or of programmatic significance, such issues do not warrant enforcement.

In situations similar to this at other construction facilities, the Task Group concludes that an unresolved item would have been inappro-priate since the potential for enforcement action is remote and methods already exist to expeditiously resolve the types of problems presented. However, due to the nature of the entire 50.55(e) issue -

in this specific instance, inclusion in a broader unresolved item combined with similar issues would have been appropriate. The 50.55(e) report is not meant to be a corrective action status or verification mechanism, and therefore the proposed violations are inappropriate.

A specific action commitment date would- not always be warranted if, for example, the reasonable milestone to complete the corrective action were prior to fuel load, startup testing,' or a defined opera-tional mode. Further, the dates of the seven CDRs in question in this issue were usually prefaced by the words " current schedule indicates" or. "should be completed by." In the case of one (Cp-85-05, Diesel Control Air Filters, issued on 2/26/85), no actual date was given but the corrective action was appropriately covered by inclusion of replacement parts in a Master Data Base, thereby ensur-ing final . action at a tiine generally understood to be prior to emergency diesel generator operation.

NRC review of the CDR (50.55(e) report) is performed, in part,-to ascertain whether different or more definitive corrective action commitments are appropriate. Of the seven CORs' noted in final Inspection Report 85-16/13 with discrepant dates, only one was general enough to warrant additional questions (CP-84-29) for extent and timing of corrective actions. One other (CP-85-04) involved three month overdue corrective action for which a revised corrective action date may have been appropriate for a supplemental CDR to the NRC. Most of the other " late" examples were apparently behind on an explicit hardware or activity commitment by 3 to 6 months, but also had an open-ended commitment with respect to as yet unscheduled activity (e.g., CP-84-27 installation of explosive proof lighting and a hydrogen test of ventilation; or CP-85-12 with revised auxiliary feedwater control valve setpoints by May 31, 1985 but recalibration at some unspecified time prior to operations in Modes 1, 2, or 3).

The fact that these CDR corrective actions were only "apparently" behind is because their status as reported by the NRC in Inspection Report 85-16/13 was probably based on the TU0C0 open licensing items status list or the SDAR files, not by verification with cognizant l individuals based on pursuit of the actual status by the inspector.

(t

121 i REV. ]

, 2/27/87 i'

It-is unclear whether most of the questionable corrective action dates were, in fact, met or that the CDRs.were capable of NRC assess-ment (although not perhaps-closure) at the time of Inspection Report 85-16/13. For the CDRs which were open but had not met the projected corrective dates by more than approximately one month,. experience has been that licensees provide telephone notification to the regional office and submit supplemental reports with revised milestones which more accurately reflect changing construction schedules. However, there is no regulatory compliance issue over inexact dates since the CDR is a commitment intended for meaningful evaluation by the NRC of a significant condition adverse to quality for generic ar.d program-matic considerations.

26.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition 26.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern Literal interpretation of 10 CFR 50.55(e) regarding specification of  ;

corrective action was taken in the report (i.e., no CDR was " final" '

until corrective action was verified [by TUGC0] and reported comp-lete), For three CDRs with no specific dates and four CDRs consid-ered " late" (no corrective action noted in SDAR files or licensing status listing), a violation of 50.55(e) - failure to report correc-tive action - was proposed.

26.3.2 Development of Finding The finding was not fully developed. The consultant's field notes (Exhibit 75 to CPRRG-16) demonstrate' a limited analysis, i

26.3.3 Characterize.ation of Finding 1 Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The inspectors concern was that a loss of TUGC0 management con-trol over CDR corrective action can result in direct safety deficiencies.

The Task Group believes that no direct safety significance existed. No evidence exists to demonstrate that management was not ensuring that corrective actions were completed, only that the status of corrective action was not totally up-to-date and the NRC should have been notified of schedule change details.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

No. Each CDR is an open item on the docket and does not require a separate unresolved tag. A sufficient sample was reviewed.

l (

L i 1 1

}.

l i

122  !

REV. 1 i 2/27/87 Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

More definitive inspection research (and possible closure) could have been done to support the original open item words "... con-sequently no field verification could be performed," without either: (1) directing further inspection or (2) directly eliciting the licensee management commitment.

26.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning The violation was reclassified to an unresolved item after obtaining licensee management commitments for correction of past- reports and future improved performance. This was based on regional management's assessment of , the negligible significance represented by the date issues.

26.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes. Position taken is responsive to the significance of the

( item (26.3.4).

26.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution Yes, IR 85-16/13 adequately bounded the expected actions.

26.4 Conclusions The conclusions of Region IV management are considered to be appro-priate. It was appropriate (for 3 of the 7 CDRs) to raise the atten-tion of TUGC0 management to be more accurate in their committed cor-rective action' dates. Howev'er, this issue as with others (see Issues 25 and 27 discussions) demonstrates a misunderstanding of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI corrective action programs. The 50.55(e) process is not intended, as originally posed in Inspection Report 85-16/13, to provide a " complete paper trail for SDAR closure," i.e.,

it is not a corrective action verification process.

i 1

h

- ---- --------- _ _-------- _ -------------------- J

123 REV. 1 2/27/87 Undue inspection focus was concentrated upon final " closure" 'of the CDR. This was not .necessarily indicative of the effectiveness of corrective. action programs. Therefore, the focus on the dates in CDRs does not accomplish the proper safety insight to quality activ-ities nor does it adhere to- the NRC inspection program goal ;- the acceptability of CDR dispositions to support plant licensing. This issue was appropriately resolved by Region 'IV management with tne licensee.

It is doubtful whether the SDAR files were the only source for NRC "closecut of the corrective action paper trail." No analysis or assessment of the specific CDR in question is presented; rather, only  !

the accounting for a relatively insignificant date with respect to quality This issue suggests that the " closure" of the CDRs was more a review of the TUGC0 licensing items status list. Not much documen-tation of additional findings or inspection activity is evident (formal documentary evidence presented to this Task Group) beyond the original attempt on October 14 and 15, until the last week in November'1985. Review of Exhibit 57 (consultant's notes) shows that the reporting inspector merely copied his cursr.r> write-up and wrote a citation.

In summary, the inspector is examining the wrong process by using the 50.55(e) deportability sy stem to assess the TUGC0 treatment of r' significant deficiencies within Appendix B, Criterion XVI corrective action programs. It is unclear based on review of this item whether-TUGC0 ultimately did properly address corrective action for signifi-  !

cant deficiencies in that the proposed inspection scope and violation to 50.55(e) were too narrow and undeveloped. These are an integral part of the QA Plan, and should not be confused with only reporta -

bility considerations. NRC IE Manual guidance in this regard - if taken too literally - could be misleading (as in these issues examined). The Task Group concludes, as in Issue 26, that the inclusion of the 50.55(e) concerns presented in a broad unresolved l item may have been appropriate in this specific instance.

I

(

l 124 REV. I  ;

2/27/87 \

28. & 33. IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-14 Concerns 28/33.1 Background These items were identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-16/13, Issues 6 and

11. These were not " highlighted" items in Attachmert I to Attachment MM to 01A 86-10. The items are combined for analysis and assessment because of their similarity and their joint review and . comment by Region IV in CPRRG-17, 28/33.1.1 Summary of Issue i

During the conduct of inspection 85-16/13, a Region IV inspector questioned the file and closure status of IEB 79-14, particularly with regard to the perceived incompleteness of the licensee response to Region IV on this Bulletin. In the original draft inspection report, this concern, combined with other questions about the record files and in progress Stone and Webster activities, was proposed as an unresolved item. In the final issued inspection report the re-opening of the bulletin file, based upon the Stone and Webster analyses work in progress, was reported as an open item. However, no discussion of the concerns regarding the completeness of the IEB 79-14 response was documented. The inspector questioned the reclass-ification of the ~1w from unresolved to open.

l 28/33.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined Inspection Report 85-16/13

.2 OIA 86-10, Pages 22, 23, and 26, and Attachment I to Attachment MM

.3 CPRRG-17, 85-16/13 Inspection Report (Items 6 and 11), and Attachments 2, 4, 8A, 12, and 13 4 IE Bulletin 79-14, Use of As-Built Drawings for Piping Seismic Analysis (with Revision 1 and Supplements 1 and 2) 28/33.2 Independent Assessment l

The licensee response to IEB 79-14 (CPRRG-17, Attachment 12) was j determined to be acceptable as written. It defined the scope of the I As-Built Verification Program for the size and classes of piping i recognized to satisfy the requirements of the IEB. The requirements f addressed by Revision 1 to IEB 79-14 (i .e. , action items regarding i

" Seismic Category I piping, regardless of size which was dynamically i' analyzed by computer") were in fact discussed in the licensee re-sponse, although not in the specific IEB wording. " Seismic Category I piping" encompasses all the Safety Classes listed in the licensee response, while the small-bore lines which were not " dynamically analyzed for computer" represented a subset of piping for which the IEB requirements did not apply. Thus, properly interpreted, the licensee's IEB response was complete. l J

(

x e

125 RE ?. 1 2/27/87 Also, the fact that the licensee did not intend to report nonconform-ances as they were identified was not truly an exception (to IEB 79-14) which had to be explained in the licensee response. Noncon-formances between as-built and design details, in this context, are processed differently at a plant under construction like CPSES, than at a plant in operation where the reporting of nonconformances was meant to be applied.

Since the IEB 79-14 process at the CPSES was still ongoing with the Stone and Webster effort, closure of this bulletin by either the licensee or the NRC at that time was inappropriate. The need to document a separate open item is unnecessary since the NRC open bulletin status already served that purpose. However, the final inspection report (CPRRG-17, Attachment 8A) write-up indicating IEB 79-14 status as o:en was an acceptable means of tracking the licensee commitment to reopen their file and submit a supplemental report on this IEB.

28/33.3 Analyzing Region IV Disposition 28/33.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern The inspector believed that the licensee's response to IEB 79-14 was incomplete in that it did not address all cases of piping or except-ions to the Bulletin requirements. This and other concerns on the IEB 79-14 file status were initially documented as an unresolved item.

28/33.3.2 Development of Finding In the third draf t of IR 85-16/13 (CPRRG-17, Attachment 4), the specific inspector's concerns on the adequacy of the response to IEB 79-14 were dropped and only the bulletin status continued to be dis-cussed. In this version, the ongoing engineering work and file status was still documented as an unresolved item. In the final inspection report (CPRRG-17, Attachment 8A), the basic report content of the third draft is retained, but the item is categorized as "open" instead of " unresolved".

28/33.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The inspector appeared to be concerned that the licensee's over-view and the actual quality of the IEB 79-14 reanalysis per-formed by their contractor were both unacceptable. This then might lead to potentially incomplete or incorrect dynamic re-analyses of piping systems. l l

)

126 REV. I q- 2/27/87 These issues have no direct safety significance in the Task Group's assessment since the inspector misinterpreted the IEB requirements and attached undue significance to the file closure on IEB 79-14 by the licensee. It appears that the Stone and Webster engineering effort was satisfactorily addressing all IEB 79-14 safety questions. Additional inspection by the NRC is required to review these engineering ' efforts in order to close the bulletin.

28/33.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared ,

in Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning The unresolved item was reclassified from " unresolved" to "open" in the final report. However, Region IV management did not con-sider this a reclassification since "open" was the proper cate-gorization for review of Bulletin-related issues.

28/33.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes; the specific concerns that were dropped were correctly eliminated because the inspector had improperly interpreted the F IEB 79-14 requirements. Changing the item from " unresolved" to "open" implied no reclassification in significance since the issue was still being tracked and the nature of the concerns did not raise questions of an enforcement nature. In fact, it is common NRC practice to track Bulletins as their opcn item with-out initiating new items to effect their closure.

28/33.4 Conclusion The handling of these issues by Region IV management was proper. The inspector misunderstood the technical aspects of Bulletin 79-14, which affected the judgement of the adequacy of the licensee response to the bulletin and the current Stone and Webster engineering activ-ities. Specifically, since the tomographic method of small-bore pip-ing analysis is so conservative, bulletin actions for the smaller seismic piping sizes are required only for that Category I piping "which was dynamically analyzed by computer." Thus, the licensee's bulletin response with respect to scope of the program is acceptable.

Additionally, the need to submit nonconformance evaluations to the NRC, as discussed by IEB 79-14, is not intended to be applicable to plants in a construction status where the as-built verification pro-cess is still ongoing. The correct reference for reporting signifi- {

cant design or construction deficiencies is 10 CFR 50.55(e), if applicable to specific problems identified in the IEB 79-14 engineer-ing effort. Thus, the inspector misinterpreted the handling of non- ,

I conformances at the Comanche Peak as an exception to IEB 79-14

\ requirements. ,

127 REV. 1 2/27/87 k

( The final inspection -report carries the status of the in process  !

' Stone and Webster engi_neering work as an open item. Such an - open item status is appropriate, either as a-separate item as was docu-mented or by tracking the bulletin itself as open,- since further NRC

< inspection and review of IEB 79-14 was required.

The facts and documents on these issues support the position stated by Region IV in- CPRRG-17 (Inspection Report 85-16/13), Items 6 and 11.

I

128 REV. 1

, 2/27/87 t'

29.0 Incomplete IE Bulletin Files 29.1 Background This item was identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-16/13, Issue 7. This was not a highlighted item in Attachment I to Attachment MM.

29.1.1 Summary of Issue From a sampling review of six IE Bulletins requiring TUGC0 response, two (see Issues 28 and 30 on Bulletins 79-14 and 79-28) were selected for hardware verification. The associated files were considered by the inspector to be prematurely closed, and decentralized, since they were not located in either the QA records center or permanent records vault. An unresolved item was proposed and was reclassified as an open item by Region IV management.

29.1.2 References

.1 OI File 86-10 and Attachments B, D and MM

.2 CPPRG-16 and Exhibits 1 thru 8

.3 CPPRG-17 and Attachment 15, Licensing Procedure N0E-205 29.2 Independent Assessments Procedure NOE-205, Licensing, provides instructions for reviewing and responding to NRC correspondence (such as IE Bulletins) assigned to the Nuclear Operations Staff. Completion of IEB responses (in Step 4.2.15), including applicable action items, administratively required a closecut package (Form D) which would include source information for the response. A review form (Form B) was to be created for each relevant IEB. The review form and closecut package (Forms B and D) were required in Step 4.4 to be retained in accordance with Procedure STA-302, Station Records. Open item 85-16/13-05, presumably to ad-dress the inclusion of Forms B and D from Licensing Procedure NOE-205 for an IEB into the station records program, is an appropriate dis-position of Issue 29.

The content and extent of the IEB records is a purely administrative concern. The only valid regulatory issues are the adequacy and completeness of commitments in IEB responses. For example, a Deviation may be issued if actual corrective actions differ from described, on a case-by-case basis, based upon the relative signif-icance to plant construction quality and reactor operational safety.

l l

l

(

t f

e l f

c 3 129 r '

REV. 1 2/27/87 4'

29.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition

, 29.3.1 Statement' of Inspector's Finding- and Regula' tory Concern l

An unres lved item was initially proposed, pending further review of IE Bulletin processing procedures and policies to addrers the con-tents of files containing information on the closeout of.IE Bulletin (IEB) responses. This underlying concern is analogous to similar concerns addressed in Issues 23, 25 and 27 regarding file contents.

29.3.2 Development of Finding -

How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

The inspector referenced Procedure N0E-205 but never described the detailed instructions in that procedure. No other licensee provisions for tracking and documenting actual implementation of IEB response actions were discussed in the available report information.

