ML20215C822

Partially Withheld Rept of Investigation Re Allegations of Misconduct by Region IV Mgt W/Respect to Plant

ML20215C822
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	12/11/1986
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20215B322	List: ML20215B318 ML20215C822
References
NUDOCS 8612150443
Download: ML20215C822 (49)

Text

..

-.r r.

a

=

=

' 3, 2

A k

k REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

~J=

ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT BY REGION IV MANAGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION j

BACKGROUND s

On March 19, 1986, met with the Acting Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor allegations of wrongdoing by M(OIA), to refer to OIA a number of concerning the handling of safety issues at COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION These allegations had been brought to h (CPSES).

=

-g attention by current n

and fomer NRC employees and NRC contractors. OIA was concurrently informed

}

of the allegations from sources outside NRC.

i On March 19 6, 1986 OIA interviewed 2

regarding his concerns a out the way Region IV was reg-ulating the construction of CPSES.

alleged that

~'

6 were being pressured, harassed and intimidated by Region IV 3

management to delete or downgrade proposed findings in draft inspection reports to make the TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY (TUGCO). the applicant

-f for CPSES, look better.

m j

During the interview, @d he could not write independent draft reports based o asserted he had been intimidated almost to the point where he believe g

his inspections.

In support of this assertion,6 discussed specific

=

instances in which he alleged that harassment and intimidation b e

n IV q

management resulted in violations proposed by M and in draft inspection reports being unjustifiably downgraded in inal reports.

i (Attachment A is a list of proposed violations that 6 alleged had been inappropriately downgraded or deleted from inspection reports by Region IV

]

management).

in 3

After reviewing the information provided byM, DIA combined the specific instances of alleged wrongdoing into a general allegation that:

Region IV management harassed and intimidated inspectors to pressure them to downgrade or delete proposed inspection findings at CPSES.

=

3 Additionally, based on our review of the information provided byg, DIA identified other issues that warranted OIA investigation. Two of these Inat-

=

ters, which did not relate specifically to CPSES, were an alleged violation of E

the Freedom of Information Act and allegations pertaining to the Fort St.

Vrain Nuclear Generatin Station. These allegations will be handled by OIA in 3

separate reports.

aised two other issues involving CPSES which OIA y

determined warranted review during this investigation:

The Region IV Quality Assurance (QA) Inspection Program at CPSES was

=

g inadequate; and Data documented in Region IV's NRC Form 766. Inspector's Report, was inaccurate.

=

9 8612150443 861211 PDR ADOCK 0500 5

'f _

SUMMARY

OF INVE3TIGATIVE FINDINGS NOTE: This report is divided into sections that separately report our investigative findings and cunclusions regarding each of the three general allegations. In each instance, the technical aspects of the allegations and the testimony regarding the allegations were reviewed by OIA's technical advisors. Their essments are attached and should be read in conjunction with each section of the report. Additionally, the first section is organized by specific inspecties report. The discussion of the inspection reports is followed by a sammary of interviews regarding Region IV management's attitude toward enforcement.

Allegation 1: Region IV Nanagement Harassed and Intimidated Inspectors to Pressure Them ts Bowngrade er Delete Proposed Inspection Findings at CPSES Mwas interviewed and stated that since September 1985 he has been harassed by concerning his lespection findings at CPSES. He believes he has been harassed to the point where he has almost been intimidated into writing inspection reports contaistag only whatM wants, instead of writing independent draft inspectism reports based on his findings of TUGC0 compliance /non-compliance with lations and then submitting the report to management. In M view, seemed to have total backing from Region IV manage-ment concerning how inspection reports were written. 6 was afraid he might be removed from the CPSES project unless he cooperated.

M also learned there were several other inspectors who had been subjected to similar treatment by while conducting and documenting ins _pections. Scammented t at the isagreements he was having with 6were aere than technical differences of professional opinion.

l Without providing any valid rationale,6 wanted

• o downgrade or delete proposed findings from inspection reports. He asserte that when gM disagreed that a violation should be written, he would wear down the i

l l

Enspector with facessant argument.

M believed motivation for not wanting to document findings against TUGC0 ms had taken it u on himself td make sure CPSES was licensed. As support for his belief, stntd hat in mid-1985, when

'first arrived at CPSES as the WdlD.573 M old M there was ra n!rc t rong with COMANCHE PEAK and in act it uns 1 one of the best ipuilt paants in the country.

M asse,rted that constantly defended TUGC0 and gave ground rud in 1 when aAperse fladings were identified. 4 considered attitude not ta be one of a diligent regulator but one of a defender and premuter of the licensing process (Attachment B, pages 6, 148-153 and159-161).

M discuss @ed the fo11 swing specific instances of alleged harassment a intimidation by as a result of inspr.ction findings:

Inspecties Eisert 5M45/84-32; 50-446/84-11 (84-32/11)

When intervi 01A cancerning inspection report 84-32/11 6 asserted that told him " Region IV management would never forget this

9 i inspection."

said he replied to Mthat he was unhappy with the enforcement pe 8Ey-in Region IV and was looking for another job, and g said he thesght that was a reslly good idea.

According tom the purpose of the inspection was to audit the TUGC0 corporate office to asure the applicant was properly managing QA activities.

The Region IV taspection determined that TUGC0 was understaffed to run an effective audit payan and TUGC0 management had not comprehensively reviewed the status and adesse of their QA p am between 1974 and 1984. During the inspection, told that 84-32/11 was the first in-depth "su corporate program that the NRC had done since the ccnstructim permit was issued in 1974.

M)15,19M. k November 2,1984, oc===asa the resvits of his inspection in a draft r ort dated October W, 6 agreed that case to CPSES to review the ins ec ion report with According to inspection findings were supported and, la fact, thought the report was too low-keyed.

M opined that because the NRC had not perfomed a comprehensive inspection of TIECS arporate headquarters in ten years, TUGC0 thouaht it was doing a good job le te absence of being told differently. M considered NRC to be the real problem. Because TUGC0 was new in the nuclear l

field, g hellesed good inspections by the NRC were needed.

l l

related he as at Region IV He arters a short time after the inspect on report uns written, and t him out to discuss and take issue with the inspection report.

defended his own actions and those of while 6was the supervisor of the CPSES project, and stated he did not believe they had failed to perfom the required QA inspections. M pointed out to severa QA inspection procedures that had not been completed at CP5ES, ad became very defensive.

In 1985, replaced In January 1986, lag to brought the report again and stated, " Regia 5 will never forget this report".

red this statement to be a eseat. Msaid he mentioned again to that he was trying to transfer to another NRC region because of the intense pressure, andWagain replied he thought this was a good idea.

related est no findings were changed in inspe,ction report 84-32/11 6(Attachment B, hps 9, M.13, 21-24 and 28).

I was interviewed regarding inspecties

-32 1.

stated that at the time of the inspection, he as As a result of inspection 4-32/11,a number of ags use identified. Several of the findings pertaining to the status and adegists d the TUGC0 QA program and the establishment and implementation dtheluGC0 audit program were considered by Mto be significant. 6said he considered the findings to be significant because the quantity aut qualtty of QA records at CPSES had already been questioned by I

the NRC Technical arrier Team (TRT).

l 4-6 agreed fully.with the inspection findings. He recalled working for about eight hours with6 to help put the findings to e her and to make sure they were is the proper perspective. In fact', after reviewed the draft findings frei a supervisory viewpoint, he thought the findings had more significance than as originally written. @ ion IV management, did not receive any resis-tance to the inspection findings from Reg he was unaware of any coments that may have been made by6 to concerning the inspectim report (Attachment C, pages 4-8 and 11-16).

s interviewed concerning his involvement with inspection report 84-32/11.

related that he was generally familiar with inspection report 84-32/11, and it was his understanding the inspection was done as a follow-up on miscellaneous allegations that had been assigned to Region IV as part of the TRT activities.

l 6 had some involvement with the inspection report in June 1985 with respect to what was going to be done concerning@the findings in the report 6 discussed the i etion report with to obtain background information and believed old him the report was more nega ive than first intended. Beyond askin for background infomation, said he had me further involvement wi the report.

% stated the report was written in a negative fashion. M stated he did not make the statement to that "Recion IV will never on@ drew himself that was a conclu forget this report.' He make the statement himself. M w,he as adding that he had hear e report m have caused TUGC0; however, not worried about any pro ems thought the report was overly critical. (

believed the report would lead the reader to believe TUGC0 did not lave an dit program.

In fact, l

although it my not have been effective. TUGC0 did have an audit program.

6 statedM had mentioned a number of times that he was looking for a ositim utside of Region IV. He recalled that one day, after he and had discussions for a period of time,4 said "I'd be better off if I had never come to Region IV; if I had gone to headquarters."

said he pve a very hone t answer, "Maybe you would have been."

i stated he never told "You better leave Region IV."

said his comments were not intended as a threat (Attachment D, pages l

67-76 and 105-112).

I Inspection tegert 50-445/85-07;50-446/85-05(85-07/05) f M told CIA he was directed to drop a trend analysis of the NRC85-07/05 6 was inspection at CPSES from inspection report asked by to do a trend analysis of the NRC inspection rocram at CPSES to include yhlaties and unresolved items. @ documented curing Region IV said i wanted to review unresolved items at CPSES that had been

(

inspections to entermine if any of them should have been violations. 6 believed 6 masted this infomation because $ suspected violations were reported as seresolved items so TUGC0 would not nave to formally document corrective actim ad would not be required to deterinine the cause of the deficiency or take corrective action.

elieved this could allow an inadequate QL preysm to go undetected.

stated his trend analysis revealed adverse trends which should have been identified during NRC

inspections. He added'that these trends were comparable to the problems with the TUGC0 QA program, which were later identified by hRC Construction AssessmenLTeam (CAT) inspection report 83-10/12 and the NRC TRT. It appeared tom that many inspection violations had been handled as unresolved items.

The results of the trend analysis performed b were documented in a January 13, 1986, memorandum from

. ttachment E). M also included the results of the trend analysis as Item 18 in a draft of inspection report 85-07/05 (Attachment F). Msaid Mdirected him to delete the paragraph on the trend analysis from inspection report 85-07/05 because the analysis would subject the NRC to embarrassing questions.

Because the paragraph did not contain at.y violations or unresolved items, later learned @lts id 6 drop d the paragraph. However, wanted the resu this without concurrence, thought of the analysis in inspection report 85-07/ 5, and 1so thought the results should be documented in the report because the work was done during the inspection period (Attachment B, pages 37-40 and 76-85).

6 continued with his discussion of inspection report 85-07/05 by claimi he was pressured to agree with changes to the inspection report.

explained the ins tion was conducted under the supervision of and and After the i etira report had been completed and signed by the inspection

team, an to interject himself in o the report process. M added that tarted to pressure to chan e his findings that were documented a the inspection report, and also exerted essure to agree with him instead of with According to n

violations that were deleted by rom inspection re t

85-07/05 included:

Failure to Translate Design Criteria Into Installation Specifica-tions Procedures, and Drawings; and Failure to Control Deviations from these Standards; Failure to Maintain Tolerances Stated and Failure to Report these Results en a Nonconfonnance Report; Failure to Audit RPV Specifications / Procedures, Installation and As-built Records; and Failure to Properly Identify a Spool Piece.

In addition,6was concerned that M did not require TUGC0 to respond to his violation that:

No objective evidence (records) that concrete mixing blades had been inspected quarterly since trucks were placed in service in 1977.

noted that two of the findings dropped as violations from the report, 6(1) " failure to maintain tolerances stated and failure to report these i.e.,

results on a nonconformance report " and (2) " failure to audit RPV specifica-tions/ procedures, installation and as-built records," were never challenged by TUGCO. gasserted that, even though the utility did not take exception did not think they were vio @ations.

to the proposed violationsq elected to drop the findings because he Additionallygnated that the proposed violation regarding " failure to properly identify a spool piece" was identified byW during the period of the inspection, April 1 - June 21,1985; however, even though the inspection was over, the utility contacted Region IV about the end of August or the first of September 1985 with additional infomation to demonstrate compliance with the requirement. According to Mdirected that this input be considered and the violation dropped.

Because M began to feel uncomfortable and pressured by6s the result of discussions they had concerning the deletion of proposed violations from inspection report 85-07/05, he prepared four memoranda to the file dated December 4,1985 March 5,1986. March 10,1986, and March 12, 1986. M said these memoranda discuss disaareements he had wit (ExTibits 6, 7 and 8 to Attachment I). @ noted that l

overheard some of the conversations ween l

uring w ichM detected what he considered to be vei threats 6 (Attachment 8, pages 85-94,102-118,132-148, and 154-159.

l was not able to cannent specifically about conversations between and M regarding inspection report 85-07 05; however, he related to DIA that Te was present during discussions between and M concerning inspection repor 85-14 11 and the findings involving the BISCO fire seals.

See sunrnaries of interview with OIA on pages 26 and 49 of this report).

was interviewed by OIA and stated his involvement with inspection repor 85-07/05 was with the planning of the inspection and preparation of the report. An inspecties plan was developed to look at some specific items at CPSES, with the intest of obtaining a better understanding of the PEAK project as a thele, and to look at areas where weaknesses ha en noted.

At the conclusion of the inspection in June 1985, an inspection report was drafted. The first draft as completed in October 1985. A copy of the draft re ort was then sent by the inspection team for review b Re ion IV mana ers, nt to October 1985, assumed posi ion as Therefore, the report was not going to be siped by W stated, haueser, that he wanted to remain involved with the inspection report to ensure the findings were properly addressed. Although the final inspection report ses issued in February 1986; between October 1985 a@nd February 1986, the report had gone through reviews and changes which was not involved with. After the report was issued, M noted that it was different from the draft report and different from the infomation he provided the licensee during the att meeting in June 1985. M said he was never asked for his input er opinion concerning these changes.

According toMeriginally there were ten items of noncompliance in the draft report that mere considered to be violations. However, when the final report was issued,@noted that five of the ten items remained as t

violations thre are down raded to unresolved, and two were deleted from the report.

