Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion to Improved STS Sections 3.1,3.2,3.5,3.9 & 4.0
	ML20236Y172
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	08/04/1998
From:	; UNION ELECTRIC CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20236Y166	List: ML20236Y172; ULNRC-03877, Submits Response to NRC RAI Re Proposed Conversion to Improved TSs Sections 3.1,3.2,3.5,3.9 & 4.0.Suppl to Will Be Provided at Later Date;
References
	NUDOCS 9808110230
	Download: ML20236Y172 (320)
	v • d • e

. _.

I l

l l

I l

l t

l JLS CONVERSION TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CTS 3/4.1 - REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

)

I ITS 3.1 - REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND LICENSEE INITIATED-ADDITIONAL CHANGES l

9808110230 980804

, PDR ADOCK 05000483 -

P PDR ;

i i

k. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _.__.__________.____d

INDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED NUMBER 3.1.G-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES l 3.1 1 WC, CA YES 3.1-2 DC,CP NA 3.1-3 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.1-4 DC,CP NA 3.1-5 CP NA 3.1-6 DC,CP NA 3.1 7 DC,CP NA 3.1-8' DC,CP NA 3.1-9 DC NA 3.1-10 DC,CP NA 3.1-11 DC,CP NA 3.1-12 .DC,CP NA 3.1-13 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.1-14 WC NA 3.1-15 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.1-16 DC, CP, WC, CA YES

, 3.1-17 CP NA l 3.1-18 CP NA 3.1-19 WC, CA YES 3.1-20 DC, CP NA 3.1-21 DC,CP NA 3.1-22 DC NA 3.1-23 WC NA 3.1-24 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.1-25 DC, CP, WC, CA YES l

3.1-26 CP NA ;

3.1-27 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.1-28 DC, CP, WC, CA YES i CA 3.1-001 WC, CA YES ,

CA 3.1-003 CA YES CA 3.1-004 CA YES CP 3.1-ED CP NA CP 3.1-002 CP NA CP 3.1-003 CP NA DC 3.1-ED DC NA DC ALL-001 (3.1 changes only) DC NA DC ALL-002 (3.1 changes only) DC NA DC 3.1-001 DC,CP NA

__ _ __.-.____---.u.--------- -- - ---' '

l INDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED NUMBER TR 3.1-001 DC, CP, WC, CA YES !

, TR 3.1-003 DC, CP, WC, CA YES TR 3.1-004 DC, CP, WC, CA YES TR 3.1-005 DC, CP, WC, CA YES TR 3.1-006 DC, CP, WC, CA YES WC 3.1-ED WC NA I

l i

l I

i i I !

l 1 I

l l

l i

l L-_-_-____________-________________-_____

JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The following methodology is followed for submitting additional information:

1. Each licensee is submitting a separate response for each section.

j

2. If an RAI does not apply to a licensee (i.e., does not actually impact the information that defines the technical specification change for that licensee), "NA" has been entered in the index column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for that licensee.

3. If a licensee initiated change does not apply, "NA" has been entered in the index column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for that licensee.

4. The common portions of the " Additional Information Cover Sheets" are identical, except for brackets, where applicable (using the same methodology used in enclosures 3A, 3B,4,6A and 6B of the conversion submittals). The list of attached pages will vary to match the licensee specific conversion submittals. A licensee's FLOG response may not address all applicable plants if there is insufficient similarity in the plant specific responses to justify theirinclusion in each submittal. In those cases, the response will be prefaced with a heading such as " PLANT SPECIFIC DISCUSSION."

5. Changes are indicated using the redline / strikeout tool of Wordperfect or by using a hand markup that indicates insertions and deletions, if the area being revised is not clear, the affected portion of the page is circled. The markup techniques vary as necessary, based on the specifics of the area being changed and the complexity of the changes, to provide the clearest possible indication of the changes.

6. A marginal note (the Additional Information Number from the index) is added in the right margin of each page being changed, adjacent to the area being changed, to identify the source of each change.

7. Some changes are not applicable to one licensee but still require changes to the Tables provided in Enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A, and 6B of the original license amendment request to reflect the changes being made by one or more of the other licensees.

These changes are not included in the additionalinformation for the licensee to which the change does not apply, as the changes are only for consistency, do not technically affect the request for that licensee, and are being provided in the additionalinformation l

being provided by the licensees for which the change is applicable. The complete set l of changes for the license amendment request will be provided in a licensing l amendment request supplement to be provided later.

I.

JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONALINFORMATION (continued)

8. The item numbers are formatted as follows: [ Source] [lTS SectionF[nnn)

Source = Q - NRC Question CA- AmerenUE DC-PG&E WC - WCNOC CP - TU Electric TR - Traveler ITS Section = The ITS section associated with the item (e.g.,3.3), if all sections are potentially impacted by a broad change or set of changes, "ALLis used for the section number.

nnn = a three digit sequential number or ED (ED indicates editorial correction with no impact on meaning) i l

.. - _ _ _ _ _ ._ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____--___a

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET I

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1.G-1 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: ITS 3.1.x Bases l There have been a number of instances that the specific changes to the STS Bases are not properly identified with redline or strikeout marks.

Comment: Perform an audit of all STS Bases markups and identify instances where l additions and/or deletions of Bases were not properly identified in the original submittal.

1 FLOG RESPONSE: The submitted ITS Bases markups for Section 3.1 have been compared to the STS Bases. Some differences that were identified were in accordance with the markup methodologies (e.g., deletion of brackets and reviewer's notes), Most of the differences were editorial in nature and would not have affected the review. Examples of editorial changes are.

j

1) Capitalizing a letter with only a " redline" but not striking out the lower case letter that it replaced.

2) Changing a verb from singular to plural by adding an "s" without redlining the "s".

3) Deleting instead of striking-out the A, B, C, etc., following a specification title (e.g., SR 3.6.6A.7).

4) Changing a bracketed reference (in the reference section) with only a

" redline" for the new reference but failing to include the strike-out of the old reference.

5) In some instances the brackets were retained (and struck-out) but the unchanged text within the brackets was not redlined.

i

6) Not redlining a title of a bracketed section. The methodology calls for the section title to be redlined when an entire section was bracketed.

7) Additional text not contained in the STS Bases was added to the ITS Bases by the lead FLOG member during the development of the submittal. Once it was determined to not be applicable, the text was then struck-out and remains in the ITS Bases markup.

Differences of the above editorial nature will not be provided as attachments to this response.

The pages requiring changes that are more than editorial and are not consistent with the i markup methodology are attached.

ATTACHED PAGES:

l Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 - ITS 3.1 L

Enclosure 58, pages B 3.1-1, B 3.1-3, B 3.1-6, B 3.1-20, B 3.1-23, B 3.1-31, B 3.1-34, Figure B 3.1.7-1, B 3.1-47

SDM --T, : 000*r B 3.1.1 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) -T,,, - 200*r BASES !

1 BACKGROUND According to GDC 26 (Ref.1), the reactivity control systems must be redundant and capable of holding the reactor core suberitical when shut down under cold conditions. Maintenance of the SDM ensures that postulated reactivity events will not damage the fuel.

I SDM requirements provide sufficient reactivity margin to ensure i that acceptable fuel design limits will not be exceeded for normal shutdown and anticipated operational occurrences (A00s).

As such, the SDM defines the degree of subcriticality that would ,

be obtained immediately following the insertion er-serem of all shutdown and control rods, assuming that the si le rod cluster assembly of highest reactivity worth is f y withdrawn. ;

~ 0,3 - l u*o Y^ '

The system design requires that t independent reactivity control systems be provided, and that one of these systems be ;

capable of maintaining the core su critical under cold l

) conditions. These requirements are provided by the use of movable control assemblies and solu e boric acid in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The . System can compensate for$S./.6-/ 4 the reactivity effects of the fuel a water temperature changes accompanying power level changes over he range from full load to no load. In addition, the ,

ystem, together with thep r./,6-/

boration system, provides the SDM during power operation and is capable of making the core subcritical rapidly enough to preve,nt exceeding acceptable fuel damage limits, assuming that the rod of highest reactivity worth remains fully withdrawn. The p5EiiRali lin'tNV53tiliimC4fitT515i&mili soldic t,orer, system can EUntr.o.1L-We' s t

5531tiMigtidm compensate for fuel depletion during operation and all xenon burnout reactivity changes and c]a;n maintain the reactor subcritical under cold conditions.

S During power operation SDM control is ensured by operating with the shutdown banks fully withdrawn and the control banks within the limits of LCO 0.1.7, 3J3% " Control Bank Insertion Limits."

When the unit is in the shutdown and refueling nodes, the SDM requirements are met by means of adjustments to the RCS boron concentration.

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1-1 5/15/97 i C_____-__-__-___ _

1 SDM --T,6 q B 3.1.1 j

) BASES APPLICABLE tp d cjg.e [ disy d ,L.,ow. S J'. /. 6- /

SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) The increased steam flow resulting from a pipe break in the main steam system causes an increased energy removal from the affected steam generator (SG), and consequently the RCS. This results in a reduction of the reactor coolant temperature. The resultant coolant shrinkage causes a reduction in pressure. In the presence of a negative moderator temperature coefficient, this cooldown causes an increase in core reactivity. As RCS temperature decreases, the severity of an MSLB decreases until the MODE 5 value is reached. The most limiting MSLB, with respect to potential fuel damage before a reactor trip occurs, is a guillotine break of a main steam line inside containment initiated at the end of core life % st- ,wws msf+

The positive reactivity addition from the moderator temperature decrease will terminate when the affected SG boils dry, thus terminating RCS heat removal and cooldown. Following the HSLB, a post trip return to power'may occur; however, no fuel damage occurs as a result of the post trip return to power, and THERMAL POWER does not violate the Safety Limit (SL) requirement of SL 2.1.1.

-In edditica to the liroiting MSLO trar.;icnt, thc SOM rcquirc;cr.t

..;^t ;U- T;t;;t ;;;b^2

c. Inadverter.t bore., dilution,

b. An uncontrolicd red withdre.;;l fica subcritical or icw 4.;-T ;--dit ti.,

c. Startup of en inectivc rcacter ceciant pump (",CI'). and '

n_; _u_a__

m. .mu - . . . .

Each cf thc;c cycnts is discussed bclow.

In the boron dilution analysis, the required SDM defines the reactivity difference between an initial subcritical boron concentration and the corresponding critical boron concentration.

These values, in conjunction with the configuration of the RCS and the assumed dilution flow rate, directly affect the results of the analysis. This event is most limiting at the beginning of core life, when critical boron concentrations are highest. He I s

}

(continued)

! MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 3 5/15/97 l

SDM ---T,,, - 000 'I B 3.1.1

) BASES .

ACTIONS M (continued) should borate with the best source available for the plant conditions.

In dctcr.;;inir.; the kretien ' lea retc. tre tin in cerc lifc :.ust k cer.;;idcred. Ier ii.sts. cc. tFe rest difficult ti;;;c in core lif; te iarcex tFe RCS beren cer,ccatretier ie et tte bcginning of cycic whcr. tPc ber.a coaccatretien ;;;ey eppreach er cxccd 2000 pp. Assu;;;ias thet e vein ef it um/k r st be ricevers-d 'end e beretica flew retc ef[gp. it is p;sibic te ircice;c the & 7./.G-/

beren coaccatretien of the RCS by 100 pF in :;pprexi;;;tcly 05 ciaut;e. If a beren worth of 10 pe;;i/pg i:; eax;ed, this .

..-__m.__

.... m. . ..r..-.._.,,_._______u_

_m. ,

....,n.

. ms m.

rex br;;tien per:.utcr; er,7. y. u.7,,_. ;ad m ps rcprcxat & 3 / 6-/

typical veix:; end ecc p.evided fer the purpen of effering a cgc.ific cx;. ric.

i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.1.1 REQUIREMENTS

3) In H0 DES 1 and 2, SDH is verified by observing that the requirements of LC0 3*:6 M and LCO 0.1.7 '

a are met. In the event that a rod is known to be untrippable, however, SDM verification must account for the worth of the untrippable rod as well as another rod of maximum worth.

In H00E0 0. 4. end 5 :e< s '

r e ": . -ne.a ..:r., the SDH is verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the listed reactivity effects: )

i

a. RCS boron concentration W sec. s . w i. nt u . %

M9porMpil i. .-

b. Control '. suv.m + . benk position: i

'. i

c. RCS average temperature: '

d. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation:

e. Xenon concentration:

f. Samarium concentration: and s

(continued)

HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 6 5/15/97

l HTC B 6-1-+ ggg i

BASES ,

SURVEILLANCE SR BRMBE2 3.1.4.2 ar,d 2 2.1.4.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS x.ewtstm,, .v .w 4

.e,.;n n w .9, :j; n.,g.uyg, ,, y, se el hog,f* a ' j'O or 36(4- si.

eg If the 300 ppm Surveillance limit is exceeded, it is O f./,C-/

possible that the EOC limit on MTC could be reached before the planned EOC. Because the MTC changes slowly with core depletion the Frequency of 14 effective full power days is sufficient to avoid exceeding the EOC limit.

4g The Surveillance limit for RTP boron concentration of d 7 I 6'I 60 ppm is conservative. If the measured MTC at 60 ppm is N ;r. orc positive than the 60 ppm Surveillance limit, the EOC limit will not be exceeded because of the gradual manner in which HTC changes with core burnup.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 11.

2. FSAR, Chapter (relline) O 7I b

3. WCAP!92EEN 0271NP- A, " Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology," July 1985.

4. ISAP, Choptcr 15.

s., i i

MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 20 5/15/97 l

1 L__--__-___-______-__--__-_--

Rod Group Alignment Limits B 3.1.5 iEl;ia

~ !

(renve red lIne) f BACKGROUND the reliability of the systen , the inductive coils are connected (continued) alternately to data system A r B. Thus, if one 3 3 system fails, the DRPI will go on accuracy. with an cffcctivc ceil O 7./ 6-/

specia; ef 7.5 iactes, which is 12 stcps. Treicforc, thc normel !

ind':etion occuracy of the 2"I systc; is 1 C stcps ft-J.75 iactes), erni the seximu; unccitainty is 12 stcps (1 7.5 iactes). L'ith en indicated dcVietion of 12 stcps betwcca the greup ;tcp c;unter sad %"I, the seximum devi;tica bctwcca l actual red positica and tre dc;;nd position could b; 24 stcps, or 15 inctes. O m i.

".y.sws.p

+ m M & +.

- m - wi. 3 y.....,

.. na :. , . c . ~,,:,.2_

g.>.__-

1 sy.n

-e-APPLICABLE Centrel %d misalignment accidents are analyzed in the $"J/ 6~/

SAFETY ANALYSES safety analysis (Ref. 3). The acceptance criteria for addressing ccatrol rod inoperability or misalignment are that:

a. There be no violations of:

1. specified acceptable fuel design limits, or

) 2. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary integrity; and

b. The core remains subcritical after accident transients.

Two types of misalignment are distinguished. During movement of a centrol rod group, one rod may stop moving, while the other rods in the group continue. This condition may cause excessive power peaking. The second type of misalignment occurs if one rod fails to insert upon a reactor trip and remains stuck fully withdrawn. This condition requires an evaluation to determine that sufficient reactivity worth is held in the control E EhED'iW5 rods to meet the SDH requirement, with the maximum worth rod stuck fully withdrawn.

Two types of analysis are performed w regard to static rod misalignment (Ref. E4). With control RiUFstiiffd5Mi banks at their insertion limits, one type of analysis considers the case when any one rod is completely inserted into the core. The second type of analysis considers the case of a completely withdrawn single rod from e Et!UttE bank E inserted to its insertion limit. ( c/u , j y # ,.r m , p g , Af ) 6:7 / 6-/

)

(continued)

HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 23 5/15/97

Rod Group Alignment Limits d3+5SM

) BASES l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.5.3 BENuiq (continued) l REQUIREMENTS mechanism will not interfere with rod motion or rod drop time, and that no degradation in these systems has occurred that would adversely affect co-trol rod motion or drop time. This testing is performed with all RCPs operating and the average moderator temperature 2 500*F to simulate a reactor trip under actual ;

conditions. !

i This Surveillance is performed during a plant outage, due to the l plant conditions needed to perform the SR and the potential for an unplanned plant transient if the Surveillance were performed l with the reactor at power.

1 REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 10 and GDC 26.

2, 10 CFR 50.46. {r,//fn,)

3. FSAR, Chapter 62* ~

4. FSAR, 6 & F. / 6~ /

(re ~ve d r=. Ch;pt;r 15. a 7./-/s Jbiks-Ouf C. IX Ch;pter 15.

7. ISM , Chepici 15.

S i

l 1

?

I I

HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 31 5/15/97

Shutdown Bank Znsertion Limits B B-1-6 Egg

) BASES APPLICABLE a. There be no violations of:

SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) 1. specified acceptable fuel design limits, or

2. RCS pressure boundary integrity; and

b. The core remains suberitical after accident transients.

As such, the shutdown bank insertion limits affect safety analysis ir,volving core reactivity and SDM (Ref. 3).

The shutdown bank insertion limits preserve an initial condition assumed in the safety analyses and, as such, satisfy Criterion 2 of th; "RC Policy Stetc. ;at. w%y m- 1 :**

LCO The shutdown banks must be within their insertion limits any time the reactor is critical or approaching criticality. This ensures that a sufficient amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor and maintain the required SDM following a reactor trip.

The shutdown bank insertion limits are defined in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY The shutdown banks must be within their insertion limits, with

+

the reactor in ."00C0 1 end 2. ; w 1 u + 1 : s y c ~ .r w

.c.9, r. . , q,b , ,,, ,.w

..e.g. The applicability in MODE 2 begins g prior te initial control bank withdrawal, during an approach to criticality, and continues throughout MODE 2, until all control bank rods are again fully inserted by reactor trip or by shutdown. This ensures that a sufficient amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor and maintain the required SDM following a reactor trip. The shutdown banks do not have to be within their insertion limits in MODE 3 unless an approach to criticality is being made. In H0DE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the shutdown be,nks are m fully inserted in the core and contribute to the SDM. Refer to LCO 3.1.1 end LCO 2.1.2 for SDM requirements in MODES 6 3, 4, and 5. LCO 3.9.1,

Boron Concentration," ensures adequate SDM in MODE 6.

The Applicability requirements have been modified by a Note indicating the LCO requirement is suspended during SR 0.1.5.2.

k'ME2 (c le.re vf M y rw e (wageagh) Q 7.l.G-1

)

(continued)

MARK.UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 34 5/15/97

02./.G-I i

h ,'

.' (17.231) (67,2 )

231 P-BANKB

\

FULLY WITHDRAWN

/

2

[ [ (100,190) g 0,191) 59 Z 150 /

O,,,

/ ;

_s !

co O BANK

{

M M100 \ I m , BANK D s

O tz" g (0, 73) '

c o

o 50 /

) THIS FIGURE FOR l ILLUSTRATION ONLY

~

' FULL INSERTED DO NOT USE FOR

/ OPERATION.

0 (19,0) , g/ {

0 20 40 60 80 100 e

PERCENT F RTP ;

Figure B 3.1.7-1 (page 1 f 1) l Control Bank Insertion vs. Perc tRTP

)

WOG STS B 3.1-45 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i

l t

Rod Positior. Indication BB-1-B M BASES LCO These requirements ensure that centrol rod position indication (continued) during power operation and PHYSICS TESTS is accurate, and that design assumptions are not challenged. OPERABILITY of the position indicator channels ensures that inoperable, misaligned, or mispositioned centrel rods can be detected. Therefore, power l peaking, ejected rod worth, and SDM can be controlled within acceptable limits.

APPLICABILITY The requirements on the DRPI and step counters are only i

applicable in H0 DES 1 and 2 (consistent with LCO 0.1.5. M LCO 3.1.C. :e5 and LCO S-1-& M. because these are the only MODES in which power is generated; and the OPERABILITY and j

' alignment of rods have the potential to affect the safety of the plant. In the shutdown MODES. the OPERABILITY of the shutdown and control banks has the potential to affect the required SDM, but this effect can be compensated for by an increase in the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable rod l position indicator gr grap and each demand position indicator.

gr bak. This is acceptable because the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable position indicator. '

y ], s, , = ::: N When one DRPI chr.ril per group fails, the position f the rod !

Bf een still be determined :.ch + c by use of th NWBQN O Z/ 6-/ '

M detectors. *.? x e,v a.. , t- % "; - u o.- m % 4 getsp . i t. . s . qiy, . .y.w .y :, , . . - 4 .. , , w . . p 2.e, n y, n . - Qt' . P ) M 2 D, E.8. '^ : dib '.iM C

r d # % l-

'Ca frt'. ' 'jf S - @ r b

. 6.w.u.; i.. .h ? 9s r ris. ' - . ' ' ". r m-u o. < V iu- 9.i-6 Based on experience, normal power operation does not require excessive movement of banks. If a bank has been significantly moved, the Required Action of B-1 g! or B-B g below is required. Therefore, verification of RCCA position within the Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months is adequate for allowing

, continued full power operation, since the probability of

}

(continued) .

MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 47 5/15/97

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1-1 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: 3.1.1 Shutdown Margin (SDM) (Wolf Creek & Callaway)

DOC 01-02-M CTS 3/4.1.1 Applicability ITS 3.1.1 Applicability Comment: According to the Conversion Comparison Table, " MODE 2 with Keff < 1.0" and " MODE 5" are added to the Applicability section of TS 3.1.1 for Wolf Creek and Callaway. All of the FLOG ITS Sections 3.1.1 have these applicability requirements included in the ITS and not in the CTS. An inadequate justification for these changes is provided. Provide a discussion explaining / justifying these changes.

FLOG RESPONSE: The " MODE 2 with k.n < 1.0" Applicability was added under DOC 01-02-M, applicable only to Callaway and Wolf Creek. The

MODE 5" Applicability was added under DOC 02-01-A, applicable to all FLOG plants. While all FLOG plants have the same ITS 3.1.1 Applicability, the statement that the above MODE requirements are not in the CTS is untrue for Diablo Canyon and Comanche Peak whose CTS 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2 include MODES 1-5. I Those plants revised their CTS SDM LCO Applicability based on DOCS 01-06-A and 02-01-A.

The change being made for Callaway and Wolf Creek under DOC 01-02-M ensures that the SDM LCO Applicability covers that portion of MODE 2 not covered by ITS 3.1.6 " Control Bank '

Insertion Limits." Adding " MODE 2 with k n < 1.0" to the 3.1.1 SDM LCO Applicability covers the period of time that the control banks are withdrawn prior to reactor criticality and entry into ITS 3.1.6.

DOC 01-02-M is revised to read as follows:

"The proposed modification redefines the Applicability of the Specification to include " Mode 2 with k,n < 1.0"in addition to Modes 3,4, and 5 (see CN 02-01 A). The current Specifications for control bank insertion limits (ITS LCO 3.1.6) and shutdown bank insertion limits (ITS LCO 3.1.5) define the Shutdown Margin requirements for Mode 1 and Mode 2 with k n > 1.0. The SDM Applicability requirement added to CTS 3.1.1.1 ensures sufficient negative reactivity is available to meet the assumptions of the safety analyses throughout all of Mode 2. The proposed change would be more restrictive, but would represent only a small change from the cur ent SDM Applicability requirements."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 -ITS 3.1 Enclosure 3A, page 1 l

l 4

I i

l l

3 L.____________._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 3/4.1

) This enclosure contains a brief description / justification for each mhrked up change I to the current Technical Specifications. The changes are identified by change j numbers contained in Enclosure 2 (Mark up of the current Technical Specifications).

In addition, the referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs) are contained in Enclosure 4. Only technical changes are discussed; administrative changes (i.e., format, presentation, and editorial changes) made to conform to NUREG 1431 Revision 1 are not discussed. For Enclosures 3A, 38, 4, 6A, and 6B. text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location.

l CHANGE IMG H21C DESCRIPTION 01 01 LG In accordance with TSTF 9,n a 1. this change would move T2' ~P./-044 the specified limit for Shutdow:n Margin (SDH) from the current TS to the COLR. This change occurs in several specifications including that for SDM and those specifications with ACTIONS that require verifying SDM within limits. SDH is a cycle specific parameter that is calculated based on an NRC approved methodology. Moving the SDH to the COLR will provide core design and operational flexibility that can be used for improved fuel j management.

01-02 M 7 roposed modification redefines the applicabil QS,/-/

the sp ~ ' cation to include " Mode 2 with - .0" in addition to 3. 4, and 5 (see A). The current Specification co ank insertion limits (and ITS Specification .. ines the Shutdown Margin applicability re ements for Mode N Q Mode 2 with k m 2 1.0. Th oposed change would be more Krictive, but i would resent only a small change from the curre a 1cability requirements.

ZAGERT3A-/

01 03 LS 1 The Action Statement would be modified to reflect that the requirement to initiate boration at a specified rate with fluid at a specified boron concentration is generalized to simply require boration. As described in the ITS Bases, the required flow rate and boron concentration should be selected depending on plant conditions and available l equipment. The ITS Bases allow the operator to use the "best source available for the plant conditions." This is l an example of maintaining the overall safety requirement l in TS but removing procedural details from the TS allowing the plant operator the ability to select the appropriate procedure and equipment for the existing plant condition, i

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 1 5/15/97 l

I l

INSERT 3A-1 The proposed modification redefines the Applicability of the Specification to include $ 7. /- /

Mode 2 with kon < 1.0"in addition to Modes 3,4, and 5 (see CN 02-01-A). The current

{

Specifications for control bank insertion limits (ITS LCO 3.1.6) and shutdown bank '

insertion limits (ITS LCO 3.1.5) define the Shutdown Margin requirements for Mode 1 and Mode 2 with k.n > 1.0. The SDM Applicability requirement added to CTS f 3.1.1.1 ensures sufficient negative reactivity is available to meet the assumptions of the safety analyses throughout all of MODE 2. The proposed change would be more 3

restrictive, but would represent only a small change from the current SDM Applicability requirements.

I 4

l l

l 1

L____________________ _

1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1-3 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: 3.1.1 Shutdown Margin (SDM)(All FLOG Plants)

DOC 01-10-M CTS SR 4.1.1.1.1 ITS SR 3.1.1.1 l 1

Comment: The justification for modifying applicability of SR 3.1.1.1 is inadequate; it only refers to consistency with NUREG-1431. Also, it is not apparent why this change is not applicable to Wolf Creek and Callaway. ,

FLOG RESPONSE: For DCPP and CPSES, DOC 01-10-M is revised to state the following:

i "In the ITS format, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN in MODE 1 and MODE 2 with k a 21.0 is controlled through compliance with control rod insertion limits. For those modes or conditions in which compliance with control rod insertion limits is not required, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is '

verified in the more traditional manner by consideration of such factors as Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, coolant temperature, xenon and samarium concentrations, etc.

Thus, the applicability of CTS SR 4.1.1.1.1.e is modified by this change to be applicable to MODE 2 with k.n < 1.0 as well as the current MODES 3 and 4. This change is more restrictive, in that CTS 4.1.1.1.1.b addresses MODES 1 and 2 with k.n 21.0 and CTS 4.1.1.1.1.e addresses MODES 3 and 4. MODE 2 with k.n < 1.0 is not specifically addressed in the CTS.

See also revised Change 01-06-A, which provides a broad discussion of how the applicabilities for CTS 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, 3.1.3.5, and 3.1.3.6 have been revised. "

The Wolf Creek and Callaway Technical Specifications were modified by Amendments 89 and 103, respectively, to contain MODE 3,4, and 5 Specifications for" Shutdown Margin" and a separate MODE 1 and 2 Specification for " Core Reactivity." This eliminated the need for individual MODE applications under the Surveillance Section. Wolf Creek and Callaway used DOC 01-02-M to make the MODE 2 with k.n <1.0 change to both the LCO and the SR. This makes DOC 01 10-M not applicable to Wolf Creek and Callaway (see Enclosure 38).

ATTACHED PAGES: None 1

i l

I i

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1-13 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: ITS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits (Comanche Peak)

DOC 12-07-A ITS 3.1.4 Bases Comment: The DOC states, for Required Action B.2.6, that "the ITS Bases discuss the accident analysis affected by rod misalignment." The associated Bases do not list the accident analyses that require re-evaluation, similar to that provided by the other Four Loop Group plants. List in the Bases the accident analyses that require re-evaluation. l FLOG RESPONSE: The APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES section of ITS 3.1.4 Bases provides an appropriate description of the various manners in which a misaligned rod can affect the safety analyses. The requirement in ITS 3.1.4 REQUIRED ACTION B.2.6 is to evaluate the safety analyses; the affected analyses are described more fully by the APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (ASA) than by the list transported from the CTS. In fact, many of the analyses listed (e.g., Decrease in Reactor Coolant Inventory in FSAR Section '

15.6) are not affected by reasonable rod misalignments; whereas some transients that are sensitive to misaligned rods (most of the Power Distribution and Reactivity Anomaly accidents described in FSAR Section 15.4) are not listed. Because of the potential conflicts between the APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES section and the list of CTS Table 3.1-1, it is preferable to not add the list, but refer to the APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES section. The ITS Bases ACTIONS B.2.2, B.2.3, B.2.4, B.2.5, and B.2.6 are revised to indicate that the accident analyses presented in FSAR Chapter 15 that may be adversely affected wi!! be evaluated to ensure that the analyses results remain valid for the duration of continued operation.

Callaway, Wolf Creek, and Diablo Canyon have reviewed this Comment and concur with the above discussion. Their ITS Bases have been revised to delete the list of accident analyses that require re-evaluation and refer to FSAR Chapter 15.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 - ITS 3.1 Enclosure 58, pages B 3.1-28 and B 3.1-31 l

l

Rod Group Alignment Limits B 2.1.5 MI 4 BASES ACTIONS B.2.2. B.2.3. B.2.4. B.2.5. and B.2.6 (continued) distributions that may invalidate safety analysis assumptions at full power. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allows sufficient g ,,ej-j , g time to obtain flux maps of the core power distribution using the on,/7 .rergre/eM incore flux mapping system and to calculate F (Z) a and Fu" .

In W AR Ch<

g g g.) y ,rf w /j, Once current conditions have been verified acceptable, time is j

4 ,g{

,fg j ,

g, g

fgg available to perform evaluations of accident analysis to determine that core limits will not be exceeded during a Design g4 oBasis Event for the duration of operation under these conditions.4 $7./-/7 a / f,, ,4 ! A Completion Time of 5 days is sufficient time to obtain the -

i required input data and to perform the analysis, dumsof/pjg4 rrutn 9 e s ,),

'/t'uffon ader. = " _.. -....- *, . .

O I'l~I

. ~, v ~ . m?..~.e m _

, J : icaT. . ';

E i55-7 ;6 2_17:n .->_ _ - = ;;; . c;7.s4Ga. u 2 iSMx=x::n .=tr rWfr ;;c---O

-E C 219;-.-O dvianwsiniessumm=rn.usan9mQ -

~.,

B C"1

When Required Actions cannot be completed within their Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE or Condition in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , which (continued)

MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1-28 5/15/97

Rod Group Aligraent Limits B 3--l-5 g BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.C.3 B WIBIRIB (continued)

REQUIREMENTS mechanism will not interfere witn rod motion or rod drop time, j and that no degradation in these systems has occurred that would #

adversely affect car,trc1 rod motion or drop time. This testing is performed with all RCPs operating and the average moderator temperature :t 500*F to simulate a reactor trip under actual conditions.

This Surveillance is performed during a plant outage, due to the plant conditions'needed to perform the SR and the potential for an unplanned plant transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 10 and GDC 26.

2. 10 CFR 50.46.

3. FSAR, Chapter 15 N l

4. FSAR, 6 . & 7./.6~/

l remwe pran,, ;gaptc7 ;;, g y,/-/3 I

(Siks-buf C. I"A". Chapter 15.

i

7. I"A". Chaptcr 15.

i l MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 31 5/15/97 l __ ._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -

i I

I l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.1-15 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l

l REQUEST: ITS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits CTS 3/4.1.3 Movable Control Assemblies (All FLOG Plants)

DOC 12-14-M Comment: The ITS has changed the wording of the TS from "trippability" to "o.oerability," and references TSTF-107 which is not yet approved (though it is expected to be approved with the OGs next revision of TSTF-107). The result is that the FLOG l plants have inconsistently incorporated generic changes into the Bases (i.e., the Bases ,

paragraphs for B.2.1.1 and B.2.1.2). This change is a less restrictive change in that it I precludes LCO 3.0.3 entry for unforeseen inoperabilities. TSTF-107 needs to be discussed / approved at the next TSTF OG/NRC Meeting, and the FLOG will then need to incorporate the resulting generic TS requirements.

FLOG RESPONSE: It is the FLOG's understanding that EXCEL Services Corporation met with !

j- the NRC on May 23,1998 to discuss TSTF-107. The result of that meeting has been reported to be agreement to approve TSTF-107 with a minor Bases change. Revision 1 of TSTF-107 has been incorporated into the FLOG submittals.

In the ITS, rod operability is addressed in the Bases as trippability within the drop time requirements of ITS SR 3.1.4.3. If not met, Condition A would be entered which requires SDM verification and shutdown to Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , which then exits the LCO.

In the CTS, the action for an untrippable rod is essentially the same as the ITS. No action is provided in the CTS for discovering in Mode 1 or 2 that a rod would not meet insertion time requirements; therefore, CTS LCO 3.0.3 would be entered. LCO 3.0.3 allows one hour to initiate a shutdown and 6 additional hours to reach Mode 3. Because the iTS only allows 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to reach Mode 3 (instead of up to 7 as allowed by LCO 3.0.8), the change from

untrippable" to " inoperable"in CTS 3.1.3.1 is more restrictive.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 -ITS 3.1 Enclosure 5A, Traveler Status Sheet Enclosure 58, page B 3.1-24 l

{

1 1

Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.1 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF 9, Incorporated 3.1 1 NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 12, Incorporated 3.1-15 NRC approved. ITS Revision 1 Special Test Exception l 3.1.10 is retained and l re-numbered as 3.1.8, i

consistent with this i traveler and TSTF 136.

TSTF 13 Incorporated 3.1-4 NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 14, Incorporated 3.1 13 NRC approved.

Revision 4- 7t-7. /-des-TSTF 15 Incorporated NA NRC approved. l Revision 1 TSTF 89 Incorporated 3.1-8 NRC approved.

TSTF107/ey.) Incorporated 3.1 6 f 7 /-/.5 TSTF 108, -Het-)lhcorporated --NA- -Net NRC approved, as-ef--

Revision 1 7 /-21 tr/ch"cutcf' ttc. M ~#'###I l

TSTF 110 Incorporated 3.1 10 A/g c ,j,jon y,/~

Revision +2 N'I /~#8 f TSTF 136 Incorporate'd 3.1 9, 3.1 15 NB C appnve/, g_ y, /-Oog, TSTF 141 Not incorporated NA Disagree with change; traveler issued after cut off date. ,

TSTF 142 -Net-/hcorporated -NA- N cfer D $ f dtcr-

2. /- 21 -cut off L :. - TX-3.1-00 3 17-Q R

- , 7- ncv'J t. Incorporated 3.1 7

-rg.- 7./ - 044 WOG 105 Incorporated 3.1-16 l

MARK UP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97 l

l Rod Group Alignment Limits B 3.1.5 ErM BASES APPLICABLE Satisfying limits on departure from nucleate boiling ratio in '

SAFETY ANALYSES both of these cases bounds the situation when a rod is misaligned (continued) from its group by 12 steps.

Another type of misalignment occurs if one RCCA fails to insert upon a reactor trip and remains stuck fully withdrawn. This condition is assumed in the evaluation to determine that the required SDH is met with the maximum worth RCCA also fully withdrawn (Ref. [5),

i l The Required Actions in this LCO ensure that either deviations i

from the alignment limits will be corrected or that THERMAL POWER l will be adjusted so that excessive local linear heat rates (LHRs) will not occur, and that the regirirements on SDH and ejected rod worth are preserved.

Continued operation of the reactor with a misaligned cc,atrol rod is allowed if the heat flux hot channel factor (Fo(Z)) and the nuclear enthalpy hot channel factor (FL) are verified to be

>:ithin their limits in the COLR and the sr.fety analysis is verified to remain valid. When a control rod is misaligned, the 3 assumptions that are used to determine the rod insertion limits.

AFD limits, and quadrant power tilt limits are not preserved.

Therefore, the limits may not preserve the design peaking factors, and Fa (Z) and FIw must be verified directly by incore mapping. Bases Section 3.2 (Power Distribution Limits) contains more complete discussions of the relation of Fo (Z) and FL to the operating limits.

Shutdown and control rod OPERABILITY and alignment are directly related to power distributions and SDH which are initial cor.ditions assumed in safety analyses. Therefore they satisfy Criterion 2 of the ."nC Policy Stat: . cat. It0CER5056(uvaiuhT5

.LCO The limits on shutdown or control rod alignments ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis will remain valid. The requirements on OPERABILITY ensure that upon reactor trip, the

' assumed reactivity will be available and will be inserted. The OPERABILITY requirements else WJrippWilit7y 'KictsW Q -J. /-/5

[@Etisj[gfateTfrbir*thchTis@LiFre@TemWe4Rhich ensure that the RCCAs and banks maintain the correct power distribution and I

l (continued)

MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 24 5/15/97 l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1-16 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: ITS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits (All FLOG Plants)

ITS 3.1.4 Bases Generic Changes Comment: Generic Bases chariges need to be discussed / justified. For example, the Bases Background discussion on the DRPI system has been revised and needs to be explained.

FLOG RESPONSE: As discussed during a telecon with NRC Staff on June 25,1998, the scope of this RAI will be !imited to the ITS 3.1.4 Background Bases. Changes fall into one of five categories:

l

1. Specification re-numbering;.

2. Inclusion of shutdown rods;

3. Addition of plant-specific design information (e.g., number of control banks and shutdown banks);

4. Editorial corrections (e.g., the correct title for GDC-26); and

5. Changes to the last paragraph.

Changes to the last paragraph were made since it was felt that this text went beyond the level of detail required for the ITS Bases. Coil spacing dimensions are not critical to operator )

understanding of this system in addition, statements in the last paragraph in the ISTS i concerning position indication accuracies are incorrect.

1 ATTACHED PAGES:

l None I

i

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1-19 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC l REQUEST: ITS 3.1.7 Rod Position Indication

! CTS 3.1.3.2 Position Indication Systems - Operating (Wolf Creek & Callaway) l DOC 13-05-A & 13-09-LS-23 & 13-06-A JFD 3.1-7 & 3.1-12 Comment: The ITS retains Conditions and associated Required Actions from the CTS addressing more than one inoperable digital rod position indicator (DRPI) per group, which is not addressed in the STS. However, not all associated CTS Required Actions have been retained in the ITS; the Required Actions to take manual control of the rods and to record reactor coolant temperature every hour have not been retained. These actions, in one case affect rod movement and in the other case provide an indication that the rod (s) position may have changed, and therefore have a bearing on SDM and therefore should not be deleted if the overall condition of more than DRPI per group is -

inoperable is retained. Either retain the CTS requirements completely, adopt the STS requirements, or provide a betterjustification for the ITS proposals. The STS wording of the note permitting separate condition entry should be retained with the STS Conditions and Required Actions.

FLOG RESPONSE: The wording of ITS Condition B, with its Required Actions B.1 and B.2, and the change to the Actions Note on separate Condition entry were made pursuant to traveler TSTF-234. TSTF-234 was created based on the Callaway ar'd Wolf Creek CTS, however, Westinghouse and the Westinghouse Owners Group felt that Action Statements b.1.b) and b.1.c) were unnecessary compensatory actions. The justifications for deleting CTS 3.1.3.2 Action Statements b.1.b) and b.1.c) are discussed in Enclosure 4 under LS-23. In order to capture those justifications under Enclosure 3A, DOC 13-09-LS-23 is revised to add the following:

"The proposed change would delete the Actions to place control rods in manual and record RCS T., hourly if multiple DRPIs per group are inoperable. Multiple inoperabis DRPls, of l themselves, have no impact on SDM in MODES 1 and 2 if the control rod positions are verified by alternate means (e g., movable incore detectors). The requirement to place control rods in manual may not be appropriate in all situations and may be detrimental for load rejection transients unless operator action is assumed to simulate the rod control system in automatic.

Accidents analyzed using the [lmproved Thermal Design Procedure (ITDP)] assume that the control rods are in (automatic]. Automatic rod movement can accommodate a 10% load rejection. Placing rods in manual may impact the load rejection capability assumed when the P-9 setpoint was established at 50% RTP. The steam dump system can accommodate a 40%

RTP load rejection and with the rod control system in automatic, a 50% RTP load rejecuon can be accommodated without a reactor trip. While manual operator action can be just as timely as automatic rod control, there is no need to have this limitation in the Technical Specifications.

Corrective actions for excessive rod motion are covered under ITS 3.1.7 Condition C. The requirement to monitor and record T y hourly is unnecessary given the available indicators

{ and alarms, e.g., T.,- T,,, deviation alarm, to alert operators to changing moderator conditions."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 -ITS 3.1 Enclosure 3A, page 12 i

I l'

l t

l I

I t

I

CHANGE NUMBER E2iG DESCRIPTION plant shutdown to Mode 3 requirement would be required in one less hour.

13 05 A This proposed change would involve retaining an action statement, currently in the plant TS, that permits continued POWER OPERATION with more than one digital rod position indicator per group inoperable. This is in accordance with the current licensing basis of the plant.

13 06 A Consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev. 1, a separate condition entry allowance is permitted in current TS 3.1.3.2 for each inoperable rod position indicator and each demand position indicator. This is an administrative change since the Required Actions address each rod or bank with inoperable indication separately [and Action b addresses the condition of multiple inoperable DRPIs, up to a complete loss of digital position indication].

13 07 H The proposed modifications to the SR would require a verification of agreement between digital and demand indicator systems prior to criticality after each removal of the reactor vessel head, instead of every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

This reflects a reorganization of surveillance requirements in the ITS. The requirement for a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months comparison would be moved to SR 3.1.4.1 in the ITS. The post-vessel head removal requirement would be a new specification that demonstrates rod position system OPERABILITY based on a comparison of indicating systems.

The Frequency requirement of prior to criticality after each removal of the reactor vessel head would permit this comparison to be performed only during plant outages that involve plant evolutions (vessel head removel) that could affect the OPERABILITY of the rod position indication systems. The Frequency change is based on traveler TSTF 89.

13 08 LS 20 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

13 09 LS 23 Current TS ACTIONS b.1.b) and b.1.c) of LCO 3.1.3.2 are deleted. SDH is ensured in H0 DES 1 and 2 by rod position.

Multiple inoperable DRPIs will have no impact on SDH in MODES 1 and 2 if the control rod positions are verified by alternate means and rod motion is limited consistent with the accident analyses. Deletion of these requirements is consistent with traveler-WOC 73. o~/ 1. "TI7-f- 234. TN-y, /_gfg

" ~*

G 3.l-l9 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 12 5/15/97 l

l

INSERT 3A-12 The proposed change would delete the Actions to place control rods in manual and record RCS T,y hourly if multiple DRPls per group are inoperable. Multiple ino DRPIs, of themselves, have no impact on SDM in MODES 1 and 2 if the control rod positions are verified by alternate means (e.g., movable incore detectors). The requirement to place control rods in manual may not be appropriate in all situations and may be detnmental for load rejection transients unless operator action is assumed to simulate the rod control system in automatic. Accidents analyzed using the (Improved Thermal Design Procedure (ITDP)] assume that the control rods are in { automatic).

Automatic rod movement can accommodate a 10% load rejection. Placing rods in manual may impact the load rejection capability assumed when the P-9 setpoint was established at 50% RTP. The steam dump system can accommodate a 40% RTP load rejection and with the rod control system in automatic, a 50% RTP load rejection can be accommodated without a reactor trip. While manual operator action can be just as timely as automatic rod control, there is no need to have this limitation in the Technical Specifications. Corrective actions for excessive rod motion are covered under ITS 3.1.7 Condition C. The requirement to monitor and record T., hourly is unnecessary given the available indicators and alarms, e.g., T.,- T,,, deviation alarm, to alert operators to changing moderator conditions.

l l

1 l

9 '

-- - - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____]

1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1-24 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: ITS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits (All FLOG Plants)

JFD 3.1-5 & 3.1-6 Comment: Rewording of LCO and Condition A approved, contingent upon OG resubmittal of change request TSTF-107 (revision) as discussed with TSTF.

FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number 3.1-15. The FLOG has incorporated TSTF-107, Revision 1.

ATTACHED PAGES: None I

l I

i I

l l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . - - - - . - - - . _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- -^

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1-25 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC t

REQUEST: ITS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits (All FLOG Plants)

JFO 3.1-16 Comment: Inclusion of SR 3.2.1.2 to Required Action .B.2.4 is approved; ensure OG submit WOG-105 as a TSTF change request. 'l FLOG RESPONSE: At the June 23 24,1998 meeting of the Westinghouse Owners Group .

MERITS Mini-Group, traveler WOG-105 was discussed. The remaining action on this traveler was assigned to Westinghouse to expand this change to also apply to ISTS 3.2.1A, "Fo (Z)

(F, methodology)." However, this aJditional work has no impact on the manner in which the FLOG has incorporated this traveler's additional restriction. The TSTF will be submitted to NRC expeditiously.

ATTACHED PAGES:

None I

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET i

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.1-27 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC

)

REQUEST: ITS 3.1.1 Shutdown Margin (All FLOG Plants)

JFD 3.1-18 Comment: This modification adds a Mode change restriction from Mode 6 to Mode 5, j as discussed in CN 1-02-LS-1 of 3.0. The discussion provided is inadequate to I evaluate the necessity of the mode change restriction. In general, throughout the submittal, justifications for notes prohibiting mode changes are inadequate. Provide explanations / justifications that present specific conditions that would necessitate the note.

FLOG RESPONSE: A Reviewer's Note in STS LCO 3.0.4 states:"LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are l part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. Before this version of LCO 3.0.4 can be implemented on a plant-specific basis, the licensee must review the existing technical specifications to determine where specific restrictions on MODE changes or Required Actions should be included in individual LCOs to justify this change; such an evaluation should be summarized in a matrix of all existing LCOs to facilitate NRC staff review of a conversion to the STS." Based on this Reviewer's Note, a matrix of this evaluation was placed in the NSHC LS-1 in Enclosure 4 of the Section 3.0 package (Attachment No. 6).

JFD 3.1-18 has been revised to incorporate additionaljustification from NSHC LS-1 from Enclosure 4 of the Section 3.0 package (Attachment No. 6). JFD 3.1-18 has been revised to include:

"LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. ITS LCO 3.1.1 was modified by a Note stating: "While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 5 from MODE 6 is not permitted." Entering MODE 5 without SDM limits met implies that boron concentration in MODE 6 is not met. Under these conditions, a transition to MODE 5 should not be attempted until MODE 5 SDM limits are met. Inadvertent boron dilution events are precluded in MODE 6 via administrative controls [that close the dilution source valves], whereas dilution events are not [ physically precluded) in MODE 5. Therefore, the transition from MODE 6 to MODE 5 !

should not be allowed if the SDM initial condition for a MODE 5 dilution event is not met."

i ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 -ITS 3.1 i

Enclosure 6A, page 3 l

l L____._--______________ _ _ _ - _ . _ .

CHANGE M#iBER AJSTIFICATIOM Thermal Power is within the defined power level for Mode 2 during the performance of Physics Tests, since there is an Action that addresses Thermal Power not within limit yet there was no corresponding LC0 or surveillance requirement. The Surveillance Frequency of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is retairr.. frm the current TS. This change is based on traveler TSTF in b ui = 3. ~7W-7./ 4Bf I

3.1 14 Not used. )

I 3.1 15 Consistent with TSTF 12. Revision 1. ISTS LCOs 3.1.9 and 3.1.11 are deleted. The physics tests contained in LCO 3.1.9 were only contained in some initial plant startup testing programs. The physics test exception can be deleted since these physics tests are never performed during post refueling outages. The physics test that LCO 3.1.11 required was the Rod Worth Measurement in the N 1 condition. The use of other rod worth measurement techniques will maintain the shutdown margin during the entire measurement process and still provide the necessary physics data verification. Since the N 1 measurement technique is no longer used, the SDH test exception can be deleted.

This change and traveler TSTF 136 renumbers ISTS 3.1.10 to ITS 3.1.8.

3.1-16 This change adds the requirement to perform SR 3.2.1.2 in addition to SR 3.2.1.1 during performance of ITS 3.1.4. Required Action B.2.4. The intent of Required Action B.2.4 is.to verify that Fa(z) is within its limit. Fe(z) is approximated by Ff(z) (which is obtained via SR 3.2.1.1) and F/(z) (which is obtained via SR 3.2.1.2). Thus, both F/(z) and F/(z) must be established to verify Fa(z). This change is consistent with traveler WOG 105.

3.1 17 Consistent with current TS'LCO 3.1.3.2 and the wording of ITS 3.1.7 Conditions A and B. ITS 3.1.7 Condition C is clarified to state that the inoperable position indicators are inoperable DRPIs.

3.1 18 A MODE change restriction has been added to ITS 3.1.1. in the LCO Applicability, per the matrix discussed in CN 102 LS 1 of the 3.0 package (see the LS-1 NSHC in the CTS Section 3/4.0. ITS Section 3.0 package).

.-rNsGKr t:A-SA & 2. /-2-)

3.1 19 Not used.

3.1 20 Consistent with current TS 3/4.10.3 " Physics Tests." ITS LC0 3.1.8 and

its Condition C and SR 3.1.8.2 are modified to refer to " operating" RCS l

loops. Adopting the current TS wording is acceptable since valid T, measurements are not obtainable for a non operating loop.

3./-:2/ rNSER7~ LA-?B ~i1-7. /- 06 /

7, / - 21 "7X - 3./-o n JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 3 5/15/97

INSERT 6A-3A LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in 6 3 /W the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. ITS LCO 3.1.1 was modified by a Note stating: "While this LCO is not met, entry into MODE 5 from MODE 6 is not permitted." Entering MODE 5 without SDM limits met implies that boron concentration in MODE 6 is not met. Under these conditions, a transition to MODE 5 should not be attempted until MODE 5 SDM limits are met. Inadvertent boron dilution events are precluded in MODE 6 via administrative controls [that close the dilution source valves), whereas dilution events are not (physically precluded] in MODE 5.

Therefore, the transition from MODE 6 to MODE 5 should not be allowed if the SDM initial condition for a MODE 5 dilution event is not met.

l

3 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.1-28 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC ,

REQUEST: Relocated Specifications (All FLOG Plants)

Comment: Comanche Peak, Wolf Creek, and Callaway have not provided relocated screening evaluations / forms for any of their specifications relocated to licensee -l controlled documents. Diablo Canyon has not provided relocated screening forms for {

all of their specifications relocated to licensee controlled documents. Provido {

necessary relocation screening evaluations / forms. '

FLOG RESPONSE: All relocated specifications have been provided the necessary relocation screening evaluations / forms which are contained in Attachment 21.

I For C.allaway and Wolf Creek, Section 3.1 specifications were previously relocated by l

Amendments 103 and 89, respectively. Therefore, none of the relocation DOCS apply to i Callaway and Wolf Creek and this question is not applicable to those plants. '

l ATTACHED PAGES:

None T

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.1-001 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: Retain words "the insertion"in CTS SR 4.1.3.6.1. Revise ITS Bases for SR 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.8.4 to reflect changes made to ITS Bases for SR 3.1.1.1 (re: shutdown rod position and, for Callaway, boron-10 depletion).

ATTACHED PAGES:

' Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 -ITS 3.1 Enclosure 2, page 3/41-21 Enclosure 58, pages B 3.1-13 and e 3.1-60 t

i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ . _ _ . . . _ . _ . . _ _ . - - . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.._____-..___<_..___.____m_. . _ _ . . - . _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

REACT!viTV CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD INSERTION tTHITS l

l ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l whap Q..ed 4- phy ie:1-insertion l 3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be /7.0/-M ,

/Imihspecified in the Core Operatino Liciits Report (COLR).;.rguenc<j s j ,,g l APPLICABILITY: MODES I d2 4N /- A I ACTION: ,,. 4 74 n f ,,,e. ,j ,v e,-jof / ;,,,7-/ r:

With the control banks inserted beyond the insertion limit g%pt for gf4 j

. survetiiance Le>Ung pursuant to Spec 1tication 4.1.3.1.2cs ;

a. Within I hour, verify 4. t & SHUTDOWN MARGI '

-ir gmtar thw gf97,gg i er cau:1 to 1.35 Ik/P or initiate baration l the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored to greater th2r er e-"

l to1?*ik/k,$and~I-hhin :-l--

fi .

b. Restore the control banks to withi the limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ', l or l f be

~ ' ai%

" ' ' '-h'G

' * ' "lim' ' '-}r '

c. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months t[less than er equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by ti.c l );

bank position using the insertion limits specified in the COLR, {

or 1

[

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY withing 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . /7.e3-fgl

~

+4e nexf SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

, '. " S+e+

1 4.1.3.6 ' ion of each control bank shall be determined to he within 4 .4 - - the '"_cer

. . ,h 1mits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .-exec;t during ti=

w w s im,m,.<mm , 4 s . u m m 4 + m ,- 4, 4mm ,m, em mm _ e n.

l OA-3. l-o

~

U$l.kEEi50$iN2h52iii5E[55'1$5:'~enieiEEI^uYE7~ h ' 2.2-/H_6-4.1.3.6.2- When in MODE 2 with K,,,less than 1, verify that the predicted critical control rod positi,on is within insertion limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achieving reactor criticality.

(blEnl) or D Vc rl* lInINr Jfec((Ted k -fQ COLA Vem'h se[vence o, e me-I- So,- donk I Lan ks noh -fu llf w;-hdenwn -from +Le ce,-e /7-6/-/1 a+ l e a.r-l o n c e ( o c jfl w r.c ,

i 1

' 500 5peci:1 Tc t Execp'3 enc Speri'ic:tient 3 . . 2 n d 3 .10. 2 . gy-p/f .

With K,,, greater than or equal to 1. l l

1 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-21 Amendment No. M y 103 j

Core Reactivity B 3.1.3 E"2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.3.1 !MW2B (continued)

REQUIREMENTS that other core conditions are fixed or stable, including control ad .rkd/own rod position, moderator temperature, fuel temperature, fuel CA- 7. /-so/

depletion, xenon concentration, and samarium concentration. The Surveillance is performed prior to entering H0DE 1 as an initial check on core conditions and design calculations at BOC. The SR is modified by a Note. The Note indicates that the normalization o.

euyv.p.m of predicted core reactivity to the measured value i

must take place within the first 60 effective full power days {

(EFPD) after each fuel loading. This allows sufficient time for core conditions to reach steady state, but prevents operation for a large fraction of the fuel cycle without establishing a ;

benchmark for the design calculations. The required subsequent Frequency of 31 EFPD, following the initial 60 EFPD after l entering MODE 1, is acceptable, based on the slow rate of core l

changes due to fuel depletion and the presence of other indicators (0PTR, AFD, etc.) for prompt indication of an anomaly. l

, REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. GDC 26. GDC 28, and GDC 29,

2. FSAR, Chapter 15.

MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.1 13 5/15/97 f

PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions MODE 2 B 3-1-10 ETE l BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.10.3 B10P8 W (continued)

REQUIREMEiUS a m s w.eu.jer der. . ' nw a M ei.c w+,, 9 wtde 4 % Sua i a a g .y3g. l q.c .,;. wg ie r;yo..e

. ,p.+ a.w .mysq% m.,' c.., -n.+ w;;

p a .s m . ,.f ..s p _, g. .).3 .:.i. . m. . he SDM is verified by performing a reactivity balance calculation, considering the following reactivity effects:

a. RCS boron concentration (may fnelude a//owance.rdr bo<on-/0derleken)j C A ~2 I~0DI

b. Control EMB1mlM9f!EEE benk position: )

c. RCS average temperature:

l

d. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation:

e. Xenon concentration:

f. Samarium concentration; and I

g. Isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC).