29.3.3 Characterization of Finding

[

Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The inspectors considered the licensee's IEB files inadequately I represented the comprehensive response and followup action. No direct safety concern is evident.

No safety significance ,is apparent to the Task Group. The issue involves contentions over the required / desired contents of a specif t file category as it affects auditability.

Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

A commitment could have been elicited directly by the inspector during the inspection period from TUGC0 management, as was sub-sequently accomplished by Region IV management after the inspec-tion period.

29.3.4 Timeliness Was communication between inspectors and RIV Management on final resolution timely?

Yes, although its unclear why management was unable to convince the inspector that IEB files were an administrative concern.

I i

e

a

~

130 1 REV. 1 2/27/87 n

s T 29.3.5 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared h

in Final Report with Brief Stateme,nt-of Management's 9easoning j The originally proposed unresolved item was reclassified in the final Inspection Report 85-16/13 under four sepacate aspects:

- unresolved with respect to a TUSCh Task Force on correctness of procedures and records.

'open with respect to reopening the specific file for IEB 79-14  ;

unresolved with respect to documentation for 79-28 open with respect t9 centralized / retrievable records 20.3 6 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifice-tion? If yes, explain. ,

Management covered all aspects of the issue appropriately, including the commitments related to the TUGC0 Task Force.

What further action should have been directed to proper resolution, See Item 29.3.2. The inspector should have beer. ' directed to j

b*oader, the inspection to tne more meaningful actions actually taken in response to the IEBs.

A TUGCO Task Fsyce was subsequently assembled following discuss-ions with regional management to address thecompleteness of idt

- ~ correspondence / commitment files and the retrievability of asso-ciated quality records that relate to (but are not necessarily required to be stored in) the IEB files committed to in N0E-205.

This appears sufficiert.

29.3.7. If Item was Determineo to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Acti.vities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution

, Yes, inspection report details were adequate.

y

[,

1, 29.4 Conclusions Bulletin followup by the NRC is an assessment of the adequacy of the written response and verification of the licensee's implementation of actual commitments in that regard. This issue was initially devel-oped from legitimate safety-significant arguments with related poten-tial , hardware concerns (see Issues 28 and 30). It resulted in a simi..lar preoccupation with file contents. (See Issues 23-27).

f f

t 4

. . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~

131 REV. 1 2/27/87 i

Because the files in question were only intended to address licensee actions up to the point of response submittal to the NRC, no regula-tory problem was evident at that point. The open item to clarify subsequent handling of the licensee's followup activities is appro-priate, although no reason is apparent why the inspector was unable to fully address this during the inspection period. See Items 23-27, 31 and 32 for related and redundant issues.

l 1

l 1

l

! \

t - -- - - - - -- o

J 132 l REV. 1 l 2/27/87 j i }

30. NAMC0 Switches (IEB 79-28) Identification problem 30.1'Backoround This item was identified in OIA 86-10 as 85-16/13, Issue 8. This was a " highlighted" item in Attachment 'l to Attachment MM to OIA 86-10.

30.1.1 Summary of Issue Ouring - the conduct of inspection 85-16/13 at the CPSES, a Region IV l

inspector identified two NAMC0 limit switches that were incorrectly identified on their installation travelers. . This inspection was accomplished to verify hardware replacement in accordance with the guidance provided in IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-28. In the original draft inspection report, this data / record conflict was evaluated to be a failure to identify and control parts and cited as a proposed viola-tion of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII.

In the second draft of the inspection report, this issue was changed by management to an unresolved item allowing for additional licensee review of the pertinent documentation. Recognition of the licensee's effort to evaluate the subject documentation inconsistency was noted in the final inspection report and the' item was issued as unresolved.

l , 30.1.2 References

.1 CPSES Combined IR 85-07/05

.2 OIA 86-10, pp. 20, 22-25, and Attachment MM (IR 85-16/13, Concern No. 4)

.3 CpRRG-17, 85-16/13 Inspection Report (Item 8) and Attachments 2, 3, and 8A

.4 IE Bulletin. No. 79-28, Repla:ement of NAMCO Valve Limit Switches Which Could Fail

.5 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.97 30.2 Independent Assessment Verification of hardware repittement to IEB 79-28 revealed documenta-tion inconsistencies on 2 of the 14 installed NAMCO limit switches reviewed. Since the component replacement was accomplished under IEB 79-28 guidance, and 12 of the 14 limit switches evidenced no record inconsistencies, it appears that enough data was available to the inspector to determine whether actual hardware problems were suspec-ted and pursuit of this question with the licensee should have been an important inspection point to place the concern in its proper l perspective.

Regardless of whether the identified documentation error was con-sidered to be a violation or not, the question of whether improper hardware was installed is of greater ssfety significance.

I \

l

133 REV. I 2/27/87 1

Issuance of an unresolved item was appropriate to allow time to determine both the exact nature and reasons for - the documentation,n inconsistency. However, nardware acceptability should have been determined during the 85-16/13 inspection and documented as such in the final inspection report.

30.3 Analyzing kIV Disposition 30.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern The inspector believed that a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII was identified because two NAMC0 limit switch identi-fication numbers did not match those documented on the applicable installation travelers.

30.3.2 Development of Finding How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

Region IV management was justified in their direction to the in-spector to determine whether additional, more recent documenta-tion existed to resolve the conflict. The licensee presented evidence of switch / traveler conformance on the one safety-

{' related switch in question prior to issuance of the inspection report. On the nonsafety-related switch, the conflict was not yet resolved; hence, an unresolved item was issued.

30.3.3 C_ characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The inspector's concern centers around whether the licensee installation and quality document controls were adequate.

With the af ter-the-fact evidence that hardware was not in ques-tion and that adequate documentation to confirm control of the switches was available, the Task Group concludes that this issue has no direct safety significance. A programmatic' review of other part/ item documentation control did not appear jestified because of the specific nature of this inspection (ie: NAMC0 limit switches) and the fact that proper records were eventually made available. The timeliness of providing the correct trave-1ers to the QA records vault could have been pursued as a docu-ment control issue or QA records issue (e.g., Criterion XVII).

1

i 134 REV. 1

> 2/27/87 i i 30.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Grief Statement of Management's Reasoning Region IV Management believed that because the documentation incon-sistency had been satisfactorily resolved for the safety-related switch, only a similar concern remained for a nonsafety switch. This justified follow-up as an unresolved item.

30.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain. ,

Yes, based upon all the facts available to RIV management at the time of their decision. However, these facts included informa-tion provided by the licensee directly without reliance on inde-pendent evaluation or review by che on-site resident inspector.

As stated in CPRRG-17 (IR 85-16/13), page 26, Region IV dealt directly with the licensee on this concern and 'as indicated on page 27 of CPRRG-17, the Region IV supervisor accepts the 11cen-

.see explanation of why QA travelers were used on nonsafety-related switches without independent NRC eview of this explanation.

30.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient

{ Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Ef fective Resolution No; but in this case the resolution was already in part effected directly between Region IV management and the licensee. Ultimate inspection and resolution by the Comanche Peak Task Group on site allowed the inspector to pursue closure of 'their issue, although other problems in process control were identified later by the inspection (reference: CpRRG-16, pp. 93-95).

30.4 Conclusion During the conduct of the inspection, the inspector could have deter-mined and documented the acceptability of the hardware for the two NAMCO limit switches in question. With the Information provided, development of the documentation concerns as an unresolved item was appropriate.

The additional work traveler concerns identified and raised later (CPRRG-16) by the inspector with respect to NAMCO switch installation do not reflect safety-significant hardware concerns. Whether they are indicative of procedural violations is not germane to the sub-stance of this concern. The safety significance of this issue, at this point, is overshadowed by the ineffectiveness of the manager /

inspe:, tor's ability to satisfactorily resolve vs?id inspection ques-

! tions. (

Reference:

Compare CPRRG-16 (top of p. 96), inspector opin-ion to CPRRG-17, IR 85-10/13, (p. 26, last paragraph), RIV supervisor position on effective use of inspection t.ime).

j i

135 REV. 1 2/27/37

31. Inadequate Procedures for Processing NRC-IE Bulletins

32. No Focal Point in TUGC0 Construction for Tracking NRC IE Bulletins 31/32.1 Background These items were identified in 01 File 86-01 as Inspection Report 85-16/13, Issues 9 and 10. These were not items highlighted by 01 as underlined in Attachment I to Attachment MM.

31/32.1.1 Summary of Issue-The inspection of TUGCO's handling of IE Bulletins as part of Inspec-tion 85-16/13 preliminarily concluded that (CPRRG-17, Attachment 8):

...it is not clear how evaluations were assigned to construction and discipline engineering organizations . . .and how they are factored into final evaluation..."

Although the issues are never well developed in subsequent drafts of-Inspection Report 85-16/13, the files for six IE Bulletins (IEB) were reviewed for possible field verification. For two (IEB 79-14 and 28) packages considered closed by TUGCO, the inspector reviewed further actions required (in the form of supplemental responses to the original responses to the NRC). The inspector concluded that the l

TUGC0 Licensing procedures to control bulletin processing, including coordination of review activities, were inadequate.

Transcripts of interviews conducted by OIA (Attachment D, Pages 627-629) with the inspector's supervisor indicate that, initially and prior to the first draft of Inspection Report 85-16/13, the inspector verbally proposed violations (presumably of.10 CFR 50, Appendix B).

Although the bases for the proposed violations were not specified, the items were eventually presented as unresolved item 85-16/13-02 and a TUGC0 Task Force review was described in Detail 4a of Inspec-tion Report 85-16/13 to determine the adequacy of procedures and the completeness of associated records.

L 31/32.1.2 References

.1 TUGC0 Procedure No. N0E-205 (Revision 1), Licensing Correspondence

.2 OI File 86-10; Attachment D (Pages 573-582,627-629)

.3 CPRRG-17 Inspection Report 85-16/13( Pages 29-32) and Attach-ments 2-8A, and 15 1

3 136 REV. 1 2/27/87-31/32.2 In62 pendent Assessment TUGC0 Procedure N0E-205 assigns the responsibility for coordination of review and response for the IEB to the Operation Support Superintendent, and the maintenance of a log and a plan for response

.to the Technical Support Engineer (in Step 4.1). Questions or con-cerns would be presumably dire'cted to the TUGC0 Nuclear Licensing Supervisor, and the licensee's engineering resources.

There is no regulatory basis for the ' administrative processing and the ability to track NRC licensing commitments. Therefore, 'no enforcement action would be appropriate.for perceived deficiencies in the licensee's administrative processing of IEB responses. Clear variance from IEB commitments, depending.upon the safety significance of the deviation, would be grounds for a Notice of Deviation. A 1 violation could also be issued if actions taken to correct IEB iden-tified deficiencies are inadequate. ' As evidenced in the Task Group's review of Issues 28 and 30, the adequacy of TUGCO's. actions with l respect to IEB's are subject to'NRC. review and may be left open until-clear safety issues can be resolved.

31/32.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition 31/32.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Finding and Regulatory Concern

./ Contents of the files used to track the progress of information organized by TUGC0 Licensing in preparing IE Bulletin responses to the NRC (see Issue 29) led the inspector to conclude that unspecified procedural inadequacies existed. These apparently involved the absence of direction to TUGC0 construction management personnel for IEB action, particularly for files classified as closed.

31/32.3.2 Development of Finding How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted 'and' by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

There was no regulatory basis developed to support the initially proposed violations. Issues 28 and 30 do, however, support the 1 fact that specific quality documentation was' available to fol-lowup IE Bulletin commitments in the licensee's overall records system.

x l

137 REV. 1 2/27/87 4

31/32.3.3 Characterization of Finding l

Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The inspectors considered . the licensee's IEB review processes l and. records files inadequate to develop the comprehensive l response and followup action. No direct safety concern is

! evident.

I No safety significance is apparent to the Task Group. The issue involves contentions over the required / desired process that the licensee uses to handle IEBs. The adequacy of actual licensee-corrective action is not in contention.

Should it have been. pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

Yes, apparently only six IEB's were audited and two selected for followup upon which to base the inspector's -concerns. A manage-ment issue could have been developed if TUGC0 was not tracking and meeting their IEB commitments to the NRC.

Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

I The inspector failed to develop / provide a coherent assessment of

~

the licensee's overall processes. Additional broadening of the inspection to develop either a basis for additional licensee action or enforcement is well within normal expectations for the inspector.

31/32.3.4 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning Findings were not reclassified; no enforcement issues were developed in the draft report (s).

31/32.3.5 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Not applicable, no reclassification occurred.

I l

1

_ _____ _______________ ____ ______________ _-__ a

138 REV. I 2/27/87 l

31/32.3.6 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities._of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution Sufficient information was not p-ovided for the general concerns of Items 31 and 32. Report 85-16/13, Detail 4a was vague and consisted of two sentences with reference to unspecified IE Bulletins, Circu-lars and Notices, and associated procedural inadequacies.

1 31/32.4 Conclusion Issues 31 and 32 were never proposed as violations. The unresolved l item was not warranted since it is unclear what was unresolved (i.e.,

potential noncompliance) other than the inspector's questions as to the process of putting a Bulletin response together.

The inspector was assessing the in-process status of specific IEB's I that he assumed were closed because their associated tracking files (under N0E-205) were closed. However, while TUGC0 Licensing's re-sponsibilities were considered finished since no further responses to NRC were anticipated, the inspector incorrectly interpreted closure of Licensing's bulletin files as being in a status which would permit final verification of corrective actions. As previously concluded in Issues 23 and 29, the completeness of administrative files is not a primary concern in NRC Bulletin followup. However, the unresolved items associated with the TUGC0 Task Force established on March 1, 1986 should serve to improve the coordination and status tracking of licensing commitments.

f

139 REV. I 2/27/87

34. BISCO Fire Barrier Seal Certification 34.1 Background This item was identified in Ol' File 86-10 as Inspection Report 85-16/

13, Issue 12, and was a " highlighted" item of discussion as under-lined in Attachment 1 to Attachment MM.

34.1.1 Summary of Issue Original Finding During conduct of Inspection 85-16/13, the inspector followed the progress of a previous unresolved item from Unit 1 Inspec-tion Report 84-22, issued in October 1984, concerning the certi- )

fication of chemical and physical testing for BISCO fire seals I used in electrical penetrations. The inspector questioned the I lack of a reference to required testing in associated certifi-cates of compliance (C0C). Item 84-22-04 remained unresolved pending test certifications.

Expansion of Findings The inspector was notified by TUGC0 QA personnel that unresolved

! item 84-22-02 was ready to be closed. The inspector left the previous item open and proceeded to additional concerns based on memoranda and telephone discussions with BISCO and TUGC0 person- 1 nel. TUGC0 Nuclear Engineering generated a design deficiency l report (TDDR) on 8/27/85 and recommended corrective action on j 10/1/85 to address the questionable certification of certain BISCO electrical penetration seals (PCA-76 design).

The inspector worked with a consultant during conduct of Inspec-tion Report 85-16/13 on the BISCO seal issue, and initially pro-posed a violation (Appendix B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Material) for f ailure to document the deficient fire seals on an NCR, per QI-QP-16.0-4, Identification of Class 1E Equipment with Deficient IEEE 323/344 Test Reports. A second violation was proposed for failure to adequately evaluate and report a signif-icant construction deficiency under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Further, the inspector recommended an 01 investigation, through memoranda to Region IV management, into the the discrepant statements as to original (1975-1976) test failures.

