ML20237L179
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, . UNITED STATES 6 h x f 'p ago%,\
? NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION gg x x d., REGION IV
" 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
,% ,,,!k,,88 p ARLINGTON. TEXAS 76011
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PEMORANDUM FOR: J. G. Davis, Director, .
Office of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards j FRCM: Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE MATERIAL FOR CPRRG - REVION IV MANAGEMENT POSITIONS ON ATTACHMENT MM 1.
Enclosed is material prepared to support the review efforts of the CPRRG. The material provided censists of the Region IV management's views on each of the items contained in Attachment MM tothe OIA investigation report. The items l include:
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. A restatement of the issue as provided in Attachment MM'
. The Region IV management's understanding of the issue
, A discussion of the Region IV management's view of the' safety significance of the issue
. The handling of-the issue in light of its safety significance
. Suitable reference material for the use of the CPRRG Should you have any questions, do not hesitatp-fto contact me.
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(g?g Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator cc w/o enclosures:
J. M. Taylor, IE L
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Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13
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- 1. OIA Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM) i Issue Resolution in Final Renort }
- 1. Failure.to develop / implement Violation downgraded procedure to demonstrate 50.55(e) to unresolved i deficiencies corrected. (445/8516-U-01; 446/8513-U-01).
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- 2. Expanded Description of the issue and Related Background Information i
I The OIA statement of resolution is incomplete. This item was originally (
cn unresolved item in a previous inspection report (445/85-14; 446/85-11). The inspector proposed to cite the licensee during this inspection. Regional management concluded that this item should remain unresolved.
The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
The inspector (H. Phillips) believed that the licensee failed to develop a procedure regarding the documentation to be contained in their l
10 CFR 50.55(e) files and that this failure was a violation of
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10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, procedures, and Drawings." The inspector was of the view that Criterion V and ANSI 45.2.9 would require the . licensee, in the file which contained
' copies of their 50.55(e) reports to NRC, to have copies of the records which tracked the corrective actions taken by the licensee on the issue in each of those reports or, alternatively, to provide a list of references to the same records.
This issue was initially identified in draft 1.a, paragraph 3, (Attachment 2) as a violation of Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings." In draft 2a, paragraph 3a (Attachment 3), the issue is documented as unresolved. In draft 3, paragraph 4, paragraph 2f, ;
t (Attachment 5) the items remained unresolved but information concerning I the TUGCo commitment to upgrade files by March 1, 1986, was addede. It remained unresolved in the final report.
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- 3. Significance of the Issue i
I There is no safety significance to this issue. i i
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10 CFR 50.55(e) is a reporting requirement for significant deficiencies l
identified during construction or design activities and does not !
specifically address record keeping requirements. ANSI N45.2 9, Revision 11 designates only the 50.55(e) report itself as a permanent record. l l
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The applicant's quality assurance program requires that conditions .l adverse to quality be identified and corrected as called for in Appendix B to 10 CFR 50. The records identifying those conditions and q attesting to the corrective actions taken relative to those deficiencies, 1
such as nonconformance reports, TUGCo Nuclear Engineering Design Deficiency i l
Reports, design changes and the like, are quality assurance records and )
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are maintained in accordance with ANSI 45.2.9. These records would be i maintained in whatever filing format the licensee chooses to use. There are no regulatory requirements that specify the content or cross-indexing l protocol these files should utilize, prudent records management principles would suggest the adoption of systems which establish record file content of suitable to the licensee's needs, but there are no specific requirements in this area. It has long been a practice of IE and its predecessors that NRC will not require records to be kept in a form only for the convenience of NRC inspectors.
It should be noted that, the 2512 program includes the review of that 50.55(e) reports as part of the inspection program. Since the NRC inspection efforts on these must be completed prior to reaching a :
licensing decision, it clearly would be prucent for a licensee to have a cross reference in the 50.55(e) file to the related QA records to facilitate NRC inspection and his own audits. If this prudent course in not adopted, the licensee runs a risk of slower NRC closeout of these reports with a concurrent risk of delays in the issuance of an operating license. j
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4 The requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B pertain to 10 CFR 50.55(e) in that the quality deficiencies that are-identified through the various mechanisms'of the QA program should be evaluated by the appropriate licensee organization for notification and reporting as required by 10 CFR 50.55(e). These evaluation and reporting procedures will normally be an integral part of the utility OA program. The records required to verify the compliance with 10 CFR 50.55(e), are those which demonstrate notification, evaluation, and reporting. Records necessary to track every action taken to completion resulting from a deficiency are handled separately within the utility's QA program.