1 Using the ITC accounts for Doppler reactivity in this calculation i bcccuse EE the reactor is suberitical, and the fuel temperature will be changing at the same rate as the RCS.

l l The Frequency of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is based on the generally slow change in required boron concentration and on the low probability of an accident occurring without the required SDM.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50. Appendix B.Section XI.

l 2. 10 CFR 50.59.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.68. Revision 2. August,1978.

4. A!CI/ANO-10.0.1-1000 Deccat,cr 10. 1000. Not'iUse~d?

5. WCAP 0370 NP A Rcacawym. " Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology Report." July 1985.

(continued)

! MARX-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 60 5/15/97 1

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET I

s, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.1-003 APPLICABILITY: CA

' REQUEST: Revise last sentence of the ITS 3.1.1 LCO Bases to read: "The required SDM lirnits are specified in the COLR."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 -ITS 3.1 Enclosure 58, page B 3.1-5 I

1 1

I l

i

1 SDH --L,-+-2004 B 3.1.1 BASES i

LC0 LCO. For MSLB accidents, if the LC0 is violated, there is a (continued) potential to exceed the DNBR limit and to exceed 10 CFR 100

" Reactor Site Criteria," limits (Ref. 4). For the boron dilution accident, if the LC0 is violated, the minimum required time assumed for operator action to terminate dilution may no longer be opplicabic. . - v ." Li.- ::'s c= > W L .

-i n ; + w .> i :. C M 3'/~## 2 j M lim:-kr are l APPLICABILITY In MODE 2 with k,n < 1.0 and in r10 DES 3E end 4, a,n ; the SDM requirements are applicable to provide sufficient negative l reactivity to meet the assumptions of the safety analyses l

discussed above. Ir. "~^0C 5, = is eddicssed by LCO 0.1.2 l l ~ . _ , ._o s.~o, -(, ; 200 "I. " In H0DE 6. the shutdown j l

reactivity requirements are given in LCO 3.9.1, " Boron !

Concentration." In MODES 1 and 2 SDM is ensured by complying with LCO 0.1.0, e c n " Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits," and LCO a . . . . , n .

.e-

' L.'" .w W a m _

1, _. s . t. . w., a . .;

.i c .. .g w .r a.:. : y.p . . . . l

., . a , , , ,) ,

u. . .

v . .o. .v. .

3, in s.c 7. . a p t.

vi a a.a y, f eia Qs. ,. . f e eg .l.j G .is h -_ t- ! , o y ,.4N e tf

d .' * * * ,Jf A 'lk,;f .nd

'F h. Ut. ISL - 1*U lPM 'i.' ' NOO 6 ' t '9 "S d.' - ' ' ' ' '*' N d ' * ^

M ;q ,pl. W u,wt w M9.L w.g.E y.4 v. w m g nr..

M l l

ACTIONS M !

l- If the SDM requirements are not met, boration must be initiated

) promptly. A Completion Time of 15 minutes is adequate for an operator to correctly align and start the required systems and components. It is assumed that boration will be continued until the SDM requirements are met.

l l

In the determination of the required combination of boration flow rate and boron concentration, there is no unique requirement that must be satisfied. Since it is imperative to raise the boron concentration of the RCS as soon as possible. the beren b'512itFd WHter.::s5UFce_ conccatration should be a highly concentrated solution such as that normally found in the boric acid storage tank! or the borated i#fDeITiiD water storage tank. The operator (continued)

MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 5 5/15/97 i

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.1-004 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Revise ITS 3.1.4 and ITS 3.1.7 Background Bases to clarify a sentence that appears to limit an incorrect demand step counter position indication to mechanical problems with the rod when the sentence should apply to any instance where rod movement does not occur upon demand. Since the DRPI system also provides shutdown rod position indication, the word " control" was struck from the ITS 3.1.4 Background Bases (same change had been made in the original submittal of the ITS 3.1.7 Background Bases).

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 --ITS 3.1 Enclosure SB, pages B 3.1-22 and B 3.1-45 l

E - - _ - - - _ - - - - - - . _ _ - . _ _ _ __ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J

Rod Group Alignment Limits B 3.1.5 S.1E4 BASES BACKGROUND BRiiinMCMsWe@$ismi are moved in a (continued) staggered fashion, but always within one step of each other. AM units havc fcur centrol banks and at icast two shutdown banks.

R1EEU5MElEt2 X2FA j

..a 3 o - w g.t..:n s.je... 9,1 a.g 9. .w .

The shutdown banks are maintained either in the fully inserted or fully withdrawn position. The control banks are moved in an overlap pattern, using the following withdrawal sequence: When control bank A reaches a predetermined height in the core.

control bank B begins to move out with control bank A. Control bank A stops at the position of maximum withdrawal, and control bank 8 continues to move out. When control bank B reaches a predetermined height, control bank C begins to move out with I control bank B. This sequence continues until control banks A. '

B. and C are at the fully withdrawn position, and control bank D is approximately halfway withdrawn. The insertion sequence is ,

the opposite of the withdrawal sequence. The control rods are '

arranged in a radially symmetric pattern, so that control bank motion does not introduce radial asymmetries in the core power distributions.

The axial position of shutdown rods and control rods is indicated by two separate and independent systems, which are the Bank Demand Position Indication System (commonly called group step counters) and the Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) System.

Hwa,. pp g "we m,,,. 4gm g The Bank Demand Position Indicat16n System counts the pulses from secu, g, the rod control system that moves the rods. There is one step

.,g j#** > counter for each group of rods. Indtvidual rods in a group all receive the same signal to move and nhould, therefore, all be at the same position indicated by the group step counter for that group. The Bank Demand Position Indication System is considered highly precise ( 1 step or i % in ).- If : red dee: =t = ve CM .y /-ce>g_

= ctep for c;ch dc:and pul;c. the - tep counter will still count

the pulse and incorrectly reflect the position of the rod.

l The DRPI System provides a highly accurate indication of actual

- ccr.tr:1- rod position, but at a lower precision than the step CA-5'/-44f counters. This system is based on inductive analog signals from a series of coils spaced along a hollow tube. with ; ccatcr to ccntcr distencc cf 0.75 inches. which i; six ;tcps. To increase (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1-22 5/15/97

)

Rod Position Indication B S-1-6 3'171 BASES l

BACKGROUND The axial position of shutdown rods and control rods are (continued) determined by two separate and independent systems: the Bank Demand Position Indication System (commonly called group step counters) and the Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) System.

The Bank Demand Position Indication System counts the pulses from the Rod Control System that move the rods. There is one step counter for each group of rods. Individual rods in a group all rece ve the same signal to move and should. therefore all be at N*# 9 '

the same position indicated by the group step counter for that

- "*"'Ne " M group. The Bank Demand Position _ Indication System is considered 8'C"- upon demak h). "

- " " " -^+ - CA-S./ -po4

-M e dem.d highly eaa stepprecise fcr =d dc=nd(i 1pulsc.

stepthe-or i % in} step counter will still co the pulse and incorrectly reflect the position of the rod.

The DRPI System provides a highly accurate indication of actual centrci rod position. but at a lower precision than the step counters. This system is' based on inductive analog signals from !

a series of coils spaced along a hollow tube. with e ccatcr to centcr distcacc of 3.75 incPas, which is C stcps. To increase i the reliability of the system. the inductive coils are connected l alternately to data system A or B. Thus, if one gi]g system

. fails. the DRPI will go on half accuracy. with an cffcctivc coil spacing of 7.5 inches, which is 12 stcps. Thcrifccc. thc acraci l irdicatica accuracy of the Orf: Systc; is C stcps '

, (12.7C inches'. end the mexieum unccrteinty is 12 sicps l (1 7.5 inchcs). 'lith en indicated dcVietion cf 12 sicps bctuxa l

l the ; cup stcp counter erd Orf!. the auximum dciistion bctwcca ectuel red position end the duend position could bc 24 stcps, or 15 inchcs. h- m%&wm.opap -- mtorgaWod7RTri_Ubii N

APPLICABLE Control and shutdown rod position accuracy is essential during l . SAFETY ANALYSES power operation. Power peaking. ejected rod worth, or SDM limits may be violated in the event of a Design Basis Accident (Ref. 2).

with control or shutdown rods operating outside their limits undetected. Therefore. the acceptance criteria for rod position indication is that rod positions must be known with sufficient accuracy in order to verify the core is operating within the tialik treep sequence, overlap. design peaking limits, ejected rod worth, and with minimum SDM (LCO 2.1.0. 3,E " Shutdown Bank (continued)

MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 45 5/15/97 w _-_- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORM ATION NO: TR-3.1-001 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Incorporate NRC-approved traveler TSTF-108 Revision 1 to delete the words "within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months " from the Frequency of CTS SR 4.10.3.2 and ITS SR 3.1.8.1.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 - ITS 3.1 Enclosure SA, Traveler Status Sheet and page 3.1-21 Enclosure 58, page B 3.1-59 Enclosure 6A, page 3 (new JFD 3.1-21)

Enclosure 6B, page 3 (new JFD 3.1-21)

Attachment 16, CTS 3/4.10-Enclosure 2, page 3/410-3 Enclosure 3A, page 2 (new DOC 3-05-LS-1)

Enclosure 3B, page 1 (new DOC 3-05-LS-1)

Enclosure 4, pages 1,14, and 15 (new LS-1) l

)

l i

i l

l l

t

Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.1 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE #

COMMENTS TSTF 9, Incorporated 3.1 1 NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 12, Incorporated 3.1 15 NRC approved. ITS Revision 1 Special Test Exception 3.1.10 is retained and re-numbered as 3.1.8 consistent with this traveler and TSTF 136.

TSTF 13, Incorporated 3.1-4 NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF-14 Incorporated 3.1 13 NRC approved.

Revision 4-4 rt-7. /-ess-TSTF 15. Incorporated NA NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 89 Incorporated 3.1-8 NRC approved.

TSTF107/ey.) Incorporated 3.1 6 f 7,/-/5-

! TSTF-108, -Net-/hcorporated --NA- -Net NRC approved,-as-ef-Revision 1 7. /-2 / + - ,_ ~+ m<< &+- 9 -7/w /

l TSTF 110 Incorporated 3.1 10 Revision +2 Ngc oj,jon, v,/, ,

N-~ 3 /~#d f TSTF 136 Incorporate'd 3.1 9. 3.1 15 NgC appieved M -7. /-04(,

l TSTF-141 Hot incorporated NA Disagree with change; traveler issued after cut off date. ,

TSTF 142 -Net-/hcorporated -NA- Y Ncfor SEIe a'ftcr

7. / .~n -cut ci; d:: , TX-3.1-00 3

-', EcN Incorporated 3.1 7 -rg 7./ - 04 4

l. WOG 105 Incorporated 3.1 16

\ .

MARX-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97

PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions MODE 2 3.1-9 3.1.10 a W 8 3.1-15 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION

> COMPLETION TIME C. RCS lowest BEEEEt C.1 Restore RCS lowest 15 minutes 3;1 20:

loop average DDifdBERI loop average temperature not temperature to within within limit. limit.

D. Required Action and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 15 minutes associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

7. /-2 /

7X-3.I-oo/

SR 0.1.10.1 M Perform a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on -W4 thin 12 hourr .B power range and intermediate range prior to channels per 5 92 a > r a eg:4 m. initiation of StKIE3l5311EE PHYSICS ESTS SR 2.1.10.2 553E Verify the RCS lowest gpiiBMtflU loop 30 minutes 3.1-20 average temperature is z 5 H M *F. B PS l

E7M24E5_id. M 3.1-13 SR 0.1.10.3 set!BN Verify SDM is - 1.0 z.k/k. EfDifit*T2ft's 4 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 3.1 1 VoWtilRISffilttie3COERE I

I MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.1 21 5/15/97 l i

PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions HODE 2 B 3.1.10 ELE BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3-4-14h4 BME REQUIREMENTS The M power range and intermediate range neutron detectors must be verified to be OPERABLE in H0DE 2 by LC0 3.3.1. " Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation." A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is performed on each :-m m. : power range and intermediate range channel Hthir.12 t a prior to initiation of the PHYSICS TESTS.fA-7.N0/ l This will ensure that the RTS is properly aligned to provide the required degree of core protection during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS. 'h 12 te ti r H =4+ 4e c"m ciaat +e eas're ;

th:t the 5tr= 7.tetier .o 0"E"J2LE :h^rtly b;fere ir.iti:tir.; j

.nu. v. e.u. _e v. r_e,v.. e. .

4 7j SR 9-hiih2 M Verification that the RCS lowest w - w H. loop T., is a 5%

B*F will ensure that the unit is not operating in a condition that could invalidate the safety analyses. Verification of the RCS temperature at a Frequency of 30 minutes during the performance of the PHYSICS TESTS will ensure that the initial !

conditions of the safety analyses are not violated. '

1 I

l "

h* *

, w s u._.. .; i. -. ,.. .j.y.;.p.,d., i. . .,

e .jr.)- . g.y . . .p y q..... ejm,h.,.] .;

.o . o..;. . . . t y. c , g Ax - l.j e . ,er.e gi c.)* ili,- $ggy 4;g( ys t.

a

]

, ,,-. . p . . .

.- ; . . p g ;;;.,

. . ...% .g r.r.y3,s ., . 9 3.g yp e;gg gn, e' gek et, w .4.- - s%_ . s e h t.s%6..I to .jeey.res.teL= es: .dg y qsj , .'.- p. TL1 j

.,.....), .

ca.p.h _a' l

SR 3-hiih6 H W E u + , 4. . . . . ; c. . v . . . ;,..a m .~. ;.i. ,. n o i 4 4.*.

M k . # % '

fjja.j? 1 . e. e (. e r .

6 .jn-d i,g @ h

g* 'lyh,,)i;I}ely % *$ IS,,a_f ' I

!.p je,sy:r.ej 1-fg ycg y ejeyg;...;4.g s g qg{fgSa.},e Q,reerag4 j .

-tim'ErwrfwprmrftsttMStrt9mkTrTitt01deffMTra:

,..-.,,.,+.

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.1 59 5/15/97 L - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - -- _ - _ --- _ ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - _--

CHANGE NUMBER 41STIFICATLON Thermal Power is within the defined power level for Mode 2 during the performance of Physics Tests, since there is an Action that addresses Thermal Power not within limit yet there was no corresponding LCO or surveillance requirement. The Surveillance Frequency of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is retained from the current TS. This change is based on traveler TSTF 14; Revisicr. 3. ~772-7 /-445~

3.1 14 Not used.

3.1-15 Consistent with TSTF 12 Revision 1 ISTS LCOs 3.1.9 and 3.1.11 are deleted. The physics tests contained in LC0 3.1.9 were only contained in some initial plant startup testing programs. The physics test exception can be deleted since these physics tests are never performed during post refueling outages. The physics test that LC0 3.1.11 required was the Rod Worth Measurement in the N 1 condition. The use of other rod worth measurement techniques will maintain the shutdown margin during the entire measurement process and still provide the necessary physics data verification. Since the N-1 measurement technique is no longer used, the SDH test exception can be deleted.

This change and traveler TSTF-136 renumbers ISTS 3.1.10 to ITS 3.1.8. j l

3.1 16 This change adds the requirement to perform SR 3.2.1.2 in addition to I SR 3.2.1.1 during performance of ITS 3.1.4. Required Action B.2.4. The intent of Required Action B.2.4 is to verify that Fa (z) is within its limit. F (z) a is approximated by Fa (z) (which is obtained via C

SR C 3.2.1.1) and F/(z) (which is obtained via SR 3.2.1.2). Thus, both Fa (z) and F/(z) must be established to verify Fa(z). This change is consistent with traveler WOG 105.

3.1-17 Consistent with current TS LC0 3.1.3.2 and the wording of ITS 3.1.7 Conditions A and B. ITS 3.1.7 Condition C is clarified to state that the inoperable position indicators are inoperable DRPIs.

3.1 18 A MODE change restriction has been added to ITS 3.1.1, in the LCO Applicability, per the matrix discussed in CN 1-02-LS-1 of the 3.0 package (see the LS-1 NSHC in the CTS Section 3/4.0. ITS Section 3.0 package).

TNSGer iA-3A & 2. /-a 7 3.1-19 Not used.

3.1 20 Consistent with current TS 3/4.10.3. " Physics Tests," ITS LC0 3.1.0 and its Condition C and SR 3.1.8.2 are modified to refer to " operating" RCS l loops. Adopting the current TS wording is acceptable since valid T.,

j measurements are not obtainable for a non operating loop.

2 /-;2 / r N / e e r- fA-78 TT-2 /-04 /

7 / -- 21 TA~ 3 I~802 f

j JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 3 5/15/97 L_________________--___-__ _ _ . _ - . .- - - - - - - - - - - -

i l

l lNSERT 6A-38 3.1-21 The ITS SR 3.1.8.1 requirement to perform a CHANNEL 7'/ 7. /-44 /

OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) on the intermediate and power range NIS channels within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS is revised to delete the phrase "within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . COT testing is performed or. :5ese channels prior to reactor startup per LCO 3.3.1.This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-108.

3.1-22 The Completion Times for ITS 3.1.2, Required Actions A.1 and A.2 are T/-3'./ -42 increased from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days, consistent with traveler TSTF-142.

i i

i

___ ' ' ' ' ' ' ~

A L

~

L s s s r,

A e e e A

/

s e e a.

C Y Y Y N Y fy K

E E

R 1 Y C 3

T F I ,

I L L O s s s A s e a N

O I

I A

B W Y e

Y e

Y e /

N Y e fy T C C I E L S P K P A 1

A E 3 P 4 E 1

- H G C E N r ,

R A e U M s s s a

A s N O C Y e

Y e

Y e /

N Y e fy M

O R

F S N E O C Y N N E A R C E O F L F B r I ,

D A I

s s s A s e a e e e e R D Y Y Y

/

N Y f y O

F E s L

n f r n Sd o o T ie i i B 5. gs a t I A 2 4.1 0

,N f T 1 1 - inic i 1

C ",d i G dCd 1 s o N 23O r n n t m O W oni 3i s S 3S T r woi n ee I Sd T r RI e et o T e a R S l hii I s s A mov f e t d t ni ou s c2 P r a d os t c is8 M oer nC o s y O f ct r n a p di h1 C eah 7

e ed P N pmt 2. 1 d d x

- 3 O

I E oow t f ri 33 .lbar 1

ai nt r

3. S

.R S G rt S e ea 0 d s R 1 t en n pe 3T p em 1 n p I o b a o E

V W e mgs t O C

n sh e .

4

/Cl o

N I

C eni LB. i at e 3 O

C C ri s i r n u uo Sdh T nt e h nek ra g

S oC T i R nS 3 E qd c a -

P S

e r1 4

t nA e ah t

iopc a t

c y

,p t i e n n t

n d "g $+

H h e 1.2 r st s r n I i t ri 0 r oi rCt d

C E ts32. B uoeP cit R t aO t l 3 s i eb e u

cs r t e a ~

T T d n hi t N dR o aSi t d s e n

r ah ei ct h i p t

d-o R O iwoob S.

l eoc t gl f i

wna o E

- I T gt A n

t Ct a r

e n po a p t t P

I a nd n e 7. dep h A1 c -

d n8 e r N h oe t o OS e t 1 e R ci t ir s 1 fi n ECL s s f C

S si u id q is 3 i i r

DL -

0 2 u

is 3 e r Z E hd e nS a e H e0 t nO D

oTl r h - o oC o T aR CI ca At 1 N CLt R / ,

E 6 7 8 B 1 1 1 9

1 0

2 2 ,

M - - -

/- ,_

1 1 1 1 U 1 N 3 3 3 3 3 f, ,,

l l

INSERT 6B-3 3.1-21 The ITS SR 3.1.8.1 requirement to perform a CHANNEL T/-y,/w /

OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) on the intermediate and power range NIS ,

channels within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS is revised to

{

delete the phrase "within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ." COT testing is performed on these channels prior to reactor startup per LCO 3.3.1.

3.1- 22 The Completion Times for ITS 3.1.2, Required Actions A.1 and A.2 are 78-2/,@3 increased from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days.

l l I-

l. l e________-_--___________. . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ - _ _

- - .._ .---- z . - -- .n = - -

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 1

(~,- 3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS

% .l.1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

. l 3.10.3 The Ifmitations of Specifications 3.1.1. 3, 3.1.1. 4, 3.1. 3.1, 3.1. 3. 5, and 3.1.3.6, may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. Th ERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, sm aya;- N. E 45.spu;s;c; ., N coLR; @ 3-01-M 7 T- + ^ ^ na c8 8"i e ' + - - - * * * - - -w b u. ".:.g"c r .. .:;

,..m.,,

-:1,.+: "n. . ." + -'.' " 7. .,...:-..

. . .,.. . .,. ur . r.: ., m.",a"a. .... ~ 3-02.- A c.

The is greater Re6ctor Coolant than or equal System to 541*F. lowest operating loop temperature (Tavg) 1

, p . -

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2, clav.,3 PHYstcs Tests 3-CH d l

-- ' ~

ACTION:

l

a. With the THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, l

\ immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

l l

b.

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T,yg) less

s. than 541*F, restore T,yg to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in at_least HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minu - -

C. M 5U n *ND w A"' 'E OO W

"'.*.b , a I,

' I" b "

tw 4e wh II _

_ w.m I q.s sup.a Pw w.s TcsTs e.ac.p .as. p 3-O L-M SURVEILLANCE RE0uTRt3ER1T-4.10.3.1. The THERMAL POWER shall be detergined to be less than or equal to 5%

of RATED THERMAL POWER, at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each Intermediate and Power Range channel shall be subjected to an 7-0.5~.-LJ ./

ANALOG TESTS.

CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST .ithi- 12 hw prior to initiating PHYSICS 7g y,f g,j

4. 10.3.3 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T,yg) shall be determined to b t' greater than or ectlal to 541*F at least once per 30 minutes during PHYSICS l 11 s ( , _ - - _ _

(gt,j) pp swi 4. L. A A ha spdecJ in -b cc)LR *4 .3 R lusk o m per 2H hc " s- p '

w 2 l

l 7 l

l CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 10-3 l

u---_--_---__------------ - - - - - - J

CHANGE NUMBER HSBC DESCRIPTION P

3 04 A The applicability stat,ement would be changed to be more consistent with operation for testing purposes. The proposed change is consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev.1. and does not result in any changes to technical requirements.

30S Ol MER7* 2Am2 TR-7. I-co l .

4 01 M Special Test Exception [LCO 3.10.4] would be deleted.

This specification allows the suspending of requirements of one or more LCOs (depending on plant specific current TS) under certain conditions. Elimination of the special test exceptions is justified either because their elimination would be consistent with NUREG 1431, Rev.1, or because the applicable tests are performed only during initial plant startup and are no longer needed.

Therefore, because the exceptions applicable to each LC0 addressed by [LCO 3.10.4] are no longer required.

[LCO 3.10.4] may be eliminated. This change is acceptable because it imposes more stringent requirements (i.e.,

eliminating exceptions). The elimination of the STEs has no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public.

5 01 R Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

5 02 H Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

l l

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 2 5/15/97

l INSERT 3A-2 1

The current SR requiring the performance of [an ANALOG) CHANNEL OPERATIONAL Tg-S./-04/

TEST on each intermediate and power range NiS channel within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS is revi.ied to delete the phrase "within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ." Current TS LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, requires the performance of an (A) COT on the power range low setpoint and intermediate range NIS channels prior to l each reactor startup, if not performed within the previous 31 days (revised to 92 days in l the conversion to ITS 3.3). These RTS SRs must be performed prior to entering the LCO 3.3.1 Applicabilities for these RTS trip functions since there are no CTS SR 4.0.4 exceptions. Current SR 4.10.3.2 requires an arbitrary estimate of when the plant is within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of initiating PHYSICS TESTING. This has no basis from the accident analyses, which are sa6sfied as long as the surveillance are current prior to entering plant MODES where these trip functions provide protection. When these surveillance are current, they have previously been determined to remain valid for 92 days. The initiation of PHYSICS TESTING does not impact the ability of the channels to perform their required function, does not affect the trip setpoints or trip capability of these channels, and does not invalidate the previous surveillance. This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-108.

f 1

i l

J

L i L - vs f ei s s e A orh e e s

e s

C N pt Y Y A e /

Y N Y }

d 9 e 8t e

tl ne K ed

_ E hy E

R nl .

C esE Y muT T A oS I F i

- vs L L ei s O s s s I orh e e e B W N pt Y Y Y A

N Y e

. A C

I

_ L

- P K P A 0 A E 1

P 4 E

/ H 3 C N

_ S A '

T M s s "

O e s s s e

T N

E C Y Y e

Y Y e A N Y e

f R

_ R U

C N O

- Y 1.

_ N 2

_ E A L C en t

_ B ee .

A O S m9

_ T L h2 B - c J

_ N A ae t st g s O

S I

I D

et a YA p Y e

Y s

e Y

s e A N Y s

e f R

A

_ P e l M 1 rd en . h a s

_ O n t - rwa gt net d u o

t n

s C i nM o ni i r c s m e i r

e e2f 9 s i w gi a ioe o s N rt en me b1 m t r u .la pt m i O l e eh - s1 a s e a qeR t s h rT dFE r ec M ehL e eye I em u l TT 3 gt n rTO r SSh e T o

S v e s s uSS o a n C a t R a rt a .

r une a wT O r pd ws pp o .

E t s e mt eC p ur on .es i i f t s

2. 2.hL V am a t t t o r c d onh e t i ot c r r o e

- N O

h e e ed S s a c ut i n TT 4

d s e o C

it mrh ut s 01 sT e t a

- nI t s h it na Sd pil rr ood g p n r wh s t a gid c . 1.F 3T a yp i gi n ne l t t n a u t r e ns e n eocdi c c a h p h c xee a a c g nomiys OT St n b ut i d t eEt v

_ ew h uprh u C od r l e r a r e e2 RR e n E

t sdtd r L rcea e em 1.

pt cu s b i eem i or ye t t ur s oS t

- G s rom r g nl h ns f o f el hh e d s oec e ef N

A n

os wO a n S s o it ah e n r- rep vi mt v. oT etl i a d

s n t t t t n i

l u t o

e H ced r oee sl prwl a t et s R s a ail w r C di rh co c .glp oe .l ii ns cit h

t s n a

t f o

eu t en pb 1 egn t o n

_ C t qr n Etx h 9. i l 3 epr e esi en E eeen s i 1 s a gy 4 hS a m rit mo

_ P l rhi ei e t ah t w s

t i na 3 st i m 1 t s

met uxc s en ei .

S dEOt t e ee eir G oina n u t t e a a g l T n u T cot n us E t h wt eyF t r n --

H eS .iadieq nC idt R t oS d s ea

_ C E

b M nmin l

ad aL e h ed e s Ud N egt n d oa1 t e - yoc ph '8 dD o vh T

i rSt met om d nuo r1 t 3

-_ N O

l Sil oc u

oeiipt whd w tl r e c oT ecI es r g pc S a eunf i s on hdih i t ak st i

ws v eA o c t l na3 e

me3 .

i hl l t a ii c b wi I T n dt ees. n W

_ t ai rl i nh el S a T 1 os nn 1 ne c t i t d rb eT ct h

_ P I

0 .cea u e

m E il eb e ed puO f C n r ee of t e

iurbdal

d. i nc l e e R

1 21 - qs e s r 0dd nt eL ts e t t oa .

qea e e pt t 1

N hineu 0 e 1i or i epT v s ps 'E C

S 3

F c s Ht d el Et a n - r t e i mrecd s a ouoe r o .or u ai a s

E D

OT ec oa CSh er e LTt t pm el u0 nesh h eo0 or ot Td wH cap o nril sd oa r a sd ppvA a eeO h rC g t o

ent h oo I^

T aLi N T cn R

E B

M 1 0

1 0

1 2 3 4 Sl U 0 0 0 0 O S

N 1H 2M 3H 3A 3 3A 2L

s '

INSERT 3D.1 The current SR requiring the perfonnance of[an ANALOG) CHANNEL OPERATIONAL T on each intermediate and power range NIS channel within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS is revised to delete the phrase "within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ."

l l

\

f I

o j

ENCLOSURE 4 1

\ <

', NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC)

CONTENTS .

l I. Organization ........................................ 2 l II. Description of NSHC Evaluations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 III. Generic No Significant Hazards Considerations l

"A" Admi ni strative Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 "R" - Relocated Technical Speci fications. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 "LG" Less Restrictive (Moving Information Out of the Technical Speci fi cations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1

i l

"M" - More Restrictive Requirements.................. 12 IV. Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations "LS" l

! -Sions

/+ 77-7. /-00 /

r l

1 5/15/97 i

u_ _ - _ _ ._ . _ - - _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-1 Tg_g, /_oo /

10 CF 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i The current SR requiring the performance of[an ANALOG) CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on each intermediate and power range NIS channel within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS is revised to delete the phrase "within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ." This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-108.

This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant he.zards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

"The Commission may make afinal determination, pursuant to the procedures in

. 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating licensefor afacility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 orfor a testingfacility involves no significant hazards consideration, ifoperation of thefacility in accordance with the proposed amendment wouldnot:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated; or

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accidentfrom any accident previously evaluated; or

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin ofsafety. "

l The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards I consideration standards: l

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

. l l i j Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously j

L performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. Current TS LCO 3.3.1, ,

! Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, requires the performance of an [A] COT on the !

power range low setpoint and intermediate range NIS channels prior to each reactor startup, if not l performed within the previous 31 days (revised to 92 days in the conversion to ITS 3.3). These i RTS SRs must be performed prior to entering the LCO 3.3.1 Applicabilities for these RTS trip functions since there are no CTS SR 4.0.4 exceptions. Current SR 4.10.3.2 requires an arbitrary estimate of when the plant is within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of initiating PHYSICS TESTING. This has no basis from the accident analyses, which are satisfied as long as the surveillance are current prior to entering plant MODES where these trip functions provide protection. When these surveillance

/*

.. IV, SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS d.

NSHC LS-1 7g-3, / 99j (continued) are current, they have previously been determined to remain valid for 92 days. The initiation of PHYSICS TESTING does not impact the ability of the channels to perform their required function, does not affect the trip setpoints or trip capability of these channels, and does not invalidate the previous surveillance. The proposed change will not affect any of the analysis assumptions for any of the accidents previously evaluated. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the proposed change affect the ability of any safety-related equipment to perform its intended function. There will be no degradation in the performance of nor an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety-related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

. There are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the method by which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function. The change to the SR will not affect the normal method of plant operation. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this change. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria, analysis assumptions, methodologies, or credited equipment for any analyzed event. There will be no effect on the

manner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions.

There will be no impact on any margin of safety.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION l

Based on the above evaluation,it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS-1" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c); and accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.

l'

/5

1 l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET I

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR-3.1-003 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Incorporate NRC-approved traveler TSTF 142 to increase the [ CTS 3.1.1.5 AOT and]

ITS 3.1.2 Required Actions A.1 and A.2 Completion Time from 72 hcurs to 7 days when the core reactivity balance is not within its limit.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 -ITS 3.1 Enclosure 2, page 3/41-7 Enclosure 3A, page 6 (new DOC 05-07-LS-24)

Enclosure 3B, page 4 (new DOC 05-07-LS-24)

Enclosure 4, pages 1,52, and 53 (new LS-24)

! Enclosure SA, Traveler Status Sheet and page 3.1-2 l Enclosure 58, pages B 3.1-11 and B 3.1-12 Enclosure 6A, page 3 (new JFD 3.1-22)

Enclosure 6B, page 3 (new JFD 3.1-22) l l

I I

l I

l l

1 i

L__-_-_-----_-----_.__-._-------_---------_-

__ - - - - - -- -d

1 f

i

'~

EEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CORE REACTIVITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.1.1.5 The measured core reactivity shall be within 1% Ak/k of predicted values.

APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

9 l*Yf 06 07 -LS .2 +

With the measured core reactivity not within limits, withinV72 .brs: ne-3 . /-oos

a. reevaluate core design and safety analysis, and detensine that j

the reactor core is acceptable for continued operation, and

.t .

establish appropriate administrative operating restrictions and Surveillance Requirements, or c.

be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.5.1 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within 11% Ak/k at least once 45' g/-fj per,31 Effective

.u... .Full

. . Power

. - . . .Days

. ., <(EFPD)

. n . . r ,.u.,- ---", 4--

,,i 4:h:1' :: ,:id:,as- a-Ls ru pEedictEd to the actual core YEEctEiE[vaIEEs'Ehei+]bE'ah'u$ted'(normAli$e5 conditions pior to xceeding a fuel rnup of 60 EFPD 'to

{

after each fuel loading. {

l (in47 i 4.1.1.5.2 The SHUTDOWN PARGIN shall e determined to gretter than or equal to 1.3% Ak/k prior to initial o eration above 5%

POWER after each fuel loading, by con ideration of the TED THERFAL ctors of og g Specification 4.1.1.1.1.b, with the entrol banks at th maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.13.6.

ence (rio<-lv en+eei M0bE /

afh,-Sek nfuelig

+Le reaffir- ord I when bornuf i

> 40 Effo. i i

l CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-7 Amendment No.103

CHANGE i NUMBER IGiG DESCRIPTION their insertion limits. The relevant requirements I regarding the adequacy of the SDM with rods at their insertion limits is determined through compliance with ITS 3.1.2. which requires a reactivity balance prior to entering Mode 1 after each refueling, and ITS SR 3.1.6.1, which requires a verification of control bank position within insertion limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to criticality. Therefore, the requirements of this SR would be performed by other specifications in the ITS. []

05-05 LS 17 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

05 06 A bc-3' He2.

requires that the predicted reactivity g y,/ 4 CTSS(s4.1.1.5.1 value shall" Ce adjusted (normalized) at 60 EFPD after refueling. ITS SR 3.1.2.1 states the normalization requirement as "may" be adjusted. This is to recognize that norma *iization is not necessary if predicted and measured core reactivity are within acceptable tolerance.

The scheduling of the normalization of predicted and measured core reactivity continues to be required at 60 EFPD. Therefore, this change reflects clarification of existing intent and is considered administrative.

MH7 f 5-a + mw1 :?A-& T&3. l-60:3' 06 01 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

07 01 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

07 02 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

08 01 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

08 02 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

08-03 LS-19 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

g.op - o *

& 7. /-c) 1 09-01 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l

Table (Enclosure 3B).

10-01 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 6 5/15/97

!NSERT 3A-6 05-07 LS- 24 The Allowed Outage Time (AOT)in the ACTION Statement of Tg-7J447 l current TS LCO 3.1.1.5 is increased from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days. The l proposed 7 day AOT is acceptable because of the conservatism

used in designing the reactor core and in the performance of the L safety analyses, as well as the low probability of a DBA or

! anticipated tr:;iisient approaching the core design limits occurring j during the 7 day period. The proposed change relaxes the AOT associated with the measured core reactivity not being within 1000 pcm of the predicted value. The required ACTIONS call for a reevaluation of the core design and safety analysis, a determination of whether the reactor core is acceptable for

j. continued operation, and the establishment of appropriate l operating restrictions and SRs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allocated to perform these tasks is insufficient. Predicted versus measured reactivity anomaly evaluation is a complex proposition.

l Data would have to be gathered, transmitted to the core design organization, evaluated by the fuel vendor, and implementation of appropriate controls would have to take place based on the data evaluation. Core design codes take time to set up for offnormal evaluations. RCS boron samples would also have to be analyzed.

Given the above time-consuming activities, the proposed 7 day AOT is considered to t)e more realistic. More thorough troubleshooting and restoration activities are possible with an extended AOT This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-142.

l i

I l

l l

w_-__-___-___-_____________

r.

e A

L A n e Ah S m d

n S mCS ee md ee S m d

ee S m d

L .rr .dn b. n Y A C

ou N c Y s

e NA om

.e om

.e on. e om

. e n

. e om n

.e om n

NA NA NA N A NA n 9 9 9 9 9 9 i

8 8 8 8 8 8

_ K y o. o o

o E d . LN LN LN o o.

E aS O LN LN LN eT O O O O O r R r t t t t t t e C en en en en en en Y l t ee ee ee ee

- / T A n S m S m ee ee F e S m S m S m S m

} 'I r d d d d d d L L .r s n n n n n n O ou e .e .e .e .e . e .e om om om om om om NW

$P i

N c Y NA o

NA o

r

/ao

. NA NA o

NA NA K g t t a/

YA A E i n d e

d e / d t

1 n e

_ P i .

t a

t r t a g a a 4 c

- / E H

t n ni l o o c d. o c

o 3 C id e l

e e l e

- a r

_ N R R m R S M o T _ A M

O s S

w sM

.d -

_ Ng T

E C Y e

NC oT eR YT sM e eR YT m Y s

e YT sH eR Y

s e

Y s

e

- R R A

- U e t t C g L e n e n N

~

e O We GE S r r

.f.' r

_ - 5 n Y .

u r N

1

^

- c

. i u F # 2 5 1 c A

1& g b dy .

2 I

t n U" , '/ A n n

_ B i en t i t aS i A ee

/ en eT T

N

_ N_/ A C

O L

B Mdu. .

S m .

- c h1 c

cM?

O'?

t N

o S mee .

- c h3 r

l t A n e

t N

o a e S g (* D O - a e r s S st g I st g .r Y

e

,T et a ut oS et a ou oS I

R^ 4 YA p Y+ NT YA p N c NT A

P n M w f

o 2

_ O eo r e. e 2

_ C bd ye e c n e

_ t t t z n o e s 1 e t u i f a e r N n i i oh v a ngnnde rdt 4 m a n a ta s e o O ns i n c S 3 r I t D ooal a c e T

- S e3 c

cpi c o di .

c i

l I e R f

m n

R n0 aft edt d ef e i e S s u E eE a r e eri v l o o s r p

- V a

l 3 a

r z 0i ocl c uat t et i ri o

t t n e

S u T o g N d6l t i bi ql a t 5 4 c I h n i

- O bS e a d ad ecr T l

y T i

C tc at rimsr pr et er t 5 E l o2 ig

_ s s T g D t1 r t a i o pepet i n D o a

_ d) ns c b c n n H ivf ed i f cf ei w i

t t F o

t h

c 5

T i o r eehi a ool m o a n 5 0 t pzhT t f d d r T 5 y c u i t ynn ea t e i t a

E G

N a e ei rl el h a s t med ri os r

.ah i e st t u ee rt esi a n g r d h S

u O

p s p

m u

o n

w 3 c we ou n

q h . i t S C

t

_ A en ta nt oats ce wzi n e -

p d

t lee gR n

- H h i i t ad s u C t h ( s u e el nh i b r iyhe

+ . t j n r a ocs a mc h

t h

t g

n h

S n f

f t O

dd d1 d n a a ee C l e s e at r s o P P ig - h c i

r o E ud et 2 o y o yi c r wna et r s MS P oi ent nt h w w a p h v iuju1 b o v i t s o m

- s o i

h Rl g H np r q ead 3 "y s v ev iih i t t t ed

.i l F .

t l

F t

c n

P u. t Sl pe i

f n oi P C e r R a nc c r n n n nn o gn n v d c t

E k e eS moaf a oa oe o e n e u r oe a r h.b" S" i eoef m i m n ig m pu h j

- u t a S

WT N O

I T

es bt om i

1 h l

a T s a

5. l I a z eneee 1

.tl t r i ri rh t n a cuc g

ol oT n r et r n i

it u B

a c r o od d

B t u a c r o od d

io t

t a .

2 r c a o h d C

d g

n s igse r a s

h t n ei m

eo f

i h

C P t i s ge m d s e s e im2 s e a e t e

'N 1-I R

s nn l

h"ieoeh n mrd ed R sl r nr c rPi eD n

.g el t l a o el t l a o i1 l

4 el t l a o h r .

c ceys sb ea l

t C oi S e ei us uF t c r c r s c r sd a t p S i h uuut s sE s ot ot e3 e d e a E t t 5l f qa a ea i l n l n v lot n vd c D

ci A w T a e eh eh e0 x C v r rt mT m6 e e o R c eo R c NS oR e o R c o n1 N a3 l

Di en lR 1~ R W-E B 57 6 1 1 2 1 2 39 HS 1

_ M 01 0

0 0 0 0 0 01 0 U - - - - - -

_ CL N 5S 0L 5

0 A 6

0R 7

0 A 8

0 R 8

0 M 85 0L 9

0

INSERT 38-4 05-07 LS- 24 The Allowed Outage Time (AOT)in the ACTION Stateimnt Q-f,/-gg3 of current TS LCO 3.1.1.5 is increased from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days.

I i

INSERT 38-4(a) 08-04 A The MODE 5 and 6 requirements of CTS SR 4.1.2.3.2 are moved by this change to ITS SR 3.4.12.2. Since there are

$ S. /-i no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) being made, this change is considered administrative (A) in ,

nature.

I i

l :

)

i l

L-

ENCLOSURE 4

' 2.

' NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION (NSHO C0KTENTS ,

I. Organization ........................................................... 2 II. Descri pti on of NSHC Eval uations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

=III. Generic No Significant Hazards Considerations A - Admi ni strati ve Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 R Relocated Technical Specifications.................................. 7 LG . Less Restrictive (Hoving Information Out of the Techni cal Speci fi cations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 M More Restri cti ve Requi rements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 IV. Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations LS LS 1.................................................................... 14 LS 2.................................................................... 16 r LS 3..................................................................... 19.

LS 4............................................................... .....21.

& LS 5.................................................................... 23 LS 6.................................................................... 26-g . 29 LS . 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4p.

LS 8..........................................................Not .................

LS 9.................................................................... 32

!~

.LS 10..................................................................... 35 LS 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N o t U s e d LS12...................................................................37 LS 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No t Appl i ca bl e

~LS-14.................................................................... 40 LS 15................................................................... 42 ;

LS 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N o t a ppl i c a bl e LS 17.................................... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . Not appli cabl e L LS 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N o t a ppl i c a bl e L LS 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N ot a ppl i c a bl e .

LS 2 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N o t a ppl i c a bl e LS-21................................................................... 45 LS 22...,...................................... ........................ 48 LS 23................................................................... 50 4..r-w 52 #1*& y/4e3 .

V. Generic Technical NSHCs TR.2.................................... ................. .............m

ft

. TR . 3 .l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................................M-F4 1 5/15/97 J____-___-___-_. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - . ._ _ _ _ .-. - -- __- - ____--_-__

1 l

l l

1 IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS N W43 )

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION l

} FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

[ The Allowed Outage Time (AOT)in the ACTION Statement of current TS LCO 3.1.1.5 is increased from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days. The proposed 7 day AOT is acceptable because of the

conservatism us iin designing the reactor core and in the performance of the safety analyses, as I

well as the low pi iability of a DBA or anticipated transient approaching the core design limits l l

i occumng durinc < 7 day period.This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-142.

This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no

, significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the l criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

l "The Commission may make afinal determination, pursuant to the procedures in l l 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating licensefor afacility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 orfor a testingfacility involves no sigm*pcant hazards consideration, ifoperation of thefacility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1. Involve a sigmficant increase in the probability or consequences ofan

{

accident previously evaluated; or l I i 1

2. Create the possibility of a new or di[ferent kind of accidentfrom any accident previcmly evaluated; or

3. Invoh: a sigmficant reduction in a vnargin ofsafety. "

The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

l Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The proposed change relaxes the AOT associated with the measured core reactivity not being within 1000 pcm of the predicted value. The required ACTIONS call for a reevaluation of the core design and safety analysis, a determination of whether the reactor core is acceptable for continued operation, and the establishment of appropriate operating restrictions and SRs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allocated to perform these tasks is insufficient. Predicted versus measured reactivity anomaly evaluation is a complex proposition. Data would have to be gathered, transmitted to the core design organization, evaluated by the fuel vendor, and implementation of appropriate controls i

S'2-

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARD 3 CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS (continued) l I

would have to take place based on the data evaluation. Core design codes take time to set up for offnormal evaluations. RCS boron samples would also have to be analyzed. Given the above l time-consuming activities, the proposed 7 day AOT is considered to be more realistic. The proposed change in the AOT will not affect any of the analysis assumptions for any of the I accidents previously evaluated. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the proposed change affect the ability of any safety-related equipment to perform its intended function. There will be no degradation in the performance of nor an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

There are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the method by which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function. The change in AOT will not impact the normal method of plant operation. More thorough troubleshooting and restoration activities are possible with an extended AOT. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this change. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria, analysis assumptions, methodologies, or credited equipment for any analyzed event. There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions.

There will be no impact on any margin of safety.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS- 24" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c); and accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.

S3 I

I L - - -- -- - - - - - - _ - _ - - _ _ _ - - - - _ - - - _ - _ - - - - -

Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.1 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-9, Incorporated 3.1 1 NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 12, Incorporated 3.1 15 NRC approved. ITS Revision.1 Special Test Exception I 4

3.1.10 is retained and re numbered as 3.1.8 ~

consistent with this traveler and TSTF 136. l i

TSTF 13, Incorporated 3.1 4 NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 14 Incorporated 3.1 13 NRC approved.

Revision 4 nf-7. /-445- !

TSTF-15 Incorporated NA NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 89 Incorporated 3.1-8 NRC approved.

TSTF-107/,y,) Incorporated 3.1 6 f J./-/f !

TSTF 108. 6)fhcorporated -NA- -ht NRC approved,.as-ef-Revision 1 7. /-2 / +-,_-m+ m<, nu 7 -7./w /

TSTF 110, Incorporated 3.1-10 A/g c ,j, joy,y ,/,

Revision +2 W /~4df TSTF-136 Incorporated 3.1 9, 3.1 15 A/t C affrev'/- 7A-7/-Sel:>

TSTF 141 Not incorpor3ted NA Disagree with change; traveler issued after cut-off date. ,

TSTF 142 -Net-/hcorporated -HA-2, l- D 1 M cfcrYS $ fc'ftcr

ut aff date. TX-3.1-00 3

%,7 ((F

, , -nc.

234-1 Incorporated 3.1 7 -7g- 7,/ - 444 WOG 105 Incorporated 3.1 16 1

MARK UP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97 i l

l

Core Reactivity 3.1 9 3.1.3 3.1.2

.t 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.3 3.1.2 Core Reactivity LCO 2.1.3 3.r.12 The measured core reactivity shall be within it ak/k of predicted values.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

f ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION ' TIME A. Measured core reactivity !

A.1 Re-evaluate core design and -72 hours y, /- 22 not within limit. safety analysis, and

'7 day.r Tg.,y,/_sy determine that the reactor core is acceptable for continued operation. I eM!

A.2 Establish appropriate 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; .f. /-31 operating restrictions and Tb7,/ -043 SRs.

7 o/,7 l B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.

i MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.1 2 5/15/97 l

L____ _ _ _ _ _

Core Reactivity B 3.1.3 3.1.2 l

l BASES LCO to be operating within acceptable design limits. Since (continued) deviations from the limit are normally detected by comparing predicted and measured steady state RCS critical boron concentrations, the difference between measured and predicted values would be approximately 100 ppm (depending on the boron worth) before the limit is reached. These values are well within the uncertainty limits for analysis of boron concentration samples, so that spurious violations of the limit due to uncertainty in measuring the RCS boron concentration are '

i unlikely. I APPLICABILITY The limits on core reactivity must be maintained during H0 DES 1 and 2 because a reactivity balance must exist when the reactor is critical or producing THERHAL POWER. As the fuel depletes, core conditions are changing, and confirmation of the reactivity balance ensures the core is operating as designed. This Specification does not apply in MODES 3. 4, ana 5 because the i

l reactor is shut down and the reactivity balance is not changing. l In HODE 6, fuel loading results in a continually changing core reactivity. Boron concentration requirements (LCO 3.9.1, " Boron Concentration") ensure that fuel movements are performed within l the bounds of the safety analysis. An SDH demonstration is '

l required during the first startup following operations that could

! have altered core reactivity (e.g., fuel movement, control rod replacement, control rod shuffling).

1 ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 i

l Should an anomaly develop between measured and predicted core reactivity, an evaluation of the core design and safety analysis j must be performed. Core conditions are evaluated to determine i their consistency with input to design calculations. Measured ;

l core and process parameters are evaluated to determine that they '

l are within the bounds of the safety analysis, and safety analysis i calculational models are reviewed to verify that they are adequate for representation of the core conditions. The required Completion Time of 7f hca is based on the low probability of aff-7./ coy :

DBA occurring during this p riod, and allows sufficient time to assess the physical conditi n of the reactor and complete the l evaluation of the core des'gn and safety analysis.

7h p (continued) t MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BAS $5 B 3.1 11 5/15/97

Core Recctivity B 2.1.3 3.1.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Following evaluations of the core design and safety analysis, the cause of the reactivity anomaly may be resolved. If the cause of the reactivity anomaly is a mismatch in core conditions at the time of RCS boron concentration sampling, then a recalculation of the RCS boron concentration requirements may be performed to demonstrate that core reactivity is behaving as expected. If an unexpected physical change in the condition of the core has occurred, it must be evaluated and corrected, if possible. If the cause of the reactivity anomaly is in the calculation technique, then the calculational models must be revised to provide more accurate predictions. If any of these results are demonstrated, and it is concluded that the reactor core is acceptable for continued operation, then the boron letdown curve may be renormalized and power operation may continue. If operational restrictions [ or additional SRs are necessary to ensure the reactor core is acceptable for continued operation, then they must be defined.

"I d*f.r

' The required Completion Time of -72 l,e ?is adequate for TE-7./-23 preparing whatever operating restrictions or surveillance that may be required to allow continued reactor operation.

IL1 i

If the core reactivity cannot be restored to within the 1% ak/k limit, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . If the SDM for MODE 3 is not met, then the boration required by LCO 3'1.1? Required ActionfA.1 SR 2.1.1.1 would occur. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without l- challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.3.1 3.1.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Core reactivity is verified by periodic comparisons of measured and predicted RCS boron concentrations (may include allowances for boron 10 depletion). The comparison is made, considering (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.1 12 5/15/97 t-

7 l

l l CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION Thermal Power is within the defined power level for Mode 2 during the performance of Physics Tests. since there is an Action that addresses Thermal Power not within limit yet there was no corresponding LC0 or surveillance requirement. The Surveillance Frequency of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is retained from the current TS. This change is based on traveler TSTF 14; hisicn 3. ~772-7 /-o#f 3.1 14 Not used.

3.1 15 Consistent with TSTF-12. Revision 1. ISTS LCOs 3.1.9 and 3.1.11 are deleted. The physics tests contained in LC0 3.1.9 were only contained in some initial plant startup testing programs. The physics test i exception can be deleted since these physics tests are never performed during post refueling outages. The physics test that LCO 3.1.11 required was the Rod Worth Measurement in the N 1 condition. The use of other rod worth measurement techniques will maintain the shutdown margin during the entire measurement process and still provide the

, necessary physics data verification. Since the N 1 measurement l technique is no longer used, the SDM test except' ion can be deleted.

This change and traveler TSTF 136 renumbers ISTS 3.1.10 to ITS 3.1.8.

l 3.1-16 This change adds the requirement to perform SR 3.2.1.2 in addition to l SR 3.2.1.1 during performance of ITS 3.1.4. Required Action B.2.4. The intent of Required Action B.2.4 is to verify that F a (z) is within its limit. Fo(z) is approximated by F/(z) (which is obtained via SR 3.2.1.1) and F/(z) (which is obtained via SR 3.2.1.2). Thus, both F/(z) and F/(z) must be established to verify Fa (z). This change is consistent with traveler WOG 105.

3.1 17 Consistent with current TS LC0 3.1.3.2 and the wording of ITS 3.1.7 Conditions A and B. ITS 3.1.7 Condition C is clarified to state that the inoperable position indicators are inoperable DRPIs.

3.1-18 A MODE change restriction has been added to ITS 3.1.1 in the LC0 Applicability, per the matrix discussed in CN 1 02 LS 1 of the 3.0 package (see the LS 1 NSHC in the CTS Section 3/4.0. ITS Section 3.0 package).

T.NSGAY t A-3A & ?. /-21

! 3.1-19 Not used.

i 3.1 20 Consistent with current TS 3/4.10.3. " Physics Tests." ITS LC0 3.1.8 and

its Condition C and SR 3.1.8.2 are modified to refer to " operating" RCS l loops. Adopting the current TS wording is acceptable since valid T,,,

l measurements are not obtainable for a non operating loop.

y, j-;2 l _rNJEAv i A - ?B ~T'X'-7 I-os/

y, j 2 2 ~1X- 7. /-40 2 JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 3 5/15/97

l l

INSERT 6A-38 3.1-21 The ITS SR 3.1.8.1 requirement to perform a CHANNEL T/ 7. /-44 /

OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) on the intermediate and power range NIS channels within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS is revised to delete the phrase "within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ." COT testing is performed on these i channels prior to reactor startup per LCO 3.3.1.This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-108.

3.1-22 The Completion Times for ITS 3.1.2, Required Actions A.1 and A.2 are Tg-7./-44?

increased from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days, consistent with traveler TSTF-142.

l l

I L

IIlll1l 1ll I

/ s 3 8 0 s f

o I. u 3 3z -

H.e P

g a

W Y

A A ~

X T a-7 9

/

5 1

/

L L

A s e

s e

s e A s rr e a 5

C / e Y Y Y N Y fy K

E E

R 1 Y C 3

T I F f ,

L L O s s s A s t a N

O I

B W Y e

Y e

Y e /

N Y e fy I

T A C

C I E L S P K P A 1

A E 3 P 4 E 1

- H G C E

R U

N M

A s s s A s er .,

N O C Y e

Y e

Y e /

N Y e fy M

O R

F

.S N E O C Y N N E A R C E O F. L F

I B A

s ,

D I s

e s

e A s e

e a R D Y Y Y

/

N Y fy O

F

.E s L

n f r n Sd i . o o i T e B 5 gsa t I i A

T 2 4.1 0 nic 1.

N C ".d f

i 1 1.G

- i i dCd 1 so N 23O r n n ts m O W oni 3i S 3S T r woi n Sd ee I T r RI e et o T e a R S l I s s 1 A f e h td i 't s c2 P mov r a d os ni ou i 3 4

t c s8 M oer nC o p s y 1 O f ct r n a di h1 -

C 7 ed P G N

eah pmt ri 2.1.ble d d x ai

" 3 E R

O E

oow t f

3. 3 a r nt r 3. S

.R U

I S G rt 1. S e ea 0d s N

R N t en npe 3T p I o b em 1 np ao -

E A e mgs t O n e . 4 o V H eni C .i sh /Cl E N C L8 at e g 3 L O

C. C ris i rn uuo Sdh T nt e h nek ra S oC TiR nS 3 B A

E qd c a opc -

P S

e r 1.4 .

t nA a e

t h .

i t

cy -

,p a t i enn t

n d "g d- T N

H he12 rst rn s i t0 ri r oi $ O uoeP I

rCt u S C

E t28 s3 cit R t aD tl 3 si eb e csr t e a ~

T I

R T d n hit A N dR o aSi tdse i n rah el ct hip t

id-o X P O t woob l

gif wna o E M I

T P

eoc gtA n

t n

Ct a 7.d ep e r

npo ap hA1 .

t n8 t J-

/

O C

I a nd h oe e c OS

- d e

e r A N R

C cir ti ts 1.f n si3ii r i o ECL DL -

s u

t s

i 3 e s

1 e f 'll O I

S siu O 2 r S E id q nS a e Me0 t nO R hd e oTl r h - o oC o E D T aR CI ca At1 N CLt V N

O R l , C E 6 7 B 1 1 8

1 9

1 0

2 2 =

M 1 1

1 1 1

U / ,

N 3 3 3 3 3

f. g.

II ; l

INSERT 6B-3 3.1-21 The ITS SR 3.1.8.1 requirement to perform a CHANNEL 7/-y,/ag/

OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) on the intermediate and power range NIS channels within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS is revised to delete the phrase "within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ." COT testing is performed on these channels prior to reactor startup per LCO 3.3.1.