The inspectors selected 8 penetrations, which were identified for rework by TUGC0 engineering, for further records review.

Apparently conflicting information was found in a series of six letters between TUGCO, BISCO, and American Nuclear Insurers

( ANI) during the one year period, November 1984 - October 1985.

- The inconsistencies involved were:

(

140 REV. I g 2/27/87 retest of an upgraded sample with a design change that added a 3/8-inch proprietary coating.

ANI versus BISCO test standards in meeting ASTM E-119.

ANI had rescinded their original certified acceptance (referred to as S-26) of the BISCO seal design configuration (referred to as PCA-76). The conflicts addressed in Inspection Report 85-16/

13 centered about BISCO's statements in their 9/16/85 letter to TUGC0 that ANI testing standards were more stringent than those required by the' ASTM or_ NRC. Although the BISCO seal design as installed at CPSES apparently...

had original 1976 test certification lost, failed a subsequent ANI retest, and had S-26 rescinded by ANI, BISCO stated that the design still met required test standards.

However, the next paragraph on Page 2 of the _9/16/85 letter de-scribed an additional 3/8-inch proprietary coating (" retrofit and/or design change") that was not part of either the origi-nally accepted S-26 or the installed seals.

A related memorandum discussing the test record discrepancies,

('

and recommending possible 01 investigation and NRC vendor inspection of BISCO QA records was. prepared by the inspector in November 1985, and revised twice prior to being sent to NRC Headquarters by Region IV for generic consideration.

Final Disposition Two unresolved items (06 and 07) were included in final Inspec-tion Report 85-16/13 to address: (a) re-evaluation of available 1976 test - documentation versus more recent test failures for deportability under either Parts 21 or 55(e); and (b) the incon-sistency between ANI testing "in accordance with" ASTM E-119 and BISCO's claim that the ANI testing " exceeded" the standard.

The inspector's memorandum discussing broader implications and routed to his Region IV Division Director, was revised and even-tually directed to the NRC Vendor Inspection Branch for generic consideration in April 1986.

i,

I 141 REV. I 2/27/87 34.2.1 References

.1 CPRRG-17, Attachments 2 through 8; and Attachment 8a, Report 85-16/13, Appendix C, Details 2h and 6 (Pages 7-9)

.2 01 File 86-10 (Pages 26-28) and Attachments MM (Pages 17-18), GG (Pages 2-19), and D (Pages 631-669)

.3 CPRRG-16 (Pages96-101) and Exhibits 67, 68, and 69

.4 CPRRG-17 for Inspection Report 85-16/13 (Item 12, Pages 33-38) and:

Attachment 16, TODR-FR-85-063 Attachment 17, QI-QP-16.0-4 Attachment 18, December 2, 1985 Memo (H. Phillips to G. Zech)

.5 ASTM Standard E-119, Standard for Fire Protection of Building Material

.6 IEEE 634, Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Test

.7 FSAR Section 9.5

.8 Federal Register Notices (Volume 45, No. 225, Page 76608), Final Appendix R Rule, Section M, Fire Barriers

.9 Fire Protection Generic Letter 86-10 dated 4/25/86

.10 National Fire Codes, NFPA 251-1979, Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Materials l

34.1.3 Discussion of Details Because of the complexity of the issues involved, the following para-graphs address in detail the circumstances surrounding the BISCO seal qualification. A chronology of events is also included in an at-tached table to more clearly assess the development of the concern for certified fire test data for BISCO cable penetration seal design PCA-76:

Oricinal Fire Tests Conflicting statements in two letters dated 11/13/84 and 9/16/85 f rom BISCO to TUGC0 ( Attachment 18 to CPRRG-17) were found as reported in Inspection Report 85-16/13. These involved a large scale fire test which, because of its size, required a separate hose stream test apparently conducted at the Portland Cement Association in.1976. It was noted that both tests, as origin- i ally submitted to ANI, received certified acceptance. When ANI '

was later unable to locate their file copy, and requested a replacement from BISCO, the documentation, for the 1976 test was discovered to be unavailable. The records of the separate hose test were either destroyed in a fire or lost by BISCO.

---

_--- _ - ------_ - -- _ - J

1 142 REV. 1 2/27/87 z

- Retest Requested by ANI The ANI then requested that BISCO conduct a new retest to ANI standards at that time which BISCO stated in their 9/16/85 letter were "'... mare stringent than those required by the ASTM or NRC." The retest experienced a burn-through at 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, 35 minutes; however, the BISCO position was that, for the seal design which failed the retest (i.e., did not demonstrate a required 3-hour rating), other test documentation was available which ". . . substantiates the fire seal design that failed the ANI fire test standards..." and which would "... meet and surpass the test standards of ASTM E-119 and the NRC." The ANI position on this retest, as stated by BISCO in their 9/16/85 letter to TUGCO, was that acceptance of the electrical cable tray block-outs sealed with RTV silicone foam (i.e., the BISCO design) would be based on the prior certified acceptance, but "for insurance purposes only."

TUGC0 Corrective Action A Nuclear Engineering Design Deficiency Report (TDDR) Nc.

FP-85-063 was reported on 8/27/85 to document the rescinded ANI acceptance of S-26 for the 3-hour rated fire barrier. The cor-rective action approved by TUGC0 management on 10/1/85 was for BISCO to supply evidence of satisfactory testing and up-to-date

( ANI acceptance for all designs covered by S-26. Preventive action included tne intent that BISCO provide evidence that "the balance of ANI acceptances used at CPSES are current." The actions were due to be implemented by 10/15/85. The approval of the corrective action also recommended that the deficiency was not reportable under either 10 CFR Parts 21 or 50.55(e).

Test Standards IEEE 634-1973 (Exhibit 68 to CPRRG-16) establishes type tests for qualifying the performance of cable penetration fire stops when mounted in rated barriers. The test requirements confirm the adequacy of the design, in this case BISCO penetration de- ,

tail PCA-76, in meeting the two and three hour fire ratings described in the FSAR and Appendix R requirements. The IEEE standard sets criteria to be met (i.e. , temperature on the cool side of the fire stop, an intact barrier) and a method of test-ing in accordance with the time-temperature profile of ASTM E-119. The CPSES FSAR states that these materials be tested in accordance with the IEEE and ASTM standards.

I

.)

~143 i REV. I 2/27/87 .

t 34.2 Independent Assessment  ;

34.2.1 Disposition of Deficiency Section 15.0 of the TUGC0 QA Plan for Nonconforming Items (CPRRG-16, Exhibit 15) states that a nonconformance report is used to document deficiencies unless another method is prescribed by a specific procedure / instruction. The TDDR initiated to address .the fire seal qualification records met this intent. Further, the seal is an Appendix R concern and the BISCO foam is therefore not governed by TUGC0 commitments with respect to IEEE Standards 323/344 whose scope is qualification of Class IE electrical equipment.

34.2.2 Determination of Deportability The TDDR corrective action, as initially approved, was concurred in by TUGC0 management as not reportable under either Parts 21 or 50.55(e). While the evaluation for deportability is not fully de-scribed, a discussion by the inspector with a TUGC0 engineer regard-ing a question on the effect of the affected seal / penetration / cable on safe shutdown systems is documented. The limited amount of rework (8 penetrations), the outstanding questions as to BISCO records, and the relevance of ANI certification to NRC qualification criteria all point to a nonreportable condition, pending further information. On j the other hand, the questioning by the inspector of deportability and i

the subsequent open item (85-16/13-06) was appropriate, even though later TUGC0 re-evaluation concluded (bases unknown) that the issue was not reportable under 50.55(e). Further research and discussions with TUGC0 Engineering personnel were required before a- balanced assessment as to the adequacy of the initial 50.55(e) decision could be made.

The Part 21 deportability is similarly unresolved (and the item 85-16/13-05 therefore appropriate) as to BISCO's test methods, records, and the penetration detail in question. The inspector does not clearly develop what actually is in question, although the bottom line concern of BISCO Detail PCA-76 for test qualification as a 3-hour rated seal is valid. Test results certified by the ANI have no direct regulatory bearing; the ASTM E-119 test methods are an indus-try standard but ANI certification is not an NRC requirement. Also of note is that the IE generic correspondence sent from Region IV in April 1986 has not had any measurable impact to date.

1 k.

-__ __-_____-__-_-__-__D

l 144 REV. I 2/27/87 34.2.3 Recommendations for 01 Involvement (Phillips 12/2/55 Memorandum to Vendor Branch)

The recommendation in the memorandum for possible C investigation is a reasonable item for the inspector to raise to his supervision, al-though the issue (material falsification by inconsistent test qualif-ication claims in BISCO letters) is not well developed. In the first memorandum to his supervisor on November 25, 1985, the inspector does not establish the clear connection between his impressions of " wrong doing" or " falsification" and the ultimate safety concern, i.e. , the adequacy of the installed seals as designed 3-hour barriers. Since the basic concern has already been identified by the licensee on the TDDR (CPRRG-17, Inspection Report 85-16/13, Attachment 16), it ap-pears that the inspector could have additionally assessed the licen-see's evaluation of this issue, to further support the need for 01 involvement at that time.

The inspector's recommendations to Region IV were proper since they represented the inspector's perception of a serious concern, even though that concern may not have been sufficiently developed by the facts. Management's role appeared to be focused as a reviewer of the inspector's write-up based on editorial considerations. Additional Region IV specialist expertise should have been dedicated to clarify the technical concerns in order to determine whether either OI or IE Vendor Program Branch followup were necessary and more importantly to refocus the inspector's attention to the basic safety concern.

In the handling of this concern regarding the request for 01 involve-ment, the inability of the inspector and his supervisor to coopera-tively work together on this issue represents the root of the prob-lem. If the recommendation for 01 involvement was improper, .as stated by Region IV, further evaluation and effort by Region IV was appropriate to clarify their understanding of the concerns and dis-position the inspectors written request in a timely manner.

34.2.4 Generic Implications The inspector's memorandum to NRC Vendor Inspection Branch (e.'ated 12/2/85 but apparently not transmitted until properly addressd to the Region IV Division Director on 3/6/86) was ultimately directed to IE Headquarters in April 1986. The successive personnel interactions on this issue between November 1985 until April 1986 were driven by the need for substantive technical discussion on the generic issue in question: the test method and seal design configuration qualified by BISCO and later apparently disapproved by ANI.

4 1

i

l

!- 145 REV. 1 2/27/87 The memorandum was, in its initial version, substantive enough for Region IV supervision to:

Request Vendor Inspection assistance.

Seek OI (Region IV) opinion.

Direct the inspector to clarify requisite technical details.

Region IV eventually took action on each of these items, although both the timeliness and interaction with their inspector were ques-tionably handled. Based upon what was the final disposition of the issues, a timely active Region IV participation in the early issue definition and development could have effectively resolved the over-all concerns.

34.3 Analyzing RIV Disposition 34.3.1 Statement of Inspector's Findings and Regulatory Concern The inspector's review of a deficiency with BISCO fire seals which was documented by TUGC0 on TDDR FP-85-063, led him to believe that:

a failure of the licensee to document the deficiency on an NCR was a violation of Appendix B, Criterion XV.

(

inadequate licensee evaluation (i.e., no significant reportable deficiency report) was identified and represented a violation of Part 50.55(e).

his request for an 01 investigation into apparently conflicting test results was not aggressively dispositioned by Region IV management.

34.3.2 Development of Finding How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

The findings were expanded from review of an existing unresolved item which could not be closed and led to the identification of

, inconsistencies between BISCO letters addressing certain test methods and ANI acceptance rescinded for certain records. The inspector (and his consultant): (1) read the letters, (2) called BISCO and TUGC0 engineering, and (3) proposed violations as well as recommending 01 and generic NRC Vendor Inspection Branch involvement. At the time of the inspection, review of IEEE and ASTM test methods was not rigorously performed, and field in-spection to describe the location and what kind of barriers were involved, was not documented as being conducted.

I

\

146 REV. 1

(- 2/27/87 34.3.3 Characterization of Finding Inspector's apparent safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

The inspector expressed generic concerns (e.g., falsification) over the vendor supplied material and design with respect to BISCO seals, their testing conduct, records and certification process, and potential Part 21 implications.

The Task Group determined that the basic safety conce'rn was that the adequacy of certified fire test data to support 3-hour bar-rier rating for BISCO cable penetration seal design- PCA-76 was indeterminable and therefore represented a legitimate safety question. However, the fundamental concern was initially iden-tified by the licensee and their corrective action was in-progress and properly directed.

Was is reasonable to expect further undirected action by the re-porting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

More interaction with TUGC0 engineering was reasonable since the item was originally initiated by the TUGC0 TDDR and corrective actions were in process of implementation.

l 34.3.4 Timeliness Was communication between inspectors in Region IV Management on final resolution timely?

The only item that appeared to have been not handled in a timely manner was the memorandum from the inspector recommending 01 investigation and Vendor Programs Branch followup.

34.3.5 Nature of Reclassification of Inspection Finding as it Appeared in Final Report with Brief Statement of Management's Reasoning The violations were appropriately dispositioned. The NCR issue was clearly not a violation, the 50.55(e) evaluation was discretionary and ultimately justified as nonreportable.

l 34.3.6 Management's Role in Achieving Final Disposition 1

Were management's actions sufficient to warrant reclassifica-tion? If yes, explain.

Yes; in fact, the existing unresolved item had previously encom-passed the substance of the concerns and expansion of the item to include the later information would have adequately addressed i this issue.

147 REV. 1 2/27/87 i '

What further action should have been directed to proper resolution.

Additional inspection by inspector to expand information basis.

More clarification on the inspector's basis for a potential falsification issue, in particular:

• Differences (if any) between ASTM 119 and IEEE 634.

• Purported 1975 versus 1976 fires. '

Specialist inspection / Consultant inspection Development by the consultant of the concerns raised by this. issue was inadequate. The inspector did not clarify this inadequate development or resolve.the questions, but instead evaluated the concerns to broader questions of compliance and generic implications.

Referred to other NRC office (IE)

A more active role by Region IV management in developing the content and basis for the potential 01 involvement and j

[i generic considerations, including use of a fire protection J specialist for further review of the inspector's original l concerns, was appropriate. j 1

34.3.7 If Item was Determined to be Unresolved, was there Sufficient Information in the Inspection Report to Focus Activities of the Licensee / Inspector to Effective Resolution The proposed 50.55(e) violation was appropriately reclassified and handled as an unresolved pending TUGC0 corrective action and re-evaluation of deportability.

Current status of item The 50.55(e) deportability was later determined to be not re-quired by TUGCO. The inspector raised a legitimate concern for the 3-hour rating of 8 penetrations utilizing BISCO seals. More development of the question of what constituted-a valid qualif-ication test (i.e., ASTM and IEEE specifics) was necessary to l place the inspection issues and the controversial memoranda into '

better perspective. This development might have answered, in a l more timely and effective manner, the larger outstanding issues regarding:

i i e .

. ,,1 ... .

148 REV. 1 2/27/87 1

Part 21 and falsification allegations toward BISCO.

The actual. notice of the rework on the 8 penetration seals (e.g. , were they modified to add damming boards, proprie-tary coatings, or internal blockout subdividers).

