ML20196G173
| ML20196G173 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1998 |
| From: | UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196G170 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812070273 | |
| Download: ML20196G173 (900) | |
Text
. - . - ..
RTS Instrumentation
" ~.
B 3.3.1 hw "
BASES _
BACKGROUND Reactor Trio Switchaear (continued)
SSPS.~ Either the undervoltage coil or he shunt trip mechanism is sufficient by itself=. thus providi g a diverse trip mechanism.
P&
The decision logic matrix Function are described in the a .g functional diagrams included in R ferenceTI) In addition to the ,3,g reactor trip or ESF. these diagr4 ms riso d0 scribe the various
" permissive interlocks" that are' associat I with unit conditions.
Each train has a built in testing (dlT&
that can automatically test the decision logic matrix Functions .
devices while the unit is at power. When any one train is taken c; . ;out of service for _ testing. the other train is capable of
. providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has if~ 7 been~ completed. The testing device is semiautomatic to minimize s testing time.
. APPLICABLE The RTS functions to maintain the Fpplicable h linj,t;$ during i SAFETY ANALYSES, all A00s and mitigates the consequences of DBAs in all MODES in LCO, and-whifh
" M tg'm=l ordne are c6cd.Meol er e rej(r Snbsl f r+cm ers &yMy Jr es p of -Tf-3.3-dos 8 nee APPLICABILITY Each of the analyzed accidents and transients can be detected by one or more RTS Functions. The accident analysis described in Reference 3 2 takes credit for most RTS trip Functions. RTS trip Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These RTS trip Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. They may also serve as backups to RTS trip Functions that were credited in the accident analysis.
The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an RTS Function, listed in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO. to be OPERABLE.
Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel (s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions.
The LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of four or three channels l in each instrumentation Function, two channels of Manual Reactor l
Trip in each logic Function, and two trains in each Automatic 4
Trip Logic Function. Four OPEPABLE instrumentation channels in a 9812070273 981125 PDR ADOCK 05000483 P PDR (continued) l MARK-UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3-7 5/15/97 l
v_
RTS Instrumentation-
.; B 3.3.1 l & v m .
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES,
- 6. Overtemperature aT (cont' ued) '
? g LCO, and used for other control functionsfer thesc units' ,4f.T. Gen-/)
l APPLICABILITY the actuation logic mustYame to wimaano an mps -
___ /
j failure to the control system, which may then require the i protection function actuation, and a single failure in the l other channels providing the protection function l actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal i to generate a turbine runback prior to reaching the Trip ;
l Setpoint. A turbine runback will reduce turbine power and i l reactor power I
- i.hf;-jMyatiorgatggn. A reduction in power will l normally alleviate the Overtemperature AT condition and may prevent a reactor trip. n -
l The LC0 requires all four channels of the'0vertemperature l AT trip Function to be OPERABLE > .'.: c.-f* ~ - i Lugg for tw :nd four leep units 'th; LC0 r; uircs :11 three cheanels sa the Overt @rature aT trip ranctica tc l < bc 0"E"2 LE for thr;; 1;;p units'. Note that the l
(; . ' Overtemperature AT Function receives input from channels !
shared with other RTS Functions. Failures that affect !
multiple Functions require entry into the Conditions applicable to all affected Functions.
In MODE 1 or 2, the Overtemperature aT trip must be
! OPERABLE to prevent DNB. In H00E 3, 4, 5 or 6, this trip Function does not have.to be OPERABLE because the reactor l 1s not operating and there is insufficient heat production to be concerned about DNB.
l l 7. Overoower AT l The Overpower AT trip Function ensures that protection is l provided to ensure the integrity of the fuel (i.e., no fuel pellet melting and less than it cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions. This trip Function also limits the required range of the Overtemperature aT trip Function and provides a backup to the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Setpoint trip. The Overpower AT trip Function ensures that the allowable heat l
generation rate (kW/ft) of the fuel is not exceeded. T_he w OverpowerJGtripiaTsgptoyideffpcotectJonltaquittsa:ttCthe
-3
! (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 18 5/15/97
..%. -% & ._ ---~s RTS Instrumentation
.& B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE 7. Overoower AT (continued) l SAFET'I ANALYSES, !
LCO, and 6 92ECEMEDDntl5E'30 N 05ttE APPU N UTY ' - - ' ' ' - - - ~ " ' ' ~ ' - " ' " ' ' ~ ' ' " " ' ' ' ' - - - ' ' ~ ' ' ' - - - ' " ' ' - " ' - ' - ' - ' " '
f a ,i . . . Q. ,, , ?L g i_sgfps. _ . }. i Qsj 3 } ,[ [.y
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l e.d:- r*0 %) l l The Overpower ATl tr p F ion is calculated for each loop l as; per Note 2 of Table .3.1-1. Trip occurs if Overpower j y ATMs indicated ' n . loops. " - - " " " -
- rr.tur; signalg er; u nd for other ;.er. trol fantions.
l .: t-l "At thex units $e actuation logic must be able to $7,7, Gen-1 l withst d an input failure to the control system, which l may then % d m pro on on ua n an a single failure in the remaining channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function I also provides a signal to generate a turbine runback prior i to reaching the A11;u;bi; '!:. luc. Dggittisstgg A turbine runback will reduce turbine power and reactor power. A reduction in power will normally alleviate the Overpower ;
j -
aT condition and may prevent a reactor trip. j
, The LCO requires four channels for tw; =d four leap units ;
l 'thr;; chen ,ci; f;- thr;; 1;;p units) of the Overpower AT '
l trip Function to be OPERABLE pm ,
1 Note that the Overpower AT trip Function receives input '
from channels shared with other RTS Functions. Failures that affect multiple Functions require entry into the Conditions applicable to all affected Functions.
l l In MODE 1 or 2, the Overpower aT trip Function must be OPERABLE. These are the only times that enough heat is generated in the fuel to be concerned about the heat generation rates and overheating of the fuel. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, this trip Function does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is not operating and there is insufficient heat production to be concerned about fuel i overheating and fuel damage.
4 i
(continued)
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. _ - . . . . - . - - - - - . . - _ - - . _ - - . - - - _ _ . - _ = _ .
RTS Instrumentation l
.,_s w..
B 3.3.1 l Ww:a.i 1 BASES -- V N APPLICABLE 8. ressurizer Pressure redline) '
SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The same sensors prov de i ut to the Pressurizer APPLICABILITY Pressure-High and --L ps and the Overtemperature aT (continued) trip. At sex units, le Pressurizer Pressure channels Q f.7.6cn-1 are als_o u_ sed _to Control Systc. ... . g input on..to h thehe Pressurizer actuation Pressurt logi: must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. l
- a. Pressurizer Pressure - Low l
The Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip Function ensures ;
that protection is provided against violating the.~
DNBR limit due to low pressure. i The LC0 requires four channels for tw; had f;ur leep units (thra chanacis for thru 1eep units) of Pressurizer Pressure-Low to be OPERABLE
.f.ourta1&l%gi@E@ESE01R _
P.Ef50 In MODE 1, when DNB is a major concern -the Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip must be OPERABLE.
This trip Function is automatically enabled on increasing power by the P-7 interlock (NIS power '
range P 10 or turbine impulse pressure greater than approxi;;;ctcly 10% of full power equivalent (P-13)).
On decreasing power, this trip Function is automatically blocked below P-7. Below the P-7 setpoint, no conceivable powcr distributicas can occur that would causc DNS coaccrae tm insuMetent3h' 'at@rJgkictret19tt!j'b)McoW3llRH!IFaboBt; e
DNB. ,
1
- b. Pressurizer Pressure - Hich The Pressurizer Pressure-High trip Function ensures that protection is provided against overpressurizing the RCS. This trip Function operates in conjunction g4 with the pressurizer relief and safety valves to prevent RCS overpressure conditions.
(continued)
MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-21 5/15/97
~ ~ ' ~ '
~'-1. _ . _ _ .Z E l RTS Instrumentation
_ B 3.3.1 4 .
BASES !
- . - . l APPLICABLE 9. Pressurizer Water Level - Hiah (continued) l SAFETY ANALYSES, ~. l LCO, and ~ fourth channel is not required to address control / {
l APPLICABILITY protection interaction concerns. The level channels do ;
not actuate the safety valves, and the high pressure reactor trip is set below the safety valve setting.
Therefore, with the slow rate of charging available, pressure overshoot due to level chanwl failure cannot cause the safety valve to lift before reactor high pressure trip.
l In- H0DE 1, when there is a potential for overfilling the l pressurizer, the Pressurizer Water Level-High trip must Jgbe;)0PERABLE.aiThis trip Function is automatically enabled
- on increasing power by the P 7; interlock. On decreasing
' 7poweeSthis[tripTunction is automatically blocked below P 7..I:Below the P 7 setpoint, transients that could raise
'the pressurizer water level will be slow and the operator wilt have ' sufficient time to evaluate unit conditions and
' take cGrim1.;1ve actions.