3.1- 22 The Completion Times for ITS 3.1.2, Required Actions A.1 and A.2 are T4-2/-443 increased from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days.

l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR-3.1-004 thru TR-3.1-006 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Revise Traveler Status Sheet to reflect NRC approval and latest revision number of travelers TSTF-14 Rev. 4 TSTF-110 Rev. 2, and TSTF-136. Change WOG-73 Rev.1 to TSTF-234 (still under NRC review). Remove traveler revision numbers everywhere except on the Traveler Status Sheet. There are no changes involved to any CTS mark-ups, ITS mark-ups, DOCS, or JFDs.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 7, CTS 3/4.1 - ITS 3.1 Enclosure 3A, pages 1,3,4,10, and 12 Enclosure 3B, pages 1,3,6, and 8 Enclosure 4, page 26 Enclosure 5A, Traveler Status Sheet Enclosure 6A, pages 1,2, and 3 Enclosure 68, pages 1 and 2 '

l l

l

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO TS SECTION 3/4.1 This enclosure contains a brief description / justification for each marked-up change to the current Technical Specifications. The cha.nges are identified by change numbers contained in Enclosure 2 (Mark up of the current Technical Specifications).

In addition, the referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs) are contained in Enclosure 4. Only technical changes are discussed: administrative changes (i.e., format, presentation, and editorial changes) made to conform to NUREG 1431 Revision 1 are not discussed. For Enclosures 3A, 30, 4, 6A, and 68, text in bradets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location.

CHANGE NUMBER MiliC DESCRIPTION i

01 01 LG InaccordancewithTSTF9/s 1. this change would move 72' 7./-44/,

the specified limit for Shutdown Margin (SDM) from the current TS to the COLR. This change occurs in several specifications including that for SDM and those specifications with ACTIONS that require verifying SDM within limits. SDM is a cycle specific parameter that is calculated based on an NRC approved methodology. Moving the SDM to the COLR will provide core design and operational flexibility that can be used for improved fuel management.

01 02 M 7 roposed modification redefines the applicabili g g,/-f the s ' ' cation to include " Mode 2 with .0" in addition to 3, 4, and 5 (see 01 A). The current Specification co bank insertion limits (and ITS Specification .. ines the Shutdown Margin applicability re ements for Mode Mode 2 with km i 2 1.0. Th oposed change would be more r ictive, but would resent only a small change from the curre DM a

1cability ZAGEAT re l 3/}quirements.

01 03 LS 1 The Action Statement would be modified to reflect that the requirement to initiate boration at a specified rate with fluid at a specified boron concentration is generalized to simply require boration. As described in the ITS Bases, the required flow rate and boron concentration should be selected depending on plant conditions and available equipment. The ITS Bases allow the operator to use the "best source available for the plant conditions." This is an example of maintaining the overall safety requirement in TS but removing procedural details from the TS allowing the plant operator the ability to select the appropriate procedure and equipment for the existing plant condition.

l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 1 5/15/97 w____-_________________________.

I l

i l CHANGE j NUMBER NSBC DESCRIPTION

02 01 A In the conversion process this LC0 will be combined with the SDH LC0 applicable for T., > 200*F. in accordance with traveler TSTF-136. Traveler TSTF 9, M.1. relocated Tg-3./-dg values for SDM to the COLR which removed the only difference between ISTS LC0 3.1.1 and ISTS LC0 3.1.2.

Differences above and below 200*F will be addressed in the COLR.

03 01 A The footnote referring to Special Test Exceptions would be i deleted. This is acceptable because the requirements for {

Special Test Er.ceptions are provided in separate LCOs. '

Therefore, a separate reference in the footnote is redundant.

03 02 LS 3 Action Statement a.1 would be revised to require achieving Mode 2 with k,,, < 1.0 instead of achieving HOT STANDBY if the BOL NTC limit is exceeded and revised rod withdrawal limits cannot be established. This change corrects the discrepancy between the BOL Applicability and the ACTION, while ensuring that the plant is taken to a condition in which the LC0 is not applicable. Revicing the current TS, l albeit to correct an inconsistency, represents a relaxation in ACTION Statement a.1.

03 03 A The statement that administrative withdrawal limits I required to meet Action Statement a.1 are in addition to insertion limits of another specification would be removed. This change is an administrative change because the statement is redundant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 and therefore can be deleted.

03 04 LG The requirement of current TS Action Statement a.2, which provides the details of how to verify that MTC has been restored ~to within limits (i.e., calculation) for the all rods withdrawn condition prior to exiting Action Statement a.1, is addressed in the ITS 3.1.3 Bases.

03-05 TR-2 The requirement to submit a Special Report to the NRC would be deleted. This is in conformance with the ISTS.

03 06 LS-4 This change would incorporate a Note from ITS 3.1.3 allowing suspension of MTC testing near the end of the cycle when further significant changes to the MTC would not occur and result in exceeding the E0L limit. This represents a relaxation in performing the surveillance requirement.

f DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 3 5/15/97

CHANGE NUMBER fi2iG DESCRIPTIQH 03 07 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

04 01 LS 5 This proposed change would make two changes to the Action Statement. First, it would alter the Action Statement shutdown requirement time limit from a combination of 15 minutes to restore T., to within limits followed by 15 minutes to be in Mode 3, if T,., could not be restored, to a single 30 minute limit to exit the Applicability if T,., were not within its limit. Second, the Action Statement would be revised to require achieving Mode 2 with k,,, < 1.0 instead of achieving HOT STANDBY if the LCO were not met (refer to TSTF 26). Regarding the first change, both the current requirement and the ITS requirement are essentially equivalent in that the plant is now required to shutdown and exit the Applicability of the specification within 30 minutes after discovering that a parameter is not within its limits, if the parameter is :

not restored to within its limits in that 30 minute time period. If the LCO can be satisfied at any time during the 30 minute time frame, the plant shutdown can be terminated. Regarding the second change, it represents a relaxation in current Action Statement requirements for plant shutdown, consistent with exiting the LC0's (

Applicability. 1 04-02 LS 6 The proposed change would revise the Surveillance I Requirement for verifying that Reactor Coolant System ,

(RCS) temperature (T,,) is within limits by changing the Frequency to once. r 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months in accordance with industry traveler TSTF 27 ,Rev 2. The current frequency 7# 7. /* I requirements are within 15 minutes prior to achieving

~

reactor criticality, which is redundant and unnecessary sinc? T,., must be within its limit prior to entering the LCO Applicability, and at least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the (T,,, T,,,) Deviation Alarm is not reset. The RCS temperature is maintained within limit: (1) to assure that the Moderator Temperature Coefficient is within the limits assumed in the accident analyses; (2) to assure that the neutron detectors are not adversely affected: (3) to assure that the RCS and pressurizer response to thermal hydraulic transier,ts is as predicted; and (4) to assure that the reactor vessel '

! temperature is above the nil ductility transition reference temperature.

The plant design incorporates the monitoring of T,,, and provides an alarm, the (T , - T,,,) Deviation Alarm, as T,,,

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 4 5/15/97

CHANGE NUMBER HSHC DESCRIPTION effect on the manner in which the operating staff would 1- determine whether a mis' alignment event had occurred. This change is consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1.

12 16 LG Several surveillance (e.g., rod position deviation l

[

l monitor and rod insertion limit monitor in this section) l contain actions in the fonn of increased surveillance frequency to be performed in the event of inoperable alarms. These actions are moved from the TS to licensee l controlled documents since the alarms do not themselves

! directly relate to the limits. This detail is not j l required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of j the public health and safety. Therefore, moving this detail is acceptable and is consistent with traveler i TSTF 110, 5 . 1. D7 /W l 12-17 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

I

12-18 LG The technical contents of the Action Statement which allow continued power operation with a misaligned rod are moved i to the Bases for ITS LC0 3.1.4. Action B.1.

12 19 LS 18 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l

l Table (Enclosure 3B). )

i 12 20 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison !

Table (Enclosure 38). l 12 21 -

Not used.

t 12 22 H This change. in accordance with NUREG 1431. Rev.1 l provides a new ACTION in the event the allowed outage l times are not met for the rod misalignment actions. Prior i

, to this change. LCO 3.0.3 would have been entered allowing

! for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months prior to placing the plant in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . This change is more restrictive in that the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months time frame is eliminated.

13 01 LG Consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1. the operability

[ attributes of equipment and components are described in l the Bases. The proposed elimination of the accuracy L attributes of the Digital Rod Position Indication System and Demand Position Indication System from the Specification on position indicating systems would have no impact on OPERABILITY of these systems because the design of these systems is fixed. Furthermore. IT5 LC0 3.1.4 requires that all individual indicated rod positions be

(

I DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 10 5/15/97 l

)

w _ - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CHANGE NUMBER BSliC DESCRIPTION plant shutdown to Hode 3 requirement would be required in one less hour.

13 05 A This proposed change would involve retaining an action statement, currently in the plant TS, that permits continued POWER OPERATION with more than one digital rod position indicator per group inoperable. This is in accordance with the current licensing basis of the plant.

13 06 A Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, a separate condition entry allowance is permitted in current TS 3.1.3.2 for each inoperable rod position indicator and each demand position indicator. This is an administrative change since the Required Actions address each rod or bank with inoperable indication separately [and Action b addresses the condition of multiple inoperable DRPIs, up to a complete loss of digital position indication).

13 07 H The proposed modifications to the SR would require a verification of agreement between digital and demand indicator systems prior to criticality after each removal of the reactor vessel head, instead of every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

This reflects a reorganization of surveillance requirements in the ITS. The requirement for a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months comparison would be moved to SR 3.1.4.1 in the ITS. The post-vessel head removal requirement would be a new specification that demonstrates rod position system OPERABILITY based on a comparison of indicating systems.

The Frequency requirement of prior to criticality after each removal of the reactor vessel head would permit this comparison to be performed only during plant outages that involve plant evolutions (vessel head removal) that could affect the OPERABILIT( of the rod position indication systems. The Frequency changa is based on traveler TSTF 89.

13 08 LS 20 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

13 09 LS 23 Current TS ACTIONS b.1.b) and b.1.') of LC0 3.1.3.2 are l deleted. SDM is ensured in MODES 1 and 2 by rod position.

Multiple inoperable DRPIs will have no impact on SDM in MODES 1 and 2 if the control rod positions are verified by alternate means and rod motion is limited consistent with the accident analyses. Deletion of these requirements is consistent with traveler WOC 73, Rev 1. - TJTf'- 2.74, 74-y, /_q

1~MSGAT* 3% -/*1 y DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 12 5/15/97

L S u c

A n e

S m d

em L Sd s s s s s r n n A e e e e e on

.d . r . e . e C Y Y Y Y Y N a ou om om N c NA NA H - .

2 9 9.

0 .

n 8 8

- S i K 1T . .

E Nt y . o o E C n d LN LN R e aS O O eT t t Y C er r en en er l t e e ee T F S u A n S m S m I

L c e d d L O s s s s s . d .r r n n e e e e e .e .e I

W Y Y Y o n ou om om B Y Y N a N c NA NA A

C I .

L S P T P K A A t n

1 E e t

n

. P r e 4 r r

/ E c

u eS.

3 H f T f

C n it S N I D n T A e M r O . r s s s s s s T o. ou e e e e e s N C N N c Y Y Y Y Y e e E Y Y R

R U

C N

- O Y t n

E N e L A r B C eS.

f T A O f T L it D n N B e O A s r

I . r s s s s s s S e ou e e e s D Y N c Y e e e e I Y Y Y Y Y Y R

A e P n n n M h f

e o a o n o O

t hht o o d o t t ge t i i C l m id 2 t

a i t uo or y t we a

inb d r t t n r i

s N wf t

h ei z td e E o . o e e n o O

i cl v D s2 b ms e p e) l t t l eu o 0 e n e I

S gH i

b t r r a a t o e w em H l

a1 f rib d R nD a c e h o o aS c ed n d

r t s o e3 iud e r E h ( i f e n i t g n qov .

V c l

g nS o er aS efiee f l l

ot i n y aT r hT a N n p f o t hI i

O si p ri s r a di t

a h c i g A i c C h r oe ci ue or et r a l n i

et ci 0. d e i

t i t " . n w1 v t a o t pn h e e c b i s o in s a o icr .

- M t s h d i e hn d io 1 t if a h d l e a r c

- w d

e ieat a si n r ic T se a

i t e n u

l iea n ,g d

1 E

eo ed d f i tat r ins r oe l

p . b vik

,i t

e6 G f t d

a d n h u t o c v A

p 4 O

h t im rl u

e a1 N su one ih e n s ghh m

ih e moc w EC r5 t t 3 A vS b i n 2 b ig O DL o1 oi it H e et o H1 or C 0 L H y f s n i cwf o sR eS C R r d b a c 0 t a t t i hh2 o l r 5 r M H di nh t g 6 yS

.f u yp e.

C d on s 0 n v et uE f T 9 o l b o mn 5 ai mi f u01 E - t w u r . f O e w e w or0 i I r

P Fi T mR 0

oeo n wt b o i eC t o e .tc r" h H3 e o S Si L n a

r cL i d h 3 a st vt Tl O 1 o t i d t i e n v oH c u .

t t ER e iuo qt t dO oy H C nH nC C hd t e e

< ita nt e a eii r mnf o odS D i h s f S e s 0 e 0 e e

r "y eD aL t S t t i

E iih f t n i s s H r n I o t l T f ic eiib a e c a a o el of n a N

wf i t ef t

a oee c t ndt h e pf B iv .C ime c oE n t

e c eco k i t t pr e o e0 t Di mi O s o1 r w t a nD et I

c et n p h e c S t

si u

mr mo e 1 e t l

a oHd ri T a sS t p n na q r f e1 e n ed ci e r iler oc g< h e t nt iuc P d r e T i S w

oe e f n3 n ,a t n inai ar q

_ I R

oh t 2D H

i t ea c r mt r y

ub qad t a s mS h a

,s

, si n h c ci) o eo rt

_ C ct n c e S er e i rT ck e e' g' ef s p a er Aidl r et l oI t t i t r s r

_ S E no u v r E

D e 0h equg ui eol pe er e f

i sh a n a o m

ee mc ri o eo vi D I mc Ht h T rf el is h n e T id h eh T pt T h

itwcer h r C f h vi n T ( l i or N p R

_ E B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 8 9 M 0 0 0 1 0

- 2 0 0 01 0 0 U 1 -G 1 1 S 1 S N 0 L 0H 0 L 0L 1 G 1 1 S 1 1 0L 0 A 0 L 0A 0A

L L s s A s s s s s e e e e e e e C Y Y Y Y Y Y Y K

E E

R Y C T F I

L L s s O s s s s s I e e e e e e e B W Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A

C I

L P K P A 1

A E

. P 4 E

/

3 H C

S N T A M s s s s s s T O e e e e e e s

e N C Y Y Y Y Y Y Y E

R R

U C N

- O Y

E N L A B C A O T L N B 0 A I

s s s s s s s S e e e e e e e I D Y Y Y Y Y Y Y R

A P o d s t

n o

M t e t l i a t

D d a O b ou t r l y eF e C s eo now e m

e e o t rF v yd e nt t e r l u e o i o oE o l et N wu 0. t v C v ot c m erf ert t it 1 vi at O o nsl en1 o a a r t r l 3 s l

ai u I di egwe n r r o ct o ei i t qr m S tu mt n ,e m< e e p

t

.tc a ni l

a y h i ec rwxe t

R ui ,

y ya e e r r r t n E h5 ns ,t ,r

,e n r m p e e o V s1 ima T a , e r t e e v v ini inf f R pm t k w t t i R d rd oe t eS N t f f S hO e u s l eie a o O no5 oi e a e r ut ee d c t s s5 a 1 t nt C gd u qc . h n C mn yoiL a n ich t s ei s t o ei rf r ii h e eoy , t i w r i t a rd e d ei ogT vki t i bdit e e i n e e g t d r i n at t ad riA el c2h v h a C ri mer a a e i e ri S neob E t .

it h pt h b s v pl

)

p 2 f t u t n es i

wt a eDf 6 w r o e o l oe d u n nd E ntos cheit0i2 o o4 dh yl cc G on l i ol rl H

YF

- o e c

f 3

ndt g oa n f a e a n ief eiirlo N t co p ,gBT l

n e s t i ics h bl f rt t A c f epnnD5 S a i a rS i os l e a rh c r o H A a s

bA ioiNT C d uT rt n e pn .

ob e ci er g C vA R r t I a i u s oD t v af pt n emt t et eT r o a pd a f sP y eioni C h oiohiiS e e c r o meg e diF st e c t r r c E

r f imnt ddh l dt a aO v cT e l

u a s

et p

oia r cf l

ua rE mi ev .

b re ocb ept P ed i y r op0 t i ot s S et l H a a n ee adt e wn 6 i t s t f t i nu ix n e mioeI r gt r e m s2 i T v o

oi t o c e a r o l

s mv f e c s H ei H aih c n a m e i a g d icaea s C l t o iuiv o r r

u ms r et n ee f rB DI h rh n S t p i mt i ri s

.qv r u a c e E ld e w t eet t

h6ii.qd o iu b c 1 a h n c ice a2 g0 E o T um Tt l n e E c a x N oio wt t f miocd i m h u a v 2h iM 4.io .n el r D l e pf 1 in0 H eirg O i i l t a n r 1 v r u D d a s o d t oe H eb p 3 ir nnaii I et y,l i e e r1 t t wr s u f e uiucl l

- T P

gn an eT3 et eoo m t i g sdf t

t i

nt oR f

o 1 e c

s a

h d ct t e oo n

o yn pt r oi u ocS t aI nT q

endr unt r

I R

h eeE u c r r0 nna a r nd R e2 d7 O4 C/ m R c r t ei r vb pi s m ioet mr i r e Rt r e rt C

S s i qs iut H mhi hct efs e o0i

- t e S s -

evT iF L3 e eS s t

Si a y d pr ee n t t r is cat e l

er oh f t S a ov rf ee rH c E en r h e5 hT y h r on h ef h eo D h ee n0 iwbi(

T r ri3 T rT TCS T pc e T r a T pt h pe0 a n T op5 ei r R

E

_ B 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 M 05 0 6 0 0 0 7 0 0

_ U 4 S 4 S 4 5 5S 5G 5 N 0L 0H 0 L 0A 0L 0 L 0 A

L ca s - i o

L s s s ei s t A e

r vi A s s s c C Y e e ol eh / e e e e Y Y N art N Y Y YS o

K t E

E d R e v

Y C o T

M I

F - .

L L s s s R O s A s s sA I e e e e / e e B W Y Y Y Y N Y Y eS Yl l A

C I -

L h M P K en t

R P A n t o T A em n 1 E i i o P y l e8 y t 4 d . d1 d .

E aS d

/ eT aS e 3 H r ot) s nl eT v C l t l a a r o S N A n ad v l t A n H

T A e ( nr e M r ue r .

. r s sdt s A s T O ou e ee n e / e ou

. r s N C N c Y Y ri Y N Y e

N c Y E

R R

U h C N en t

- O n t o - n Y i em4 i o E N y le &ga; y t L A d .

d4 d . d B C aS aS e eT ot ) eT v A O r s nl r o T L l t A n l a a ad v l t M B e ( nr A n N A ue e -

O I

.rr s sdt s A s r

. r sA R.

S D ou e een e / e ou eS I N c Y Y ri Y N Y N c YF R

A p P e r M o o o O nn s

d r g n

is t C oe i dh it n nT d niy i c d w l d e a ol oace N

O t i al c

o r l l

o eoo c rR nt r

a e h

ne m . nu od ns wd o .

mt ns nouh e1 need1 I i s g o e ne yt s oi e ocqTl S f u i o n F. f .

r oh t f . i ri f r i e R S ect i s o7 r et ef r t ) r ri ir* sT f ol E ev u0 d ed n t i ie 0 at a r a u a nf . r V ve s1 pnc et c o N r d 05 ot rn roi r

bf e - e uih s c o ivi e O M p D

F

a nr e e t om s "e aiear r sF uT oof t c ci g et cr or d cn ac e C S a 1 or et e l

b pl aS cT a peai a rt nd nsl aee eal gc u nn 5 l l a pn oc evht h o l ai 5 T n eeb l r nt t a i si es a i e d uo pi e l e os n rt ith i e ed a

,n t h o d rp irf n al g

e d pii pe on en vb e t e t y st r a c E at i

a st e t oa r v eut ov o uri t l n h oa s oie e pns el t G t a s n Tt n

t m o

di a el c us

" e c f r a r s r e i N ni Si pr sii s e n t b go uh t pt t n d d o A m C a of ib r muv eh d s a e or ent H iei Rm r v at oai k t etd nh m r osi C rl e no dd er c r ct ai nio c n . it ef a e r ee f c t w r nig . cnr o C

d n

i t a

mv r o eoe pl l i imd ihi go l

dl r et r no

e. mnt h E ue t d om r n wl oe n e eat b n eat e a i nt P wb f e ai r n s e t v ns ( t S iai s r r e eee ot eI diii f v ed mve e

pe sdh not d r r a u t s dP ot R r a r m sei imo H ga b oro os e S is sO r ea cl mef s C nh a

or o i r n r N n i at n n rh E t t d t l r b eo O o s s nr a not d T

h t e l c oo m I c t ' yi a e l of ca tb t u A r .

s o T ndb nmh l i N h n n o t em i t s C ,

e o i t eioh O dt e

ed ml ew m

] n r e 1 out i

h A y t

mrt n

imeet odh h e rh v et d I s t on .

eu ee cl s ig"e n T ei g enat w rs T

P I

pet omn ir wo u

r c i n ua 3.

1 of f iaSy d. db r a l t l

.ib ai ih l t a

.s nion ne un nmr sii r a s r e e qg qn l e ord r a s no l p sf s n R pr m en ee 3 st o s weepr ei gc etr im a onr ne C

s un id ri rt [ e n r U pr oe imet S i qe es t

ei n

S u gn s et t

s oer p n v po win e e dt s af t r

e r io E h em h e h a T a r o o ihi opn vdt D T ra T t T m C cuC N T" cai oeoh f e Rb pc ed enc ec

. S a ab R

E B 9 0

0 0 1 23 3 4 5 6 M 1 1 1 3 1 1 1

1 1 1 U

2 2S 2R 2S 2 2 2 2G N 1 M 1 L 1 T 1 L 1 1 M 1 A 1 L

_ l

A L

l t A n e

g g~- S md -

ee/ 5 -

c

_ L s s s r . '7 nC dc

_ A C Y e e e ou

. r s e 7 omb . e

. c

_ Y Y N c Y NA MV n 9. 9

_ i 8 8 K y . .

- E d . o - :

_ E aS LN LN R eT O O

_ Y C r en t

c t.

- l t A n ee c T

F e S nh S

_ I L L s s s .rr c

n r.

_. O e e e ou s . e . c

_ I B W Y Y Y N c Y e om o-

_ NA N"

_ A C -

I t ;

L n o r .

P K e t e P r r A

A r d r 1 E u e ;

P c t N0.

4 N0. n a c - "

E

/ C2 C2 i o

H - - i-

_ 3 C eS eS t l

e t c

- S N A

eL S -

8 eL S -

8 N o R N'

;A/

e T M 0 0 2 T O o3

- - s e

s rsM 0A o3 e o. S.

C N1 ,teR ;S0 N N1 Y Y N T rYT

- NT1 E e r -

R R U U

C N t

n e

r fe7 w-7 0

- O r a5 - 5 -

- N Y

c u ,s9 5

9 -

E . t ,- _

L A N0 N0. n M/ 9 1

R9 -

B C C2 C2 i ,L 4 2 A/1 E42 A eS eS e / 2 - /2 O t e9 2 e02 T

N L

B A

eL S -

8 0

eL S -

8 0

N o _de1

- (s d

% 4d0 e1 -

s - 5 O

S I o3 o3

- s e

s e

S. ,vo st eL eaC

- e st L D t, No N1 N1 ,I ee C I

R Y Y f

T V d D - -

VdOA - -

- A r p

_ P o t

M n r y e -

_ t e dd s n bh -

O a m

_ C R c h

c e a e es a p ':/- e indii o t s d

.Ei a e h a s I 7 r t i iew o r

N O t O n nPi Wd e r a r

gt l o

es b n owr P

r a i sHf t t s

, d r

I S

e md n f o

yo s r si i oD t l al e f- 2 oDi pS r eepe n n m s e

t e -

f o1 R

E eeo t ui y f i ee i r v g i c al -

b3

- 3 1

d nvs oo et ey r

n e

aS cCt oR neh7 a r r p n isi tstint f d a7 r e R e

- V e ra c is t r - 3 le e m yc ta r nu i l i N n v s oh cuer oq rh ea O no e m t c eope O b a l

C nop oc d n .

or d e c l t a y us rec pwol s n e C

L 2 s

ceF r t

o 1

T r4i iH u

_ it s o ct r i o oy ws n

e t s nn er

,i v a f o

d imnd oeeT i t s 3 4 t

nr er

. qe notsiti eJ ai it at eu eont a ml d c R r h q n

3

3. e 4- ug eoli m h '7

_ nr a ni ri o - )

- S o t e rt 6 1 1 1 t n E a et od t r uin9 c. v p s o'-

_ f aiS G n pi c n ea f F cd aW 1 S a 3 3 ctT1

- g N

A iaad t i e t d i

h ic o t e s ot h nh -

b D Ehdi o n3 n uNaC -

d l h 'y c ei t 0l o v ilrno4 H a n eh C

t h et e r a on aT v a nr w d Hl n ioi t G i idpt O

t i -

r

.o n a pe m t i o wio a nwot eO a e p C sd m a a mt rol W t S :

E dS l T n ed s

n n e s.

oa r r l t n )

i st me - ic P d P u a h m u l

a et t rh e

b. dI n eP od D r e

f si! aA e-C S ot h wnt .

wc o a it e h o C cis 1 rR co .l i

c i

s -

ad ch wi uD r s e e a e e a mr H el el gprb l

l a r ic d e29 oenn s b s e n eh d s a ev St p .

S mi mn de

_ C n o a f n 1 8 rd oo S el t n yr n ts -

E o i a r -

f ni c N b al t t e et

_ T a emr e d d eyF

,ut O s af a n m N

h h ct h p l 1 uP ol t rT ma f eS n ,ri a s I T

i rf s nh e nat e u r c im T-im,t e

- t o oR t a vT T eie ai O oh e C H p2 a r o h I

d nin ei wi wD di egy e r isi c ps oi AD o et iw ud c wt l-T P

s oyN p ee gl si t f e odi ol ih v wdT h S T

S nd mn i n a ed n et s e d

0, f- eri pl O u nb p l e o e .e e el out e I

R ot I r nT r o a a h r onad v r ec a a rd u pen .

tnepdl 1 atncict s t l d ea ent

- t s C pea g c ep peier si p a o od ct i rR et i S r ai c r Ci a S erE r eo et wt t t s

sit u r et E e s ot E h uP e h n h e ir n n d v n o rl l Dt en l n et d e o r eo ue sv D T cO p ue u0l h o h Ti Tb ci o A r c g CdMH at c R c T e4-R E

B 5 6 7 80 9 3 1 1 -

M 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 U

3 3 N 1 A 1 A 3

1 H 3S 1 L 3S 1 L 4 5 -

1 R 1 R l' l

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS l r i 1.s NSHC LS-6 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed change would revise the Surveillance Requirement for verifying that .

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature (T,,,) is within limits by changing e l Frequency to once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months in accordance with industry traveler TSTF-27 ,Rev 2. W4./-@/,

The current frequency requirements are within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor l criticality, which is redundant and unnecessary since T,,, must be within its limit prior to entering the LC0 Applicability, and at least once per 30 minutes when the l reactor is critical and the (T,,, T,,,) Deviation Alarm is not reset. The RCS temperature is maintained within limit: (1) to assure that the Moderator Temperature Coefficient is within the limits assumed in the acident analyses: (2) to assure that the neutron detectors are not adversely affected: (3) to assure that the reactor coolant system and pressurizer response to thermal-hydraulic transients is as predicted; and (4) to assure that the reactor vessel temperature is above the nil-ductility transition reference temperature.

The plant design incorporates monitoring of T,,, and provides an alarm the (T,,, T,,,) i Deviation Alarm, as T,., approaches its limit. This alarm condition requires a i response by the operating staff. Therefore, at any time that T,,, is approaching its limiting value, the plant operators would receive an alarm and initiate corrective i action.

This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

"The Comission may make a final determination. pursuant to the procedures in 50.91. that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendnent would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. "

The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 26 5/15/97 l

Zndustry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.1 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF 9, Incorporated 3.1 1 NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 12, Incorporated 3.1 15 NRC approved. ITS Revision 1 Special Test Exception 3.1.10 is retained and re numbered as 3.1.8, consistent with this traveler and TSTF 136.

TSTF 13. Incorporated 3.1 4 NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 14 Incorporated 3.1 13 NRC approved.

Revi sion 4- r & 7. /-des-TSTF 15 Incorporated NA NRC approved.

Revision 1 TSTF 89 Incorporated 3.1 8 NRC approved.

TSTF-107/cy.) Incorporated 3.1 6 f 7 /-/5-TSTF 108 -Het/hcorporated --NA- -et NRC approved,.as-ef-Revision 1 7. /--2 / _g r yj e, m- cut et< g te, 9 -F./w /

TSTF 110 Incorporated 3.1-10 Revi sion-1-2 Ngc ,j,jon, v,/,

N'I /--#d f TSTF-136 Incorporated 3.1 9, 3.1 15 NgC oppoVed -R--7 /-04(,

l TSTF 141 Not incorporated NA Disagree with change; traveler issued after cut off date. ,

TSTF-142 -Net-/hcorporated -NA- .M ,rr/c. % OM vYeftcr r s "ua 3'. I .*n -cut off d;tc. 7X-3./-00 3

-- d Y ~; N Incorporated 3.1 7 /X.- 7 /-04/,

WOG 105 Incorporated 3.1 16 l

l l

l MARK UP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97 i

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1431 NUREG 1431 Section 3.1 This enclosure contains a brief discussion / justification for each marked up technical change to NUREG 1431. Revision 1. to make them plant specific or to incorporate generic changes resulting from the Industry /NRC generic change process.

The change numbers are referenced directly from the NUREG 1431 mark ups. For Enclosures 3A. 3B, 4. 6A. and 6B text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant-specific information in that location.

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 3.1 1 In accordance with TSTF 9/,c. 1; this change would relocate the ~7~R-7 /14 specified limit for Shutdown Margin (SDM) from the ISTS to the COLR.

This change occurs in several specifications ' including the Specification for SOM and those specifications with ACTIONS that require verifying SDM within limits.

3.1 2 p = ;r m n C w.vec.3en T;bic Notapp't:bictcCall[2y.

JE=ler: 00). u.re S f) yg_p 3.1 3 Not W M 61c to C:ll = y. SO: Ceniersion Oc ;;risca ToblC -

-(Encl; r e 00). u. red. $ f. / .27

.3.1-4 SR 3.1.4.2 of NUREG 1431. Revision 1 would be deleted. In accordance with TSTF 13f= 1. the intent of this SR is only to determine the~72-F/-#44 next frequency for SR 3.1.4.3. Performance of SR 3.1.4.2 is not necessary to assure that the LCO is met: SR 3.1.4.3 fulfills that purpose. Therefore. SR 3.1.4.2 may be deleted. In addition, the Note in the Frequency column of SR 3.1.4.2 would be moved to become Note 1 in the Surveillance column of SR 3.1.4.3. This is for clarification purposes. As discussed in CN 3.1 9. section re numbering results in SR 3.1.4.3 of NUREG 1431. Revision 1 becoming ITS SR 3.1.3.2.

3.1 5 Per current TS [3.1.3.1], the words "with all" have been removed from ITS LCO 3.1.4 Tht: is a clarification that ensures the proper interpretation of the LCO. The change makes it clear that only one channel of DRPI is necessary to meet the alignment accuracy requirement of the LCO. With the word "all" in the statement. it may be possible l for those unfamiliar with the DRPI design to interpret the LCO as i

applying to all channels of DRPI.

3.1 6 ITS LC0 3.1.4 would be split into two separate statements to clarify that the alignment limit is separate from OPERABILITY of the control rod. The CONDITION A wording is broadened from "untrippable" to

" inoperable" to ensure the CONDITION encompasses all causes of inoperability. Previous wording was ambiguous for rods that, for instance, had slow drop times but were still trippable. These slow JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 1 5/15/97

l CHANGE NUMBER JUSTfFfCATION rods are inoperable rods, and the change clarifies the appropriate ACTIONS. The Bases are changed to reflect the changes to the LC0 and l

CONDITION A. These changes are based on traveler TSTF 107. i 3.1 7 This change to the ISTS would incorporate into ITS LCG 3.1.7. an Action Statement that was previously approved as part of the Callaway {

and Wolf Creek licensing basis as revised in Enclosure 2. The Action i Statement would permit continued POWER OPERATION for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months !

with more than one Digital Rod Position Indicator per rod group inoperable. The Action Statement specifies additional required actions beyond those applicable to the condition of one DRPI wr group i inoperable. The Bases for this change also would be incorporated into I the Bases for the plant ITS. These changes are consistent with traveler = 73. ns.1. The Note under the ACTIONS is changed to be consistent with the new equired Actions. 7 4 - 7 /-444 i

~Ory=~- 2 3+ .

3.1 8 The Frequency for ITS SR 3.1.7.1 for comparing DRPI and group demand position would be changed from 18 Months to "Once prior to criticality after each removal of the reactor vessel head." This change makes it clear that the surveillance must be performed each time the head is !

remed and that it is not tied to an absolute time interval. This change is based on traveler TSTF 89.

3.1 9 This change would eliminate ISTS 3.1.2 because the SDH requirements for MODE 5 have been incorporated into Specification 3.1.1 in accordance with traveler TSTF 136. Traveler TSTF 9, Re. 1. relocated values for T#-3./-404 :

SDM to the COLR which removed the only difference between ISTS LC0 3.1.1 and ISTS LC0 3.1.2. Differences above and below 200*F will be addressed in the COLR. Subsequent sections have been re numbered.

3.1-10 Several surveillance (e.g., rod position deviation monitor and rod insertion limit monitor in this section) contain actions in the form of j increased surveillance frequency to be performed in the event of i inoperable alarms. These actions are moved from the TS to licensee l controlled documents since the alarms do not themselves directly relate l to the limits. This detail is not required to be in the TS to provide

adequate protection of the public health and safety. Therefore, moving this detail is acceptable and is consistent with traveler TSTF 110 , 7g .7 /-oo+.

D'".' 1.

l 3.1 11 Not used.

3.1 12 The Required Actions for inoperable DRPI in ITS 3.1.7 are revised per j the current licensing basis to note that the use of movable incore i

detectors for rod position verification is an indirect assessment at best. The position of some rods can not be ascertained by this method.

3.1 13 This change adds an LC0 requirement and SR to MODE 2 Physics Tests

( Exceptions 3.1.8 to verify that thermal power is less than or equal to 5 percent RTP. The LCO requirement and SR were added to verify that JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 2 5/15/97

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTlFICATTON s

Thermal Power is within the defi.ned power level for Mode 2 during the performance of Physics Tests, since there is an Action that addresses Thermal Power not within limit yet there was no corresponding LC0 or surveillance requirement. The Surveillance Frequency of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is retained from the current TS. This change is based on traveler TSTF 14; ncsisicr. 3. TA'-7. / -4BS .

I 3.1-14 Not used.

3.1 15 Consistent with TSTF 12. -Rcvi;icr.1. ISTS LCOs 3.1.9 and 3.1.11 are 7#-7,/-44/ !

deleted. The physics tests contained in LC0 3.1.9 were only contained in some initial plant startup testing programs. The physics test exception can be deleted since these physics tests are never performed i during post refueling outages. The physics test that LCO 3.1.11 '

required was the Rod Worth Measurement in the N 1 condition. The use of other rod worth measurement techniques will maintain the shutdown l

margin during the entire measurement process and still provide the necessary physics data verification. Since the N 1 measurement ;

technique is no longer used, the SDH test exception can be deleted. I This change and traveler TSTF 136 renumbers ISTS 3.1.10 to ITS 3.1.8.

3.1-16 This change adds the requirement to perform SR 3.2.1.2 in addition to SR 3.2.1.1 during performance of ITS 3.1.4. Required Action B.2.4. The intent of Required Action B.2.4 is to verify that Fa (z) is within its ;

limit. Fa(z) is approximated by F/(z) (which is obtained via '

SR 3.2.1.1) and F/(z) (which is obtained via SR 3.2.1.2). Thus, both F/(z) and F/(z) must be established to verify Fe (z). This change is consistent with traveler WOG 105.

3.1 17 Consistent with current TS LC0 3.1.3.2 and the wording of ITS 3.1.7 Conditions A and B. ITS 3.1.7 Condition C is clarified to state that the inoperable position indicators are inoperable DRPIs.

3.1 18 A HODE change restriction has been added to ITS 3.1.1. in the LCO Applicability, per the matrix discussed in CN 1-02 LS 1 of the 3.0 package (see the LS 1 NSHC in the CTS Section 3/4.0. ITS Section 3.0 package).

rNSGCr i A-3A & S. /-29 3.1 19 Not used.

3.1 20 Consistent with current TS 3/4.10.3. " Physics Tests." ITS LC0 3.1.8 and its Condition C and SR 3.1.8.2 are modified to refer to " operating" RCS loops. Adopting the current TS wording is acceptable since valid T,y

measurements are not obtainable for a non operating loop.

l 2./ .2 / rMrekr iA-TB 9~d-2. /-06 /

y l- 22 *

TX- 3. /-603 JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 3 5/15/97

A L

L s W- i S^O I

'~' /

A 7 s

A s WY e s s C Y eIS ' e Y

e Y

e is.

K n .

i g E a .

E R

C ii ind r p

1 Y

T ia i

O..A/' N 3 F -

N I

L I

L O s e

0 T

C N -

s e

s s O B W Y i I Y Y Y Y e

Y e

I T A C

C I E L

_ S P P K A A 1 E 3 P 4

1 G

E H

C MN p/

E N R A M

- A U s t s

_ N O e e o e

s e

s s C Y V e e

- N Y Y Y Y M -

O R

F S N E

C N

O Y

N ~, 7,' '

A E

R C E

F F

O L

B /vf<"y /n -

p/

I D A s A - s s I s s D Y e

bf - d,- " e e e e e R N Y Y Y Y O -

F -

mo r f E pt ef d e o L

B s

m

" W ,. . de ... ,

S p T d .o wo .

e v

b s e eh t n

oi i .

S0 edl nd o o dt . r i t A

T h o t r " = . /, ". I 0 v e 3 oi eim oe m e

t ioir v no d ak pe t i a

N O

4H

- 5 f

0

" e

~ 3 u-

,h r v C.

e 1 1 e

- t h s r mf h t r i t a o i emir cf r sd eh r rTi i e r psl t o s r aC np e

i od r

eP S

I v

er

't ' cm e s

- v enR v of e ri p a u q

eir gmt df el dt R i.. 't m . e t ,

R R o

- i

,, RiS ef r " ni n v oei a e M^w1

)h b l s r al o oW s ml A jf -

t k 3 t t el b l t h c r r P

M 9

- s l C h 1 i a ot c wht a d aiI mP ct na pd v pn e pi i e Ft ot t F t r al hiR ee a a r O Ti c

9. ' u s n i TC t a u h mf di C S m d e e e ST nipyo it l D t n go yysl D h

ynsi Ti t - TMi mel h wt f l a a u l h : t " no s w oe N r ct t s :

i r gel i sl s a e

,iY O ed i. 5 i ,

? E- ent t i t s ms 7 l T 0 aI ua ol 7

. wn I E l e v D l i oC nt i d nl L S G ei vf 4ei y~ d e N O eyNT e nm r ged

. 1

- eI iva1 l t ne R N A

ai .t t c

~

r -

vf ai e M mei esl oine wl nu FhB T t A eC r 3 mh E r c a . n V H t e p

1 c um ~ i u i r rh rr s t et eieC e a a r h t S

Tt E R pf oSt et N C ys

^ t .

.+ q -

e e y v wu T hd c s aP s T a e O r 1 .indu_ --

R D d oqsH t o n rho a s t r r s nl ei C C E

t e sh ie -

- t ea r r .rfocos l et e

widS o r s e

_ P d ut .

R 3i R ni._:

t cn- 5 v

s r uidh a uw e t e ] l 1 ori enh v ot t a v n ab ooh o S n eL S i, d > -

1 i d uet b o r em ai h rit n e .- inqt ees o t

.l 3 t b rt m t gpt H

it O aC e 't - p3 ". rl e nR e 1 oub n me t a o c r t iia nn c C h c t oe t i w p ._ _

3 h e r Sh c n hif n s E t hdi s t 3 t t f e noer i l h :

yc,._=

f C c T wet iwis q uin [ reo e met h ur r

t ot 0 or oh n iiwrt ec T o N .. 0 0 ewhi eRi o a a e Sf t t id O o Ni - . ; N ;; -

,rSt a f T l el r al e

. cdt e r e c Otl c ca t d I r l m ia_;, _ n n .t td cR t C ai n p S t d22 p T a uS t t - n a P d oT r i

- da 2.i a eiS nLh w e

al e ne eo uacr': 5 d a s

- t r

o w : e imht eit e f r e E r n or ert o I l 8 r o 4.l l rh rh sL ooe rb u R

C S

cea c gr a n e 9_.__u

- _.n m f m

c1 c

a3 o R eet nSd v n

ut eB c

muR rA ci r ct a ai it u A

ccd ouc l l s

a v E

D nh e

% a :- ~su s i o r nR ohhTh r eeC e r osE e r nP ndC dO eucrd nh onon I c s "c f I Sbt T H w P f eO I aL At wE f I R

_ E B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M 1 1 1

1

- U 1 1 1

_ N 3 3 3 3 . 3 3 3

A r L

L I~ T -

s s s A e e e A s e

s A s C Y Y Y

/ e / e N Y Y N Y K

E E

R 1 Y C T F 3 I L

L O s s s A s s N I e e e e A s O B W Y Y Y

/

N Y Y e /

N e

Y I

T A

C C I E L S P P K A A 1 E 3 P 4

1 E

- H G C E N R A U M s s s N O e e e A s e

s A s C Y Y Y

/ e / e N Y Y N Y M

O R

F S N E O C Y N N E A R C E

F O F L I B D A s s s s I

e e e A s A s D Y

/ e e / e R Y Y N Y Y N Y O

F r e n E t o o l a L o 6.

t i n t b c t R d B o n r a d nE en A t M 3

1 ni oa y

ce .

e p o v s d

n a

eW mO ga n

T d D - mt ns 0 m o t eP a e t S F n e ed1 nr N

nee eb v et S oT no oc uh e1 d

e f a O a ir Ch L h g c n 0 m o qTl -

e s o e Lt uA ive seis o m h nT i l F qH S ed m t i t ) r oT eyer ish I

rl e r a n f . rS s hf rE h i ur ed e i o st T r un H R uo qws s el vi emn of t. irO T t s A e ut e et c r or e ei o eC i

P M r n i a a v c r a d c e

na al ce r h t 3 vL s 1 hT on re l a t a n od e or ns a ee I t ic o l

O eia b pt e v i t ai C r io l N

h t e t i h

,ol s

2 oh 1 ni ct ti ih st s i es a el nr vb et r a c P af t R hii D t r s e o 6de ,id s qu e e 51 1 O 9 pe i w o urih e e v p r ,1 I E 8 s 3 pn 4f i 2 s el t ovh c l t .

S G - d s ne i p i b o ned 1 di 1 ?.

N F n e S ec d dentoow F ori R T a v T e n or a noh o r i Th T mph Fdt E A S m Sb a ro si t e ot t S w T n S a0 V H T e r I d t a S n pt e T e s T er is N C d o i ef T e o .m rib r e v o 9 O epc t

go n r o t n s ot r ah r C C ua t a c c es i i ps s e T N e1 .

E l

eoe ah c n a e

.m nt hi i nt s s ei l s O l v r r r adbh et .I e3

_ P a g i5 ( e n ob o t v n T v m n it S m foeoc v mo a EPI f rt a sT r e i Ei s g a y r mT D rOS t t h l D ei r s n r b t eRN H st e01 cl mef s ni ot r O .

t CI L

C n r H n rh i o sf nd hi t Ct h E hwgiav e t d 1 a not d ic c es n e e mn t uS t S stomi i l r l e s t q l iof T s. i T N a eh uo3 of nvi r si iwe i wSb O e cI en nt w s o n iev rhett d eioh mT Ai os a d

l t et c s r e

R c ee nn rd l

e I

- I nP h o et i r s ee c e

_ et es e nc woi nt e T

P aR wm dD gnt n e a unnmr .

sii r a s r nt a c e e a n oph a e as d a pst dl I

r oee1 d8 a mc h ei l d sf s n .

o t d e iurdt qr c rl ol l ei r w d

e r e6 od3 R c r r crf a on r n ei s e ueee ci a r s c C c ai y a pur ii r r ipi oe uom u R c r rb c e moe u cd -

S m qe s uc qe e oi a v r cb al F E i vdt t c t eecdt r e t u D I noe v cr e h ep T rS e n c ec S a ab ad" o: N o h h n n o T t ii n n uh oo o noS I S t t t N I w R

E 0 1 2 3 4 5

_ B 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1

_ M 1 1

1

_ U 1 1 1 1 1

_ N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

l 1

l l

I JLS CONVERSION TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l

CTS 3/4.2 - Power Distribution Limits I l

ITS 3.2 - Power Distribution Limits l

RESPONSE TO RAls AND LICENSEE INITIATED ADDITIONAL CHANGES i

l l

)

l l

I t.______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ __._ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

INDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Page1of1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED 3.2.G-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.2-1 CP NA 3.2-2 DC NA 3.2-3 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.2-4 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.2-5 CA YES 3.2-6 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.2-7 WC, CA YES 3.2-8 WC NA 3.2-9 WC NA 3.2-10 DC, CP, WC, CA YES CA 3.2-001 DC, WC, CA YES CA 3.2-002 DC, WC, CA YES CP 3.2-001 DC, CP, WC, CA YES CP 3.2 ED CP NA DC 3.2-001 DC NA DC ALL-005 (3.2 changes only) DC NA

, DC 3.2-ED DC NA TR 3.2-004 DC, CP, WC, CA YES WC 3.2-001 CP, WC NA j

I

t 1

JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l

l The following methodology is followed for submitting additional information:

l

1. Each licensee is submitting a separate response for each section. ,

I

2. If an RAI does not apply to a licensee (i.e., does not actually impact the information that defines the technical specification change for that licensee), "NA" has been entered in the index column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for that licensee.

)

3. If a licensee initiated change does not apply, "NA" has been entered in the index column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for that licensee.

l

4. The common portions of the " Additional Information Cover Sheets" are identical, except for brackets, where applicable (using the same methodology used in enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A and 68 of the conversion submittals). The list of attached pages will vary to match the licensee specific conversion submittals. A Licensee's FLOG response may not address all applicable plants if there is insufficient similarity in the plant specific responses to justify their inclusion in l each submittal. In those cases, the response will be prefaced with a heading l

such as " PLANT SPECIFIC RESPONSE" i

5. Changes are indicated using the redline / strikeout tool of Wordperfect or by using a hand markup that indicates insertions and deletions. If the area being revised is not clear, the affected portion of the page is circled. The markup techniques vary as necessary, based on the specifics of the area being changed and the ;

complexity of the changes, to provide the clearest possible indication of the changes.

6. A marginal note (the Additional Information Number from the index) is added in l the right margin of each page being changed, adjacent to the area being changed, to identify the source of each change.

7. Some changes are not applicable to one licensee but still require changes to the Tables provided in Enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A, and 68 of the originallicense amendment request to reflect the changes being made by one or more of the other licensees. These changes are not included in the additional information for the licensee to which the change does not apply, as the changes are only for consistency, do not technically affect the request for that licensee, and are being provided in the additional information being provided by the licensees for which the change is applicable. The complete set of changes for the license amendment request will be provided in a licensing amendment request supplement to be provided later.

l l

l

JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONALINFORMATION (CONTINUED) 1

8. The item numbers are formatted as follows: [ Source][lTS Section)-[nnn)

Source = Q - NRC Question CA - AmerenUE DC-PG&E WC - WCNOC CP - TU Electric TR - Traveler ITS Section = The ITS section associated with the item (e.g.,3.3). If all sections are potentially impacted by a br ad change or set of changes, "ALL"is used for the section number.

nnn = a three digit sequential number or ED (ED indicates editorial correction with no impact on meaning) 1 l

l l

l L_______________________ _

j

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.2.G-1 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC

! REQUEST: ITS 3.2.x Bases i

l General

, There have been a number ofinstances that the specific changes to the STS Bases are not properly identified with redline or strikeout marks.

Comment: Perform an audit of all STS Bases markups and identify instances where {

additions and/or deletions of Bases were not properly identified in the original submittal. '

FLOG RESPONSE: l l The submitted ITS Bases urkups for Section 3.2 have been compared to the STS 1

Bases. Some differences that were identified were in accordance with the markup methodologies (e.g., deletion of brackets and reviewer's notes). Most of the differences were editorialin nature end would not have affected the review. Examples of editorial changes are: capitalizing a letter with only a " redline" but not striking out the lower case letter that it replaced, changing a verb from singular to plural by adding an "s" without

" redlining" the "s", deleting instead of striking-out the A, B, C, etc., following specification

[ title (e.g., SR3.6.6A.7), changing a bracketed reference (in the reference section) with j

! only a " redline" for the new reference but failing to include the strike-out of the old reference. In some instances the brackets were retained (and struck-out) but the j unchanged text within the brackets was not redlined. Where an entire section was i bracketed, the methodology calls for the section title to be redlined. The redlining of the title was sometimes omitted, Differences of the above editorial nature wili no.l be '

provided as attachments to this response. The pages requiring changes that are more than editorial and are not consistent with the markup methodology are attached.

ATTACHED PAGES: '

Enclosure SB B 3.2-3, B 3.2-7, B 3.2-9, B 3.2-10, STS B 3.2-20, B 3.2-13, STS B 3.2-42 '

l i

I L

Fo (Z) (F aMethodology)

B 3.2.1E l

BASES (continued)

LCO The Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor. Fo(Z). shall be limited by the following relationships:

r,(z) s

x(z) for P > o.5 l

r,(z) s

x(z) for P s o.5

0.5 where

CFQ L Fa"? is the Fa(Z) limit at RTP provided in the COLR, K(Z) is the normalized Fa(Z) as a function of core height provided in the COLR, and p=

RTP For this facility. Tthe actual values' of CFQ and K(Z) are given in the COLR. he.;cicr. CFO is , era.elly a nu;scr en the ordcc of

[2.32], sad X(Z) is ; function th;t look; likc thc en; picvidc-d in Figarc 0 0.2.10 1.

For Relaxed Axial Offset Control operation, F a(Z) is approximated by Fj(Z) and F#(Z). Thus, both Fj(Z) and Q(Z) must meet the preceding limits on Fa (Z).

An Q(Z) evaluation requires obtaining an incore flux map in H0DE 1. From the incore flux map results we obtain the measured value (Fi(Z)) of Fa(Z). Then, Fj(Z) = F;(Z)

Q 3,2 6--l

[1.001^ (1.03) (1.05) . Jf(Z) (1.0815)

D where fi!-066} 1703 is a factor that accounts for fuel manufacturing tolerances and 1.05'isra facto'r that ' accounts"for flux map measurement uncertainty.

Fj(2) is an excellent approximation for Fo(Z) when the reactor is at the steady state power at which the incore flux map was taken.

The expression for Fl(Z) is:

Fl(Z) = Fj(Z) W(Z)

(continued) 1 MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 3 5/15/97 j 1

_ _ - - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - .__ ___ 1

Fe (Z) (Fo Methodology)

B 3.2.1E BASES SURVEILLANCE Frequency condition together with ine Frequency condition -

REQUI.REMENTS requiring verification of Q(7) and Fl(Z) following a power (continued)

[ ant-3 increase of more than 10_t. ensures that they are verifierc; scen c >. 2 -7 ,

A Y M_t0T A0510?.55. @il.Siis = - w -~ =l M g ( qtcaded operaticr0 % Ochievedj Equilibrium conditions ar,e "c'~ achieved' shen theTeore is'sufficientlyis.tableSstich"thatlthe D

A "

uncerta~ihty-illowances'asfoci'itfd TsithMhs measiirs:ient'.areWilid.

~

.;t R.T (n q 421" P " In the absence of these Frequency conditions, it is possible to M p, a M -v M increase power to RTP and operate for 31 days without

~_ O - J verification of Q(2) and F#(Z). The Frequency condition is not l intended to require verification of these parameters after every l 10% increase in power level above the last verification. It only l

requires verification after a power level is achieved for extended operation that is 10% higher than that power at which Fa was last ueasured, a

SR 3.2.1.1 '

Verification that Q(Z) is within its specified limits involves }

increasing Fl(Z) to allow for manuf acturing tolerance and i measurement uncertainties in order to obtain Q(Z). _

Specifically. Fl(Z) is the measured eo ac qbtained from %3.2 G lf incore flux map results and Q(Z) = a(Z) 1.08153 ( ef. 4).

Q(ZL is then compared to its specified 1 'ts The limit with which Q(Z) is compared varies inversely with power above 50% RTP and directly with a function called K(Z) provided in the COLR.

Performing this Surveillance in MODE 1 prior to exce xfing 75 RTPZor at"a~fsdiIcedVoWer51evsiratiany~other',,ti n 3end O ,' g ,, {

mesti,nF1he'100_GTPETlZ t ,_

1fMtgr];vidir,,isgursncT s that the Q(Z) limit is met when RTP is achieved, because peaking factors generally de, crease as power level is increased.

If THERMAL POWER has been increased by :t 10! RTP since the last - -

determination of FhZ). another evaluation of this factor is QJ.2-3 2.9 W requireh2j hourDfter achieving equilibrium conditions et Q).2-7 this highC po-cr ic7cl (to ensure that f8Z) values are being \

reduced sufficiently with power increase to stay within the LCO limits).

(continued)

L

( MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.2 7 5/15/97

Fa (Z) (F aMethodology)

B 3.2.1B BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance has been modified by a Note that may require that more frequent surveillance be performed. M When Fj(Z) is cv;b;ted measur_ed ;rd fear.d te k withic its li;;;it, an evaluation of the expression below is required to account for any increase to Fa(Z) that may occur and cause the aF (Z) limit to be l

exceeded before the next required Fa(Z) evaluation.

If the two most recent F a(Z.) evaluations show an increase in the expression maximum over z rl(z) it is required to meet the Fa(Z) limit with the last F#(Z) increased by e ,theZapp_r_opr,1jite factor of C.02] specified?]nithe l COLR, or to evaluate Fa(Z) more frequently, each 7 EFPD. These alternative requirements prevent Fa(Z) from exceeding its limit for any significant period of t' ut detection. t

w i y ,

Q L2&-l Performing the Surveill iffiuut 1%or to exceeding 75% RTPt, RWe'dg,cMDiger - t'ahyT6,tyrtimleaXd36?ifflinD}ie i infbrirgresultrfo 41_00PRTP2meetithe2005'giF,G),Qis]t' pid?fdesrassulance that the Fa(Z) limit e gflybe met when RTP is achieved, because peaking factors are generally decreased as power level is increased.

1 Fr.(Z) is verified at power levels 210t RTP above the THERMAL-Q 3*'3 POWER of its last verification ,24 hcar; after achieving 1 Cl L 2 'I i

(- equilibrium conditions to ensur at Fa(Z) is within its limit ~

at higher power levels.

The Surveillance Frequency of 31 EFPD is adequate to monitor the change of power distribution with core burnup. The Surveillance may be done more frequently if required by the results of Fa(Z) evaluations.

I The Frequency of 31 EFPD is adequate to monitor the change of j i

power distribution because such a change is sufficiently slow. !

when the plant is operated in accordance with the TS, to preclude i adverse peaking factors between 31 day surveillance.

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 9 5/15/97 E_____________------.___________------------.____._________________ - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _

j

Fa (Z) (F oMethodology)

B 3.2.1E BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.46,1974.

2. Rchautcry Oui t 1.77. Rci. O. lioy 1074 ;fSAR,';S.ection 15M.

3. 10 CFR 50 Appendix A GDC 26.

4. WCAP 7308 L P A, " Evaluation of Nuclear Hot Channel Factor Uncertainties," June 1988.

C.'...I.jur [0. 3 1 10 N.II d3Ad.-

~

.s v-- - . .. -

b 3+ d b h

MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 10 5/15/97 l

L________--- ;

Fo(Z) (Fa Methodology)

B 3.2.lB l\

~.s 2 .