Ipstioned and concerning the rationale for downgrading the pisosed violations, was told that for the two items that were deletsitem the report, subsequent infonnation provided by the utility in Janery586 resolved the violations. M told CIA that this additional activ%was not noted in the inspection report,. 6 did not consider this ayyiate, g was not aMeto determine the basis on which three of the proposed violations assedshd with installation of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel were downgradeL S also questioned 6and6 about differ-ences between 1brRes the report was signed b e inspectors nd the date he final reportes concurred in and issued.

aid and basicalbtid him it was management's prerogative to do things the way they wanted.

6 also notdtst a paragraph documenting 6' review of NRC's inspection proymat CPSES (i.e., the trend analysis) was deleted from the final inspectim myort. Th s infomation had been provided to the licensee at the exit meeths, and did not know wh deleted from the final report. Nd that although the appears to be mWective regulator, there were managers b low that level that did not sank be as objective as they should be.

stated he was tired of indivith making excuses for why the utility cannot meet regulations, hthfieved Region IV had trouble addressing the big issues, and l

the bigger the hun the less likely it would be addressed (Attachment C, pages 16-77).

was interviewed concerning his participation isimpection report 85-07/05.

related that the first ins ection he partkipated in at CPSES was 85-07/05. During this inspection, performelainspection of the reactor pressure vessel and internals for Unit 2 and teseactor coolant pressure boundary system for Unit 2.

6 reportedte re its of his inspection of these two areas in inspection i

report 85-07/0L related that as a result of his inspection, he documented a viskaton involving installation of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel. Additimsy, he documented two findings which he later agreed to l

delete from thenprt as a result of information provided by the licensee several months er the completion of the inspection.

M noted tuthrtween the time the draft report was signed by the inspectors on Satur 1 r 2, 1985, final report was issued on Janua 28, 1 replaced several occasions, discussed with the fact that nted to change some of iolations to unresolved itsum opined that this action by was based on additional i n provided by the utility after the conclusion of the inspection adtsmuse and M, the team leader who worked I

for S

.ty eed with interpretation of the requirements.

Eventua

, thmEndings concerning the installation of the reactor vessel which indesumented as violations were changed to unresolved items, did nottBure these changes were appropriate because he thought he had developed sMent information to cite violations.

l' Miso noted that uhes the draft inspection report containing these three violations was originally prepared, it was approved bM and M i

11 i

repor,t "the inspector considers this setter unresolved," pertaining to the three findings concerning installation of the reactor vessel, was true. M explained that when Mdiscused the findin s he wanted changed with him, he told M the findings wese valid and if wanted changes made, then Te would have to make ths himself. ThereforeM did not believe it was correct for rt ta attribute to him the fact that the findings were unresolved addittunally related that as a result of his discussions with several items he had documented as unresolved were deleted from the inspection report. (AttachmentG.Pages4-54).

M related to DIA hat he was very familiar with inspection report 85-07/05. He said the isspection was conducted between April 1 and June 21, 1985, and the report was povided to the division director in late August or early September 1985.

reviewed the report and instructed M and to review the report and provide comments on its tec nica content.

e e

eturned the draft report with his coments 6 Mexplained that den he reviewed the draft report, he had questions concerning the accuracy of some of the violations cited in the report.

M did not think a violation pertaining to retrievability of certified material test reports (DR) was valid because the regulations did not specify records had to be readilysetrievable, only that they had to be retrievable.

M noted that his agerience has been that, although TUGC0 might not have the fastest retrieval system. TUGC0 has always been able to come up with i

documentation if the NRC unt to the right person. Mnot d that TUGC0 eventually provided the records requested by the NRC inspectors, has had no problem with TECO finding records, other than the utility was slow. Although antiquated, their system always worked. Consequently, because retrievability was not defined in the requirements with respect to an amount

(

of time,Mdid not see anything to be gained by writing a violation.

With respect toMgroposed violation regarding TUGCO's failure to audit the reactor vesseTiestallation, stated there was no absolute requirement that the uti1% perfonn an aud t o this specific activity.

Additionally, he stated est because this issue had previously been identified by the TRT, he wanted ate it an unresolved item pendtng TUGCO's response to the TRT's finding.

stated that generally'the effectiveness of audits of this sort was spuestionable because audits do not catch everything.

Masserted that to have a violation the NRC must show that a require-ment was not set. Mknew of no specific requirement which stated the reactor vessel must be austed. However, during questioning by OIA he was not aware if the reactor vessel was scheduled as part of TUGCO's audit plan or if TUG O's audit plan satisfied 10 CFR 50 A endix B, Criterion XVIII. Also, stated that he Ad not have review the TUGC0 audit plan to determine its adequacy erto see if it required an audit of the reactor vessel.

Mtold CIA that he relied on who was a member of the Region IV Consethe Peat Buriew Group, and knowledge of the ASME code i

l 9-to resolve a ipesttusencerning a violation in the inspection report involv-ing the deferral af stydrostatic test on the cold leg subassembly.M stated it @d ens setunderstand the codeM stated that because itindicated to him incorrect an was a piping udessuely, and not a component under the code, it was accept-able for TUEEE to thy conducting the hydrostatic test until the entire system was assusbleth the field. For this reason M deleted this finding from te legaction report.

dituut anNer the failure by TUGC0 to mark a spool piece with the ma eria speciftndus, beat number or heat code to be a violation involving the lack of teamstEEly.M stated that the proposed violation as written did out stsenthere was no marking on the spool piece; the violation stated the spesi pine had not been marked with the material specification, heat number er heatsudes.M stated it was not necessary for this information is ne anled on the spool piece to have traceabili in that any identificatis set a the piece could establish traceability.

stated that missT'd to the conclusion of the NR ins ection, t utility located a mart a sespool piece and showed it t and M the inspectors.

asserted the mark provided sufficient identification of the spool pisa andMagreed. Mconnented that if the utility prwidstrformation to the NRC before a final inspection report is issued, he ensiks the new infonnation and, if warranted, drops the proposed vielstisk 6notat estafterM made the changes to the first draft inspection rupert.M suggested it be returned to the region to be typed. The rgarties then returned to CPSES to be signed by the inspectors.

M er-ud=8 9st igned for himself and for and expressed no sesaragins.

e report was then returned to Region V to be concurred wis ufismed. The concurrence procedure involved forwarding the report to theOffhanf Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office of the Executive LepIMusar (ELD) at NRC Headquarters.Mstated that based on commuts amiting from the NRR review, he decided he would not require TUGC8 m ng% to a Level V violation concerning concrete mixer blades.

Concerning thsistelu pertaining to TUGCO's failure to translate des n

criteria intstumEssion specifications, procedure n

stated this wishtisans initially questioned by aulpulkreview Region IV draft reports on CPSES.

wro e on east "Isn't a traveler a form of instruction?"

concurred vi question and believed the traveler used by UGC0 to install the susarmsel was a controlled instruction. All changes to the traveler weressummfia by Westinghouse (the manufacturer of the reactor vessel) and daystethe installation requirements did not require a formal l

design contritsubmith accompanying signatures.

AdditionallyMdid not agree withMuoncerning the need to write a noncueusmereport for changes to clearances stated in the traveler (i.e., clearamskamen the reactor vessel support brackets and support j

shoes) becaentummeler could be changed in the field, according to the plant procedmetrarpreparation, approval and control of operations l

travelers. hum 6gma questioning by OIA.M could not describe the l

l

1 TUGC0 change premss concerning travelers, nor could he describe or sumarize the installation specifications. Also, Mcould not verify if the traveler specified all the critical components, and he did not know if the design specifications were on site. In the final reportMwrote this issue as unresolud to allow the inspector time to acquire sufficient information abostEastinghouse's design criteria in order to convince Mthere ma a violation. Mleft the resolution of this issue to the inspector.

Concerning the trued analysis of the Region IV inspection program at CPSES, M relatedit was deleted from the report based on a coment from NRR that in their episten the paragraph did not describe a trend review. When M askedMwhy he had included the analysis in the report, Mrepliedla wanted to account for the time he spent preparing the analysis. Mthougnt the information could be applied tom inspection programs however, he did not believe the information belonged in the inspection report. 6 stated he never told Mthat the trend analysis would epse the NRC to a lot of embarrassing questions. M indicated t that it would be a subject in the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board B hearing for CPSES and would result in a lot of needless questiens.

M noted est e made to inspection report 85-07/05 from the time signed it on October 1 and 2,1985, was reviewed with e asserted the inspectors knew exactly how the report was going te be changed. Mrelated that while using the cover sheet which had tems signed by the inspectors in October 1985 on the final inspection report as not the most ideal thing to do, he considered it an acceptable way to heilitate the issuance of the final inspection report. On the concurrence for the Region IV 1 transmittal for h ins ection i

report, signed for believed agreed with the report use toldM that he had seen enough of the report, specificaMy the part of the report that change roposed violation on the susctor vessel to an unresolved item.

sai M indicated that heany not fully agree with downgrading the violation, but if 6

that was what ammynent wanted to do, then he concurred. M noted M later pruridedM with a memorandum stating that even if he signed the insperden re ort he was only concurring that management had the right to make chmys.

noted the report was discussed with M after Mrsises questions concerning the changes he noted in the final report.

6 commentuithat there are different ways the Region can approach writing a violatimL He said you can write a violation that may not be a violation and ustfor the utility to respond as to why it is not a violation.

Mfurtherstated that on some other plants he might take more liberty in writing the vidrtion, but that in the case of CPSES he was going to be very tight in theviolations and make sure the violations are absolutely

correct, explained that because CPSES was in the ASLB process and with contest

'ngs, he did not want to write a violation that the utility could argue was estnically incorrect. M further stated that would make unnecessary pperwork and could even raise questions regarding the Region's credibi1% and technical competency during the ASLB hearing.

( Attachment D, hys 113-208).

i a,.- - - -, - - -,

-,,e-,

. l 05-7 ted his involvement-s rincipally as a reviewer of the draft ins ection report.

Af ter his reffew, relayed his coments to Region IV.

noted his coments concerning the draft inspection report were made in marginal notes on the report.

Concerning the proposed violation regardin the f ilure to translate design criteria into installation specifications, stated that, although he never inspected the traveler written to install the reactor vessel, he opined that it could have provided specific enough instructions for the construction activity. Consegently, his question on the draft inspection report asking if the traveler uns a fom of instruction was intended to determine if, in fact, the traveler used TUGC0 was detailed and equivalent to an instruction or procedure.

said his coment on the report was not opinion, it was a question to be answered by Region IV.

Concerning the proposed violation pertaining to failure to provide objective evidence to show that central and truck concrete mixer blades were insoected, Mstated that he thought it was unusual for an inspector to look at concrete mixer blades because the safet -related concrete work at CPSES had been already completed. However, oted that possibl the NRC inspec-tion procedure for concrete on CPSES Unit 2 had not been c ted; therefore, it would have been a perfectly understandable effort by M to complete this construction inspection program.

Msaid the citation as written, stating that there was no documented evidence in the form of records that the quarterly checks on the blades had been done, was, le and of itself, an explicit violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

However, in partial mitigation of the finding was the fact that the actual condition of the blades was good. Consequently, Mconsidered the importance of the finding in the 1985-1986 timeframe to be pretty minimal. When viewed from the broad context of all the issues that were ongoing at CPSES.Mpined that Region IV had been under a great deal of criticism by the intervenors for a number of years for not having done a complete job on inspections. From the standpoint of its appearance to the public, it seemed an unwise use of NRC resources to raise a relatively minor administrative issue on something that happened years in the past.

Mcknsuledged as valid the argumerit presented byMthat if the licensee failed te maintain records in one area, then ft may have failed to maintain records is other areas as well. However, at CPSES there was already a litany of examples where they failed to follow procedures.Mopined that had the inspection found the condition of the mixer blades to have been poor, then there Id have been broader im lications concerning the quality of the concrete stated he told it was a clear violation (Attachment H).

M was interviewed concernino his involvement with inspection report 85-07/05 and stated he was asked byMto review the report and make technical e conducted a limited review of the report and identified to areas he thought were questionable. M believed that when he redeued t e inspection report it was still in draf t.

Concerning the proposed violati n that a spool piece had not been marked, that he thought the inspection was in error, B recalled.tellin s ated that based on his knowledge of the code, there was no requirement to maintain the material specifications, heht number, and heat code of the material on a piping assembly M recalled that the inspector found a mark number on the spool piece in question, an asserted that this mark number, in itself, provided total traceability, stated that his reading of the ASME code did not indicate that the item had to have heat numbers.

Concerning the proposed fin involving the deferral of a hydrostatic test on the cold leg subassembly stated he believe was in error and did not understand the E code quoted rom various parts of Section 3 of the ASME code to support his e ie that the hydrostatic test of the subassembly was not required prior to the hydrostatic testing of the full assembly believed he was told the NRR opinion verified that his understanding o e code was correct (Attachment J pages 7-25).

in inspection report 85-07/05 wer un stifiably downgraded o unr ens by Region IV management.

documented his technical assessment of these proposed violations on pages 11-18 of his July 8,1986, memorandum and pages 1 and 2 of his November 25, 1986, memorandum (Attachment HH).

ho is detailed to OIA to provide technical assistance, performe a rev ew o e technical issues contained in inspection report 85-07/05. He reviewed five issues that were specifically related to DIA as allegations byM His assessment is documented on pages 2-9 of Attachment MM.

Inspection Report 50-445/85-14; 50-446/85-11 (85-14/11) as interviewed concerning inspection report 85-14/11 and stated sured and harassed him because of the findings in the inspection report.

stated the purpose of the inspection was to review the applicant's act on on previously identified items and to look at the overall condition of and equipment. While inspecting previously identified

items, found significant problems with records. These y ems ecame focus of the inspection.