When the final 50.55(e) report is submitted, a utility may then "close" that file, since their reperting responsibility has been. satisfied. It j has been a practice of the inspection program to permit a' licensee to issue a final 50.55(e) report when the corrective actions have been decided upon and the acticns to be taken have been initiated via 'one or more of I
the corrective action mechanisms of the licensee's QA program. Final j action closecut is then covered by that program.
- 4. Region IV Management Handling of the Issue As discussed above, 10 CFR 50.55(e) does not specify record keeping l requirements. Deficiencies are identified and corrected within the l
licensee's Quality assurance program and the appropriate records for these activities are maintained within that program. Therefore, Regional management concluded that this item was not a violation. It was left
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unresolved in order to track the licensee's con.mitment.to revise and resolve any problems in the 50.55(e) files. 1 Thi/ commitment wa's as a u
result of a meeting with the licensee and Regioralemanagement 1n wh(ch the ,
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licensee was informed of the risk of delay that he might encounter if NRC ,
followup on 50.55(e) items we delayed by the ineff.tfency of verifying , ,
i corrective actions.if the appropriate records were not available. The #
licensee proposed to verify that using.the existing files, the appropriate records were retrievable to demonstrate that corrective actions had been taken.
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+ 4, Inspection Report 50-445/85-16: 50-446/85-13 Item 2
- 1. DIA Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM)
. Issue Resolution in Final Report
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- 2. Failure to revise implementing Violation Downgraded procedure containing 50.55(e) to unresolved reporting. (445/8516-U-01; 446/8513-U-01).
- 2. Expanued Description of the issue and Related Background Information
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' The OIA statement of resolution is incomplete. This item was originally t ,
an unresolved item in a previous inspection report 44/85-14; 446/85-11).
The inspector proposed to cite the licensee during this inspection.
Regional management concluded that this item should remain unresolved.
The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
The inspector (H. Phillips) believed that the failure to revise all i l
associated implementing procedures prior to issuance of corporate procedure NE0 CS-1, " Evaluation of and Reporting of Items / Events Under 10 CFR 21 ar.d 10 CFR 50.55(e), was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings."
7 This issue was initially identified in draf t Ia, paragraph 3, (Attachment 2) as a violation of Criterion V. In draft 4, paragraph 2f, (Attachment 5) this issue was changed to an unresolved item.
- 3. Safety Significance of the Issue There is no safety significance to this item. j l
l Region IV management concluded that the issuance of NEO CS-1 (Attachment 9) as a corporate policy prior to revising implementing l procedures did not compromise the identification, evaluation and reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50 55(e). It is our experience that corporate policies at all licensees are revised from time to time and that the subordinate implementing procedures are revised within some subsequent reasonable time frame. NEO CS-1 was issued on October 21, 1985, and required the cognizant subordinate managers to ensure the necessary implementing procedures were created. It is Regional management's observation that Nt'0 CS-1 was promptly implemented.
4 Region IV Management Handling of the issue Regional management concluded that it was not a violation to issue a corporate policy without first revising the lower tier implementor.g procedures. Regional management did conclude that allowing a reasonable time frame for implementation was appropriate.
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8 The issue was left as unresolved pending completion of the utility commitment that revision to existing procedures would be accomplished by March 1, 1986.
It should be noted that TUGCo's corporate practice was changed such that new or revised corporate policy would be issued with instructions to the subordinate managers at to the time frame allowed for revising subordinate procedures.
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Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 Items 3 and 5
- 1. DIA Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM) )
Issue Resolution in Final Report
- 3. Failure to maintain retrievable Violation downgraded 50.55(e) files, to unresolved (445/8516-U-01; 446/8513-U-1).
- 5. TUGCo's 50.55(e) files not Violation downgraded auditable. to unresolved.
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- 2. Expanded Description of the Issue and Related Background Information The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
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The inspector (H. Phillips) believed that because the "10 CFR 50.55(e) files" did not contain documentation or reference to documentation of final corrective action, and that after approximately 6 weeks the documentation of final corrective action was not in the files, the utility was in violation of 10 CFR 50, Apperdix B Criterion XVII, "QA Record" for failure to maintain readily retrievable 0A records.
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10 This issue was initially identified in draft la, paragraph 3 (Attachment 2) as a violation of Criterien XVII In draft Ib, paragraph 3 (Attachment 2), it is identified as an unresolved item.