I DO NOT OPERATE IN THIS AREA (6.0,1.0)

N ,0.8, 0.9 4) 0.8

\

(12.0,0.65) y 0.6 g

! 0.4 s THis FIGURE FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY.

0.2 DO NOT USE FOR O P E R ATI O N

\

FT. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 \

(*) % 16.6 33.3 50.0 66.7 83.3 100 N CORE HEIGHT

For core height of 12 feet Q 3.26 -1 '

Figure B 3:2.181 (page 1 of 1)

K(Z) - Normalized Fo(Z) as a Function of Core Height l

1

! WOG STS B 3.2-20 Rev 1, 04/07/95 -

l N-______-___--___-____-.

Fi, B 3.2.2 BASES APPLICABLE Therefore, any DNB events in which the calculation of the core SAFETY ANALYSES limits is modeled implicitly use this variable value of Flu in (continued) the analyses. Likewise, all transients that may be DNB limited are assumed to begin with an initial Flu as a function of power level defined by the COLR limit equation.

The LOCA safety analysis indirectly models F!n as an input parameter. The Nuclear Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (Fa(Z)) and the axial peaking factors ar inserted directly into the LOCA safety analyses that r1 y the a c bility of the resulting -'

peak cladding tempera 're(-ERef. 3r p jy g _ j The fuel is protected in par echnical Specifications, which ensure that the initial conditions assumed in the safety and accident analyses remain valid. The following LCOs ensure this:

LC0 3.2.3, " Axial Flux Difference (AFD) " LCO 3.2.4, " Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (0PTR)," LC0r3174%"RodlGr6GpTAlignmehtiLimitsf" EC097135'.'"ShutdoWnfB,ank; Ins _ertionitimits',", LC0 3.1.7. 3.176',

" Control Bank Insertion Limits," LCO 3.2.2, " Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (Flu)," and LCO 3.2.1, " Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (Fa (Z))."

Fin and Fa(Z) are measured periodically using the movable incore detector system. Measurements are generally taken with the core at, or near, steady state conditions. Core monitoring and control under transient conditions (Condition i I events) are accomplished by operating the core within the limits of the LCOs on AFD, QPTR, and Bank Insertion Limits.

F!n satisfies Criterion 2 of the "I,C I;1 icy Stat;;;nt 10!CFRJ50136(c)12)(ii).

LCO FI, shall be maintained within the limits of the relationship provided in the COLR.

l The Flu limit Mcadncs ts representative Lo.f the coolant flow channel with the maximum enthalpy rise. .This channel has the least heat removal capability and thus the highest probability for a DNB.

The limiting value of F1,, described by the equation contained in the COLR is the design radial peaking factor used in the unit safety analyses.

(continued)

HARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.2 13 5/15/97 l

l

AFD (RAOC Methodology)

B 3.2.3B

\ ,

(-15,100) (6,100)

UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION OPERATION j 9 /\ \- ,

g 80 '

W \

! 60 r N

8 / ACCEPTABlis

/ OPERATION o N I 40 (-31,50) g (20,50)

\

20

\

THIS FIGURE IS FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY.

DO NOT USE FOR OPERATION.

\

0

-50 -30 -10 10 30 50 {

-40 -20 0 20 40 l AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (%)

T

~

y'Q 3.2G1 i

i Figure B 3.2.3B-1 (page 1 of:1)

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Acceptable Operation Limits as a Function of RATED THERHAL POWER WOG STS B 3.2-42 Rev 1, 04/07/95 E__._________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - _ _ _ -

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.2-3 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC i

REQUEST: ITS 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor !

1 CTS 3/4.2.2 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (All FLOG Plants)

DOC 02 06-A JFD 3.2-12 ITS SR 3.2.1.1 & 3.2.1.2 Frequency Comment: The ITS SR frequency has been changed from the STS frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This is based upon the incorrect justification that the CTS would allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months based upon ITS SR 3.0.3, since the CTS does not specify a frequency. ,

Adopt the STS SR frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , l

FLOG RESPONSE:

The change descriptions (DOC 2-06-A & JFD 3.2-12) will be revised to provide a basis for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months that is predicated on the time required to perform the surveillance.

Callaway and Wolf Creek are incorporating this change (DOC 02-06-A, JFD 3.2-12) in lieu of maintaining CTS which did not specify any completion time. DOC 02-13-LG (applicable to Callaway only) and JDF 3.2-17 are no longer used.

ATTACHED PAGES: l Enclosure 2 3.2-6 Enclosure 3A 4, insert 02-06-A, 5 l Enclosure 3B 3, 4 j Enclosure SA 3.2-3, 3.2-5 !

Enclosure SB B 3.2-7, B 3.2-9 ;

Enclosure 6A 2, insert 3.2-12, 3 l Enclosure 6B 2, insert 3.2-2

l POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVE1LLANCE RE0VIREMENTS i 4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable. 02 A 4.2.2.2 For Normal Operation,gF (z) shall be evaluated to determine if F (z) c,, . ) f$(y) YO y " N G'- -

c;.oj w.

. . , U; i n g t h; m: ;; b ! c : n c o r c m. te c t o r s to-obtau-a--poh tun _

map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

l b. Increasing the measured F n (z) component of the power distri vion gp by 3 to account for Manufacturing tolerances and fucttier 4 increasing the value by 5% to account for measurement uncertainties.

Veri hat the requirements of Specification 3.2.2 2re satisfied.

c. Satisfying he following relationship: /

/

RTP xK -

/ 02-Ol~/ 0 F M(Z) < F0 . for P > 0. 5 f' P x h(Z)NO E

,/

F M

g (2) < F 0 x K(Z) for P <N.5'

,W(Z)NO x v.5 4

/

/ N n

where F (2) is the meisured F g(Z) inc'reased by the allowances for manufacturing tol.e/ances and measurement uncertainty, F RTP is the ,

F0 limit,K(Z.) - s the normalized F 0 (Z) as a function of core height, P is the,rilative THERMAL POWER, and W(Z)NO is the tycle dependent, NormaV0peration function that accounts for power distribution tra$sients encountered during Normal Operation. F ,K(Z).and '

/W(Z)NO are specified in the Core Operating Limits Report as per

,' Specification 6.9.1.9. '

,i a wF ff. .-4 Mea uMy F[(:)p (l'e) the following schedule: LO -d-/ -

% g ts w4 9 oz-o6-Af i

; . -4p%ffcTa eving equ a ibrium conditions af ter exceeding, by 10.

l

. re of RATED THERMAL POWER, the THERMAL POWER at which Fg(z) was last detemined,*-or- Aud.

2.

At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD), whic..;'icrYup -

-eccur: "r:t ^

y, % ,g ML p& Tian%. PudiX gh- OW.M UTP &

During power escalationge-; t',c bE;i ,ni,.; cf E5;h cy;ie, power level may be f41-% Mw o;.upA increased until e &c Er lE.el f;qpower r gr;ctcrlevel 'or utaccd epcraticn (egected Oper;tior power distribution (1 map w;,,ther. 72 nce 2) has been achieved af ter which a o g. % M CE-obtained.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 h 3/4 2-6 l

Amencment No. 28,44,58,72 @2 .3 f G 3.2.-7

CHANGE NUMBER NMiG DESCRIPTION r,A OL-OM & 3 2.-3 02 06 t h Cunversion Comparison

/'f4 c .1. 2 -7 ,

02 07 A The footnote allowing the power to ba increased until an equilibrium power level has been achieved has been incorporated in the note preceding SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.2.1 in the ITS allowing power to be increased until an equilibrium power level has been achieved. This footnote replaces the specification 4.0.4 exemption in the current TS. Therefore, the change is administrative, and no technical changes would result.

02 08 LS 4 Consistent with industry traveler TSTF 99 and NUREG 1431 Rev.1, the time allowed to reduce the acceptable operation limits on AFD is changed from [15 minutes) to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and the requirement to reset the AFD alarm setpoints is deleted. The restriction of the AFD [ ]

limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is a reasonable time for completion of the activity, and is acceptable because Fa is not necessarily outside of its limits and the probability of an event during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months period is low. The removal of the requirement to reset the AFD alarm setpoints reflects the deletion of a requirement from the Technical Specifications. The means of monitoring compliance with more restrictive AFD limits is reflected in the appropriate operating procedures and is beyond the level of detail required of Technical Specifications.

02 09 H Consistent with NUREG 1431, tne optional action to comply with Spec 3.2.2 if Fa"(Z) exceeds its limit would be deleted. This eliminates an option and is more restrictive. The remaining ACTION provides acceptable remedial requirements.

02 10 -

Not used.

02 12 LG Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38) 02 12 A Fe (Z) must be verified to 'ie within limits whenever F o(Z) is measured, as required by the current TS. Incorporating this requirement is acceptable because there is no technical change in current peaking factor measurement practices. #

02 13 .LG y The ion of exte a 1on (expected operatic f 5 2 7{

Q at a power lev '-

ter than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ) is moved to the B s and redefined as ac DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 4 5/15/97

O 3.2-3/Q 3.2-7 l INSERT 02-06-A 02-06 M in the ITS SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.1.2, a time limit for assessing Fo(Z) after

! reaching equilibrium conditions is specified. Because the CTS does not have such a time restriction, this change is more restrictive. The time limit for completion of this surveillance,24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months following the establishment of l equilibrium conditions, has been selected based on plant experience.

l Twenty-four hours is a reasonable time for obtaining and evaluating a flux map and then completing the required procedural steps associated with this surveillance. Further, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months time limit does not allow for plant operation in an uncertain condition for a protracted time period. The time

' limit of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is consistent with Amendment No.116 for Wolf Creek in which the NRC approved allowing the performance of a flux map 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after achieving equilibrium conditions from a Thermal Power reduction required with QPTR determined to exceed 1.02.

l l

I:

l

t CHANGE NUME'ER H51lC DESCRIPTIQB y ,

' Q 5 1~3 his is acceptable beca i rium .

43 2-7 conditions wou oe v' t _ r than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and it-- J ~

l l

is/

consisW 1431.

02 14 M Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison f Table (Enclosure 38). I l 03 01 LG Moves the details of the F", limits to the COLR.

Previously, the equation for the dependence of F", on l THERMAL POWER had been located in the LC0 and the COLR.

The full power limit value of F", and the power factor multiplier had been located only in the COLR. Now, the equation is also located only in the COLR. Definitions and details of the measurement, including the treatment of uncertainties, are moved to the BASES. The REQUIRED ACTIONS are re written for consistency with NUREG 1431.

The changes are acceptable because they remove details not required to be in TS to support operational safety. l 1

l 03 02 LS 5 Revises the completion times to be consistent with l NUREG 1431. The adequacy of these completion times are

! discussed in the applicable BASES section of NUREG 1431.

l In summary. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (vs. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in the current TS) is l provided to attempt to restore ,F" .to within its limit or j to reduce power to below 50 RTP.

l l

03 03 H The Requirement to reduce power to less than or equal to 5: RTP (exit Mode 1) within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is added in lieu of the use of LC0 3.0.3. This requirement is more restrictive than the previous requirement to enter l LC0 3.0.3. because LC0 3.0.3 allowed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months before the j 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months shutdown requirement became effective.

! 03 04 LS 6 With the Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (F",)

having been outside its limits, the current TS require ,

l that within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after exceeding the F", limit, an i incore flux map be performed to verify that the F", has I been restored to within its limits. If this activity is not completed. the current TS require that the plant be taken to Mode 2 within the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . The proposed change revises the time allowed to reduce the reactor '

power to a condition where the LCO does not apply (Mode 2 j i < 5: RTP) to be consistent with NUREG 1431. The adequacy of these completion times are discussed in the applicable BASES section of NUREG 1431. In summary, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (vs.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in the current TS) is provided to perform an orderly shutdown of '1e plant. The proposed change is acceptable based on operational experience regarding DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 5 5/15/97

_ A R n C L i Y

_ L s s t s A t s s s e e oo e oe e e e C Y Y N n Y N r Y Y Y s

t n

_ e K m e

- E r .

E iS w R uT Y C e qC R n S

T C

T F i I -

L s s s L O t s s s I e e oo e o e e e B W Y Y N n Y N r Y Y Y

- A C

. I

_ L .

- P K S P A T A dC

_ E 2 P ie n f i

- 4 E i

/ t t 3 H no

- C en N d S A I n

_ T o M s s s s s s

- i s

- T O e e e e e e e op t

N C Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N o

- E R

_ R

- U s M.

C N t 4

- O n 1 Y e -

N m 2 E

L A C

e.

r iS N

B uT C

- A O qC e e

T L B

R n i

A" S e

N A - -

_ O I s s t s s ' s s S e e oo e e _ e o e D Y Y N n Y Y

" Y

_ I N Y

_ R A

A.

P f s x o r s M o c-

- O d u n ) i 4. iu ._ n

- C el a

x F i

o Z

(

r p

l i

st 4 G. i _

i . a r4 it im 99 n

a n t F, a i i. si N l eo it rh s e s i e l - )

O I

r r eus t .

d ut d o r e

t i

m nh lctt t

t n nd p4 w0 o n T o S F Z(

",t s

e S

R E

r er aN u o h ah n e6h i

v e x n u i

l e4 iwe 5 t - i e

c i i s wh s

db ue n e

ea mn uo i T t

a h F a f i n

t ei f n .af 1 ii r t i m

_ V N

shh N g t

ini w h i 3 ) W n o

s s rt e pwi i

_ O Oi2 eh d t d w t h t G.

ii L ep c Z icc i a a1 b a eh i c o 2. e l C

I H7 T uie s e g t r

2. i lf i e n t 2 iwD9 4 cd s i

t C eo wt r r d ne3 ui qc e

_ mS:

l Aht c e i l 3i ell 1 e n i v b t h t

in2l im a t . p o eR ee a s ST d

ees

]

e@ l f T S b of R

l T

d . t- is c

bh eiS gs p t i ps T

C .

amees t

lr uc u r od o n oC m c gn e n E t oc t P

iu oa inie c o hd

_ G ydeh o M i e e h d r ai s t t vh c c t e N er d e t mh . it ml pa es n r nd et a t A r 4 etb s s i i t ieh c ci m b r eei e s iwe

_ H o wt y f e : r e i e ech s yev l

iepiv i at l wb ec e h r C et m v e o e eb r o o r a c t u l di aS.

i h o el n r c u ps p o p

_ b ht d ef mec c un t d r r v e q a rl T e h

_ C ,ef t s o e e eh s op c obi E w( eaN t t r ef t : h ef et u 4 c P

S 5 o 9l s r

a nI O

d ai u b a ryn , g n

t l t e oS r n e

d e o ol s dt l t iT iet S u gv nT er s eq s Cd t u q i r t t ue F a n sut {P h n e S t r o H T i N eA io f ur h ieAer e c eI o u o d nw i l 5 e o Ob j a w nc o C T mp er i s mJ} t p E f e h t e s

E I

r ort et i t r i t T oh e et a - m! r e h oe d a tcaiim

) l T ht e C t t p e w nt oh e e

_ N t i e 5 A t f e e n

n (

t i

w"h c r

e l

a oi p n f t w r oc O

v o , Zg h* imlpd.

l p d n om b ,o e i t e di s n l n l ee I

T twh ir ndT t

r myt en i

t s r a di et F

d - p e f

a t me o ut 1 h i i l i a

s a s nt d P iur ade ni a T n oi n I

en t er qi u un m si a n e - -2 : w o

s r

t r r2 ob o o ei m it s R st o eud r a m u oi p r 2. l.i D C

S is xt ec r ql eu iu ) e r met

)

Z y W' h e

l h

o f l o3 em t

p i

t F A

pd n oe eio alm 2 Z

E n ooe a er oq (

( a a_ eui c v e e ect D Ct R h

T a s r h e F id

,s e /o F t E

^

MWia i

4 h qnR e x T eiSl e h n T o h x p T eo R

E

_. B M

U 2

03 3

0 4

0 5

0 6

0 7

0 8

0 4 9

0 N

2S 2 0H 2

0H 2 2

- *M r 2 2S 2 0L 0 H 0 A 0J 0L 0 H

_ l ll' l l

A C R in yN l

l A o oo t s e o s

e s

e C N N n Y Y Y Y Y 0 t

_ 1 n .

e S S e

_ K E a v m e

r . sC r

T sC T

r

_ E R

h iS uT un oi un S oi

- Y C T C

qC e

R n AV h

y h y

T F 4d 6d I

L - -

i

/ a a L t s s

- e - e O o oo e

~ r s r I

W N N n 6 o e ol e ol B Y 0 N Y N a Y

_ A A N a

- C I

L

_ P P

A K

A eT S

. t n

e d

e ir

- 2 E uI m u P l e q 4 a n r . e

/ E vi iS r

_ 3 H Sd uT qC t l C T e e o /

_ S N A

C n i

R n i

NS. T V

_ T M - a -

.C /

_ t t s s T O oe oo oy -

o e e s s ie C N r e e N N n Nb J N Y Y Y Y E

- R R

U C N

- O ,

- Y ,

E N L A 3, B C

_ A O N T

N L

B A

V

/-

g O

S I s

e s

e

- 7 s e

s s s s

_ I D Y Y Y l'o

Y Y e

Y e

_ R A o^

A g ,'

P n e ,'

M ih t a e O vt at

) s o h a) ns h s t on P

_ C e t a Z di i o t i oT iP e e (

, e y r nt t R N hTh t l F t ) l t o i l d

_ cRT t s t i / r a e O a imt r er nm d s o ud r1 e5

_ I f r i a e pu ei n r qd w S no o dt

.e l n v o rl a ut ea o <

R p% ef e h r oi p E

si n ue R h m r s V

u0 n a 2i t

i d e 2 cm L i oi r2.

7 O d md e h i 2l o N e> r e gm w n st C

.s n s t e O r er s a i

a e st a r cd a o C i yt i inro t h e h vi h u t o eM ub q e u df t rf t ( h r(

eg d q er i m eo n s e ee i r h o si s6 ey c p e t n rh e r int s r x l

. t o t

ut l t h l t p .

yd a e ee E

G l el b t e )

b ins h C T

a e

r Pt P i

,i t

i s oi h w oe t n x

eaS c

p)

T N nc s w Z n t C s m 4 o ut C ex a o ( o e e D o t r e d o

. A r ewn Qi iwh t p i

o ene H r ur) d F t .

t x e

r m l

tLP. eh wt . r h C ceZl h xde be y oi

% e F T o 3 st u

f e R pn oe C

E isf t (

aF Q o . iwrlee t

dt o d b f o .h F

imert eh i 0 t on di

_ w t 4 t . e t o0 ct 3 P P e e n e h t 5 ui dO s

) sh) T S t t d d r io S .g t ns d w0 C r Z

(

ncZR oi(

n n ei e ieiu t L en r a f oew e r) (

C oL u o

. H QihQf mob ep f q i .

8 - oh o i r t lo 1 l

l eh

_ C Ft wF o i e n s 0 f c e oe o f ah E

i irtel d r r i e e s l t b t eo .t 2

_ f dt f t e s f 2 r e d e T

N ona oo o l u

q s u o v a e d a 0 e v h i l

i a

mt opt o t oe nH s me .

i r s ncr neoy epw e , c m e u

- O o ri b t .N C t t c

t e e r mt t ev h (

I T

i t u ot mwib nt B rY d e

a a w ot: i r

d et e h t w ei e h

ew s P ai pa g n r nn o D t

s r n t e t a o ir etxh t n r I iTN u u o tri ims h p u( ou R imia bl ii md t DA cP T m sa it t

e t s o q f si o al r . et e eP o et h C rl mr e aOS ) e ~

ad l s s s c RT si S ei r ee Z m r e i e e e e ) u R u i d6 E t u et c e qh e x eeT h h O

(

e s , po ev immr i o v s oa ivSd eT e e

h1 i e v n e oo D D et d e T t H Fi T om St m MB R C r T5l R ct R

E B 0 1 5 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 M 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 05 0 0 6 U 2 25 2 2G 2

3 G 3S 3

3S N 0H 0L 0A 0L 0H 0L 0 L 0 H 0L

Fo (Z) (F oMethodology) 3.2.1B SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

........................................ NOTE - - -- . . - . .

During power escalation et thc bcginning of cach c.icle following shutdown. THERMAL 3.2 13 POWER may be increased until an equilibrium power level has been achieved, at !

which a power distribution map is obtained.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.1.1 Verify Fj(Z) is within limit. Once after each l refueling prior '

to THERMAL POWER j exceeding 75% RTP "g 3,3 'l g gQ- A3 1-7

)

1 Oncewtthte) _

[12] hours 3217 after achieving Q , Q ~=l equilibrium -

conditions after exceeding, by

t 10 RTP. the l TriERMAL POWER at I which Fs(Z) was last verified E

31 EFPD ;

thereafter '

1 (continued) I l

l l

l l ,

I i

i l ,F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.2-3 5/15/97 I

l

Fe (Z) (F oMethodology) 3.2.1B SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) Q3-SURVEILLANCE FREQUr y I SR 3.2.1.2 (continued)

Q L4 u Once wMh+nt' ,

[12] hour 3 J.617 after achieving ~ 2 .1- fl.

equilibrium conditions after )

exceeding, by 2 10% RTP, the THERMAL POWER at which Fl(Z) was last verified MQ 31 EFPD thereafter l

l MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.2-5 5/15/97 i i

Fa (Z) (F aMethodology)

B 3.2.1E BASES SURVEILLANCE Frequency condition, together with the Frequency condition -

REQUIREMENTS requiring verification of Q(Z) and Q(Z) following a power [a3.1-3 (continued) increase of more than 101, ensures that they are verifieFas soca o.2-7 ;

fx 4 c; ;fter :chicVir,g cquil_ibriuL RTF wi m. v e n.c i c , J. fui

, ( cxtcadcd operaticr.' i: ::hieved.{ Equilibrium conditions are ~ ' ~

achieve (Mhen, the !cor,e'is; sufficiently y[sfablei sudithit5tiie~

b uncerta~ihty~ allowances'a~ssociited Mithiths measTJrembntrareWilTd, a R.rPl s qMP" In the absence of these Frequency conditions, it is possible to J h M 9- N increase power to RTP and operate for 31 days without

% -_0 1-verification of Q(Z) and Q(Z). The Frequency condition is not intended to require verification of these parameters after every 10% increase in power level above the last verification. It only requires verification after a power level is achieved for extended operation that is 10% higher than that power at which Fa was last measured.

I SR 3.2.1.1 Verification that Q(Z) is within its specified limits involves increasing Q(Z) to allow for manuf acturing tolerance and measurement uncertainties in order to obtain Q(Z). ~-

, Specifically. Q(Z) is the measured eo a btai ned from '

incere flux map results and Q(Z) = a(Z) 1. 0815-} ( ef. 4) . Q(Z: d).2 G -l is then compared to its specified 1 'ts The limit with which 4(Z) is compared varies inversely with power above 50% RTP and directly with a function called K(Z) provided in the COLR, c Performing this Surveillance in MODE 1 prior to exce = ding Q-r

! 75% RTPEor at"aTrsduc6d p~oWerElever atlny~other!ti ne3nd E , g ,,,

et me'.,ihDhe],001.KiPiFnTHigt3fo'vid6Tiss~uranceI that the Q(Z) limit is met when RTP is achieved, because peaking factors generally de, crease as power level is increased.

If THERMAL POWER has been increased by 2 10 RTP since the last - -

,y determination of Ff(2), another evaluation of this factor is Gj.20 g 2.9 W require 24 hourDfter achieving equilibrium conditio .sy - Q ).2-7 this hiwo.c ;c,cr ',c.cl (to ensure that Q(Z) values are bein

~

reduced sufficiently with power increase to stay within the LCO limits).

(continued)

, MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 7 5/15/97 L

1 I

Fe (Z) (F aMethodology)

B 3.2.1&

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance has been modified by a Note that may rec,uire that more frequent surveillance be performed. H WJ)en Fj(Z) is cveluated measured end found tc bc within its liait, an evaluation of the expression below is required to account for any increase to Fa(Z) that may occur and cause the Fa(Z) limit to be !

exceeded before the next required Fa(Z) evaluation. '

If the two most recent Fe(Z) evaluations show an increase in the expression l

F,# (Z) maximum over Z K(Z) , , j l

it is required to meet the Fo (Z) limit with the last F#(Z) .

increased by e tWappropriat;e factor of [1.02] spiecfgedgnJ,the i C,03, or to evaluate Fo(Z) more frequently, each 7 EFPD. These alternative requirements prevent Fa(Z) from exceeding its limit for any significant period of t detection. t Q 3 2 C, -j j xm : C Performing the Surveill in Moot.1 prior to exceeding 75% RTP:,

pr ~atTGed0cyd;, power ,,_tliLnysotheCffiieZarid'vs~rjff.1]Fg',',1h:6 i , 1 s

i nferr'edire~sul ts",fo l0,0Y"RTP2 meet;the]00t J RTP ~Fa'R)3 j mi t" ;

prot / ides!assufan~ce that the Fe(Z) limit 4e Wfil'be met when RTP is achieved, because peaking factors are generally decreased as power level is increased.

pp Fe(Z) is verified at power levels 10 RTP above the THERMAL ~3 POWER of its last verification 24 heurs after achieving C L 2"I l equilibrium conditions to ensur 1

at Fa(Z) is within its limit ~

at higher power levels.

The Surveillance Frequency of 31 EFPD is adequate to monitor the change of power distribution with core burnup. The Surveillance may be done more frequently if required by the results of F a(Z) evaluations.

l The Frequency of 31 EFPD is adequate to monitor the change of power distribution because such a change is sufficiently slow, when the plant is operated in accordance with the TS, to preclude adverse peaking factors between 31 day surveillance.

(continued)

MARK UP 0F NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.2 9 5/15/97

i CHANGE NUMBER ,10SIIE1 CATION

t. setpoint adjustments, and channel restoration), adding 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for i necessary initial preparations (procedure preps, calibration equipment checks, obtaining tools and approvals), it is reasonable to expect a total of 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . Further, setpoint changes should only be required for extended operation in this condition. Finally, the Bases for making this setpoint change is exactly the same as the NUREG Bases provided for the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time of LC0 3.2.1 Required Action A.4, which is also a setpoint reduction. In summary, this change is acceptable because it would permit time to perform required flux mapping, permit orderly resetting of the high flux trip setpoints, and reduce the chances of an inadvertent reactor trip during the required power reduction.

1 3.2-07 Consistent with TSTF 97, the NOTE in SR 3.2.1.2 is revised by removing i the phrase "is within limits and" to clarify that the actions to be I taken if FCa (Z) is increasing are required regardless of whether FCa(Z) is within its limits.

3.2 08 Consistent with TSTF 99, the LC0 3.2.1 (Fa Methodology), Required Action B.1 Completion Time for the reduction of the AFD limits if F"a(Z) is not within limits is increased from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . This makes it consistent with the Completion Time associated with Required Action A.2 of LC0 3.2.1 (Fn Methodology). The change is acceptable because it eliminates an inconsistency in the ISTS.

3.2 09 For consistency with current TS 3.2.4 and improved TS 3.3.1. condition D, the breakpoints for the applicability of the surveillance in the i notes in improved TS SR 3.2.4.1 and SR 3.2.4.2 are modified to be applicable at less than or equal to 75t RTP, and greater than 75t RTP.

respectively dmin4stratheehan that retains current TS -

j requirement x M k W 4 r5TF-Ml O 3 l'I*

3.2 10 Consistent with TST -1 . this change moves requirements for increased surveillance frequencies in the event of inoperable alarms to licensee j controlled documents. This change is acceptable because it removes l requirements regarding alarms and alarm responses that are not necessary to be in the TS to protect public health and safety.

l 3.2-11 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

1 -

3.2 12 Not licabl o Callaw See C sion arison 3. 2 - 5 clos B). Q bl-7 l bT ...T 3 .1 Y2._ -

-i 3.2 13 This change retains th er rmance of peaking factor determinations following plant shutdowns. The CTS, through the exemption to specification 4.0.4. allows prerequisite plant conditions to be_o i d prior to requiring that the surveillance be complet 3.2. - / 3 a 3, 2 - 4 I .

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 2 5/15/97

Q 3.2 3/O 3.2-7 INSERT 3.2-12 3.2 Consistent v.ith current Techn;ce: Opecif; cat;cne, The required time for completion of a flux map for determination of the heat flux hot channel factor is changed from 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after achieving equilibrium conditions. The proposed change affects SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.1.2. Based on plant experience, the proposed time (24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ) is a reasonable time period for obtaining and evaluating a flux distribution map and then completing the procedural steps associated with this surveillance. Further, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months time period does not allow for plant operation in an uncertain condition for a protracted time period.

1 l

l l

l l.

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 3.2-14 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

3.2 15 .This change incorporates t. e industry traveler TSTF 109. Action A.2 would require the OPTR be oitermined rather than performing a specific .

surveillance because more ti,an one surveillance can be used to - m l determine OPIR. SR 3.2.4.1 was revised to retain allowance that SR 3.2.4.2 may be performed in . lieu of SR 3.2.4.1. The notevfor %e~f

SR 3.2.4.2 ic che =d te require performanec if cr,c "or-mor+"-OPTR- as.t-so

-ir. puts ere ire,pcrabisqThese changes are acceptable because they clarify the ISTS regarding frequency and use of incore flux monitoring for OPTR measurement. The changes reflect that in'core detectors provide an acceptable'[0PTR determination during all plan , ,.

L. o <e e:vi. ed i: le ::n.mM w.*+i, ?gio /f re,7 " '*n 3.2 16 a

This change be determined A.6.

wouldforrequire when performed Required Actions that3.2.4 both transient A.3 and 3.2.4 and I5e S.- s The intent of the Required Actions is to verify that Fe(Z) is geni /af within its limit. Fe(Z) is approximated by FC a(Z) (which is obtained UN J*r via SR 3.2.1.1) and F"a(Z) (which is obtained via SR 3.2.1.2). Thus.

both FC a (Z) and F"o(Z) must be established to verify F (Z).

f Thischange"j,N#/f a t is consistent with traveler WOG 105.

m j 3.2-17 Th requency requirement for performing Fa measurements has l g 3.t-3 revise o conform to CTS which do not specify a Comple Time. Q 3 2 -7 1 p&ACurrent pr ice is to perform the measurements a on as practical.

The ITS SR Comp 'on Times are based on wha 's a normally reasonable Completion Time for orming a flux . however, if problems occur, the plant may be forced t duce er or shutdown. This would subject the plant to a tran ondition without sufficient safety basis. Therefore mai ing the cu t TS requirement is acceptable because it would tinue to assure adequa eaking factor surveillance thout subjecting the plant to unne ary shutdown transi s.

3.2 18 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

l 3.2 19 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

" " ' '

0Yn

g. -:w M sp,,l:d,'c 5 0 Il'y. O' 3'~2 ** M

%'le ( En.'s. s. c ld) .

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 3 5/15/97

L L

A o s s s -

s A C N h Y e

N o

Y e

V e g N

o w

L K

E I

?.

N]h". ,

c E

R b" c 2 Y C - ,f T F 5 na A 3 I !'.,.

L L O o s s s "is s s. v s N I W N W Y e e e

/; Y e e f e O B Y Y Y. Y I A &

T C C I 3a .

E L ?' l 2 S P K 'n 1 P A '/ 2 1

A E ! ,

P ' 3 3 2 1

4 N 1 E H

S"1/

C A G

C h,. c c

y E N S R A M de U

N O s

e s

e o s

e mse o M

O C Y Y Y N Y Y" r f Y N u

N R I- h F "s 0 1

S N -

O 2 A E e C Y -

N N '* < 3 N

E A #* "

R C 'r

i C

E O 2 # =. r F L - e F ,- T I B 1 D A s s s 0s e -

I o e 3 e o e # o R D N Y Y N Y

Y W N i

~

O - r ?.

h.

F !

E E g s

, " ,n L 3. T .

n i d e n B

A 2 SN6 E

O4 1 ~

i k

a s

a bg2 .

re e n R

. c "' s l i e P aT n - 4 e a

n t s t 1 3

r /. h n .

4 T T n - e ems e 1 3l O oF oN 'T s s p v r u eo m -

N O O r Ct eoT mS T t i r ge t

c f o

i n

s A

a ea rt c t e e Qm"K nf r

ws et r e u n G

E RS S

I L nt c oa r onf t if es n2 e y db ime r p t

n6 s

o J T q N'

oC r a e r c v a c n r ee e e a R t a l i oa n w i c2 t b c t e mA e

ed t A t poe t f ie e a o l 3 s n e r rd n m inneo P ee et v s s na a h g c n md uR a di ule. u a ,h ic rt M l bf ic l ea a rt ou t n n o dT l s s r i r nPl oqb us O

C af e cO eO t f i

n n r f h r s ei rt i Oi t e a e r r a

e3 m

h w

t n

e c

i rCh c a e e r c eev d - e = S mei-N lpathLt l e uh t pl cf pt n

uA c

hh r e ep ,A T ems O i t t u st e F4 C r oi E

pi ew S f a ea d s u n s v I

S G a x mh A ot t a es hl t p k e s s e r yt eec ea -

di c2 e iu qnr -

l ei i h R N S r n a h r o ri b ge t 3 t ei E A E t f f e cf ur rg r u wpi f n r a r a eO n o T n ot i op on C q . r ui n a a t s t t V H N C O a)

N t ) si s

h nl uh e

f i w f R e e,p ee oqc ah -

c s s n o

r o R ea T r r r O s cns c of h S o l r r p c. t di f P Worfo C C enion ei T . Tl qdcnoa s es u nt .Q opl E

P h

t Ciof t c r i co T t t ea 1 Cl o

e w ci p n - n a c A

t n

e m e t r S s

(

e e p pi e os t l e n ph e n s

2 h

ef h 1 ,in g a 2.i l -

t nd e e e

m e

i T

h tk .

s n2

4. RT t s i gc s r oer o n t 1 y 2. ni li n s e eit H

C n n t e r ch ui3 u o s o s 6, <l l

Am r e v 2.P isir tr o ieC rt a eS ng ni nt .a O n u t E

T r rE e n r eS r a af P eh c r hf o2 n o

ht R dS ia t n a

t ia t m en .ni ri n t of uo r sR e r3

~-

a q r e d e el t f i f dd t R dl n e N ef Cf c t n

1 od ei r m ed . at e S r s o o a O

ri( f D i s i

w o m n

a r r ne - pc pe A n r m o h r t o i

v mW I e ydi i om ee e m (t[noo - of e ert o T gxl h t t t r u1 gt gA g r b - r gon r P n u ngT n af i n e n n .h o d nf e p

- I R

al on hF c st .

i d n eidb r mei r ad ic r a e h s c n a9 t a er h0 c1 rt oe h t ~

s e e

r r m

n e

ef ha.

c1 r n C l t ck i r gl : o e - e nn o bi s a n e c iuf .

S E

D h ixlaf f i

T A pab o

l ue ni3 n qt a u oe eh q3 C rd c e5 st i c h a T f s c ii h L T (

isF T th hS a oh f T T r mT i r ee o.

qr ee R p es e h a p Th s c s i v qt h eec T R rA R

E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 B

M 1

1 1 1 1

1 1

1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 U

N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

l l

l Q 3.2-3/Q 3.2-7 l lNSERT 3.2-2 i

Based on plant experience of a reasonable time to obtain, evaluate, and complete associated procedural steps, the time allocated for the performance of Fo surveillance is set to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months j after achieving equilibrium conditions. The proposed change affects 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2. '

i I

l I

i L

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.2-4 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l REQUEST: ITS 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor !

CTS 3/4.2.3 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel (All FLOG Plants)

DOC 02-07-A JFD 3.2-13 SR 3.2.2.1 NOTE and related Bases. I Comment: Justify the need for the note related to permitting power ascension after shutdown to a level at which a power distribution map is obtained. It appears that this '

note is unnecessary, considering the phraseology of the SR Frequency ("Once after each refueling prior Thermal Power exceeding 75% RTP"). Explain the need for this note. The SR 3.2.2.1 Bases also mentions "(leaving Mode 1)" which appears to be the !

incorrect mode. 1 l FLOG RESPONSE:

i The note, as described in JFD 3.2-13, was incorporated to address the rare situation where, during a mid-cycle shutdown, through further review of the previous surveillance, ;

it was determined that the surveillance was invalid; or the required surveillance ;

frequency is not met due to the shutdown. The amended Note would be requirea to "

return the reactor to a power level at which a new surveillance could be performed.

! The

leaving MODE 1" clarification is based on the Applicability of the LCO (MODE 1, l only) and is intended to avoid confusion in a scenario where the plant may be taken ;

I off-line (typically, MODE 2), but not " shutdown" (commonly considered to be MODE 3 or ]

l-

' lower).

i ;

ATTACHED PAGES:

Encl.6A 2, Insert 3.2-13 i

l l

I

(

I i

1

l CHANGC NUMBER JUSTIFICATION setpoint adjustments. and channel restoration), adding 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for necessary initial preparations (procedure preps, calibration equipment checks, obtaining tools and approvals), it is reasonable to expect a total of 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . Further. setpoint changes should only be required for extended operation in this condition. Finally, the Bases for making this setpoint change is exactly the same as the NUREG Bases provided for the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time of LC0 3.2.1 Required Action i A.4, which is also a setpoint reduction. In summary, this change is acceptable because it would permit time to perform required flux mapping. permit orderly resetting of the high flux trip setpoints. and l reduce the chances of an inadvertent reactor trip during the required power reduction. I 3.2 07 Consistent with TSTF 97, the NOTE in SR 3.2.1.2 is revised by removing the phrase "is within limits and" to clarify that the actions to be i

taken if F((Z) is increasing are required regardless of whether FC a(Z) is within its limits.

3.2 08 Consistent with TSTF 99 the LC0 3.2.1 (Fa Methodology). Required Action B.1 Completion Time for the reduction of the AFD limits if F"a(Z) is not within limits is increased from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . This makes it !

consistent with the Completion Time associated with Required Action A.2 i of LC0 3.2.1 (Fn Methodology). The change is acceptable because it eliminates an inconsistency in the ISTS.

3.2 09 For consistency with current TS 3.2.4 and improved TS 3.3.1, condition !

D the breakpoints for the applicability of the surveillance in the i notes in improved TS SR 3.2.4.1 and SR 3.2.4.2 are modified to be )

applicable at less than or equal to 75% RTP, and greater than 75% RTP. l respectively@*edminntrative&n that retains current TS -

requirement i c, . m t J rsTr 't il G 3 2 - l-3.2 10 Consistent with TST uirements for increased surveillance frequencies in the event of inoperable alarms to licensee controlled documents. This change is acceptable because it removes requirements regarding alarms and alarm responses that are not necessary to be in the TS to protect public health and safety.

3.2 11 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

3.2 12 Not licabl o Callaw . See C sion arison G 3 l'5 clos B). Q 31 7 \

%W 3.1 V2 " ,

i 3.2 13 This change retains th er rmance of peaking factor determinations following plant shutdowns. The CTS, through the exemption to specification 4.0.4. allows prerequisite plant conditions to_ be__o_

d prior to requiring that the surveillance be complet

3. 2. - t 3 O 3' * ,

l JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 2 5/15/97 l

l

Q 3.2-4 INSERT 3.2-13 I

The note was incorporated to address the rare situation where, during a mid-cycle shutdown, through further review of the previous surveillance, it was determined that the surveillance was invalid; or the required surveillance frequency is not met due to the shutdown. The amended Note would be required to return the reactor to a power level at which a new surveillance could be performed.

l l

l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.2-5 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ITS 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor i

CTS 3/4.2.2 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (Callaway)

! DOC 02-13-LG i

ITS 3.2.1 Bases i t Comment: The Callaway definition of extended operation has been moved to the Bases; l where in the Bases? What is the need for this definition in the Bases?

FLOG RESPONSE:

J l

The definition of extended operation (expected operation at a power level for greater than

! l 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months )is redefined as achieving equilibrium and moved to Bases Section B 3.2.1, '

" Surveillance Requirements." The sentence " Equilibrium conditions are achieved when the core is sufficiently stable such that the uncertainty allowances associated with the measurement are valid"is added to define the term " equilibrium conditions"which is used i in NUREG-1431.

In the Callaway CTS a footnote defines equilibrium conditions as * . . a power level for extended operation (expected operation at a power level greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months )". Our Reactor Engineering Department feels that " equilibrium conditions" can be interpreted in various ways and that the above definition provides needed clarification and is more restrictive than " . greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ."

It is noted that change description 02-13-LG has been deleted. See response to O 3.2-3.

)

l ATTACHED PAGES:

None f

l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET

' ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.2-6 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: ITS 3.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio CTS 3/4.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (All FLOG Plants)

DOC 04-01-A JFD 3.2-05 ITG Required Action A.5 ;

Comment: The ITS proposes to change the STS wording for Required Action A.5 from

" Calibrate excore detectors to show zero QPTR," to " Normalize excore detectors to eliminate tilt," based upon WOG-95 (and rejected TSTF-25). A preferred wording would be that proposed in the Comanche Peak CTS mark-up, " Calibrate excore detectors to l show zero Quadrant Power Tilt." What is status of WOG-957 i

FLOG RESPONSE:

Traveler WOG-95 was transmitted to the NRC in February 1998 as TSTF-241. The FLOG is incorporating TSTF-241 including the latest revisions discussed at the ,

June 1998 WOG MERITS Mini-Group meeting. These revisions corrected errors made '

during the' development of TSTF-241.

Additionally, Wolf Creek submitted a License Amendment Request to CTS 3/4.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, on February 4,1998 which was approved on April 27,1998 in l Amendment No.116. This amendment incorporated the changes proposed in TSTF-241.

The FLOG believes that it is appropriate to incorporate the proposed TSTF-241 changes based on the NRC approval of the Wolf Creek amendment request.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Encl. 2 3/4.2-10, Insert X Encl. 3A 6 Encl. 3B 5 Encl. 5A Traveler status page, 3.2-10, 3.2-11 Encl. 58 8 3.2-5, insert B 3.2-5, B 3.2-6, insert B 3.2-6, B 3.2-7, insert B 3.2-7 Encl. 6A 1, insert 6A-1, 2 )

Encl. 6B 1, insert 68-1 !

l

)

4 I

l

POWER Of5TRtBUTXON LfMfTS l 3/4.2.4 OUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO l

~

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

l i

j 3.2.4 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall not exceed 1.02.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.*-

ACTION:

a ..

04~06- L.S 13 l

With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.02.+trt I

. _ _ . . le:: then ;r q =1 : 1. 00:. !

1. ulate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per until 0 4-02-LS-io a)

The QUADRANT POW T reduced to within !

its limit, or l

b) T OWER is reduced to less than 50% o THERMAL

POWER.

l

'h ~oy.oi- A __

1. - 2. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ,.lti.. . p a opra.ex .

Q 34 -6

[ :

) P.; t: 0

O QL'?.DP? F POh!ER I! LT PA I!O t0 'ithir it:

l i.T.i t , ;,r- '

4- 4.) Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% o,f indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO inp4 0p45-// J excess of 1-end s4-na -!y eduee 'h o e eve- 5 ;c 5 trer Td$rM - r T M ::ip. Trip ktp; int: 'ith" the eext ' heers.' M y 04 - 0T //

3. rify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is within its wit ' 24' hours after exceeding the limit or reduce L POWER to s than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER . in the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and te the Power Range Neutro ux-High Trip l Setpoints to less or equal to 5" of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , l j

, 4. Identify and correct cause of out cf-limit condition l prior to increas HERMAL POWER; subs nt POWER OPERATION above 50% o iED THERMAL POWER may procee vided that the QUADRA ' WER TILT RATIO is verified within its at least o- per hour for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or until verified acceptable 95%

or areater RATED THERMAL POWER.

=5ee 5 paw i Ica; LucpL w, Secw;i catien 0.10.2. OI- of- A CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 2-10 Amendment No. 15 l

l I

CTS 3.2.4 INSERT X :

i b) At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , determine the OVADRANT POWER TILT

'i RATIO and-r: duce THERIAL PGWER Li et lcast M T em RATED THEPJRL o 4 ~ '- d

-POWEP, for eeJ h or uuAunmi POWER TILT TeTIC in encn cf 1 t G 3' -' J

-end-c) Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and once per 7 days thereafter, confirm that the Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor Fe(Z), is within its limit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.2.2.2 and confirm that Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor. Flu, is within its l limit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4 2.3.1.:

2. Prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Action a.'1.a) and a.1.b):

a) Re evaluate the safety analyses and confirm that the results remain valid for the duration of operation under this condition, and2nlythen g

[

b) Normalize excore detectors to climinct: Silt; 04 -OI-A

[ G s.t-6 1 3.* Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after reaching RTP or within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months after increasing 11iERMAL POWER above the limits of ACTIONS a.1.a) and a.1.b), confirm that Fa(Z) is within its limit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.2.2.2 and that Flu is within its limit by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.2.3.1: and

4. If the requirements of a.1. a.2 or a.3 above are not met, reduce THERMAL POWER to s 50t of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

ACTION a.3 must be completed when ACTION , ?.b) is implemented.

ctsinsrt.32 i

L_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . , _ . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ ._. _ _ _ _ __ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

l CHANGE M)fiBEB M2iG DESCRIPTION performance of an orderly plant shutdown together with the negligible probability of an accident occurring during the extended shutdown interval.

l 03 05 H If the enthalpy rise hot channel factor action statements requiring flux mapping and correction of the cause or power reductions are entered. they must be completed, even if compliance with the LCO is restored. These requirements from NUREG 1431 are more restrictive than the corresponding requirements from current TS.

03 06 A Consistent with NUREG-1431. a note would be added to state that THERHAL POWER does not need to be reduced below the power required by Action a. in order to comply with the series of flux maps required by Action c. This is a clarification of the current TS in that if compliance with l

the LC0 s restored prior to reducing power level below 50%, flux maps need only be performed for those plateaus traversed. If power level did not drop below 95%. no flux l map would be required by Action c. but would be required by Action [b].

03 07 A Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison

! Table (Enclosure 38).

03 08 A. Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison I Table (Enclosure 3B).

03 09 H Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison

! Table (Enclosure 38). ;

I l 03 10 LG Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparisow_ ,

e -

i Table (E g ur.e_3B). __ , , g g,M. p. . i 04 01 A Clarifies that when the exc re detectors are calibrated.

the Quadrant Power Tilthis = ;cd cut. (The OPTR is /

lh# llI

\

g normalized to unity.) The requirement from NUREG 1431 as ;

modified by TSTF 2fi is consistent with the current TS

, ACTION requirements for verifying OPTR is within limit s' i

during power escalation subsequent to identifying, and

! correcting the cause of OPTR out of limits. AMJ~~W N s

\

)

04 02 LS 10 m m -w &w-1. w n - Q -- b - g.t m n _-- w -- - 2 2-nE-'regaTred-setinn Nalculatidn Om once ;'cr _ w 4 eera hem until THERMAL POWER was reduced to less than 50t RTP would be eliminated and replaced by new requirements from NUREG 1431. This represents a reduction in requirements for monitoring and reducing power. The proposed change would reduce the frequency of OPTR calculation: however.

l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 6 5/15/97

l a oc n bit l

a ee nh eh t e oUl Hh nRiE e oh l r ea oh e

eoh q u e a

l a r siv e a h s e flu eenAn D E

ing r e i E mR m r t u l u ap i e x do S i eeo i or t GiMr aQi D n

a nv s n f re i

e q

c d t e ot o - n Ae r1 a Lq u

ia i 4h l u f C P

idD r

ebP C

e ml s

. e a e t y dD o P C mt e a o t C R

.d mui t ee r a i 4t z de BP me P e D nP p w I eu r r o s i n3 epi e r s a e oC P dt ie r r l g 1 dor da s n nds

.r nP ,F ps s bo eu T

. rfq oiu ee m

ws o a We n t eo t ep l P ... t l I nei e e ur nT n R a E d t t h o a s t e

l e t e c .R y s ec hr d a e O dr x n l e dhd a Pt ot i pp wi t db N f i c t os dg r si wc r a t uo o ef wa e of ue T l dn u ug r a nw w n r di o r c u ic mc E br e e s i ieh e c u a i uea xr ea ed drp o t re m s a l mf l

d p s dd C iQ n u el r n y n e t n a de i H

- n P g T dd e

mni og cp a e ir c dt

. T a s

odl r

t c ba t

ie d

h R t c v n ee uo

) it l h u er o l be er C e r a bnd e S ir ea cp eo g s dc Atp e r e w s T dm ot P g et db e e c . e Rp e d S e e t r o E ht o u

t a ob t a t p nbda ot y i

s p em Cl d Sa e R l t a d C e e l

l C F uz-k e s t r b ri oi w s t c n c a eS i er t r ne i c i l

t n e

.r ar nou e l e.

t f e c l

dt i c

t f u g e t

.r n t t a C H

p t r oe ht hni eg wl a e

u o el r d

.R uoe A a i et n w iwon doe p

N s s ne er s e i c ws oc t ep t ns BQ des d e wt s s w noh G t o o e AP uq Q t r ih ia 3 h ma E p w r l f S T cut P ce , t t f n n ap t ci oe e s o ER t ihT u c ht o c d 2 l i r .S u i r a R t t i hr e p -

n .r d a ,

j. o n ne 3 h ry T e H t

t anti w r m ee a

si n

oen7n nme in0 5

c j

r s

t 2me r io t w e

a i s u t

iwE R odhi is nu g nt t s

e~ i (T a f hr u oec o d ir a

n a r t H nhA or r Rp 3 heer s d L

< t n o

t c u e l d t t 5 2 p i e n h

e ef T e q r P r g Qc 1 r r d a e v

3 e ohP 5r 4 rg - .s e .

r eO a iuo , Pa 1 s R c e 2 i p W 7 e bQ i

n r mwh oo I l e 0

w t C ol - v os E wRi s h rS n. 3 e we R we o l P c e u u b i s b d e r ot u eT o m l r i r i c f t rid u r R r e d _. s a s t l a T t v eo l P a e n u~

d ow .s g t io a s e

& _m n h o r w t b l n e v w t e l s eh e

s e t' .d o e u o be Q i v e f n er P n f l I o

T o d. T t R r A Ae-- S Y Y Y V Y Y Y e

s e e e h, M e e e e Y Y e D I

s s s s s s s A

B

&g L y O C

A N

Y

- O

- N n

M.

nN Sc Y CN

" Y N N N N Y C o

t i

n R o

ehe c a t n oe ig s

To S

D o

t i

n R

.s e

(o o o o e s O M

A N

Cq e n S e Cq e C 0 e t I u 1 a T u H Si 1 - e i

.S ri E

. r 02a l e 9l s e P m - s m E e Lo n e A n S o n A P t

i t t K P n i L n I C

A 4 N Y N B

- o 4 N

- o e Y

e Y

e N

o o N

o N

o Y

e W I 1 1 s s s s O L

_ 0 - 0 - L I L- S LS F T

_ Se Se C Y 1

- e 1

- e R 4 C 4 C E N N E

_ K Y Y Y Y Y N N N N Y C e e e e e o o o o e A s s s s s s L L

A W

A Y

d

_ 2

_ 3

_ 2

Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.2,i <- , .

ntf '.' - l ali .: :-: . r:.: C

/ :n ty (cue.:)

TRAVELER

STATUS DIFFERENCE * / COMMENTS TSTF 24 Not Incorporated NA /

gev. / h__.Not traveler NRCcut approved off date.as of TSTF 95 Incorporated 3.2 06 Approved by NRC.

TSTF 97 Incorporated 3.2 07 Approved by WRC.

TSTF 98. Incorporated 3.2 03 Rev. + 2 97 TSTF 99 Incorporated 3.2 08 Approved by NRC.

TSTF 109 Incorporated 3.2 15 Approved by NRC.

TSTF 110, Incorporated 3.2 10 i Rev.-1 '2 Appad oy m. ,-tc.=- n TSTF 112. -#st Incorporated -ttk- " ct "qc app mied 20 of Rev. 1 7."2-20 -try;;1er . cut ef, go, %.'-7.2W3)

TSTF 136 Incorporated NA f A,y = _e h MAC ]{-y q TSTF-164 Incorporated 3.2-11 Applicable to CAOC only i (CPSES). {

i!OC S3.-Rev. 1- Incorporated 3.2 05 j Will incorpe ste-N .04 / 3.2-1Q $crtion: cf TSTn25 Q 3 "

~

WOG 105 Incorporated 3.2 16 l 3

l k Affnved by ^IA C

App l.% Ile -lo C AD C on p ( Cf.fEr) . !

I MARK-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG-1431) 5/15/97

OPTR 3.2.4 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION. LIMITS 3.2.4- QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (0PTR)

LCO -3.2.4 The OPTR shall be s 1.02.

-APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP.

' ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1 A. OPTR not within limit. A.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 2 3 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months c.N v 3.2-ccE from RTP for each it of OPTR E>da G% o 3. 2 -'

l > 1.00. cid e - atiA _

l.

M A.2 Pcrf;,r2 5", 0.2.4.1 Determin6 Once per 3.2 15 DFTR =d ;idgce TiiC'4%L 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 3.2. -cm r rvim a a. irom nar Tor- g 3, t .,

ccch li ef ^5TR - 1.00.

M A.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1' '3R 24hourj _

3.2 16 E2;E2 and SR 3.2.2.1. 3,t. g E G 3.2 -6 loJ4 o.enievm3 e.wierium N

!c.r.mditim d om MMAl- Once per 7 days

~

p ; 704EfL rhicw '

thereafter h ::.u-i R uv ^Acntw M

'%f ' ' # A.4 Reevaluate safety analyses Prior to and confirm results remain increasing valid for duration of THERMAL POWER operation under this above the limit j--

condition.

l of Recuired

@A.2 s' '

f(A nd v

ED M

(continued)

MARK UP.OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.2 10 5/15/97

l i l

1 OPTR 3.2.4 l

1 l

ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l,

A. (continued) A.5 - NO S .- ....

. Perform Requirea Action A.5 {3 L - b only after Required -

Q3 1-04 l l Action A.4 is completed. !

,. -- m --

., v...........................

2. E q E d Acn h A G M i g preA.uhuey, ) Celibratc cx;;r; dctcct;rs Prior to 3.2-05

\

g%

4 emu A.5 u , w .~.w q Normilize increasing

, f excore ors '-%s TliERMAL POWER (Q#W" # climinct'c: tiltkydim Ofi?. above the limit I 6 u,u , , , . of Required -

W ;

A A. nd; / ED E d A.6 NOTE - -

Qv AN , T--fccm Required Action A.6 8 31~

M

must. compisted?When erfry g l

A. G % A.S

@1 ,~ if ^ y

e h Requ Action A.5 is /

l i * ' )

(P "

j cesi t td impTeteW~.~. . . . . . .

~

3.2 16 Perform SR 3.2.1.1'75R . Wtthm 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ED 32'12 and SR 3.2.2.1. after rcach,ini; 7_,~

.pe7p- m ,c., q . ...

.:od.iik h M d' _' % '

d net rt, exd) ,

QRT9 3, WTttrin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months after increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required L .- >

Actionk AMnd '

t ED (2- j B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion s 50 RTP.

Time not met.

l HARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.2 11 5/15/97

OPTR ;

B 3.2.4 BASES l

l ACTIONS M (continued) conservative tradeoff of total core power with peak linear power. i The Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months allows sufficient time to identify the cause and correct the tilt for_ reduce, power',iasine~cessary. _

Note that.,th(po er reduction 4tself may cause a change in the '

tilted condition. 4g rw 3 J 2.-7 S U

After completion of Required Action A.1, the OPTR eierm may still 68Fied:EitsillaitD k in its ele xd stetc. As such. any !

aoditional changes in the QPTR are detected by requiring a check l of the QPTR once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter. If the QPTR continues l to increase. THERMAL POWER has to be reduced accordingly. A l 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time is sufficient because any additional change in QPIR would be relatively 11~ _

, i g w W _= m J '-_4 A TL.'A-* 4?