A finding in the inspection report was that TUGC0 had shipped all original design records for piping to Stone and Webster New York, without making a duplicate. The licensee also made no provisions to protect the records in route comensurate with requirements employed while the records were stored onsite. A similar finding was also identified byM with respect to Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) records shipped from CPSES to Houston Texas. As a result of these findings, site storage facilities were inspected and found to be in noncompliance with requirements.M provided 01A a copy of a memorandum dated A ril 29, 1986, that he had written t M The memo addressed concern reaardino the CB&I records shipped off-site and TUGC0 site storage facility. Mmemorandum recomended that the issues be forwarded to IE's QA Branch for review (see Attachment 00).

- 13 M agreed withh findings and ded them when M tated none of the fiadlugs were violations.

related that durin of the :nspecties la October 1985 argued with @ g the period in an attempt to convissa his re was nothing wrong with the records. Addition-ally.6 said interjected himself into the inspection process by going to the atility to get more information in an attempt to defend the

)

utility and prese empitance. Alth eventually agreed with g inspecties flodin, he made report other findings as unresolved itais that considere to be violations.

The first draft af tospection report 85-14/11 (Exhibit 10 Attachment B) contained two violations (one with two parts), one deviation, and eight unresolved items ist CPSES, Unit 1 and six violations, one deviation, and nine unresolved Itas for CPSES, Unit 2.

However, the final inspection report

)

85-14/11 (Exhibit 11, Attachment B) contained one violation,11 unresolved items, and two spes items for CPSES, Unit 1, and three violations,12 unre-

.* solved items, and tus open items for CPSES, Unit 2.

further related that by the end af October 1985,6 considered to be a trou-blemaker and tal he had started takin action by discussing the matter with at

. 6 considered consnent to the effect that "you male guita a bit of money, don't you" to be a threat (Attachment B, pages 163-183).

6 related to EA that he participated in inspection 85-14/11. During his

. inspectionMiserned that all the containment liner and mechanical pene-tration records did had been generated on site by Chicago Bridge & Iron had been shipped to Amstan, Texas, for reproduction. W also discovered that these safety-rehoed records were shipped in cardboard and wood containers which were not fiseproof or waterproof. Additionall there was no inventory of the records and Sere were no back-up records.

considered this a violation; however, he did not recall how he initially wrote the finding in the inspection ripart. The finding was eventually documented in the final inspection report a an unresolved item which required no written response from the utility Desscheent G, pages 54-62).

, was intervimed concerning his invo vement with Region IV inspections at CPSES. Wretsted that while he was reviewing changes to drawings at CPSES, he decided to check to make sure there was adequate documentation for the changes. As a sesult of asking for some records, he learned TUGC0 had shipped all orighal design records for piping to Stone and Webster, New York, without making a diplicate set. Additionally, there was no complete inventory made of the w before they were shipped. As a result of this finding, 6 inspected te EEC0 site storage facilities and found they were not in compliance with supirements.

M reported tts fladings to M who agreed the finding was a violation. Wielated that did not agree with this finding and

" grilled" a the issue for an estimated five hours. W considered that us to the point of being badgered. 6 asserted that 1

TUGC0 was in umptleute with the Na ional Fire Protection Association Standards; houver,6 and isagreed. These issues were l

documented is fime tuspection report 85-14/11 as unresolved items. O

believed there uns sufficient information available to cite TUGC0 for violations (Attachment I, pages 37-61).

M related to OIA that ins ection report 85-14/11 pertained to records control by TUGC0 at CPSES.

had providedMwith a matrix of the differences between the draft inspection reports and the final inspection report (Attachment K). During his discussion with 01A.M referred to this matrix and a draft of the inspection report to explain his rationale for es to the draft inspection report. Some f he changes discussed by ad not been raised as issues by during his interview with 01A.

noted that as the draft i on report was reviewed, each draft report was marked and returned t Some items were also discussed in great length with also noted that prior to this inspection, the TRT and QA Branc. IE. were at CPSES and conducted a complete review of TUGCO's records control. As far a "new, the uncovered no roblems with TUGCO's records.

identified l

The first proposed violation downgraded to an unresolved item in inspection report 85-14/11 concerned TUGCO's description in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 17.1.17 of its current QA ree rds s stem.

onsidered this to be a violation of 10 CFR 50.34(a)7.

state e

d not believe the standard review plan for F5AR 17.1 would require the amount of detail desired byMto be in the FSAR. Additionally. M oted the IE QA Branch had looked at the same area and had no problem with it. Mtold CIA that the FSAR section describing the TUGC0 QA records system for the desion i

and construction of CPSES nas in conformance with ANSI N45.2.9. M downgraded the proposed violation to an unresolved item.

The next violation proposed b as that the TUGC0 QA manual did not address ANSI M45.2.9 requirements.

stated the TRT review of this i

area, as documented in Su ntal Sa ty luationReport(SSER)11.found TUGC0 to be in compliance.

E stated that the SSER indicated the QA manual did address ANSI N... a though, perhaps not in great detail.

considered this to be an unresolved item because of the disagreement l

between findings and the SSER.

The next items discussed by ere three proposed violations and one proposed unmselsed item concerning the shi design records from CPSES to. a Stone and Webster office'pment of original in New York. M found TUGC0 did est have er use procedures to control the shipment in cardboard boxes, so backup copies of the records were made, and TUGC0 failed to control or account for the records transferred to Stone and Webster.

11eved TUGC0 was in violation of 10 CFR 50. Appendix B. Criterion XV an did not conform to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9.

tated that ANSI N45.2.9 did not clearly addressM issues concernin the shipment of original records in cardboard boxes, not creatin backup copies and not controlling and accounting for the documents.

i i

considered the Stone and Webster documentation to be in-process documents and i

not records became they were design calcul in t were being sent to Stone and Webster for reanalysis. However stated that because TUGC0 had committed to having procedures, he retainedM violation that TUGC0 failed ta establish and implement procedures in accordance with 10 CFR l

50, Appendix 3..triter' ion V, which addressed required control and inventory measures.

The next itus dhrussed b were proposed violations b concerning TUGG's shipment o cons ruction records pertaining to t e containment liner fram CPSES to Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) in Houston, Texas. Mielations concerned his findings that TUGC0 did not properly contret te shipment of these records because there were no backup copies and the suerds were not inventoried, and TUGC0 did not document an audit of CB&I 5 records at the CB&I facility.

considered these findings to be violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendt ria XVII and XVIII and not to be is enfermance with ANSI N45.2.9.

oted that at the time of the insputtia, the records were in the contro B&I, not TUGC0; therefore, ontended that neither 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVII nor A

. have specific requirements concernin the control of records during skipment that TUGC0 could be cited against.

opined i

that the recerds inre shipped at the risk of CB&I.

Malso stated that the requirements were not clearly defined regarding i

the control of recards in transit off-site. He added that NRC's ultimate concern was that priar to licensin TUGC0 have in its possession all records l

required by regshtia.

further commented if the records were considered is-pruuss documents, there would be almost no requirements controlling how tuy were stored while on-site, let alone during the short time they were is transit. Whe uestioned about ultimate authority under 10 CFR 50, Appendia I, Criterion I stated that in his view, because CB&I was a vender, ttues TUGCO's responsi ility to ensure CB&I complied with ANSI N45.2.9 and B CR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVII while the records were l

in their possesstus. Once these records were turned over to the utility they l

would be maintalmsd for the life of the plant in accordance with ANSI N45.2.9.

ConcerningMxt proposed violation regarding TUGCO's failure to document 155 audit of the QA records control system at the CB&I records

facility, related that after the NRC inspection was completed, he learned from the audit had been >erfonned; however TUGC0 could not locate any W thereof.

Eat that time, decided to make the finding as amessited item until UGC

,ocated the paperwork.

Subsequently, MIB papared a January 9,1986, memorandum to the file documenting the Art est a TUGC0 auditor had found no problems with the CB&I records contraligsten, accepted this memorandum and deleted the violation from te report.

provided OIA with a copy of the January 9,19E,EG memoran ttachmentL).

The next proposedvishtions discussed b6'nvolved TUGCO's failure to preclude ralstrumentering the QA records vault over several years and the failure to precinde fire hazards in the records vault.Mwas concerned that the records Sicilities were in violation of 10 CFR 50 A endix B, Criterion XVII ad did not confonn to ANSI N45.2.9.

acknowledged that the roof as te setords vault had leaked over a period of time, and the licensee had rupshed the roof on several occasions. Additionally, TUGC0 imediately attatte esempt the potential fire hazards from the records vault.

Mopisednotte requirements in ANSI N45.2.9 w re nelear and

~

subject to intapuestism in these areas. Additionally, stated 1

there were no housekeeping codes or standards applicable to CPSES. These vio-lations were downgraded in the final int.pection report.

The next issue was TUGCO's failure to provide a temporary or pennanent storage facility for QA records that were comingled with in-process documents in the paper flow group. Wexplained this violation concerned the installation of fire rated cabinets for storage of permanent records.

6 contended that he could consider these QA records to be in-process records and not permanent recoros, in which case they would not be subject to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9.

ated the issue revolved around the legal definition of a final record.

was not certain which records @fied by the TRT in SSER 11 under allegation AQ 45.

ms referencing but he be 1 eve the records were the same ones identi SSER 11 stated that ANSI N45.2.9 did not address protection of incomplete or in-process record documents. If these in-process documents were destroyed or lost, the TRT had determined it would be the contractor's responsibility to reconstruct them. The TRT aise noted that when permanent plant records are taken from the pennanent plant records vault to record modifications to previously accepted hardware, the records become in-process records again and are not covered by ANSI N45.2.9. 6 believed that the utility had the leeway to decide how they were going to classify and ndle their records. Based on the findings documented in SSER ll, deleted this violation from the inspection report.

The final proposed violation discussed byMwas a finding involving weld rod control, i.e., labels taken off or lost on E-309 electrodes at the main distribution station. M referred to a memorandum prepared by as justification for deletin this violation from the inspection report ttachment D Exhibit 12).

read from thew memo which stated was informed b6 that the report was unacceptable because the proposed weld rod violation was the same issu that was previously documented as an unresolved item and closed out by in the same inspection report. 6 did not consider it proper to close an unresolved item on weld rod control based is part on a current Region IV inspection that showed no finding, then have a posed violation n the same issue in the same re ort.

Additionally, stated that memorandum noted that agreed to drop the vio' tion (Attachment D, pages 325-328).

6 stated he was at CPSES about four days a week a's part of inspection 85-14/11. He esvally acted as a sorter of issues that were developed during the inspection in an effort to detennine where to go with the findings. He coordinated between the utility and NRC inspectors to ensure they were communicating with each other concerning inspection findings. He also arranged for meetings between the inspectors and TUGC0 to ensure the findinas were properly idestified and that TUGC0 had the chance to respond. M commented that the meetings served to get more infonnation on consnitments from the utility and tel ve the utility the opportunity to provide the NRC with i

infonnation to ensure the inspectors were looking at the issues with the proper perspective. M considered this to be the nonnal way to conduct an inspection. He expected that when the NRC arrived at an exit meeting there would be no surprises for the utility.

@ related that although there was interface with M concerning tne paragraphs of tis inspection report that he was responsible for, most of

the findings is.the draft inspection report were writt After the first draft inspection report was prepared, he and is-r orts were then prepared, said that cussions and' subsequent draf during his discussions wit did not to obtain dditional information to further support violations disagreed with.

believed that if id not a ree that ed violation should be do ded, then should have brought the facts that supported e vio en.

also stated the for most of the violations proposed byM i he l

thought additlanal information or another opinion was needed, then he would make the findi en unresolved item pending receipt cf the additional guid-ance.

sserted that although the discussioas be had withM may have become heated differences of opinion, he never ressured or intim-idateMto drop any violation. In fact stated although there were disagreements concerning violations, no issues were dropped from the report, i

In comenting as the status of April 29, 1986, memorandum ardi l

certain issues identified by in inspection report 85-14/11,

)

said he prepared his first memo by Ma 21, 1986 (this was a transmitt i

memorandum addressed toMfrom

. M said he was then i

directed by t write a memorandum that gave the Region's position on the issues.

said that M still had the memorandum.

(In response to Oln's inquiry as to the status of April 29, 1986, memorandum,Msaid it was in final form and t at e still had it.

Mcomented that it " kind of languished" because of all the other things to do for the levestigation.)

also cammented thatM was not involved with the various ra ts o inspection report 85-14/11 except for discussions M had with him concerni indings and conclusions being drawn by the ins ectors.

According to never provided an feedback to to indicate he disagreed w s positions.

concurred with the final inspection report without coment (Attachment D, pages 208-348and515-571).

j oo we n

pertainin to las tion report 85-14/11.

recalled a conversation he had with concerning certain OA deficiencies ass d with records at CPSES that unre identified byg that his l

conversation withMtook p ace in ear une 986, and as seeki inion on how severe the deficiencies were. Mstated i

tha d not reference an inspection report during the conversation, l

and did set think that the conversation was related to an inspection report. He believed the conversation was related to recent allegations made by said the deficiencies as explained by were transpor a ion of records and the filing of records in the interim prscess prior to being stored in a final storage facility, and (2) fin in s related to the construction of the final r ords storage facility, i

said the first deficiency, based on explanation, was not a violation. In separd to the second deficiency, he stated he was unsure of the exact problem, tot said that the applicant could use alternate methods i

I (Attachment M).

i

\\

i

' l

~

6 was interviewed concerning his involvement with in ection report 85-14/11 state had only moderate involv nt with these issues, and he relied heavi y on M input.

as the deputy QA/QC leader of TRT.

opined l

that the inspection report repeated basically the same information that was contained in SSER 11.

i Concerning the proposed violations identified by taining to a weld rod not identified at the main distribution station, told OIA he believed t proposed weld rod violation was the same as a previous unresolved i

item losed out in the construction appendix of the inspection report.

opined that either the unresolved item should remain open if the inspectors thought there was a viola ion or the unresolved item should be closed and the violation dro ed.

discussed this matter with 6 and several da s later informed that he had discussed the matter with and the violation was dropped. 6 instructed W to continue to follow-up on the issue because the weld rods should be identified. 6noted that he did not discuss his other concerns with inspection report 85-14/11 directly withM. He relayed this pages 25-45). M who did the necessary coordination (Attachment J, infomation to was interviewed concerning his involvement with ins etion report 85-14/11 6 stated that in June 1985 he and since that time he has had the responsibility for addressing issues at CPSES. W comented that he did not review inspection report 85-14/11.