- 10. Reactor Coolant Flow Law
- .' 35$ts "=h, r1= L= Ei=1
- L2:0 The Reactor Coolant Flow-Low (Single Loop) trip Function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to low flow in one or
.more RCS loops,'while avoiding reactor trips due to normal variations in loop flow. Above the P 8 setpoint, which is ;me;;intcly 48t RTP, a loss of flow in any RCS loop will actuate a reactor trip.
Each RCS loop has three flow detectors to monitor i flow. The flow signals a - t ae g any control ;
system input. l lShrNN The LCO requires hree Reactor Coolant Flow-Low l
channels per loc to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P 8 IlB808i @ 9.ff3M M N4!!OToop2ttiElogicM3beKrjp DIRMnE1@ig 4Toopsplinomitieasgedmia Mtg6q33 3 vin MODE 1 above the P 8 8116*r I
! setpoint, a los s of flow in one RCS loop could
! .c result in DNB nditions in the core. In MODE 1
! :. g,+
^
^-
_J (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 23 5/15/97 i
i l . . . - - . -. . . - .
' Nc MDI 4 Seet p4
RTS Instrumentation
_ B 3.3.1
. . .q .
- 1 l
BASES l
- 77 APPLICABLE e. Power Ranoe Neutron Flux. P 10 (continued) ]
SAFETY ANALYSES.
- '~LCO, and must be OPERABLE in MODE 2 to ensure that core -
APPLICABILITY protection is provided during a startup or shutdown by the Power Itange Neutron Flux-Low and Intermediate ;
Range Neutrra Flux reactor trips. In MODE 3. 4, 5, or 6, this Function does rat have to be OPERABLE because tne reactor is not at power and the Source Range fieutron Flux reactor trip provides core :
protection. ,
- f. Turbine Inoulse Pressure. P-13
_ _ - The Turbine Impulse Pressure. P 13 interlock isf e '
actuated when the pressure in the first stage of the
- :.- high pressure turbine is greater than opprai;;tcly - ,
. .10% of the cated full power pressure. M
- f. ,
- m. .. e. . . ; ,g . j g.
( t .6 - 9 M e ' .:J ' ' ' " >;.ue d TMs is
" determined by one out of-two pressure detectors.
hi_y The LCO requirement for this Function ensures that u one of the inputs to the P 7 interlock is available.
The LCO requires two channels of Turbine Impulse
-= 6 Pressure, P-13 interlock to be OPERABLE in @ZIbl ,,
MODE 1 1
The Turbine Impulse Ehember Pressure. P 13 interlock must be OPERABLE when the turbine generator is operating. The interlock Function is not required OPERABLE in MODE 2. 3. 4, 5. or 6 because the turbine generator is not operating.
- 19. Reactor Trio Breakers This trip Function applies to the RTBs exclusive of individual trip mechanisms. The LC0 requires two OPERABLE trains of trip breakers. A trip brc;kcr tecia censists ;f oil trip brc kcrs associetcd with ; singic PZ logic train l I
that crc reckcd ;n. closed ;nd capable of applying pacr t; the CPO System. Thus, the train acy consist ;f the gg main brc;kcr. bypass brcckcr. or ;;in brc;kcr and b3 pass i h) (continued)
MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-41 5/15/97
g.-,-n,e e is.-w=ui-in--e.%,_-a m
-w- s-h --. - W RTS Instrumentation
.~, B 3.3.1 1 g , <
v-gJ BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.6 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of 92 EFPD is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift.
SR 3.3.1.7 [fdad hew @
SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT eve y 92 days.VA COT is ggg ggf performed on each required channel to ensu he ent4re channel will perform the intended Function. -
Setpoints must be within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1-1,_ . . _
T'c diffcccrec kt c a the caricat ";; f;;nd" velac; and tra previeu; tc;t ";; icft" valuc; ;;;;t k con;i; tat with the drift all;nacc u;cd in th; ;ctp; int nthed;l;;y. Thc xtp; int ; hell k left xt cea;i;tcat with tre ;;;;;.ptica; cf tre current unit I ;pccific ;cipiat KU,edelegy.
Oc ";; found".;;d ";; left" voix; ;u;t al;; k recordcd er.d revic.cd f;r idi;tacy with the ;;;W;ica; ;f Referace 7.
SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a C.: . A t & w that provides a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from HODE 2.
This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.7 is no longer required to be performed. !
If tie unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> this Surveillance must be performed prior to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after entry I into MODE 3. NN"daartegyiCOT4 font _he ;
sour,cr _0deWertfspagongly l observatieuinGJ.EEoistmga[WMu*fyeTannuncfatogwindo##that the1PJ6Tand@IWnricT6cks"agggrMi rjte_qiH1'idMta.te'iogf.Ne existingluntt; conditions
- The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 7 51
,n ' q' i
~ -
(continued)
MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 64 5/15/97
- - . _. i RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
- n BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.12 HQtRised; .
REQUIREMENTS .
SR 3.3.1.12 is the p;rforn ax of a C"/ C EL CfLI""JT!0'
~
(continued) ~;s~~~
d; xcibed i- SR 3.3.1.10 cary 10 ;;nths. S i; S" i; adified by ; !%t; ;teting th;t thi; tat :holl ixl;& verific; tion of th; RCS ruistex; tagr;tur; itator '"J0' bypn; 1;;p flew rete-Thi; tat will arify th; r;t; 1;; caganti= f;r 1";w fra th; cer; to th; "J":.
n; Trcqu;xy is justified by th; enu;ption of an 10 renth
- libretien interval in the iter;intion of th; =gnitui ;f
.p ;quigat drift in th; xtpcint =alysi;. pp ~ r SR 3.3.1.13 1 SR 3.3.1.13 is the performance of a COT of RTS interlocks every g') 1.,
Q 3 months.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. -w--
an -Me seacb %rp
$y/*rr $rukeeader SR 3.3.1.14 /fj msedo n,em f,
.r.
SR 3.3.1.14 is the performance of a TADOT of the Manuall Reactor TrQC" Srckcr ";sition. xd the SI Input from ESFAS/ This CA-F.~5-SS-Nke l TADOT is performed every 18 months. l On t. I lY1on,) feach,~Gt ~TAbvT~ ~ con-luc-hr Ar ks+h l The hall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the /Ad.rW[b 3 p/ undervoltage and shunt trip"= ch=ia;5 Tec une ;%nual " =:te-gg / Trip F=cti= f;r the Reactor Trip Breakers and Reactor Trip CA-3.7-@$ ;
Bypass Breakers. The Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker test shall ,
include testing of the automatic undervoltage tr mec44mrrh.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Functions and the multichannel redundancy available. and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
?$. s g..-
%. J (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 68 5/15/97
ESFAS Instrumentation
_ B 3.3.2 I
W- If BASES BACKGROUND Trio Setooints and Allowable Values (continued) providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the DBA and the equipment functions as designed.
Each channel can be tested on line to verify that the signal processing equipment and setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. of Refcrcacc 2. Once a designated channel is taken out of service for testing, a simulated signal is injected in place of the field instrument signal . The process equipment for the channel in test is then tested, verified.-and calibrated. S nnels are specified in the SR section.
~
The Trip 5Atpciht[5ad Allowab(e Values 31sted in Table 3.3.2-are based on the 6wescribed in Reference 6, whic $ 7.7,6en-I l
incorporates all of the known uncertainties applicable for ea .
channel. The magnitudes of these uncertainties are factored into l the determination of each Trip Setpoint. All field sensors and <
signal processing equipment for these channels are assumed to operate within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.
Solid State Protection System The SSPS equipment is used for the decision logic processing of outputs from the signal processing equipment bistables. To meet the redundancy requirements, two trains of SSPS, each performing the same functions, are provided. If one train is taken out of service for maintenance or test purposes, the second train will provide ESF actuation for the unit. If both trains are taken out ;
of service or placed in test, a reactor trip will result. Each train is packaged in its own cabinet for physical and electrical separation to satisfy separation and independence requirements.
The SSPS performs the decision logic for most ESF equipment actuation: generates the electrical output signals that initiate the required actuation; and provides the status, permissive, and annunciator output signals to the main control room of the unit.
The bistable outputs from the signal processing equipment are sensed by the SSPS equipment and combined into logic matrices that represent combinations indicative of various transients. If
'. we (continued)
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ESFAS Instrumentation r, B 3.3.2 i ~s k?h BASES i
-H- APPLICABLE d. Safety Iniection Pressurizer Pressure - Low SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
" LCO, and APPLICABILITY . A spectrum of rod cluster control assembly ejection accidents (rod ejection):
. Inadvertent opening of a pressurizer relief or safety valve:
. LOCAs: and
. SG Tube Rupture -
- ,^[::e.....'3; pressurizer pressure provides both control and $8 3*E'^~I b
~
protection functions: input to the Pressurizer Pressure Control System, reactor tripJand SI. ~
Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to (r'OI'd h equire t%'pr'~ofecETon function withstand both an input failure to control system, actuation, and a single failure in the other
' O.
- channels providing the protection function
- actuation. Thus, four OPERABLE channels are required to satisfy the requirements.with a two out of-four logic. rer unit; th;t h=;
dedi;;ted.pret;; tion-end centrol ch;;;l;,' only thre; pret;; tion chsal; er; r.;;;nery to ;;ti;fy th; p;;t;;tiv; r;quir; ant;.