- 3. Safety Significance of the Issue There is no safety significance to this issue.
All 50.55(e) reports will be inspected and corrective action verified prior to licensing of CPSES as a part of the routine inspection program applicable to all reactors under construction. The closure of 50.55(e) reports will be one of the issues tracked in the Regional IE Manual Chapter 94300 letter which is updated periodically orior to licensee issuance.
Regional management also concluded that the "50.55(e) files" should demonstrate proper notification, evaluation, and reporting to demonstrate conformance to 10 CFR 50.55(e). Records necessary to demonstrate completion of corrective action are retrievable from within the TUGCo 0A records system. This general issue was also discussed previously in the discussion on Item 1 for this report.
l The inspector identified the following "50.55(e) files" as containing no I
documentation or reference to documentation of final corrective action:
CP-84-27, CP-84-29, CP-85-04, CP-85-05, CP-85-11, CP-85-12, CP-85-13, and
1 11 CP-85-14. (Final 50.55(e) report provided in Attachment 10.) These files were still considered deficient by the inspector after 6 weeks.
It should also be noted that Regional management has taken the position in Item 1 that copies of all corrective action records or reference to all those records in these files is not a regulatory requirement.
The licensee questioned the NRC supervisor as to whether they should concentrate on the specific 50.55(e) reports of concern to the inspector and was told that they should proceed with the overall review of 50.55(e)s they were undertaking in response '.o Item 1 above. Further, Regional management had concluded that, using the information in the existing files, it was possible to verify that corrective actions had oeen completed.
- 4. Region IV Management Handling of the Issue Regional management left this is ue as unresolved pending completion of the licensee's commitment to demonstrate that sufficient documentation was available to demonstrate that corrective actions were completed.
Regional management has now been informed by the utility that their review of the QA records applicable to each 50.55(e) file is essentially complete. It is the utility's position that QA records of completed i
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reports. This will be verified in subsequent inspections of 50.55(e) )
reports as recuired by MC 2512.
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l 12 Footnote Exception is taken by Regional management to the conclusion in the OIA Summary Report which states, " he [the responsible Region IV manager) did not provide adequate direction or guidance to the inspectors to obtain the adcitional information he believed to either develop the violation or resolve the issue .[and] (4) not oirecting [the inspection] to review the TUCCo 0A program'to identify if the 0A requirement for nonconformance documents, such as 50.55(e) report!.. had been satisfied.
The utility did agree in order to facilitate NRC inspection and their own audits, to provide "50.55(e) files" that would provide ready b reference to the QA records necessary to verify corrective action. It is managements position that these same QA records could have been located by the inspector as has been done in past inspections by other inspectors.,
but would have involved more inspection time The direction provided to the inspector was not to expend further inspection effort, but to await the simplified files. The comment that the inspector was not directed to identify if the OA requirements for "nonconformance documents, such as 50.55(e) reports had been satisfied," is unfounded. The inspector and his consultant had been directed by Regional management to review NEO-CS-1. In paragraph 2.f of the final report, the review of NEO-CS-1 is documented. This same procedure was reviewed by Regional management and was, in part, the casis for the on site meeting held with TUGCo to discuss 50.55(e) reporting.
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t 13 Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 Item 4
- 1. DIA Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM)
Issue Resolution in Final Report
- 4. Failure to report to NRC corrective Violation downgraded actually action taken on 50.55(e)s. to unresolved.
- 2. Expanced Description of the issue and Related Backaround Information The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
The inspector (H. Phillips) interpreted the words of 10 CFR 50.55(e) that, "The report shall include the corrective action taken ."
to mean that the final 50.55(e) report should not be submitted until all corrective action has been completed. The submission of 50.55(e) reports by TUGCo stating the proposed corrective action, but before all corrective action had not been completed, was, he believed, in violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
In addition, four 50.55(e) reports were identified, which indicated scheduled corrective action dates that had not been met, and three additional 50.55(e) report were identified that gave no corrective action l
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14 date. The inspector interpreted this as a failure to report on corrective action, in violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
This issue was initially identified in draft la, paragraph 3 (Attachment 2) as a violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e). In draft 2b, paragraph 4 (Attachment 3), the issue was included as an unresolved item (in the inspector's handwriting). The issue regarding." action taken" was deletec by the inspector following discussions with Regional management as discussed below.
- 3. Safety Significance of the Issue There is no safety significance to this issue.