Instead, he was involved in discussions concerning the appropriateness of proposed violations. M commented that some of the discussions he was asked to take part in dealt with the propriety of a finding regarding the handling of records bein shipped off-site. The records were Stone and Webster and CB&I records.

as also involved in discussions concerning the design of the records facility and a detemination of then a record becomes a final record.

Concerning the shipment of the Stone and Webster original records off-site,

@ opined that, based on the infomation provided to him, once the records were removed from the records vault, they became in-process documents and were not subject to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9 or 10 SFR 50. Appendix B, Criterion

1. Although he thought the utility used poor judgment and took a big risk, did not believe there was a violation. Mcomented that if TUGC0 had a procedure for handling these records which they violated, then they could be cited for a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V.

Regarding the shipment of all the CB&I site documents,$said that until the records became part of the utility's record system they would not be classified as site records subject to ANSI N45.2.9. W comented that if something happened to the site records during shipment, then CB&I would have to regenerate the records. Once again, if the utility had a procedure that was violated, then the utility would have a problem.

Concerning the puposed violation regarding TUGCO's failure to provide a temporary or persument storage f cility for records comingled with in-process records in the.pger flow group onenented that when records were taken from the peruanut records storage facility they again become in-process documents. Coesspently, they were no longer sub ect to ANSI M45.2.9.

Therefore, he didnot consider this a violation noted that although SSER 11 addressalan issue involving in-process documents in the paper flow group, it was est the same issue raised in inspection report 85-14/11. The difference was est in SSER ll, the records had never been entered into the pemanent recordicenter; however, in the inspection report the records were part of the pemment records center and were then removed and placed back into the paper th group.

Concerning the ical condition of the records storage fa li and TUGCO's failure to prec rain from entering the QA record vault mented that ANSI N45.2. tis not specific in this area acknowledged that it was a situation thatseeded to be corrected; however, he thought there were other means besides isming a violation to get the utility to correct the problem.

Concerning the pupos d violation that food stuffs and fire hazards were found in the records vuelt said that he would have tempered the action based on the circumstasmes surrounding the situation. If the situation was a one-l time occurrence ten he would have verbally instructed the utility to correct l

the problem. If te situation had been goin issue a violaties(Attachment N, pages 6-63)g on for some time, then he would viewed the concerns expressed by M that violations propose and other inspectors in inspection report 85-14/11 were tif ly desgraded to unresolved items by Region IV management.

ocummeed his technical assessment of these proposed violations on pages of hisJuly 8,1986, memorandum and page 3 of his November 25, 1986, memorandus pttachment HH).

formed a review of the technical issues contained in inspection reportES-14/11. He reviewed six issues that were specifically related to OIA asallegations byM His assessment is documented on pages 9-14 of Atachment 991.

Inspection teort 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 (85-16/13)

Mwhen terrviewed about inspection report 85-16/13, stated its purpose was a rutine, unannounced inspection of CPSESs Unit 1 to review the applicant's actims on previous NRC inspection findings and IE Bulletins, the applicant's iss on construction deficiencies and a review of electrical inspections, related that had been trying to inspect construcsun deficiencies reported per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and IE Bulletins deallegelth hardware modifications. Because the utility could not produce auditablerecords concerning hardware modifications associated with 10 CFR 50.55(e) reynes and IE Bulletins after four mon h concluded that TUGC0 recertswere not readily retrievable.

considered this a violation. Accumng to disagreed and stated that if the NRC gave the uti3Ry enough time, t ey cou find anything.

Additionally,6 stated that IE Bulletin 79-28 required a certain model and serial number RKO switch to be replaced. However, the inspection disclosed the actaal switch replaced tas not the switch identified by the paperwork. Mconsidered this to be a violation. Another finding that was considered to be a violation was a failure to revise all CPSES implementing procedures regarding 50.55(e) issues to conform to the TUGC0 corporate procedure.

6 continned by stating that in December 1985,6 took draft inspection report 85-16/13 to Region IV for review becauseMad findings writtaa as violations that M had instructed him to write as unresolved i reviewed the draft report and wrote on the I

violations (Exhibit 17, Attachment A)paragra hs three and four were not copy back to trecting that wrote next to paragraph three of the draft report that "scst of the apparent violations cited are not vio-1ations. Records for the convenience of the NRC are not required." 6 considered the records asked for during the inspection to be records required by the NRC to be naistained. Malso wrote next to paragraph four of the draft report thatMwas " citing them for a potential hardware problem on NAMCO switches - find ost if there is a hardware problem or not - otherwise there is no citation." 6 disagreed with this coment because 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IVII, required that the utility have records regard-less of whether or met there was a hardware problem.

M noted that draft inspection report 85-16/13 contained five violations l

for CPSES, Unit I and three violations for CPSES, Unit 2.

In the final report, this number uns reduced to no violations and a number of unresolved items which applied to both units. M comented that by the time the final inspection report was written, he had capitulated to the point where he believed it was best to present his findings in his draft inspection reports the wa wested. It had become apparent to M that a6 was telling him not to write violations and to only write unresolved items (Attachment B, pages 199-215).

M was interviewed about his involvement with inspection report 85-16/13. The purpose of this inspection report was, among other things, to review TUGC0 actious concerning IE bulletins and construction deficiencies.

As with inspection report 85-14/116 had provided 6 with a matrix of the differences between the draf inspection report and the final inspection report (dttachment 0).

referred to this matrix during his discussion with SIA concerning his rationale for changes to the draft in tion report. M noted that, as with inspection report 85-14/11, signed this report, after which no other changes were made.

did recall in connection with signing the inspection report, that stated to him they could not continue with all the interaction between them. W replied by telMngM thatWwas not making it any easier.

6 rela the first group of changes included six proposed violations b originating from attempts by M and an NRC contractor to fel ap on corrective action on hardware taken by TUGC0 as a result of TUGta satuitting 50.55(e) deficiency reports to the NRC. M and the contractor wre annble to locate rk to perforin the follow-up.

6 said the violations proposed by were (1) a failure to

develop)and tuplement"a procedure to show or reference objective evidenc 50.55(e deficisacies were corrected; (2) a failure by TUGC0 to revise conflicting partless of implementing procedures concerning 50.55(e) reporting; (3) a failure By TECO to maintain 50.55(e) files that were retrievable; (4) a failure by TUES to report to the NRC corrective action actually taken on 50.55(e) reports, and changes to comitments regarding corrective etion reported to E;(5) a failure by TUGC0 to have a procedure (whic said duplicated the first proposed violation); and (6) TUGC0 files were not auditable withvapact to corrective action on 50.55(e) deficiencies.

With respect ts the first two proposed violations.Mtold CIA it was his position that there was no requirement under 10 CFR 50. Appendix have.a procedure to implement 50.55(e) reporting requirements.

added that t e documents necessary to show closure of a 50.55(e report are documents that are encompassed as part of the utility's QA programM opined thathanted TUGC0 to have a file for every 50.55(e) report which he could rutes to determine the status of corrective action and then close out the report.gknew of no requirement that directed the utility to han this infonnation in files for the convenience of the NRC.

FMtated this information is part of th i

's nonconformance system that is unistained by QA. To the best o knowledge TUGC0 maintained the status of all nonconformances; however, he not as to detemine Get becausMwas not raising that question.

Concerning the retrievability of recordsMclaimed the utility offered to guide the inspectors through the paperwork and locate the documents required by te E to show closure of each 50.55(e) report. However, the approach preferred by the utility was to gather together all the records concerning 58.5(e) reports into one comprehensive package so that a number of issues could be addressed at once. The utility requested time to put the package together.Mthought that was a reasonable request by the utility, and et regnest for time did not indicate the records were not available. Re added that putting all the documents to r in one effort i

instead of pistanal would also make.better use ofI time.

recor vaults and geesessded that instead of going to the TL obtaining the secards associated with the hardware.Mwanted the utility to puuride ten with a list of'all the documentation that eey could quickly retrisse. Because were not able to obtain the required documents, thy were unable to accomp the purpose of the inspection, i.e.,

inspect the herihere. However, because there was no ur ene for the records as the plantus est pending an operating license left the records retrievabilig issue as unresolved until TUGC0 put all the records together.

Miamarted that, inM opinion, corrective action reported to the NRC on 58.5(e) reports must contain information that the utilitygas actually talas actism.M:ontended that corrective action to close a 50.55(e) report emb has to include the action the utility plans to take to correct the dificiesty.Mdid not believe the utility)'s failure to provide a cesplattan date for the corrective action on 50.55(e deficiencies was significs6 stated the corrective action will have to be completed primr to fuel load, which is the critical date.M considered the stRftr's failure to have corrective action completed by a certain date as he a deviation to a comitment and not a violation.

. t l'

As to TUGCO's failure to have auditable files with respect to corrective action on 50.55(e) deficienciesM stated TUGC0 consnitted to form a task force to. locate and put in a convenient place all documents TUGC0 would need to demonstrate close-out. It was never shown these record > did not exist. Although not in a file that "ould put his hands on, M stated there have always been re ords to show corrective action.

conmasted that the second series of proposed findings concerned U

s actions resulting from IE Bulletins. The proposed findings pertained to (1) TUGC0's failure to respond to all aspects of IE Bulletin 79-14, (2) l incomplete TUGC8 IE Bulletin files, (3) NAMCO switches refers. ced in IE Bulletin 79-28 set properly identified on travelers, (4) a deficiency in TUGCO's procedures to handle IE Bulletins, and (5) no focal point at TUGC0 to track IE Bullette actions.

g provided some back round to this portion of the inspection by explaining he had askedE to look at the utility's response to all bulletins and to ensure al e still open had been inspected. This was done with the istant tham review the utility's response on all IE Bulletins and emere the NRC had conducted the appropriate inspections of hardware.

opined that in performing this inspection,M concluded t e verified the utility's corrective action in most cases by only reviewin the documentation which supported hardware replacements or repairs.

disagreed with this overall conclusion. He stated he talked to some of the inspectors who had conducted some of the inspections on IE Bulletins and they told him that, when appropriate, they inspected hardware to ensure the stility properly took corrective action as a result of IE Bulletins.

ConcerningM proposed finding regard n TUGCO's reported failure to respond to all aspects of IE Bulletin 79-14 tated that when IE Bulletin 79-14 uns issued in July 1979, CPSES was in the early stages of pipe support work and, therefore, it was very difficult for TUGC0 at that time to erly respond to the Bulletin.

It wasMunderstanding that M contention was that TUGC0 never adequately responded to all aspects o

ETu letin B-14 in that the responses did not indicate that all seismic category I piping (regardless of size) would be evaluated to the action items in the IE Bulletis.

Additionally,Mstated thatMreported that TUGC0 never ressed the reporting of nonconformances as required in the Bulletin.

referisced a TUGC0 internal letter, CPPA No. 24.163, dated October 22, 1982, in which wrote that the reporting of nonconformances uns an area o te u e ins at TUGC0 must take exception to and that TUEES would not identify nonconforming conditions. This exce tion by TUGC0 was not documented in their final report to the NRC.

stated thatMbelieved the action taken on the bulletin was incomplete, and the file uns closed prematurely because the utilit was taking exception and was not golag to state the exception to the NRC.

related that Meported the finding pertaining to TUGCO's failure to respond to all aspects of IE talletin 79-14 as an unresolved item.

Concerning6 contention that TUGCO's response to IE Bulletin 79-14 did not indicate that all seismic Category I piping (regardless of size) would be evaluated, M believed that only high energy lines over one inch in diameter were cat.puter analyzed by TUGC0 to limit the number of postulated energy breaks. Those lines under one inch in diameter were not computer analyzed and were excluded by the bulletin. 6 further noted that pipe and pipe support issues at CPSES are still being reviewed by Stone and Webster and NRR.

RegardingM issue that TUGC0 never addressed the requirement in the IE bulletin to report nonconfonnances,6 opined that for a construction facility, the reporting re uirement is met by filing reports in accordance with10CFR50.55(e).

stated that from his review of IE Bulletin 79-14, the reporting requirements for nonconformances appear to have been established for an operating plant. The reporting requirements for a facility under construction are not clear. Therefore, TUGCO's exception to the reporting requirements in IE Bulletin 79-14 were not appropriate for inclusion in TUGC0 s reply to the NRC concerning the IE Bulletin. 6 removed this proposed unresolved item from the inspection report because he did not believe there was a potential for a violation.

Concerning the second finding that TUGC0 IE Bulletin files did not contain i

sufficient records to show action has been completed,N stated that the IE Bulletin file maintained by the utility was not intended to track every l

piece of paper associated with the bulletin. That was accomplished by other systems. All the file was intended to contain was the response back to the l

NRC concernin what actions the utility planned to take in response to bulletins, noted that he andpt at CPSES with utility management and obtained an oral commitment from the utility to review records to determine the adequacy of their procedures and completeness of associated records involving IE Bulletins.

Concerning 6 proposed violation that NAMCO switches replaced by TUGC0 per IE Bulletin 79-28 were not properly identified on the installation travelers. W stated that during this portion of the inspection an NRC consultant looked at equipment in the field to determine if it actually matched the documentation in the control center. The inspector found that two of the fourteen RMCO switches inspected by the NRC consultant were not properly identified on the documentation. 6 stated he* believed that i

I before the final inspection report was issued, he went.to the TUGC0 QA supervisor and obtained documentation e neerning the two NAMCO switches with which the inspector had a problem.

found that the first of the two switches was safety-related, and there were travelers issued subsequent to the one reviewed by the NRC inspector which properly identified the switch that was installed. This resolved the issue with the safety-related switch. The second switch was act safety-related and eventually the paperwork concerning that switch was also resolved.