, ;p p J-s M ep_ Q =>

U m e ;; s & W 1 The peakin factors Flu and Fa(ZQasfa]goximated:bf]N(Z)Zar[d l FRZ)y are f primary importance in ensuring that the power

! / .

distributi n remains consistent with the initial conditions used a in the sa ety analyses._ Performing SRs on Flu and Fa(Z) within -

l-A@ "'%0 TM NL the Comp tion Time of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months stensures that these primary Q LM i l_ p u g,;;_ h p indicato s of power distribution are within their respective N A.I limits. A Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 4 takes into consideration y f the rate at which peaking factors are likely to change, and the time required to stabilize the plant and perform a flux map. If these peaking factors are not within their limits, the Required L Actions of thcsc alsociatsd?with?thes~d Surveillance provide an appropriate response for the abnormal condition. If the OPlR

j. remains above its specified limit, the peaking factor surveillance are required each 7 days thereafter to evaluate flu and Fe(Z) with changes in power distribution. Relatively small changes are expected due to either burnup and xenon redistribution or correction of the cause for exceeding the OPTR limit.

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 25 5/15/97 l-i

\

0 3.2-6 f INSERT B 3.2 25 i l

The maximum allowable THERMAL POWER levelinitially determined by Required Action A.1 may be affected by subsequent determinations of QPTR. Increases in OPTR would require a

}

THERMAL POWER reduction within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of OPTR determination, if necessary to comply with !

the decreased maximum allowable THERMAL POWER (evel. Decreases in OPTR would allow j raising the' maximum allowable THERMAL POWER level and increasing THERMAL POWER up to this revised limit. -

l l l

t

OPE B 3.2.4 l

l BASES ACTIONS b.d (continued)

Although FL and Fe(Z) are of primary importance as initial conditions in the safety analyses, other changes in the power I distribution may occur as the OPTR limit is exceeded and may have an impact on the validity of the safety analysis. A change in (

the power distribution can affect such reactor parameters as bank I worths and peaking factors for rod malfunction accidents. When the OPTR exceeds its limit, it does not necessarily mean a safety concern exists. It does mean that there is an indication of a j change in the gross radial power distribution that requires an '

investigation and evaluation that is accomplished by examining the incore power distribution. Specifically, the core peaking j

factors and the quadrant tilt must be evaluated because they are i the factors that best characterize the core power distribution.

This re evalu on is required to ensure that, before increasin -

I THERMAL POWE bove the lim f Required Actions A. Q 3.2-(-

h the reactor core condition re consistent with the assumptions in the safety analyses.

O A c eT A. ~5 ,

,- ' .M,,JA )

If the OPTR hcc cxcccded temains'.above the 1.02 11'mit and a p~ ,,1 -y, g m ' t',o _ re evaluation of the safety analysis is comple d and shows that l r ~' safety requirements are met, the excore detect rs are g i

~ M a. er = U , ecc;11brcted te che.; e zcrc OPE ,normilJzyc['to@j:iiirAt* t i

' M Gertt ph- @]^.d{~cstCQrior to incraadna THERMAL POWER to above e

H mit of Required Acti A.1, yid M This is done to detect any subsequent significan canges in OPTR.y 2.sM uwu. <W *^8- Required Action A.5 is modified t g by,p"-te until tha a*

C4 OPT after thcu ret Iciecd cu % r X Q"sa&d 3),7}. l y flT,T@ e re evaluati fety analysis has determined l Q 3.2.-G i p ,, _ e Q that core conditions at RTP are within the safety analysis assumptions -(i.e., Requiret Action A.4). J;ic Natc_ i- intended to prevent any amb1guity about the re 1 red sequenc _ of actions, y @eP.M9 9 39 Once the fhx tiit-in zcreH ut excore detectors are normalized t %irde kirdiceted 'tily (i.e.','R' equired Action A.5 is Q 3. 2 - 6 A GPTAC & M

~

(continued)

MARK UP 0F i:UREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 26 5/15/97

O 3.2-6 INSERT B 3.2-26 Note 2 states that if Required Action A.5 is performed, then Required Action A.6 shall be performed. Requireo Action A.S normalizes the excore detectors to restore OPTR to within limit, which restores compliance with LCO 3.2.4. Thus, Note 2 prevents exiting the Actions prior to completing flux mapping to verify peaking factors per Required Action A.6.

1 QPTR B 3.2.4 BASES ACTIONS A d (continued) performed), it is acceptable to return to full power operation.

owever, as an added check that the core power distribution @

4TP- consistent with the safety analysis assumptions, Required c ion A.6 requires verification that Fa(Z)Eas!apprbximatediby l{CZFand FJZK and FL are within_p ts within__

24 o s reaching m M 2r, ; mcd precentien, . Lim pediv

- stP ;;rffiretien cannet 55-fdrPTtMENNu-r@erth M

M S 3.'lO - MPdd0ilibfiWJeJGefiditE~;I?lhi:=.0;'ti;c?cTT32N~2 bl]b0cd'ferithcicc picticr._ cf'_thc7/;rificetien~;, f~ss -

=' 7 ::9 "" wi thi n TA '. ~ur e , m. sbut ..~.mussJ .a . thc. t;.c -- ()

1 13ms. )<.2 4

-;; i.n; facter amricilleimme . . bc p f r, .d withi.. O ;~ers of - -

' h; t i .,m -l m. . J.c s-- n tc p wc ws mm- .

7 T;m-- as-Ce;1cticr. Ti=; ;r; 1] 4te@d tt :llow edequete ti .c to-

-ieeresse TnTJdw. POWER te e' u % iimii.5 vi RWeired 4t" ' ' lJZIfC, w i e not permitting the core ~ to remain with unco wer' distributions for extended periods of time.

Required Action A.6 is modified by a Note that states that the peaking factor surveillance may cr.ly b; dcac efter aust be p]@Te~ted1Tdi6n the excor rs have beenlibrated to ;how Icre tilt horm31TZYdi 3Tiffr.:tfthc7fidicetWM (i .e. ,

g y itequired Action A.b[.7 T lie TntMis NoEe' is to have the

, peaking factor surveillance performed at operating power levels, Q3.2-{

't.; M which can only be accomplished after the excore detectors are '

~~ ettd horm3Tff.ed how-:ere ti1Qnd th; : orc rcturn;d to u

If Required Actions A.1 through A.6 are not completed within j their associated Completion Times, the unit must be brought to a H0DE or condition in which the requirements do not apply. To achieve this' status, THERMAL POVER must be reduced to < 50 RTP 4

l within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The allowed Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is l reasonable, based on operating experience regarding the amount of time required to reach the reduced power level without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 27 5/15/97

O 3.2-6 INSERT B 3.2-27 l 1

.... achieving equilibrium conditions at RTP. Equilibrium conditions at RTP are achieved when the core is sufficiently stable at the intended operating conditions to support flux mapping. As an

, added precaution, if the core does not reach equilibrium conditions at RTP within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , but l power is increased slowly, then the peaking factor surveillance must be performed within i 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months after increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1. These Completion Times are intended to allow adequate time to increase THERMAL POWER to above the limit of Required Action A.1, while...

l i

l l

! I i

I l l

l l

\

i 1

r

_ - _ - - _ _ - _ - . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - _ . - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - . _ . . . . . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ____ - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - - _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - _ ~ _ _ - - _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1431 l NUREG-1431 Section 3.2 i

This enclosure contains a brief discussion / justification for each marked up technical change to NUREG 1431 Revision 1 to make them plant specific and to

( incorporate generic changes resulting from the Industry /NRC generic change process.

! The change numbers are referenced directly from the NUREG 1431 mark ups. For l enclosures 3A. 3B, 4. 6A. and 6B. text in brackets "[ )~ indicates the information

! is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location.

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 3.2 01 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

3.2 02 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

3.2 03 Consistent with TSTF 98. 1cv 1 the factor by which thea F must be-TT-7.hc.

adjusted on increasing Fa measurements is moved to the COLR. This change is acceptable because the factor is normally contained in the COLR. and it removes details not required to be contained in TS.

3.2 04 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). o , .

a 7a (, A l .. ...., ~-,,

-m 9

.%3.z.c 3.2 05 Per : p ep= cd r:; m e n ,l0C ::..his ch;nge :12r4#ic: the. Q -

_cx; crc @+o-+ m nr n m li;;d to w , A m ; 11 . his n a,, a cl2r4#ic2tiOr C M #

DEG-F21 Ucrding Ond i3 GCCQtOblG.

3.2 06 Consistent with TSTF 95. the time allowed for resetting the power range neutron flux high setpoint if Fa or F% is outside their limits is extended from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . As written, the Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux High trip setpoints presents an unjustified burden on the operation of the plant. A Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months will allow time to perform a second flux map to confirm the results, or, determine that the condition was temporary, without implementing an unnecessary trip setpoint change, during which there is increased potential for a plant transient and human error. Following a significant power reduction, at least l

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months are required to re establish steady state xenon prior to i taking a flux map, and approximately 8 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to obtain a flux l map. and analyze the data. A significant potential for human error can be created through requiring the trip setpoints to be reduced within the same time frame that a unit power reduction is taking place, and I within the current 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period. Setpoint adjustment is estimated to take approximately. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months per channel (review of plant condition supportive of removing channels from service, tripping of bistables.

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 1 5/15/97 c_-_______________________________-_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ ___ ._ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Q 3.2-6 INSERT 6A-1 3.2-05 Consistent with TSTF-241, ISTS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, is revised to provide more appropriate Actions. Required Action A.2 contains a redundant action to reduce THERMAL POWER This redundant action is deleted and the THERMAL POWER limit of Required Action A.1 is revised to provide the appropriate allowance for subsequent power reductions based on subsequent determination of QPTR. [This was approved in CTS in Amendment No.116 for Wolf Creek.]

The Completion Time of Required Action A.3 requires the peaking factors to be verified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of achieving equilibrium conditions with THERMAL POWER reduced by Required Action A.1. In the current Required Action, a significant fraction of the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months could be spent waiting for the plant to stabilize at the new power levelleaving insufficient time to measure and analyze the peaking factors or resulting in the peaking factors being measured when the plant is not stable yielding inaccurate information. Since the peaking factors are of prime importance, the proposed change will allow sufficient time to obtain an accurate measurement. [This was approved in CTS in Amendment No.116 for Wolf Creek.)

Required Action [A.5) is revised to add a new Note stating " Required Action [A.6) shall be completed if Required Action [A.5)is performed." As discussed in Section 1.3 of the ITS, an Actions Condition remains in effect and the Required Actions apply until the Condition no longer exists or the unit is not within the LCO Applicability. Therefore, when Required Action [A.5)is completed, QPTR should be back within limit and the LCO may be exited. Adding this Note ensures that the peaking factors are verified after normalization of the excore detectors.

Additionally, Required Action [A.5)is revised to state " Normalize excore detectors to restore OPTR to within limit." Normalization is accomplished in such a manner that th3 indicated QPTR following normalization is near 1.00. Thus, the absence of a tilt will manifest itself as QPTR=1.00 rather than zero since quadrant power tilt is expressed as a ratio. Also, from a literal compliance standpoint, the tilt cannot be restored to exactly 1.00. [This was approved in CTS in Amendment No.116 for Wolf Creek.)

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATUM setpoint adjustments, and channel restoration), adding 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for necessary initial preparations (procedure preps, calibration equipment checks, obtaining tools and approvals), it is reasonable to expect a j total of 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . Further, setpoint changes should only be required ;

for extended operation in this condition. Finally, the Bases for making this setpoint change is exactly the same as the NUREG Bases provided for the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time of LCO 3.2.1 Required Action A.4, which is'also a setpoint reduction. In summary, this change is acceptable because it would permit time to perform required flux mapping, permit orderly resetting of the high flux trip setpoints, and reduce the chances of an inadvertent reactor trip during the required power reduction.

3.2 07 Consistent with TSTF 97, the NOTE in SR 3.2.1.2 is revised by removing the phrase is within limits and" to clarify that the actions to be taken if FCa (Z) is increasing are required regardless of whether F(a(Z) is within its limits.

3.2 08 Consistent with TSTF 99, the I.C0 3.2.1 (Fa Methodology). Required Action ,

B.1 Completion Time for the reduction of the AFD limits if F"a(Z) is not I within limits is increased from ~2 hours to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . This makes it consistent with the Completion Time associated with Required Action A.2 of LC0 3.2.1 (Fn Methodology). The change is acceptable because it eliminates an inconsistency in the ISTS. !

3.2-09 For consistency with current TS 3.2.4 and improved TS 3.3.1, condition D, the breakpoints for the applicability of the surveillance in the notes in improved TS SR 3.2.4.1 and SR 3.2.4.2 are modified to be i applicable at less than or equal to 75 RTP, and greater than 75% RTP.

respectively dministr-at.tvede that retains current TS -

l requirement k w . E.J M TSTF-Utl C324 1 3.2 10 Consistent with TSTr 1 , this change moves requirements for increased l surveillance frequencies in the event of inoperable alarms to licensee controlled documents. This change is acceptable because it removes requirements regarding alarms and alarm responses that are not necessary to be in the TS to protect public health and safety. <

3.2 11 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table

! (Enclosure 68).

3.2-12 Not licabl o Callaw See C sion \G315 clo B). Q Lt-7

'bW 3.1 42-. -

3.2 13 This change retains th. eri rmance of peaking factor determinations following plant shutdowns. The CTS, through the exemption to specification 4.0.4, allows prerequisite plant conditions to be_og ' ad prior to requiring that the surveillance be completV 43.2.-I3 0 3' *

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 2 5/15/97

L - .

L t s s s s s s f A o o0 e o s e e e e e e C N N1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y s

ie f

i .

c R K e p A E S E s U R S o 2 Y C T t C

T F -

3 I L - .

L t s s s s s s s N I O o o0 e o e e e e e e O B W N N1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y I

A T C C I E L S P K P A 1

A E 3 P 4 M.

1 E R

- H T G C o E N t R A U H s s s s s s s s s s N 0 e e e e e e e e e e C Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y H

O R

F S N E O C Y N N .

E A G R C C E

E F O o F L t I B l D A s s s s s s s 9 s I

o e e o e , e e e e 1 eY R

O F

D N Y Y N Y NY Y Y Y -

c y

E t . - t . t s r d s T 0 -

L a 2) S 1

- n a

A a

s r o x D e e c r 7

- e s r m

B aTS - t P y ee u F n a a a A r re sU - t c i z l A a t el T e rI nT 6 e n f F 5 r a w o 0 g e r l 2. 7 _

c N

O S

I o

p r

e o

v f

t Fi e e at

,n h

R 8

9

, Ce) . 0 t s c9 ui - e f of Eh 0 r

- a u

q e

r irt l

a a ci e n d

eW c

Hi t

e s

f r

o s

f o

e c

n l

ie 4

v 2. t r

u3l p s

o a

g o r n e i l r a f e b

R F hi X t e gi e n a R u p A r

. 7.h o

gd ne T gcR h n r o w eS q e y

. s o P S n e s t d

a o o h t n M f t T i pn e t , o it l t d l ni O 6 imr h t sii s -

oe i c

d t c a

l a

n r e v

e C

ri t t fo a o i mf 1 oc t eSd f s e e e o N N f e r p i

w WE eh Sb yi c r i z h i m

h e

h e. y 1 n t a c r

it O c es p t h C rh eP iic n e e v t l a

it t t s r

t i 4. thp e u n qe I

S E

G N

if r u e n e

t gyeb

( c w s

u qs . r s

e s

e s u e o i 2 s es l

e r ev R i c

ol f a t

ngd6 ei r

s a if sh a

b3 s r a e E

V A

li e p

v iss islo y1 f r o e i e4 cRl .

s et eh n t r . r r iS P vt e N C s n1 n uog et - c s a c o l t T o O S e0 m1 o d o9 c c n a n r l nt pS a R mnu C C c s ol i u c pT E E e t h o6 af o i,sr a e 1 .i

_ P S

P ir he R

. nt d a e oS l l

g '

4 5 .h 7

9 u dl 5 eeb 7 0 sd 1 e S C . ut lp mhT i n 9 9 o h v a c g 92 - 7

_ L r o n q e .

O C l et t ei vk is e q F F F

- h t oc n rl a 1 -

F nl ic H

ei r s oo mn r a 4 T o 1 T 2 r pi h T el C

E wt o c S(

v t

o t r t er e s u pe v e T

t 5 1 ') .

5 T m om p t p

5 u o T qr pn o fs i a r g5iwr T T enh r 8 et r u r d l ot u e) h h z h r n e h r n N ef t e e bC ccZ t m t ( ,

t f t i et t f o v n w v s n( o n a b a O op eo o n erF e. iw"F iwsn ioeor s e iwec I

T P

e i t t r

r p r

un m

s ictes e l

pf s

u i e df e x

e It n s f t g n n t o ni pt t g k o t n e n a u ci i pf c ef h e et ei et a ndd el I t r aOibi t h t n t s t c e e n t l R i o ine r rid - t si s a si r eia s i c C t t g o sl t r h a i o e i r bh f i ei S s c a n t i a c c x c - t s p is r st s vl E

b a t a c e s ui r a nt n c ns e t i d P. n r D

u e S r eh F

a R ixl el h eh i o e on oe h n oI T i mR ou o C st R c SA Edf w P t t C s Ci C r R

E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 t - - - - - - - - - -

t 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 U

- N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

O 3.2-6 INSERT 681 3.2-05 Consistent with TSTF-241, ISTS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio, is revised to j provide more appropriate Actions.

l l

l

3DDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.2 7 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: ITS 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor CTS 3/4.2.2 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (Callaway & Wolf Creek)

JFD 3.2-17 ITS SR 3.2.1.1 Frequency Comment: The ITS SR 3.2.1.1 Frequency does not adopt the STS of "within [12] hours" based upon the justification that the CTS does not specify a time limit. The STS uses a bracketed time for accomplishing the SR, meaning that a plant specific number can be l utilized. Utilize a plant specific number based upon plant experience, or other relevant justification, if the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is unrealistic. A time limit must appear in the frequency in place of the brackets.

FLOG RESPONSE:

Callaway and Wolf Creek are placing a time limit in the Frequency for ITS SR 3.2.1.1 and i SR 3.2.1.2 in lieu of maintaining CTS which did not specify any completion time. DOC i 02-13-LO (applicable to Callaway only) and JFD 3.2-17 are no longer used. See i response to Comment Number 3.2-3.

ATTACHED PAGES:

See attached pages for response to Comment Number 3.2-3.

l l

f

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.2-10 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: ITS 3.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio CTS 3/4.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (All FLOG Plants)

JFD 3.2-15 ITS SR 3.2.4.2 Comment: JFD 3.2-15 justifies numerous changes to the STS one of which is i unacceptable. JFD 3.2-15 is based upon TSTF-109, which has been rejected. The l unacceptable STS change is: The modification of the note to SR 3.2.4.2, and in l particular the addition of the 12-hour allowance in the Note to SR 3.2.4.2. Provide adequate justification for this change or adopt the STS version of the Note.

i 1

l FLOG RESPONSE:

i j

l The latest status report from the TSTF industry database, dated June 16,1998, indicates that the NRC has approved TSTF-109. The FLOG continues to pursue the changes approved in TSTF-109.

JFD 3.2-15 is revised to delete the sentence: "Ihe note for SR 3.2.4.2 is changed to require performance if one 'or more' QPTR inputs are inoperable." and added: The note and Frequency for SR 3.2.4.2 are revised consistent with typical presentation formats that provide for a period of time after establishing conditions." NUREG-1431, Rev.1 currently

! has "or more" in the Note and TSTF-109 did not modify this wording.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Encl.6A 3

l Encl. 6B 2 l

l a - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ . - _ - _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _ _ - -

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION l

3.2 14 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

3.2 15 This change incorporates the industry traveler TSTF-109. Action A.2 would require the OPTR be determined rather than performing a specific surveillance.because more than one surveillance can be used to ,.- onal determine QPTR. SR 3.2.4.1 was revised to retain allowance that SR 3.2.4.2 may be performed in lieu of SR 3.2.4.1. The notevfor

%cacy SR 3.2.4.2 ic cMed to require perfoncr.cc if-cr,c ~cr ere" OnTR- o3.t no

-4rputs ere ir,epcccble.4These changes are acceptable because they clarify the ISTS regarding frequency and use of incore flux monitoring for OPTR measurement. The changes reflect that incore detectors provideanacceptabig[QPTRdeterminationduringallplantcond l

L- o ee ec vi.ecrl O Ae conrr.r. lear l w.?L lyf i ca /,or-q , ,,

3.2 16 This change would require that both transient and static F meaI a be determined when performed for Required Actions 3.2.4 A.3 and 3.2.4 A.6. The intent of the Required Actions is to verify that F (Z) is a go , pc day r, %

within its limit. F (Z)o is approximated by FC (Z) a (which is obtained n'd arre -

via SR 3.2.1.1) and F"a(Z) (which is obtained via SR 3.2.1.2). Thus, both FC a (Z) and F"a(Z) must be established to verify Fo(Z). This change "h"/A is consistent with traveler WOG-105.

3.2 17 The Frequency requirement for performing Fa measurements has been revised to conform to CTS which do not specify a Completion Time.

Current practice is to perform the measurements as soon as practical.

The ITS SR Completion Times are based on what is a normally reasonable Completion Time for performing a flux map: however, if problems occur, the plant mey be forced to reduce power or shutdown. This would subject the plant to a transient condition without sufficient safety basis. Therefore maintaining the current TS requirement is acceptable because it would continue to assure adequate peaking factor surveillance without subjecting the plant to unnecessary shutdown transients.

I i i 3.2-18 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table I (Enclosure 3B). :

3.2-19 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table l (Enclosure 6B).

2. 5-2:, M + *pyI .b ile f 6 tim s;,, Scc % w.v.~on Crmpamor, n -2. M3

?~ ile ( En c l::ee lC) .

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 3 5/15/97 I

w___-_-_______-___.___ ._ _ . - - - .

e A S L

L s s s s A

o o e o e e e o C N N Y N Y Y Y N 7

j K

E 1

2 j

E 3 ,

c R e 2 Y C e *],

S T F .

3 I -

L N

L I O W N o

N o

Y s

e s

e f" f, s e

s e

O B Y Y ) Y Y Y I

A '4 T C C I .

E L 2 S

1 P

P A

K A

E M(/ 1 2

P 3 3

4 N 1 E C

- H C T[j e G N I e E S R A '

U M s s s s s N O e e e o e e o o C Y Y Y N Y Y N N M [/

O //

R F *; 2 1

S E

N O

Y h 2 C N 3 N

E A ' N R C ' C E O [ e F L e F *, S I B D A s s s

'l, j s I

o e e o e e o o R D N Y Y N Y Y N N O '

F E E . g s ,

L . T n i d .e .

O4 s re a].

B 3 i R c s 1 A

SN 6 k a en T n n t 3 T

2 E T n -

1 a e bg2 . l emi eP s Q mye n 4 nf[ h e 1 3l O oF e s s p v r u r w m -

n r oN nT N O h i t c

a e a eo e to G O e5 t r ge f iA rt c s r n E S

Ct eoT L nt c s o s t e ei r t u RS onf n2 b me y d n6 UT oa r n es e r p s I

or c v a t i f c n e a o N R oC r ae a ic2 r e ee - mA e d t t l oa n w t b ct nn A t poe it f f ie e a o l 3 s n e e r . e rd m h i eo P

M ee et v s s na a

ic apl h g md uR adi e u s n F ,ic rt ea c a n a s r rt t n dT ul O lbf af e i r ou n o nP l

l oqb a h t u f mn h ea g n

e c t f h ei O it C nr c r s i

e r r e3 n w

icO rCh eO ic x a e e r t r c ee vd - e m i S mei N hL t e uh t d r eep ,A e m O

I E l l pat pi ew i pl cf e S f a s pt ea n

uA c

d h h t t ust o s u n F4 o

m T r C r o s

S G a x mh A ot t t

a os p o hl k e s s di c2 f e iu N S r n l t p e r ye e cee - i r h qnr R a h r o ei r ib ge t 3 e t ei E M E t f f e icfox op ur r g r u c.pit f n r a p r a e V

T n ot s n oni C q . r u e

i na e t s o t N

I C

O a)

N t ) h nl uh e

f e,o pe q ec cah - s s n r t R ea si w f R o o ewt T r r O s c n s c of 4 h S o l efr r sp di f m P C C enion ei 2T . T l or u nt r Q o pl E h t Ciof t i co T t t e a o 1 Cl o

W o r~d w n o a n - n c4 p a c tn foe. t P ( c r A m e ,

S s eos t l n ph et s.

2 h

ef he pii n gl a 2. -i t nd e ni m oT h

tk n eeppi gc s e m s n 2 t s t 1 a y2 nl e e e c ei r oer o n 4. TR n s e 6, isir r l l i n n t e r ch ui 3 s o s A P oo ier iC E

T a eS n g r rE e n r eS r a u

c r of t ot h i dS R

ni ia a t int a e n nila nof im r ve 2. Q o r3 u

n a q r e u iuq ed e t i t f i f d Ct af P eh ef Cf c h f o2 n 1 od t n ei t

ed m ~tri r sR "e t R r el s p dl n o oa N t e n at e S r r m mW ri( f c n r n pc pe o O

I e D

ydi i s iwmom om a

ee r

em e A n oo n r m h r t o of yi m c v o n eC ert T g xl h t t iitaf u1 gt gA g a r b e r gon

- P I

n u n gT al on h F i n

ed n t eidb r ir1 .

h n e ad n

a e h s n

a9 t a h 0

.h h

nk o tel s e em d u qn ee y a

h nf a p a

R c st .

s rir mei2 c r c n c1 rt oe r r r ef c1 r C l t ck gl o e - e n n o F bi S is a n ec isn qt a u u e ni3 st s i ic sF h e iT t r e -

o iuf q r es e c s .

E h Ai aff l o i c v x o e eh qR h a hL h S a oh f e e h a p i e h

D T lpab C rd c eS T f T ( T T r mT i R p T h s T R r R

E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 M -

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 U

N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.2-001 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CA REQUEST: Revise last sentence of Bases 3.2.1, Action B.1 to read: " Reducing both the positive and negative AFD limits by . . . " This change makes it clear that both positive and negative limits must be reduced when Fo*(Z) is not within limits.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Enclosure 5B B 3.2-6 l

l l

Fa (Z) (F oiethodolog.s '

B 3.2.1B

)

BASE 5 ACTIONS [L1 (continued) " ' -

If it is found that the maximum calculated value of Fo(Z) that --

can occur during normal maneuvers. Fs(Z), exceeds its spe:ified CA 3 L'03, limits, there exists a potential for Q(Z) to become excaHmr6Ty' , ,

high if a normal operational transient occurs. ReducikAhe-AFDM by :t it for each 1% by which Fl(Z) exceeds its limit withh die ^

allowed Completion Time of a 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , restricts the axial flux distribution such that even if a transient occurred, core peaking factorsr [ini_1_ts are not exceeded.

T-.~* = ~ % 3 '2 4 3 ~ _. -

(c4 .5. t - o 01-If Required Actions A.1 through A.4 or B.1 are not met within their associated Completion Times, the plant must be placed in a mode or condition in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

} This allowed Completion Time is reasonable based on operating J experience regarding the amount of time it takes to reach MODE 2 from full power operation in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.1.2 are modified by a Note. The Note REQUIREMENTS applies during the first power ascensions cftcr e rcfuclir,;

,fo].]jiwy_gTp]iint ih0tdo#5-(leavingJ0DE,T. The Note"illows7for pchePaltensi ons ;1_f t,thersur've'ill ances ?a retn6t1 current : It states that THERMAL POWER may be increased until an equilibrium power level has been achieved at which a power distribution map can be obtained. This allowance is modified, however, by one of the Frequency conditions that requires verification that Fo(Z) and Q(Z) are within their specified limits after a power rise of l more than 10t RTP over the THERMAL POWER at which they were last verified to be within specified limits. Because Q(Z) and Fl(Z) could not have previously been measured in tMe a reload core, there is a second frequency condition, applicable only for reload l cores, that requires determination of these parameters before exceeding 75t RTP. This ensures that some determination of Q(Z) I and Fl(Z) are made at a lower power level at which adequate margin is available before going to 100t RTP. Also, this (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2-6 5/15/97

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _____________________-_____________a

1 I

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.2-002 APPLICA~BILITY: DC, WC, CA i REQUEST: Insert in ITS Bases 3.2.1 the expressions from CTS SR 4.2.2 for how to calculate !

the percent by which both Fac and Fo* exceed their limits. This provides more readily available information to Operations and Engineering personnel. l l

ATTACHED PAGES:

I Enclosure 5B B 3.2-5, insert B 3.2-5, B 3.2-6, insert B 3.2 , / -

i i

l l

I l

__-_-_____-_-___________--___________-.A

Fe (Z) (F oMethodology)

B 3.2.1B

) BASES ACTIONS M (continued) orderly manner and without allowing the plant to remain in an.

unacceptable condition for an extended period of time.

TM 'i> 3 L ~ f g } g n_oo(I .

A reduction of the Power Range Neutron Flux-High trip setpoints by a it for each it by which Fj(Z) exceeds its limit, is a conservative action for protection against the consequences of severe transients with unanalyzed power distributions. The Completion Time of 8 [2 hours is sufficient considering the small likelihood of a severe transient in this time period and the preceding prompt reduction in TliERHAL POWER in accordance with Required Action A.1.

U

) Reduction in the Overpower AT trip setpoints by z It for each it by which Fj(Z) exceeds its limit, is a conservative action for protection against the consequences of severe transients with unanalyzed power distributions. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is sufficient considering the small likelihood of a severe transient in this time period, and the preceding prompt reduction in THERMAL POWER in accordance with Required Action A.1.

M Verification that Fj(Z) has been restored to within its limit, by performing SR 3.2.1.1 prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the limit imposed by Required Action A.1, ensures that core conditions during operation at higher power levels are consistent with safety analyses assumptions. l[nh;erent'f.inM,f.Cacybglis

.idedt'if.1citionToT th6260tuTofilthe40t!.of': limit %ondition;ian_d

.the ?c_o.rrectionsof-the';causellJo';the' extent",ne.cessar.Y7.to'.' allow s a.f e operati onlat 'the"h_i gher " power ;1.,e' vel .dThe ,all,owa bl efpo'wer l

) eveUj s~.l. determined 1by~eva;,l uating .Tj(R ifoCthe,lhi ghe.r_ power

,le9jil QR'3';2.'1:11 must #be isit'isfied p~rior '.to 'increasi#g.; power ab@eithelhigherZal)owible p@er ' level br restoration :of any reduced ^ Reactor, Trip?SystemfSetpo~ints,'..

(continued)

MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 5 5/15/97

l. ,

CA 3.2-002 INSERT B 3.2-5 c

Calculate the percent Fo (z) exceeds its limit by the following expression:

,g ,,

< max. over z of Fj(z) x 100 for P ;t 0.5 1

CFQ x K(z)

_. < P- ), _

1 i

1 j

7 3, max. over z of Fj(z)

-1 x 100 for P < 0.5 :

CFQ' x K(z) q' O.5 ), .

i 1

I l

i t

_ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - . . . . _ _ . . _ __e._

l Fo (Z) (F oMethodology)

L B 3.2.1E j

\

)

BASES ACTIONS IL1 (continued) " ' -

If it is found that the maximum calculated value of Fo (Z)'that a can occur during normal maneuvers. Q(Z), exceeds its spe:ified C A 3 l'"I. ;

limits, high if athere exists normal a potential operational transient for Fj(Z) occurs. to become Reduci @ excaaiv6T i

]

by 2 It for each it by which Q(Z) exceeds its limit wittiin Ui-e '

allowed Completion Time of E 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months , restricts the axial fiux

distribution such that even if a transient occurred, core peaking l factore Dimits are not exceeded.

M3. 2 ~ 6 .g. t - c o t-(c 4

~ _

l l

If Required Actions A.1 through A.4 or B.1 are not met within their associated Completion Times, the plant must be placed in a mode or condition in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. This is done by placing the plant in at least H0DE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

J

) This allowed Completion Time is reasonable based on operating experience regarding the amount of time it takes to reach H0DE 2 l from full power operation in an orderly manner and without

! challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE $R 3.2.1.1 and SR 3.2.1.2 are modified by a Note. The Note REQUIREMENTS applies during the first power ascensions eftcr a rcfsclir,;

l YoT15Wijji la plint 7 hut'do@E(leavjng MODE,g]. The Note ~illowsTfor

poweC aa 5 censi_onsj f t.the ysu riej ligce s ?'a rein 6t '; current .'

_ It states l that THEPF.AL POWER may be increased until an equilibrium power level has been achieved at which a power distribution map can be obtained. This allowance is modified, however, by one of the i Frequency conditions that requires verification that Q(Z) ana

! Q(Z) are within their specified limits after a power rise of I more than 10% RTP over the THERMAL POWER at which they were last l verified to be within specified limits. Because 4(Z) 'and Q(Z) could not have previously been measured in tMt a reload core, there is a second Frequency condition, applicable only for reload cores. that requires determination of these parameters before exceeding 75% RTP. This ensures that some determination of Fe(Z) and Fl(Z) are made at a lower power level at whicn adequate margin is available before going to 100t RTP. Also, this L (continued) l MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.2 6 5/15/97

i CA 3.2-002 INSERT B 3.2-6 1

Calculate the percent Fo*'(z) exceeds its limit by the following expression:

l I'

7 3, i

Fg(z) x W(z) I

< max. over z of -1 x 100 for P 2 0.5 CFQ 8 x K(z) :

.. . .

I l

1 1

, 3, max. over z of F[(z) x W(z)

-1 x 100 for P < 0.5 l CFQ x K(z)

_c ( 0.5 s, _ !

I l

f l

l- i l

i f .'

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CP 3.2-001 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: This SR requires a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the RCS loop flow rate once per 18 months (refueling interval for DCPP). The CTS SR is equivalent to ITS SR 3.3.1.10 and the Reactor Coolant Flow- Low functional unit. DOC 5-12-A was initiated to address that CTS SR 4.2.5.3 (4.2.3.4 for DCPP) is equivalent to ITS SR 3.3.1.10. For CPSES and DCPP, the strikeout is removed consistent with the FLOG markup methodology.

For CPSES, the CTS SR 4,2.5.3 statement "The channels shall be normalized based on the RCS flow rate determination of Surveillance Requirement."is struck through and DOC 5-03-LG applied. DOC 5-03.LG is revised in Enclosures 3A and 3B to indicate the DOC is applicable to CPSES only and that this information is moved to ITS Bases 3.4.1.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Enclosure 1 CTS-3 Enclosure 2 3/4 2-13 Enclosure 3A 9,11 Enclosure 3B 6, 7 l

l l

l' l

I i

4 I

l CROSS-REFERENCE TABLE FOR 3/4.2 Page 3 of 3 Sorted by Current TS l Current T5 1moroved TS Itm l Code l Para. Item Code l Para 4.2.4.2 l SR 3.2.4.2 SE NOTE I

3.2.5 LCO 3.4.1 LCO 3.2.5 Table 3.2 1 NOTE 3.4.1 !

AoD/ BASES NOTE 3.2.5 ACTION 3.4.1 CONDITION A 3.2.5 ACTION 3.4.1 1 CONDITION B j

4.2.5.1 SR 3.4.1.1 SR 4.2.5.1 SR 3.4.1.2 SR !

4.2.5.1 SR 3.4.1.3 SR 4.2.5.2 SR 3.2.2.1 SR 3.4.1.3 4.2.5.2 SR 3.2.2.1 l SR 3.4.1.4 4.2.5.3 55 SR

3. 3.1. /0 h. Cf_,7,3 po /

^ : . . . .'

A:::

4.2.5.4 SR 3.4.1.4 SR l 4.2.5.4 lSR moved BASES 4.2.5.5 15R l mved r542 l

5/15/97

i l

l 1

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.2.5 The following DNB related parameters shall be maintr' led within the l limits shown on Table 3.2-1:

a.

Reactor Coolant System T,y ,

b. Pressurizer Pressure, and '

1

c. Reactor Coolant System Total Flow Rate.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

1 i

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to i

within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hours.

D S*-Ot. - LS- 2

[o SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.5.1 Each of the parameters of Ta'ble 3.2-1 shall be verified to be within their limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

' . 2. 5. 2 '5: :21 ulated "CS total ' lee rate ch:1' be datam4ned-to-be-greater-

-then ;r qu:1 :: 232,520* Cpu 05 A

. "rier t: Oper:ti n :bev: 75% ef MTE THER"AL-+3WER-e f-tem ach-fuel-10: ding, 2nd .

< m ._m ____ ___ - .. ,

...m. ._ m...s

-. n. .~.em es. .- . . . . eys- gp 4.2.5.3 The RCS loop flow rate indicators shall be subjected to a CHANNELpr' - - - -"S ~-4C /\

l CALIBRATION at least once per 18 m nths. ^f- U J - e a p -4 4.2.5.4 The RCS total flow rate shal be d

ur:::nt: at least once per 18 months.p ct:- #

-With'- ed by 7 d:y: c ' preci:icn p e r fe--ih::t n g balance-t'e- - 0 5 -c "Ifl prectrica hest be'2 ace, the 4 art u-eatatica uc ed 'er deter-mination-o.f-steam-

prec rure , ' cede-ter M pe-2ture , 2nd feede: te- ventur4 9da tha-calor-ime,tric ,

! -calculation :hal' b; ::1fbr:ted. .

06 - 0 4 - LL-

- ' 2.5.5 . 'he feed::ter venter' ch:1' be in:pecuad 'e r 'cu' ' q nd c' eaned-as--

accer: rf at le::t One -per '_E '"enths. 05 - o9 g "The calcwie.cd-velue ef 200 total fica ret: shall be used-s+ece-enceet,not4 err-of 2. 5 for fica 'inclucing 0. : f:r f t:isat-ec-ventru%eMng}-measurement-hav: been inc4eded 'a the :bovuur-veillanca. O.f- O/- LG I

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 2- 13 Amendment No. 15 m y;c

k W A 79 .fL-. 2 95% ATP c5 M

l CHANGE l Wt!BE8 NSRG DESCRIPTION l i

04 10 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ,

Table (Enclosure 38). l 05 01 LG The designation of how instrument uncertainties are treated (nominal, in the analysis, or in the development of the TS limit) is moved to the Bases. The movement of this level of detail out of the specification is l consistent with NUREG 1431 and is an example of removing i unnecessary details from the TS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36.

05 02 LS 7 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

4 05 03 *- L. f- <cnitcc.; m ui iiUREC-101. the reqd ramant te yfer

- C"/J::CL CAL:0 RAT 0t cr. the RCS flew mcter et ic::t ence M!

P IS ..~uuis m d t M reg s ..~.A te craclice the ch:r.cas cre moved to tne 6ases for cae isCS 'le.;

lon in 173 3ed.w. 2.2.1. le;. /fcd/* i rem i

-fo D /YA ip iu"See Cenveeson Camperson %Lle Als/-(ybelosare .38) 05 04 LG Consistent with industry traveler TSTF-105, the explicit requirements that the RCS flow be measured through the use of a precision heat balance measurement and that the instrumentation used in the performance of the calorimetric flow measurement be calibrated within a specified time period of performing the measurement is J moved to a licensee controlled document. The requirement l to verify that the RCS flow is within limits remains j within the Technical Specification. This is an example of removing unnecessary details from the TS and is acceptable l based on the guidance provided in 10 CFR 50.36. i 4

05-05 LG Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

05-06 LS 8 In accordance with NUREG 1431 if any of the DNB related !

l parameters of pressure, tem'p erature, or RCS flow are found !

to be outside their limits, the time period required to perform a power reduction would be extended to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The DNB related parameters of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) average temperature, pressurizer pressure, and RCS flow rate are maintained within specified limits in order to ensure consistency with the assumed initial conditions of the accident analyses. The limits placed on the RCS temperature, pressure. and flow ensure that the minimum !

departure from Nucleate Boiling ratio (DNBR) will be met for each of the transients analyzed. Compliance with the above limits is verified every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . If a parameter DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 9 5/15/97

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - - - .__ __ A

CHANGE ,

NUMBER tLtC DESCRIPTION 1

l 05-11 A Not applicable tc Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l

l Table (Enclosure 38).

0 S -I a A TAe <et"r<c ~e d- h rc Esc ~ !s n+L canarin. ci'- :-aj CAL dRA*T=CNS of -hia A CS / soy flow raYe f~', co+:<: ( pa,--l s-f :Ts JR 2.2. /.10 Se '

X'each< n' y S y sk Z~h a ~nh+io n f:u~ncHon /o ( Rea ch. Cso lan+ flow -lsw).

l I

l

\

)

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 11 5/15/97

A L

L s s M, " m, y s

A s s. #f e e A e g

o e s

- C Y Y N Y N Y o e e

_ N Y Y_ ,

g "r

f.

i n

K E

n.

ia g C

E t n # n R ni - ,

Y C id a r H o

/, "$ /. -

T I F L

w A y L

I O s e

s e A

-S oT s

e s -

s r

s W Y Y N e o e e B NC Y Y N V A Y

- /'

C <

! n

L P

i t o W K t n

?

A o n n n %

2 E i r

. P s io y r 4

/ E n

o t

p d a

" /.

3 I

I i

e e e C t c r n J c x . l S A T W l

E S

- C T

A

/er 0 S S s e

T oT on A oT o e s

e c s N C NC Ni N NC N Y e - e

_ Y I f, Y E

R R 7, U

C N O

y , t Y f ,, n N , e E m L A g e B C ~

r .

A f,, iS uT T O qC N

L B

[ e R n O A I

s s s s s

- ,y -

i S e e A e o e o t I D Y Y N Y N Y N e /, oo R V- F N n A .

P d

on dS S p - C M s r O e n io n o eT C a - - e C

t a

st i a i

r of t C a

R t t s R n o t u s

n r o ri ee l a e e w ic e i

ye et s rh a eh N i t w wc r t t x t c

O m lpop o o u u t i l t i h i

d op Pd o ef ol t e

- e n l t eri p

I p et eh r o t ec u h le S

R e ad t u e

d dd n a ea d

h e r 2

a t

er h o a z nf

- i a -

Nl l p xh t eg E b on s t r7 e

s n t r

O al i eoa ut N d ni t

s u e t w o eot ie em t e I

T r et mir h rh ef f

s n ieb aeb l s p t p a t d. A o v t,th dt 0 lu eo e n o h u e R n r r-C o oc r r g e d

ia le t pt B - u o 5d nf p w d t

o oe nd t v yol m e I ost 0 ea os N t p L t c 1 r oi n r e f c e A ea 9

0 4 it m a s n o t r e ut ed c

i r t d C bb n4 e e - ut e F s n c T a e n 0 r t d x n e e n s L- e 1 e .le i n e uh v E mr w S e mai E g 3 p 1 n s et t lai W erf loe T me mh r

G n ni mn e t ops N

A i

d1.

n s on i o vh l e c e

.a eib r o pd n n ei m

t t h a es i WiIC u qe s -

r e u leb as l

e3 t i R n iut l ur ewe mpe vo ed C

i e4 at e. e n qe u r o s nt b e

- e s w c1 c c m r a e s o t e mgy a r a o al x - . oh - - Bl rf eea C eG f i Ai t

1 3 c c r

h w s n s s

a enl me f t c E

P sR E i d c

4 x ee egS ii B irih st r h e ot hS yC a S nt R U e l

h ii ON s u u n f - t E .

rR l S I N P

pi S vd sE on t r

l I

wy ol h e q est m n r d e n o - R /t s eb a

L h a t pat e uh l

Oh eo o - CT r i a i

C gi t t a

ri B n A e f x A f a n

o m

- - - h osdt +. dn t t a

r R h u o n E

T n w h s e t a p E w el R e t

ic i o f l t h e -

t v r 3" .hhi tahe N iv ec h P t OR mF I P

nh d e ic ne t n o o n o mf -

O l

o n t dd n ee iweP T i onG t iot v ei g e m- - -

t t n o o

I v a ed t eG d r y .

t n o ai m ph a st t m - es1 e8 rt -

iwsi t s a T in m mei t r .

et bk n r a n eem i l t nit u P r nh eP wu e g ,s S w o - e 3- n e c n

d. u 1_

i o

t ni et t T v e me I

R sf n n t a

r n l e s

t aR loN ed e r e is e n) a l i E S i t s q el e r s m 3- t e r l rC P e pe rS s r p u C

S ioo t

c s eg u en r u

ist s imc5 n rl 7 lu1 a ei g uf di t e om mi C

wp u r _ nit e n u1 isn qiua he lotu E t e n ql ec a q -

c n T

h loo o oe a D h a e o h ni 5 nh en oef nl A i f N C pc s T R rW T o

( l T f T

c. 4 4 i -

C r oif p R

E B 63 7 3 9 0 4 1 2 3 4 M 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 0 0 U -S 4 4 N 0 L 0 A 4 4 4 S 5G 5 S 5G 5 G 0 0 A 0 L 0 L 0 L 0 L 0 L

t r A e s L -

t L p s s 3 a s A o e e A C N Y Y H eh Y C Y e o N

_ t n

e E

K E

R A

S U6.

m e

r .

iS

_ R o

1 uT qC C

_ Y t r e

e r T

I F t R n i

e L

I B

L O

W Y s

e Y

s e

Y s

e A N

s a eh YC p

oo N n t

N o

A C

I L A.

P K 1

P A t t A 1 n n 2 E -

e e P 5 m m

_ 4

/ E N

C e.

r i S iS e

r .

_ 3 H uT uT C e qC qC

_ N e e e r S S R n R n e A

T M -

i i

. T O C

o s

e o A oo t

oo t s e

l N N Y N N N n N n Y E

U R

R

_ C

_ N t

- O n Y e

_ E L

N A

C S

T 4.

m e

r .

B I 31 iS uT g A O' e 5 qC T L e n -

e e.

S

_ N B A -

io4 t 3 R n i y

. O I s c t s S o e oeN A oo e o I D N Y NSC N N n Y N R

A L

_ P r S n E M w r /

O eo e io t r sC .s i R eet rh l !A

- C m

vl of s

t a

w r a of p

s h

t nt os a wu s A N

O oo t l w er b u o e d

e e

s n s it aR d

i dii n s x O

Ct, L n e

r r

Ml I

S nt ai e I

S d r dh l

b f d e imgne or c e et moe w C u6 i t o pe, er w h en o R ieo f o t el l ih o t r p E f wt x i

hl t o dt c pt pl us k V i e ina a ua f rs e s t l om N

O C

d s o u ma P e T n R

t h T t R aP. gt n n r

o hl o t r n

s r a A s wf e d e a ped m

o i b

dfu e -

e c

% h e

e1 inc a iweud l f i o or

.sl yf eu i

d ie wghoa o e i r b e 5t ee 7 l l

dt h

n n ai ir5 u

qg 9

lcsen t ef e ah a r c n t kaen el P a ci lad r r q ue f l t r i f u p r

en o y 1

uf e n

- E G

oo w

hh t t ri v

d e n c wem o

ai et d f h u a e v iog n n l

S C

i ai N n s w oe l rli h n e c er e t esi o

_ A s o s t i g l

f e e nd h t bil ce t l l

ni ot eo h not t ai at a oe u -

mc i

i l t d c Sf e h t rf C

C i a t c ci os t r i

ea f f it cd ee C ab R

P d o ch C at b yt y

s r e pe rO C

e y/

4

- af u o pv yT l oe iwdf e

_ E i r o id s o f R u t h ei eh aL . lf

_ P dt en eh o s my nm o t P t r t t e geP S

H r e iui q

d p w

o4 n isd a irb e o

ir1 e5 v7 s w

D ic f a T c e t R ev h % f o f

mf nhT a

r oit a eof 1 w

R &, e C egs ei ch e 7 f d oeF ict 5 at prl o5 mo

_ E t vP e eTr l

r n es ut c n 8 ul 8 s u p y T

k di a di ew ni t o t b oE . sf won t t el on

. N O e rB r ah i t n

e w n a1 s e 3 r s irl o n e m

h ia ioev t

f l

ea m l i mi mn e i a es e . FPtab o .

I T

r g e C eh oor le w er r u .

eo yt l bi r n I

.Rl o a agb t

iri ec u ed P f rt e

f vd r e

. i t s t erm e g n ns io d1 n -

I lols o imd u m d e

u nt ua v a n oo at i ioae t i ie5 v i o - r qen L

qr e r :

R t e s r s e v e e e a h t t m df 8

es i

C Wi t s o u r m r pt p cd ai di wh n e S a e i sf wu os erd w a ral ot e k A et t ev i r eo c e E h ea h e h e t

o h l o h oeN aB ed e n o Inl c ^ C cbi aens 7 D h d p ol T d r T r T p N T f d T t l D T a ocf R 1

- E 1 B 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 -

M 0 0 8 0 0 0 1 1 g)

U 5G 5S 5 5

5G 5

N 5 0L 0L 0 M 0 0 L 0 A 0 A o}

l ! l'

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR 3.2-004 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: Revise Traveler Status page to reflect NRC approval and latest revision number of Travelers TSTF-110 Rev. 2 and TSTF-136. There are no changes to any CTS l

mark-ups, DOCS or JDFs.

l ATTACHED PAGES:

I l

Enclosure SA Traveler Status Sheet l

1 l

l

'l Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.2 App /:a.1/. A cAoa

/ on ly (care.r) .

TRAVELER s STATUS DIFFERENCE * / COMMENTS TSTF 24 Not Incorporated NA Not NRC approved as of ggy, / , traveler cut off cate.

TSTF.95 Incorporated 3.2 06 Approved by NRC.

l TSTF 97 Incorporated l 3.2 07 Approved by NRC.

TSTF-98, Incorporated 3.2 03 l

Rev. + '2. T,0-ca.

TSTF 99 rcorporated 3.2 08 Approved by NRC. I l

TSTF 109 Incorporated 3.2 15 Approved by NRC. l TSTF 110 Incorporated 3.2 10 Rev. -: ~2 pIO ,,g j/ N/d d. -Th?. 2-D TSTF 112, e Incorporated -ftA- "c "T er-va --t Rev. 1 Z2"20[> tr;veler h; g<d n c' %-?.2W2 l

< s,+.

TSTF 136 Incorporated NA f AW h MAC. M-y.c-g4,.j TSTF 164 Incorporated 3.2 11 Applicable to CAOC only (CPSES).

".!C: ; , . Rev - t- Incorporated 2.2 05 li" "n:crper;;;- !

TcP77:~ .a4 / 3.2 18 icrtion: c' 'S"-25. 2'M / '

WOG-105 Incorporated l 3.2 16 l

\ AppovedL h/A C -

Affire L e e Chu' only ( ofRd.

l l

MARK-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97 E___-____________

1

)

JLS CONVERSION TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CTS 4.0 - Design Features ITS 4.0 - Design Features j

RESPONSE TO RAls AND LICENSEE INITIATED ADDITIONAL CHANGES I

l l

1 l

1 i

! i r

I f

l l

l lNDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Page 1 of 1 l

bDDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSEQ 4.3.2 DC, CP, WC, CA YES i CP 4.0-002 CP NA i

l l

f l

l JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l

The following methodology is followed for submitting additional information:

1. Each licensee is submitting a separate response for each section.

2. If an RAI does not apply to a licensee (i.e., does not actually impact the information that defines the technical specification change for that licensee), *NA" has been entered in the index column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for that licensee.

3. If a licensee initiated change does not apply, "NA" has been entered in the index column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for that licensee.

4. The common portions of the " Additional information Cover Sheets" are identical, except for brackets, where applicable (using the same methodology used in enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A and 6B of the conversion submittals). The list of attached pages will vary to match the licensee specific conversion submittals. A Licensee's FLOG response may not address all applicable plants if there is insufficient similarity in the plant specific responses to justify their inclusion in each submittal. In those cases, the response will be prefaced with a heading such as " PLANT SPECIFIC RESPONSE" i

5. Changes are indicated using the redlir'e/ strikeout tool of Wordperfect or by using i a hand markup that indicates insertions and deletions. If the area being revised is not clear, the affected portion of the page is circled. The markup techniques vary as necessary, based on the specifics of the area being changed and the complexity of the changes, to provide the clearest possible indication of the l changes. I

6. A marginal note (the Additional Information Number from the index)is added in the right margin of each page being changed, adjacent to the area being changed, to identify the source of each change.

7. Some changes are not applicable to one licensee but still require changes to the Tables provided in Enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A, and 6B of the originallicense amendment request to reflect the changes being made by one or more of the other licensees. These changes are not included in the additionalinformation for the licensee to which the change does not apply, as the changes are only for consistency, do not technically affect the request for that licensee, and are being provided in the additional information being provided by the licensees for which the change is applicable. The complete set of changes for the license amendment request will be provided in a licensing amendment request supplement to be provided later.

I l

l l

L___________...___._.______._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

JOINT LICEMSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (CONTINUED)

8. The item numbers are formatted as follows: [ Source] [lTS Section)-[nnn)

Source = Q - NRC Question CA - AmerenUE DC-PG&E WC - WCNOC CP - TU Electric TR - Traveler ITS Section = The ITS section associated with the item (e.g.,3.3), if all j sections are potentially impacted by a broad change or set of changes, j "ALL"is used for the section number. 4 nnn = a three digit sequential number or ED (ED indicates editorial I correction with no impact on meaning) l 4

l j

i I !

i i

L_ _ _ --___- _ - _ _ -- - _ -----_-_ ------- -------- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 4.3.2 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: 4.3.2 DRAINAGE The ISTS for this section is as follows:

The spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation [23 ft].

l Comment: This section for all four FLOG plants are the same as the ISTS above. Each l

i has a plant specific elevation for the bracket instead of the 23 ft. They are: Callaway 2040 ft; Wolf Creek 2040 ft; Comanche Peak 845 ft; Diablo Canyon 133 ft. Provide !

l explanations that these elevation levels are at 23 ft above the spent fuel in the pool.

FLOG RESPONSE:

General Discussion The elevation reported by each of the FLOG plants is based upnn reference elevations i

used in the plant's design and construction. The design feature (plant specific elevation) of CTS 5.6.2 is provided in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.13, " Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis," C.6. Per RG 1.13, this design feature is required to assure that an l inadvertent drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool will not "cause the fuel to be u,. covered." 1 This RG also states that loss of inventory from the Spent Fuel Storage Pool"could cause overheating of spent fuel and resultant damage tr cladding integrity." The margin of coverage above the spent fuelis in excess of the 10 feet stated in the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 9.1.3.lll.1.e.

Plant Specific Discussion l

For Callaway the reference grade elevation is 2000 ft. The top of the currently installed ;

spent fuel racks are at a nominal elevation of 2021'5" and the suction of the spent fuel J

, pool cooling system piping is at elevation 2040 ft which is the value in CTS 5.6.2 and ITS 4.3.2. The top of proposed new spent fuel racks are at a similar elevation.

ATTACHED PAGES:

, None j

i i

l l

l l 1

JLS CONVERSION TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CTS 3/4.5 - EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ITS 3.5 - EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND LICENSEE INITIATED ADDITIONAL CHANGES u'

INDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED NUMBER 3.5.G-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES i

3.5.1-1 CP NA 3.5.1-2 WC NA 3.5.1-3 CP NA 3.5.1-4 DC NA 3.5.15 DC NA 3.5.1-6 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.2-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.2-2 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.2-3 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.2-4 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.25 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.2-6 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.2-7 CP NA 3.5.2-8 WC, CA YES 3.5.2-9 DC NA 3.5.3-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.3-2 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.3-3 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.5.3-4 DC, CP, WC, CA YES j 3.5.3-5 DC, CP, WC, CA YES I 3.5.4-1 DC NA 3.5.5-1 DC,CP NA 3.5.5-2 WC, CA YES l l

CA 3.5-001 DC, WC, CA YES CA 3.5-002 DC, CP, WC, CA YES CA 3.5-003 CA YES I

l- CP 3.5-002 CP NA ;

CP 3.5-003 CP NA CP 3.5-004 CP NA i DC 3.5-ED DC NA DC ALL-002 (3.5 changes only) DC NA DC 3.5-001 DC, WC, CA YES DC 3.5-002 DC NA DC 3.5-003 DC NA DC 3.5-005 DC NA DC 3.5-006 DC NA

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ . --- N

INDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (cont.)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED NUMBER TR 3.5-001 DC, CP, WC, CA YES WC 3.5-ED WC NA WC 3.5-001 WC NA WC '3.5-002 WC NA WC 3.5-003 WC NA i

i i

1

JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONAL F MMATION The following methodology is followed for submitting additional information:

1. Each licensee is submitting a separate response for each section.

I

2. If an RAI does not apply to a licensee (i.e., does not actually impact the information that !

defines the technical specification change for that licensee), "NA" has been entered in the index column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for that licensee.