All 50.55(e) reports will be inspected and corrective action verified prior to licensing of CPSES as a part of the routine inspection program applicable to all reactors under construction. The closure of 50.55(e) reports will be one of the issues tracked in the Region IE Manual Ch. apter 94300 letter which is dated periodically prior to licensee issuance.
The term " corrective action taken" does not imply that all physical changes have been completed. On many occasions, for example, licensees, because of long lead time procurement items, must report that the i corrective action will be delayed until just prior to fuel load. There ]
I is no regulatory position regarding the interpretation taken by the i
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inspector. The acceptance of a final 50.55(e) report by the NRC is judgement by the inspector and Regional management. 10 CFR 50.55(e) requires " . sufficient information to permit analysis and evaluation of the deficiency and of the corrective action . . . ." It is not an issue in this item that sufficient information had been provided to make this determination. l The issue of corrective action date has no significance. All 50.55(e) reports will be inspected for closure. The IE Manual Chapter 92700 (Attachment 11), states in paragraph 03.02, " Specific Guidance" that "If inspection activity identifies significant incorrect information in the report, the licensee should submit a corrected report to the NRC The tnreshold of significance of errors, including omission, above which a corrected report is required, involves inspector judgement and should agree with considerations for citing the licensee's failure to report.
Errors of lesser significance should be discussed with the licensee for accuracy of future reports." Regional management concluded that the ,
issue of corrective action oates falls in this latter category.
Moreover, as discussed previously, it has been the practice in the inspection program to accept a final 50.55(e) report from a licensee when the issue is being finally resolved through one of the corrective action I systems of the licensee's QA program.
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- 4. Region IV Management Handling of the Issue Res.on IV management concluded that categorizing the update of the scheduled dates for completion of corrective actions as an unresolved item was proper. The utility committed that any required updates to 50.55(e) reports would be included in the task force effort discussed above. If updating does not occur, then some enforcement action may be appropriate if the items reach the significance levels described above.
The issue of the phrase " action taken" was dropped based on discussion between Regional management and the inspector. Regional management concluded this was a closed issue.
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Iispection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 J I
Item 6 and 11
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- 1. OIA Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM) 1 Issue Resolution in Final Report
- 6. TUGCo never responded to all Unresolved item downgraded of IEB 79-14. to open item (445/8516-0-3; l 446/8513-0-03).
- 11. TUGCo internal letter stated that Paragraph dropped in final TUGCo not identify non-conformance report, on IEB 79-14 to NRC.
- 2. Expanded Description of the issue and Related Background Information ,
The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
i The inspector (H. Phillips believed, based on his determination from his review of the TUGCo responses to IE Bulletin 79-14 (Attachment 12), that TUGCo did not respond to all aspects of the IE Bulletin 79-14, i.e., the TUGCo response did not indicate that all seismic Category I piping (regardless of size) would be evaluated to the action items in the IE Bulletin if it was dynamically analyzed by computer.
18 The inspector (H. Phillips) believed that TUGCo was not reporting nonconformances as required by IE Bulletin 79-14 based on an TUGCo internal letter CP8#24.163, dated October 22, 1982, that he had reviewed.
This issue was first identified in draf t la, unnumbered paragraph, page 4-2 ( Attachment 2) . It is not assigned any category, i.e., open, unresolved, or violation. Page 4-3 addresses an unresolved item related to further review of TUGCo policies and procedures. In draft 3, paragraph 6 (Attachment 4), the issue is deleted.
- 3. Safety Significance of +he Issue There is no safety significance to either issue.
At the outset, while the following paragraphs will discuss the details of the technical issue, it should be noted that since " unresolved items" are reserved to identify those items which may be violations of requirements upon further review, the requests made in an IE Bulletin are not regulatory requirements unless further imposed by NRC Order. Thus, a Bulletin related issue for further review as an open item does not represent a " downgrading" but rather an appropriate classification.
The inspector has improperly interpreted IE Bulletin 79-14 with regard to seismic Category I piping to be evaluated as discussed in Addenda 2 in the testimony of T. F. Westerman ( Attachment 13). Safety Class 2 and 3 small bore (2" and smaller) non-high energy lines were stated in the TUGCo l I
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19 December 3, 1982, response to IE Bulletin to have been excluded from the TUGCo formal 79-14 verification program, since the TUGCo program already in place satisfied Bulletin 79-14 verification requirements. In j l
addition, TUGCo had excluded high energy line of 1-inch and under as '
allowed by the Bulletin, since these lines were not computer analyzed. q l
The inspector had incorrectly drawn the conclusion that based on an internal TUGCo letter, TUGCo had not reported nonconformances found during the followup of IEB 79-14. For a facility under construction, the requirements for reporting to the NRC were satisfied by filing reports in j accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as discussed in Addenda 4 to T. F.