6 comented that all the NAMCO switches purchased TUGCO'were qualified, even those installed in non-safety systems.

stated the reason there was same difficulty with the paperwork was that a number of the j

switcha were replaced during testing and this required additional paperwork.

made this violation an unresolved i em u til it could be determined whether the final paperwork was correct.

consnented that some of the i

l

paperwork delay was because some travelers dated between 1982 and 1984 were still in the paper f1'ow group and had not been sent to the Document Control Center.

The next proposed finding discussed by Wwas that W procedures for handling IE Bulletins were deficient. M comented that when an IE Bulletin was received, the utility would infonn the NRC as to what they planned to do to respond to the requirements in the bulletin. The NRC then normall verified what the utility did what it had stated it was going to do.

did not believe there was any regulatory requirement that the utility have a separate system to track the status of IE Bulletins.

6 considered M proposed violation that TUGC0 had no focal point for tracking actions on IE Bulletins as being the same issue as the previous proposed violation. M did not believe the utility was required to have a central point where an inspector could go to locate all the paperwork on an IE Bulletin. Additionally, these issues were going to be addressed by TUGC0 during their ongoing overall review of their actions in response to IE Bulletins.

I M noted that after Region IV management reviewed and comented on drafts of inspection re ort 85-16/13, the drafts were returned to M 'for typing.

Therefore, was aware of all the changes made by Region IV to his inspection report. Additionally,M stated that after the final report was prepared, it was taken to CPSES for signature by the inspectors who were responsible for the various sections. Ndded there was no pressure put on the inspectors to sign the final report.

M acknowled

d. however, that although the changes were discussed with M and signed the final inspection report, he may have not been in full agreement with all the changes.

mstated he was having problems withh reports and had a lot of conversation with M about the problems. M noted that although M ma have displayed an attitude of giving up and writing anything that wanted, in actuality M never wrote a report that way. 6 stated that he tried to calibrate W to his way of thinking, but he never told M that he could not write violations.

However,6 noted that if M wanted to write violations, then Region IV had to be able to prove that the violation wps,M stated that they had to be proper and had to be based on the facts.

a factual and technically competent violation.

4 also believed that M felt a lot of pressure because M was under a lot of pressure, and he was going back and forth with M over various issues. M asserted that while there were many discussions with M about technical issues, he never attempted to harass or threatenM Mstated he kept Region IV management infonned about the difficulty he was having with N reports, and he provided a draft version of inspection report 85-16/13 to M M reported that M went to CPSES and had a discussion withN (Attachment D, pages 348-409, 573-631, 643-653, and 670-673).

. Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, W told OIA t t ginning in November 1985, when he became the w

Division of Isacter Safet and Projects. Re ion IV. M came to him and explained the difficulty and were having with the quality of the irspecties reports coming from the construction N M,W In December 1985 discussed a draft of inspection report 85-16/13 with him.

tol that he had been discussing the draft inspection report with said tot W was so frustrated with the re ort that he

) asted kle for a copy of the draft report.

read the draft inspection made some coments on it, and sent it back to N through There were items in the report that M regarded as totally unacuytable. These items included overstated conclusions and technically wung and incomplete findings. One issue involving NAMCO switches was indetenminste in the report; however, the inspector was going to cite the i

utility. Wput a comment on the draft that additional information should be obtstmed concerning whether there was a hardware problem in order to cither cite a violation or to determine that the switches were acceptable.

A second isse is te report involved 50.55(e) reports by the utility.

6 had a preposed citation that there was no auditable file for 50.55(e) reports which mask allow an inspector to track the action from point to point. Wstated the utility was required to maintain records, but there was no requisesset that the records be in a form that would make it convenient for an NRC tuspector to look at. M noted that he and M held a meeting withMBasnagement over this issue, and TUGC0 was told that before they got theirlicasse, the NRC would follow up on all the 50.55(e) reports.

TUGC0 had the delta of either making it convenient for the NRC thereby allowing the Ein perfonn the review faster, or making it difficult for the NRC. Nevertheless, NRC would take the time to complete the review.

N stated that he wrote on the draft report of inspection 85-16/13 that the proposed stelation concerning the NAMCO switches was unsatisfactory because the luspector had not supported a violation in the inspection report.

Mbellemed te inspector had left as indeterminate an issue with an important ptase of equipment.

opined this, along with previous inspection fimlings. indicated that was not spending as much time looking at andese items as he was looking at records. He wrote on the report he thus$tWshould spend less time apparently sitting and looking at vuuses and more time out in the field looking at what was oing i

on. Wstatut that he did not discuss the draft ceport with after he rettmut St. He gave the report to M and told him to send it back to the sIIe. Additionally. M conclusions about the draft report were drawn autise% from what was written in the report. He opined if he misread the segurter did not understand what he was reading then someone should have tulihhn.

W casamend est when he reviewed the report, he focused just on para phs thuen and four and only skinned the remainder of the report.

constemelbsth para raphs t be an unsatisfactory product by a M st the Concerning M coments in the draf t reportgartstring to IE Bulletin 79-14. M noted on the report.

" stick to theseptruments." W wrote this note because he considered commes to be opinion and not based on any written requirements.

alssunse en the report "I'm very concerned that we can't seem to get

better quality reports.im a first draft," because Mthought that the draft. report uns inauglete in a number of areas.

Concerning the coment '95" thatWwrote on the report, he stated it tied in with another comment he made that "Most of the apparent violations cited are not violations. Records for the convenience of the NRC are not required." Mapland that the reason for these coments was the report was poorly written. AdStlonally, M coment on the re ort "do not use this ters unless Joe can define it," pertained to use of the words " objective evidence" and was inter.ded to convey the guidance that the inspection report stuuld document what the file actually contained and not a judgement on the part of the inspector.

Overall, M stated his coments to N were intended to get him to write a better report. Mnoted that other than the written coments based on his review of inspection report 85-16/13, he had no direct discussion i

with M concerving his preparation of inspection reports. M did not believe his criticisms were harsh considering they were levied against the product of a M (Attachment P pages 5-12,48-77and85-111).

M was intervimmi cacerning his involvement with inspection report 85-16/13. In regard to Se proposed violations involving TUGCO's actions on 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports,Mstated that M handled these issues by himself. Regarding M Bulletin 79-14 M stated that TUGC0 hired Stone and Webster to verify that all the analysis had been perfomed with respect to the Bulletin. This as e ongoing endeavor. Concerning the issue of records retrievability with aspect to documentation of actions taken in response to IE Bulletins, Mstated that if the NRC inspectors went to the quality engineering supervist,le could locate any record requested. W acknowl-edged that has at the only inspector that had trouble from time to time retrieving records. However, the records have always been retrieved.

Additionally,Msffered that TUGC0 did not have the best records re-trieval system and at ttues they have had difficultly retrieving records. In essence, TUGC0 has retrieved the records asked for; however, sometimes, in W judgement, it did take too long.

BISCO Electrical Penetration Seals Memoranda re u to an ca e it inflamatory. Per instructims, rewrote the memorandum on December 2, 1985 (Attachment B, Exhiktt IS, and addressed it through6 to teatr Program Branch, IE. This memorandum was taken by On about January 23 BE.M returned the memorandum tom, and he old that he also criticized it for being inflamatory, (

should have directed te amorandum to him ccepted the criticism and revised the memorandum as W wanted. On March 6,1986, the

memorandum (Attadmastl. Exhibit 19) was sent to 6 M concern over this incidset was that he raised a potential safety issue in November 1985, and became unnagement wis worried about the protocol in documenting the l

information. asting was done with the allegation until March 1986 (Attachment 3 pages 215-220).

M related toEl that while conducting a follow-nspection a i

the i

netra l

5 6 related tot des he raised the issue of the validity of BISCO's certification of meir seals, it was ncp well-received by M (W provided docessetten concerning BISCf penetration seals -- Attachment 1

)

l Exhibit 2.)

1 M opined est. tesed en his observations of

' interaction with j

Reg" ion IV ma

.if M had his way, would just say "yes,

~

that the large aussut of time M, eliminate a lot of problems. spent talking tom. plu sir to and, thereby M comented l

direction to rasite and rewrite reports, could makeM look i

unproductive as tur as conducting inspections was concerned (Attachment I, pages 61-85).

j With regard ta te preposed violation ertaining to the certification e

BISCO electrical penetration seals.

related to OIA that M M had findings involving (1) TV s

fat ure o adesmee.y evaluate. document and report a construction deficiency in accordance wie N CFR 50.55(e). (

insufficient evidence cessful testing of 81 i

Regarding Wasacers about the lack of an adequate. engineering evaluation cesseming the SISCO seals and TUGCO's failure to report a deficiency is anstate with 10 CFR 50.55(e). N stated since the utility prepareda MES Sesign Deficiency Report (TDDR) on the lack of documentation puentelag to test results there was no violation concerning TUGCO's doc =smanetas of the deficiency. M stated he told M that if he ussessto cite the utility for not reporting the deficiency in accordance wie N Cft 50.55(e) or 10 CFR 21 then he would have no problem with that vielstism. Bouever, the conflicting paperwork involved with the certification site BISS seals W was not certain it was a clear violation, and hausted that there would be paperwork that indicated there was no probles. Mstated he did not direct M to write the violation beM was the inspector and he signed the report.

statsfle seed his prerogative and left the decision to M If muest to lost at something more. W stated he was not going to stop htL

l Because the initial memorandum addressed actions i

and conclusicus related only to CPSES, Masked M to prepare a memorandum to y as the Vendor Branch IE. W asked that the memorandum be scenal so the Vendor Branch could use it as a basis for reviewing poteuthi BISCO generic issues identified by As a result, M prepared a December 2,1985, memorandum through to the W of the 1sedur Branch.

To the best ofM knowledge, M found the memorandum to be opinionated and t contain recommendations that M thought the Vendor i

i Branch should decide. M asked M to rewrite the memorandum and gave the instructlen that correspondence with IE was the responsibility of the i

i. He told What anything going to IE should go througbW stated the next memorandum was still opinionated and metained unnecessary recommendations. This memorandum was rovided by to W and was the topic of discussions between r,

te the final memorandum, dated March 6, I

i 1986, through to M l

Mrelated ts CIA that, W had prepared on the BISCO fire seals.in January 1986, he concerning a muurandum that j

M connestad that M had written several versions of a memorandum on the BISCO sash which event was sent to IE. M stated the i

original memorsedus was from o 6 6M Branch, IE. M believed should have sent the memorandum through Region IV managnust.

on the inspection Mut. He thought that the Vendor Program Branch could use the l

information in temenorandum sent to IE as background to highlight some of l

_ 29 F

the areas te lendor Program Branch should inspect. Mcomented that the purpose of the memorandum that he sent to NRC Headquarters (April 4,1986) was to point ein possible generic concerns (Attachment P, pages 15-18, 78-85 and99-102).

p

. IE, was interviewed by OIA concerning his involvemsut with the issue involving the BISCO electrical penetration seals at CPSE5. W stated he had previous involvement with respect to BISCO as part of the E allegations management system. This resulted from problems identified III.

eviewed the il 4, 1986 memorandum from 6 to

, and ccanented that t problem ran um was sent to the

?

wrong office. Because there was a technical requirement at issue, the memorandun shesid have been sent to NRR. @ ensured the memorandum went to NRR for reselstles. Based on his review of the memorandum, 5 stated there

_~

appeared to be a safety concern which needed to be addressed by NRC. M further opined that the BISCO issue could be a generic issue (Attachment Q, pages7-13).

m viewed the concerns expressed by W that violations proposed by and other inspectors in inspection report 85-16/13 were

~

tifiably hegraded to unresolved items by Region IV management.

u Astusented his technical assessment of these proposed violations on i

pages 7 af his July 8,1986, memorandum and pages 4 and 5 of his L

November 25.15. memorandum (Attachment HH).

f 6 performed a review of the technical issues contained in inspection rgart 85-16/13. He reviewed five issues that were specifically related to SE as allegations byh His assessment is documented on pages 14-18 sf Attachment MM.

L-l Comments Regarding Region IV Management's Ehforcement Attitude Toward CPSES I

M Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, Region IV, hemmes January 1984 and January 1985, was interviewed concerning b

h his knowledje et the attitude of Region IV management towards identifying and documenting visistions at CPSES. 6 stated he did not consider Region IV to have a strvas enforcement program, and he believed the lack of a strong P

enforcement pray'en had its roots in the attitude of the senior managers, f

which he statsdiscluded W andM He conwented that, in his opinion, the usular managers did not evidence a strong comitment to ensure r

conformance use regulations and did not take a tough attitude regarding enforcement.

g M statad est when he reported to Region IV, it was clear to him that the g

senior and aime management's attitude towards a utility influenced the er decision of dueer to take enforcement action. This attitude came to bear on E

the individsel kapectors and how they perceived their job as guided by their i

senior ma M elieved that the attitude of Region IV management towards uns not to do work which would cause more problems for the utility. At Se time W arrived in Region IV, he found the amount of b

inspection artistty compared to the need was very small and, for a considerable of time, almost all the inspections at CPSES were done by g

the with very little regional support. g stated that

-r

- _ - ~

=

- a

~

-=m

, had repeatedly requested ssistance ros the egion Region did not respond.

n conducting construction inspections, but the

-g In addition to not providing assistance to inspect the plant, Mstated a favorite approach to discourage inspectors from writing violations eras to

_e worry the ins tors' work product to death and to question it to a great c

extreme.

added at he had a sufficient number of discussions with m. who was the to conclude that j

compliance with the regulations.did not really believe in enforcement as a means of a

=

worrying the paperwork to the point that less than theTherefore, W participated in5

=

that could have been written were actually written.

r of violations comented the manner used by Mto reduce the number of violations was to argue with the inspectors that a finding was not a violation and to defend the utility on a violation.

5 acknowledged that all of M contributions were not negative.

called the inspectors' attention to the need for greater precision in their language, and that was beneficial.

~'

B t overall, Mtated, attitude nti-enforcement.

also stated he was told a number o imes that vehicle to achieve corrective action.did not think a violation was an appropriate handle the matter by discussing it with the utility and have any document

?

record be observations in the inspection report rather than clear violations.