34.4. Conclusions-The inspector's bas'i c_ concern represented a valid safety question as to whether the fire seals in question had to meet a' 3-hour barrier i^

rating per the FSAR. The development of these concerns was incom-plete, and essentially provided additional technical questions to the year-old unresolved item 84-22-04 (which fundamentally posed the same question). At the time of the inspector's findings, the'11censee was aware of the stated issues and had develuped or was formulating cor-rective actions.

The inspector's memoranda to Region IV management appeared to initially lack substantive supporting evidence to justify _'immediate 01 involvement. However, these memoranda did portray valid questions requiring further NRC review (01 investigation, IE generic vendor inspection, and Region IV technical followup).

(

1

(

t

REV. 1 2/27/87

' CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FOR ISSUE 34 Date Correspondence Subject and Comments October 1976 N/A BISCO test data for PCA-76 (eventually lost in fire).

10/11/84 NRC Inspection Report Unresolved item 02 on test certification.

50-445/84-22 issued.

11/13/84 BISCO to TUGC0 Stated the seal met test requirements (IEEE and ASTM).

8/20/85 ANI to BISCO Withdrew acceptance for BISCO S-26.

8/20/85 ANI to TUGC0 Informed of test failure and rescinded acceptance (upgrade test to ASTM-319) 8/27/85 TUGC0 TDDR No. Report initiated by TUGC0 Engineering FP-85-063 for deficiency.

8/29/85 TUGC0 TDDR No. Documented the seal deficiency.

FP-85-063 9/16/85 BISCO to TUGC0 Details supporting withdrawal of test acceptante (still met ASTM-E-119) 10/1/85 TUGC0 TODR No. Proposed corrective action for TDDR FP-85-063 approved by TUGC0 management.

10/15/85 TUGC0 TDDR No. Due date for TDDR corrective action FP-85-063 implementation.

10/16/85 TUGC0 Interoffice Discussion of rework.

Memorandum (Creamer to

, Kennedy) 10/24/85 BISCO to TUGC0 (Trent Identified 8 penetrations for rework.

to Anger) 12/2/85 NRC Interoffice Memo- Recommendations to NRC Vendor Programs randum (Phillips to G. Branch to inspect BISCO QA Program (dis-Zech, Vendor Programs cussion of potential false statements).

Branch) 3/6/86 Memorandum Redirected to Same as 12/2/85 memo.

Director (Johnson) 4/2/86 Region IV Correspondence Same as 12/2/85 memo. i to IE (Johnson to (

Partlow)

/ 4/4/86 Inspection Report Final issuance (discussion of BISCO in 85-16/13 Detail 6). )

REV. 1 2/27/87 i

APPENDIX 4.1 RESUMES l

[

1 REV. 1 2/27/87 l I l

RESUME Donald A. Beckman Organization: Prisuta Beckman Associates, Inc.

Title:

President and Special Consultant Education: BS, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, 1969 Experience: (Nuclear Industry - 21 years) 1985 - Present Prisuta Beckman Associates and affiliated companies. Pres-ident and co-owner involved in day to day management and performance of nuclear consulting engineering practice, mechanical construction contractor, and related services.

Personal engagements include multiple technical consulting projects for NRC.

1982 - 1985 Prisuta Corporation, ACC Consultants and Engineers and Energy Consultants, Inc. Vice president and special con--

sultant providing engineering and consulting services to nuclear utilities and NRC.

1977 - 1982 USNRC Region I. Multiple positions including Senior

[

Resident Inspector and Chief, Plant Systems Section. Exten-sive involvement in all aspeccs of nuclear power plant engineering, construction and operations. Recipient of agency's Meritorious Service Award in 1979.

1976 - 1977 Burns and Roe, Inc. - Plant test and operations supervisor startup and operations of nuclear and nonnuclear power stations.

1971 - 1976 Newport News Shipbuilding - Testing supervisor for naval submarine nuclear plants.

1969 - 1971 First Atomic Ship Transport, Inc. - Watch engineer, reactor operator, health physicist, water chemist on board Nuclear Ship Savannah.

Special Qualifications: USD0E Management Oversight Risk Tree Analysis Training USDOE Accident Investigation Training USNRC BWR Operations Training USNRC PWR Operations Training LMBFR Systems and Maintenance Training, Rockwell Int'1.

Construction Estimating, Planning, Scheduling, RS Means, Inc.

.f

\

4.1-1

l Donald A. Beckman i I REV. 1 J 2/27/87 j i

1 i

Special ,

Qualifications: l (Continued) USAEC, Reactor' Operator License, Nuclear Ship Savannah USCG Marine Engineer's License, Steam & Motor Vessels USERDA Certification, Submarine Reactor Plant Shift Test Engineer USCG Certification, Health Physics Technician i

I f

4.1-2

REV. 1 2/27/87

-( i RESUME Antone C. Cerne Organization: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I, Division of Reactor Projects

Title:

Senior Resident Inspector Educationi Bachelor of Science, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering, Massac.husetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 4

I Experience:

.1980 - Present NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station, Seabrook, .NH. Responsible for conducting the NRC Light Water Inspection Program at a pressurized water reactor facility Completed the construction and preoperational testing inspection programs with special emphasis upon plant design, construction disciplines, and integrated system testing. Currently engaged in the conduct of the Startup Testing inspection program.

1978 - 1980 Member of NRC regional technical staff, engaged in inspec-tion, analysis and evaluation of nuclear power plant con-l struction. Managed conduct of inspection programs as the Project Inspector .for Seabrook, Nine Mile Point 2 and Millstone 3. ,

I l 1975 - 1978 Chief of Construction Supervision, Charles River Dam Area l Office, New England Division, Corps of Engineers. Super-vised inspection staff and reviewed design change implemen-tation for a multimillion dollar flood control construction project. Also served as Resident Engineer on another Corps '

project.

1968 - 1975 Various assignments with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, involved with project management and construction super-vision at military installations in the United States and overseas.

l Technical Completed series of NRC sponsored courses in concrete, Qualifications: welding NDE, QA, electrical and I&C disciplines leading to certification as a construction inspector. Completed i series of NRC courses in pressurized water reactor systems l and technology leading to certification as an operations 1 inspector, f

4.1-3 i

REV. 1 2/27/87 RESUME Samuel J. Collins Organization: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I, Division of Reactor Projects

Title:

Deputy Director Education: Bachelor of Science, Maine Maritime Academy, Castine, ME Graduate Business Program, Southern Vermont College, Brattleboro, VT Experience: (Nuclear Industry - 16 years in Design, Construction, Operations, Inspection and Management) i 1986 - Present Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, USNRC, Region I l

Provides project management; conducts inspections and evaluations of assigned NRC programs for all power and non-power reactors within Region I; directs and performs Regional efforts toward reactor licensing activities and the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)

Program; implements the NRC resident inspector program and related enforcement actions for assigned facilities. Admin-j isters and conducts the operator licensing program.

1985 - 1986 Branch Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No. 2, USNRC Region I Provides project management, including inspections, imple-mentation of SALP, resident inspection and enforcement for eleven assigned power reactor sites in operation and under construction.

1984 - 1985 Section Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2C, USNRC, Region I Responsible for implementation of the routine and reactive inspection program at six assigned powee reactors during new construction, testing and operation. Accomplished through supervision of Resident Inspector offices at assigned facilities. Cumulative responsibility included two . operating Boiling Water Reactors, three operating Pressurized Water Reactors and one construction phase Boiling Water Reactor.

1983 - 1984 Senior Resident Inspector for Operations, Yankee Nuclear Power Station, DRP, USNRC Region I. Supervised inspection and event response program at operating Westinghouse PWR power reactor facility, f

4.1-4

Samuel J. Collins REV. 1 2/27/87 i

-1980 - 1983 Resident Reactor Inspector for Operations, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, DRP, USNRC Region I. Field inspec-tor at operating General Electric BWR power reactor facility.

Private Industry 1971 - 1980 Tenneco Corp., Newport News Shipbuilding. Various posit-ions as contractor to U.S. Navy Nuclear Program including:

Project Manager - S5W Steam Generator Chemical Cleaning Project Chief Test Engineer - Chairman and NNS representative to Joint Test Group for S5W overhaul and construction Shift Test Engineer - Shift supervisor'for reactor overhaul and refueling i Shift Test Engineer - Shif t supervisor for reactor new construction Mechanical Test Engineer - Shift mechanical test for j reactor new construction Reactor Design Engineer - design support for reactor new construction Special l Qualifications: Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program, l USNRC 1986-87 Qualified BWR Resident Inspector Qualified PWR Resident Inspector Qualified S5W Shift Test Engineer Third Engineer License, USCG l

l I

4.1-5 l _

REV. I 2/27/87 RESUME Thomas C. Elsasser, P.E.

Organization: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I, Division of Reactor Projects

Title:

Chief, Reactor Projects Section 30 Education: Bachelor of Science, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Training Program Experience: (Nuclear Industry - 22 years)

USNRC 1981 - Present Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, USNRC Region 1. Responsible for implementation of the routine and reactive inspection program at assigned power reactors during new construction, testing and operation. Accomp-lished through supervision of Resident Inspector offices at assigned facilities. Cumulative responsibility has included all' sites in New England as well as Calvert Cliffs 1&2.

. Responsibility has also included all Region I test and research reactors and fuel cycle facilities. Oversight during construction Phase has included Millstone 3 and Seabrook 1.

1978 - 1981 USNRC Office of State Programs, Regional State Liai son Officer, Region I. Regional contact for State and local government agencies in areas of interest to the NRC, par-ticularly reactor licensing, emergency planning and commer-cial uses of radioactive materials.

Three Mile Island During the accident at TMI, served as a spokesman for the 1979 - 1980 NRC to the national news media. Following the accident, represented the NRC before legislative committees and public inquiry groups on matters related to the accident and clean-up operations. From April to November 1980 was t assigned to the NRC Middletown office, to ass 1st with l public and local government liaison in matters pertaining I to the krypton venting and the Environmental Impact Statement, on Unit 2 clean-up.

1 I

(

1 4.1-6

)

-, Thomas C. Elsasser REV. 1 2/27/87

? -

1975 - 1977 Reactor Inspector, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Dranch, NRC Region I. Assigned as project inspec-tor for various new construction projects including Millstone 3. Also responsible for overall implementation of the SNUPPS inspection program which included leading and participation in team inspections at SNUPPS headquarters, Calloway 1&2 and Wolf Creek.

UE&C Nuclear Engineer, United Engineers and Constructors, 1974 - 1975 Philadelphia, PA. Responsible for PSAR and EIR development fnr various new nuclear projects under development by UE&C.

Served as project manager for an HTGR piping optimization study performed for General Atomic.

U.S. Navy Member, Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

1972 - 1974 Duties involved conducting operational reactor safeguards examination of nuclear powered units of U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

1970 - 1972 Chief Engineer, nuclear submarine USS Will Rogers. Respon-y sibilities including directing the operational, maintenance and testing of the ship's nuclear reactor and all support facilitfes.

4 1968 - 1970 Training Officer, SIW Nuclear Prototype, Idaho Falls, ID.

I Served as principal Navy assistant to the Westinghouse plant manager for training of all officer and enlisted operators assigned to S1W for initial nuclear indoctrina-tion.

1966 - 1968 Division Officer, nuclcar submarine USS Simon Bolivar.

1964 - 1966 Completed U.S. Navy nuclear power and submarine training.

Special Registered Professional Engineer (Nuclear), Commonwealth of Qualifications: Pennsylvania Completed NRC sponsored courses in quality assurance, concrete, and NDE leading to certification as an NRC construction inspector Completed NRC sponsored courses in BWR and PWR technology Completed DOE Radiological Emergency Response Training, Nevada Test Site, Mercury, NV l

I 4.1-7 l l

l l

l

y-('

- . RE.' I 2/27/87 RESUME ,

7 '

Eugene '+. kelly Organization: U.S. Nuclear 9egulatory Commission Eegion I Division of Reacter Projects '

Title:

Senior Resident Jnsontor - Liderick Education: B.S. Physics - Villanova University M.S. Nechanical Engineering - University of Pennsylvania Experience: 13 fears in nucleer industry 1985 - Senior Resident at Limerick Unit 1 managing inspection programs 3 Present power ascensfon testing and operations. Supervise detailed inspections of system design and modifications, surveillance l

testing and maintenance, and other program areas. Special pro-Jact assignments include team inspections at LaSalle, Peach Bottom and Nine Mile Point sites.

1982 - 1985 Reactor engineer assigned to ter, plant, sites, conducting inspec-NRC tions and allegation followup. Major pedjects included licens-ing of Susquehanna Unit 2, extensive allegation followup at Shoreham, completion of construction anq design inspection pre-grams at Seabrook and Hope Creek, and overall engineetir.3 evalu-ations of Yankee ' Atomic facilities (Vermont, Mafne, Rowe).

' 1980 - 1982 Project engineer responsible for plant modifications including Catalytic Inc design specifications, procurement, coordi natir.,n of detailed engineering and calculations, and test and installation, s

1979 - 15s0 Nuclear engineer responsible for isotopic analysis, shielding General calculations, sump water sampling coordination, and krypton Pub 71c venting assessments.

Utn ities Corp.

1974 - 1979 Safety analysis engineer contributing to PSAR and FSAR prepara-United tion for several nuclear projects. Startup test and licensing Engineers and assignments for nuclear facilities.

Constructors Inc.

l Technica1 p alifications:

Completed NRt BWR & PWR operational course series

• 5 - week PRA training program

• GEandCEStationEngineeringcourses.

I i

4.1-8

REV. 1 2/27/87 APPENDIX 4.2 TASK GROUP 2 CHARTER 1

l 1

i a \

x j

i U

1 thaC+ l Task G2-02 2-1 (2/02/87)

TASK GROUP 2 TASK FOR EXAMINATION OF ISSUES RELATING TO PROCESS AND DISPOSITION OF INSPECTION FINDINGS OF OIA REPORT 86-10 This task relates to examination of the 34 issues of Attachment 1 to Attachment MM of OIA Report 86-10 and any additional relative issues revealed by the activities of Task Group 1 as a result of activities under Item 5 (and docu-mented in Item 6e) of the Task I description.

The basic task is to review the processing and disposition of 1ssues and inspections findings in the Region IV inspection of the Comanche Peak project l

and to compare the actual processing against the identified policy or practices of the NRC, IE, and Region IV.

As a minimum, the Task Group will have available to it:

1. CPRRG-7, the information from IE in response to CPPRG Letter RG IE-02.

l This information establishes the basis from IE for inspection reporting; 1

item identification, classification and disposition; and responsibilities for inspection performance and reporting.

h 4.2-1

Draft 2-2(2/02/87) t-

2. CPRRG-8, the information from Region IV in response to CPpRG Letter RG RIV-02. This information establishes the basis from Region IV for inspection reporting; item identification, classification and disposition, and responsibilities for inspection performance and reporting.

DrotoaA

3. Information from.98C relative to NRC policy and practices for processing l and disposition of issues and inspection findings, this shall be forwarded to Task 2 by CPRRG 1etter. >

4. The information of specific process and disposition issues from OIA Report 86-10 (essentially the 34 issues in Attachment I to Attachment MM of OIA Report 86-10).

5. Any process and disposition issues forwarded to Task Group 2 from the work of Task Group 1, this shall be forwarded to Task 2 hy CPRRG 1etter.

Insofar as possible, the performance of this task should rely on the written record where that record provides sufficient information to support conclu- I sions. Where it is necessary to extend this record, this should be done in I coordination with OGC.