Westerman, OIA testimony (Attachment 14).
l The inspector (H. Phillips) assigned his consultant (J. McKluskey) to inspect IE Bulletin 79-14 without Regional management direction or concurrence. He apparently considered that Region IV had, in most cases, inadequately inspected hardware associated with IE , Bulletin corrective actions (draft la, page 4 [ Attachment 2]). The hardware associated with IE Bulletin 79-14 has been thoroughly inspected, and the present Stone and Webster redesign of pipe supports is receiving direct oversight by NRR, as discussed in Addenda 1 to T. F. Westerman OIA Testimony J (Attachment 14a).
- 4. Region IV Management Handling of the Issue l
l Region IV management has concluded that there is no substance to the two items. The issue was properly left open for followup on the TUGCo i
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commitment to provide-'a revised response to IE Bulletin 79-14 to reflect the new S&W pipe support effort l
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, Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 Item 7
- 1. 01A Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM)
Issue Resolution in Final Report
- 7. TUGCo's IEB record files were Unresolved item downgraded incomplete. to open item (445/8516-0-05; 446/8513-0-05).
- 2. Expanded Description of the Issue and Related Background Information The OIA statement of resolution in the final report should be changed to state that the completeness of record issue was left as an unresolved item.
The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
The inspector (H. Phillips) believed that the "IE Bulletin File" maintained in accordance with Nuclear Operations Engineering Manual,
" Licensing Procedure NOE-205", Revision I was incomplete in that neither the 1982 nor 1985 files contained sufficient records or reference to records which would show that IE Bulletin action items were completed.
t 22 The "IE Bulletin File" was not in the QA Records Center and the inspector believed that support documentation of engineering evaluations either residea with specific individuals or were unknown.
This issue was identified in draf t la, page 4-3 ( Attachment 2)., as an unresolved item. It was identified in draft 3, paragraph 6 (Attachment 4),
as an unresolved item. The issue is considered open with regard to locatior, of the IE Bulletin file in the final report, paragraph 5, and an unresolved item with regard to the completeness of records is included in paragraph 4a of the final report (Attachment Ba)
- 3. Safety Significance of the Issue There is no safety significance to this issue.
Verification of corrective action will be inspected prior to licensing.
The closecut inspection of IE Bulletins will be tracked in the IE Manaual Chapter 94300 letter. Corrective action committed to in a . Bulletin reply is inspected using the OA records. The reply provided by the licensee to a Bulletin is complete within itself and can be inspected directly using
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the associated QA records. A licensee may choose to track all IE Bulletin 4 corrective action in one location until completion but such " single file" tracking is not a regulatory requirement. As has been discussed previously, files do not have to be established for the convenience of the inspector.
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1 The "IE Bu'lletin File" referred to by the inspector is an administrative '
file assigned to.the Nuclear Operations Department by the Nuclear j
Licensing Supervisor. The file 1s intended to control licensing 1 4
correspondence assigned to Nuclear Operations. The file is maintained in accordance with Nuclear Operations Engineering Manual, NOE-205 {
( Attachment 15) and is termed the licensing correspondence log (LCR). The purpose of the LCR log is to track incoming and outgoing licensing correspondence to assure response to all licensing correspondence, including IE Bulletins. All internal memoranda necessary to prepare a Bulletin response to the NRC is required be included in this file. The file is closed upon final reply the NRC.
The inspector indicated that there was support documentation of engineering evaluations which he believed were in the possession of individuals or whose existence was unknown. Regional management was unable to assess the significance of this item since the inspector was not specific; i.e. , were they required QA records or did he have specific examples of corrective actions for which necessary support documentation was apparently missing.
- 4. Region IV Management Handling of the Issue I
The location of the "1E Bulletin File" issue was properly carried as an )
open item since TUGCo had committed to review the issue.
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With regards to the other issue, the inspector, at the time of the report, i
had not identified any specific QA record which not was not being maintained as required by regulations. The matter was appropriately handled as an unresolved item as it had been initially categorized.
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25 Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 Item _8
- 1. DIA Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM)
, Issue Resolution in Final Report
- 8. NAMCO switches IEE 79-28 were not Violation downgraded to properly icentified on travelers. unresolved item (445/8516-U-04; i
4e6/8513-U-04).