The transmitters are located inside containment.
l with the taps in the vapor space region of the pressurizer, and thus possibly experiencing adverse environmental conditions (LOCA. SLB inside containment, rod ejection). Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects the inclusion of both steady state
! and adverse environmentet instrument uncertainties.
n) .e lar bleeIced & 3.V$3 ThisFuncthn must be OPERABLE in H0 DES 1, 2, and 3 l (above P-1d to mitigate the consequences of an HELB inside containment. This signal may be manually blocked by the operator below the P-11 setpoint.
Automatic SI actuation below this pressure setpoint
! g:,3 ., is then performed by the Containment i j ,j . Pressure-High 1 signal.
4 v
- (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 87 5/15/97
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
%i w
BASES APPLICABLE c. Containment Sorav - Containment Pressure SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)
LCO. and APPLICABILITY electronics are located outside of containment.
Thus, they will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties.
ElT.ntplSetpaggjfG230MUgj This is one of the only Functions that requires the bistable output to energize to perform its required action fjeF81sdItcFAxtudi::tfonicHBH It is not desirable to have a loss of power actuate
- - containment spray, since the consequences of an inadvertent actuation of containment spray could be TseriousE Note that this Function also has the inoperable channel placed in bypass rather than trip to decrease the probability of an inadvertent I actuation.
Two differcnt 1cgic ccafigurations arc typically used. Thrc; and fcur loop units me Bour channels RCII[ec} in a two out-of-four logic configuration.
This configuration may-be g called the Containment Pressure High 3 Setpoint. for threc and four icop units, and Contain cat Pressure !!igh lligh Sctpcint fcr Cthcr unit;. Sc;; two icop units u;c thrc; ;;t",
of two channcis, c;;h sct ccabined in a cac cut of two configarction. with thcsc cutputs combincd 30 that two cut-cf-thrc; scts trippcd initiatcs cantain; cat aproy. This configuratica is calicd Contain cat Pressurc-::igh 3 Sctpcint. Since contain: cat picssurc is not used for contrci. both of thesc arrangcacnts cxeced the minimum redundancy rcquirc; cats. Additional, redundancyMarrdn e ~
because this Fun lon is ener relline)
Containment Pre sure @ gize !!i-hto tM be must n Q S. J.sen- /
OPERABLE in MODES I. 2. P-suf'icient energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. In MODES 4, 5. and 6. there is insufficient energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment and reach the Containment
. Pressure-High 3 Oligh liigh) setpoints.
m (continued)
MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 95 5/15/97
- Amp *w+* -
- 9"'WE's ,m*Q ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE - 3. Containment Isolation SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Containment Isolation provides isolation of the APPLICABILITY containment atmosphere, and all process systems that l (continued) penetrate containment, from the environment. This ,
Function is necessary to prevent or limit the release of radioactivity to the environment in the event of a large break LOCA.
I There are two separate Containment Isolation signals, Phase A and Phase B. Phase A isolation isolates all automatically isolable process lines, except component cooling water (CCW), at a relatively low containment pressure indicative of primary or secondary system leaks.
For these types of events, forced circulation cooling-using the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and SGs is the-
~ -
preferred (but not required) method of decay heat removal.
Since CCW is required to support RCP operation, not )
isolating CCW on the low pressure Phase A signal enhances e' unit safety by allowing operators to use forced RCS C -I circulation to cool the unit. Isolating CCW on the low
~
pressure signal may force the use of feed and bleed cooling, which could prove more difficult to control.
Phase A containment isolation is actuated automatically by SI, or manually via the automatic actuation logic. All process lines penetrating containment, with the exception of CCW, are isolated. CCW is not isolated at this time-to permit continued operation of the RCPs with cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat exchangersg end 333 air er-en coolers;LagdIupp'erandHOWeKbeaMhgcig@gM All process lines not equipped with remote operated isolation valves are manually closed, or otherwise isolated. rior to reaching MODE 4. ,(
Hanual Phase A Con inment Is ati. is accomplished either of two sw'.ches in the c n ol room. Either switch l
actuates both tr 'ns. Note th N anual priautomatit S7.7,6en-/
actuation of Phas ot nme Iso Containment Purge and Cxhaust Isolation.
The Phase B signal isolates CCW. This occurs at a j ,:; relatively high containment pressure that is indicative of C;.
c-(continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 96 5/15/97 i
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i t
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- m ESFAS Instrumentation I
B 3.3.2 f .@s I
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1 i (continued) 7 MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 105 5/15/97
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
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MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 106 5/15/97 l
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l APPLICABLE 3
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l (continued) i l HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-107 5/15/97 r
~
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 b, ,
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APPLICABLE - .-
Ge- Auxiliary Feedwater Loss of Offsite Power SAFETY ANALYSES,
- LCO, and- A len of effsit; F;r t; th; nrvix b;xs will b; APPLICABILITY exapni;d by a len of renter calat p;; ping (continued) pct.cr ad tFa Abxqant nad for ;a Ethed of ;
da;y hat rea sel. The loss of offsite power M is detected by a voltage drop on each semee E bus. hm47.- .: z. + f e .. v -
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l aggaMRE Loss of power to either semee E bus will start the turbine driven AFW pump to ensure l _ that at least one SG contains enough water to serve
- y. . as the heat sink for reactor decay heat and sensible I.:.~,,-.:..-+
heat removal following the reactor trip. E i
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, p .3 Functions 6.a through 6ha-e-ust be OPERABLE M ES 1, 2, 4 % _
Ed and 3 to ensure was um 5E iE=ain Ine heat sink for the
& reactor'
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f ' r SG Water Level-Low Low in any operating SG will cause the motor driven AFW ,
pumps to start. The s'y stem is aligned so that upon a start of the pump, water immediately begins to flow to the i
SGs. SG Water Level-Low Low in any two operating SGs will cause the turbine driven pumps to start, These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is not enough heat being generated in the i
reactor to require the SGs as a heat sink. In H00E 4 AFW l
actuation does not need to be OPERABLE because either AFW or residual heat removal (RHR) will cir;;dy be avga5Fe in 0;iration to remove decay heat or sufficient time is available to manually place either system in operation.
i ls
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MARK UP 0F NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 115 5/15/97
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ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 )
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BASES A APPLICABLE. b e- Au tic Switchover to Cont'ainment Sima Refueli l SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Wat/r Storaae Tank (RWST) Level - Low Low Coinci n t '
W 6 h Safety Iniection ad Coinci i nt "ith j
APPLICABILITY 'it;i n __... - - . . . . . . . .
(continued)
During the injection phase of a LOCA, the RWST is the source of water for all ECCS pumps. A low low level in the RWST coincident with an SI signal provides protection against a loss of water for the ECCS pumps and indicates the end of the injection phase of the LOCA. The RWST is equipped with four level transmitters. These transmitters provide no control functions. Therefore, a'two out of four logic is adequate- to initiate the protection function actuations Although only three channels would be sufficient, a fourth ~ channel has been added s for increased. reliability.
The RWST - Low Low All;;;ble '!;12/ Trip Setpoint has
~
beth si.i,;r e,-41;;;r li;it:;. Oc 1;nr li;;;it is
r selected to ensure switchover occurs before the RWST
" empties, to prevent ECCS pump damage. The si,i,;r li;it i; 21;;; d t; ;T2 70 ;ia 7, M T;t d ;t;T i; injuted :: a;ar A renter rsair.:; shut c r..
O,; hi p,li;it ;l;; craurcs ei ga;te a ter inJ;r,tery in th; cent;i. ;at :;;;;; t; i,resii CCCS ;^--
- actim.
The transmitter's are located in an area not affected i by HELBs or post accident high radiation. Thus, !
they will not experience any adverse environmental conditions and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties. HERIRI)
Automatic switchover occurs only if the RWST low low level signal is coincident with SI. This prevents I
accidental switchover during normal operation.
Accidental switchover could damage ECCS pumps if they are attempting to take suction from an empty sump. The automatic switchover Function requirements for the SI Functions are the same as
- , .. p._ the requirements for their SI function. Therefore, I .v. f';
k Q.,J
! (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 119 5/15/97
- , , . , - . ,a --
JS:"O'.- 4G"-'.'W 'W&'w1p'%' '""2: '
hOM' ESFAS Instrumentation e B 3.3.2 n .,
~
<.~
BASES A APPLICABLE mbe-A p omatic Switchover to Containment Sumo Refueli _ f)y,7.frem/
SAFETY ANALYSES, Waler Storaae Tank (RWST) Level Low Low Coincidebt LCO, and ? T ~ f ffith Safety Iniection =d Ccucidc ,t ith APPLICABILITY Cw it-ir.z.t "'= Levc' l:ich (continued) the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1.
Instead, Function 1. SI, is referenced for all initiating Functions and requirements.
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--- n--.s J 2 ---x.2--- x -A L L.._ _..2Ls..