4 related that when6 handled a disagreement between himself and ctor, M would normally interact with the an i

,M i

to gain acceptance of his conclusions.

oted that would result in peop ng lined up against the inspector who wrote the 3-violation.

and a Branch Chief, attempting to make a decision based on the fa 1

2 addition to being influenced by M who basically had an anti-enforcement attitude.

=

M stated he observed on the part of

, M and a few others.

a continual stress of connents about watchin

, not trusting p J and watching your back wi which 6 performance at concluded was based upon W

where he identified a r. umber of deficiencies in the utilit s operation.

Opined th'ere was some i

distrust and some dislike and apprehension about having,a strong-willed, 3

meticulous and capable person on the staff who was not easily swayed to a M

different point of view. M further opined that N and W si were of like mind se an appeal of an inspector would not likely be heard t

r strictly on its merits. They would back each other up (Attachment R, pages

-i 3-15,18-19 and 55-56).

2 A

{

01A interviewed a number of Region IV inspectors concerning whether Region IV e

placed a strong emphasis on hardware inspections and downplayed inspections in

=

the QA areas. Additionally, the inspectors comented on whether they had been pressured by Regios IV anna nt to downgrade or delete valid violations from L

inspection reports.

(Attachment S) stated he did not believe e

Region IV downplayed QA issues. Instead, he thought there was overkill in the t

1 QA area.

NRC recently developed 500 open items on CPSES and 90 percent of

[

i

~'

~

them were minor. The issues were paper problems and he thought that was ridiculous.

(Attachment T) believed Region IV excessively concentrated on QA.

believed Region IV needed more engineers who were qualified to inspect hardware and understand technical issues and who could make engineering judgments in the field. M was never harassed or pressured by Region IV zana ement to downgrade or delete violations from inspection reports.

(Attachment U) stated Region IV management has not directed his inspection effort away from QA areas. Re ion IV management never pressured him to not write violations.

(AttachmentV)statedthat he is exclusively involved with QA issues at CPSES. M stated he has the freedom to identify, document, and report deficiencies. He said he has never encountered difficulty in presenting facts he believed were appropriate.

N(Attachment W) related that if Region IV assigned priorities to areas, then immediate operational safety concerns are higher than QA issues.

However, there has not been an attitude by Region IV to lessen the impact of QA findings.

W (Attachment X) related that as ah, he expected his inspectors to focus their efforts on finding real safety issues

,~

as opposed to wasting a lot of time on paper work issues that had no safety l

significance. His instructions to his inspectors were to inspect the plant as thoroughly as time allows, document inspection results and findings, and present them, hopefully, in a way that represents the agency view. He thought l

this was the policy in Region IV. He did not believe QA was separate from hardware. When an inspector looked at hardware he was also looking at how the utility's program functioned which caused the hardware to be properly built.

If a problem was found with the hardware, then the inspector would start looking at the paper behind the hardware to determine what led to the problem.

He opined the harduare was the real issue, not the paperwork. M stated that,to his knowledge, Region IV inspectors have been allowed the freedom to conduct their inspections and to document their findings on inspection reports.

W(Attachment Y) stated it was his impression that the QA emphasis at Re ion IV may not have been as strong as at Region III, the previous region that was assigned to. At Region III, there was a section assigned only to QA areas. Whas not encountered any problems with identifying and documenting findi in inspection reports. However, he pas told by l

N had observed what he thought stere violations at CPSES and sked him to change his inspection re rt. M told M that he M refused to change the report.

said m was upset over the issue, and his main objection was that he was asked to change the report. M told M he did not agree with changing the report, and he told management if they wanted to change it, then make the change themselves.

,a at CPSES, were interviewed by stated that Region IV had not directed them to avoid looking at QA issues in favor of inspecting hardware. They all believed they had the freedue to inspect any area that required inspection.

Additionally, all of these consultants stated they had not been directed or I

i l

. l' pressured in aug usy by Ingion IV to not document inspection findir:ss or to downgrade or dHtte laspection findings documented in an inspection report.

None of the coussitants had any problem with Region IV not issuing inspection reports the my may were written by the inspectors (Attachments 2-EE).

was interviewed CIA to obtain perc tions te activities involving PSES.

has been ince October 1985. Although had no l

first-hand inftpuetten specifically concerning the matters under investigation prerlded OIA witWbservations and opinions of interactions M and NRC consultants at CPSES and between g and Angles If ammagement (Attachment FF).

with Region IV, was interviewed by OIA concerning informatism he had regarding Region IV's regulation of the construction of CPSES. M was employed by Re ion IV from 1973 to July 4, 1984, when he retired. Stace October 1984, has been employed as a consultant for te stility at CPSES. Although unable to provide any direct information cancerning tie matters under investigation, based on his involvement wie Region N and his knowledge of the issues at CPSES, M provided DIA with general observations and opinions that were critical of Region IV's sensgement of De inspection program at CPSES (Attachment GG).

was interviewed by OIA concerning at ubich print the NRC should no longer accept input from a utility concerstag proposed violations developed during NRC inspections.

W stated that generalis it is the NRC's policy that the exit briefing is the utility's Ippertmity to dispute inspection findings. The exit briefing concludes the inspecties period, and the subsequent inspection report documents activfty camischd during the inspection period.

Information provided by the stility subsequent to the exit briefing could be used by' the utility in its response to a Notice of Violation if issued by the NRC, M noted that the stility has 20 to 30 days to reply to a Notice of Violation.

Additionally, the isferention developed by the utilit would be considered by the NRC during te folhadog inspection period.

comented that an exception to tis policy usuld be an instance where the utility's information showed m unde an obvious mistake in fact. However, the additional islerustian sust have existed during the period of inspection to be

~

considered darlag the preparation of an inspection report. Melated that he is not anere of anywitten instructions which specifically address the question of shun impet shus1d no longer be considered;'howver, guidance published is unrimus N smual chapters concerning the conduct of inspections and the docessetstiam of violations makes this unstated policy clear (Attachment 4 1 put from a utility relating to prupamed violations durin the period the draft NRC inspection report is betag processed.

stated nonnally inspection reports are issued vielm 30 days of the exit briefing with the utility.

Although Wham ef us specific guidance in IE Manuals addressing the is of accspting imput tem a utility after the conclusion of an inspection, belleist mere are instances where it would be appropriate to accept the additional inforestius and delete the proposed violation from the

33 -

inspection report. Generally these instances would depend on how soon after completion of the inspection the new infomation was provided, as well as the nature of the proposed violation and the new infomation. As an example, M stated that shortly after completion of an inspection, if the utility provided the IRC with a record that was difficult to locate and which resolved an issue, tnen it would be proper to delete the proposed violation from the report. However, if the proposed violation was an indication of a possible widespread problem, n it would be appropriate to document the finding in the final report.

further explatend that if the information provided by the utility was created subsequent to the inspection in response to a proposed violation, then it would not be proper for the NRC to use this input to delete a proposed violation from an inspection report (Attachment PP).

Sumary of Review of Technical Aspects of Allegation 1 ce s

proposed by as a result of their inspections findings were us owngraded unresolved items by Region IV

' management.

reviewed the proposed violations in Region IV inspection reports 85-07/05, 85-14/11, and 85-16/13, and the transcripts of OIA interviews with NRC inspectors and consultants. Based on his review, M found that while the downgrading of violations in some instances was well within management's prerogative, there was sufficient evidence to support 6 concern that several violations were downgraded without cause. Of the 16 issues that were specifically related to OIA as allegations byM M found seven to require more infomation be ea violation could be imposed. For nine of the allegations, considered either that sufficient infomation existed to impose a violation or that management's reasoning for down ra ing, or otherwise treating the violation, was questionable.

stated that although he found no evidence that the downgrading of proposed violations had an adverse effect on plant safety, he did consider certain instances of downgrading to represent poor management in Region IV (Attachment HH).

perforined a review of the techn cal issues containe in laspection reports 85-07/05, 85-14/11 and 85-16/13. He reviewed the 16 issues that were specifically related to OIA as allegations by M This review was to determine if Region IV mpnagement improperly downgraded, changed or deleted inspection findings and violations. Based on his review of 16 issues, he found nine instances where more work was required before any enforcement action could be imposed on TUGCO, and five instances where the reasoning used by Region IV management to downgrade the proposed violations appeared questionable.

In addition, Regional management identified issues as unresolved items without directing the inspectors to take specific

~

action to resolve those items. T'his practice was contrary to the requirements in Chapter 0400 of the IE manual (Attachment MM).

The technica1' advisors were not in agreement on all issues. A comparison of the results of their reviews is set forth below.

Inspection Report 85-07/05 Concerns 1 and 2 l

Reactor Vessel Installation Inconclusive Inconclusive l

Concern 3 Audit of Reactor Vessel Installation Inconclusive Inconclusive Concern 4 Spool Piece Marking No Violation Inconclusive Concern 5 2

Cement Mixing Blades Questionable No Violation Handling of Violation Inspection Report 85-14/11 Concerns 1, 2.)and 3 Records Shipment to Stone Questionable

• Question'able and Webster (85-14/11 cont.)

Concerns 4 and 5 Records Shipment of CB&I Inconclusive Questionable Concern 6 Temporary Storage of Records Questionable Inconclusive I

Inconclusive - There was insufficient infonnation to detennine whether a violation was appropriate.

Questionable - There was sufficient information available to cite a violation.

2

Inspection Report 85-16/13 Concerns 1, 2, and 3 10CFR50.55(e)

Questionable Inconclusive Concern 4 NAMC0 Switches Not Properly Identified Questionable Inconclusive Concern 5 BISCO Seals Refer to IE; Refer to IE; Inconclusive Inconclusive Sumary Inconclusive or No Violation Questionable 6

7 9

g 11 5

Conclusions Allegation I: Region IV Management Harassed and Intimidated Inspectors to Pressure Them to Downgrade or Delete Proposed Inspection Findings at CPSES M had lengthy disagreements with M regardin the o

downgrading of inspection findings. One witness stated

@ grilled"M on an issue.for five hours and he considered that as to the point of being " badgered."

There were coments exchanged by M and which o

M claimed were harassing and/or trireaten ng.

either denied the coments or denied the coments were intended to harass or threaten OIA could not substantiate the cosuents through i pen ent sources.

W established a higher than normal threshold for assessing o

violations at CPSES. While at another plant he might have been more liberal in citing violations, he stated that at CPSES he was being very ' tight" to make sure violations were absolutely correc Because CPSES was in a contested hearing before the ASLB, did not want to write violations the utility could argue w technically incorrect. He believed that would create unnecessary paperwork and could even raise questions regarding Region IV's t

technical competency.

M believed W unjustifiably downgraded or deleted o

proposed inspection findings concerning CPSES from R inspection reports 85-07/05, 85-14/11, and 85-16/13.

on the other hand, responded that he downgraded or delete proposed findings because he believed the inspectors had proposed violations

. 7 e

'_I 2

against TUGC0 that were either technically incorrect or inadequately developed. DIA detemined there were 26 proposed violations and four proposed wresolved items that were either downgraded or deleted fra the three inspection reports reviewed by6 e

o 01A's nical reviews of 16 proposed violations detemined that h

used a prerogative as a manager to downgrade proposed violattens uhee there did not appear to be sufficient infomation to support the violation. However, DIA found that in many cases the li rationale used bMto downgrade the violations was faulty.

=

Examples where O'A' technical advisor believed faulty reasoning was applied bM downgrade violations were the lack of a TUGCB audit of the installation of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel, the use of travelers as design control documents, findings i

involving the Stone and Webster and CB&I records. TUGCO's handling 1

of recards in the paper flow group, and the application of SSER 11 to 19013's failure to provide a temporary or permanent storage 2

facility for records comingled with in-process documents in the paper flew groep.

6 identified several pro]Losed violations as unresolved items 2

o to duumstrate to the inspectorW did not avoid issues even though l

Wbelieved further inspection activity would not develop violatises. This practice was contrary to the requirements in IE Manual Chapter 9400 and 0610. Examples included the issues of whether the traveler could serve as a design control document, whether travelers could be changed in the field without issuance of a esmcomfomance report, and whether TUGC0 needed to audit the installation of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel.

3 o

when believed Region IV inspectors did not develop l

sufficient aformation to adequately support to osed violations g questiamed the proposed violations. However did not provide adegate direction or guidance to the inspectors to obtain the 2

additiemal informationg believed necessary to either develop violatisms er resolve the issues.

Instead, in most cases. D dangraded the proposed violations in the final inspection orts.

?

Some ammspies of this practice were (1) not directing to reviss the IgGt3 audit plan to deterinine f the Unit 2 reactor vessel ues included, (2) not directing to expand the sample stae of the EMD switches that were inspected to ascertain if 1 documentation problems existed, (3) not directing j

to determine the safety significance of the fin regarding the SISCO fire seals, and (4) not directing to i

restes the IgGC8 QA program to determine if the QA requirements for nascasformance escuments such as 50.55(e) reports had been l

satisfied.

j 6 dela ed two memoranda to NRC Headquarters o

which unre witten by to resolve ongoing technical issues at EF5E5. In the first case, they delayed a November 25, 1985, j

messeumba for more than four months because Q were dissatisfied i

with gesener in whichMaddressed and worded it. This memormhm teio'.ved potentially significant information regarding a

' 'poss9k guerie issue with Bisco fire penetration seals. In the secostsuse, an April 29, 1986, memorandum requested guidance from 1E repsens the shipment of CB&I records off-site and TUGCO's recort sewage facility. As of July 22, 1986, the memorandum had not jet has submitted to NRC Headquarters.