- 2. Expanded Description of the issue and Related Background Information l
The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
The inspector (H. Phillips) assigned his consultant (J. McCluskey) to inspect a sample of 14 NAMCO switches, which had been replaced in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-28. The inspector drew the initial !
l records (travelers) of the replacement from the Permanent Plant Records Vault and determined that 2 of the 14 were not the same model and serial I number as installed. Based on this initial look, he felt that TUGCo had failed to identify and control parts in the RHR system in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII, " Identification and Control of Materials, Parts and Components."
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This issue was initially identified in draft la, page 4-4 ( Attachment 2) as a violation of Criterion VIII, " Identification and Control of Materials, )
l Parts, and Componer.ts." In draft 2c, Page 4-3 (Attachment 3), the issue was changed to unresolved pending review by TUGCo to determine if there j was further documentation. It was issued in the final report, in that form. paragraph 4.b.(2) ( Attachment 8,a).
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- 3. Safety Significance of the Issue This issue has no safety significance.
Initially, the inspector identified that two NAMCO position indication switches, one on valve 1-HCV-606 and one on valve 1-FCV-618, did not match with model and serial numbers on the travelers which had been obtained from the permanent plant record vault. Regional management directed the inspector to determine whether there was later documentation on this issue and that the issue would be treated as unresolved pending that determination. Prior to the issuance of the final inspection report, the inspector informed his immediate supervisor that no further documentation had been located.
The NRC supervisor contacted the TUGCo Quality Engineering Supervisor (the I normal interface point for TUGCo with the NRC on quality issues,) and inquired with regard to further documentation because this person, who had not been contacted by the inspecter on this issue. Within approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, a traveler for each valve was provided. The i
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traveler for valve 1-FCV-618 matched with the NAMCO switch installed.
This switch was a safety-related switch. The traveler for valve 1-HCV-606 did not match with the NAMCO switch model number installed.
This was determined to be a nonsafety-related switch, hence, there was no violation. The issue was carried in the fit;al report as unresolved since there was still a question as to the use of a QA traveler to install a nonsafety device.
The utility personnel subsequently indicated that a QA traveler was being used in this case to prevent damage to the NAMCO switches during installation since all NAMCO switches purchased and installed in response to to IE Bulletin 79-28 were environmentally qualified and could, at some later time, be used in a safety application.
The inspector, sometime later (months), came into the Region IV trailer which houses the NRC staff and consultants following the ongoing CPRT activities, and stated that somebody was supposed to be following up on the NAMCO switch issue. The supervisor of the Comanche Peak Task Group immediately directed an inspector out of the Region IV Group assigned on site to contact the TUGCe Quality Engineering Supervisor and determine the disposition of the nonsafety-related NAMCO switch for valve 1-HCV-606.
A final traveler for the NAMCO switch associated with 1-HCV-606 was provided and it matched with the model number of the installed NAMCO switch. A comolete documentation package was provided to the inspector to close the issue.
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4 Recion IV Management Handtino of the issue i
Regional management concluded that handling this issue as an unresolved ;
item initially was proper, since the quality documentation did not match.
1 with the installed switch, albeit in a nonsafety application. 1 i
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Footnote '
Exception is taken to the OIA conclusion, in the summary report, that Regional management did not develop sufficient information, that the I inspector was not directed "to expand the sample size of the NAMCO switches that were inspected to ascertain if. additional documentation prcblems existed."
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safety-related switch had been resolved. Had the utility been unable to produce the final traveler for the nonsafety-related switch, then an j expanded sample night have been in order because then a documentation problem would have existed. Regional management is responsible for the i proper utili:ation of inspection resources.
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29 Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 Items 9 and 10
- 1. 01A Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM)
Issue Resolution in Final Report
- 9. Daficiency in TUGCo's procedures Violation downgraded to to handle IEBs. unresolved item (445/8516-U-02; 446/8513-U-02).
- 10. No focal point at TUGCo to track Violation / unresolved item IEB actions, dropped.
- 2. Expanded Description of the Issue and Related Background Information The OIA statement of this issue is in error. It should be revised to l
1 inoicate that the inspector had only verbally stated he believed TUGCo to be in violation. Both issues were addressed as unresolved items.
The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
l The inspector (H. Phillips) in his verbal briefing of his supervisor believed that, although the TUGCo operations department had Procedure N0E-205 which deals with IE Bulletins which require action,
l 30 because TUGCo had no procedure which described the construction organization responsibilities or how the construction organization was to handles IE Bulletins requiring action or established a specific
" construction IE Bulletin focal point coordinator" that-TUGCo was in violation.