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. . _ - - _ u 2
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., y g (continued)
MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 120 5/15/97
a w
---.~..- - -- -
.$ A ESFAS Instrumentation I u,. B 3.3.2 s
et+:9 BASES M APPLICABLE e- utomatic Switchover to Containment Sumo - Rcfuel of)ggfg l SAFE 1Y ANALYSES. hter Storace Tank (RWST) Level - Low Low Coinciddnt - j LCO and 'ith Safety Iniection end Coincident "ith APPLICABILITY fantai=cnt Sumo Lcvcl "ich (continued) [ required to be OPERABLE in H0 DES 5 and 6 because 4 there is adequate time for the operator to evaluate unit conditions and respond by manually starting systems, pumps, and other equipment to mitigate the consequences of an abnormal condition or accident. System pressure and temperature are very low and many ESF components are administratively locked out or otherwise prevented from actuating to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of unit systems.
- 8. Encineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks To allow some flexibility in unit operations, several interlocks are included as part of the ESFAS. These f; interlocks permit the operator to block. some signals.
C j automatically enable other signals.~ prevent some actions from occurring, and cause other actions to occur. The interlock Functions back up manual actions to ensure bypassable functions are in operation under the conditions assumed in the safety analyses.
- a. Enoineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks - Reactor Trio. P 4 The P 4 interlock is enabled when a reactor trip breaker (RTB) and its associated bypass breaker is open. Oncc the t' 4 interhck is tacticd, cutomctic SI initiction is bhcked efter tthtMEN!setIdfi3I fqllolwiO:g a 60 second time delay EmhcongunutMon witMEcse!Lergtesrjargat'matreggang a This Function allows operators to take manual control of SI systems after the initial phase of injection is complete. Once SI is blocked, automatic actuation of SI cannot occur until the RTBs have been manually closed.
9 The functions of the P 4 interlock are: i
>\ *
- b.;
(continued) MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 121 5/15/97
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - ___ =_-
. , . ~ , -
ESFAS Instrumentation i
; , . - B 3.3.2 4 ,
% BASES
, Qi;f
~
ACTIONS F.1.'F.2.1. and F.2.2 (continued)
- of Offsite Power Function, this action recognizes the lack of manual trip provision for a failed channel. rer th; A"J Sy;tca e . . . .. .... . .......~. . ... .ica recegnic;s that pining a f;i';d chanel in trip during c,gi;ti;n i: not ra;;;nrily ; ;.axintin xti0n. Spris; trip ;f thi; fsatic , ;;uld clign 9: A"J Sy;tc; t; ; nur;; th;t i; net i ~di;tcly ;;pble ;f npperting pnp m; tion. If a train or channel is inoper able. 48 hours is allowed to return it to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable
- considering the nature of these Functions, the available j redundancy, and the low probability of an event occurring during
~ ar -ithis interval.- If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE j ' (staturittie unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours
= ~
! _ and(M00E4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion s Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and 3 wiMiout challenging unit systems. In MODE 4. the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above. w G.I. G.2.1 and G.2.2 [.plc[) Condition G applies to the automatic actuation logi: ation rela s BSSRS7 for the Steam Line Isolatio , Tu..,.= CA-7.:iNkC2. l
.ri;4r/ Tri--ster lic';@and AFW actuation Functions. l 1
The action a ses the train crientation of the actuaj@oggjgit SS"S end th; ;;;; ster and sien r:1;ys for these functions. If one train is inoperable, 6 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time for restoring a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another 4 train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditio in an orderly manner and without chWenging unit
. syst
. (cA 9 km ux+y) gf,7 Gen-/
e ~ A (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 131 5/15/97
~_ - - .___ .. . -. . _ _ _ _ -_ , _- -
_ ,. 7 . _. _ . . , - - A ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 i
'NM s BASES ,
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.5 l REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.5 is the performance of a COT. - - A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entwe channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be i found within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.11.
)
310EREE l The differsacc bctuca th; curicnt "a found" voluc; =d the picvica; tc;t ";; icft" volu;; ;;;u;t b; an;istat with the drift all;;nce u;;d in th; ;;tpoint calculation. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology. m , _ m. , The "as fcur.d" cad "cs 1cft" v;1acs ;r.ust alsc. rcce d i er2
, revised for cen;i;tscy with the n;u .ption; cf the ;;rkiilmc; interval aten; ion =:ly;i; ("cf. S' whcn applicabic. ~
,. r - The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 8.
j ;s .c , _ u ,,,.
..e SR 3.3.2.6 ,1. ,(m .,
4 f .we _ - SR 3.3.2.6 is the perfo nce of a SLAVE RELAY . --The SLAVE REMY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified 1 1 one of two ways. Actuati n equipmen that may be operated ir' the design mitigation s either 4 % M -I allowed to function, or is placed in a condition'where the re ay I contact operation can be verified without operation of the - ' l equipment. Actuation <quipment that may not be operated in the i design mitigation modevis prevented from operation by the Su Q 3,14-/ I RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation 1 l verified by a continuity check of the circuit cont ng the j slave relay. This test is performed ,
- m. :-~=L . ;._. : _.
1 n?L%Yrt'2-weh%=E Eis ~2.m tfhe.*=- - - \ m._ _ m _ _ -- =- - - _. > ___-_: m .,~ .m. ~ .._,. _ _ _ - - - - Q, d: *
'" :L 7m. .
.- x ".? !.'"3s rm&.L .m*"? J3.'b% !"t*.St.5 ..-.
r-
<m Garw -a s.1
-=w h4 f) 7.7-/1 5?n .
.?$ ,Q1 .a
%~ (continued)
MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-141 5/15/97
n ESFAS Instrumentation
,m B 3.3.2 U"s,7"GBASES
~ Jw '
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.9 REQUIREMENTS l (continued) SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 28 months, or ;
approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the unit specific setpoint methodology. The diffcrena k t x . tk current "a; f;und" v;1 x; ad tk g ;visu; tc;t "a; i;ft" voi x ; = ;t h cen;i;ta t with tk drift all;w s ;c und in thEhit,~ig ;thedelegy. The Frequency of 3 months is based on the ;;n ption of = 10 c;ath M calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint methodology.
. This SR is modified by a Note stating that this test should
.. include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable. EgqLido[estgegMg33 m-fatesesmenetmaamm f
u l rivreer- rg 1.2. a.9 'M-* H + r g ~,p SIL3 3.2.m j g,g, g,m_/y This SR verifies tho 6 individual channel ESF RESPONSE 4 7M TIMES are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the l accident analysis. Response time verification 1GG97 x
@ acceptance critoria are included in the Technical p y,y_55-Rcquir; .at: "auel"(Ref. 7). F Individual component response times are not modeled in the an yses. The analyses model the i overall or total elapsed time, rom the point at which the l parameter exceeds the trip set int value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment both trains reaches the required .
l functional state (e.g., pump at rated discharge pressure, valves l in full open or closed posi on). For channels that include ynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, l lead / lag. Iate/ lag, etc.), the response time verification is mey l ?g ' Alo evedrMi -h ke,, ra, -/-4a rg auf "n ppjog,h wTf4 Mn't%dhpe, HARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-143 5/15/97 l
i._,._. . _ . . _ . . _ _ . . .
. . 49'*
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 D ^ L SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.10 (conti ed) % ,,. , red Unh REQUIREMENTS be performed wi resultin;; n::pthead'7ensfer rc;pasc function- d to the appropristc = ti= c9_7'ct to enc with the rc; pense tig Altcrptely, the ryn;; tin tc;t c:n hc pcrfer provided cdtt wi7.thetigconstan'gm.,cttotheirne;in;lv;1ac requir Q Tc; pen- is enelytically calculated i
- essum+ng-th time cor stants [,c set at their nominal values. The
- 1 response ti r me may bedrified by a series of overlapping tests.pygg such that the entire 1
6 _ . y i response ti s =;;ured. ggttTfEd!_ w W / ' Et646de 51E&hsMt.6hE%1BER.id'_ a _ m
. . . - . .,i ....ah.-.._. ...._,-m... a. . . . _ . _
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( ) . ; .$ . , _ 61 e .[.'.~.
.'w..
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e a . .. u:.. . .
.. + m . .. . .
. ~.c. .
s.
- .
- ;..[,a p...; y .\ Q ., . a . , y _ ,,. . .,; _ y y- .
. /.m g. __ m .. ; a w +: .. .. 9 c..n . _3.g_. . _ ; . - j
~y ...... - ...,.,... . . _ .
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.__a _.. _ . . . . . _ _ , . . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ j
._,--..,_m .__...m _. __- -
damMsgggggg!g0tes13 Thei't N i s ; s;Juissen _ tDBdW2!gethet J fojawinalmainten' a nMtemaustdrersen!!'m IirmneArMectrigilgen!!mgorge!at;1a.m proviiided!LtWpar;tsgIsedtBggpa3r~df6MEthe%,% e valmegrampLm egun_setjs ugtetorpensemans rep 13%.wsyse_nsinggssembTraflagttansmittegi Irqadditforga11locationsifoKothe@ircuWconstituenJher_t_ro,~ s n.s ofTthettota1Lresponse;timeImaylbelus_ed. tins _tead.lofstest measArementsfusingLthelmethodoTcigyIoREAIL:1363ffiARqgfjggtnced above#1nltaccordancetWith*J_EEEE3383977pfonJ6gr2g l ESF RESPONSE TIME verification is performed on an 18 month
.c., v.. , STAGGERED TEST BASIS. E.ach!ve. - ri f.i cati.on!.s.h.alFi.n.