Mhleted proposed violations from draft inspection reports o

baseds hformation received from the utility well after completion of the tspections. The original issue and the additional inspessimmactivity was not documented in the final inspection report. Bile this action a peared consistent with Region IV policy s spressed b in several instances the imple of this policy was inconsistent with the policy as stataf E. An example of this inconsistency was acceptance by TUGC0's January 9,1986, memorandum to file to document a

WGC0 audit of the QA records control system at the CB&I records issflity. TUGCO's original failure to document their audit of them QA records had been discovered during the conduct of

(

insperthsE5-14/11 in Oc er 1985. Based on the January 9, 1986 TUGC8 mmuundws, deleted the proposed violation citing TUGC8's fulkre to nt their audit from the inspection report.

o acknowledged the inspectors' disagreement with the sumer w ic proposed inspection findin s were deleted or dowayukik final insp ts, were also ame hat did not concur with changes made in langusthe te s and si ned ports only because management wantedS ts.

accepted this situation and took mastism to address the inspectors' disagreements.

Allegation II: En kvion IV QA Inspection Program at CPSES Was Inadequate.

office was preputumaging corporate QA activities at CP.SES. T inspection, ubiens documented was conducted duringhgst and Septem er 84 an ified several weaknesses in the impleneesis of the TUGC0 audit program.

In particular, several Level IV violatissure identified as a result of the applicant's failure to (1) regularly valmte status and adequacy of its QA program, and (2) establish and hghust a comprehensive system of planned and periodic audits of safety-relahsa:Ihities.

relatettutking the NRC inspection, the stated to thateis inspection was the first comprehensive u o the TUGC0 corporateShe by NRC since the construction perinit was issued in 1974 (the Construc ts for Units 1 and 2 were issued in December 1974).

Consequently, saviewed past Region IV inspection reports and was able i

l

l '

to identify only a few superficial, very focused technical audits but no comprehensive in-depth-NRC inspection of TUGC0 QA management since 1974.

j 6 stated to SIA that the NRC inspection program under Manual Chapter 2512 has been revised several times during the last few years. He stated the old program required a mid-QA inspection under procedure 35200, which should be a comprehensive Icok at all the activities that have occurred by mid-project. @to TUGC0 corporate Headquarters.

said procedure 35200 was perfo d on-site; however, no inspectors ever west added that 35200 was conducted so superficially, it was almost meaningless.

After d from th UGC0 corporate office in Se r1 asked at to review previous Region IV inspection reports and compare them to requirements in IE Manual Chapter 2512. The results cf The January 13,1986, memorandum addressed the NRC inspection program at CPSES and concluded that the implementation and documentation of the required ins e n program by Region IV at CPSES between 1974 and 1984 was weak.

review of inspection data for CPSES, Unit 1, revealed that inspections of the applicant's QA program required by IE Manual Chapter 2512 were weak or nonexistent after the QA inspections for the construction pennit were completed in 1974-1975.

review also disclosed that Region IV QA inspections and reviews for CPSE, nit 2, were not coninensurate with the construction states of the plant. The memorandum also identified technical inspection procedures required by IE Manual Chapter 2512 that had not been completed by Regica IV or not completed as thoroughly as the inspection records indicated. However, the memorandum also stated that additional and supplemental NRC inspections were perfonned at CPSES which provided some assurance that the licensee's QA program was acceptable. It further stated that these inspections did not identify an overall breakdown in the CPSES QA program, and the specific areas of concern appeared to be salvageable.

Weephasized the laportance of the NRC's QA inspec' tion program by noting the NRC inspection program is three-pronged. The NRC inspectors are supposed to review and ensure that implementing procedures for work activities are in place prior to work starting. This inspection activity is followed by the NRC inspector reviewing actual work in progress. Finally, the NRC inspector reviews the stility's QA records for the work completed to ensure that the documentation reflects that the completed work activity was properly controlled by the stility.

Some of the NRC technical inspection procedures that identified as not completed at CPSES were required to be conducted whi e construction work was in progress. Consequently, the opportunity for the NRC to inspect these activities was lost. In these situations, the NRC inspector must rely on the utility's quality assurance / quality control (QA/QC) records to have assurance the work was completed properly. Therefore, it was important for the utility

39 -

to have an effective 5 program to ensure their system for controlling and auditing work activities included making sure quality control personnel were ins ect ng daily work activities and were documenting their ins Hections.

comunented that earlier NRC inspections had indicated tie utility's QA in on program uns not adequately reviewing QC inspection activities.

pined that the TUGC0 audit program at corporat arters should have disclosed this shortcoming; however.

discovered the TUSCO corporate tudit prcrgram was at effe ive, stated that because the NRC did not comprehensively inspect the TUGC0 corporate QA audit program until 1984, this weakness went undetected by TUGC0 and the NRC. Consequently, NRC could not fully rely on the accuracy of the TUGC0 QA records when NRC technical inspection procedures were not completed in time. (Attachneet 5, pages 10-13,16-18, 29-36, and 38-68).

s interviewed conc g the adequacy of the Region IV QA ins ion program at CPSES.

related that the inspection program required by IE Manual Chapter 512 had been a " moving target" because over the years its scope and requirements have changed. Consequently, it would be difficult to ascertala if previous R inspections complied with current n

requirements of the manual chapter.

tated that for some inspection modules where a timely inspection was net perfonned, the window of opportunity may have passed. In those cases. NRC must perform compensatory inspection procedures.

believed the pality and quantity of Region IV's QJLinspection program at C SES outlined by Annual Chapter 2512 was a non-issue.W stated there was a breakdown in the stility's QA program at CPSES; however, by completing the Comanche Peak Response Team Plan (CPRTP the NRC can gather enough information to make a licensing decision for CPSES.

acknowledged that by not

[

performing timely inspections, NRC may contributed to the weakness of the utility's QA program at CPSES; however, phasized that NRC is not a substitute for the stility's QA program.

stated the best NRC can do is to make sure the stility is doing all it can, and even that's a very small sampling.

related that he asked Mto analyze the information provided in te anuary 13, randum to determine if additional inspection effort was required.

noted that most of the observations in the memorandum had been overcome events.

explained that a significant development over the past year as the CP, w ich had a program pl,an that addressed the type of shortcomlegs identified in the January 13, 1986, memorandum (Attachment P. pages 3-45 and 122-136).

Mnas interriamed concerning the adequacy of the Region IV QA inspection program at CPSES, and asserted that over the years the IE inspection program outlined in IE Manual Chapter 2512 had changed. 6 said that by virtue of the constant changes in the IE inspection program it was difficult to impleent some of the procedures in a timely manner 6 added, however, that recent NRC inspection efforts such as the Construction Assessment Team, the Region IV Special Inspection, and the Technical Review Team (TRT) may have addressed the QA requirements outlined in IE Manual Chapter 2512. Howser, Region IV had yet to determine to what extent these inspections meet 512 5 requirements.

I Mprovided an explanation regarding Region IV's application of the QA inspection procedures duHng the period of 1974 to 1984. Wthat up until 1980, there were only three QA modules for the construction phase. One of them was an as-required module, which means it may never be completed. In 1980/1981 IE added OR modules and within the same year the inspection program was changed to a Priority I, II and III, which gave the R ption of determining the level of inspection effort. According to III decision was made to cut back on the inspection effort at CPSES be use a i

had been assigned to the site.

' sion was madi to do only Priority I and II modules, and hey dropped the QA modules under Priority III.

In 1984 IE revised the inspection program and did away with the Priority I, II and III system (Attachment D, pages 46-55 and 76-104).

Concernin the information contained in the Januar 13, 1986, memorandum from to directed to review the inspection isto ted the results of this review in a 1

memorandum to (AttachmentII).

In that iaemorandum, stated:

I believe that all the changes made in the IE program, and in particular, l

the prioritization established in the September 15, 1981, revision of Manual Chapter 2512, make it impractical to draw any conclusions without taking such aspects into consideration. The IE Manual Chapter 2512, 766 l

data provides so method to account for IE program changes.

I earlier reviewed the Manual Chapter 2512 QA modules and found that from 1975 to 1980, there were only three QA modules and one of these was to be performed only once. Since 1980, there have been five changes and four QA modules added. The 1981 prioritization dropped three of these four QA modules as well as many parts of the other Manual Chapter 2512 modules.

Prioritization was in effect through 1984.

6was interviewed concerning the adequacy of the Region IV QA inspection program at CPSES.was conducted, in Au@ gust and September 1984 related that Region IV inspection 84-32/11 inspection NRC learned TUGC0 had some deficiencies in its review of their QA program at CPSES. IRC found that TUGC0 failed to establish and implement a required system of comprehensive, planned and periodic audit safety-related activities and vendors associated with CPSES.

considered the findings pertaining to the establishment and imp ementation of the utility's audit program to be significant. The failure by the utility to review the status and adequacy of the QA program and the failure by the utility to implement an audit program indicated the utility did not have control of its 04 activities nor was assessin the adequacy of the QA activities that were in place, also said considered the findings to be significant in this particu because t e records of quality assurance at CPSES were placed in question by the efforts of the TRT.

Monnented t$st when@made an overview of the types of problems being identified at CPWame to the conclusion that the Region IV inspection l

pr ram applied to DSES was less than appropriate and less than adequate.

believed the reason that the TRT and the CPRT existed was an attempt to

recover the quality of CPSES which should have been verified during the past ten years of construction.

~

W related that during 1984-1985, M conducted a review to understand the status of the Region IV Tnspection program at CPSES. This was done for two purposes. First, it was to establish the status of the NRC inspection program and to use the status to modify or tailor the NRC inspection program of CPSES, Units 1 and 2, to strengthen any weak areas.

Secondly, the review was to provide input to the CPRT action plans so the licensee would fully address any safety concerns the NRC might now develop because the NRC had not inspected the TUGC0 corporate QA program during a 10-year period.

said that although Region IV conducted some inspections of TUGCO's QA p gram, they were not extensive or fully adequate. Consequently, if neither the utility nor the NRC had reviewed the status and adequacy of the TUGC0 QA program, then there were some concerns relative to the quality of constructica at CPSES. With the informationMdeveloped during their review l

of the Region IV inspection program at CPSES, the NRC could modify inspection l

programs to provide the most assurance of the level of qual ES.

(Attachment C, pages 5-11).

(For details of the results o review of the Region IV inspection program at CPSES, see Attachment E.

i was intervie e

e a equacy of the Region IV QA inspec-tion program at CPSES.

related that during the sumer of 1984,5was detailed to the TRT effort at CPSES wherhversaw the completion of the routine inspection program required by IE manual chapters and was responsible found that because Region IV had been pursuin@g De resolution t a number of miscellaneous allegations. Upon assignment to for el

CPSES, of many a egations that were associated with CPSES, the Region had fallen behind in the completion of the inspection program. It was W initial impression there was a lot of inspection work still to be done.

While conducting inspections at CPSES, Region IV did not place any more emphasis than was called for by the IE inspection program on either QA inspections or hardware inspections. However, Region IV inspectors discovered l

that QA type inspections, especially at the TUGC0 corporate Headquarters, had not een completed according to the schedule called for by the IE manual.

opined that Region IV was probably further behind in terms of l

completing the QA inspection program than the inspections ' involving direct I

observation of work at the site.

As a result of an overview of the Region IV inspection program at CPSES that F equested, learned that ion IV QA inspection program was not as complete as it s culd have been.

l recalled that as part of the

review, ted an informal ation of the status of all 9egion to do additional in@spections at CPSES in the QA area.

pointed out t that as a result of the revie6 l

IV inspections.

M ied thealso noted that Region IV had missed some QA inspections required by I

the IE inspection program to be completed at various stages of construction.

Consequently, in the sumer of 19846 instructed M to capture in one inspection effort as many of the previous inspection procedures as l

h

possible, althoug recognized this was not the perfect o ortunity to complete some of aspections. As an example of this.

.ited the Region IV QA inspection effort relating to vendor QA programs. Some of the TUGC0 vendors had either completed their work or had very little work remaining on site. Therefore, it was difficult from an inspection standpoint

)

to achieve a full appreciation concerning how good the QA programs of these vendors were because they were no longer on site.

ommented that if Region IV had not completed some of the QA

@ ions when required, then the Region would not have a complete data base inspect to judge the adequacy of plant construction.Wnoted that the QA program is one important part of a set of management con r that the utility has to assure the plant is constructed properly.

dded that the fact that the region may not have done an inspection did not necessarily mean the utility's program was inadequate.

It just meant that NRC had no basis upon which to judge the program.

InWview, the NRC and Region IV have recovered sufficiently from this deficit because, since 1984, a tremendous number of resources have been used at CPSES and much of the effort has been related to the adequacy of the utility's quality assurance and quality control programs.

(AttachmentJJ, pages 2-8).

was interviewed concerni the adequacy of the Region I nspection ram at CPSES.

rela ed that whi was not aware of any concerns wi y

egion V QA inspection program during the l

construe CPSES.

tated that duri the time M was assigned as the

, a group of inspectors from the lilE Headquarters oo e status of Region IV's implementation of the IE Manual Chapter 2512 inspection program and detemined that most of the undules had been completed. gadded that later on in the TRT effort, QA inspectors looked at the QA ins etion procedures and found that the QA modules had not been completed.

learned that only 50 or 60 percent of some of the modules had been completed and the modules had then been closed. When asked by DIA whether more effort by Region IV to complete the NRC QA inspection modules could have resulted in TUGC0 implementing earlier action to correct problems with its QA program,Meplied that it was hard to say.Splained that had Region IV been able to do more at CPSES, they may have surfaced some of these problems and had a handle on them earlier.

Instead, it uns the TRT that identified many of the problems.

(Attachment KK, pages 10-22).

concerning the adegnaq of the Region IV QA inspection program at CPSES.

Mstatedplief that the attitude of Region IV mana ement was that it did not want to create too many problems for the utility.

added that this was difficult to deterufne conclusively; however, whenMooked at the facts, Efound that the amoust of faspection activities compared to the need at the plant was very small, and that for a considerable period of time, almost all the inspections at CPSE5 we done by6 with very little

regional support. Wstated that it was a fact that the inspections were not being done.

s M.urthershtsrated on the Region IV inspection program b ining that the Region didmet have a strong orientation to QA programs.

believed that had RegimIT had such a strong orientation over the. years, e problems seen at CPSES.3muth Texas and Waterford would never have arisen sWhen asked if greater emphnis by Region IV on the QA aspects of the NRC inspection program at CP55 could have resulted in TUGC0 implementing a better QA program at an earlier sange stated that he believed this to be true. He added that if the pnym for is not strong, then any deficiencies which occur in the constructie ergestration will simply be magnified.