3. If a licensee initiated change does not apply, "NA" has been entered in the index ,

column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for that i licensee.

4. The common portions of the "AdditionalInformation Cover Sheets" are identical, except !

for brackets, where applicable (using the same methodology used in enclosures 3A, 3B,4,6A and 68 of the conversion submittals). The list of attached pages will vary to match the licensee specific conversion submittals. A licensee's FLOG response may i not address all applicable plants if there is insufficient similarity in the plant specific responses to justify their inclusion in each submittal. In those cases, the response will x be prefaced with a heading such as " PLANT SPECIFIC DISCUSSION."

5. Changes are indicated using the redline / strikeout tool of Wordperfect or by using a hand markup that indicates insertions and deletions. If the area being revised is not ;

clear, the affected portion of tne page is circled. The markup techniques vary as i necessary, based on the specifics of the area being changed and the complexity of tha changes, to provide the clearest possible indication of the changes.

6. A marginal note (the Additional Information Number from the index)is added in the right !

margin of each page being changed, adjacent to the area being changed, to identify l the source of each change.

i

7. Some changes are not applicable to one licensee but still require changes to the Tables provided in Enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A, and 6B of the originallicense amendment

! request to reflect the changes being made by one or more of the otherlicensees.

These changes are not included in the additional information for the licensee to which l the change does not apply, as the changes are only for consistency, do not technically affed the request for that licensee, and are being provided in the additionalinformation being provided by the licensees for which the change is applicable. The complete set of changes for the license amendment request will be provided in a licensing amendment request supplement to be provided later.

j

. JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONALINFORMATION (continued)

8. The item numbers are formatted as follows: [ Source][lTS Section)-[nnn)

Source = Q - NRC Question CA- AmerenUE DC-PG&E WC - WCNOC CP - TU Electric TR - Traveler ITS Section = The ITS section associated with the item (e.g.,3.3). If all sections are potentially impacted by a broad change or set of changes, "ALL"is used for the section number, nnn = a three digit sequential number or ED (ED indicates editorial correction with no impact on meaning) l r

l

l l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET I

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.G-1 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: ITS 3.5.x Bases There have been a number of instances that the specific changes to the STS Bases are not property identified with redline or strikeout marks.

Comment: Perform an audit of all STS Baces markups and identify instances where additions and/or deletions of Bases were not properly identified in the original submittal.

FLOG RESPONSE: The submitted ITS Bases markups for Section 3.5 have been compared to the STS Bases. Some differences that were identified were in accordance with the markup methodologies (e.g., deletion of brackets and reviewer's notes). Most of the differences were j editorial in nature and would not have affected the review. Examples of editorial changes are:

]

1) Capitalizing a letter with only a " redline" but not striking out the lower case letter that it replaced.

2) Changing a verb from singular to plural by adding an "s" without redlining the "s".

3) Deleting instead of striking-out the A, B, C, etc., following a specification title (e.g., SR 3.6.6A.7).

4) Changing a bracketed reference (in the reference section) with only a

" redline" for the new reference but failing to include the strike-out of the old reference.

f

5) In some instances the brackets were retained (and struck-out) but the unchanged text within the brackets was not redlined.

6) Not redlining a title of a bracketed section. The methodology calls for the section title to be redlined when an entire section was bracketed.

7) Additional text not contained in the STS Bases was added to the ITS Bases by the lead FLOG member during the development of the submittal. Once it was determined to not be applicable, the text was then struck-out and remains in the ITS Bases markup.

Differences of the above editorial nature will not be provided as attachments to this response.

The pages requiring changes that are more than editorial and are not consistent with the markup methodology are attached.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 58, page B 3.5-18

]

ECCS Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS a l (continued)

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering design flow to the RCS. Individual components are inoperable if they are not capable of performing their design function or supporting systems are not available.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function.

Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment such that 100% of the ECCS flow HIBHEtBEBildWiFM1QSMtMDEIMERE ecuivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train remains availableAg. (.rame gagngh C This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under O ## 6'I circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure '

s of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 5) has shown that the impact of having one full ECCS train inoperable is sufficiently small to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Reference 6 describes situations in which one component, such as cr = crossover volvc can disable both ECCS trains. With one or more component (s) inoperable such that 100% of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is not av611able, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analysis.

Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be innediately entered.

l B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable trains cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a H0DE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 1B 5/15/97 I

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.1-6 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC i I

I' REQUEST: DOC 1-07 LG CTS 4.5.1.1.b (DC, CA, WC)

CTS 4.5.1.b (CP) -

ITS SR 3.5.1.4 The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not provide any justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with the STS.

j Comment: Please revise the DOC to include additional justification as to why this detail is not necessary in the ITS.

i FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-07-LG has been revised to provide additionaljustification for the proposed change by adding the following information:

i "The RWST has its own LCO and SRs to verify OPERABILITY and cross-references to other specifications are generally inconsistent with the ITS format and are not required to impose OPERABILITY on the referenced equipment. The RWST boron concentration is maintained ;

between [2350] ppm and [2500] ppm, which is higher than the minimum boron concentration required to be maintained in the accumulators. If there were reason to doubt the RWST boron concentration, ITS 3.5.4 Condition A would be entered with its 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time. In addition, ITS SR 3.5.4.3 verifies the boron concentration of the RWST every 7 days. i Therefore, it is unlikely that the boron concentration being added to the accumulators would be )

, below [2350] ppm. Additionally, plant procedures implementing the SR 3.5.1.4 Bases specify that if the RWST has been diluted since its last boron concentration sample per SR 3.5.4.3, the boron concentration in the accumulators must be verified within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after adding [70]

gallons or more to the accumulators from the RWST, The moving of this detail to the ITS Bases maintains consistency with NUREG-1431; retention of this detailin the ITS is not necessary to adequately protect the health and safety of the public. Details for performing surveillance requirements are more appropriately specified in the plant procedures required by ITS 5.4.1 and the ITS Bases. Control of the plant conditions appropriate to perform a surveillance test is an issue for procedures and scheduling and has been previously determined by NRC to be unnecessary as a TS restriction. As indicated in Generic Letter 91-04, allowing this licer,see control is consistent with the vast majority of other surveillance requirements that do not dictate plant conditions for surveillance. Any change to this detail will l be made in accordance with the Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5.14."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 3A, page 1 E_--_--__------- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - __ _ _ --------____J

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS SECTION 3/4.5 This enclosure contains a brief description / justification for each marked up change to the current Technical Specifications. The changes are identified by change numbers contained in enclosure 2 (Mark up of the current Technical Specifications).

In addition, the referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs) are contained in enclosure 4. Only technical changes are discussed: administrative changes (i.e., format, presentation, and editorial changes) made to conform to NUREG 1431 Revision 1 are not discussed. For Enclosures 3A, 3B, 4, 6A, and 68, text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not comon to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant-specific information in that location.

CHANGE NUMBER NSliC DESCRIPTION 1 01 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

1 02 -

Not :ppli nb k tc C:l k ;y.

-T:bk 'Enclc=r: 3S' . - u.re),M Cv.. m a c., C:r.p;ri n r. g 7, g ,f- f !

)

1 03 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

1-04 LS 8 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison !

Table (Enclosure 3R),

1 05 LS 9 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

1-06, A Adds the words "wlth 3 accumulators OPERABLE and" to both Action statements to make entry into LC0 3.0.3 mandatory with two or more accumulators inoperable. This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 and is considered administrative in nature since it reflects current plant practice, i.e., current ACTION Statements a and b are not entered at the same time on different accumulators.

1-07 LG The SR currently requires a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months surveillance if the makeupssource is the RWST and the RWST has been diluted i since verifying its boron concentration per the RWST LCO.

!' The proposed change would move the statement "and the RWST l has not been diluted since verifying .. " to the ITS SR 3.5.1.4 Bases. This level of detail is not included in the ISTS and is consistent with the kind of information a contained in the Bases.

.TNNA'T SA-f & 3,5 /-4 1 08 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 1 5/15/97 j

l lNSERT 3A-1 l i

The RWST has its own LCO and SRs to verify OPERABILITY and cross-references to S 7.C /-/, i other specifications are generally inconsistent with the ITS format and are not required to impose OPERABILITY on the referenced equipment. The RWST boron concentration is maintained between [2350] ppm and [2500] ppm, which is higher than 1 the minimum boron concentration required to be maintained in the accumulators. If there were reason to doubt the RWST boron concentration, ITS 3.5.4 Condition A would be entered with its 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time. In addition, ITS SR 3.5.4.3 verifies the boron concentration of the RWST every 7 days. Therefore, it is unlikely that the l boron concentration being added to the accumulators would be below [2350} ppm.

Additionally, plant procedures implementing the SR 3.5.1.4 Bases specify that if the i RWST has been diluted since its last boron concentration sample per SR 3.5.4.3, the ,

boron concentration in the accumulators must be verified within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after adding !

[70] gallons or more to the accumulators from the RWST. The moving of this detail to i the ITS Bases maintains consistency with NUREG-1431; retention of this detailin the

{

ITS is not necessary to adequately protect the health and safety of the public. Details i for performing surveillance requirements are more appropriately specified in the plant l procedures required by ITS 5.4.1 and the ITS Bases. Control of the plant conditions appropriate to perform a surveillance test is an issue for procedures and scheduling i and has been previously determined by NRC to be unnecessary as a TS restriction. As indicated in Generic Letter 91-04, allowing this licensee control is consistent with the vast majority C other surveillance requirements that do not dictate plant conditions for surveillance. Any change to this detail will be made in accordance with the Bases l

Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5.14.

l i

I

l I

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET j ADDITIONAL INFORMAYlON NO: O 3.5.2-1 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l

REQUEST: DOC 2-01 LG

}

CTS 3.5.2 LCO '

ITS 3.5.2 LCO The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not provide any

)

! justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with the STS.

l i

Comment: Please revise the DOC to include additional justification as to why this detailis not necessary in the ITS.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 2-01-LG has been revised to provide additionaljustification for the ,

proposed change by adding the following information: !

"The proposed change is consistent with NUMARC 93-03, " Writer's Guide for the Restructured Technical Specifications," and the philosophy of NUREG-1431 in which the LCO describes as simply as possible the lowest functional capability of the system and relegates the details of what constitutes an OPERABLE system to the Bases. Therefore, the details of what constitutes an OPERABLE subsystem (train) such as required pumps, heat exchangers, and flow paths are more appropriately discussed in the Bases than in the LCO. These details are not necessary to ensure ECCS OPERABILITY or that the ECCS can perform its intended safety function. Therefore, the proposed change moves to the Bases details that are not necessary to provide operational safety while retaining in the Technical Specifications the basic requirements for maintaining OPERABILITY."

i ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5

[ Enclosure 3A, page 2 l

i i

CHANGE NUMBER HSBC DESCRIPTION l 2 01 LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, the LC0 and ACTION a l are revised to replace'the word " subsystem" with the word

" train" and the descriptive information in the LCO is moved to the BASES. Whereas there is no technical change associated with the replacement of the term " subsystem",

" train" better describes that all parts of the required system (e.g. , piping, instruments, controls, etc..) must be OPERABLE to support the required safety functions.

rNSEA7~ SW .2 Q *T.C > l l

2 02 LS 1 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, a note with respect to RCS pressure isolation valve testing is added to the LCO.

Plant design requires closure of certain valves in the SI pump flow paths to perform PIV testing. Isolation of the injection paths in H0DE 3 is currently prohibited as it would constitute entering TS 3.0.3 since both SI trains l would be made administratively' inoperable. In actuality, the flow paths are readily restorable from the control l

room and a spurious single active failure is not likely in the short term (2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ). The new note will allow closing l these valves without declaring either SI train inoperable.

This change is consistent with traveler TSTF 153.

2 03 LS 2 This change revises Action a to allow for increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances where components in opposite trains are inoperable, but at least <

L 100t of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is available. Due to the design of the ECCS l subsystems, the inoperable condition of one or more components in each train does not necessarily render the ECCS inoperable for performing its safety function. The allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is unchanged; but, it is l to be contingent on being capable of providing 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single operable ECCS train.

This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1.

2-04 TR 2 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, the requirement to submit a Special Report within 90 days of an ECCS actuation and injection event is deleted. This change is l acceptable because the requirement to submit a report is

sufficiently addressed by the reporting requirements l contained in 10 CFR 50.73.

l 2 05 LS 3 This change revises the LC0 Applicability note to allow operation in H0DE 3 pursuant to LCO 3.5.3 until "all" cold legs exceed the RCS temperature setpoint in lieu of "one or more." The previous allowance was [within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to "one or more" cold legs exceeding 375'F]. The 375'F is a nominal temperature selected to give time to DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 2 5/15/97 u__________-________________. _ _ _ . _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ ._-________A

INSERT 3A-2 The proposed change is consistent with NUMARC 93-03, " Writer's Guide for the $ 3',5 p- /

Restructured Technical Specifications," and the philosophy of NUREG-1431 in which

{

the LCO describes as simply as possible the lowest functional capability of the system 1 and relegates the details of what constitutes an OPERABLE system to the Bases.

Therefore, the details of what constitutes an OPERABLE subsystem (train) such as required pumps, heat exchangers, and flow paths are more appropriately discussed in the Bases than in the LCO. These details are not necessary to ensure ECCS OPERABILITY or that the ECCS can perform its intended safety function. Therefore, the proposed change moves to the Bases details that are not necessary to provide operational safety while retaining in the Technical Specifications the basic requirements for maintaining OPERABILITY. <

i u--_----_--------

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.5.2-2 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: DOC 2-09 LG CTS 4.5.2.c The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not provide any justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with the STS. .

l Comment: Please revise the DOC to include additional justification as to why this surveillance is not necessary in the ITS.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 2-09-LG has been revised to provide additionaljustification for the j . proposed change by adding the following information:

" CTS SR 4.5.2.c requires a visual inspection to verify that no loose debris is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction to the.

pump suction during LOCA conditions at the frequency specified. This ensures that during the process of performing maintenance or other work inside containment that debris is appropriately discarded. Existing procedures restrict containment entries and assure accountability of items entering containment such that they are removed at the completion of the containment entry. ITS SR 3.5.2.8 continues to require a visualinspection every 18 months on each of the ECCS train containment sump suction inlets to ensure that the sump suction inlet is not restricted by debris. Therefore, this detail is not required to be in the Technical Specifications and moving this requirement maintains consistency with NUREG-1431."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 3A, page 3 L

l l

l

CHANGE NUMBER HSBC DESCRIPTION restore the pump operability without delaying startup.

The four hour limit is' unchanged. Changing "one or more" to "all" is still bounded by the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months limit. Thi change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1.

2 06 Not used.

2 07 A Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. this change revises the i surveillance to make it clear that the " listed" valve position is the concern and not indicated position in the control room. The surveillance can be satisfied using indicated position in the control room but may also be satisfied using local observation. This is an administrative change since the surveillance acceptance criteria are not changed.

! 2 08 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 3B).

2 09 LG The visual inspection surveillance performed when establishing containment integrity is moved to a licensee controlled document. "; W g thir typ= cf regirse..t is- l

- a t set with "LHEC 1131 6 . 1. fNIEg-r 7A-3) Q 7.EM j 4 2 10 A Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, the current TS SR for I verifying interlock action of the RHR system is moved to improved TS SR 3.4.14.2.

2 11 TR 1 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. the ECCS pump and valve actuation SR is changed to allow the use of an actual ,

signal, if and when one occurs, to satisfy surveillance '

requirements. The specific signals used to actuate the pumps and valves have been moved to the Bases.

.rNTE N 3/)-38 0 2 S*~

2 12 LG The ECCS pump performance is revised to be consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1. The test method and specific data required to verify pump performance are moved to licensee controlled documents. Specification 4.0.5 no longer exists in the improved TS: however, the requirement for an Inservice Testing (IST) Program is moved to Section 5.5.8 of the improved TS. The IST Program is referenced directly

[ for the frequency of testing.

XWER r 3A-SC Q 25.2-+

2 13 TR 3 The current TS allowance, which permits the ECCS throttle

. valves to be declared OPERABLE without verifying ECCS throttle valve stop position for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following valve stroke testing or maintenance, is deleted from the current TS to be consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. The ECCS l

l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 3 5/15/97 4

l

)

INSERT 3A-3A CTS SR 4.5.2.c requires a visual inspection to verify that no loosa debris is present in O ~7. C-2 the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction to the pump suction during LOCA conditions at the frequency specified. This ensures that during the process of performing maintenance or other work inside containment that debris is appropriately discarded. Existing procedures restrict containment entries and assure accountability of items entering containment such that they are removed at the completion of the containment entry. ITS SR 3.5.2.8 continues to require a visualinspection every 18 months on each of the ECCS train containment sump suction inlets to ensure that the sump suction inlet is not restricted by debris.

Therefore, this detail is not required to be in the Technical Specifications and moving this requirement maintains consistency with NUREG-1431.

1 1

I l 1 g

\

l I

l i

L___________._.__________.____ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ __

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.2-3 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: DOC 2-11 TR-1 CTS 4.5.2.e ITS SR 3.5.2.5 & SR 3.5.2.6 The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not provide any justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with the STS.

j l

Comment: The NSHC for this change appears to provide the needed justification.

{

Therefore, please incorporate the information contained in the NSHC into the subject :

DOC.

FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS requires the use of a test signal for initiation of valid tests. The .

unintentional result was to require the performance of the verification even if an actual signal ' i has already verified proper operation of equipment. TR-1 allows either an actual or test signal. -i DOC 2-11-TR-1 has been revised to provide additional discussion to allow the use of an actual !

signal to meet this surveillance requirement. l I

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 3A, page 3 l

l l

l L___:__________-___---_-_ ._ _ - _ _ . - .]

~

CHANGE NUMBER HSE DESCRIPTION restore the pump operability without delaying startup. .

The four hour limit is' unchanged. Changing "one or more" to "all" is still bounded by the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months limit. Thic change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1.

2 06 Not used.

l 2 07 A Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 this change revises the i surveillance to make it clear that the " listed" valve l position is the concern and not indicated position in the i control room. The surveillance can be satisfied using indicated position in the control room but may also be satisfied using local observation. This is an administrative change since the surveillance acceptance criteria are not changed.

2 08 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison !

Table (Enclosure 3B). 1 2 09 LG The visual inspection surveillance performed when i establishing containment integrity is moved to a licensee l controlled document. R.tg this tm cf regimat is - ,

a and st^at d th MLHEC 1016. 1. 2'NIEg r 7A-$ $ SS.2 .2 i 2-10 A Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, the current TS SR for :

verifying interlock action of the RHR system is moved to improved TS SR 3.4.14.2.

2 11 TR 1 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, the ECCS pump and valve !

actuation SR is changed to allow the use of an actual signal, if and when one occurs, to satisfy surveillance requirements. The specific signals used to actuate the pumps and valves have been moved to the Bases. !

.rNCEA'Y 3A-38 0 2S'-Q~3 2-12 LG The ECCS pump performance is revised to be consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. The test method and specific data i required to verify pump performance are moved to licensee controlled documents. Specification 4.0.5 no longer exists

, in the improved TS: however, the requirement for an Inservice Testing (IST) Program is moved to Section 5.5.8 of the improved TS. The IST Program is referenced directly for the frequency of testing.

ZA/Segy 3A- SC Q 2. .T. 2 -+ ,

2 13 TR-3 The current TS allowance, which permits the ECCS throttle

valves to be declared OPERABLE without verifying ECCS throttle valve stop position for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following valve stroke testing or maintenance, is deleted from the current TS to be consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. The ECCS DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 3 5/15/97 i

j l

i (NSERT 3A-38 l

In several specifications throughout the CTS, OPERABILITY of certain equipment is tp yfa_3 demonstrated by ensuring that the equipment performs its safety function upon receipt I of a simulated test signal. The intent of a ' simulated' signal was to be able to perform d the required testing without the occurrence (or without causing) an actual signal generating event. However, the unintended effect was to require the performance of the surveillance (usin0 a test signal) even if an actual signal had previously verified the operation of the equipment. This change allows credit to be taken for actual events when the required equipment actuates successfully.

While the occurrence of events that cause actuation of accident mitigation equipment is undesirable, the actuation of mitigation equipment on an actual signalis a better i demonstration of its OPERABILITY than an actuation using a test signal. Thus, the {

change does not reduce the reliability of the equipment tested. The change also l

improves plant safety by reducing the amount of time the equipment is taken out of !

service for testing, and thereby increasing its availability during an actual event, and by reducing the wear of the equipment caused by unnecessary testing.

i l

l l

I-1 u__-___-_-_--__-_____-_____________ _ __ .>

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.2-4 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l

REQUEST: DOC 2-12 LG i CTS 4.5.2.f ITS SR 3.5.2.4

)

The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not provide any ;

justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with the STS.

]

Comment: Please ravise the DOC to include additional justification as to why this detailis not necessary in the ITS.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 2-12-LG has been revised to provide additionaljustification for the l

proposed change by adding the following information:

"ITS SR 3.5.2.4 retains the SR requirement and references the Inservice Testing Program (IST), discussed in ITS 5.5.8, for the surveillance Frequency. The specific SR acceptance j criteria for the pumps have been moved to the ITS SR 3.5.2.4 Bases. Although this may make l the ECCS pump performance testing more flexible in the future, only with regard to licensee control over the numerical values of the acceptance criteria, this testing must continue to conform to the IST program requirements. Revisions to the acceptance criteria will have to meet the requirements of the Bases Control Program discussed in ITS 5.5.14. Details for performing surveillance requirements are more appropriately specified in the plant procedures

! required by ITS 5.4.1 and the iTS Bases. Control of the acceptance criteria for a surveillance

! test is an issue for the IST procedures and has been previously determined by NRC to be unnecessary as a TS restriction. As indicated in Generic Letter 9104, allowing this licensee control is consistent with the vast majority of other surveillance requirements that do not dictate plant conditions for surveillance."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 3A, page 3 I

L l

l

CHANGE l l

NUMBER IMC DESCRIPTION restore the pump operability without delaying startup.

l The four hour limit is' unchanged. Changing "one or more" to "all" is still bounded by the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months limit. Thi:

change is consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1.

2 06 Not used.

2 07 A Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. this change revises the surveillance to make it clear that the " listed" valve l position is the concern and not indicated position in the )

control room. The surveillance can be satisfied using '

indicated position in'the control room but may also be satisfied using local observation. This is an administrative change since the surveillance acceptance I criteria are not changed.

2 08 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). ;

2 09 LG The visual inspection surveillance performed when ;

establishing containment integrity is moved to a licensee !

controlled document. -it;% this tm of reg:1rar,t is I

-4 ?tet "ith NUREC 101 L 1. 2'Nrgtr FA-34 Q 2.S.P.2 l 1

2 10 A Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. the current TS SR for verifying interlock action of the RHR system is moved to improved TS SR 3.4.14.2.

2 11 TR 1 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. the ECCS pump and valve actuation SR is changed to allow the use of an actual signal, if and when one occurs, to satisfy surveillance requirements. The specific signals used to actuate the ,

pumps and valves have been moved to the Bases.

.ZNCERT SA-38 0 5 S #~3 2 12 LG The ECCS pump performance is revised to be consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. The test method and specific data required to verify pump performance are moved to licensee controlled documents. Specification 4.0.5 no longer exists in the improved TS: however. the requirement for an Inservice Testing (IST) Program is moved to Section 5.5.8 of the improved TS. The IST Program is referenced directly for the frequency of testing.

zureer 3A-Sc & 2..r.2-+

2 13 TR 3 The current TS allowance, which permits the ECCS throttle valves to be declared OPERABLE without verifying ECCS l throttle valve stop position for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following valve stroke testing or maintenance. is deleted from the current TS to be consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. The ECCS DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 3 5/15/97 l

m_____________________ _ _ J

i INSERT 3A-3C ITS SR 3.5.2.4 retains the SR requirement and references the Inservice Testing D E5.2 Program (IST), discussed in ITS 5.5.8, for the surveillance Frequency. The specific SR acceptance criteria for the pumps have been moved to the ITS SR 3.5.2.4 Bases.

Although this may make the ECCS pump performance testing more flexible in the future, only with regard to licensee control over the numerical values of the acceptance criteria, this testing must continue to conform to the IST program requirements.

Revisions to the acceptance criteria will have to meet the requirements of the Bases Control Program discussed in ITS 5.5.14. Details for performing surveillance i

requirements are more appropriately specified in the plant procedures required by ITS 5.4.1 and the ITS Bases. Control of the acceptance criteria for a surveillance test is an l issue for the IST procedures and has been previously determined by NRC to be i unnecessary as a TS restriction. As indicated in Generic Letter 91-04, allowing this i licensee control is consistent with the vast majority of other surveillance requirements i that do not dictate plant conditions for surveillance.

I L

l -

l t

l l

i I

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.2-5 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: DOC 2-15 LG CTS 4.5.2.h The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not prcvide any justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with the STS.

Comment: Please revise the DOC to include additionaljustification as to why this surveillance is not necessary in the ITS.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 2-15-LG has been revised to include additionaljustification as to {

why this surveillance is not necessary in the ITS. j ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 3A, page 4 l

l

- - _ - - _ _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - J

CHANGE

< NUMBER HS!!C DESCRIPTION throttle valves are manual valves and plant procedures governing post maintenance test requirements specify verification of correct throttle position prior to declaring the valves OPERABLE. Explicit post maintenance TS surveillance requirements have been deleted because i these requirements are adequately addressed by i administrative post maintenance programs.

l 2 14 A The note providing a one time extension of surveillance intervals is administratively deleted since it is no longer applicable.

-2 15 LG The surveillance requirement for the flow balance test following ECCS modifications is moved to a licensee controlled document. This requirement is not included in NUREG-1431 Rev.1. :2 urEtr 'TA-+A & 2.S 2 S 2 16 LG The specific means by which the ECCS piping is assured to be full of water is moved to the Bases. This level of detail is not included in the ISTS and is consistent with the kind of information contained in the Bases.3 Q 74 D-6 2 17 TN MRY3A-48 A. Adds the phrase "that is not locked. sealed, or otherwise secured in position" with regard to which valves require actuation testing. This change is merely a clarification.

Valves that are secured in place are secured in the position required to meet their safety function. The actuation testing ensures that valves can move to the position that meets their safety function. If the valves l are secured in the position that meets thrir safety function, no testing is necessary.

2 18 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

2 19- LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. this change moves the requirement that the 18 month verification of automatic ECCS valve actuation and ECCS pump actuation be performed during shutdowa to the Bases. INSERT 7A-fC 2 7.52-P 3 01 LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. the LCO is revised to replace the word " subsystem" with the word " train" and the descriptive information in the LC0 is moved to the BASES.

Whereas there is no technical change associated with the replacement of the term " subsystem". " train" better ,

i describes that all parts of the required system (e.g., i f piping, instruments, controls, etc. .) must be OPERABLE to l l support the required safety functions.

wrer zA-+b a ~ ! ;

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 4 5/15/97

)

INSERT 3A-4A Plant procedures governing the restoration of equipment after maintenance specify the $3'.C2-f requirements for determining the appropriate post-maintenance testing. Any time the Operability of a system or component has been affected by repair, maintenance, or 1 replacement of a component, post-maintenance testing is required to demonstrate Operability of the syste- " component. As such, the requirement to perform a flow balance test after modifications that alter ECCS subsystem flow characteristics is not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety.

This requirement has Men moved to the [F)SAR (for Callaway, Diablo Canyon, and Wolf Creek) or TRM (

omanche Peak) These licensee controlled documents containing the moved requirements will be maintained using the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the descriptive information that has been moved continues to be maintained in an appropriately controlled manner.

l l

l' L

I

l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.2-6 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: DOC 2-16 LG

CTS 4.5.2.1 ITS SR 3.5.2.3 The referenced DOC describes the change *o the CTS but does not provide any justification for making the change other thw that it is consistent with the STS.

Comment: Please revise the DOC to include additional justification as to why this detailis not necessary in the ITS.

l FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 2-16-LG has been revised to include additional justification as to why this detail is not necessary in the ITS.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 3A, page 4 l

1 l

I 1

L

l CHANGE MlltiSf3 H$liC DESCRIPTION throttle valves are manual valves and plant procedures governing post maintenance test requirements specify verification of correct throttle position prior to declaring the valves OPERABLE. Explicit post maintenance TS surveillance requirements have been deleted because a these requirements are adequately addressed by administrative post maintenance programs.

2 14 A The note providing a one time extension of surveillance intervals is administrative 1y deleted since it is no longer applicable.

2 15 LG The surveillance requirement for the flow balance test following ECCS modifications is moved to a licensee controlled document. This requirement is not included in NUREG 1431 v. 1. ~AC /Mg7- ~7A-4A S 7.5l2-5 2 16 LG The specific means by which the ECCS piping is assured to be full of water is moved to the Bases. This level of detail is not included in the ISTS and is consistent with the kind of information contained in the Bases.A Q y.5 o-(,

2 17 rN.rERT 3A-+8 A Adds the phrase "that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position" with regard to which valves require actuation testing. This change is merely a clarification.

Valves that are secured in place are secured in the position required to meet their safety function. The actuation' testing ensures that valves can move to the position that meets their safety function. If the valves j are secured in the position that meets their safety !

function, no testing is necessary. '

2 18 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison I Table (Enclosure 38).

2 19 LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. this change moves the !

requirement that the 18 month verification of automatic !

ECCS valve actuation and ECCS pump actuation be performed during shutdown to the Bases. .CN rE47 7A-fc & 7.5.2-P l 3- LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. the LCO is revised to -l

!- replace the word " subsystem" with the word " train" and the I

(

descriptive information in the LCO is moved to the BASES. !

Whereas there is no technical change associated with the j replacement of the term " subsystem", " train" better l describes that all parts of the required system (e.g.,

piping, instruments, controls, etc. .) must be OPERABLE to support the required safety functions.

f g f gg y y /J & A Y, C.3-l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 4 5/15/97 ,

i

INSERT 3A-4B The requirements of ITS LCO 3.5.2 and the associated Surveillance Requirements are $ 3,c-/,

adequate to ensure the ECCS are maintained OPERABLE. As a result, the methods of performing Surveillance are not necessary to ensure the ECCS can perform their j intended safety function and the details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. The ITS Bases containing the moved requirements will be maintained using the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, as required by Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5.14. Therefore, the j descriptive information that has been moved continues to be maintained in an '

appropriately controlled manner.

i l

\

l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.2-8 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: DOC 2-19 LG CTS 4.5.2.e The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not provide any justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with tne STS.

Comment: Please revise the DOC to include additionaljustification as to why this detail is not necessary in the ITS.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 2-19-LG has been revised to provide additionaljustification for the proposed change by adding the following information:

"Such limitations are not required to be detailed in the Technical Specifications. These surveillance requirements are typically performed during plant shutdown, however, if for instance, an actual signal is generated while operating, results should be useable even though .

the plant is not " shutdown." Similarly, if testing would be required to complete some repair or modification made while operating, a shutdown should not be required. Thereforb, the CTS wording is consistent with the NUREG-1431 Bases wording that states: The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Moving these details to the Bases is consistent with other requirements specified in NUREG-1431, Rev.1. This change moves to the Bases details that are not necessary to provide operational safety while retaining in Technical Specifications the basic requirements for maintaining OPERABILITY."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 3A, page 4 i

l I

I i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____________d

i CHANGE

! NUMBER NJMC DESCRIPTION throttle valves are manual valves and plant procedures i

governing post maintenance test requirements specify verification of correct throttle position prior to declaring the valves OPERABLE. Explicit post maintenance TS surveillance requirements have been deleted because a these requirements are adequately addressed by administrative post maintenance programs -

2 14 A The note providing a one time extension of surveillance intervals is administratively deleted since it is no longer applicable.

2 15 LG The surveillance requirement for the flow balance test following ECCS modifications is moved to a licensee controlled document. This requirement is not included in NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. fM. TEAT 3'A-4-A & 3 K2-S 2 16 LG The specific means by which the ECCS piping is assured to be full of water is moved to the Bases. This level of

( detail is not included in the ISTS and is consistent with the kind of information contained in the Bases.3 Q74 2-6

.;2*N.rERY 3A-+8 '

2 17 A Adds the phrase "that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise l-- secured in position" with regard to which valves require l actuation testing. This change is merely a clarification.

Valves that are secured in place are secured in the position required to meet their safety function. The actuation testing ensures that valves can move to the position that meets their safety function. If the valves are secured in the position that meets their safety function, no testing is necessary.

2 18 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison !

Table (Enclosure 38). 1 2 19 LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 this change moves the requirement that the 18 month verification of automatic 7

ECCS valve actuation and ECCS pump actuation be performed ;

during shutdown to the Bases. INSE47 7A-fc Q J.52-P 3 01 1" Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 the LCO is revised to replace the word " subsystem" with the word " train" and the descriptive information in the LCO is moved to the BASES.

Whereas there is no technical change associated with the replacement of the term " subsystem". " train" better describes that all parts of the required system (e.g..

piping, instruments, controls, etc. .) must be OPERABLE to <

support the required safety functions.

rNrer ze+b a ' ~'

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 4 5/15/97 l

INSERT 3A-4C Such limitations are not required to be detailed in the Technical Specifications. These S J.K 2---P surveillance requirements are typically performed during plant shutdown, however, if for instance, an actual signal is generated while operating, results should be useable even I though the plant is not " shutdown." Similarly, if testing would be required to complete some repair or modification made wnile operating, a shutdown should not be required.

Therefore, the CTS wording is consistent with the NUREG-1431 Bases wording that states: The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Moving these details to the Bases is consistent with other requirements specified in NUREG-1431, Rev.1. This change moves to the Bases details that are not necessary to provide operational safety while retaining in Technical Specifications the basic requirements for maintaining OPERABILITY.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.3-1 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: DOC 3-01 LG CTS LCO 3.5.3 ITS LCO 3.5.3 The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not provide any justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with the STS.

Comment: Please revise the DOC to include additionaljustification as to why this detailis not necessary in the ITS.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 3-01-LG has been revised to provide additional justification for the proposed change by adding the following information:

"The proposed change is consistent with NUMARC 93-03, " Writer's Guide for the Restructured Technical Specifications," and the philosophy of NUREG-1431 in which the LCO describes as simply as possible the lowest functional capability of the system and relegates the details of what constitutes an OPERABLE system to the Bases. Therefore, the details of what constitutes an OPERABLE subsystem (train) such as required pumps, heat exchangers, and flow paths are more appropriately discussed in the Bases than in the LCO. These details are not necessary to ensure ECCS OPERABILITY or that the ECCS can perform its intended safety function. Therefore, the proposed change moves to the Bases details that are not necessary to provide operational safety while retaining in the Technical Specifications the basic requirements for maintaining OPERABILITY."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Encicaure 3A, page 4 l

4 .. . .

CHANGE NUMBER MStiC DESCRIPTION

~

throttle valves are manual valves and plant procedures governing post maintenance test requirements specify verification of correct throttle position prior to declaring the valves OPERABLE. Explicit post-maintenance TS surveillance requirements have been deleted because these requirements are adequately addressed by ]

administrative post maintenance programs.

2 14 A The note providing a one time extension of surveillance intervals is administratively deleted since it is no longer applicable.

2 15 LG The surveillance requirement for the flow balance test following ECCS modifications is moved to a licensee controlled document. This requirement 'is not included in NUREG 1431 Rev.1. ~Z~MTW 3'/ )-4-A $ f.C-5 2 16 LG The specific means by which the ECCS piping is assured to be full of water is moved to the Bases. This level of detail is not included in the ISTS and is consistent with the kind of information contained in the Bases.A Q y, < D-6 l 2 17 TN rGRY 3A-48 A Adds the phrase "that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position" with regard to which valves require actuation testing. This change is merely a clarification.

Valves that are secured in place are secured in the position required to meet their safety function. The ,

actuation testing ensures that valves can move to the l position that mee'cs their safety function. If the valves l are secured in the position that meets their safety function, no testing is necessary.

2 18 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

2 19 LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. this change moves the requirement that the 18 month verification of automatic ECCS valve actuation and ECCS pump actuation be performed during shutdown to the Bases. I N Jgg y 7A_ 4 c gy5.2-P 3 01 LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 the LC0 is revised to replace the word " subsystem" with the word " train" and the descriptive information in the LCO is moved to the BASES.

Whereas there is no technical change associated with the replacement of the term " subsystem", " train" better describes that all parts of the required system (e.g..

piping, instruments. controls, etc..) must be OPERABLE to support the required safety functions.

ZAlfER7 3)}-4-b A3'S.3~l DESCRIPT1 OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 4 5/15/97 L ___ - _-_-_ ______---____ _--_ - -- - -_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "

i I

INSERT 3A-4D l l

The proposed change is consistent with NUMARC G3-03, " Writer's Guide for the $ 3' .

S. 3-/ -

Restructured Technical Specifications," and the philosophy of NUREG-1431 in which the LCO describes as simply as possible the lowest functional capability of the system and relegates the details of what constitutes an OPERABLE system to the Bases.

j 3

i

-Therefore, the details of what constitutes an OPERABLE subsystem (train) such as i required pumps, heat exchangers, and flow paths are more appropriately discussed in the Bases than in the LCO. These details are not necessary to ensure ECCS OPERABILITY or that the ECCS can perform its intended safety function. Therefore, the proposed change moves to the Bases details that are not necessary to provide j operational safety while retaining in the Technical Specifications the basic requirements for maintaining OPERABILITY. l i

I l

l 1

l l

l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - _ _ - - - - . _ - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - -- ~

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.3-2 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: DOC 3-03 LS-5 CTS 3.5.3 Action a ITS 3.5.3 Actions A & C DOC 3-03 LS-5 discussed two distinct changes. The first change involves movement I

of the descriptive information to the Bases. The second change is an increase in the completion time to reach Mode 5 from 20 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Comment: The first change, movement of the descriptive information to the Bases, should be separated out and justified as an "LG" change, consistent with other similar -

changes in this section. The increase in the completion time to reach Mode 5 from 20 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is correctly justified as an "LS" change and the justification provided in DOC 3-03 LS-5 is acceptable.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 3-03-LS-5 has been separated into two DOCS (DOC 3-03-LS and DOC 3-13-LG). DOC 3-03-LS-5 has been revised to address only the increase in completion l time. DOC 3-03-LS-5 has been enhanced to include additional justification. New DOC 3-13-LG has been created to address movement of information to the Bases.

l ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11 CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5

! Enclosure 2, page 3/4 5 I Enclosure 3A, pages 5 and 6 Enclosure 3B, pages 4 and 5 l

l I

7-

/_ I

(,UMQ_

N EMERGENCY CORf C00 LING SYSTEMS OEVf Ol\f ] .

3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYST[M5 - T avg < 350'F 4

IIHillNG CONDll10N FOR OPLRATION .

W I 3.5.3 ^( ' , ~ . .

Me ECCS "Ihe o n V'"k';" * - c--- ' red ' +': fe!':.'n; shall be f gf L g.

OPERABLEd'. 3'-66-A m.

_., __ y . ,

m

...,3..,

r ...r ,

x n - . n n e. n , e. , e. eue u.

. . , t... . . . ,

m... n e e e . e. ,.e

- . . . - eu e , . ._ , - -s

,m e e. ,._., ,.r ..-

, , _ . _..t _ . , . u s. .- . ..,+a:, ..-+:-<..-u. -- - - - --

no---

- ___..,, .. _ ..-g--

3.. _ , , : ,. s ..s + ,-,<-.. -- ...,<- +-.u

<_1,_

7',,:--

7.. . , . .

,-,-,:-_.- . . .., s . . . :

.-_...-,7

-: ~..qt:- < :;: :ti r o - tu

,, APPL.CABILITY: H00E 4

' 6 7, C ~ ~l ACTION- -

cadn-gga/ y yng />u'sj> r g_ n_t c .

a. WithnoECCdsubsystemOPERABLE5:::::: 3 c' t': ' u;: ?:t i' ' t; ef g g.g.,,,g c;th:r th: ::r.tr' f;;;' ch:r;ing pu ; :- th: :1 ;:th 'r= th:

".:. . restore at least one ecc Wsubsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next iKghours.

ruo-dual he*+remo va / (RHA' M. 'I~~OY-l 6

b. With no ECCS V subsystem OPERABLE,)rer'~- # - - : 15 ' c' ' ' ' ":

~

^'

't': th:

"u" 5 :t :n':J;-- :- 'eu' ;- r rj estore r at least one ECCS////R 7-/f-/}

A g y,,5- 7 g subsystem to OPERABLE status, q

,r .$.--,.... :i-t:i d :.. .::_:t:., S :':nt fy:t; -

t fag f ,g; ,gp*h gh,pn h

- tw:- ,cnee m* _,e - :

avg (, ,-

.: : ...: i t, -. ~~~; : ::t;:ted :nd 'mj::t: ::::- ' .t: th: * ::t:-

~

.x

: :. n . 5,, : : :: , ;::' '

-t: t:

e--c <q.'.'re-e 5: ; :p:- d :16: e cut g 'it:d eg it':;; _ :,3 g pg.,,g r- __ : : : r - 7. . .

'n; :h: :fr::::: ..=: c' t': 2:te:t':- :-d:t:. te t .' :nu ul:::d

' t': a n;; f;:n ':-

ri.:t':- :j:'-: t- d:t: '": r- :-t .

._ ;f'::::: R f::, I r f::t i r :::' ^ :t . 5: ; :-.~d:d ' - "':

e_

n... ~w...

- . ~ . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. .

.rarmer s + s-1A .7-ot-A CA.tAWAY - UNii 1 3/4 5-7 r

l l 5 L__-----___

I l

CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION I

3 02 LS 4 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, the low temperature overpressure protection limitation on ECCS pumps and related surveillance are moved to improved TS 3.4.12. The l

prescriptive wording related to pump operability is l changed to wording specifically addressing the pumps' j

capability to inject into the RCS. This change is less l restrictive on the configuration of the centrifugal charging and safety injection pumps but is acceptable i because it is consistent with the cold overpressure l analysis requirements and still precludes flow to the RCS.

""""o" ' ' " ' c

..~.m..'...'.,-......'

3-03 LS-5 '^~.._d.."...'. . . . . . . . . - *'. .m " . ~ - " . .

^ - " ^ ^

g

-temi=le;y is rcvind =d the 9:criptive 4"fe--etica

ved to th: E^.S"Sr The completion time for COLD SHUTDOWN due to CCP inoperability is increased from 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This time is reasonable based on operating experience to reach MODE 5 in an orderly manner, without challenging plant systems or operators, and is consistent with other shutdown action Completion Times to reach l H0DE 5 from H0DE 4. 2^NEGA*r 3A-SA & 3. .C 3 *2 ,

3 04 LG - Ceardstent .ith """CC 1121 90 1, th; ^.CTIL"' b- Q y, .r. :P-s te min; h ;y is mei cd. The requir;;.~nt to " rester;" :t

-lcat 0= ECCS :rbryst- is revis=d to ~4-diately -

-initiate action te eetere" en ouo rubryst- "ith both - ;

""" pu .p; ;nd heet enh=; r: in0per:bh, it nuld be~

e ire te require the p h nt te g^ t0 "00E 5. where the

-caly ev=41=hle haet r=v:1 cy:te- in th RlR. Thcccfore.

, th; Appropriate acti0n B to initict: .cssurcs to re:tcre -

onc ECCS ".'i"_. ;ubsjaten. =d t0 continue t", actions unti' a... _ . _ _ _. _-- , , , _ .u

_+ . u..wweava,7 a b wisa 4J 4 CJ kbli Uka

.bv_ wnn.

ws en , n JbUbuJe vlubb , e _. .

nasv -.--

=1+--netc ;rirert '" ""." annet be rettered} te

iatein ( < u n r by g ef gt:73;te 3;;; 7;;,a;g teth^A: ir 9 c-iptive infor;; tion =d i; ;nved to ths

";;ca. The tr=:ition to "00E 3 5 elreedy prohibited in-

-tH Scener4e by tN ECCS specification for "00ES 1, 2.

=d 3. .~[Nf6A*r 3h-S8 G 2.C.2-3 s

3 05 TR 2 Consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1, the requirement to submit a Special Report within 90 days of an ECCS actuation and injection event is deleted. This change is acceptable because the requirement to submit a report is i sufficiently addressed by the reporting requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.73.

3 06 A Consistent with TSTF-90, a note is added to the LC0 that clarifies that an RHR subsystem's ECCS function is f

, OPERABLE if it is capable of being manually realigned to l

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 5 5/15/97

INSERT 3A-5A Due to the stable conditions associated with operation in MODE 4, the probability of G 3'S. '3 ~2 occurrence of a Design Basis Accident is low ".s a result, the ECCS operational l J

requirements are reduced with only one irr? . of the ECCS CCP Subsystem required to I be operable. The required action if the QP Subsystem is inoperable is to proceed to cold shutdown.

l l

i l

i L_ ._ _ _ __ __ . _ _ _ _ _ . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

CHANGE NUMBER fiS!1C DESCRIPTION the ECCS mode of operation. This is an administrative change to provide clarification.

l l 3 07 H The surveillance frequency to verify a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump is capable of injecting into the RCS is changed from "at least.once per 31 days thereafter" to "at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter." This change is more restrictive with regard to surveillance interval:

however, the SR can be performed using control room indication and administrative controls.

3 08 A A footnote is added to CTS SR [4.5.3.1] indicating that the SR to verify the RHR interlock action is not applicable when the RHR suction isolation valves are open ,

to satisfy LC0 [3.4.9.3). This LC0 permits the use of the '

RHR suction relief .alves to satisfy the low temperature overpressure protection requirements in [HODE 3 below 368'F and) HODE 4. When in this configuration, the RHR suction isolation valves are required to be gen.

3 09 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

3 10 LS 6 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, the requirement to demonstrate ECCS train operability in H0DE 4 in SR [4.5.3.1] has been revised to delete the 31 day surveillance to verify the correct position of each valve in the ECCS flow path which is not already locked in place and the38bnth surveillance to verify automatic .b C-ALL-do l actuation of ECCS pumps and aut'o matic valves.

3 11 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

3 12 A The SR to verify that no more than one centrifugal charging pump and no SI pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS and the SR exception for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after entering H0DE 4 from H0DE 3 or until the temperature of one or more RCS cold legs decreases below 325'F. whichever comes first. are moved to improved TS SR 3.4.12.1, SR 3.4.12.2, and LC0 Note 2. g y,s. 3 ."2

-[N.rEgr 3A-f,8 g gS,g-3 4 01 LS 4 In conformance with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, the LCO requirement to satisfy cold overpressure analysis assumptions on ECCS pump injection sources by rendering pumps inoperable has been revised to preclude those pumps from injecting into the RCS, This change revises the LCO. Action Statements.

and Surveillance Requirements and allows deletion of the DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 6 5/15/97

INSERT 3A-6B CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION 3-13 LG CTS LCO 3.5.3 Action a terminology is revised and the Q25.'S-2 descriptive information is moved to the ITS Bases. These details are not necessary to ensure the ECCS Required Actions are met. The requirements of ITS 3.5.3 LCO and Conditions are adequate for ensuring the ECCS are OPERABLE. These details are not necessary to ensure the ECCS can perform their intended safety function. As such, these details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Moving these details maintains consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to these details will be made in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and the Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5.14.

3-14 A CTS LCO 3.5.3 Action b provides, with no ECCS RHR & 2E 3-3 subsystem OPERABLE, the option to either restore at least one ECCS RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status or to maintain the RCS T.y < 350 F by use of alternate heat removal methods. Condition A of ITS LCO 3.5.3 requires that with no ECCS RHR subsystems OPERABLE that immediate action be initiated to restore an ECCS RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status. While the CTS does not specify a time frame to initiate action to restore one ECCS RHR subsystem, the current operational philosophy is that this action is initiated immediately. The Completion Time of "immediately" to initiate actions that would restore at least one ECCS RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action is taken to restore the required cooling capacity. Revising the CTS Action to immediately initiate action is considered an administrative change and is consistent with NUREG-1431.

l L

,Illl 8 4 6

3 -

g 7 -

f t* . . q -

o 3,

- . H f

_ ~5 7 c, -

4 0 g l -

9, e g 3 g_

/ -

5

_ - g a Y g N

' <.' P A W

A 7 C e

e g

- L pW s p -

L A

C Y s

e Y

s e _e Y s s e

Y s

e Y Y s

e N

o Y

s e

]),,

e, .

r H-f), 7 K

E r,

e r,

0 3

N E e C R

Y T

I F C

L3

+a e

e s _

L -

I L O W Y s

e Ya s n e ny, Y s

e Y

s e

s e o s

e B

C A c, f Y N Y I

L M,

> H P

P K A

^f 9 0

A E P{

5

(_

P 3 4 N .

E C

/

3 H _

S C

N &g, e

n, e

e s

T A o e

M O s e

sr, er s s s s s _

T N C Y Yug Y e Y e

N o

Y e

p E

R e R r t U n _

C N e r

- O Y

N 4y, r i

n r u

c r i

n _

E L A e f, e p

es ci n e

p es ci (p n B C e ay i n a y a e A O c l c t c l c T L n, nrl n o nrl n O uie n O uie B oeu oeu r

N 0

S A

I s

e sr ee a

, s.se s e

- h vq .

o2 urT reS

- h vq .

r eS s D Y oS o2 urT e I eY Y N1 sf C NT N1 sfC Y t

R

_ A P

M oC P

hn y e

r, go af e

ee n

g t

o s e

v h "r hh -

O

" 5j rs tC ^ f t w s ns l C y o t e O r iy a

_ d o Ta . t t eC u s a v _

N O

ct a- es "N,r.0

'e d

Rlbio en e

nrt. e of a

al L hb h o ad e f t i oc u r. ' I t a y r1 o t zy 9 I -

R atpa oir cf 4 c3 ea Y 7n .

. S . d u o

i na r f gh e gi s nl i ned r e ncm ono R a. WN h

.i d ace ont i pt ih e i at E Ah e p V -, O4 A ft t t s o mt s ucy i t pa a as h t s p t g tl u i l a N c. TD2 W oi e ai mea c oee si O fwl h f it o iwt c oed U

.y - td l

U o e t t o '

d ot n pvn x jd'.

i C

J T 4r SHt s i

e n nn n mrd o r a ys us ai1 r i ool s .

D r Ng a pios efd i i o m f 3 e

)i p s e ri od f r c n p v e t f iO L u o '

oR t f

iE m a orf yepe ea 1

n o

derC p

S a i rt u h m S T

E G cc Ch r0 o2

- $nmla v Y

A n

e rL S a8C l AC cRE fl ib ee r 3. ioera

5. ct goRt n

s enp v

S T N

N A t.

.f m

i e c

en E

t P e ra ch epnt va o 4 as

[ e h

a3 er cEt f hi to}8C C E

R H

C

eo mr i f Si po t

h aCh t s t o t ss u c

t r s

R cl S oa k v i

s0f s 0

l oru e6E c ef nh a R

l i

c td G-f C ac i o y i a eh o l v at C E : ne e D' t S r ymec l n

_ tj n C n c pl T en cor c l d o -

P d os i a

-~ i mi L od nn eut 1 2 Ct o nr oo i ni S n.

i e ni ef m eat

t e b et n upa oit u r v a E er q ~ r a H l c M- .

ud s n h cg t ni eg e t q4 e

r e ov rh u ut t L

dI Rl C - pn .-. a ul r nmp o rE e sa c B E - mi -

-', o of a f igr o e eR s i f D eh .

y pa A T t o t n t e d O nc s T ccs ' .- o S r erf c d e eM oir a wc .

A dC ca n c h u d oi) i t i ah n N N e - .

nt eC y nhd o t o ngf wo l t4 O 3 h y - L. -

ea del a c egt s i a no .h 1 f a O I

5

.T t i * .

mu et d

a sa l l l l ns i yt l i l r eF2 3

S oD mE S eiuf c .

T I

.l rc u i a aa i er* 1 eCt O P 2 Si "2. .

i a u

s 'm n egh e t rs]

oe et u5 v nt 2 r hC uH R A

0 Cb I

i ea v ucl 3 t E a(

R a qS t m rf nvR r ea3 e P C L C e

/ r " eC es t yg uist t ooR I 9 u s rew r p eeys t h f e M S

E p

o

'i rC e

E os nbi n

s ri a ens" t f

ot e

4 et nl c epoe l et iv rl O

C D n h n ue h eC o Rh3 hf een enea

%h t I "Cr. T a A sb T cR t ASt [ T at b o Di v v N O

I R S E R B F M 35 0 -

4 0

52 0 -

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

06 1 V U

N N 3L S

3& 3T

- R 3A 3H 3A 3H 3L

- S O

C il!l! l( l! l .l , r i' i

l l1

A L

L s s s A s s s o e e e e e e C N Y Y Y Y Y Y K

E E

R Y C T F I

L -

s L O s s s s s I o e e e e e B W N Y Y Y i Y Y e

A C

I s .

L A. ee t P K ot o P A 6

0 d o n

nT.

5 A E -

S dA 0

P 4 T s 4 N Ci h

i d s

/ E C St Sh i

3 H e E Et C e S e S S N s P v C a P e Cd T A h u M -

s s s

- - l T O o o e e e oo t

on c

N C N N Y Y Y N n Ni E

R R

U A. t t t t t C N o o o o o 6 n n n n n

- O 0 s

Y -

e s s s s N 4 e . e . e . e E A N dT oS. oS dT oS dT oS o5.

L dT dT D C C P s P s P s P s P s A O e Pi Pi Pi Pi Pi T e Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch L s Dt Dt Dt Dt Dt N B O A s

- - e - e - e - e - ve I

e v v v v S D o oa oa oa oa oa I Y N Nh Nh Nh Nh Nh R

A g s P n g mg s s M 2 S a a ei nS o e o h O h t iC rl t e n ldC R e . d a h

r C t c gRf t i o . h s e n , u e r dd o cen t r wnf no s o N hj a e4l eN s o h o u ooo h O ii c n e

hh ct E co2 ov e cs t

h et i eo t zh l

i i yc t P is r l S n L a4 I h D m1 rid t oa i aC o t n Cb S wf u l o0S us e t i r8 i u e R w o s s

at g n HC e4 R r oys sla ivC 5. f nt u isRit l f egh E oe e uig oii s n d ea i n nT a3 et h ic n si bl .

oi V l l r f ne nn eR ngi eh a a 2 s N eb wp on O b a o pl e i gi r

. t i emsL nrr . ot O C ioa r e t enh it n pi t i o ew rt h t oi t r f r v eo pm 1

ken a c e1.