- n cTo.d. . emtt.2Teast.
a u-TA d . hl N,y')' . (continued) MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 144 5/15/97
. _ .._-- m_. . _. I PM Instrumentation B 3.3.3
(??f BASES j ACTIONS C.J, (continued) - event requiring PM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information.
._...I - , . _ - . . - . . ~ . - . . , _ _ . . ~
m., -mm-am.m aan ,m..am ..h a a . 6 e Semi, amee ensung.Ib s- ,- j [ l i Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a] I Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may / i not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applie0 : to the PM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of # l one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the l PM Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident ! occur. Condition C is modified by a Note that excludes hydrogen l e;it# M. - channeTs. M ) Condition D applies when two hydrogen menttee aggg)]g channels ! are inoperable. Required Action D.1 requires restoring one I hydrogen moniter M channel to OPERABLE status within ; 72_hoursi. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the a il y os Acc nt ng ys n c ,,r ion or alu io f re a t rov i o H ra e s- Al fnr isi , nlikelygg,g,ggjg ' eyenf that a L6CA (which would cause core damage) would occur during this time. E.1 Condition E applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D are not met. Required Action E.1 requires entering the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.31 for the channel immediately. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of i Condition C or D, and the associated Completion Time has expired. l Condition E is entered for that channel and provides for transfer ; to the appropriate subsequent Condition. I-
.i
, (continued) MARK-UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 170 5/15/97 f l
i L.
- 1. -. .
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 S Wns BASES i ACTIONS .-- -- F.1 and F.2 i (continued) If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions C or D are not met and Table 3.3.3-1 directs entry into Condition F, the unit must be brought to a H0DE where the requirements of this LC0 do not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least H0DE 3 within 6 hours and H0DE 4 within 12 hours. I The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience to reach the required unit conditions from full power l conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit i . systems.
~ .
v - i
.i. _ . . _ _
g y+ ndfl& -
$ F.3,6en-l l At th unit." ternate means of monitoring Reactor Vessel Wetee l Level containment Aree Radiation -
l p. .M have been developed. ;nd tasted. These alternate l (d.' M . ' means may be temporarily in;talled (sgd, if the normal PAM channel '
?
cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allotted time.
~
If these alternate means are used, the Required Action is not to shut down the unit but rather to follow the directions of Specification 5.6.8, in the Administrative Controls section of the TS. " --"'- - -
./.!O'.'1'? M - ' :: : h ' *1 ': i 'M'NW *% 2 * ..Hc I
_'g l : }PhL' ____,
':k.Lt t i*? XL M:!.u;l
- f &. ' * # f'l?
___-Q h -- _-
- r. .>
ie. i,. .l , Ii + y. .....p. a . l
~~ ,
---.--~>m ,
- a -- -
8!@ G t 10DIL L 6. CA-7.7-4/4 inspeta Ebttt!qggsstsgmagensedggg.J---n= n z== I Gbtaj[nRISM-=id'?L ~ E_916,MmFT($2 Thejcpert previded t; th; '0C ;hould discus; th; altcrnetc ;;7 3 und. l dc;cribc th; degic; to sich the alteract; c;n: ep equivelcat
- to the in
- talled P'." chenacl;. Justify the crcas g. sich they
! erc not equivalcat. and provid; ; ;chcdul; for rc eering the acr;;;al PA" ch;nacls. b ( pr4.rcess4 and PrAcccostoor C9%mt,o) i SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that SR 3.3.3.1 l REi?JIREMENTS and SR 3.3.3.3 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in
- g., Table 3.3.31.
i /pEi4 jLy (continued) HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-171 5/15/97
j Containment Purge ed Sh;u:t IsoTationErnstrumentation i B 3.3.6 ' I
.5*h i (ih? BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6 ~ pg,f. fA -
REQUIPIMENTS ~ (continued) A CHAWNEL CALIBRATION is performed every g months. or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The i test verifies that the channel responds to a measured narametpr- M; l within the necessary range and accurac (The Frequency is basedpf,y, Gen--/ on operating experience and is consi ent; with the typical : industry refueling cycle. f m:x:om [h f
.f N Q f f-32.
x: m;g :.:r r;e ; . . . ;
- 2. ; . . . . i .. 2g_ . jw . . . .
l [
. . . , . ;, .: :. ;g 6 . J . f. . g pQ ~. . _.,,...y . :.gi .
f,- q.. . g:. . g. n ....;.m...J .m__ , y, , r . : . . .6- .
- ,a . , i, ,3 l N
. .; REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100.11.
C
- 2. NuREs-1366. *- nammaus -
g musrwammmenensammer,emsemumme l E ESM@thTe1Bfii!55 E NE l .. ... .. . . .. .. . . l I i i a e MARK-UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 199 5/15/97
l GREFS GREVS Actuation Instrumentation , , ~. B 3.3.7 TM l
./
l
-Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the ACTIONS (continued) calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immed ly and the appropriate Condition entered.
~
~ -
A Not has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that separate 4 I 8 b l n ition intry is onf ie LonTiiLions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.7-1 in the accompanying LCO. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s)/ train (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time i the Condition was entered for that Function. 1
.- bl
. Condition A applies to glRECREjgggettbnEggg the actuation logic train Functiong of thc CREIS, the radiation monitor channel Functions, and the manual channel Functions 7 If one train is inoperable, or one radiation monitor channel is I.fcm) : inoperableg in onc or more functions. 7 days are permitted to e
restore it to OPERABLE status. The 7 day Completion Time is the same as is allowed if one train of the mechanical portion of the
. system is inoperable. The basis for this Completion Time is the same as provided in LC0 3.7.10. If the channel / train cannot be I restored to OPERABLE status, one GREFS gtEVJ train must be placed l in the c;crgcacy radiation protection Contro17R5deTvettt.f341MD Iso 78tTortTSignaRCCRVISI mode of operation. This accomplishes the actuation instrumentation Function and places the unit in a conservative mode of operation.
l The Rcquircd Actica for Condition A is acdified by ; Note that rcquires placing onc CREIS train in thc toxic gas p ;tcction ;;d; instead of the radiation protection mod cf opcration if the cutomatic transfer to toxic g;s protection ;;dc is inopcrobic. This casurcs the CREIS train is placcd in th; i.;st conscrvative acdc of opcration rclative to the OPE"A"ILI"' of the associated actuation instru;cntation. i i~'J-
.x
.s
% ssaO
(continued) MARK-UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-204 5/15/97
W B9Ps lLP'yy B 3.3.9 BASES (continued) c-Je@Td) 6 %74f APPLICABILITY The BBPS BDMS must be OPERABLE in H0 DES M ; 3, 4 and 5 I
- M use the saf nalysis-identifies this system as the primary means tigate,an inadvertent boron dilution of the RCS.
G 2,3. Gen-l adhe) .re+prd) & 2.1-!! The B 0 ILI requirements are not applicable in j { ]H0DE It nd woult
. _ because an inadvertent boron dilution e inated by : ;;ur;c rer.gc trip a trip en the P;;;r P,;ng; Ncutren flux lligh 'ica ;ctpoi.. .~ .. . . 7 - .,..,, m l Overtemperature AT DEchBall8MMEDsg These RTS Functions are l discussed in LC0 3.3.1. RTS Instrumentation."
In MODE 6. a dilution event is precluded by locked valves EUGj!Q17M06BM that isolate the RCS from the potential source of unborated wateF(a ing to LCO 3.9.2 "Unborated 750urceTsolation Valves"). p .y.y pp a s.t.Gm-I r, The Applicability is ifi by a Nbte that allows the boron dilution flux d;ubling ' , t signal to be blocked during
. reactor startup in H00 _.
_ 3. Blocking the
~
flux doubling _i%. w signal is acceptable during startup
& Whilc in ."00E 3. provided the reactor trip breakers are closed with the intent to withdraw rods for startup. The28Biumla m t LILRgg@L6._
ACTIONS The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure or drift of the bistable or process module sufficient to exceed the tolerance allowed by the unit specific calibration procedure. Typically, the drift is found to be small and results in a delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination of setpoint drift is generally made during the performance of a COT when the process instrumentation is set up for adjustment to bring it to within specification. If the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate Condition entered. t (continued) MARK-UP 0F NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 222 5/15/97 L i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-A GEN APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Generic Administrative Changes Comment: Provide one DOC for each LCO to justih CTS changes that involve reformatting or word differences without any change in meaning or operation of the plant. FLOG RESPONSE: As discussed in the transmittalletter and the " Methodology For Mark-Up of Current TSin the back of Enclosure 2, the CTS has been marked up to reflect the substance of NUREG-1431, Revision 1. In general, only technical changes have been identified. However, some non-technical changes have also been included when the changes cannot easily be determined to be non-technical by a reviewer, or if an explanation is required to demonstrate that the change is non-technical. DOC 1-63-A was created and added to the top of the page for each CTS Section 3.3 Specification. DOC 1-63-A states:
"All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. During the development certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted. As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the TS were made unless they were identified and justified."
ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 , pages 3/4 3-1,3/4 3-13,3/4 3-38,3/4 3-49, and 3/4 3-52 A, page 17 8, page 12
)
- .- . 1 A
E}r: 3 /4.3 INSTRUMENTATION l-SS-A
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'3 /4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
.- LIMITING CONDITION.FOR OPERATION -
3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and l interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. ACTION: . As shown in Table 3.3-1.5 f_. g A SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTS
~
4 3.1.1 Each Reactor Trip System instrumentation channel and interlock andJ the automatic trip logic shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance ~ of
-- the. Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified'in Table 4.3.1. ,
even f*ed-4.3.1.2 The /-dQ./ G ic shall be d:...gEACTOR
..: trit 9to be within its limit at least once per 18 months a /qy Reac IRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each Lg Neutrondetebtorsareexemptfromresponsetimetesting. E:ch t :t 05:1
', )'7 clud: it 1 :::t :n: tr in :uch th:t b:th tr:in: :r;t;;tedatI;;;tnp. p;.
cr t :t
-- 25 :::th: Ord :n: ch:nn:1 per functi:n ::ch th:t :ll ch:nnel:t:t:1 number ;f " ;p ct 10 :t :n:: : :ry " time: IS :: nth; wh:r " i: th:
" d :.. dant . Of th:nnel; in Chennel ' j luan f T:51; 3.2 1.:p::ifi: 'le::t:r trip functi:n :: :h:un " +5:
g g 3 s s- _ on a ETA GGEAEb "YM~ SW-e I y J, ,.l a (onelo'h*on en5'~f ' " N'"* l %
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- /
l Amendment No. 104 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-1
)
t fNSTRUMENTATfON - f g _,j 3 /4.3.2 EEGfNEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATfCW SYSTEN INSTRUMEKTATIONg /.-/) gg i
- __ . LIMITING CONDTTION FOR OPERATION j
A 1 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation i My channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE dth th:tr T-ip 2 -c/-A i *:t; 6 t: nt copsistent with thegValues shown in th: T-ip S:tpcint cir, ;f 2-CH.G-l Table 3.3-4. 3anA g gf y g t , j APPLICABItITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3. ACTION: # i., o,.L __ ree,e ,..+
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m..... _ _ _ _, ,..L,_ e,- With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Tame 3.3-3.. ,n , PrAcccxa:b l SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENT7 T#M# l 4.3.2.1 l actuation Each logic and ESFAS relaysinstruneatation shall be demonstrated channel and interlock OPERABLE by the and perfo the autohtic nce of he SFAS Inctn=antation illance Requirements specified in Table .3-2. ! G'E s oww n ,e i 4.3.2.2 inevtEINEER SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS func tion gg l shall be tr=tr:.ted i.o be within the limit at least once per 18 months 1(the i provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for the steam turbine-driven NM i auxiliary feedwater pump for entry into MODE 3. The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 1 RESPONSE TIME testing for the steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is
!. required
.,enerator.
to be completed .... with,in, ,.,.2. 24 hours . after attaining 1900 psig in .all._. steam
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- Eera wh Cesh% en i.e alle.wl -G,- ead Fune%. l-ot-A CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. M4,108 j
n REVISlay , INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION N/~A 68M
~[' .\
RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT DDERATIONS j g pA l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 I 3.3.3.1 The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels for plant operations ' shown in Table 3.3-6 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm / Trip 5etpoints within the specified limits. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-6. _ ACTION: 1
- a. With a radiation monitoring channel Alarm / Trio Setpoint for plant operations exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3-6, Mj = t the - Sqq
-Cats ...; ;; .ithir, ;h. liait .cithi, I h;.r; ;r declare the channel inoperable.
- b. With one or more radiation monitoring channels for plant operations inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-6. I
- c. The provisions of Specificati . C. C ... 3.0.4 are not applicabi c[ 7.-gg,-A
-h He ter La hy baker ndru~~+ h. ~., ,
- d. weer 2/+ T-n g4pf SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS 4.3.3.1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel for plant operations shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-3.
l l l e M l l , CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-38
fN5720 MEN 7ATION
/-t2-A l
REMOTE SHUT 00VN FN {}/07sy _ g /_ggg
-/ LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERAT!ON - I Sfh &n c&nt 3.3.3.5 The remote shutcown V eirawMietliisc6acreo7 - - Vgiven in "/ 0/ A Table 3.3-9 and the auxiliary shutcown panel (ASP) controls shall be OPERABLE, ;
^ j WMoM W3*WP W3=W)%) ~f.-04 -l G APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
C No+e: Sep~+e Conhan e>&y i.e allowa} 4,,. esef .
/-et-A Sne%n and racwerd Aq con +<sl.) 75_.w(,) 1
- a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitering-:henn hhess */g/g (
than-t.t: "' 't c 05...c.. . OF:'L'.0L: :.; required by Table 3.3-9, restore I the inoperable c.;.nn: (:' to OPERA 8LE status within cays; otherwise, -/ g g t g be in at least HOT STAND within the next 6 hours a in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 h urs. 3 f5ncf*on(.c)
- b. With the ASP controls inoperable, restore the inoperable ASP controls ays; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY'/ g.f L g to OPERABLE status within within the next 6 hours an n HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, yd
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
-4TN l y
l SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS .
?
l l 4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentati channel shall be deconstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHEC d CHANNEL ~/-89 4,,5 CALIBRATION at the f requencies given in Table 4.3-6. 4.3.3.5.2 The ASP controls shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months,fy.,epphcMDdQ4.@D ~7~/?-LS A $ 7-/3 4.3.3.5.3 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not a.pplicable for entry into H30E 3 for the turcine-criven auxiliary feeewater pump hm 7 ffg
^
WPY 0 9-//-A g p;, c.J ,.ey;<J r~+~ M*n c k~l +A H< ~-~Ily e,,ey=ed. 7-n-Ls l l 3/4 3-49 Amencrnent Nc. 45 , CALLAWAY - UNIT i 1
INSTRUMENTATION
/ ~~ h
\
&*?-A f' W m i ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION f) /-AfEA/ \ j LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation g th:nn;is shown in Table P-4/-A 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.
Funei % c APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTION: (No+e : Sef are-le CandiH*~ en4>y II *II*"*0 S" **ch 5"c0fm.) lof-A e,avr)e u,.6 .t. ..._t._ .,nnen,n e ___o._. ___,.__,__ ...._.___...u. I /Go./;,,,, d "L
- 2 :".._...s. :. s. :.Z..'h...!.n' -% :'7" , C:"
- Wi :2 : s ? _ L':Ji 7:"Z I~d7-A !
cne Reguire) 3.0 10, - p.;g.g l - CAan elievrer* Ale; within $estore daystheor inoperable prepare and channel submit(s) to OPERABLE a Special Report status to the 1 ex,,g p,, Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the following 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, . N eU8ar the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and sched f -- I f and lly restoring the channels to OPERABLE status. er .~ , FGne#en fer li '
' ' " " " " ' " ' ' - - ' ' - - ' ' - ' - ' ' Ow,K yA=speg,mcx_;i b~
'M **
5 $$ $ $, Y ept lor' 5 5 $..2$5 3 Net [oN [ iO [56 And l8 - (Contain t Hydrogen Concentration Level, Containment adiation 8-07-A 6nehearkin Level, and the Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System),4 err- P-df-A
\ Ne geptral th;n th: Minimum Channel; Or;"a"L: requ r;;;nt; -f Tabi; 2.': - C, I
c y n,,,j, restore one channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, l fuI,,gg,> be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in WT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. A Q fnyentle
- c. With- th; numb;r ;f OT:ra0LE channelsVfor in:trum:nt /5nctions 16 P-os.A ,
or 18 (Containment Radiation Level or the Reactor Vessel Level l Indicating System)4.:es; r:quir^;;nt: Of T.1; 2.010, theninitiat; the Mini;;; Channel; ^I "'"L th; preplanned alt;rr,ete
- th:d :f :: nit:rin;; th; :.ppr;priate parameter (s) ithin 7" A-H-4.5 h gr; end either restore one inoperable channel to OPERABLE ' ,
status within 7 days, or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the following 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status. he
- d. With the number ;f OP ra"LE ;h;nn;i; f,r th # Containment f--42-A Hydrogen Concentration Level monitors 1;;; th:n th: Minimur. /neferd/e ,
Ch:nn::: C?EPfal: r quir:::nt f T:.bi 2.2 10, restore one channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.6 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel Jhall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECMnd CHANNEL
' ' ~
CALIBRATION at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7. 7-Of-L5 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-52 Amendment No. ei, 103 E kr- eaeh qdo-c) Inchrumsorfm-l9n chmnef -fid i.r ne m i ene ;&. 7-o1-u )
CHANGE
- r. .