I 1

l 4.2-2 l

Oraft 2-3 (2/02/87)

I 1his lask Group shall:

I. Review information provided by IE, Region IV, the Comanche Peak Project Office or others against the primary or source document to k become familiar with the investigation and CPRRG record. Shere applicable, assess the accuracy and completeness of the reccrds ,

provided3 K,

2. Icentify the specific process and disposition issues from OIA Report 86-10 (34 issues of Attachment I to Attachment MM).

' 3. Analyze each issue, independen) essess and describe the process and  ;

t' disposition by which the item should have been handled. Identify the hRC, IE cc Rgem \

3 process, guidance or practice that was used in making this indepen-dent determination.

4 Analy:e the actual process and disposition of each issue. Describe the process by which it actually was handiec ircluding where appli-cable, the identification and classification as a finding (with references) by the inspector, inclusien in the draf t reports, eval-l l uation by Region IV managernent and inclusion in the final report.

Particular attention and discussion will be provided to items where there is an absence of agreement on process or disposition. The basis for the disagreement and documentation there of, including timeliness of review, signature, concurrences and rcport issuance f will be described.

4.2-3

Draft 2-4 (2/02/87) j Grepp'5 {M i g

5. Inadditiontodescribingtheaboveprocessthedskreportwill: I f

" or.t'dct ir, the fitti reprt.-

k bbe.

a. 4 dc;crigivii v' how the task was performed. ,

b. Identify where there are differences between agency guidance, IE guidance, and Region IV guidance and areas where guidance does not exist or is subject to wide interpretations. Include where applicable:

Where and how this failure to follow guidance has occurred.

For items of disagreement, express an opinion on whether the guidance for process and disposition was, or was not, followed. For disagreement for which no guidance exists, express an opinion on the appropriateness of the process and disposition actually performed in light of the signi-ficance and implications of the disagreement.

Where guidance does not exist, express ar. opinion as to what guidance is needed.

Where guidance does exist, but there are differing inter-pretations, recommend a course of action.

(r 1

1 i'

4.2-4

__ _ _ - - - - - - }

Draft 2-5-(2/02/87)

(

, Schedule 1/20/87 Task Leader appointed 1/29/87 Membership, Organization & Approach established

'1/31/87 Start work on example (pilot effort) 5 2/0//87 Review pilot effort with CPRRG 1

'2/05/87 Check for possible impact of Task I on Task 2

] 2/10/87 Task 2 report complete, provided to CPRRG

\

4.2-5

) . s .

t .

m g^ .

)

usurso sTAvas'

') . )%u.-S.s

/ ' ~, NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMISSION ,

M

• A ****

l */ f$h5 i ,

I January 21,1987 -

3 I

REMORANDUM FOR: John G. Davis. Dimeter  :

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards ,

FROM: Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations SU8 JECT: l CIA REPORT REVIEW: CIA FILE #86 ESTABLISHMENT OF REVIEW GROUP In order to resolve issues which DIA Report 86-10 has raised, I am taking the following action:

1. You are assigned as Chairman of a Review Group to evaluate the safety significance of OIA findings in CIA file #86-10 and recommend resolution of the items. G. Arlotto, J. Heltames and C. Paperiello are assigned as members of the Group. This effort is not intended to duplicate the OIA effort.

2. The rask of the Review Group is to review the technical issues identified in DIA report 86-10 and to determine and document in a report to me

' (1) the safety significance of those issues for Comanche Peak, i.e.,

whether actions should be taken to rectify any unsafe conditions; (2) whether the issues when identified were appropriately handled as to l l

process and disposition; and, (3) determine whether the current augmented review and inspection effort at Comanche Peak is sufficient to compensate for any identified weakness in Region IV's Q/A inspection programs. -

3. In addition, you should (1) review the purpose and significance of NRC Fors 766 and make appropriate reconnendations concerning its use, I (2) without expanding the tasks described in paragraph 2. offer me any judgment you may have on whether it is likely that there are broader implications in Region IV.

4.

You may task other NRC staff or utilize contractors as required, although I recommend that you keep your requirements to the minimum possible.

Necessary funds will be r.ade available at your request by RM. T. Westerman and H. Phillips will be detailed to support your independent review on a full-time basts; other members of RIV are at your full; disposal as you may require. Similarly. IE and NRR staff working on Comanche Peak are available to assist.

4.2 - 6

~

k h 2 .

5.  : Copies of the report and enclosures will be provided to you by separate cover. . _

.6. .I would like to have your report in my hands by February 20, 1987. -

l A p .

r te r.

Executive Director for Operatton cc: E. Beckford R. Martin G. Arlotto R. Scroggins J. Taylor H. Denton J. Keppler C. Paperiello C. Heltemes l .

l 4.1 /

/ 'o, UNITED STATES

! NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

{ WASHINGTON. D. C. 20655 ,. ,

j **

l FEB 131987 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations FROM: Guy A. Arlotto, Chairman Comanche Peak Report Review Group (CPRRG)

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK OIA REPORT 86-10 REVIEW GROUP The purpose of this memorandum is to present the CPRRG's plan for accomplishing tasks outlined ir, your memorandur dated January 21, 1957.

l In performing our review, we will rely principally on the OIA Report 86-10 and information submitted to the CPRRG. The CPRRG will not duplicate the OIA effort but will request information, review records and documentation, and interview as needed to perform its mission. We have organized four working groups as an aid in accomplishing the following assigned tasks:

1. IDENTIFY TPE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN OIA REPORT 86-10.

The CPRRG will specifically address the safety significance of the identi-fied issues and the need for additional action, if any.

2. DETERMIRE WHETHER THE ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN OIA REPORT 86-10 WERE APPROPRIATELY HANDLED AS TO PROCFES AND DISPOSITION The CPRRG will address this aspect as an integral part of its report. The CPRRG report will deal also with whether an item was appropriately categor-ized within the IE report system and how the item was dispositioned, as documented in the record.

3. DETERMINE WHETHER THE CURRENT AUGMENTED REVIEW AND INSPECTION EFFORT AT COMANCE PEAK IS SUFFICIENT TO COMPENSATE FOR ANY IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES IN REGION IV'S QA INSPECTION PROGRAMS.

a. The CPRRG will use the existing IE construction inspection program as the standard against which the efforts at Comanche Peak will be compa red. Consequently, the CPRRG will not identify the IE inspec-tien requirements that existed at various times during the Comanche Peak process.

b. The inspections actually performed by Region IV of those activities d and items at Comanche Peak will be compared against this inspection program in tems of inspection objectives or coverage.

4.2- 8

e l

r

(

V. Stello ,

c. The inspections actually perfonned by the Comenche Peak Project Office I and any other elements of NRC (such as inspections managed by IE Head-l quarters, NRR, or other Regions) and the Comanche Peak Response Team will also be compared against this inspection program in terms of inspection objectives or coverage,

d. The CPRRG will provide a judgment whether the inspections actually performed result in an inspection coverage at Comanche Peak sufficient to compensate for any identified gaps in Region IV's inspection programs,

e. The CPRRG will not review the technical findings of the inspection program actually performed and thus will not comment upon the adequacy ;

I of the IE construction inspection program'or the quality of the plant. !

4 REVIEW TFE PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF NRC FORM 766 The CPRRG will review the purpose and significance of NRC Forv 766 and

( make appropriate recommend 6tions concerning its use.

l In addition, the CPRRG will address the following:

I

5. JUDGMENT ON BROADER IMPLICATIONS IN REGION IV

^

Without expanding the above four specific tasks, and based upon the l record, the CPPRG will offer its judgment on whether it is likely that there are broader implications in Region IV, beyond the Comanche Peak plant. i Your memorandum of January 21, 1987 requested a report by February 20, 1987.

We expect to have the relevant information collected by then. However, we request additional time, ur.til March 13, 1987, to allow for adequate research and documentation'of the issues.and overall evaluation and integration of the  !

findings into a suitable finel report. )

i Unless I hear from you, I will proceed on the as mption that our proposed scope and course of action as stated above, is atisfa tory.

uy A.\ Arlotto, innan ,

g Comanc Peak Report Peview Group >

v i

a.1* 3

O

• l FEB 131987 CPRRG CHARTER

Enclosure:

List of Principal Participants and Schedule cc: T. Murley, RI J. Keppler, RIII R. Martin, RIV E. Beckjord, RES W. Mcdonald. IRM J. Taylor, IE H. Denton, NPR R. Scroggins, IRM C. Paperiello, RIII C. Heltemes, AEOD J. Lieberman, OGC J. Goldberg, 0GC R. Erickson, NMSS P. McKee, IE I S. Collins, RIII D. Crutchfield, NRR R. Hartfield, IPF.

i A.2 \0 l

FEB 13 rA7 COMANCHE PEAK OIA REPORT 86-10 REVIEW GROUP (CPRRG)

Principal Participants Guy A. Arlotto, RES, Chaiman Clemens J. Heltemes AE00 Carl J. Paperiello, R-III James Lieberman, OGC Jack R. Goldberg, OGC Legal Advisors Robert A. EHckson, N".55 Coordinator Phillip F. McKee, IE, Leader Inspection Assessment Task Group Samuel J. Collins, R-I, Leader Issue Handling and Process Task Group Dennis M. Crutchfield, NRR, Leader Safety Significance Task Group Richard A. Hartfield, IRM, Leader 766 System Review Group Schedule Complete issue Handling and Process Task February 10, 1987 Complete Ir.spection Assessment Task February 13, 1987 Complete Safety Significance Task February 17, 1987 )

Complete 766 System Review Task February 17, 1987 i Assemble ard Integrate Information February 27, 1987 Verify and Augment Information March 6, 1987 Complete Final Report March 13, 1987

(

ENCLOSURE 4.1- I l

REV. 1 2/27/87 i

APPENDIX 4.3 I METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING REGION IV DISPOSITION .

I

.c t

4

Commanche Peak Allegations CPRRG Task Group 2 CRITERIA ,

FOR ANALYZING RTV DISPOSITION i

X.3 Analyzing Region IV Disposition X.3.1 Statement of Inspector's finding and regulatory concern j l

l

• Development of Finding

- How issue was researched and analyzed, including supportive bases; applicable documents consulted and by whom. Discuss appropriateness of documents reviewed.

Person Inspector Document ( ) Phillips Westerman Barnes NRR Other Part 50 App B l l l l l l }

PSAR/FSAP Commit. l l l l l l l Code or Std. l l l l l l l TUGC0 QA Prog. l l l l l l l Contractor QA Plan l 1 l l l l l QC Procedure (s) l l l l l l l TUGCo l l l l l l l Contractor l I l l l l l Other l l l l l l l

[YES, NO. BLANK = N/A)

- Narrative (i

I

) 4.3-1 l

l .. . . . . . . .

i Characterization of Finding Inspectors apparent' safety concern and Task Group's evaluation.

Should it have been pursued for more examples of programmatic significance; was it?

Was it reasonable to expect further undirected action by the reporting inspectors? If yes, what action should have been taken?

Timeliness Was communication between inspectors and RIV Management on final resolution timely?

Was lack of timeliness a detriment to effective resolutier,?

(

4.3-2

j

[  !

Nature,of downgrading of inspection' finding as it appeared in final report with brief statement of management's reasoning.

I

{

Management's role in achieving final disposition Were ranagement's a:tions sufficient to warrant downgrade? If yes, explain.

1 What further actior should have been directed to proper resolution.

Additional _ inspection by inspector to expand information base Actions by licensee on his contractors to provide additional information Discussion with upper Region IV management. '

Specialist Inspection / Consultant inspection Referred to other NRC office (IE, NRR etc.)

i i

l 4.3-3 l

l-g'

If item was determined to be unresolved, was there sufficient'information in the inspection report to focus activities of the licensee / inspector to )

effective resolution.

was this done (i.e. how was the item resolved) l l

current status of item I,

X.4 Conclusions (Discuss [asappropriate): Region IV handling vis a vis Group 2 indepen-dent assessment; potential safety significance of improper handling; whether additional action is still needed for effective resolution; implication of broader Region IV problems; if NRC pclicy/ procedures require revision) l 1

(

i 4.3-4 )

REV. 1

'2/27/87 APPENDIX 4.4 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1

l l

I i

l l

l 4  :

02/04/87 i

l l DOCUMENTS RECEIVED BY CPRRG ITEM DESCRIPTION CPRRG-I Supplemental statement. Del Norman to G. Nulley 12/18/86 l J

CPRRG-2 Memo.

CPRRG-9)Noonan-to-Davis,1/6/87, (Note: This is response tow/ attachments CPRRG (superseded request RG-P0-01 by)

CPRRG-3 Ten CPP0-furnished documents as follows:

(1) Special Review Team Report (2) Technical Review Team Reports - SSERs, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 (3) Comanche Peat F.esponse Team Program Plan and completed results reports. (Some of the results reports are not yet coe.pleted.)

(4) TUGC0 Ouality Assurance Program Review (5) Cable tray and hanger inspection report (6) HVAC and support inspection report 4

(7) CPRT-QA Program Review Report (8) Contention 5 Panel (memo from EDO dated  !

2/28/85, superseding earlier memo dated 12/24/84)

(9) Intimidation Panel (memo from EDO dated 12/24/84)

(10) Report of Intimidation Panel (letter, NRC to TUGC0 dated 11/4/85)

CPRRG-4 Memo. Parler-to-Commissioners , 12/23/86,

Subject:

OGC REVIEW OF OIA REPORT CONCERNING REGION IV MANAGEMENT ACTIONS RELATIVE TO COMANCHE PEAK (OIA INVESTIGATION NO. 86-10)

CPRRG-5 Memo. Connelly-to-Stello, 1/6/87,

Subject:

DIA COMANCHE PEAK REPORT. (Transmits corrections to chart on page 34 and 35 of l basic report, sumarizing Mr. Goldberg's analysis of technical issues.)