1 Initially in draf t 3 paragraph 5 ( Attachment 4), the inspector i
identified this issue as unresolved. In draft 4, paragraph 4, Regional 1
management. replaced the inspector's paragraph with a paragraph which !
indicated that TUGCo had committed to perform a review of related procedures and records to determine adequacy of the procedures and completeness of associated records as an unresolved item.
- 3. Safety Significance of the Issue Regional management concludes that there is no safety significance to l this issue. Management viewed the actions of the inspector as establishing requirements for which there was no regulatory basis.
The Nuclear Operation Engineering Manual, Procedure N0E-205, Revision 1, (October 1985) " Licensing" (Attachment 15), clearly established responsibilities within the TUGCo organization for handling IE Bulletins l requiring action, In summary:
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[. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
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The corporate nuclear licensing supervisor is responsible for forwarding all applicable licensing correspondence to the operation support superintendent (OSS).
The 055 is responsible for coordinating the review and response.
The technical support engineer (TSE) is responsible for maintaining a Licensing Correspondence Revies (LCR) log and assigning a responsible engineer.
The TSE assigned engineer is responsible for identifying actions required and to develop a plan.
When action is required, assistance is to be provided by station personnel or TUGCo Nuclear Engineering. (TUGCo Nuclear Engineering is the proper organization to initiate action on the construction side.)
-TUGCo Nuclear Engineering would initiate construction activities as required, using existing QA program or construction program controls, such as Design Change Authorizations, TUGCo Design Deficiency Reports, Design Calculations, QC Inspection, etc. These programs have governing procedures which outline responsibilities and overall controls for the activities.
Regional management found no regulatory basis for a violYtion with regard to either issue. ~
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- 4. Recion IV Manaaement Handlino of the Issue 1
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.~t Although this item could have Deen dropped from the report entirely, it was carried as part of the unresolved item discussed under item 7 above.
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i Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 i 1
I_ tem 12
- 1. OIA Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM}
Issue Resolution in Final Report
- 12. Insufficient evidence of successful 01 investigation requested testing of BISCO fire seals - filing but rejected by Regional of false report by BISCO - Validity ma r.a g eme n t . Inspector's of BISCO seals questioned, unresolved items maintained 1
(445/8516-U-06; l 440/8513-U-06);
445/8516-U-07; 446/8513-U-07).
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- 2. Expanded Description of the Issue and Related Backcround Infortnation The OIA statement of the issue should be corrected to indicate " violation deleted," $n the Resolution in Final Report.
The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows:
The inspector (H. Phillips) and his consultant (T. Young) believed that, f because TUGCo failed to document deficient BISCO fire seals on a I
nonconformance report as required by QI-QP-16.0-4, Revision 1, L
34
" Identification of Class-IE Equipment with Deficient IEEE-32.3/344 Test Reports" and CP-0-16.0, Revision 19. "Nonconformances" dated October 16, 1985,.they violated 10 CFR 50. Appendix B, Criterion XV, " Nonconforming Material, Parts, or Components."
On the second part of this issue, the inspector (H. Phillips) and his consultant (T. Young) believed that because the TUGCo engineer who was interviewed stated that they did not evaluate whether the penetrations with BISCO seals affected systems required for safe shutdown, TUGCo had therefore failed to acequately evaluate and report a construction deficiency, a violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
On tne last part of this issue, the inspector (H. Phillips) and his assigned consultant (T. Young) believed his request for an 01 investig6 tion was ignored. He also believed that a vendor progran branch inspection should be performed at BISCO and that this was an unresolved item.
This issue was identified in draft la, paragraph 6 ( Att,achment 2) as one unresolved item and two violations. In draft 3, paragraph 7
( Attachment 4), the issues were identified as 3 unresolved items (in the inspector's handwriting) and following discussions with Regional management. In draf t 4, paragraph 6 ( Attachment 5), the inspector notes that he is revising paragraph 6 based on reviewing his consultants work ,
and because of a recent meeting with the utility. Tnese issues are l I
b i
1 35 identified as unresolved items in the final report, paragraph 6 (Attachment 8.a).
- 3. Safety Significance of the Issue There is a potential generic issue regarding BISCO fire seals which has been forwarded to IE;HQ for review. It was forwarded to IE:HQ on April 4, 1986.