NUPEER M. DESCRIPTION k,j'3 1 60 - Not used, l 1 61 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison i Table (Enclosure 38). [N.rStr 3A-t 1 - 2 01 A Tite Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation [ ] Allowable Values are moved to ITS Table 3.3.2-1. l 2-02 A CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.21, and the values for Total Allowance (TA), Z, and Sensor Error (S) are deleted, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. The TA, Z, and S I' parameters were developed by Westinghouse. If the as-measured value of a trip setpoint were found to be less conservative than the Allowable Value, current ACTION b.1 provides 12 hours for the adjustment of the setpoint without declaring the affected. channel inoperable, provided that Equation 2.21 was satisfied. This would have avoided the necessity of writing a Licensee Event Report (LER) prior to the revision of 10CFR50.73. Since i the revision to 10CFR50.73, an t.ER would no longer be i required. Setpoint adjustments required by-current ACTION b.1 for analog channels are performed with the affected channel removed from service. Equation 2.2 1 effectively allows rack error to increase above its nominal value by an amount dependent on the available setpoint margin: however, this margin is available for utilization at any time and is not restricted to whether the ACTION is entered. As such, current ACTION b.1 effectively provides no different recourse than current . ACTION b.2. With a nonconservative as measured trip i setpoint, current practice is to enter ACTION b.2. Therefore, CTS ACTION b.1. Equation 2.21, and the values for TA, Z, and S can be deleted as they are no longer required. 2 03 LG The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints are moved to a licensee controlled document, consistent with one format allowed by NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. This information is more appropriately controlled outside of the TS. The parameter used to assess operability, the Allowable Value, is retained in the ITS. 2 04 LG The requirements stipulated in ACTIONS a and b are moved l , y to ITS Table 3.3.21, with explicit direction contained in l the ITS ACTIONS Bases. L DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 17 5/15/97
INSERT 3A-17 (page 1 of 2) 1-62 A ACTION 7 in current TS Table 3.3-1 is moved from Functional Units 13.a , and 13.b to Functional Unit 13.c. ACTION 7 applies to the delay timers in i the TTD circuitry that delay reactor trip at reduced power levels upon reaching the SG Water Level Low-Low setpoint. The EAM/TTD design modification added NPL cards to the 7300 Process Protection System which use Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM) modules to perform timing functions. The NPL timer module plugs into the PROM sockets on the NPL card and provide _s an adjustable range of time delays. ACTION 7 was written in recognition of the fact that these new NPL cards require a separate Action Statement since they are not part of the SG water level analog channels and are separate eom the circuitry added to ; l implement the Environmental Allowance Modifier (containment pressure l bistable comparator cards and normal containment environment SG l water level bistable comparator cards) and Trip Time Delay (vessel AT l bistable comparator cards). ACTION 7 has no applicability to the SG Water Level Low-Low (Adverse Containment Environment or Normal Containment Environment) analog channels since the timers are not part of those channels' circuitry. Neither the inoperability of the delay timers i nor placing the Vessel Delta-T (Power-1, Power-2) channels in trip affects the OPERABILITY of the SG Water Level Low-Low analog channels. ACTION 7 affects only Functional Unit 13.c since the action trips the l channels associated only with Functional Unit 13.c. Since this change l does not affect any operating limits or the manner in which the plant is operated, this is an administrative change that moves an ACTION Statement citation next to the equipment it affects. The same changes are made in current TS Table 3.3-3 for the related i ESFAS Functions where ACTION 35 (the ESFAS counterpart to RTS l ACTION 7) is moved from Functional Units 5.d.1) and 5.d.2) to Functional i Unit 5'.o.3) and where ACTION 35 is moved from Functional Units ; 6.d.1).a) and 6.d.1).b) to Functional Unit 6.d.1).c). The same change ! would have been made for ESFAS Functional Unit 6.d.2) had it not been deleted by DOC 2-09-LG. 1-63 A All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is in accordance $ M 6EN with the Westinriuse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. During the development certain wording preferences or English language i conventions were adopted. As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) i to the TS were made unless they were identified and justified. 1-64 A The refueling interval TADOTs for Functional Units [1 and 17] in CTS Table 4.3-1 have been revised to include existing Note [10, Setpoint
$ /dd verification is not required."] Likewise, refueling interval TADOTs for Functional Units [1.a. 2.a,3.a.1), 3.b.1), 3.c.1),4.a, 6.a. 9.a, and 11.b] in CTS Table 4.3-2 have been revised to add a new Note [6], " Verification of
(G d4
%Qp~
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 12 of 26 I TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON C0HANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER The DCPP CTS 3.3.1 Action 2.c requires that power be Yes No No No 1 56
-*- reduced to less than 75% or that SR 4.2.4.2 be performed !"~NN whenever power is a 50%. .This power level requirement LS-f */ should be 175% since if power is decreased below 75% per the first part of Action 2.c. the required Action is couplete and in addition. SR 4.2.4.2 is only required for power levels a 75% with one power range detector inoperable, Yes Yes Yes Yes 1-57 Current TS Table 3.3-1 Functional Units [12.a and 12.b] are LG conbined per TSTF-169. The relationship between the Functional Units is moved to the Bases.
The proposed change would allow Reactor Trip System and No See CN Yes No - See CN No - See CN 1 58 ESFAS sensor response time testing to be performed per 1-03 LS-1. 1 03 LS-1. 1 03 LS-1. A WCAP-13632-P-A Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements." or other similar ~ methodologies. This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-ill, which revises the Bases for ITS SR 3.3.1.16 and SR 3.3.2.10 to allow the elimination of pressure sensor response time testing.
,1$Q tt & Z M K7~ 3 $-/2 A -wA-Ye r -ttHr--M wA-A4 Ma Q t-st-4 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 60 Not used.
If the requirements of current CPSES ACTION Statement 6 are No - see CN Yes No - see CN No - see CN 1 61 1-19-LS-8. 1-19 LS-8. 1-19 LS 8. M not met. LCD 3.0.3 would be entered. In accordance with the ISTS, this ACTION Statement is revised to state that, if the ACTION requirements are not pet, the plant must be taken below the P 7 Interlock setpoint within the next 6 hours. Yes Yes Yes b2-01 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Yes A Instrumentation [ ] Allowable Values are moved to ITS Table 3.3.2-1. 2 02 CTS ACTION b.1. Equation 2.2-1, and the values for Total No - not in current No - not in current Yes Yes A Allowance (TA) Z, and Sensor Error (5) are deleted. TS. TS. consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. l
< .rNnser .T2-/28 5/I5/97i ! -
CONVFRSTON COMPARISON TARIF - CllRRENT TS
I l INSERT 3B-12B NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CALLAWAY CANYON PEAK CREEK 1-62 in a Callaway-specific change, ACTION 7 in CTS Table No No No Yes A 3.3-1 is moved from Functional Units 13.a and 13.b to @ T.T-6f . Functional Unit 13.c 1-63 All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial wording is in Yes Yes Yes Yes A accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical g /-/)-f' Specifications, NUREG-1431. 1-64 Notes are added to Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 to exclude Yes Yes Yes Yes A setpoint verifications during TADOTs on Functiona! Units $ /-23-A that do not have setpoints associated with them. 1-65 Explanation of ITS treatment of seven slave relays with No No Yes Yes g 3,gg A extended surveillance frequency. 1-66 This change would delete the reference to Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes LS-45 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1 in the allowed bypass notes contained in certain CTS ACTION statements, thus g g,g,d permitting any testing needed for restoration of the , inoperable function. 1-67 This change revises DCPP CTS ACTIONS 13 and 29 to Yes No No No M provide specific shutdown requirements to exit g gJ ef-f Applicability, in lieu of applying CTS LCO 3.0.3. This change is more restrictive by one hour than the CTS. 1-68 This change deletes DCPPP CTS Table 4.3-1 note (8) Yes - see No No No LS-54 which is applicable to the source range. The verification also CN cannot be performed in MODE 3*,4* and 5*, since the 1-69-M bO'3 M Y power and intermediate range channels are not required to be operable until MODE 2. 1-69 This change applies new note (20) to DCPP CTS Table Yes - see No No No M 4.3-1 function 6, source range neutron flux. a!so CN bO-73-d84-1-68-LS-54 i i
l l t ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-LS GEN APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Generic LS DOCS l Comment: For each proposed less restrictive change discussion include a clear ; statement of the CTS requirement, the CTS reference, a statement of the proposed ITS l' requirement, and the proposed ITS reference. For an example of this problem, refer to the first paragraph of LS-17. Based on 8/14/98 meeting comment responses will be addressed in individual LS NSHC. ' l FLOG RESPONSE: No specific response will be given to the comment; however, this RAI number will be used for tracking purposes where NSHCs in Enclosure 4 were revised outside of l a specific comment (e.g., the response to Comment Number Q 8-04-LS-17 addresses the NSHC ' cited in the comment). See attached revisions. l l ATTACHED PAGES: I I Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 1 Enclosure 4, LS-8 (page 33), LS-11 (page 39), and LS-40 (page 72)
]
l 1 t s
, IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 8 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES WAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS yj,rc$ exf-l:r Ne /lffli'enlllif aS This change reflects a 'evision to current ACTION Statement [6). If the requirements of current ACTION Statement [6] are not met, LCO 3.0.3 would be SNMW entered. This ACTION S1 atementisrevijsgt st. ate that if the ACTION requirements are not met. EERMAL POWER must be recpcec t6Te$ the P-7 interlock setpoint within the next 6 hoursU ,_ ef the4unctional Units that impose ACTION Statement [6 Low: Pressurizer Water Level High: Reactor Coolant Flow $ Pressurizer Low, Two Loops (above P 7 and Pressure below P 8): RCP Undervoltage; and RCP Underfrequency,3are automatically blocked below P 7 and an Applicability Note has been added accordingly. The Reactor Coolant Flow - Low (Single Loop) reactor trip function does ht have to be OPERABLE below the P 8 setpoint: however, the Required Action must t ce the plant below the P-7 setpoint, if an inoperable channel is not tripped withi 6 hours, due to the shared components between this function and the Reactor Cool t Flow Low (Two Loops) trip function.