CPRRG-6 IE response (1/9/87) to CPRRG draft request (RG-IE-01)  ;

,I CPRRG-7 IE response (1/9/87) to CPRRG draft request (RG-IE-02) 1 i

CPRRG-7A NRC Enforcement Policy 10 CFR Part 2, 49 FR 8583-4.4-1

02/04/87

! CPRRG-7B NRC Manual Chapter 4125, Differing Professional Opinions CPRRG-70 IE Manual Chapter 0400, Enforcement Program CPRRG-70 IE Manual Chapter 0610, Inspection Reports CPRRG-7E IE Manual Chapter 1245, inspector Qualifications CPRRG-7F IE Manual Chapter 94300, Status of Plant Readiness for an Operating Licensee CPRRG-7G IE Manual Chapter 2512, Light Water Reactor Inspection Program -

Construction Phase CPRRG-7H Letter to TUGCO, April 11, 1983,

Subject:

CONSTRUCTION APPRAISAL INSPECTION 50-445/83-18; 50-446/83-12 CCPRG-71 Letter to TUGCO, January 21, 1986,

Subject:

INSPECTION OF COMANSE PEAK DESIGN ADE0VACY PROGPAM SCOPE VALIDATION PP0 CESS AND REVIEW CHECKLIST DEVELOPMENT 445/85-17, 50-446/85-14 CPRRG-7J Letter to TUGCO, September 9, 1986,

Subject:

INSPECTION OF CCHANCHE PEAK DESIGN ADE0VACY PROGRAM (DAP), IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCIPLINE SPECIFIC ACTION PLAN (DSAP)X, MECHANICAL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS - 50 445/86-18, 50-446/86-15 ii Letter to TUGCO, September 10, 1986,

Subject:

INSPECTION OF CPRRG-7K TERA'S QA PROGRAM FOR THE COMANCHE PEAK DESIGN ADEQUACY PROGRAM 445/86-17, 50-446/86-14 ,

CPRRG-7L Letter to TUGCO, November 4, 1986,

Subject:

INSPECTION OF COMANCHE PEAK DESIGN ADEQUACY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC ACTION PLANS VIII, IX, and IX; 50-445/86-19, 50-446/86-16 CPRRG-8 RIV response (1/9/87) to CPRPG draft request (RG-RIV-02)

CPRRG-9 Memo. Noonan-to-Davis, 1/13/87, w/ attachments (supersedes CPRRG-2) (Note: This is response to CPRRG reauest RG-P0-01) i CPRRG-10 Memo. Dircks-to-Office Directors, 3/13/84,

Subject:

COMPLETION OF OUTSTANDING REGULATOPY ACTIONS ON COMANCHE PEAK AND WATERFORD CPRRG-11 Memo. Dircks-to-Office Cirectors, 10/17/84,

Subject:

COMANCHE PEAK PROJECT DIRECTOR CPRRG-12 Letter to TUGCO, 9/18/84,

Subject:

COMANCHE PEAK REVIEW t

CPRRG-13 Letter to TUGCO, 11/29/84,

Subject:

CONANCHE PEAK REVIEW CPRRG-14 Letter to TUGCO,1/8/65,

Subject:

COMANCHE PEAK REVIEW j

4 i

DOCUMENTS RECEIVED BY CPRRG 4.4-2

_ _ _ _ ___ _ D

02/04/87 CPRRG-15 Memo. Martin-to-Davis,1/20/87,

Subject:

REFERENCE MATERIAL FOR CPRRG - NOTES OF D. NORMAN CPRRG-16 Meno. Martin-to-Davis, 1/20/87

Subject:

REFERENCE MATERIAL FOR CPRRG - NOTES OF H. PHILLIPS CPRRG-17 Mero. Martin-to-Davis,1/20/87,

Subject:

REFERENCE MATERIAL FOR CPRRG - REGION IV MANAGEMENT POSITIONS ON ATTACHMENT MM CPRRG-18 Memo. Martin-to-Davis,1/20/87,

Subject:

REFERENCE MATERIAL FOR CPRRG - REGION IV INSPECTION AT COMANCHE PEAK (Note: This is response to CPRPG draft request--RG-RIV-01)

CPRRG-19 Memo. Martin-to-Davis,1/22/87,

Subject:

BACKGROUND INFORMA-TION ON CPSES INSPECTION REPORTS CPRRG-20 Memo. Ma rtin-to-Davis ,1/23/87.

Subject:

ERRATA REPLACEMENT SHEETS FOR REGION IV ASSESSMENT OF COMMANCHE PEAK IDENTIFIED TECHNICAL ISSUES CPRRG-21 Note. Martin-to-Davis, 1/25/87 transmitting amendment to CPRRG-16 CPRRG-22. Memo. Martin-to-Davis, unsigned, undated.

Subject:

EVALUATION OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES (w/5 attachments)

I DOCUMENTS RECEIVED BY CPRRG 4.4-3

r ATTACHMENTS To oIA % 10 A. Technical Issues Raised by PHILLIPS During OIA Interview.

B. Interview of Shannon PHILLIPS, dtd March 19, 1986.

C. I,r.terview of Dorvin R. HUNTER, dtd April 10,1986.

D. Interview of Tom WESTERFAN, dtd July 10, 11, 21 and 23, 1986.

E. Memorandum from Chief RSR, to E.H. JDHNSON, Acting Director, DRSP, anuary 13, 1986. .

F. Draft Inspection Report 85-07/05, dtd February 3, 1986.

G. Interview of [dApril9,1986.

H. )

~-

Interview of Charles J. HAUGHNEY, dtd June 17, 1986 and November 25, 1986.

1. InterviewofThomasHo'itenYOUNG, dtdp.sy29,19fC. )

l J. Interview of Ian BAPNES, dtd July 25, 1986.

~

P'. . Matrix of Drafts for Report 85-14/11.

L. TUGC0 Speed Letter, dtd January 9, 1986, i

M. Interview of John GILRAY, dtd July 17, 1986.

N. Interview of Cliff HALE, dtd July 24, 1986.

{

0. Matrix of Drafts for Report 85-16/13, dtd May 12, 1986.

l P. Interview of Eric JOHNSON, dtd July 22, 1986.

, Q. Interview of Edwin F. FOX, Jr., dtd July 17, 1986.

R. Interview of dtd June'24, 1986.

S. Interview of Robert C. STEWART, dtd May 28, 1986.

~

T. Interview of dtd May 28, 1986.

U. Interview of Lawrence E. ELLERSHAW, dtd July 24,1986.

V. Memorandum from H.S. PHILLIPS, to T. WESTERMAN, dtd April 29,1986.

W. Interview of John BOARDMAN, dtd July 9,1986.

X. Interview of dtd July 9, 1986.

Y. Interview of dtd July 9, 1986.

l 4.4-4

2. Interview of Dennis Lee JEW, dtd June 26, 1986.

AA. Interview of Allen Louis MAUGHAN, dtd ilune 26, 1986.

h

('

BB. Interview of William Dwaine RICHINS, dtd June 26, 1986.

CC. Interview of Jimy Richard DALE, dtd June 26, 1986.

DD. Interview of Mitchell Keith GRAHAM, dtd June 26, 1986.

EE. IderviewofJosephLeeBIRMINGHAM,dtdJune 26, 1986.

FF. Interview of Wanda WARREN, dtd July 24, 1986. -

GG. Interview of James SUTTON, dtd March 20, 1986.

• HH. Memoranda to George MULLEY, JR., CIA, from Thomas G. SCAR 8 ROUGH, dtd July 8. July 15, 1986, November 5, and !!ovember 25, 1986.

• II. Memorandum to E.H. JOHNSON, from T.F. WESTERMAN, dtd May 23, 1986.

JJ. Interview of Richard L. dtd June 25, 1986.

KK. Interview of James GAGLIARDO, dtd July 23, 1986.

LL. Interview of Bob TAYLOR, dtd July 22, 1986.

MM. Technical Review of PHILLIPS' Issues Contained in Co.nanche Feak Inspection Reports, prepared by Stephen GOLDBERG.

\

NN. Frequency of QA Modules Based on Fast Versions of the MC 2512 Program.

00. Interview of Arthur B. BEACH, dtd November 24, 1986.

PP. Interview of James PARTLOW, dtd November 26, 1986.

4.4-5

1 pINN -

1 1

l LIST OF E1HIBITS FROM CARAS-lb l l

l 1 Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria 18............................pp 413-416 0 F S AR S ec t i on 17.1. 3, De s i g n Con t r ol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p p 17.1- 14 thru le 3 TUGCo QA, Section 3.0, Design Control.......................P 1 4 B & R Tr a vel e r Pr oc e d ur e CF-CPM-6. 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p p 1- 11 j

l 5 Westinghouse Procedure......................................pp 1-B {

1raveler ME 79-248-5500.....................................p l-b e

7 Contentier. 5................................................pp 3-4 0 NUREG-079'i, M i s c e l l a n e o u s i t e m 2. . . . . . . . . . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p p L- 9 9 t h r u 102 9 Riv Report 79-03/03 and Letter and page 3...................

r ks 10a IE Frecedure for Vessel Installation: 50051.................

(

10b IEF for vessel Installation: 50053..........................

10c IEF for Vessel Installation: 50055..........................

11 Original Final Draft inspection Report 65-07/v5 Subtitted to Hunnicutt.....................

12a Second Final Draft Inspection Report C5-07/05, Fevision 1 Signed October 2, 1985 Submitted to RIV and HQ.............

12b01AReport..................................................pp M Cossents 30, 42, 43 OIAAttachment..............................................pp 13 Peport 85-07/05 1ssued February 3, 1986.....................

14 FSAR Section 17.1.16........................................pp 17.1-3B thru 39 15 TUSCO GAP Section 15........................................pp 1-2 S e c t i o n 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p 1 16 B & R Q A M , S e c t i o n 16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p 1 4.4-6

l l

2 1

l l

LIST OF E)HilllE 17 -FSAR Sect 2on 17.1.16. Audits................................p 17.1-36 18 AN51 N45.2.12, Draft 3, Revss2on 0, 1973, Requirements 4or Aud s t i ng Q A Pr og r a s s f or Nuc l ear Pl a n t s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pp 1,5,6 l

19 TUGCo NAP Section 18, Audits................................p 1 20 NRC Inspectson Report 84-32/11. Netser of Violatson and Letter......................................................pp 1-!

21 MHC Audit et TUGCc and Response.............................pp 1-6,15.16 22 Worshat ForsythE. Samples & Wooldrige Mero. May 29. lie 5....pp 1-2 23 NRC Board Notification Nos.85-067 and 85-076 Memo..........pp 1-2

( 24 F5 Lobbin Report. F e b r u a r y 19 8 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p p 2, 3, 4 4

(

25 TUSCo Transmittal Letter to NRC, (enclosure Lobbin Report)..

26 NRCCATReport.............................................. ppb-1thru!

VI!!-1 thru 5 27 NUREG-0797, 55ER No. 11.....................................pp 31-33 28 Comman che Pea k Resp onse Ac t i on Pl an--IS AP V!] . a. 4. . . . . . . . . . . pp 5-9 29 Results Report--15AF Vll.a.4................................pp 1-53 30 Letter and Draft of the Notice of Violation Bo-08/06........pp 4-9 31 List of Quality Assured Structures, Systees, and Components..................................................pp 1-2 32 Original and Final Inspection Report Details................pp 16-17 33 Identification and Control of Materials Parts and Components, FSAR 17.1.8.................................pp 17.1-25 thru 17 34 TU6CD GAP, Section 0.0, Identification and Control.of 1 tees............................................p 1 1

i  :

4.4-7

3 LIS1 0F EKHIB115 35 Code Requireser.ts NCA 3086.6 and NCA 4134.6.................pp 36 4c

~3 6 BLR QAM, Section 9.0........................................pp 1-4 37 86R Procedure CP-CPM-6.9E, Revisions 2 and 4................pp 18-19 QI-QAP-11.1-26, Revisions 4 and 18......'...................pp 6, 7. B .

38 B&R isometric BRP-CS-2-RE-076 and Bill of Materials.........

39 IE Inspection Frocedures 49uS1.-53,-54.-55, anc -5c.........

40a Portions of 014 6ttachment D Statement......................pp  !!?.113 and 14E-158 40b A t t a c h m e n t J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p p 1 - 3 a n d 9 - 13 9

dia Attachment MM of 014 Report.................................p t

42a Original Draft inspection Report 85-14/11...................pp 1-4 42b Second Draft Report 65-14/11 bith directed changesi........pp 67-7E a2e Fsnal Inspection Report E5-14/11, March 6, 1986.............pp to and 13 43 FSAR Section 17.1.17. 0A Records............................pp 17.1-40 thru 41 44a ANSI N45.2.9, Requireter.ts for Collection, Storage, and Maintenance of 04 Records...................................pp 11-12, 14, 16-21 44t FSAR Costitsent, ANS! N45.2.9...............................

45 TUGC0 DAP, Section 17.0, Este Construction Quality Records and Record Rctention and Storage............p 1 46 Attacheent MM to 01A Report.............................. ..pp 11-12 47 Attachment MM of 01A Report.................................pp 13-14 48 TU6Co GA Record Receipt Controll/Storagei Procedure CP-QP-18.4, Revision 7............................pp 1-2 CP-CPM-7.1, Revision 3, and.................................pp 2-4 STA-302, Revision 11.....................'................... l f  ?

4.418

4 h.p List OF EtH1 bits 49 01A Report. Attacnsent MM...................................pp 14-10 Original Rough brait Repcrt 05-16/1!........................pp 3-1 thru 3-6 50 4-1 thru 4-4 6-1 thru 6-4 Final NRC Inspection Reper't 05-16/13........................pp 5-9

)

51 38B 52 Regulation 10 CFR Part 50.55(el.............................p

$! TUGC0 DM . Section e.0 Dc:urent Control....................p 1 IE Guidance on 10 Code of Federal Regulation.... ...........p B-0 54 55 TrendAnalysis..............................................pp 1-le 1-5 56 South Texas Net.crancus (LesscnsLearned.....................pp 1-2 BtR Engineering Mecorancus..................................pp 57 McClestey's vield Notes 57a Review o f F' r o c e d u r e N E D C E - 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p 1

$7b Review of Con s t r uc t i on De f i c i e n c y F i l e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pp 1-10 Johnson's Comments on Draft Report 86-16/13........'.........pp l-5 50 1

$9 Comanche Peal 50.55te) Tracting.............................p NJRES 0797, SEER 11, Cossents on 50.55(e) Reporting. .......pp 0-275-2Eu 60 106CD Letter (TAI-45001 Unit humber Correctson..............p 1

61 OIA Report, Attachsent NM...................................pr 16-1E 62 63 McClesty Field Notes on IE Eulletin Review Notes dated November 1, 1905................................p 2 Notes dated Novesber 26, 1985...............................pp 1-10 Notes dated Novesber 26, 1985...............................pp 1 and 3 64 TUSCO Official Contact 1. int.................................pp 2 65 AIV Traveler for Report 85-16/13............................p I Conversation Record, Phillips--Baker.........................pp t

1 and 3 66 I  !

4.4-9

l %

1 1 s i

5 l

l LIST C t1HIB11E 67 BISCO Fire Fenetratt or. Seal Memorandum November 25, 1985, Draft....................................pp 1-3 ,

March 6, 1981 Final........................................pp 1-3 8 Attachments (14 pages!

68 IEEE Standard 634...........................................pp 9-10 69 TUGCO/ BISCO Seal Documents Design Deficiency Report....................................p 1 Tel-4B;E....................................................p 1 IX)-4 toc.... ...............................................p j TX1-4956....... ............................................p 1 50.55(el Evaluattor. ho. 0177................................p 1 T56-1Bc95....... ...........................................pp 1 'e i i i

k  !

4 4.4-10 t

l REV. I 2/27/87 i

APPENDIX 4.5 CPRRG TASK 2 RESULTS MATRIX 1

1 l

l l

et

.a ewe _

gg - - - - - - -

=c E$50 e - e w n a g *  ! ,, g

E"

n - B-e lI m.

B E "E IE ga d

- -m a e, egg =I*i g: gag r aga =e g y ,5 =* =E E- 5 s""k' .

~* e E

E- gse Se 28

=a 2- -

8 nal 8-

-gw :2-s w 5at _ g g *gE_("88 r wie

,_, Em fg sa*E IE=I- set ls

~

~g = -

= R:E v!:I a! e g,

gsfB Il- Evi=l a gw-Ig

g r E

sE -

a raf

.E  : -:

s!av .Ess

=c:

giugeaE _ejle ga 3 .ls g f 5 EgsE

- l=w=n _ g E W

- E mIEn EE

=E gE. ruse EE:: s_we e e I

a au sE l

s =gs g-Imn i~g!I gII IIlE

-g sin

-- ee r-=ei-= !!g s imIs EIie

=

~5-=

w-g E__

g=m j wag m e.