Regional management has concluded that there is no safety issue at CPSES, since the issue has been formally identified as a TUGCo Nuclear Engineering Design Deficiency Report (TDDR) FP-85-063 ( Attachment 16).
Resolution will be required prior to plant licensing.
The significance of the individual issues is as follows; With regard to documenting the seal deficiency on a TDDR in lieu of a nonconformance report, the inspector was requested by the NRC supervisor to determine if a TDDR was adequate for identifying a nonconforming item.
The issue was made unresolved while the inspector conducted further review.
Subsequent to the inspection report, the supervisor has reviewed QI-QP-160-4, Revision 1 (Attachment 17), " Identification of Class IE Equipment With Deficient IEEE-323/344 Test Reports." This procedure indicates the purpose and scope as: "The purpose of this instruction is to detail the use of the nenconformance report to identify, trace and
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.close out deficient environmental test documentation for Class IE equipment and components. This instruction is only applicable to this equipment and purpose." Regional management has concluded that there was-no vio.etion t
of CP-OP-16.0-4, since the BISCO penetration seals relate to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirements (which are covered by ASTM E-119 and IEEE 634). The issuance of a TDDR by TUGCo was proper.
With regard to the second issue, the belief that the failure of TUGCo to properly evaluate and report the fire seal problem as a construction deficiency was as a violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e), it must be noted that it was the inspector himself who determined that further followup was necessary before he could determine if it was a violation. Regional management concluded that this was appropriate. The inspector was going to base the violation solely on a statement by a TUGCo engineer that he did not know if the electrical penetration affected safe shutdown equipment. The engineer's rationale for not reporting had not been determined during the inspection.
It must also be noted that the consultant had not determined the location of the penetration or if indeed the penetrations affect safety related equipment. (As a side note, TUGCo has completed its evaluation of this item and determined that it is not reportable.)
With regard to the request for an 01 investigation of BISCO, the inspector provided to his supervisor a memo dated November 25, 1985, (and a revised one on December 2, 1985) which contained the requests for 01 investigation and a vendor program branch inspection of BISCO. This memo included background material relative to the seal testing. This memo was forwarded
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to the Division Director who showed it to, and discussed it with the Region IV Allegations Coordinator and a representative of Region IV Field
]
Office of 01 (who was acting for the Field Office Director)in early December 1985. The Division Director asked them whether there was sufficient information in the memo and background material that would indicate that an investigation was warranted. They concluded that, based on the information provided, an investigation was not warranted, and suggested that the appropriate action was to forward the issue to the Vendor Branch. Based on results of their inspection, additional information might be developed that would then make it apparent that an investigation was warranted. The Division Director informed the inspector of this in mid-January 1986, and reouested the memo be revised to req 1est the vendor inspection.
With regard to the need for a vendor program branch inspection of BISCO to determine the generic significance of the issue, the matter was j forwarded to IE:HQ for review (on April 4, 1986).
- 4. Region IV Management Handling of the Issue Regional management concluded that using a TDDR instead of an NRC to report the penetration deficiencies was appropriately classified as unresolved since further NRC inspection was needed. This item can now be <
cnanged to an open item, since using a TDDR was appropriate and the open item would track the item for NRC inspection to close it.
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38 Classifying the issue related to the reporting of the deficiency under i 50'.55(e), as unresolved, was appropriate since the inspector had not developed all the necessary information to determine if a violation existed. Regional management did inform the Region IV, 01 Field Office of the potential for falsification. It was suggested that additional information was needed before it could be determined that an investigation was warranted and that the vendor inspection could accomplish this.
Regional management has concluded that the forwarding of the BISCO issue to IE:HQ could have been more timely. It has been in IE:HQ since the first of April 1986 There has been no determination of its generic or safety significance since that time.
Footnote Exception is taken with the conclusion in the OIA Report Summary that Regional management did not provide adequate direction or guidance to the j inspectors to obtain the additional information believed necessary to either develop violations or resolve the issues . Included in the statement ". . . (3) not directing Phillips to determine the safety significance of the findings regarding the BISCO fire seals." This conclusion appears completely unfounded in that the issue had been properly identified by TUGCo in a TDDR, and corrective action will therefore be required. IE:HQ is assessing the potential safety significance of the issue which is beyond the expertise expected of the inspector. Neither Attachment MM or Attachment HH (where the technical issges are viewed) state that Regional management failed to direct the inspector to assess the safety significance of the BISCO seal issue. The report of the investigation somehow comes to this conclusion.
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