C P a h nt t r c r et a ci d t n e oe 4

mie P c mt C n u e c nrid eue l et ai v r 3 l t Di mn c ej eof n a

j sb o ns t ojc i na e, tha h

t g y p

mt S o

t t N o

in i enres i es n vi c p na ua T n rd niene .

o f f t om2 r ai e n nid pe s eO E

G oeid f t me a noaf c2 o mr ue en ph g inf oa i t n at e

ot i c1 I h d e

v nrC e iorL u N

A it tr hi) efi " . a h es o r 1 pvl i obt s ed pv pl e m i l oy t e3 aj c na S y gc a o r

t c c 2 ll imst n" cR eL pI t l r ee4 b ur v S

Cd r e a c mb ua m c ra i i f y . i d n e ig a e1 d h

C l mt ea oue3 Cl ej ppi if l d d gt 4 n een sP r ph t h E opn a ms r os e r e n C rd e e

( oa m c4 riS a cR g c oi n S

C ce os r r e e

veoi ur ah gt f

o i r3 e t e E u mut P t eel r oerpw eh n yi m i b o C

E ei f c r u e eb i v q u l e rt 3 l e pS

,T S abt a o r a vp n af r eom 1 v d r a qd n h a e e c p ad ef f e e t p r r ee e m gdh g H C

et t ps s er m u r e t a s n h poe5 t F2

1 h er r od w es i s rd e e

d s ol t uh s c e

aP s

a t t oo N r t

N o

on e ci v s t op E emeus h s t t mih24 ol n eu

@ eyt c rt o y .w y p

O rc oepu r m ypput t 3 eh t f l rl

_ g T S p st si e m f el w 3

t a r p iunad epi r s iunc q

n no i t L t oC f jmp

_ g N O

I C myri R ub pl p /

i I ci oR rS xt l S e en e nt ee eab s mh o qa g e

r eai a nf b l eeei r r ut a qi l

b i6 o t

0 T

Af t inio T m d e e v o ub5 et sh rh ,ts e es ad o u1 er r nR T r nt n u c gs r o c nd r dh P m5 c uu o S r s f o os ee n p i a e ueet iuoie a gf g I R

C indl at t n pr r ima re ee a a S

t d R ah3 a v ne t

oed s e eo q

es pu r s ml t d i s ns t eeid c r e wn a pb r a h ur r c pue ok l

p5 p

A s v ol v mhb amo 4 p o

g S E eP pm m e@dDE r eg r c

e uc ec t e r

ee shS e sSh a iC e ed e en ec eT a n g D h C s ee T Ci t t h u n0 T paHdi h x s r T ea p h v at C T ohOR hC2 r T E 1 b h oe T Mb h ne0 T ibA g- R x E B

i 1 2 1 4 2 3 4 5 1 ;

_ G 1 0 - ; 0 0 0 G -

- S - - -

i 3L 3 A 4 L ! H 4 H 4 A 4 M I

Illl l!l l

Y A

W A

L -

L s s A e e C Y Y K

E E

R YC ITF L L B O I

s s e e AW Y Y CI L E P

P H A C N

A M K M As OEe s e

CPY Y N

5- OO L

B Y B

3 Ns IA Ae s e

- T DCY Y R

E

_ S s.S g N d eC in eR e sC I l

_ r .

o

_ is aE Se < s a H t o

Ch

. vB e e ,d iRac t rSh Cioet Th t

.o it insth d

_ isTt E omSe Cere t

_ i e ot yer gh u nnteCmlyC eEs q ru i u

_ ot s n h io yRls a t

ae ner loo e t i t wp bs he vi od n e e nt i

d o ,o ut m eoo h E met r vy ses ne mts eh t

s e t

G e o idt,Htna i r Ra ima N

A t

amsas r

vE Ri eot t

let uro at o t s

_ H nn e .rpBL S m aht das eEr e

ioo ct

_ C it e e e C

t bACot er as LoBt o ca nm Amt nRCtmvsAn i t E

P r o eoEEr o e ee e S 3 o nar iP t

coneot uaisd Pt st t r r R k H

5. f 3 in resAn l Ea

_ CN Ovea o 3 es mta saf no u s o oOi t

EO Ct ipi s ic 5. st eEs ct t

eiwo t n

l io I

TT Li taA 3 yl t

P I

ScedOb r

aB ySt s t L uAamt e ah c y.

R C Tesd eCu r e Ab Tsst t t

Cd eiLs s u r RFCny pi c 0 eibos op ma S ed eqSRoE* t E

D h nh eTHsP 5h TaTRCRreO3Tas pc c ur a t

B M 3 4 UR1 G NE3L 1

- 3A 1

l ll l ! l l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.3-3 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: DOC 3-04 LG CTS 3.5.3 Action b !

ITS 3.5.3 Action B DOC 3-04 LG discussed two distinct changes. The first change involves a change in the wording of the Action requirement. The second change is movement of the instructions to maintain temperature using altemate heat removal methods to the Bases.

Comment: The first change to the wording of the Action requirement should be separated out and justified as an "A" change. The movement of the instructions to the Bases is correctly justified as an "LG" change, but the justification provided in DOC 3-03 LS-5 is not adequate. Please revise the DOC to include additionaljustification as to why this detail is not necessary in the ITS.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 3-04-LG has been separated into two DOCS ( DOC 3-04-LG and DOC 3-14-A). DOC 3-04-LG now contains only the information related to the movement of !

information to the Bases. DOC 3-04-LG has been enhanced to provide the requested i additionaljustification. New DOC 3-14-A was created to address the change to the wording in i the Action requirement.

l t

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 2, page 3/4 5-7 Enclosure 3A, pages 5 and 6 Enclosure 38, pages 4 and 5 i

l

lO*

p~e,_ne\

a. j l

EMERCENCY CORE C00LINC SYSTEMS NE{/fS/0N f..'

3/4.5.3 ECC5 SUBSYSTEMS - T * %_ < 250*F I

I IH111NG COND1110N FOR OPL RAfl0N .

-}ya =

I

" * ^- -- ' r e d c ' * ': ':":- ' .; shall be f.gf, [,g. )

3. 5. 3 -4 -

' .. .7jnef ECCSV '" 1 OPERABL h. 3-sh-A wgwa W* Mr i s h we b rir lw b b bbiIba 8 3 b i rw a gIs rg y wsusy y n_. n n en. t.e , c. nue _ m .____

a . . .. u._... . - , . . . , . .

n__ -.ee.--,.e.

ne. non . . . _ _ ._s

-- - nn. 7---, , -

___.<,_ _, .,tt_, ,m,.. <__ <___ .t. oue.

_Me

.,w.e we s nr sy

. w-

__.m pv =w-- =-r-- -. -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

_;;- 5:in; ::nu:y -n'4;- ' ---d : * ' - 'n; cert' - t: th:

cc-t:'- :-t tv p de 8 ; Pe er'-ce':t'r p':' c' ep:r:t h:

,, APPLICABILITY: HODE 4.

ACTION: g g d, ,- g 67I ~2

a. WithnoECC7subsystemOPERABLEt:nr:: c' th: ' :;: rit i' ' t; c' g,.dS-/ J

*ther th; natr'f;;;? ch:rgin;3;rm :r 150 ' ? :1- ?:th 'r:: th:

16.. restore at least one tcL Wsubsystem to OPERABLE status l within I hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next-iMghours. '

re.rrdual ha*+remaval (RNA p

b. WithnoECCSsubsystemOPERABLE)ecn-c:

V '-^re:t'+'tt c' 3~~O N . 6 ~

r e_ _ p: eue 3 n y p .c 7 . -. 3 eue r" r, restore at least nne ECCS////l2 7-/f-A subsystem to OPERABLE status,;r :i-tri- t-:

nt:? S;'.;rt 5,, & *= ^ g y,.5~,"T -S

, _s. ..... il ..

_ .y 3 9,, . q unor p.- ._ , 7 ,

l avg

4. ,m n _ __:h:h Jg id*h a c-l1m ~l~e

o t;., . ..; the "C~ ; - ::t= t:' :- ' ' nj::t' ::t:- -t: th: ".: = t ; )

n br: Syn :, : : ::i:' " ;:-t i t:" 5: ; ::: ed 19:_- 2-M ::bn 'n:d *- g gg g

.u c - _ r , , : , - ._. . . . . , . . .. e,.,.:<<c- re. ; e - ; n;__q-l n; th: : H::::::nn: ^' : : iu:!'t- -M 9 ' 1 t:' :::r u'.:t:d '-

2 n e:t':- cy ! = * - t t: : cu- :

n';; :' th: .::;: int;r ce;? effe nct R f::j 'nj:: !:r :n': e 5: ; :rie d '- t: l Ops . . . ' hpr J;n:.: ':: :12: :-nre C.'" -

=N~ . 2~N.rEkY 3 + S'-1A 3'-N -A CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 3

l t---_-__-_____.____ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

CHANGE NUMBER IL91C DESCRIPTION 3 02 LS 4 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. the low temperature overpressure protection limitation on ECCS pumps and related surveillance are moved to improved TS 3.4.12. The prescriptive wording related to pump operability is changed to wording specifically addressing the pumps' y capability to inject into the RCS. This change is less j restrictive on the configuration of the centrifugal charging and safety injection pumps but is acceptable because it is consistent with the cold overpressure analysis requirements and still precludes flow to the RCS.

3 03 LS 5

- C= izt=t uith

---te=i=legy i; revi;;d NU"EC

=dl'31 the Rev.1. the4-fematica descriptiv LCO 2.5.3 Acti= :N '

=ved to the SA5ESr The completion time for COLD SHUTDOWN due to CCP inoperability is increased from 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . This time is reasonable based on operating experience to reach H0DE 5 in an orderly manner, without challenging plant systems or operators, and is consistent with other shutdown action Completion Times to reach H0DE 5 from HODE 4.:CNfter SA-SA Q 3. C3-2 3 04 LG - Cear4rtent ith "U",00 li21 Rev 1. th; ACT!C*' E Q z.r. 7-s te -in:10;y is revi: d. The rquir ..~at te "rceter;" :t

--le: t = ECCS =bryst= is re"irad to ~4-dittely -

1-itiate action te retere" en ouo subsyst- "i'h both-

"Jl" pu p; ;nd heet e;;;h=ger; d=per:ble, it w;uld V

-e~ ire te rea"4re the pl=t to 90 to "00E S. where the-enly eue41eble haat r =0v;l ;yste- is th: Rl R. Thcccfore.

, th; :pprepriate acti= 10 to initict menur;; to rc; tere--

On: ECCS """, ;;b;yste; =d t: :=ti=0 the articar "nt4'

-the ;ub;ystem is ic5tured to OPE"A"L tetw3. Al;; the

='+e-aete rgi r=rt r =t be retterM) to ri at ei n T., < mn e by'i',.e""e",r 3 ::1;;77,;;; h:: 7;;,;;:1 etW: ir derr-iptive 'nfe = tion =d i; moved to the t ace. Thc trm:ition to "00: 0 is elreedy prohibited in-

-tbic crenarie by tb ECCS :pecific tion for "0 DES 1, 2.

=d 3. :[Nf6h- 3A-:S~8 G 3.C.?-3 3 05 TR 2 Consis' tent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. the requirement to submit a Special Report within 90 days of an ECCS actuation and injection event is deleted. This change is acceptable because the requirement to submit a report is l sufficiently addressed by the reporting requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.73.

3 06 A Consistent with TSTF 90. a note is added to the LC0 that clarifies that an RHR subsystem's ECCS function is OPERABLE if it is capable of being manually realigned to i

l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 5 5/15/97 l

INSERT 3A-5B CTS 3.5.3 Action b provides an alternate requirement (if RHR cannot be restored) to Oy..s- 33 maintain T.,< 350*F by use of attemate heat removal methods. These details are moved to the ITS Bases. These details are not necessary to ensure the ECCS are '

OPERABLE. The requirements of ITS 3.5.3 LCO and Conditions are adequate for ensuring that the ECCS are OPERABLE. These details are not necessary to ensure the ECCS can perform their intended safety function. As such, these details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety.

Moving these details maintains consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to these details will be made in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and the Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5.14.

I l

l l

i C___._____.__._____

CHANGE NUMBER MC DESCRIPTION the ECCS mode of operation. This is an administrative change to provide clarification.

3 07 H The surveillance frequency to verify a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump is capable of injecting into the RCS is changed from "at least once per 31 days thereafter" to "at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter." This change is more restrictive with regard to-surveillance interval:

however, the SR can be performed using control room indication and administrative controls.

3 08 A A footnote is added to CTS SR [4.5.3.1) indicating that the SR to verify the RHR interlock action is not applicable when the RHR suction isolation valves are open to satisfy LCO [3.4.9.3]. This LCO permits the use of the RHR suction relief valves to satisfy the low temperature overpressure protection requirements in [ MODE 3 below 368'F and] H0DE 4. When in this configuration. the RHR suction isolation valves are required to be open.

3 09 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

3 10 LS 6 Consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1, the requirement to demonstrate ECCS train operability in MODE 4 in SR [4.5.3.1] has been revised to delete the 31 day surveillance to verify the correct position of each valve in the ECCS flow path which is not already locked in place and thed8hnth surveillance to verify automatic ,h C-ALL-do /

actuation of ECCS pumps and automatic valves.

3 11 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

3 12 A The SR to verify that no more than one centrifugal charging pump and no SI pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS and the SR exception for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after entering HDDE 4 from H00E 3 or until the temperature of one or more RCS cold legs decreases below 325'F, whichever comes first, are moved to improved TS SR 3.4.12.1.

SR 3.4.12.2, and LCO Note 2.

O S.S. 3 .'2

%NSE M 3A-48 g g g.g-3 4-01 LS 4 In conformance with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. the LCO requirement to satisfy cold overpressure analysis assumptions on ECCS pump injection sources by rendering pumps inoperable has been revised to preclude those pumps from injecting into the RCS. This change revises the LCO, Action Statements.

and Surveillance Requirements and allows deletion of the DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 6 5/15/97

l INSERT 3A-6B l l

CHANGE i NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION 3-13 LG CTS LCO 3.5.3 Action a terminology is revised and the Q 3.:r.7-2 descriptive information is moved to the ITS Bases. These details are not necessary to ensure the ECCS Required Actions are met. The requirements of ITS 3.5.3 LCO and Conditions are adequate for ensuring the ECCS are OPERABLE. These details are not necessary to ensure the ECCS can perform theirintended safety function. As such, these details are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Moving these details maintains consistency with =

NUREG 1431. Any change to these details will be made in accordance with 10CFR50.59 and the Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5.14.

I 3-14 A CTS LCO 3.5.3 Action b provides, with no ECCS RHR 6t 7.5.3'3 subsystem OPERABLE, the option to either restore at i

, least one ECCS RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status or to maintain the RCS T., < 350 F by use of alternate heat removal methods. Condition A of ITS LCO 3.5.3 requires that with no ECCS RHR subsystems OPERABLE that immediate action be initiated to restore an ECCS RHR !

subsystem to OPERABLE status. While the CTS does not specify a time frame to initiate action to restore one ECCS l RHR subsystem, the current operational philosophy is that this action is initiated immediately. The Completion Time of "immediately" to initiate actions that would restore at least one ECCS RHR subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action is taken to restore the required cooling capacity. Revising the CTS Action to immediately '

initiate action is considered an administrative change and is consistent with NUREG-1431.

l t____________.______.__ _..__-___._ _ _ . _ _ _ __ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ ._. _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

A L - s y

L A

C Y s

e Y

s e _e Y s

Y s

e s

e Y Y s

e o N

Y s

e b ,, .

+

r, H -

7 K

d),

e, 0

3 E r, N E e C Y

R C $y e e

T I

F L

feng ,, s L s s s s s s I

O e e n e e e e o s

e W

B A

Y Yaw e, Y Y f Y N Y C

I L

A, H H P

P K A

^f 9 0

5 A E fi 3 P

4

/

3 S

T E

H C

N A

(_

d e m +,

N C

e e

s M e -

O s sr, s s s s s T e ei e e o e e e N C Y Yeg s Y Y N Y Y Y E e 7 R e R r t U

C N O

ba, n n

e r

r n Y

N wy r i

c u

r i

E A t e es e es L

C O, p ci n

n p ci n

ep, i

B e a y e a y A O c l c t c l c T L n rl n o nrl n n O uie n a ,,

O ui e N

O B

A I

s seas , s.se s

- h v qoe u .

r eS oe u

- h v q .

r eS s S e e o2 u rT oS o2 urT e I D Y Y N1 sf C NT N1 sfC Y R

A P

M - P fnAY e

r , A[o ee n

t o s e

oC e g v O

C t C

-Kj'srasy f

o ht e "r h h t w O

s r

n sy l a

N O

d o

.t es

. ' 0,Id i

0 Rlb oi e n e

n r e of t.

t a

t e hb al C

L y h u

o is a ad e

v f t i o

oc

0,7 l t a r1 t I . ur -

1 9 R a pta oir c f 4 c3 ea S

R E

V uN nO4 d u W

h o

'N7 wh V ' ide e

n t t

. na r a c ep t s o f gh ont mt s i

e gi nl i p t p a a i

t s

a s

ined h t s p t

h e

g re nc m on o i at t l l a u

N cD2 y ai u c y me a c oe e c isi O iT wl h f i t o iwt l oed C Uot e t it o i xjd". n d o n n t n pv n MS t d mrd o r a

' N. r'N'sie I

s sr g a p4os t e ai1 r i n ool ys u s tef d m 3 e s e ri od R, LD u r f i o m a orf f t ] i 1

p o

f r c n p a f p h m

- O o Ch o9 t n

i E yepe ea n d S irt u

'5nve rL S

3. io e erC , enp E aB C f l r r gor t v i.

F F '

r0

. o2 f

"M -

mici ea v e

l cR E A C E

i b ee r a ch epnt

5. c 4 a t a s h n

a3 e r h i s

ohs C A t 8C t m - _. e n t P e v a o s [ e cE t f H

C ipeo po h

aOh o

c tr : k v D e6E Fo c S i t s) Kf s c cf r imr f t t s t s s u l

a i or u nh o "G

I ct a c i o i a o l v at C : d e 0' t y eh S r yme c l n E : ne a" t j C n c pl T e n c or c l d o P f ios -

n L iod nm 2 Ct nr o o i ni S a l^

n- bimi e e ut 1 n io ef m e at

t e a et n u pa oit u r v a e r n ud h cg eg" q r t a q4 r e rh u H c s n t ni e e o v ut t dl Rl

- l .

C r pn i- .- a ul r nmp o rE e s a c E mi - o of a f igro e eR s i f D eh . pa T Wcs o

i 1t t i n

o t

dC S r e

erf c ca n d

d e ah n eM oir c

O n c s h u y

a wc .

d oi)

N e n gf wo

_ - nt eC y nhd o t o t 4 O 3 h y - _ e a del a c egt s i

.h 1 lf a

"; a ino I T it mu d a s a l l n s i yt l r eF2 3 mE

_ T 5

.l et r c

u l l a a a eiu .

f c l e r' 1 S oD eCt O P

I 0b i - i a u

s mn i ea iegh v u cl e t oe rs]

3 iet v nt 2 r u5 h C uH t E a(

^

ri R 05 a qS t m rf n vR r ea3 e C

r eC e s uist t 9 u r p eeys C s r e w I

' " ep

rC t yg s ri a ooR epoe t h f e S E o s n ot 4 E : : o r e nbi e t

nS" f e et ml c let rliv D

M"i'4T n h n a A sb ue h T cR t eC o AS t [

Rh 3 h f e en T at b o e ne a Di v v R

E B

M 3 5 4 52 6 7 8 9 0 6 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 1 U

_ N 3L

- S 3 g 3T

- R 3A 3 H 3 A 3 M 3L S

A L

L s s s A s s s o e e e e e e C H Y Y Y Y Y Y

~

K E

E R

Y C T F I

L L s s s O s s s I o e e e e e e B W N Y Y Y l Y Y A

C I s .

L A.- ee t P K 6 ot o .

P d o nT A A 0

- n 0 5 E 4 S dA P T s 4 N Ci h

i d s i

/ E C St Sh 3 H e E Et C e S e S I

s P v P e S M C a Cd T h u M -

s s s

- - l T O o o e e e oo t

on c

N C N N Y Y Y N n Ni E

R R

U A. t t t t t C N o o o o o 6 n n n n n

- O '

0 s s s Y e .

s s N 4 e e e . e E

L A y dT o5 d1 o5. dT oS. dT oS dT oS.

B C r, P s P s P s P s P s A O e Pi Pi P i Pi Pi T L e Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch s Dt Dt Dt Dt Dt N B A - - e - e - e - e - e O I s v v v v v S e o oa oa oa oa oa I D Y N Nh h Nh Nh Nh R l}

A g s P n g mg

. s s M 2 S a a ei nS oeo dC h h O h t iC rl t e n l R e . d a r C t c e

gRf t i o . h s e n , ou r dG o cen t r wnf no s N hj c n a e4 l eN s o h o u o oo i i i h O e hh ov e t et i eo l t P s c s yc

_ ii ct E co2 h t zh l S n C a4 I h r D m1 rid t oa i aC o t n Cb S wf u l oOS us e R w o s s at g n MCR re4. oys .

sl iS f nt t i r8 u

s n isRi t i fu l egh e

E oe oii d ea i nnT V

e uig a3. a vC n si h c bl oi l l r f ne nneR oa r ngi eh eti a a 2. s N eb wp i gi r , O on rt h f r v1 en .

O b a o r nr ot C i e i i n pi t oi e o k e1 C

pl e t i emsL t enh t t o e w t r pm 4 a c P a h nt t r c r et a ci d t n e oe mie P c mt ecnrid eue C n u c eeof n a

jsb o l

ojc et

.ht h ai v p

r 3 o

l t o

ivin ae ecn ap j

Di imn enr es ins es n t t gy n a mt S ua T t t N n

rd oeid n i nien e o t om2. pph r ai nf t at nid pe s eOd ot h d nrC e E f t me f f o . mr g i oa i n c1 I e orLt G

N a

t r ef i " .

noaf c2 a o r . 1 u een pvl i s ed i l pv e it aj e3 S y v a o it c u

t hi)

A ims n t ceLF.

h es t l b urr v ee4. S obt a c pl e m mb m oy ic i na gc r c a e1 d 2

H i o

Cd r e ua n c r f y . ine d ig h C l ea c

n "t pT sP ea oue3 r ph t h o a Cl ej E opn ppi a ms a if l r os e d d r e gt 4 n

C rd e e

( a cR g coi n S c e os e ur ah f i r3 e E u mut mc4 riS C r r e v eoi gt o t e eh n yi m C ei f x l i u e epS P

S t eel r abt a o r a v p oermw nr o af e 1

. i b v

ad ef d r o E r u a qd n e e eb v q h a e e t pr r rt ee c

3 e

l p

mgdh

,T gC f

et t e t t F2 h er i s r d e aP t t t one H ps s er a s n ' 1 wes e uh s c s oo o ci vs

.aw m u r e h poe5 nmd s o l t N t op r od N r

_ E e meus t mih24 ol eyt c rt oy y p rc oe pu r

t h st ypput t 3 f l e u eh i O T irlad unc n g N S p st si e m f el w 3

t a r p u ng e ?i r s q no t oC it L f jmp ni g O I

C m y ri R ub pl p /

ir5 e

v o 1 ci oR xt l S en e nt ee e ab s mh o qa e

r eai a nf b l eeei r r ut e

a qi es l

i6 o b t Ti 0

Af t o

o

_ T P

mier d e e r nR ub5 T

et sh nt nuc rh ,ts gs r o ad c nd r d mS c uu o S r s ir f o ios ee n gf p i a e ueet g I R

C ndl a a at t n pr r ima er e ap t d R ah3 a v S

ne t

oed s e eo uoie q

es p u r s ml t d t eeid s

c rra rwn apt ns a h ur r c pu e ok l

p5 o p

A s v

m ol v hb o r 4 p a m S en a n emdDE r cr g e uc e r

g E eP hC s e e mm h unO e e c s e ee shS isSh C ae ed e h oe eceT h n eD D T Ci t t T paMdi h x s r T ea p h v at C T ohOR hC2 r T E 1 b T Hb TibA g

_ R E

_ B

_ M 1 1

2 1 4 0 -

2 3 0

4 0

5 0

U - G 1

S 0

N

_ 3L 3A 4 L 4 H 4 H 4 A 4 M jI

Y A

W A

L '

L s s A e e C Y Y K

E E

R YC TF I

IL L s B O s

e e AW Y Y C

IL E P

P H A C N A

M K M As OEe s e

CPY Y N

5- OO L

B Y B Ns s 3 IA Ae e T DCY Y R

E

. S s.S g N d eC in I

e sC s Se r

< s.

eRH lo aE t a o ivB e Ch d iRac t

e rSh Cio t E et Th inSth d mo it isTt eI ot omSe t

Cere nnteCmlyC eEs r qu i u ye r gh u ot s h ioy sRlaae ner t loo n e t

i t

s e vi wpbh od eoo n e e int d o ,o ut m h E met r vy ses eh ne mts s t

t e

G e o ar dt ,Htna Ra i r N t amss ivE t

ima letur o A o L Rieot tat s H nn e r

.pBSm a ht as e C oo ct e d eEr cai enme bACot er L o it t C n RCt as oBt it E

P Amt r o eoEEr r omvsAn e reeR e S 3 o na iP e t c0n otst t r k

- 5. inesA f uaisd Pt l Ea H 3 r n 1 CN Ovea o 3 nt af no u t o oOi s EO Ct i s ic i 5. s l

t es t a s eiwo t no 3 yl s eEs ct I

t TT LipaA i P

I ScedOb r t aB ySt t L uAamte ah c y.

R sd eCu Te Cd eiL r Ab T s t st t C s u s e r RFCny pic S

E ed eqSRoE* t 0 eibos op ma D h nh eTHsP TaTRCRrO3T as epc 5h cur a t

B M 3 4 UR1G NE3L 1

3A

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET I

I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.3-4 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l

l REQUEST: DOC 3-06 A l CTS LCO 3.5.3 l ITS LCO 3.5.3 Note This change is categorized as an administrative change even though it provides an exception to the LCO requirements that does not exist in the CTS. The DOC states that the note is only to " provide clarification."

Comment: Despite licensees'individualinterpretations of the CTS, the CTS themselves do not contain the allowance provided in the ITS Note. Therefore, this 4 change should be reclassified as a less restrictive change and an appropriate justification provided. '

i FLOG RESPONSE: As discussed during a telecon with NRC Staff on June 25,1998, the FLOG takes exception to this RAl. NRC accepted the same change at Vogtle as an administrative change, as discussed in Section 3.1.3.5 item (4) of the Vogtle SER wherein it was stated that this Note "is a necessary clarification when using the RHR system for cooling l the RCS, when transitioning between MODES 4 and 5. Because this clarification constitutes

, existing operating practices, this change is administrative and is acceptable." In addition, the wording of CTS LCO 3.5.3.d, which refers to the RWST flow path "being manually realigned",

supports the position that the new LCO Note, moved from the SR to the LCO per NRC-approved TSTF-90 Revision 1, is an administrative change .

h i

ATTACHED PAGES: None i

l 4

i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.3-5 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l

REQUEST: DOC 3-10 LS-6 CTS 4.5.3.1.1 (DC), CTS 4.5.3.1 (All others)

ITS 3.5.3 The referenced DOC describes the change to the CTS but does not provide any justification for making the change other than that it is consistent with the STS.

Comment: The NSHC for this change appears to provide the needed justification.

Therefore, please incorporate the information contained in the NSHC into the subject DOC.

FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 3-10-LS-6 has been revised to provide additionaljustification for the proposed change by adding the following information:

"This change is acceptable because the ECCS operational requirements can be reduced due to the stable conditions associated with operation in MODE 4 and the decreased probability of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident (DBA). ECCS operational requirement reductions mean that certain automatic safety injection (SI) actuation signals are not available. However, in MODE 4, sufficient time exists for manual actuation of the required ECCS to mitigate the consequences of a DBA."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 3A, page 6 h

l l

_--_-_____--_-___A

CHANGE NUMBER [6hC DESCRIPTION the ECCS mode of operation. This is an administrative change to provide clarification.

3 07 H The surveillance frequency to verify a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump is capable of injecting into the RCS is changed from "at least once per 31 days thereafter" to "at-least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter." This change is more restrictive with regard to surveillance interval:

however, the SR can be performed using control room indication and administrative controls.

3 08 A A footnote is added to CTS SR [4.5.3.1] indicating that the SR to verify the RHR interlock action is not applicable when the RHR suction isolation valves are open to satisfy LC0 [3.4.9.3]. This LC0 permits the use of the RHR suction relief valves to satisfy the low temperature overpressure protection requirements in [ MODE 3 below

)

368'F and] MODE 4. When in this configuration the RHR j suction isolation valves are required to be open.

3 09 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

3 10 LS 6 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. the requirement to demonstrate ECCS train operability in H0DE 4 in _

SR [4.5.3.1) has been revised to delete the 31 day surveillance to verify the correct position of each valve in the ECCS flow path which is not already locked in place and the58bnth surveillance to verify automatic .b C-ALL-do /

actuation of ECCS pumps and auto'matic valves.3 SNSEAMr 3/l-l. A & 3.S.3-5 3 11 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ;

Table (Enclosure 3B). j 3 12 A The SR to verify that no more than one centrifugal charging pump and no SI pumps are capable of injecting into the RCS and the SR exception for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after entering MODE 4 from H0DE 3 or until the temperature of one or more RCS cold _ legs decreases below 325*F. whichever comes first. are moved to improved TS SR 3.4.12.1. !

! SR 3.4.12.2 and LCO Note 2. g 7.S. 3 .~2

l. ZNR~RT 3A-48 g g,g,g-3 l 4 01 LS 4 In conformance with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. the LC0 requirement to satisfy cold overpressure analysis assumptions on ECCS pump injection sources by rendering pumps inoperable has been revised to preclude those pumps from injecting into the RCS. This change revises the LCO, Action Statements, and Surveillance Requirements and allows deletion of the DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 6 5/15/97

)

INSERT 3A-6A i

This change is acceptable because the ECCS operational requirements can be O '3, S.'3 - C reduced due to the stable conditions associated with operation in MODE 4 and the decreased probabihty of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) ECCS operational requirement reductions mean that certain automatic safety injection (SI) actuation signals are not available. However, in MODE 4, sufficient time exists for manual actuation of the required ECCS to mitigate the consequences of a DBA, l

i i

i I

l

i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET j i

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.5.5-2 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: Section 3.4 DOC 6-28 LG !

CTS 3.4.6.2.e & 4.4.6.2.1.c STS 3.5.5 I

This change is a change to both the CTS and the STS and is beyond the scope of the conversion review and is generic. In addition, it is not consistent with the conversion submittals for Comanche Peak and Diablo Canyon.

Comment: Please revise the conversion submittal to include an LCO equivalent to i STS 3.5.5, " Seal Injection Flow." The information provided in DOC 6-28 is not sufficient j justification for moving these requirements to a licensee controlled document. Also, l please see comment 3.5.5-1 related to ITS 3.5.5 for Comanche Peak and Diablo !

Canyon to assist in preparing the specification for seal injection flow.

FLOG RESPONSE: Union Electric Company and Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation i disagree with this RAl's assertion triat DOC 6-28-LG, and the choice to not adopt ISTS 3.5.5, is a change to the current Technical Specifications (CTS) with generic implications. Further, consistency with the Comanche Peak and Diablo Canyon conversion submittals is not a j prerequisite for our conversion to the ITS. The ISTS seal injection LCO was not adopted based 1 ea s, i ea e o f, ereas Co nc P an ablo Canyon d n th erm s seal water flow to the seals. Further, the Callaway and Wolf Creek RCS Operational Leakage CTS {

LCO 3.4.6.2.e and SR 4.4.6.2.1.c are also based on seal leakoff, not seal injection. Our l definition of CONTROLLED LEAKAGE, as we'll as the structure of our CTS LCO 3.4.6.2.e, SR I 4.4.6.2.1.c. and SR 4.5.2.g.2), was accepted by NRC in a meeting between the SNUFPS utilities (UE, KGE, and SNUPPS Staff), Westinghouse, Bechtel, and NRC Staff (F. Anderson, J. Holonich, and D. Brinkman) on December 13,1983, prior to initial operating license issuance i for both plants.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE, defined to be seal leakoff in our CTS, is intended to ensure proper l RCP seal performance. Sealinjection flow rate does not provide an indication of proper seal performance, whereas No.1 sealleakoff does. Our CTS do not have a separate RCP seal water injection LCO because proper throttle valve position is ensured when we perform CTS SR 4.5.2.g.2) every 18 months. The seal water injection throttle valves, BGV0198 through i BGV0201, and the seal water return throttle valve, BGV0202, as well as the other ECCS

, throttle valves are set to ensure proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping to each <

l injection point in the event of a LOCA. Once set, these throttle valves are secured with locking i devices and mechanical position stops. These devices help to ensure that the following safety 1 analyses assumptions remain valid: (1) both the maximum and minimum total system i resistance; (2) both the maximum and minimum branch injection line resistance; and (3) the i maximum and minimum ranges of potential pump performance. These resistances and pump performance ranges are used to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flows assumed in the LOCA analyses of FSAR Section 15.6.5.

i

1 i

l l

The function of the RCP shaft seal assembly is to provide a pressure breakdown from RCS l pressure conditions to ambient pressure, and thus maintain reactor coolant leakage along the pump shaft to a miniw.um. During normal operation, high pressure seat injection flow from the CVCS enters the pump through a connection on the thermal barrier flange at a rate of l approximately 8 gpm per pump. About 5 gpm of this injection water flows downward through l the main radial bearing and the thermal barrier heat exchanger into the primary system. The I remaining 3 gpm flows up the shaft and enters the No.1 seal. The No.1 sealis a hydrostatically-balanced, film-riding face seal that has approximately 2200 psi of pressure drop i' across it. The No.1 seal is referred to as a " controlled leakage" seal because the leakage through the seal is predetermined by ensuring that the gap between the seal ring and the seat runner is held to a constant value via a stable balance of hydrostatic forces on the seal ring.

The No. 2 sealis a rubbing-face reallocated above the No.1 seal. The No. 2 seal backpressure forces most of the water leaving the No.1 seal into the CVCS seal water return line. It is this No.1 sealleakcff flow that is surveilled to meet the CONTROLLED LEAKAGE ;

requirement in the CTS. The No. 3 seal is also a rubbing-face seal, located above the No. 2 l seal. The No. 3 seal backpressure, provided by the RCP seal standpipe, forces approximately 3 gph leakoff from the No. 2 sealinto the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank via the No. 2 seal leakoff connection. No. 3 seal leakoff (approximately 400 cc/hr) is sent to the normal containment sump. The CONTROLLED LEAKAGE LCO limit ensures that the No.1 seal leakoff does not exceed 8 gpm per pump. This is a more proper gauge of RCP seal performance.

In addition to the above CTS basis for not adopting ISTS 3.5.5, some of the DOCS and JFDs in Sections 1.0,3.4, and 3.5 (as well as a Bases Insert ITS for SR 3.5.2.7) have been revised to provide additionaljustification for the proposed change by adding the following information:

Add the following to DOC 1-28-LG in Section 1.0, Enclosure 3A:

" CONTROLLED LEAKAGE as defined in the CTS has nothing to do with the performance of the ECCS system. That definition relates only to the proper performance of the RCP seals.

Facility performance and operational details are required to be described in the FSAR by 10CFR50.34. It is therefore acceptable to move the RCP seal water return flow limit to the FSAR since that return flow limit does not satisfy any of the four criteria in 10CFR50.36 and l

since that type of detailed information will be adequately controlled in the FSAR. Therefore, it l

is appropriate to delete the CONTROLLED LEAKAGE definition and maintain seat leakoff I limits in the FSAR. See also DOC 6-28-LG in Section 3.4."

Revise DOC 6-28-LG in Section 3.4, Enclosure 3A to read as follows:

"The current TS definition of CONTROLLED LEAKAGE is deleted as discussed in DOC 1 LG in Section 1.0. The RCP seal water return flow limit is moved to a licensee controlled document. Seal injection limitations are established by the throttle valve position surveillance in l

CTS SR 4.5.2.g.2) which is moved to ITS SR 3.5.2.7. This surveillance ensures that the ECCS I analyses remain valid. Since facility performance and operational details of the type embodied l by the RCP seal water return flow limit are required to be described in the FSAR per l 10CFR50.34, it is acceptable to move the requirements of CTS LCO 3.4.6.2.e and CTS SR 4.4.6.2.1.c to the FSAR."

l Revise Section 3.5, Enclosure 5A, "NUREG-1431 Specifications That Are Not Applicable" sheet, to read as follows for ISTS 3.5.5:

1

_. - ---- j

l l " Seal injection flow rate limitations, consistent with ensuring the LOCA analysis assumptions for safety injection delivered to the core are met, will be ensured by the throttle valve position ;

surveillance in ITS SR 3.5.2.7." l Revise JFD 3.5-9 in Section 3.5, Enclosure 6A to add the following:

"The positions of the RCP seat injection and return throttle valves ensure that the assumptions used in the ECCS analyses to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flows remain valid."

]

Revise ITS SR 3.5.2.7 Bases to add the following: j "The ECCS throttle valves and the seal water injection throttle valves are set to ensure proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping to each injection point in the event of a LOCA. 1 Once set, these throttle valves are secured with locking devices and mechanical position i stops. These devices help to ensure that the following safety analyses assumptions remain !

valid: (1) both the maximum and minimum total system resistance; (2) both the maximum and l minimum branch injection line resistance; and (3) the maximum and minimum ranges of - i potential pump performance. These resistances and pump performance ranges are used to ;

calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flows assumed in the LOCA analyses of l

Reference 3."

l l

ATTACHED PAGES: J Attachment 4, CTS 1.0 - ITS 1.0 Enclosure 3A, page 6 l

Attachment 10, CTS 3/4.4 - ITS 3.4 Enclosure 3A, pages 12 and 13 Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 ITS 3.5 Enclosure 5A, NUREG-1431 Specifications That Are Not Applicable Sheet Enclosure 58, page B 3.5-22 Enclosure 6A, page 2 l

l

,s CHANGE NUMBER 85HC DESCRIPTION addressed by the definition of the term Mode. This definition stipulates that fuel be in the vessel in order to be in a " MODE." These changes are administrative /% ndure, except fer-the ne: =ter b eM c, added per trcveter-- ;rg-/,0 ogy a TSTF SS cad W.ressed in NS"C LS-2. -

1 26 A New sections 1.2, 1.3. and 1.4 are incorporated into the improved TS to be coraistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1.

Section 1.2 provides specific examples of the use of the logical connectors AND and 2 and the numbering sequence associated with their use in the improved TS. Section 1.3 deals with the proper use and interpretation of Completion Times, and specific examples are given that will aid the user in understanding Completion Times. Section 1.4 deals with the proper use and interpretation of surveillance frequencies. Specific examples are given that will aid the user in understanding surveillance frequencies as they appear in the improved TS. The proposed changes are administrative in nature and by themselves are not technical changes, incorporating travelers = 74 Rev 1 'TO/4-dor

, " uLv: 5;. ~13YF- 3*70 and TrYF'-247, 1 27 H The definition of Restricted AFD Operation (RAFD0) is deleted from the current TS. in accordance with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. See CN 115-H in the 3/4.2 package.

1 28 LG The current TS definition of CONTROLLED LEAKAGE is deleted to be consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. The RCP seal water return flow limit is moved to a licensee controlled document.

.Th/SER*T~ 3A-(, 62.755.2 1-29 LS 3 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

TrrF~-noSy 1 30 A Consistent with 4STT-3^. Rev. 1.Vthe definitions of -rX'-/,o-oo3 Channel Operational Test (C0T) j [ ] and Trip Actuating

~/~e vevice Operational Test (TAD 0T) are expanded to include

4,4,,./e/.kr)d; -

the details of acceptable performance methodology.

l

~

g [j # g, f,/ Performance of these tests in a series of sequential.

overlapping or total chcnnel steps provides the necessary ance of appropriate oper ion of the entire channel, relay 3 or o/, gee,reifechvef.This change also makes the COT [ ] and TAD 0T definitions consistent with the efinition of Channel Calibration which already cont ns similar wording.

cu,-n.A- TJ on) +Le h/UREG-)f.*fl DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 6 5/15/97 J

i

! INSERT 3A-6 l CONTROLLED LEAKAGE as defined in the CTS has nothing to do with the performance of $ .7,f,.f--2.

the ECCS system. That definition relates only to the proper performance of the RCP seals.

Facility performance and operational details are required to be described in the FSAR by 10CFR50.34. It is therefore acceptable to move the RCP seal water return flow limit to the FSAR since that return flow limit does not satisfy any of the four criteria in 10CFR50.36 and since that type of detailed information will be adequately controlled in the FSAR. Therefore, it is appropriate to delete the CONTROLLED LEAKAGE definition and maintain sealleakoff limits in the FSAR. See also DOC 6-28-LG in Section 3.4.

l l

I I

l t

CHANGE l ,

NUMBER HSBC DESCRIPTION RCS hot leg suction isolation valves from inadvertently opening when RCS pressure exceeds the interlock setpoint.

Upon failure of the interlock. the current TS parmits continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for restoration of the affected subsystem. The improved TS requires action within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to isolate the affected RHR subsystem.

Thus the new ACTION decreases the probability of an intersystem LOCA upon failure of the interlock. This is a more restrictive change and the new ACTION is in LCO 3.4.14 Condition C of the improved TS.

6 23 LS 25 Specification 3.4.6.1 (Leakage Detection Systems) is revised such that the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. This will allow entry into the applicable MODES with only one.of the Leakage Detection Systems OPERABLE, subject to the requirements of the ACTION statements. This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 and traveler TSTF 60 and is acceptable because of the diverse means available to detect RCS leakage.

6 24 H ACTION c of Specification 3.4.6.2 (Operational Leakage) is revised for consistency with NUREG 1431 Rev. I to require going to Cold Shutdown rather than going to Hot Shutdown with an RCS pressure less than 600 psig. This is a more restrictive shutdown requirement.

6 25 LS 26 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

6 26 LS 30 The CTS surveillance requirement for performing an RCS water inventory balance is modified to allow deferral of the water inventory balance such that it would be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after achieving steady state conditions. The RCS water inventory balance must be performed with the reactor at steady state conditions as discussed in the ITS Bases. This change is in conformance with traveler TSTF 116 Rev.1.

6 27 A RCS leakage detection system descriptions are revised for consistency with current TS LCO 3.3.3.1 and FSAR Sections 5.2.5.2.2 and 11.5.2.3.2.2 6 28 LG e eted Qrrent TS definition of CONTROLLED L to be corm nt with NUREG 143 . . The RCP seal' water return flo moved to a licensee controlled document. Sf4H1ffe'ction tions are established by t ow balance test procedur ed from

.rht.rsW SA -/2 O r. .r. c .2 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 12 5/15/97

CHANGE NUMBER H2iG DESCRIPTION

h. licensee controlled doc nce Q3.5 5 2 CH 215 LG of Enclosur conversion package) ar.d by the thr e position a lance in TTS SR ...

7 01 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

8 01 LS 16 This change, in conformance with NUREG 1431 Rev.1.

revises the applicability of the specification to MODES 1, 2, or 3 with (T.,) :t 500*F. The change deletes the requirement to perform an isotopic analysis for Iodine every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months in Modes 4 and 5 and in Mode 3 below 500*F, whenever the reactor coolant exceeds its Dose Equivalent I-131 limit. In addition, this, change deletes the requirement to perform the once per 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months surveillance for Dose Equivalent I 131 in the event the gross specific activity limit is exceeded, in accordance with industry traveler TSTF 28. The latter is an unnecessary requirement since the ACTION requires the plant to exit the LCO's revised Applicability. This change is acceptable as offsite release of radioactivity in the event of an SGTR is unlikely for operation below 500'F, as the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure settings of the main steam safety and

[SG atmospheric steam dump] valves.

8 02 LS 17 This change, in conformance with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1, adds an exception to LCO 3.0.4 when operating in ACTION a, which is not in the CTS. This would allow H0DE changes under conditions that the plant is anticipating a return to acceptable activity levels within the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months A0T.

This exception is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit the low probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit, and the ability to restore transient specific activity excursions while the plant remains at, or proceeds to, power operation.

8 03 LS 18 This change, in conformance with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1.

revises the sample frequency from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days for performance of a gama isotopic analysis. The 7 day i frequency is acceptable based on the low probability of a i

gross fuel failure occurring which would significantly alter the analysis results.

8 04 H Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. the CTS requirement to measure Iodine including I-131. I 133 and I 135 is l

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 13 5/15/97

INSERT 3A-12 The current TS definition of CONTROLLED LEAKAGE is deleted as discussed in DOC 1 g y,S,.r -

LG in Section 1.0. The RCP seal water return flow limit is moved to a licensee controlled document. Seal injection limitations are established by the throttle valve position surveillance in CTS SR 4.5.2.g.2) which is moved to ITS SR 3.5.2.7. This surveillance ensures that the ECCS i analyses remaire valid. Since facility performance and operational details of the type embodied by the RCP seal water return flow limit are required to be described in the FSAR per 10CFR50.34, it is acceptable to move the requirements of CTS LCO 3.4.6.2.e and CTS SR 4.4.6.2.1.c to the FSAR.

1 l

I l

NUREG 1431 SPECIFICATIONS THAT ARE NOT APPLICABLE Specification # ' Specification Title Comments ,

3.5.5 Seal . Injection Flow Seal injection flow rate limitations, consistent with ensuring the LOCA' analysis assumptions for safety injection delivered to the core are met, will be ensured

- by +ha ErC? 'h;balenn Q J.ES-2

- prece4rer rel ::ted te FS'a Cheptcr 15 (:c; change descriptier. 215 LC of

-Crcl;;;r: 2M =d by the throttle valve position surveillance in ITS SR 3.5.2.7.

3.5.6 Boron Injection Tank'(BIT) The BIT has no safety significance; it has been retired in place.

l

-v-MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97

ECCS Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) helir a-t EMt3Dfi of pjfRilpi valves in the flow path er, sr. 5: i egnei- is necessary for proper ECCS performance. These valves i have iglbaEIEE stops to allow proper positioning for restricted !

flow to a ruptured cold leg, ensuring that the other cold legs I receive at least the required minimum flow. This Surycillerc; is r,et r;;uired fer pier.ts with flew li;;;itirs erific;s. The 18 month Frequency is based on the same reasons as those stated in SR 3.5.2.5 and SR 3.5.2.6. .'Z A/TEtr~ d F. 5-22. p f,M .'2.

SR 3.5.2.8 l Periodic inspections of the containment sump suction inlet ensure l that it is unrestricted and stays in proper operating condition.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage, on the need to have access to the location, and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance I were performed with the reactor at power. This Frequency has l been found to be sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and is

.. confirmed by operating experience.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 35.

2. 10 CFR 50.46.

3. FSAR, SectionMiEPhiill535"5I

4. FSAR, Chapter 15. " Accident Analysis."

5. NRC Memorandum to V. Stello, Jr. , from R.L. Baer.

" Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1. 1975.

6. IE Information Notice No. 87 01.

.U. NE a; tunt. .n.eadgid azi.m-ul?

9j. @Mn'diiEHt3dE58)at~eti'd3'!24E MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 22 5/15/97

I INSERT B 3.5-22 l

The ECCS throttle valves and the seal water injection throttle valves are set to ensure proper $ 255--2 flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping to each injection point in the event of a LOCA.

Once set, these throttle valves are secured with locking devices and mechanical position stops. These devices help to ensure that the following safety analyses assumptions remain {

valid: (1) both the maximum and minimum total system resistance; (2) both the maximum and '

minimum branch injection line resistance; and (3) the maximum and minimum ranges of potential pump performance, These resistances and pump performance ranges are used to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flows assumed in the LOCA analyses of Reference 3.

l l

I

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION incapable of injecting." The wording change makes the Note consistent with the wording used in LCO 3.4.12. These changes are consistent with traveler TSTF 153.

3.5 9 The seal injection / return valves (BGV0198 BGV0202) are included in ITS SR 3.5.2.7 since they are included in CTS 4.5.2.g.2). These valves ;

have throttled positions to be verified similar to the ECCS throttle valves which are listed in the SR per NUREG 1431 Rev.1.

.-CN.rERT* l A-2. Q 3 3 3 - 3.

i l

I JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 2 5/15/97

i INSERT 6A-2 The positions of the RCP sealinjection and return throttle valves ensure that the assumptions' ~2 used in the ECCS analyses to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flows remain valid.

l f

m_..______.__________ _

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.5-001 APPLICABILITY: CA, DC, WC REQUEST: Revise the ITS 3.5.1 Bases to address Westinghouse NSAL 97-003 with regard to the relationship of permissive P-11 to the accumulator isolation valves. The discussion of P-11 1 is not relevant to this LCO which is applicable above 1000 psig. Nor is the IEEE 279-1971

" operating bypass" discussion relevant or correct per the current licensing basis.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 -ITS 3.5 Enclosure SB, pages B 3.5-1 thru B 3.5-5, B 3.5-8, and B 3.5 9 i

i l

Accumulators i B 3.5.1

! B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.1 Accumulators lahr.rh e.sof R.

4/,wdswnf4.fch& ref / c, legna.* ,rh p of Ne ihvan+ory in BASES EI" ' ' '

' l"A ' b '

w >

w -

g y BACKGROUND The functions of the ECCS; accumulators are to supplyVwater to the bC-Ir-oo/

reactor vessel during theWhda-, phcsc of e loss of coolant accident (LutA)['tc pr=ide i=ctry te help =cc: pith the e'"' phne that fc1h; thccceftcr.- and to provide Reactor Coolant System (RCS) makeup for a small break LOCA.

m bc-3.r-es/

~7%, EcCJ /njee-/ An The blowdown phase of a large break LOCA is the initial period of A,,/, /,//m,- , /, ,. the transient during which the RCS departs from equilibrium

/,.,,4 LocA ,,r; { conditions, and heat from fission product decay, hot internals.

p and the vessel continues to be transferred to the reactor g"'8j"" coolant. The blowdown phase of the transient ends when the RCS

/*") ") 50/// pressure falls to a value approaching that of the containment Y 3.) refloosl. atmosphere. g,, ,p. Z Q ,.f In the refill phase of a LOCA. which* cdiately fclhs the bC-3.5-oo t blowdown phase, reactor coolant inventory has vacated the core

$ through steam flashing and -cjecticn -out through the break. The core is essentially in adiabatic he tup. The balance of accumulator inventory is then avail ble to help fill voids in the lower plenum and reactor vessel do ncomer so as to establish a recovery level at the bottom of t core and ongoing reflood of the core with the addition of saf ty injection (SI) water.3 SC-#N#/

.rfill

.TMTEA*7" 8 3 5-/ l The accumulators are pressure vessels partially filled with borated water. and pressurized with nitrogen gas. The accumulators are passive components. since no operator or control actions are required in order for them to perform their function.

Internal accumulator tank pressure is sufficient to discharge the accumulator contents to the RCS, if RCS pressure decreases below the accumulator pressure.

Each accumulator is piped into an RCS cold leg via an accumulator line and is isolated from the RCS by a motor operated isolation valve and two check valves in series. The : ster cpcrated CA-25-oe/

--teektien valvec ar+-4eter4ccked by P-11 with the pi usserizcr prnrure ~erure crt channch to ensee-thet th; vches will l --automat 4es4b-open = RCS prcru c-mercascs te ctrave the

--per~ictive circuit P-11 setpcirt.

I s (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 1 5/15/97

Accumulators l B 3.5.1 t

BASES BACKGROUND "k Stcricck :h0 pre >cnts ined';ertent !ccure cf +he ve"';c: C/)-35W (continued) -&r ng reimoi vn etica prior to en eccidcat. The V:hc: will d

- ;;teeucall.r vru. lswever. = 2 result Of = SI signel. Thc = -- 1 ICOIurCO CCUr0 th0I Ihs valvca .CCI thC rC@ir^^CNIS cf thO

--!=ti+"+e af Elar+H r=1 a~4 Electronic Engineer (IEEE)

-Stande-d 279-1971 'Ref 1) fer "eprath; byp==:" =d that the -

-ac-' htcr: aiP b; eveihble for dnjectier "itha"t reliance en N iseSLUF aGLluri .

The accumulator size, water volume, and nitrogen cover pressure are selected so that three of the four accumulators are sufficient to partially cover the core before significant clad melting or zirconium water reaction can occur following a LOCA.

The need to ensure that three accumulators are adequate for this function is consistent with the LOCA assumption that the entire contents of one accumulator will be lost via the RCS pipe break during the blowdown phase of the LOCA.

APPLICABLE The accumulators are assumed OPERABLE in th the large and small SAFETY ANALYSES break LOCA analyses at full power (Ref. $). These are the Design CA-3,6-dol Basis Accidents (DBAs) that establish the acceptance limits for the accumulators. Reference to the analyses for these DBAs is used to assess changes in the accumulators as they relate to the acceptance limits.

In performing the LOCA calculations, conservative assumptions are made concerning the availability of ECCS flow. In the early stages of a LOCA, with or without a loss of offsite power, the accumulators provide the sole source of makeup water to the RCS.

The assumption of loss of offsite power is required by regulations and conservatively imposes a delay wherein the ECCS pumps cannot deliver flow until the emergency diesel generators start, come to rated speed, and go through their timed loading i sequence. In cold leg break scenarios, the entire contents of one accumulator are assumed to be lost through the break.

The limiting large break LOCA is a double ended guillotine break at the discharge of the reactor coolant pump. During this event.

the accumulators discharge to the RCS as soon as RCS pressure decreases to below accumulator pressure.

(continued)

MARK UP F 1UREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 2 5/15/97 I

t______________________________________-.--

Accumulators B 3.5.1 l

) BASES APPLICABLE As a conservative estimate, no credit is taken for ECCS pwp flow SAFETY ANALYSES until an effective delay has elapsed. This delay accounts for j

(continued) the diesels starting and the pumps being loaded and delivering /

full flow. The delay time is conservatively set with an additional 2 seconds to account for SI signal generation. During this time, the accumulators are analyzed as providing the sole source of emergency core cooling. No operator action is assumed during the blowdown +tagegof a large break LOCA. AC-J.f-04/

h f ase The worst case small break LOCA analyses also assume a time delay before pumped flow reaches the core. For the larger range of small breaks, the rate of blowdown is such that the increase in fuel clad temperature is terminated sek4y pf.jmhyQy by the accumulators, with pumped flow then providing continued cooling.

As break size decreases, the accumulators and centrifugal charging pumps both play a part in terminating the rise in clad temperature. As break size continues to decrease, the role of the accumulators continues to decrease until they are not l required and the centrifugal charging pumps become solely responsible for terminating the temperature increase.

This LC0 helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria s .

established for the ECCS by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref.g&P will be met CA-IS-64 /

following a LOCA: !

a) i

a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is s 2200*F:

b. Maximum cladding oxidation is s 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation:

c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is s 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react: and

d. c Core(emp+y is maintained

+bewe in1 pve<oolable geometry.7 m fLey,nn Since the accumulatorsWischarg: during the bbwdun phasc of a

/arge lekl0CA. they do not contribute to the long term cooling requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.

i

[ (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 3 5/15/97

Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE For both the large and small break LOCA analyses, a nominal SAFETY ANALYSES contained accumulator water volume is used. The contained water !

(continued) volume is the same as the deliverable volume for the accumulators, since the accumulators are emptied, once discharged. For small breaks, an increase in water volume is a peak clad temperature penalty. For large breaks, an increase in '

water volume can be either a peak clad temperature penalty or benefit, depending on downcomer filling and subsequent spill through the break during the core reflooding portion of the transient. The analysis makes a conservative assumption with respect to ignoring or taking credit for line water volume from the accumulator to the check valve. Th; ;;fcty enclysi; a;sumcs valucs of C40 gallens and 270 guilens. Tc silou for instrument ineccuracy,-- Values of ,5D5I gallons and 5555 gallons are specified.

The minimum boron concentration ;ctpeint DME is used in the post LOCA boron cor nentration calculation. The calculation is performed to assure r3 actor suberiticality in a post LOCA environment. Of particular interest is the large break LOCA, 3 since no credit is taken for control rod assembly insertion. A

) reduction in the accumulator minimum boron concentration would produce a subsequent reduction in the available containment sump concentration for post LOCA shutdown and an increase in the maximum sump pH. The maximum boron concentration is used in '

determining the cold leg to hot leg recirculation injection switchover time and minimum sump pH.

The large and small break LOCA analyses are performed at the minimum nitrogen cover pressure, since sensitivity analyses have i demonstrated that higher nitrogen cover pressure results in a computed peak clad temperature benefit. The maximum nitrogen cover pressure limit prevents accumulator relief valve actuation, and ultimately preserves accumulator integrity.

The effects on containment mass and energy releases from the accumulators are accounted for in the appropriate analyses (Rets. G ;n G . CA s. S--oot L. -- / an/ 3 5 SaNtyMa]?se(4(sunieKapJIO5ibirndbiipe7bffl979387b IREf.;h Admin,iMaj,1geXp.ntrg]Ressuheltliat_Qheihdjigi%ty2.i j iegib'n]ro'm theIa_c.cygatg;rgreggmmssumpt;toa; (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 4 5/15/97

Accumulators B 3.5.1

) BASES APPLICABLE The accumulators satisfy Criterion 3 of thc NPI Policy '; tats,cnt SAFETY ANALYSES

@_ICERE50R63Tt')T2)TST).