= siE E g Erg am s*lE

_g*m.

r a 8 g ::

e h==

aE s v-

==E=:

. z5e r - 5;5. -t ewgE e_ws g- e s-E a w I: e met e -

e a:E G5=)  : a5 E IEEE se.g E Eg Ec=. 5 g

=

mR eaE_ m es _m wrs= . s_555 e_ s _g

~

h w w w w - "

S 50

. s s s s E 5"a E E I58E g g g I lig

( i Elis B

r x x  ! s s E

E s

a

.E * -.8 4

. ER i E!EI se:us-E E s

E s

E E Em ESE! E 2 -

ge s: z -

a

- 55

s. $

E EEs, M:$EEr.

X

~

N d. I .= E,s [ - E -

M M e i E vfE5 5 5

s E 8

e e e

_s i g

zu e i

• 5 . s EE

. 5 s. r . =m .

iE gE lE g E_ ig E Ei si si sE a E" E s* af l

1 ag E

EN a

EN EN E W EE EE I as s i-5 sI

=

w rI e s I:i se rs al r

B 53

-= a a g, E a ed -

l,

--ws . K f: 9 l

3Eng EEema M u I E .E Ej g Ewg-  !;g EEe:gg IEg EE-

• Ug= -

E*=E r E* "E ",d E E D e -

E -l =. = mm==I ME g smEI_a E

E 8

9' gl p mgg O

ems m - *s gg i

H a eE wegE weg ,g gg

=5 l

Emm* sg!g5 mgGlggs$g@s- eI* gg lg g-w s

g=I[

=

ggw

.m g,

9*EW 9eE-E seE- e -

-595 Emg 3

==== ree8s vers REKI Ears Is e sEm !W a

E E E E

/

5E rr 9

c 9

s s 9 9 s

E 9

s E

9 E

9 t s A ij g, gj - ~ . . . . ~

e G

h

b e9 t

sul t n e6Tt U

t t 9 i

0u g Y P T f T T T N tu1 - IS S t 6 T E R0 uY t

i 1 ti t l 8t S 5 5 i

i un o 3 A M A e 8 t l

E 2 O i t

sf t

t f t S E =it

.eA g E t f T E t u A

3a St9 E l C F t

t I F t I W .E L L B u . e8 t u t 9 6

tit IL i WP t uR E O R F E R O uE t D 9 I E R O

E E

R F W

Kt t tA f T . T l A a E I P T

A L tmiL f

! u v sA mS M f C E E AP EPP A P A A E E S E S E T t E P t t P u lu!

l F N UF/ F E UF F srf lfE t A

Eru eC U t t t 5 tS I KO 5 E O I S E 0 f 1 t u C eKu pK9 5 P uef a RATIN84 iN u y! E C R t E N R 1 vA pA 9 tAf WNAa t o S

t s .R O0 A I L M 7 R4a1 t L n1 W

P t WBl f P S L E L .

t f uPPta .

P t uW 5 KIRI 5 P i tF t i P E O V R t V

t Wtu i l 7 iu M!OV IOOR O M K18 sR PK A P 5 P PT E E . A 5 F 9 tI A

nS i 5 5 VT ViO s 2t u stn i . aF V CE T f t u

F t v F t F t u F t F t tsME .

A t3Etl .

V taMt H .

e EMiEnS u H

S t P U U C ea et iF WrgAf ut R .

O e

n 7tpE WS.

A G p E N U R .

t O M

sE tt8l

. H ef R A eI R E et it eS A a O

P 7 EW p5geng

! t nP i R E L E S p L t PS t t t R t t t L u5p9 ttt t

1e C5 a9 tt MC ME uV t R E

nC ettI A 90 M I M >< i t n 6a9 NIritW t FAI F C Ei P A E sL L P 4 L MfuKN te >,twf m Ru A p T S M

sI e

gpt y EE P 0 9 VNMP I

P A 0 RN M I S EVP.WE A

F KC E uf DIfP.OC 8 a t R E R

E I S I9#

s F Kt

,9 M MTi WM

( P C IOE I I CP C mf KC5 eWR sCP [ gF eO R

t f Y l i f i T f e t i l I

I L

i t 4 g A t.

Ets t i

r L

A a

u t

A 4

1 u

. u B

. S e

! I .W 3E

. R . o

. t.s tGtsi  !

.f EF

. S E

C F E.

C F S Et C uO L t t S O L t A 5 .

t R 9 t t

C s tsr e EFO EO M 0 aO ut A A

uDA aR 4 uI a O 9e t M .t CnSD at A t A A C L CO 0 t # C M05h 9, m t 5 t 1 4

Cf t uutt C5 t 5 I%

C C l 55 g S r

i IIE F A t C 5 f

f EA F P t I F e Ft t l 0 LO u 0 f A f 5 F

M t i 19 i

u 1 tuC f D u tu6 & A t

t . f 4

5 1 tart SO t

il s

& A G I SR m

r, m tf 5

E 1 OS FM s

! S a t

1 mm 5

l I M 1

2 S 3 r5 t Bu t

5RSp T

5 I

f L F 1 D

$ F f L S I t t i e S F f L iffW SB TP 3

f TI i N S O

A S i ETSe9 T

El 5

Y nri a 91 eMPf l i IA s.

T I i 1 T T vf ruwno i A . i A . i A .

T s

u p P t tl isA tl 5 F t t Gl i D 5 f l 5 f

t5A tam r p IsW F pE (r efW Ce tRE i F E E t t

A S T A MnCul A t A W R f A luR A SsPI A M S tPg etsi t S

5 t E E T

Sgt Si a S f d S r O i C t e f t t I St P 1 8 R t i C A P Su nP f t f t eM it Ot o T

U L A ESE 5

T S I SA M E nI e0 WP M s0f vP P O G E W P R 00 t uP R 5R W 0t 1 sSR P N A t S

E P

7 S

P g E R t t 9 E t U 1 v 9 t O

P N l K [

g V

I E

D m i t

K t st it i S  : r V S

0 OI G R V v U v e u 9 9 1L 9 t

O p L Q 9 C 9 2 5

4 8

1a- AR f 5V9 t 9 t

P R p r E i f fic E 9

P N O

P

- O 5 C B t t t K

1

• t uo I r E )S t

1 o n IO W 5 6

1. 1 S 0

U eG C t W g a I W C I n I t

i ft } .

t D E B .

S g Y O E T

t v M t

4 E N

N y R t f

u t 51 I D

0 t I tv A

A tl V

a w tt f

VI U V V e O L 0 61 V 1 0 R 5f R9 0 g 1

t 0 9 t t

t R C u

9 P

- 9 1 fi P f u P 6 A it R 8 R C A P F 5 5 g T

o t T t

C T 1 K f E u O u 8 l

eS C t

• MS t O N

0 9 8 t 0 N

U D t N t W L

t A R t n s E

T I 05 L t tV y

9 E n

A pin 9 ut S V t I O U T 3 S t E P

fr P u E e e0 i

t G 5 P 9

K 4 39 K 0 e . .C s

. K l' O S

t P t D 3 t 9 t 4

8 6 a t i P R t

P i f P it t P T M i P

Wt i t t ui 9

P 9 4 P O W P t Gt FCC RP E M

P 0

9 9l 9

5El 1

W O

8 R 9 P B y 3 l S 5 4F 9

81 s F S tl N 1 8 8

1 gu ut y nO e

R O

I T

R O

h t" Wii

! t N O B T l e

11 5 E l tI T s t t t t t fl R I T

A f

A T t Ar E E  !

t a

T P I t

A5 au A S L MI At 9

P 5

M R (u l E g 5 O t t 8

L O 0L L aL O

MPM 0 L C tD 1 t 9 t tvt u tv8 0 I V u L

t v

f v !TCI tVtiM v i 2 K

msu t 8 O O T T m U !9

, 0 t

i g

A S C M t m 0 t t t .

5 5

f a

S T

. Eg E O 50 i

t l

5 E 9 I 99 O ES T Si Oe Se .

t 8 C 5l 0

A T

Y O RR A

i u.t t

t A

N E

eF T P SS 9 9 R

9 S C

t S e9 mT A ns C t F p N A E C V I t

t M =

3 0t t T t1 9 C R 9 R A l d 1 $ gl toD J t

8 B

m M543

/

1 t A i p 0 9 i F 0R O 9 E

. L t MP P C B

S R i B .

• O n

Km. _

8 t P tR tm9 t ? f eu t

FPP A t SR Tt E B R

! T in 5

f C

I u e

n9C 1 O MMil T t S fab oS C 5 l 0 P P H S I I P ef i

t u

wn5 -

V I O 9. TS $ C t u

t C

Ct u 5 R. 9u0 C t s v uI 8l N uO R S

7. N stM RNI I P O9 E S

B S N WSM W t E 5 . tWs fI uB T 9t tA u A MtnD i I fPI15 lP A L

5E R L L C s C F 5g p 5 6 GE i9 m9 8 T R R A D H t sA EC e I E 8 9e R

u l W5M Mt h tuE !

4 E 1 P CtP E B uKt s f h t 9 A 4 S99 K SR C O l 0 E o R

M8t fi s3l t I

a W 5 P D P I t t C C

S W u I

tsW t C l5 t

A ttt 9 I IMT M O t "I M

f R s A O u t C t fM I C g U

MA u t

IJ rit et E

S 8F 1F F t A SAR uE F i O u t

MSS N S5 F F A l A I uR T M E 1 i t 1 i l i 1 1

i t

TI E 4 l t fi I

/

t t

i t

t /

4 t

i 7 CT E R P 9t K 4 1

1 tI 4

1 4

! 41 4

4 9

1 1

t S P i - - - -

5 5 S 5 S

% 5 5 E wM9 t

t 5 5

5 8 9 8 8 5 E 8

. ?

st u e s 3

et s . 8 9 9 l I I

l i

t t 1 ot i

gI a%

P t iW t

t 1

ll .!l(l. l!fl

J

. 1 l ms I -5 hWe- -v g .. - - . . . - .

8EE {

Eaz -

-n -

E EE ~EE h 5 E *

• B I"*f eg5

, sN*E5

~**

-as. e2 se*$ s - w ,.

5 .!1

~=_e=

EE E

eI a E!E gr s ae _e "g g =. 5. g -g ,s I

g I_- I,_

- =eg ss

_ =se a e g -

s gE gG e

m = _g . r I-E

.E= s e -

-l es:Eg sE s- en se!"e

I= asw

~~ .w .< 1.e g.g m-E.

(ww go sw g sdEgis

=w e '

• se s Rs a-m= -(gwE . _g E __g s- E

ggE =ggs asE

= g gw!

w= -

=w- =.e 3s=w g - e- .,

fes EEg-sE _EEmu_EE EE E EeE m_55 Em m EE 8-53e a -

se a: E e

s~ E  !.=E

.W .g .gn l]

n=1)# u:g I)s2 I:a lE

_n IW un W i I*E es.

) el e. -

s mg mg wer_ ==. se e-- g ag g_ agg

~R---

sa r. a a r, ss aw s= s 5- .

r_ a a aEm.. e, _

Ergn Ee 8 kgv i_

• =E E=E a ==.g 25 65g IE5 REE 5555 R@g IG- I. E E =j= -g s!*r i

m2E s!! s!! esr c ser s!! uf R*E E n

w - . . . , . ,

I as W E

• 5 -,

. _. s r. -s E s a.

g

. 9 IEEE E I E =

g E g g m i EIE5 W D E D - E

• 1 $

n ga a a g -= c w .

1 e-gg 5 E E 5

I E a

f A R s -

.= .= =.

s !aB s E 5 s E E E E

@In 5 kg es

. t e.

- e aw e e gy = . --

g r = i-s m '.E M8 u-5 5 a

s-

=s is s

E g

a Ee a

s.w F

g -

af s.w 5 E ,- w 5 E -

EN =E E_ Eg Es

$ $' we= w n E s a as s=w s s _: 8I min wE s m

sf  ;

! Im E .

ws *

[ _

g 1:

an

• E EmneE.- Ed e Ens l 8 2 RE

-s wij

c. is g 5 z c "= _. H e fu gE g-a .ws 8 w I.

l 5 ~5 d a. == _5Ea a- Es E. E_ ma gE. gel -e e "r gaf E=

s w a w.

s-w!

2-!

size r_

e8 a

e:I 2 e -E. s. ,s eis sg ge-3w, e.j ag_,w E. we E3 Egcg Elg-Esg E

a: lez E_w e cgc e c u et ew e- at essu a .s --

wn::  ::= =Bw eswee Wa = E m. B :E.r E y _ _

e

=

= = =

e

_E E

rm =.

E,  %,  %,  %,  %

t 2 2 f _rG G G G G C E C G IE gE E p 2 -

t A A A 2 A 69 e & a a 6 h

l I

i 1

i i

m Ewe _

i. . i

. . . . . . . . . 1

-gel- aE i Ess- {

-E g - g G -

R:m-En z_ l Es. -2 Eng-g==.g -e g _

.a g;Eg _ g=sgg

• i j

e. g.g. ; y msg = . - w4 5 w-

g. g.gsE

=

N -e g=..gsg -

z-e g=.wg_

- s *= -M -

E E i g:.,

g= D m e= =sg e - ag=w

=EE g - e_8g 5=3

.s gs=am._g=

_~ w =sRE..

-c e::s=

= J

~8 sois,wi* siv s- i ,s gig mig je gj.

-X -

B

,_!- Igag.gslis==i r

!j g.sI .

slseilner 5_

!=

8=

g II.E =

v . c _= a!sgse e

=

=

E g as a

u EE s  ! Ie, RE s

l. - _N E !. is __ . i. i "e.

i.25 or i "s-

_E= h,f,s r,

E ss e E

,aw hE.

_=e eres

_b EE E m a e. h k-

= -L w me n as at z n n

Iwest C._W E W = c5 2.E I*EE. CE =

E &_k gWgt g58 W WU

!gCEg gWB

• W a _5 a E_ I r_gj s_I E_ w ~ ,5-= *IE_ E. s_I_E_E g m --,EE i a r

=

. . . . g . . .

4 g

• kE . sG -- -E E

a E

E a

E S

E a

E s E I " E E, { C t E t l, t t E e, i

p c

-I_

z.ge .

e a

a v

v _

v v

v q e

- _ . . . . w . . .

.- sE _

si 8

g r

g g

g

[ g E'

r E

3 2 G G 3 uE I E I 5 E I E E E 2 2 s g = -

• g e e e e 3;$ Eag  :

g e=g gt-BR E _ .

= = = ="g NW: r EE sE sE af E

Eg Eg E

af E EE w E lEI s.

~ $

Eg Es ' e gs sa E5 W- W- E) a E as EI EI EI II II EI Is E  !  ! .

s - W I= mE . Eri (a

a g a - g g=(

.b rs. $ EE E E 54 gas b Re E" = hf s :i Bis E"

• EE 4 *E 22 55 s=j E ,s w e if 2,

ge

=r g58 -W a ma w. ==.

We -

j sil d

el e.

g5 el 5

a..:= *vv es

== egg g=n g"gl

_E __ g,s . sE

=

-u n- gs r_

s

E C 2 O p C O C O

=

?  ?  ? 3  ?  ?  ?  %  %

< lEE

_ur s s a 4 s s s s s M 2 2 R R A A 4 N g5 _E d e

@ $ 9  % $ & O I h h O g

1 I

si 7

-r, 1 Evg!