@ stated thatMES did not have a strong QA pro ra and the Region did not remedy that sitettes over a period of years. 4 further considered it a "very severe diHciency" on the part of Region

.V to have not conducted an inspection of MC8's corporate QA program and taken corrective action However, Wild act believe the NRC should do the utility's job.6 cormented thatssen though Region IV may not have fulfilled its responsibilities.the utility cannot blame the NRC for its mistakes. However, the NRC would nue better represented the public, both in terms of health and safety and la tras of expense, had Region IV demanded and obtained better quality asseruse from TUSCO. (AttachmentR,pages6-9and23-29).

6mststerviewed concer the ad uacy of the Region IV A inspect at CP surefore could not speak with any spe o events th occur prior to t date pertaining to the status of Region IV QA inspection prepen at CPSES. However. M tated the IE Manual Chapter 2512 inspectieprsgram has been a dynamic program and in constant change.

Logically, if te program was continually changing, the changes would impact on what was dueis the pastM statemwould not be able to make any i

judgement ce Se statas of the Region IV inspection program until5 was able to determine muttly what was required at various points in time.

(Attachment J,ynges 66-67).

was interviewed concerning the adequacy of thetegies IV QA inspection program at CPSES.

first involvement um(F5E3 was in Februa be connented that when irst becameM

, 6 were required to perfonn he inspectionsutlined in IE nual Cha er 2512.

which contained s ca led "C" modules, and e reg onal inspectors completed the inspection premtres in IE Manual Chapter 2512. W further noted that IE Manual ChaptarIBt did not contain any QA inspection modules.

Mconused est inspectors concentrated their inspections on hardware instead of Samus because he inspection program in IE Manual Chapter 2512 was structured called that until 9 or 1980, Se $l taspection mo es in Manual Chapter 2512, concerning l

post constructlur permit requirements, only contained inspection procedure 1

l

. 35200.@urther recalled that between 1979 and 1981, the South Texas project was consuming almost all of the Region IV resources that were not dedicated to the res13ent inspector program. Regional management had to decide where they were going to concentrate the finite manpower resources available. At that point in time, CPSES was not the priority.

In early 1982, the CPSES hearings began, and from 1982 until 1984, the hearings plus resolution of allegations were about all of inspection work that did at CPSES. He said that examination of nspection reports at C E l

would disclose that they were published fu er and further apart until the point where almost a year of inspection activity was documented in one of them.

(Attachment LL, pages 6-14, and 29-31).

)

Sumary of Technical Review of Allegation 2 At OIA's request, M revie concerns regarding the NRC inspection program for CPSES.

opined that based on his review, the QA in ion effort by Region Vf CPSES over the years was inadequate.

compared the content of various QA inspection reports by Region IV with the nspection procedure utdance provided in past iteratiora f IE Manual Chapter 2512.

considered as part of his review the nistory of frequencies speci ied in anual Chapter 2512 for the performance of the QA construction inspection procedures. He learned that a significant number of the QA inspections.specified by Chapter 2512 were not performed in a timely manner (Attachment HH).

In regard specific Manual Chapter 2512 inspection procedures reviewed by he found the following:

Inspection Procedure 35020, Audit of Applicant's Surveillance of Contractor QA/QC Activities. Although required since 1977 to be performed between 5 months after docketing and construction com-pletion, this procedure was not satisfied until CPSES was nearing completion.

Inspection Procedure 35060 Licensee Management of QA Activities.

1 Since 1980, the IE Manual has provided that this inspection is to be performed every 18 months. At least two inspections 'on this area

- were not performed as specified by Chapter 2512.

Inspection Procedure 35061. In-Depth QA Inspection of Performance.

Since 1980, the IE Manual has provided that this inspection is to be performed annually. At least three inspections were not perfonned in accordance with this inspection procedure.

Inspection Procedure 35065, Procurement, Receiving and Storage.

Since 1980, the IE Manual has specified that this inspection be performed annually. At least three inspections that were to have satisfied this procedure were not perfonned.

Inspection Procedure 35100 Review of QA Manual. Since 1976, this IE Manual has indicated that this inspection is to be performed as required.

was concerned that the licensee needed to revise its manua late in the construction process.

l

45 -

.i Inspection Procedure 35200, Mid-Tenn Construction Permit QA Inspec-tion. Since 1976, the Manual has provided that this inspection is to be performed between 18 to 30 months after the beginning of construction. This inspection was not satisfied as specified by the April 1976 version of Chapter 2512.

• 4 Because the ($ inspection procedures required by IE Manual Ch ter 12 were not satisfied by Region IV as to frequency of perfonnance, opined J

l that it would not be possible to rely on the QA inspection e ort ion IV E

as evidence of the safe construction of CPSES. Consequently, 1

believed that other efforts such as the Construction Assessment eam Inspection 83-18/12, Region IV Special Inspection 84-26, the Technical Review Team activities, and inspections of technical work by Region IV over the ear uld be relied upon to detennine the adequacy of plant construction.

concludpd that:

The fact that the Region IV QA inspection elfort was weak is not the major concern at Comanche Peak by itself, because the applicant's QA program could have been satisfactory despite the weaknesses in the Region IV effort. However, the Technical Review Team in Supplement 11 to NUREG-0797 identified numerous deficiencies in the implementation of the

$P applicant's QA program. In particular, the Technical Review Team con-

_r cluded that failures by QA and QA personnel to detect deficiencies K

suggested an ineffective Brown & Root and TUGC0 inspection system.

It g

therefore appears that the weaknesses on the Region IV QA inspection

-i effort any have contributed to inadequacies in the applicant's QA pro-g gram.

g r_a As a resvit I do not believe that the past Region IV QA inspection effort provides strong support for the safe construction of Comanche Peak.

3-Other efforts such as the Construction Assessment Team Inspection

-3 83-18/12, Region IV Special Inspection 84-26, the Technical Review Team

-g activities, and inspections of technical work by Region IV over the years, should be relied upon to determine the adequacy of plant con-3 struction.

g

=

Because the requirements of IE Manual Chapter 2512, Light Water Reactor g

Inspection Program - Construction Phase, have changed over the past years OIA reviewed past iterations of the manual chapter and prepared an array which a

sunnarized the specified frequency of the QA inspection modules that were reviewed during this investigation (Attachment N).

Conclusion 3

-i A11egatten II: The Region IV QA Inspection Program at CPSES Was i

Inadequate

=

Based on the available information, it appears that at CPSES Region IV did not j

satisfy the frequency requirements for the IE Manual Chapter 2512 QA inspection procedures reviewed by OIA. OIA noted that the requirements of the T

IE inspection program had changed over the years making it difficult, at this

{

date, to determine if past Region IV inspections fulfilled the QA inspection procedures prescribed by the Manual Chapter. Additionally, none of the Region IV management officials interviewed by OIA could state whether the Region IV 9?

e

46 -

OA inspection progra at OSES met the IE Manual Chapter 2512 requirements.

The Region IV management afficials could only conjecture as to how the Region IV QA inspection program amplied with IE Manual Chapter 2512. Consequently, it appears that it would at be possible to rely on the Region IV QA inspection effort as eviduce of the safe construction of CPSES. This, in combination with the deficiencies identified in TUGCO's implementation of its QA program, means that ta detennine the adequacy of plant construction it will be necessary for the MC m rely largely on the detailed technical inspections of various structures, systems and components that have recently been conducted by the MC at Cp5ES.

Allegation III: Beta Doceented in Region IV's NFL ljnn 766 Inspector's Report was Inaccurate WhenO intervised by OIA, estated that snii nwas reviewing the Region IV inspection progrcm at CPSES form,Wid ied problems with Je ion IV's documentation of inspections at CP5ES.

explained R

thatW discovered instaners of inspection procedures being ocumented as completed; however, the actual inspections were not conducted or not conducted as thoroughly as the recast indicated. 6 stated the problems ranged from inspection work not &cumented and perhaps not done, to what appeared to be false entries false documentation reported on work done by NRC inspectors.

destified that the problem was with the information contained on Region IV's BC Forms 766. Inspector's Report, which were prepared by the inspectors to document the NRC inspection procedures addressed in inspection reports, and inforination provided by the 766 computerized system.

As backgrou splained that after the inspector prepares the 766 i

data forms, ttaches than to the referenced inspection report, and the information then used ts update the Region IV computerized inspection and enforcement statistical data file. This file is a management information system used to track inspations that have been co and to maintain a status of the inspection program at a project.

oted that during a review of the i tor's report it is normal to 1 ntify some errors; how-ever, the e was finding with the NRC Forn 766 data were flagrant.

Mrelated that, as a result of @omparison of the Region IV, NRC Form 766 data with the actal inspection reports,Midentified discrepancies between what uns listed as the NRC res and what was documented in the inspection mports. Additionally, ated his. review showed QA program ins s at CPSES had not been adequately completed by Region IV.

further explained thatSwas not disputing the information from the stantoint of exactness in recording percentages of completion of verless insinction modules; rather.Mconcern was over inspection modules being sucorded on the NRC Forms 765 as being 100% complete when in t isspection reports there was no indication the area was looked at.

revMed two charts, one for Unit 1, CPSES and one for Unit 2. CPSES, that estiland the results ofMcomparison of the NRC Form 766 data with inspecties reports for Region IV inspection program at CPSES (Attachment B, pages 41-9 and 75-76; Exhibits 3-3 and 3-4 to Attachment B).

DIA interviewed a amber af Region IV managers and inspectors concerning the accuracy of the inforestics recorded in the NRC Fonn 766 system. The general

consensus of these interviewed was that because of carelessness, lack of knowledge abost the 76fr system, and lack of quality control over infomation entered into the'systas, the infonnation in the automated inspection and enforcement statistical data system was inaccurate.

It was generally believed that little reliability could be placed on any information obtained from the system. However, there was no indication that inaccurate data was intentionally recorded and put into the system in an effort to make the Region IV inspection progra at CPSES look better.

It appeared to SIA that Region IV personnel were uncertain about the proper method for completing the NRC Foms 766 and whether there should be a direct corelation between a reference in an inspection report and an entry on the 766 form. There was aise confusion concerning how to determine the percentage of completion of as inspection module. These questions centered around whether percent of completion should be viewed as a percentage of the inspection modules completed or as a percentage of the inspected work activity that was completed at the construction site. Frequent changes in the implementation of the 766 systes ever the years has also created confusion. Additionally, several individuals stated that certain information 'was recycled on the NRC Forms 766 merely to get the computer to accept the data.

Sumary of Technical Review At 01A's request.

reviewed the accuracy of the NRC Foms 766 that were hid11$ted by in the documentation ided to OIA.

Based on his review of a number of NRC Foms 766 for CPSES, determined the 766 data for CPSES was unreliable, noted discrepancies between the information on the NRC Foms 766 and the infomation documented in the asSBciated inspection reports.E concluded that some of the NRC Fom 766 data for CPSES overestimated the extent of completion of the Region IV inspection program (Attachment HH).

Conclusion Allegation III: Bata Documented in Region.IV's NRC Form 766 Inspector's Report was Isacerate Based on the infamstles developed during this investigation, the data recorded in the EC Fems 766 pertaining to CPSES is inaccurate and unreliable. The incurrect reporting ranged from inspection activity recorded on the NRC Forus 166 for which there was no documentation in associated inspection reports to listing inspection modules as 100 percent complete on the forms without completing the reconsnended inspection activity, merely to close the module. The cause of the discrepancies appears to be a lack of understanding as the part of NRC inspectors as to the proper method of completing the BC Fans 766.

ATTACWENTS A.

Technical Issues Raised byMDuring OIA Interview.

B.

Interview ofM dtd March 19, 1986.

C.

Interview ofM dtd April 10, 1986.

D.

Interview ofM dtd July 10, 11, 21 and 23, 1986.

i l

E. Memorandum f 6 to M 6 did January 13, 1986.

I F.

Draft Inspection Report 85-07/05, dtd February 3,1986.

G.

Interview of M dtd April 9,1986.

H.

Interview of M dtd June 17, 1986 and November 25, 1986.

I.

Interview of M dtd May 29, 1986.

J.

Interview of M dtd July 25, 1986.

K.

Matrix of Drafts for Report 85-14/11.

L.

TUGC0 Speed Letter, dtd January 9,1986.

M.

Interview ofM dtd July 17, 1986.

N.

Interview of Mdtd July 24, 1986.

O.

Matrix of Drafts for Report 85-16/13, dtd May 12, 1986.

l P.

Interview of M dtd July 22, 1986.

Q.

Interview of M. dtd July 17, 1986.

R.

Interview of M dtd June 24, 1986.

S.

Interview of M dtd May 28, 1986.

T.

Interview of M dtd May 28, 1986.

U.

Interview ofM dtd July 24, 1986.

V.

Menorandum fremM to M dtd April 29, 1986.

W.

Interview of M dtd July 9,1986.

X.

Interview ofM dtd July 9,1986.

Y.

Interview of Mdtd July 9,1986.

('

2. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.

AA. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.

BB. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.

CC. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.

DD. Interview ofM dtd June 26, 1986.

EE. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.

FF. Interview of M dtd July 24, 1986.

GG. Interview of td March 20, 1986.

HH. Memoranda to

, DIA, from M dtd July 8. July ovem r 5, and November 26, 1986.

II. Memorandum tch fromM dtd May 23, 1986.

JJ. Interview of M dtd June 25, 1986.

S.

I KK. Interview of dtd July 23, 1986.

i LL. Interview of M dtd July 22, 1986.

1 MM. Technical Review ofMIssues Contained in Comanche Peak

~

Inspection Reports, prepared by 6 NN. Frequency of QA Modules Based on Past Versions of the MC 2512 Program.

00. Interview of 6 dtd November 24, 1986.

PP. Interview of M dtd November 26, 1986.

e 9

OS

,_