(continued)

LC0 The LCO establishes the minimum conditions required to ensure that the accumulators are available to accomplish their core cooling safety function following a LOCA. Four accumulators are required to ensure that 100% of the contents of three of the accumulators will reach the core during a LOCA. This is consistent with the assumption that the contents of one accumulator spill through the break. If less than three accumulators are injected during the blowdown phase of a LOCA, the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref.p could be violated.

c) eg_.f,gyo j For an accumulator to be considered OPERABLE, the isolation valve must be fully open, power removed above Esch (E000 psig, and the limits established in the SRs for contained volume, boron concentration, and nitrogen cover pressure must be met.

APPLICABILITY In MODES I and 2, and in HODE 3 with RCS pressure > 1000 psig, the accumulator OPERABILITY requirements are based on full power operation. Although cooling requirements decrease as power decreases, the accumulators are still required to provide core cooling as long as elevated RCS pressures and temperatures exist.

This LCO is only applicable at gg pressures > 1000 psig. At pressures s 1000 psig, the rate of RCS blowdown is such that the ECCS pumps can provide adequate injection to ensure that peak clad temperature remains below the 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 3lH limit of 2200*F. f anal 7 Ll) cj_y,gg/

In HDDE 3, with RCS pressure s 1000 psig, and in H0 DES 4. 5, and 6, the accumulator motor operatqd isolation valves are closed FitMyoWrtr.emoiTidCfd5FnyheTvilFeTEgrMtm e to isolate the accumulators from the RCS TReIsr:s!:sq4. This allows RCS CA-7.SW/

cooldown and depressurization without disc arging the accumulators into the RCS or requiring de pressurization of the accumu1ators.

A c cumu la4ve iso l=

Won i.c only re(uire) wh en +4e aeeunuI,+,,,>-onace r.r yrede L or egul "4, &

SY'"2rNc/YWi,(*/e#** N 4 continued) d fenyer,fuo-e, or a/ lowed Ay l MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 5 5/15/97

& / b- Irmr+eu,-w,pvJ.d

.n n/at w .

u - - . _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - . - - - . - - _ _ _ _ _ - - . - - - - - - - - - ------- - ---_----------- ___ -------_-------

I Accumulators B 3.5.1 1

/ BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS of the accumulator, a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency usually allows the operator to identify changes before limits are reached.

Operating experience has shown this Frequency to be appropriate for early detection and correction of off normal trends.

SR 3.5.1.4 The boron concentration should be verified to be within required limits for each accumulator every 31 days since the static design !

of the accumulators limits the ways in which the concentration can be changed. The 31 day Frequency 'is adequate to identify changes that could occur from mechanisms such as stratification or inleakage. Sampling the affected accumulator within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after a it volac EDBapon increase will identify whether inleakage has caused a reduction in boron concentration to below the required limit. It is not necessary to verify boron concentration if the added water inventory is from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) liNUEtihMe'ssnot3b Neens

] yer.ny3nydH5tMli5f6nEconcentcRNn%ai.ngespy.c@.

because the water contained in the RWST is !TydijifnTER within the accumulator boron concentration requirements. This is consistent with the recommendation of NUREG 1366 (Ref. .

CA .7.5-dd/

+

SR 3.5.1 1 Verification every 31 days that power is removed from each accumulator isolation valve operator when the prcssurizcr ECS pressure is 2-2000 51D0D psig ensures that an active failure could not result in the undetected closure of an accumulator motor operated isolation valve. If this were to occur, only two accumulators would be available for injection given a single failure coincident with a LOCA. Since power is removed under administrative control, the 31 day Frequency will provide adequate assurance that power is removed.

SM % Oh peau it h rappit iL ik zis Lputiti icciaticn valics whcn picssuri;c_r picssurc u : 2000 psig. thus l cllcwmg cpcrational ficxibility by cvciding unac;cncry dclays f ic ;;nipulatc thc brCckCrs -durins plani startups ci shutdcwns. I l Evcn with powcr supplicd to thc velvcs inadvcrtcnt closucc is I (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 8 5/15/97

Accumulators B 3.5.1

\

! BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.5 (continued)

REQUIREHERTS piricatcd by thc i:C" presserc intcrieck casocicted eith the velvcs.

5%uld cle:tre of : valve c cur in spite of the interic,ck- g CA-SSW/.

w--_- m aMwauscanvanzs:nmeanw.cssuns:tep3DV511TM

<I5EurE2iicimudTrg15(.Ujf53ptic El Sig":1 previded te Ithe V:1v0:

,:culd ep n a closed valve " the event Of : L^CA -

_ ,eer e .>..a ggygRENCES --l . .--- s. .....

.,,n

-,- ~,. ,n,,. CA-3. C-ool

/, --G-- FSAR, Chapter 6.

.2. - 10 CFR 50.46.

7, -6 FSAR, Chapter 15.

f, NUREG 1366, February 1990.

5~-E- fF REE7D7 DAB

[.-g- rau<mectqongte:sid 74 c:wedettaan; cosy i ,

MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.5-9 5/15/97

l l

1 l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET {

' ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.5-002 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Revise ITS 3.5.4 Bases to indicate that the RWST LCO, by virtue of its temperature, (

volume, and boron concentration limits, also satisfies Criterion 2 (initial conditions of accident j analyses).

l 1

. ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5

- Enclosure 58, page B 3.5-30 l

1 l

l l

l t

RWST B 3.5.4

.~

BASES APPLICABLE assumes that all control rods are out of the core. Rje l{@n SAFETY ANALYSES sbitt31tiedWdterN1um3ehd;tRrc6n%ncehtcat4bnJ5fftKeIRRST,2Xo (continued) briftHWaTsuiinimon0Feq0n3b~r;1amMuti@H5tm5PEllr6~f.st!bt'It510tMn gcTttiG15tHUWTftfiiffdihtairimutWf!iliaa.u.a gtum=meleT sitiifiW=& evogt~Kn85fXd53bGiHUBILTrDiiMa=newrtiR:t"oT MmW=lEuantbjLEGF==_@w K5&miiWG=^ n Tad = mwd

Uu!R19!ffE!7 The upper limit on boron concentration of 2200 g500 ppm is used to determine the maximum allowable time to switch to hot leg recirculation following a LOCA. The purpose of switching from cold leg to hot leg injectica 5iiGiidiiisti5h is to avoid boron precipitation in the core following the accident.

cadurnmaad-V jaak f rerrureforHon af Me In the ECCS analysis, the containment spray temperature is CA-7.5-23 assumed to be equal to the RWST lower temperature limit of 35 pl %. If the lower temperature limit is violated, the h*g* y _ containment spray further reduces containment pressure, which decreases the rate at which steam can be vented out the break and increases peak clad temperature. The Upper temperature limit of AIDlF is used in the small break LO".A analysis and containment OPERABILITY analysis. Exceeding this temperature will result in a higher peak clad temperature, because there is less heat transfer from the core to the injected water for the small break LOCA j and higher containment pressures due to reduced containment spray cooiing capacity. For the containment response following an MSLB. the lower limit on boron concentration and the upper limit on RWST water temperature are used to maximize the total energy release to containment.

MriBT sW33TtTiuiie7.am s .aussourTd8t~SgiMTI.RRet:m.n; L

K, d.sf@3,_tsLilfeM_rit_rW3Teiristi#63thTtgtfieVKctiPR39ihshttRin~#r5'm pib'RW5TMb73 u~ct'sMNiYiiittliiiitt!5tE C eid-e <ron : Land The RWST satisfiesVCriterion 3 of thc "RC Policy Stat;xat g _7' 3-10RnJ50'36R(QI22(1][),..

f LCO The RWST ensures that an adequate supply of borated water is available to cool and depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), to cool and cover the core in the event of a LOCA to maintain the reactor subcritical following a DBA, and to ensure adequate level in the containment (continued)

M/EUP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 30 5/15/97

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.5-003 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Clarify ITS 3.5.4 Bases regarding RWST temperature assumptions for MSLB core response and LOCA analyses.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 l Enclosure SB, pages B 3.5-29, B 3.5-30, and B 3.5-33

-)

1 1

i l

I l

m_____________________________________--- --- - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - -

1 RWST B J.5.4 BASES l

APPLICABLE The RWST must also meet volume, boron concentration, and l SAFETY ANALYSES temperature requirements for non LOCA events. The volune is not (continued) an explicit assumption in non LOCA events since the required volume is a small fraction of the available volume. The deliverable volume limit is set by the LOCA and containment analyses. For the RWST, the deliverable volume is different from the total volume contained since, due to the design of the tank, more water can be contained than can be delivered. The minimum boron concentration is an explicit assumption in the main steam line break (MSLB) analysis to ensure the required shutdown i capability. "; i;;;perterec of its veluc i; ;; ell for units with !

a beren injcction tank '0IT) with a high bcrea coaccatration.

For CJ,ggjiyyl units with nc OIT or reduced SIT beren i rcquirc;ents, the minimum boron concentration limit is an important assumption in ensuring the required shutdown ,

capability. The maximum boron concentration is an explicit l assumption in the inadvertent ECCS actuation analysis, although it is typically a nonlimiting event and the results are very insensitive to boron concentrations. The maximum temperature ensures that the amount of cooling provided from the RWST during the heatup phase of a feedline break is consirtent with safety l analysis assumptions: the minimum is an assumption in both the CA-7.M3 l HSLE 4 and inadvertent ECCS actuati n analyses, although the in{vertent ECCS actuation event is typically nonlimiting.

core rupee Q m.Jura The HSLB analysis has considered a delay associated with the interlock between the VCT and RWST isolation valves, and the results show that the departure from nucleate boiling design basis is met. The delay has been established as F. seconds, with offsite power available, or 37 S_9 seconds without offsite power.

This response time includes 2 seconds for electronics delay, a 15 second stroke time fee t6"bodh the RWST valves, and foR5WHd by a 10 second stroke time fee tormse the VCT valves gtTe.Glie RWJN@WesYaref0TI3@p~ien. Plants with ; DIT nccd not bc concc acd with the dcicy sins thc CIT will supply highly bcratcd watcr prior to LU ;witchevcr. provided the O!T u bctuxa the pu;r.ps ;nd thc cccc.

For a large break LOCA analysis, the minimum water volume limit of 4CC.200 394'l000 gallons and the lower boron concentration limit of E999 2350 ppm are used to compute the post LOCA sump t boron concentration necessary to assure suberiticality. The i large break LOCA is the limiting case since the safety analysis f

l (continued)

MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 29 5/15/97

RWST B 3.5.4 BASES APPLICABLE assumes that all control rods are out of the core, I_be]mrdtgon

SAFETY ANALYSES ED#tiligeWNgteWV611mieWhd,it@nsconcehtcht3bnjTdf5hs RRSluts'o l l (continued) bdidrBMaimenimosisfegq5_TJbrl10m' 3UbippforwsiidE*: t!h62s310ti6n

! {

si@bclDRt~fdWitWfn26htsfRCaf.t~frSiTDCA?3tFfs'.DIGTe1E K

ifrifi$tiB3t eMoTumo_nsoTr5dai.muiliemiziiritrie'3eff s apt.g htD#dttleWs0dtcanstLit3!3M*wffe' 51bnRKC&Liahit203iiW=3rfd DDiR@gMt2E The upper limit on boron concentration of E200 gS00 ppm is used to determine the maximum allowable time to switch to hot leg recirculation following a LOCA. The purpose of switching from cold leg to hot leg injcction EEEW.cEliiti66 is to avoid boron precipitation in the core following the accident.

Cwlwremed $=clc In the V ECCS analysis, fcertwefordim $ Ne the containment spray temperature is CA-?.5-23 assumed to be equal to the RWST lower temperature limit of 35 pl%. If the lower temperature limit is violated, the h*g*y- containment spray further reduces containment pressure, which decreases the rate at which steam can be vented out the break and l increases peak clad temperature. The upper temperature limit of EDUjF is used in the small break LOCA analysis and containment OPERABILITY analysis. Exceeding this temperature will result in

. a higher peak clad temperature, because there is less heat transfer from the core to the injected water for the small break LOCA y and higher containment pressures due to reduced containment spray cooling capacity. For the containment response following an MSLB, the lower limit on boron concentration and the upper limit on RWST water temperature are used to maximize the total energy release to containment.

51@ty3j0XsysliYs~0m7em 2u';nb[trid8Hc~egpsmar6E6MZ Adefriisti htivbitoht:51hWnsDi-h'i th1tRh~eW6ai~ctWity'2ihsbtt3b~n?frfim j;,ht"JRWSTRrif.l sttT2hTflirumi!tioK C e 14-e rion 2 o n d The RWST satisfiesVCriterion 3 of th; Z: Policy Stat; x at g _,7y MMg36]fic)I2,Rij[),..

LCO The RWST ensures that an a; equate supply of borated water is available to cool and depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), to cool and cover the core in the event of a LOCA, to maintain the reactor subcritical following a DBA, and to ensure adequate level in the containment (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 30 5/15/97 c____________-____________-_____________ _ - _ _ .

RWST l B 3.5.4 1

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.4.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS protected by en BRiNGEE alarm Rt35tRREN {

M. a 7 day Frequency is appropriate and has been shown to be l acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.5.4.3 The boron concentration of the RWST should be verified every 7 days to be within the required limits. This SR ensures that the reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA. Further, it assures that the resulting sump pH will be maintained in an acceptable range so that boron precipitation in the core will not occur and the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components will be minimized. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 7 day sampling Frequency to verify boron concentration is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15. '

g. e k (.o./.S sm/ E lla /S.4 -// . CA--3. S-oo 3 l

MARK'UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 33 5/15/97

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: DC-3.5-001 APPLICABILITY: CA, DC, WC I

REQUEST: Revise the Bases 3.5.1. Background, to discuss the three phases for large break LOCA (blowdown, refill, and reflood) as discussed in FSAR Chapter 15. The revision clarifies f that reflood is accomplished initially by ac,umulator discharge and by ECCS pump flow.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 - ITS 3.5 Enclosure 58, pages B 3.5-1 and B 3.5-3 I

l t <

i

Accumulators B 3.5.1

~ B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

/a4er es of 4l=

B 3.5.1 Accumulators //<wdewn M,re 6 -M e le ref /,,e,

^p of fle

%- ,rh

" I" inven+ory in BASES *

I' 7 * <

" ' i.,sd BACKGROUND The functions of the ECCS, accumulators are to supplyVwater to[the bc reactor vessel during theV bicut m Aesc cf c-loss of coolant accident (LOCA)[tc provide inventcry te help ;cccmplich the en'1 pha:0 that fellc6 thcreeftcr.- and to provide Reactor Coolant System (RCS) makeup for a small break LOCA.

m b c-3.r os /

~~M e ECCI /njee.k,, The blowdown phase of a large break LOCA is the initial period of no,/, #,// owr ,/ e i the transient during which the RCS departs from equilibrium fre,/ LocA ,,7 ( conditions, and heat from fission product decay, hot internals,

.g and the vessel continues to be transferred to the reactor jg* fj"*C coolant. The blowdown phase of the transient ends when the RCS I pressure falls to a value approaching that of the containment i b/'*/'*^j d ", O//J ad 3.) reflood atmosphere, j, , - ,,.,4}g ,Q,$ j l

In the refill phase of a LOCA, which ' :diately fellows-the bC-J.S-do f blowdown phase, reactor coolant inventory has vacated the core through steam flashing and ejection -out through the break. The core is essentially in adiabatic he tup. The balance of accumulator inventory is then avail ble to help fill voids in the lower plenum and reactor vessel do neomer so as to establish a recovery level at the bottom of t core and ongoing reflood of the core with the addition of saf ty injection (SI) water.3 M ~# N #/

.rpill rurggy- g y S.-/

The accumulator:. are pressure vessels partially filled with borated water. and pressurized with nitrogen gas. The j accumulators are passive components, since no operator or control )

actions are required in order for them to perform their function.

Internal accumulator tank pressure is sufficient to discharge the accumulator contents to the RCS. if RCS pressure decreases below the accumulator pressure.

Each accumulator is piped into an RCS cold leg via an accumulator line and is isolated from the RCS by a motor operate / isolation valve and two check valves in series. --TM ;;. -

Opcrated CA-2 Fu/

isclation valve arc interlocked by P 11 with thc pmswriccr prc::ure measurement channel; to ensure that thc valvc; will

-automatically open-:: RCS prc;;ure 'ncrcescs tc abcvc the

---permittive circuit P-11 sctpcirit.

l s (continued)

MARK UP 0F NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.5-1 5/15/97

I .

i I INSERT B 3.5-1 '

3 c - 3.5-oo/

l l

l The refill phase is complete when the injection of ECCS water has filled the reactor L

vessel downcomer and the lower plenum of the reactor vessel which is bounded by the i

bottom of the fuel rods (called bottom of core recovery time).

I The reflood phase follows the refill phase and continues until the reactor vessel has been filled to the extent that the core temperature rise has been terminated.

! The accumulators function in the later stages of blowdown to the beginning stages of reflood to fill the downcomer and lower plenum. The injection of the ECCS pumps aids during refill. Reflood and the following long term heat removal are accomplished by water pumped into the core by the ECCS pumps.

, 1 i

i i

Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE As a conservative estimate, no credit is taken for ECCS pwp flow SAFETf ANALYSES until an effective delay has elapsed. This delay accounts for (continued) the diesels starting and the pumps being loaded and delivering full flow. The delay time is conservatively set with an additional 2 seconds to account for SI signal gencration. During this time, the accumulators are analyzed as providing the sole source of emergency core cooling. No operator action is assumed during the blowdown stege3of a large break LOCA. AC-SS-00/

h f ase The worst case small break LOCA analyses also assume a time delay before pumped flow reaches the core. For the larger range of small breaks, the rate of blowdown is such that the increase in fuel clad temperature is terminated sede+y pfimhjity by the {

accumulators, with pumped flow then providing continued cooling. l As break size decreases, the accumulators and centrifugal l charging pumps both play a part in terminating the rise in clad '

temperature. As break size continues to decrease, the role of the accumulators continues to decrease until they are not required and the centrifugal charging pumps become solely responsible for terminating the temperature increase.

This LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria established for the ECCS by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref.j&will be met CA-JS-44/

following a LOCA: aj

a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is s 2200'F:

b. Maximum cladding oxidation is s 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation:

c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is s 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react; and d.

Core is' maintained (amp +y +bewe in pves lcoolable ggometry.

y-W ep in nty .r er S 44* rrOd flare Since the accumulatorsFdischarge-der-ing thc bicadown phnc of a

/arge dreakLOCA. they do not contribute to the long term cooling g l requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.

l l

] (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.5 3 5/15/97

1 JLS CONVERSION TO IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CTS 3/4.9 - REFUELING OPERATIONS ITS 3.9 - REFUELING OPERATIONS e

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND LICENSEE INITIATED ADDITIONAL CHANGES i

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR-3.5-001 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Revise Traveler Status Sheet to: 1) reflect NRC approval of three, travelers, TSTF-90 Rev.1, TSTF-117, and TSTF-153; 2) delete reference to TSTF-155, which was rejected by TSTF and not incorporated by the FLOG; and 3) change WOG-84 to TSTF-236. l There are no changes involved to any CTS mark-ups, ITS mark-ups, DOCS, or JFDs.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 11, CTS 3/4.5 -ITS 3.5 Enclosure 5A, Traveler Status Sheet I

l

\

) INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.5 l

l TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF 90 Incorporated i 3.5 6 Aj,fy,y,/ gy gjg>c , 77g,f.gjj TSTF 117 Incorporated 3.5 1 N/freve/ ly 4/g d. -

TSTF 153 Incorporated 3.5 8 /}ggrave/ ly NAC, TSTI 155-- e t Incer r e+ + -NA- Hvi. NRC ypreved e3 of travci;r :ut-c#' dete.

OG4 Y.rTF-n yg Incorporated 3.5 4 DCDP and CPSES only. !

! l i

l l

i k

)

1 MARX UP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97

- - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - ~ ~ - ' ' - ' - ' " - -

' - ~ ~ ' ' ' ~ ~ ' ' ' ' ^~~'

j INDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Page1of2 l

2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSEQ 3.9.G-1 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.9-i DC, CP, WC, CA YES j

$ 3.9-1a - DC, CP, WC, CA YES )

'd T 3.9-1 b CA YES yy:-

<w 3.9-2 CP NA 3.9-3 CP, WC, CA YES l

)

3.9-4 DC, CP, WC, CA YES l l

3.9-5 DC, CP, WC, CA YES j 3.9-6 CA YES 3.9-7 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.9-8 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 3.9-9 DC,CP NA y 3.9-10 DC,CP NA 1.9-11 DC,CP NA

.9-12 DC, CP, WC, CA YES

.9-13 DC, CP, WC NA

'.. 9-14 DC, WC, CA YES

.9-15 DC, WC, CA YES

.9-16 DC, WC, CA YES

.9-17 DC,CP NA 18 DC,CP NA 9-19 CA YES 9-20 WC NA 9-21_ DC, CP, WC, CA YES 9-22 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 9-23 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 9-24 DC, CP, WC, CA YES 9-25 DC NA O 3.9-ED DC NA

)

C ALL-002 (3.9 changes only) DC NA l l l l l 1

t __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _

INDEX OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Page 2 of 2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION APPLICABILITY ENCLOSED DC ALL-003 (3.9 changes only) DC NA

y. .

E .. ' CP 3.9-001 '

CP NA g,Gt l . ~ . ': c g@ g*-,.CP 3.9-002 ~ v- CP NA

-u.

4. :

gh.o h,Cg 3.9-003. . ,

CP NA I? ~

" CP 3.9-004 ' CP NA W'

TR 3.9-001 DC, CP, WC, CA YES

+

TR 3.9-002 DC, CP, WC, CA YES l TR 3.9-003 DC NA WC 3.9-ED WC NA WC 3.9-001 WC NA b WC 3.9-002 WC NA WC 3.9-003 WC NA WC 3.9-004 WC NA WC 3.9-006' CP, WC NA i

i l

1 I

JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONALINFORMATION

' The following methodology is followed for submitting additional information:

l ; . 1. Each licensee is submitting a separate response for each section.

N ; W ':2., if an RAI does not apply to a licensee (i.e., does not actually impact the y y .~pg e.a information that defines the technical specification change for that licensee), "NA" J L 0 %W has been entered in the index column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is N 9,% n w % provided in the response for that licensee.

g ,

_ 9e- '~ 3. If a licensee initiated change does not apply, "NA" has been entered in the index b column labeled " ENCLOSED" and no information is provided in the response for 3

that licensee.

y- .

[-c 4.' The common portions of the " Additional Information Cover Sheets" are identical, j except for brackets, where applicable (using the same methodology used in j enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A and 6B of the conversion submittals). The list of attached pages will vary to match the licensee specific conversion submittals. A {

i licensee's FLOG response may not address all applicable plants if there is

insufficient similarity in the plant specific responses to justify their inclusion in F

each submittal, in those cases, the response will be prefaced with a heading such as " PLANT SPECIFIC DISCUSSION."

j if

5. Changes are indicated using the redline / strikeout tool of Wordperfect or by using a hand markup that indicates insertions and deletions, if the area being revised is not clear, the affected portion of the page is circled. The markup techniques vary as necessary, based on the specifics of the area being changed and the complexity of the changes, to provide the clearest possible indication of the changes.

i

6. A marginal note (the Additional Informai:on Number from the index) is added in the right margin of each page being changed, adjacent to the area being changed, to identify the source of each change.

7. Some changes are not applicable to one licensee but still require changes to the

)

Tables provided in Enclosures 3A,3B,4,6A, and 6B of the originallicense !

amendment request to reflect the changes being made by one or more of the l other licensees. These changes are not included in the additionalinformation for i

the licensee to which the change does not apply, as the changes are only for consistency, do not technically affect the request for that licensee, and are being provided in the additional information being provided by the licensees for which the change is applicable. The complete set of changes for the license amendment request will be provided in a licensing amendment request supplement to be provided later.

JOINT LICENSING SUBCOMMITTEE METHODOLOGY FOR PROVIDING ADDITIONALINFORMATION (CONTINUED)

8. If an NRC RAI question corresponds to a licensee initiated item, only one information package is provided. The question number is listed in the

/ - 4

" ENCLOSED" column of the index and both the question number and the licensee

=27;Na '

item number are listed on the " ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET"

,g;g. ;.f.sy ,,-r-.. -

- -c'N ~

~ 9. The item numbers are formatted as follows:

EviQ,6 yv -

.3 +

[ Source][lTS Section]-[nnn)

Source = Q - NRC Question CA - AmerequE DC-PG&E WC - WCNOC CP - TU Electric TR - Traveler ITS Section = The iTS section associated with the item (e.g.,3.3). If all sections are potentially impacted by a broad change or set of changes, "ALL"is used for the section number.

nnn = a three digit sequential number

{

l l

l i

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET

! ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.9.G-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: ITS 3.9.x Bases There have been a number of instances that the specific changes to the STS Bases are

! 4 not properly identified with redline or strikeout marks.

C: %, gum j p.ggg A Comment: Perform an audit of all STS Bases markups and identify instances where

- p m.I.I , .

additions and/or deletions of Bases were not properly identified in the original submittal.

t l f $ $.N FLOG RESPONSE:

g 4 7.-

' ~

The submitted ITS Bases markups for Section 3.9 have been compared to the STS

Bases. Some differences that were identified were in accordance with the markup methodologies (e.g., deletion of brackets and reviewer's notes). Most of the differences were editorialin nature and would not have affected the review. Examples of editorial changes are: capitalizing a letter with only a " redline" but not striking out the lower case letter that it replaced, changing a verb from singular to plural by adding an "s" without

" redlining" the "s", deleting instead of striking-out the A, B, C, etc. following specification title (e.g., SR3.6.6A.7), changing a bracketed reference (in the reference section) with l..i only a " redline" for the new reference but failing to include the strike-out of the old reference. In some instances, the brackets were retained (and struck-out) but the f ,

unchanged text within the brackets was not redlined. Where an entire section was

( bracketed, the methodology calls for the section title to be redlined. The redlining of the

[.

l title was sometimes omitted. In one instance, on Bases page B 3.9-15, text was deleted

- f' without the strike-out method. The deleted text referred to a reference in the reference

[ section. The page requiring a change is attached.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Encl. 5B page B 3.9-15 1

l l

l

Containment Penetrations B 3.9.4 BASES BACKGROUND ec (continued)

g ;,n s pSpIcATDM the minipurge system is not used in H0DE 6.

pm w All four- f 0 inch velvce arc accurcd in the cicscd pcsition.-

re -

{s The other containment penetrations that' provide direct access

{a% . , .4e I from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be J

isolated on at least one side Diriessiop~eneamunaermad5iDTm255N15 II E5Htt: ole. Isolation mhy be achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods must be approved and may include use of a material that can provide a temporary atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier [guo s Qg}sNb7JbTnWtTtwonmednDFchTiiLT!ii)! for t o her Q3.qG-y containment penetrations during fuel movement

-(M.1}

i Etatec.rdee'ecessunomsoneEonDBDmeutgarmo3 plier:esmosgeenne. ansa b liAeE3tDDEDIEDeEonQaM1menGEt'iiiospherA2pnoceeoM9EfiE5fii

[ FohTammentfttoXtneIouibwegatmosonenewa.tM5Ut'EdE755trongor, t a rre_r,r.upuonsavamoavanampono mga;r.r>1iore.teme nt?

3 E! -} APPLICABLE During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies SAFETY ANALYSES within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel . handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Tuci handlin; accidcats. cnclyccd in Rcfcccacc 0 includc droppin; e singic irradictcd fuci esscably and handling teci or c hcavy objc;t ente othcr irradicted fuci csscablics.

irhBfD'E'IrhTirdla naseccfdsh5tM nicant a T_nmenj ?anaMiedUiT)

BETE c ence32TechTi s t 5316f;U55~pjgggYa751?iHlR3ir r TdNtFd Ef0N h s fEiiidhy?o nt'oToThprT-WKd NtFd 3ftTelWisei6tilieTC The requirements of LCO 3.9.7,

Refueling Gmty PEoT Water Level," and the minimum decay time of 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident. results in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. Standard Review Plan. Section 15.7.4. Rev.1 (Ref. 3), defines "well within" ;

) 10 CFR 100 to be 25 or less of the 10 CFR 100 values. The

! {

acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure will be 25% of l 10 CFR 100 values or the "R: ncff cpp. cud liccasing ben s l (c.;.. c spccificd fraction of 10 CTC 100 limitO.

l l

l (continued) l MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.9 15 5/15/97 t

J

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.9-i APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: General A great majority of the DOCS state that the reasons for the relocation and for the proposed changes including deletions, additions, and revisions, are made to be consistent with NUREG-1431. While this is a valid statement, additional justifications are still required in order to support the proposed relocations and the CTS changes. The DOCS should be expanod to include additionaljustifications for the relocation and/or changes.

Comment: Revise those DOCS which do not provide technical justifications for the proposed relocations and changes, and indicate which DOCS are being revised under this comment.

FLOG RESPONSE:

The statement that the changes are made to be consistent with NUREG-1431 in a number of the DOCS was not intended to be a justification for the proposed change but an indication that changes were being made to make the Technical Specifications similar to NUREG-1431. The DOCS were developed (specifically the Less Restrictive DOCS) with the intent that the No Significant Hazards Consideration would contain more detail justifying the change. The conversion license amendment application was developed using as a guide the Vogtle application for determining the level of detail needed for the DOCS. During the development of the conversion license amendment application in late 1996, several issues were identified with impact on the conversion process including

" literal compliance," Generic Letter 96-01 and feedback from NRC concerning the acceptability of the submittals made by some other licensees. On January 24,1997, senior managers from the FLOG met with the NRC (the Technical Specification Branch and Project Management) to discuss these and other issues. The utilities took additional time to review the conversion license amendment application to make sure that these issues were being properly addressed.

On June 25,1998, a discussion was held with the NRC staff, in which it was believed that comments provHed in Section 3.9 addressed those DOCS and JFDs that required additionaljustificatioi.. The FLOG has agreed to revise those DOCS, as identified by the NRC, by either bringing forward information from the No Significant Hazards Consideration (Enclosure 4) or providing additionaljustification as requested. No additional DOCS or JFDs have been revised unless indicated in the response to a specific Comment Number. l ATTACHED PAGES:

None (All additional justifications have been provided in this submittal in response to NRC f

! specifically identified requests for additional information) l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.9-1a APPLICABILITY: CP, DC, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.1 DOC 1-01-A -

ITS 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.1 JFD 3.9-15 a-r + -

a. (Comanche Peak, Callaway, and Wolf Creek)

%+ The CTS and ITS are proposed to be revised by adding "when connected" preceding " Reactor Coolant System." The DOC provides a generic explanation, but it 'does not provide any specific technicaljustification for this addition. This i revision is considered an administrative enhancement and a generic change to the ITS. Therefore, it must be reviewed and approved via the TSTF process before it may be adopted as the standard ITS language. Furthermore, Diablo Canyon does not include the proposed addition, "when connected," in its CTS markup.

Comment: Either remove this item from the submittal and adopt the ITS language, or submit a TSTF for this generic change. Also, provide explanation why Diablo Canyon is not adopting the proposed language, "when connected."

FLOG RESPONSE:

The proposed changes to CTS 3.9.1 and ITS 3.9.1 were based on traveler WOG-103, Rev.1. WOG-103, Rev.1 has recently been designated TSTF-272 and transmitted to the NRC in May 1998. The proposed wording in TSTF-272 was modified from WOG-103, Rev.1, and these modifications have been incorporated into the iTS and ITS Bases.

During preparation of the Conversion License Amendment Request, WOG-103, .Rev.1, was inadvertently omitted by Diablo Canyon. Diablo Canyon willincorporate TSTF-272 into the ITS and ITS Bases.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Encl. 5A Traveler Status page,3.9-1 Encl. 58 8 3.9-1, B 3.9-3, B 3.9-4, B 3.9-5 Encl. 6A 3 I

l 1 3

__________J

Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.9 s TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFER $NCE # COMMENTS TSTF 20 Incorporated 3.9 2 NRC approved.

TSTF 21 $ Incorporated i Not Applicable "'C :pprcjg[.j o [ [ h TA-3, % ; '

TSTF 23. Rev.-e- Incorporated 3.9 13 Traveler bracketed 3

ITS 3.9.2 and revised the Bases for 3.9.3. Bracketed Bases information from the traveler that is not 7 g._y,9,9 applicable to a specific plant was not incorporated MgC TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific wwel.

reanalysis to establish j g;3 !

decay time' dependence for fuel handling accident. j TSTF 68. Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Similar changes (Difference

3.9 1) were incorporated into the ITS based on l current licensing basis. /

' r TSTF 92, Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable

Not NRC approved as of traveler cut off date.

TSTF96;/ev. / Incorporated 3.9 4 NRC approved.

TSTF 136 Incorporated Not Applicable NgC offraveI. ;T_g,N2 YSfF153 Not Incorporated Not Applicable "0t "PC 3pproved : Of- ,

-tr:veler cut c,ff det q 2 h ,

Incorporated 3.9 11

/

h M b3 i Incorporated 3.9 15 /

M Q m L\ m , J. du cl o p 4 7.1,S~u w ce.croy w) erea r *T. + a*vl 3.S' were nvited la n-lc/

3. % r ~o-s',4 s

l HARX UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97 L____________________.._________ _ _ . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

Boron Concentration l 3.9.1 0

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS .

gp6 O '3 A - I"d 3.9.1 Boron Concentration (400e l 6 -

LC0 3.9.1 Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System. thc rciuclin? :1319 15 d y

g eeneh and""""5..;_ - : :G'the refueling eevtty E shall be gg p3%

maintainedwithin the limit specified in the COLR.

' L APPLICABILITY: HODE 6.

n=- = =_ y= = mN0_ ; 1 . __ _ _ _ - . _ .__

WifEBEt22LTOWsanotanefMelitmmnttE40Dhan=rmmmau*=--+ w__ t0359f14%

pgattRE

_= _--

_ = . :wa __ .=.=.=_= m _-_=- . - - -

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIPID ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. Boron concentration A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. Imediately 4

not within limit.

A.2 Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.

bB A.3 Initiate action to Immediately restore boron concentration to within limit.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREHEKTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months specified in the COLR.

ED

)

MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.9 1 5/15/97 i

Boron Concentration B 3.9.1

~ B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration 3,9-lh ConnecQ b1 W

ve -

BASES:

4 e .,

f BACKGROUND.

The limit on the boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant p

t System (RCS). the Tcfueling car.el. and the rciucling cavity EE na c.p.+r.vW during refueling ensures that the reactor remains subcritical during HODE 6. Refueling boron concentration is the soluble boron concentration in the coolant in each of j these volumes having direct access to the reactor core during j refueling.

The soluble boron concentration offsets the core reactivity and l is measured by chemical analysis of a representative sample of i

the coolsat in each of the volumes. The refueling boron concentration limit is specified in the COLR. N ewme e- .

F0il J.ldGleh J.Jt) .N eW%.9T J3 MiMrd ' lily!'d F Wreku

(

w a) p p tg f.)x 9. pip s M.jo.nc,tpe w v.y .p M M y,t.

j { (.N..y . c .:. i in +1 ..jp .: u rg .;.t .3 3 g , p.ga.J.tq3 p g 3. git E '

EtMtMiW M)s3Et. h ofdJtsb&#d.6 % d C.Jn 3 P -duPMG4 #.

sr.ya u.% i .c 4 t,s ' mA0 m .0% 1,ws M.i Mw.L o W.

l l b1 Bet Efi9A& $ ?.OYWJ 4%iW9 4LJ iW3EP.JWo Plent-proccdurc; ca;urc th; ;pccificd .berca canccatratier. in erdcr to l emtcin cr. cver:P ccre rcccti"ity cf y 0.% during fuci h;ndling, with centrol rods and fuci es;c..ilic; cssu..;cd to bc in the aest ;dver;; cor. figuration (icc;t n;;etivc rcactivity}-

clicwcd by plant preccdurcs.--

GDC 26 of 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. requires that two independent reactivity control systems of different design principles be provided (Ref.1). One of these systems must be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions. The i

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) is the maxn system

! capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions by maintaining the boron concentration.

The reactor is brought to shutdown conditions before beginning operations to open the reactor vessel for refueling. After the j RCS is cooled and depressurized and the vessel head is unbolted.

the head is slowly removed to form the refueling cavity. [he gq0Ejl.1,37[{a,ig'y}16thFnLTro3d6 dW55f65EtWeW6 fuel:1hfgMEoTf -The refucling cana; and the rcrucling cavity are grpIca]3ysthe

) i (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.9 1 5/15/97 i

Boron Concentration B 3.9.1 BASES APPLICABLE The limiting boron dilution accident analyzed occurs in H0DE 5 SAFETY ANALYSES (Ref. 2). A dctciicd discussica cf thi; cycat i; providcd in (continued) B=c: E 2.1. 2. "S"L""'"

l

.. nu m....m _ ,wm

"^.90!" 'SD") T.,, 200'!'." M m.

-,..ranmne- . .. ._ : = .gy-mrmm.m usuorerma m D]M u > ==5 Ilmisto'umunWIL- C -- *UMEW 3DDOu'*4r1 Air =?_GW T. , . .. e teli, @ m r - t m).lsM perdeTh;

T 6e&@ (Fjeid m:M lF p elsl 2g,cJ.efj r..

DECDu r macruouw;"-'*=_e-~suw =*-->vmL* ---= n== nu:

E hk ifft 7:3 yt )sr.leLm r.y w e. s.y .g,y.9qeig.rp cy.u .c m illau:uumaser-am mu - - - ;_ _- =_ . .-- ;g

[u-ecosamm un_ i-m-~ .-w_ _-un- . ._ao eduuheIceanomann hJ,Dragwnu6iiiEmu

-usa-n==~ -_ .u=uoor

.-r n-m :-- -g,. -.. y gw, maa a. 34g an .

% 5pm v wp, m.m ee#3J #acu m w @ @iw w egu3 mr.t .girvisu ww w vMim

iim. s.s Eg 5h*_m"m =mu=~ -_= ~rn- vvwaam- ~e E;uumDava- i--ouse-= < __ -a i- "* -- --ia Re Eeisepii nuspoo5-c.mucumu uau ue.umvocenemancar 1

t5t%ImitWre onmosmpmusuruereym_-wn-ua, ns, sexciiFdInamneuxnKusy xm/mununusthl!WEVi!7BETSEIFJ th'EEMY5hTeMRenu msmameev:,muorenmaum triUiWdswateratWheroogotAthesDoo.imawaym&5iHEtlie teacrormessenganlacor,es

@g d ETe12t' heaf VelEDa sEDeenWoweted tE6Eb'e~3575theHGB U.tg S~da'3T/3h i1DI!3rtamedr/heasar,a?ntngcorshmted o

EffStWdtb7pheMhT@eRaamethrJoTdtt6EffiUK@

perJDra6QFDTtheRXdXEcoDuectT6HTt'.o'E1Y61GhemiramaTio F51DmegEontTdlE~efdownEtiFdit l

1 The RCS boron concentration satisfies Criterion 2 of thc OC l'ciicy Ststcc. cat.- 1010FM5055ISREti2DE qM O

- t annet.kE ko LC0 I

Qd The LCO requires that a minimum boproconcentration be maintained in thsifil!Geg{pyoonPE the RCS grii3b31h'4HODE56.W.ddi. tit _nia LE 9Meh2the'IRCS"iMV1oo'dsdWin~dW~dM'O . thc ccfg;iin; can 1. and th; iciucling cavity thgefyls idgfp55E"ths3a66fiiiiiihiumTb6r6h E65$EfithitT6nm s2regDjfe,d 46KeJmaj}i,tWi nedyfilthpljfSil e~gpyQiM)s 3 0h,e'2Ee7Ed)_3,fgIpyo]3 whii; in ",00E C.- The boron concentration (continued)

HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.9 3 5/15/97

Boron Concentration B 3.9.1 d -

BASES -

LC0 limit specified in the COLR ensures that a core k,,, of s 0.95 is (continued) maintained during fuel handling operations. Violation of the LCO g.,

could lead to an inadvertent criticality during MODE 6.

7 APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in H0DE 6 to ensure that the fuel in the reactor vessel will remain subcritical. The required boron concentration er.sures a k.tr s 0.95. Above MODE 6. LCO 3.1.1.

" SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDH) '--T,,, .. . . mm m. ... . ,.m..~,m uA9CIM (SD$ T,,, a 200"I.1 - ,39 = = e vuuuewu-sra-seauvan E m e .' .im.

a ' a IL 91 der 9 Mn !iewarver96 saim ' ensure that an adequate amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor and maintain it suberitical.

Me 2. e e M e n.ms.v w E.2 e n gJ. e 9 ft. w w m y % n , w ir.;r

% N E 4 e M M i 4 .h # 64rrett *% @ %c) e Me Ti %. ' l pq a m -5.wam @ 3:v@Hogi a 99 iw. yep. eps + -

s s?JEO6b a,1@ @M E4%4si[FMTop) y@KM gig .@l j@j7 0.$

.~u .k.8.p s pr.ps. 3 ygy.py+.sj as.g.nsoorms ch.ms34+5 I D.EEMMBEREDlEE22553FE!Il ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent g

upon maintaining the unit in compliance with the LCO. If - h#"[?g op boron concentration of any coolant volume in the RCSrwnaa,the_ mes>

m .,.._ _ _ .

..~ . -.ing canal . er the refueling eevtty M is less than its limit, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or q 3.9-k.

positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of CORE ALERATIONS and positia re%vity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a ;fe position.

A.J.

In addition to immediately suspending CORE ALERATIONS or j

positive reactivity additions, boration to restore the ;

concentration must be initiated immediately. 1 1

) (continued)

MARK U" d VUREG 1431 BASES B 3.9-4 5/15/97

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ - - _ _ _ - - - _ _ ]

[

~

1 Boron Concentration B 3.9.1 ;

1 l

BASES -

l ACTIONS A l (continued) x_ In determining the required combination of boration flow rate and t concentration, no unique Design Basis Event must be satisfied.

The only requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its required value as soon as possible. In order to raise the boron concentration as soon as possible, the operator should begin boration 'with the best source available for unit conditions.

)

i Once actions have been initiated, they must be continued until l the boron concentration is restored. The restoration time depends on the amount of boron that must be injected to reach the required concentration.

- F ,

SURVEILLNiCE - SR 3.9.1.1 coM N -

REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the coolant boron concentration in g g tiNFdEMEltNIEEtfi th. CS. the rciuclir,g car.ci . crd the rcfuclir,; cavity ~

rosnamentoTuvene w___ _- - .immeanroenroquDoom

~

is within the COLR limits. The boron concentration of the coolant in each ISRMl fed' volume is determined periodically by chemical analysis.

A minimum Frequency qf once every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is a reasonable amount of time to verify the boron concentration of representative samples. The Frequency is based on operating experience, which

, has shown 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to be adequate.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 26.

2. FSAR. Eheptcr [15]. pgpIerennnecmonndsT:

@I. NnencliiEHtE7mona castwmirenamnesistensemNoNRFED?! i Rah 1May40ifir21NdEt'EUplir2hT3LW955

]

By CE131WffjlPJ EntBEQtiEstTf5FXReso Mit@TiXBIT73.7.

l MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.9 5 5/15/97

CHANGE NUMBER DESCRIPTION )

' ') if the boron concentration limit for MODE 6 is not met. (See the LS 1 0

Q 3.q-24 NSHC gn in theITS3,g 3 Section A _3, 3/4.M, ITS Section 3.0 package.V , ,

3.9 15 (9.rrF-:r72 Q 3.9 - la 1 LCO 3.9,.1 hai been revised in accordance with travel'erh103 clarify that boron concentration limits do not apply to7he-re ueling

[ pool] or other flooded areas when these areas are not connected to the RCS. This change is acceptable because the boron concentration limit is intended to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical in MODE 6.

However, when areas containing boron solution are isolated from the 1 RCS. no potential for boron dilution exists. Therefore. there is no '

need to place a limit on boron concentration in these areas when they are not connected to the RCS. This change is consistent with the intent of the Specification, as described in the Bases, and eliminates restrictions that have no effect on safety.

)

e 1

)

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 3 5/15/97 w___-_-__________-__-

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.9-1b APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.1 DOC 1-01-A ITS 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.1 ,

JFD 3.9-15 I

b. (Callaway only)

The CTS is revised by changing " refueling canal" to " refueling pool". The DOC stated that it is adding the filled portion of the " refueling cavity". The change is not consistent with what was stated in DOC, nor was there any explanation in addressing these terminologies.

Comment: Revise DOC by providing explanation to these discrepancies or make the appropriate corrections.

FLOG RESPONSE:

Plant Soecific Discussion:

In CTS 3/4.9.1 LCO and in the CTS 3/4.9.10 Specification Title, revisions were made to more accurately reflect Callaway editorial / preference changes. As discussed in the transmittal letter and the " Methodology For Mark-Up of Current TS"in the back of Enclosure 2, the CTS has been marked up to reflect the substance of NUREG-1431, Rev.1. In general, only technical caanges have been identified. However, some non-technical changes have also been included when an explanation is required to demonstrate that the change is non-technical.

DOC 1-13-A was created and applied to editorial / preference changes in CTS 3/4.9.1 and 1 3/4.9.10. DOC 1-13-A states: "During the development of the ITS certain wording ;

, preferences or English language conventions were adopted. As a result, the Technical j

' Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the TS were made unless they were identified and justified. These changes made to CTS 3/4.9.1 and 3/4.9.10 are considered editorialin that they make the wording consistent with the substance of NUREG-1431 and also consistent with the current operating practices of the plant. NUREG-1431 uses the term

' refueling cavity'. The Callaway FSAR interchangeably uses the terms refueling canal and refueling pool. The change from refueling canal to refueling pool is based on plant preferred terminology" ATTACHED PAGES:

Encl. 2 pages 9-1,9-12 l Encl. 3A page 3 L Encl. 38 page 2

REvjg,0N f

a n t-JJ, co *

.. 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS I g,)h 8

t.

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATE 0,N ,

p..!

I.IMITINGCONDITI FOR OPERATION ,

3.9.1 The ron concentration f all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant 1 A Systes and the ref ueling -eene+ shall be - i-t:9:d e '*e-- t-d tuf*1ciet u i A

-enn n 2.:t t'.: ::n r::trkth: :- t'.: f:1 b in; reteti"ity ce^ditien: 1: 6.,,.J.=1 o sA-lb w wn A Ms ar**iCad **.d B6 imvosol,,

% cas n . AL ta. usc.4

is.1=4c sl. Il 6< srcu m .d .% #e. </ese</ pas ,'f ea, J

m4<.e sesseu.Q DGYo t TB

. a

v. ., 7 7 , n_ . e_c . 1. ._. , .. -

-04 M

t. ' in:n :nnatati:n :f ;n:::r th= :r :;r! '- 2000 pp;.

APPLICABIt.ITY: h00E a,. ws .u,,WM n ,

1-05-A ACTION: 6 .a;4 W I*. . * '*'

%c.n e.nssohrmg.s .

c.., With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate _-d ^=the hef: tin :t ;mt:- th= :r cau 1 t; % ;;; g . 04.l.5

f: ::hthn :=*:i-%; ;r- ter er : :;r! te '000 pte 5:r= :r it: :;;i--

Ourt = ti' ".erf S ner:d u h:: S = :r ::=1 t: 0.05 :r th t;re,n

-eent a tr:t h n h n :t: n d t: ;n :t:r th e Or :; rl t: 2000 ;;;, t h hn :r h

~

'~

_su. - - - .......a...

b. U5 7 '.E 'Ee're '.s'.'IM wakts M Man.) eia % 4ke. lose.cl s.l; ssspa,I cgc:

a ;-;we. ab-s 9 mi posi.}.; , ;,on,;,,a w;oa! --d* 1-07-M w,ws Aerenari.ase4.em st ko rs r sx sl,9, t,2 + +- t SURVEILLANCE ,REOUTREMENTS

" . 3.1.1 The .~re r e.n.rictive ;f th :tn; t'.;; r::ct4*ity ;;ndi tha: :h:11 :

dete-. b d p-b r t:: 1-09-LS

. huein; cr reltb; th; n=ter ;n::1 5::d. =d -

t. ither;..! ;f ry f*H-4C;th :=t=1 =d ' :::::: :i 3 f at f rr.:

it; fully inset:d ;;;iti= rithi- th: m :ter v::::1 4.9.1.2 The boron concent'atier of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling

' Mis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . 1-10-LG

-+aa*4 p..) ysha11 be determined ;b -c'.:qi_r1 Qh w e.

som.^;U) 4.9.1.3 Valves BG-V178 and BG-v601 snal) be verified locked closec and securec in position at least once per 31 cays.

y d.**b .

"h: r :: :r :h:i' be m4 t t ed <- MOE E " enever *ue! i: i- re 5 :4:""

l-05-A v: ;ci m th th en ::1 5::d- !ecure belt: l e- : th:6 ful'; ten f rec :r ein

=: an:: rca.c. .

s .s:s a 41.~2 f.e ca sk wh,nk) wahr a.es s is olk." \-06-R

+ S.b, k3

... v.

c q c4c.d aL% . 4; .., b is u4e.et). 1 M

+ sn 9.9.i.2. m s4 Li. l i _.-

j, CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-1 k

- ' ~

. \'.W.' . .

REVISION 1 ;

REFUELING OPERATIONS. - .... ...-

3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - REACT 0e urgstt g,p g;n g,, g l A .

N. o '

FUEL ASSEMBLIES Q 5.8- $b '

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

.t .x I ~3.9.10.1 At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of the

~'

reactor vessel flange.

Q>

. APPLICABILITY: During movement of fuel assespblies within the containment when il the f uel assemblies being moved are irradiated. ,!

s ~~<sude\ y s ACTION . :

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, uspend all 10-04 -d' operations involving movement of fuel assemblies within the :::t:r ue;;ei. p 3,g f g nmen4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.10.1 The water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum . .,

required depth U thia ? ha'_'* e p* ice te tM !!!-t c' end at least once per 10-07.- LS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , ther::f t:r dur'r,;; ::v;;;r.t :f f u ;;;;tli:;.

. l I

.k

! l.

l l .'

7 v

. .CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-12

. . :. . . r. ..

} ;. .-. -

CHANGE NUPEER JGliC DESCRIPTION 1 11 LS 19 Not applicable to Callpway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

1 12 LG , Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38) l-G A 4- -Insed 3A D 3.bibl >

, '2 01 ' LS 21 . Consistent with NUREG 1431, Rev. I and TSTF 23, the l requirements related to indication provided by the source range detectors would be deleted from the LCO. In accordance with TSTF 23. the requirements for visual indication for plants that do not rely on a boron dilution analysis would be discussed in the Bases; while the requirements for audible indication would be eliminated as I 4 a Technical Specification requirement. fThis change is acceptable because it would eliminate requirements associated with indication channels that are not required (q 3 to mitigate boron dilution events.

2 02 M The ACTION statement is revised to require that

. restoration of one' monitor is immediately initiated. This change adds a more stringent TS requirement which is '

l appropriate and consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1.

l 2 03 LS 3 The ACOT requirements are deleted and a Channel

]

t -

Calibration is added, in accordance with NUREG 1431, Rev. 1. In Mode 6, the source range monitors are required for indication only and there are no precise setpoints i asLociated with these instruments. In this capacity, the

, source range instrumentation is typically used to read a

relative change in count rate. The source range l instrumentation is monitored for significant changes in r count rate which are important to e, valuate the change in i

c're o status. Even the accepted convention defining criticality only requires a slowly increasing count rate be verified. Consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1, l indicating instruments only require channel checks and channel calibrations. The more frequent ACOTs are applied only to those channels with operational interlocks or other setpoint actuations. Therefore, the MODE 6 channel checks and channel calibration requirements for the source range monitors are adequate to assure their operability, considering the more frequent ACOTs performed on this instrumentation in other Modes, the effectiveness of these surveillance requirements in maintaining other indicating instruments operable, and the accuracy _ required of these instruments in Mode 6. g .g. g ] g g 3,g g r -

U, DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 3 5/15/97 L.... . . . . -, , .

Q 3.9-1b INSERT 3A-Q 3.9-1b 1 13 A During the development of the iTS certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted. As a result, the Technicai Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the TS

, , ~ , ,

were made unless they were identified and justified. These changes made m- ' - -

' to CTS 3/4.9.1 and 3/4.9.10 are considered editorial in that they make the gg,. wording con:Nient with the substance of NUREG-1431 and also j,. consistent with the current operating practices of the plant. NUREG-1431

/L. uses the term ' refueling cavity'. The Callaway FSAR uses all of the following terms concurrently: ref teling canal, refueling canalwalls, refueling pool. The change from refueling canal to refueling poolis based on plant preferred terminology.

I

\

n l

l l

L

A n n S rh.

L C

_ L s s s

- R A s sA s e o o e e e o eS e s

C Y N N Y Y Y N YF Y e

Y 1

2 o t

S S 5 T T L d C C

- e K 1 0

t a

E n n -

c6

_ E i i 2 o1 R

l

_ t t e C o o e .

Y n n e rh

- T S C

_ I F - - -

L L s s s s

- R I O e o o e e e o sA s e

s B W Y N N Y Y Y N eS Y (J Y Y e

A C

I 1 L e 2 o P h -

P K t 5

t A A o L d 9 E t

- e P 1 0

t a

4 d - c

/ E e 2 o H v 3 C o e l

e N H e r S A - s S T M e -

s s s s s s s

_ T O e e e a e e e o sH s e

s N C Y Y YB Y Y Y eR e N YT Y Y E

R R e U g C N nn nn a oo oo G p

- O dt i i L Y dt -

N eu e u 4 1 E

sl sl 0 A 2 L ai ai -

B C bd bd 2 t A Sdt Sdt e en T O T e n T en e e e L C s e C s e s S m B nd nd h

' N A - ei - ei -

- c O s c c a I

e c c s s s st s s S D oic oic o e e e et 7. e e I Y Nl a Nl a N Y Y Y YA1 Y Y R

A P s n n s M i l o r O nr

s. a v

i io o e rd C ou o t

a t

a t v oe n io m e c l t. l i t N o r r e e n a r a r

t h e h .

o b t ue g v O o a r t O t i e f m n pi d

I r4 C s l d u c S b t nr yL e a d c i s a no oo b r C e e o eei r r R e . et i e g t d h eb gt r a ur E hS c t s d h t l n a oi V t E nr up e t a e a i d t f um opo h

N S ou l o d h n r d e m f

O eA co it i m t n al oet u t 0 o 0

nB h d s v o a e rl rl na C n o r e 1 t ime rh oI r

el h a r f p

r h

C c

r r o i r fb e a mn ne n

u pna t

et om b o t c i n e d iud.

qe a

s o on t

"c ai i h e m

e o r yn o t t o i ca r t v et d c t t o i o dt ef f a e rai n e E h i h i

t l a h r

oe a enf mb o wm G

os t d r c a e ot t e o ct nr t t e e e irs

_ N A R y s t x a a v m ic d t i n

d e rs pn t n[ n u o e i oo Sl oy d e di t oe e ai cm t n H a hl n b e y s e f s t c " a o C en t e r

t b i d i l l

e a nt tat ir e . ci h a y sB eI d r ai s it td o l v e d t m rt mue f a C t f n ne t u et n e ea oe oqs i r E l i e e s o ra e eh r wnt ea r e P na r e mo d w i r mt o epae u rB

_ et S

i ic eb v

el r c e

t s sd i e a e r to iut q vl nm s a r h ee a H

C oe h

oa t h iue qr l

e t o t ni mt sn iu qd ed r e t

t hEhh s aB cL T t m

r e or it c ea r c e e ee ya eeA n E ip y d s r e ms m r v v f o t c R .i r c T rb c

et ri m

ee r. s s t t e t ei e r ym o i o l l ot E e map vd e

pf N h v e nd tast ro iuq a e s n iui w e t ehOl e o O eo t l me i e c r rt at o I

T di t

e ql r s s vp e

a o eg r n nni e l r i a i

t s et a nva t t t

ML20236Y172

Text

0.5 where

Navigation menu

Search