~

E?

g agt

_ s ::

!= Il

,1*! i=

E E s E I II E

~E GEggIgg Wi e!._ s t-ag [2 =se

, a g g g i:: g

!R 52Ea5I5 -

gle s:st IBGja E

• E' - E z9 i* 2E E"

g[ g21

= ~~i *E w e i I!E s E

g _5R. E Esgs.t E.is..e w

~

g :w

! Ej t I

g .d s_g

!s.

,_ 9

?

sie mRB. !Ier=I EE WM of Il 1(;g 2 5: !'

at  !!ss I

e aa EE gs A .3la

" oft,!!!

3. 5 as m!!!,

~

g**jlB E!!g smstl

=s  !"' 5m_m -Un*

lIm.:if _ :rs wtG t

O n i Ed A 1.5 - l 1

i

= .

e o e *

• REV. I 2/27/87 t

APPENDIX 4.6 INSPECTORS APPARENT SAFETY CONCERN AND 1ASK GROUP 2 EVALUATION I

l I

i  ;

)

Appendix 4.6

't

^ Insoector's Apparent Safety Concern and Task Group's Evaluation Item 1/2 Design information must be properly controlled, otherwise installation of safety related components may occur outside parameters of the design envelope.

The Task Group considers this item to have moderate potential safetv impact in that the inspector and his management did not ensure that the licensee's program for control of design information in installation instructions was rigorously controlled. This had the potential to result in actual hardware quality defects: however, with the evidence that the operations traveler system was fully functioning at the time of installation. any concern of adverse hardware impact is diminished.

Item 3 On the broad scale. the failure to implement a meaningful audit prooram (if this were the case), represents a failure of an important part of the licensee's OA Program.

4 1 The Task Group believes. that. for this specific case. the failure to audit the RPV installation when couoled with the design control issues documented by concerns 1 and 2. reeresentsover reliance on the contractor crocedure and orogram to assure quality work. This has moderate potential to imoact safety but is sufficiently removed from the actual cuality related eculoment activities to have not had direct safety impact, particularly Level I OC activities for this activity were in evidence.

Item 4 Without proper traceability, the potential existed for the installation of non-code centrolled material in safety related I systems.

The Task Group considers this to be an apparently isolated instance which has no direct safety significance. Further examples or evidence l that the licensee's programs had failed to provide the requisite traceability would orovide a safety concern of generic applicability to the site.

However, further inspection for additional examples was not l accomplished and therefore, no evidence of safety impact exists.

/

4.6-1 ,

L

Appandix 4.6 Item 5 The inspector's onlv concern was than an ASME Code requirement had l

been violated and it then followed that the ASME Code stamp for the subject piping subassembly had been improperly applied.

The Task Group cor.siders this item to have no direct safety l significance in that the technical concern was not valid for the identified example, i.e. the spoolpiece would be subjected to a s y s t e r.

level hydro and this fully complied saith the ASME Code requirements.

Item 6 The implied safety concern was that the absence of periodic mixer

! blade inspections could permit blade degradation which would produce defective concrete for placement in safety related structures. Since this was not accarent from the concrete test results, the insoector assumed this issue represented a failure to cocument the reoutreo inspection.

Given the reoort statement that the mixing blades had been periodically inspected and that strength and uniformity tests of the resultino concrete were consistently acceptable. the lack of recuired g

documentation is of neolloible safety significance.

Jtem 7 No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspector. He apparently believes the licensee did not meet minimum standards for record storace facilities whien could jeopardize quality records which could prevent substantiation of perf orma nce /cha ract eri st ic s of quality activities and hardware.

The Task Group concludes that essentially no safety significance can be attached to this i t e r.: however. potential major economic significance would occur should record reconstruction be necessarv.

The only element of safety significance would involve both the licensee and NRC acceoting less than optimum data / records due to the inability to reconstruct lost records to origina.1 quality.

Item 8 No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspector. He apparently believes the licensee did not address all committed minimum standards for record storage facilities which could ieooardize quality l records which could prevent substantiation of performance / character- l 1stics of quality activities and hardware. l f

i 4.6-2 f

Appandix 4.6 The Task Group concludes that there was neolioible direct safety

( 1moact. This item is an editorial problem'with no evidence of a programmatic imo11 cation.

Item 9 Original single cooy design records were being shipped from Texas to New York to support a me.1or reanalysis effort. Loss of records would have_substantially reduced the confidence level in the data availatie for reanalysis.

The Task Group concludes that essentially no safety significance can be attached to this item; however, potential major economic significance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

The only element of safety significance would involve both the licensee and NRC accepting less than optimum data / records due to the inability to reconstruct lost records to original quality.

Item 10/11/12 No direct safety concern is aoparent on the part of the insoector. He apparently believer the licensee Cand a contractor) did not meet minimum standards for records shipments could jeopardize quality records which could orevent substantiation of performance / character-istics of ouality activities and hardware.

The Task Group concludes that essentially no safety significance can be attached to this i t e r. : however. potential major economic significance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

The only element of refety significance would involve both the licensee and NRC acceotino less than optimum data / records due to the inability to reconstruct lost records to original quality.

I t e n. 13/14/15 No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspecter. he apparently believes the licensee (and a contractor) did not meet minimum standards for records shipments could jeopardize cuality recorde which could prevent substantiation of performance /cheracter-1stics of ouality activities and hardware.

l The Task Group concludes that essentially no safety significance can be attached to this item: however, potential ma jor economic significance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

The only element of safety significance would involve both the licensee and NRC accepting less than optimum data / records due to the inability to reconstruct lost records to original quality.

4.6-3 i l

j

Appandix 4.6 3

Item 16 The omission of the records management area audit summarv oaragraon represented a potential programmatic breakdown which evidences TUGCO's lack of control over contractors. Those (that) contactor(s) bed allegedly abrogated their records management responsibilities and therefore jeopardized the availability of records necessary to substantiate the performance / characteristics of quality activities and hardware The Task Group concluded that there is no apparent safety significance to this item since the audit findings did not identify any condition adverse to quality. The comments missing from the report ostensibly addressed areas inspected, not deficiencies. '

Item 17/18 N: direct safety cencerr. is apparent en the part of the i r. s o e c t o r . He found that the licensee did not meet minimum standards for record storage facilities and thereby was jeopardizing quality records which could prevent substantiation of performance / characteristics of quality activities and hardware.

The Task Group concludes that essentially no safety significance can be attached to tnis item: however, ootential major economic l, significance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

The only element of safety significance would involve both the licensee and NFC acceptina less thar ootimum data / records due to th+

inability to reconstruct lost records to original quality.

Items 19/20 No direct safety concern 'e apoarent on the part of the insoeetor. He found that tne licensee did not meet minimum standards for record storage facilities and thereby war ,1eacordizing cuality records whien could prevent substantiation of performance / characteristics of cua35.y activities and hardware.

The Task Groue concludes that essentially no safety significance can be attached to this item: newever, potential major economic significance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

The only element of safety significance would involve both the licensee and NRC accepting less than optimum data / records due to the inability to reconstruct lost records to original quality.

Item 21 No direct safety concern is apparent on the part of the inspector. He

[ found that the licensee did not meet minimum standards for record storage facilities and thereby was jeapordizing quality records which 4.6-4

. - - - - - - - - - _ - - - _ - - _ - - - _ _ - - -___--_-_J

Appandix 4.6 could prevent substantiation of performance / characteristics of ouality f activities and hardware.

The Tash Group concludes that essentially no safety significance een be attached to thir item: however. potential major economic significance would occur should record reconstruction be necessary.

The only element of safety significance would involve both the ,

licensee and NRC acceoting less than ootimum data / records due te th+ I inability to reconstruct lost records to original quality.

Item 22 Missing labels on weld rod potentially represents a material traceability problem which could result in improper filler material being used to make a weld joint The Task Group concludes there is no hardware or programmatic significance to this issue since weld rod identification was not really in cuestion. A Criterion V procedural violation could have been written, but would have had no basis in safety or the need for further NRC followup.

Item 23/24 Loss of manaoement control over corrective actions can result in direct sa f et y consequences .

l No direct safety significance can be attached to 10 CFF 50.55(e) reporting. Tne imo11 cations of a failure to identify. report, and correct could have significant consequences Cat the affected site. or be yo n d .) . In this case, the issue was the ability of the licensee's program to track the disposition of the items. Therefore, there was no actual rafety elonificance.

Iteme 25/27 Loss of management control over corrective actions can result in direct safety consequences.

l l

No direct safety significance can be attached to 10 CFF 50.55Ce) reporting. The implications of a failure to identify, report, and correct could have significant consequences (at the affected site. or beyond). In this case. the issue was the ability of the licensee's program to track the disposition of the items. Therefore, there was no actual safety significance.

Item 26

( Loss of management control over CDR corrective action can result in direct safety deficiencies.

i 4.6-6 i i

)

Apoendix 4.6 The Task Grouo believes that no direct safety significance exieted.

1 No evidence exists to demonstrate that management was not ensuring that corrective actions were comoleted, only that the status of corrective action was not totally up to date and NRC should have been notified of schedule change details.

Items 28/33 The inspector aceeared to be concerned that the licensee's overview and the actual quality of the IEB 79-14 reanalysis performed by their contractor were both unacceptable. This might lead to potentially incomplete or incorrect dynamic reanalyses of piping systems.

These issues have no safety significance in the Task Group's assessment. The inspector misinterpreted the IEB requirements and attached undue significance to the file closure on IEB 79-14 by the licensee. It apoears that the SWEC engineering effort was satisfactorily addressing all IEE 79-14 safety questions. Additional insoection by NFC is recuirec to review these engineering efforts to close the bulletin.

Item 29 The inspectors considered that the licensee's IEB files inadequately represented tne comprehensive resoonse and followup action. No direct l

k safety concern is evident.

l l No safetv significance is apparent to the Task Grouo. The issue l involves contentions over the recuired/ desired contents of a specific file cateoory as it affects auditability.

Iter 30 The insoector's concern centers around whether licensee installation controls were generically inadequate.

With the after-the-fact evidence that hardware was not in cuestion and i

that adequate documentation to confirm control of the switches was available, the Task Group concludes that this issue has little safety significance. A programmatic review of other part/ item documentation control did not appear justified because of the specific nature of this inspection (i.e., NAMCO limit switches) and the fact that proper records were eventually made available. The timeliness of providino the correct travelers to the QA records vaults could have been pursued as a document control issue or QA records issue C.e.g., Criterion XVII) but apparently was not.

]

l 1

4 4.6-o

________-_________-____________L

, Appendix 4.6 l

l Items 31/32 l The inspectors considered the licensee's IEB review processes and records files as inadeouate to develop the comprehensive resnonse ano followup action. No direct safety concern is evident.

No safety significance is apoarent to the Task Group. The issue involves contentions over the recuired/ desired process that the licensee uses to handle IEBs. The adequacy of actual licensee corrective action is not in contention.

Item 34 The inspector expressed generic concerns (e.g., falsification) over the vendor supplied material and design with respect to BISCO seals.

their testing conduct, records and certification process, and cotential Part 21 imo11 cations.

The T a s y. Group det ermined t hat the basic safety concern was tnat tne adequacy of certified fire test data to support 3-hour barrier rating for BISCO cable penetration seal design PCA-76 was suspect and therefore represented a legitimate safety question. However, the fundamental conern was initially identified by the licensee and their corrective action was in cropress and properly directed. Wnile any generic imo11 cations as thev acoly to BISCO are beino reviewed by the i Vendor Prograr.s Branck th+ hardware imoact at CPSES was :iatted and the overall issue was of miner safety significance.

f 4.6-7

' - _ s

.......*e*s oSS;yc{f;f

- . c ,

i

\

UNITED STATES i

~

\ NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCT,WISS!CN CPy2pf - k

• ,a j AASHINGToN D C. 0H5

~ []

'.,,.." ';: . 3 MEMORANDPM FOR: Guy A. Arlotto, Chairman Comanche Peak Report Review Group (CPRRC)

FROM: Jack R. Goldberg, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT:

APPLICABILITY OF FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPOR"' TO PLANT UNDER CONSTRUCTION By your Memorandum to me dated February 25, 1987, you requested an opinion from OGC about the use of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) in the inspection and enforcement process for a facility under construction.

Some brief background will be helpful to a discussion of this issue.

A Notice of Violation must be premised upon the failure of a licensee (which includes the holder of a construction permit) to adhere to the Commission's regulations or to the terms of any lfcense or order to which the licensee is subject. For a facility which is under construction, the licensee must adhere to the terms of its construction permit. A construction permit is issued to a licensee following the submittal by the licensee of an application to the agency. Part of that application inqludes a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). See 10 C.F.R. I 50.34(a). The PSAR is reviewed by the staff in considering the licensee's application for a construction permit and, when a construction permit is issued, the NRC staff makes a finding that the application for the construction permit, including the PSAR, ccmplies with the rules and regulations of the Commission. Consequently, the PSAR !F "ap-proved" by the staff upon issuance of a construction permit to the licensee.

However, neither the construction permit nor any regulation of the NRC requires the licensee to adhere to all representations made by the licensee in the PSAR. These representations have become to be known as the licensee's

" commitments". Consequently, should a licensee fnil to adhere to the commit-ments it has made in its PSAR during the course of its construction activi-ties, a Notice of Violation is inappropriate (except in unusuni cases in which the failure constitutes violation of the requirements of the construction per-mit). Rather, the agency should issue to the licensee a Notice of Deviation describing the licensee's failure to satisfy a commitment and requesting the ,

licensee to provide a written explanation or statement describing the correc-tive steps taken or planned, the results achieved, and the date when corree- l tive action will be completed. See 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C,Section V.E. (?) . In summary, it is the construction permit and the PSAR which should govern inspection and enforcement activities of a facility under construction.

gjh57

o

-2 The Final Safety Analysis Ecport (FF A P ?. is a document required of an yalicant for an operating license. See 10 C.F.R. F 50.34(b). Prior to issuance of an operating license, there is no lege] hasis for a Notice of Viola-tion tied directly to the FSAR. However, it should be recognized that 17 otic--

es of Deviation from licensee commitments made in its FSAF may be cppro-priate prior to the issuance. of the operating license. Given the ecmplex nature of a ' nuclear facility start-up, the staff may review and approve por-tions of the FSAR,. or other licenses proposals, prior to the issuance of an operating .lleense in areas such a preoperational testing or plant start-up.

Such programs would then be in the nature of licensee commitments and could form the basis for the issuance,of Notices of Deviation.

The FSAR is " approved" by the staff when it issues an cperating license for the facility. There is no Commission regulation er other requirement which explicitly requires a licensee to adhere to the representations made in its FSAR following issuance of an operating license. Consequently, Notices of Violation tied directly to the FSAE remain inappropriate. Ilcwever, o fsilure to adhere to FSAR commitments .after issuance of the operating license may fc,rm the ' basis for a violsetion of 10 C.F.R. I 50.59, which governs changes to the facility, procedures, tests and experiments described in the FSAP, since

~

the provisions cf 10 C.F.R. S 50.50 .become effective upon issunnee of an opearting license. Alco, as was the chse prior to issuance of an opersting license, Notices of Deviation would be appropriate for those instances where a licensee deviates from commitments made in the FSAR.

l In conclusion neither the IWAR nor the 7SAR may directly form the basir for )

the issuance of a Pctice of Violation. -

j/' l W'-

p g.

v'}f /

Jagk R. C-oldberg, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement  ;

Office of the General Counsel ec: C. I!eltcmes, Jr. , AEOD

'C. Paperiello, Reg. III R. Erickson, NMSE 1 l

I 1

i L i

l k

+

i

\S 4