Th e.re F-Le kr l The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it O involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or i
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or l 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
l l The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant
- hazards consideration standards
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
l ) Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The proposed change adds a relaxation to the ACTION Statement associated with l NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 33 5/15/97
l l IV. SPECIFIC NO S!GNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 11 ' 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION l FOR 2 6 fd7V ' TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE l REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS irefa-hin Aehe&n f&ammhlin fr rw+ regarred-la le ofE' AAGE [ Note (a) is added to current TS Table 3.3 3 for the eam Line Isolation Function 3 to state that the f y N p d p @ g M M in MODES 2 and 3 when the MSIVs are closed.] Note [(b)] is added to current TS Table [3.3 3] for the Feedwater Isolation and Turbine Trip Function to state that the LCO requirements are not applicable when the [MFIVs] are closed [ ]. When these valves are closed [ ],
-6eic Tro/42,,, Lkan is css ykeEr
" h here is ^* he* 0%;WW G'sy;"h -
a,r.roeTa a c-/ua-h3n ing/yamenhNm e
-fa ]y/
The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it 4/'E4MBLE. involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
1
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an ;
accident previously evaluated; or l
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated: or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The proposed change adds a relaxation to the Applicability associated with the [ Steam Line Isolation and] Feedwater Isolation ESFAS functions. Thosefro/.Mn functions are accomplished when the associated valves are closed [ ], whether that closure is as a result of automatic isolation A'Yffy or operator action. Operability requirements on actuation ;#f,"pr ar not applicable if the valves are closed [ J. The proposed change will no af ect any of the analysis assumptions for any of the accidents previousi ev luated. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any eve, initiators nor inc{ramenhNon NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 39 5/15/97
I IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFZCANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATZONS l NSHC LS-40 I 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION a! FM TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IM MSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WIlliIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The current TS require that the setpoints be verified during the quarterly TADOTs for the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Underfrequency [and RCP Undervultage] functions. The setpoint is adequately confirmed during the 18 month calibrations. JAUE#T M GEhf The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in l
50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance i with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: or
' 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any l
accident previously evaluated: or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following cvaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The setpoint for the RCP Underfrequency [and RCP Undervoltage functions are] selected such that the Allowable Value is not expected to be exceeded during the 18 months between calibrations. This function is not an initiator for an accident previously analyzed but the function is used to provide a reactor 7 trip signal to mitigate certain accidents. However, because the function is l not expected to exceed its Allowable Value based on the 18 month calibration, it is concluded that the proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the consequences of any accident previously analyzed.
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of
. accident from any accident previously evaluated?
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 72 5/15/97
l
. .x INSERT LS-40 g a_Lf-f6M Therefore, Table 4.3-1 is revised to add Note ((10)) to the TADOTs of Functional Unit [s 14 and 15] such that setpoint verification during the quarterly TADOT is not required.
This is acceptable because operating experience has shown that these relay setpoints demonstrate such low drift that if the setpoints were verified only during the 18 month calibrations there would be no effect on system performance and the Allowable Values for these Functions in current TS Table 2.2-1 would not be challenged. t l . i l i A l
l ! l l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ; t l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3-LS GEN APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC { REQUEST: TSTF-135 changes l Comment: TSTF-135 was dejec:ed except for the traveler changes identified by the ! l following justifications: DOC 3 which deletes STS Condition V for two inoperable trains; DOC 4 which makes changes STS T3.3.1-1 Note (b); DOC 5 which deletes Source l j Range Flux for Applicabilities in T3.3.1-1 with Note (f); and DOC 7 which deletes l Intermediate Range Flux for Applicabilities in T3.3.1-1 with Note (e). Revise the submittal to delete all other TSTF-135 proposed changes. FLOG RESPONSE: This traveler was discussed during meetings with the NRC staff during the week of August 10,1998. The attached pages represent changes, including revised DOCS and JFDs, that we believe are acceptable to NRC. These changes are marked with the change code l "TR-3.3-006" since the majority of these mark-ups were self-identified and pre-date the RAl.
- Mark-ups are based on TSTF-135 Rev. 3.
i ATTACHED PAGES: , Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 l Enclosure 2, pages 3/4 3-5 (single
- table notation),3/4 3-6 (ACTION 5.a),3/4 3-6(a) (ACTION 4 i
10), and 3/4 3-12a (Insert new note (19)) l Enclosure 3A, pages 4,11, and 16 Enclosure 3B, page 3 Enclosure 4, pages 37 and 56 Enclosure SA Traveler Status Sheet Enclosure 5A, pLyes 3.3-1, 3.3-2, 3.3-4, 3.3-16, 3.3-17, 3.3-21, and 3.3-22 Enclosure SB, pages B 3.3-7, B 3.3-9, B 3.3-14, B 3.3-15, B 3.3-42, B 3.3-43, B 3.3-44, B 3.3-45, B 3.3-51, B 3.3-56, and B 3.3-58 Enclosure 6A, pages 6,10,13,14, and 15 ! Enclosure 6B, pages 7,13,14,18, and 21 1 I I ! l i 1 ' l i I
"S (1~nderths/Th $an **$**n flu & f,,4r,.ln e k . f-6-l-LS g
- 1 (Low lowee Reac-/s,- ojor Sle e Q ,,.k/o c k. }-14-LS (C) A),ove +La lL9 ( few,,. g4 9 3 *
/~/f~~A >' - TABL[#3.3-1 (Continuedi bif b.r fa?kk.%} aee eaeked in and elere) ,,,,g Y
Y f Only "(l 1j f;$thyn "* %;per :: be i d i ::d
^
p::iti: M : & 'CW trolb:t Rod=Drive b =System h r: is capable ~oTroif j g ry_~y,,fr._,,g withdrawal f , edt are ne+ fully interfe/. N,#[ " The boron diluuon flux multiplication signals may be blocked durinJ .f; M reactor startup_in accordance with anproved procedurgn 'ggI Th: pr:vi:icn: Of Sp::in = w5 T.O.i fr: r.01 :ppli::ble.
/-/.f-/)
## Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
### Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock)
Setpoint. (1) The' applicable MODES for these channels noted in Table 3.3-3 are f more restrictive and, therefore, applicable. l ACTION STATEMENTS 1-O+-LG ACTION 1 - With the OP number
"/"LE of OPERABLE r ;;irc::nt, restorechannelsthe inoperable one less than th: Mir':e/~
channel ge l revlChannels$LE to OPERA status within 48 hours or be in HOT STA ' the next 6 hours.
/-fy_j; l
l ACTION 2 - With the number.of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tet:1 gut,v2 i:::b:r :f Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may providedthefollowingconditionsaresatisfieg: I
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours,and n,...,a , noreneir .~,4.-_m.+ 4, ..6-m..... '
/_OfIG
' i, n u 4. 4_-- '
Mek: The inoperabie~channei may be by;lassedler up to'4 hours f~or pr C;::ift::t!r /.fy.4 surveillance testinggof other channel y,y_/;20
*ad M/*id *8att -_
4.2. .:, :nd(t&a. fewer rame'ne&Meax input tQ iess man or equa t ( ' J,.-4-- Either, THERnAL ruwER W ree meo w r C:n;; :::;tr:n Ti c 75% of RATED THERMAL 4. _a..__a . POWER .nd th: P= ___.a
,--,.t._ . o em e v 4. e..a.
% tai i5EjN[hb"dSithin ~ ' hours [Arhthe hbAb"R[ POWER /
, &/YR J litt RA110 tis monitored at 1 ast once per 12 3 hours per g Specification 4.2.4.2,,,. 12 gg s.c en ,pera&le y #
- c. 0+kerw:ve be in Hov NMbty wi+hin Il keur.r. MO ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the -Mini:::
g /cgu/rel Channels CP:PA L: c:qu;r: cat :nd with th; T":RPAL P0":n 6 lg D al co the D-E (later ediate o. rge "cutrer c' u x i-terlock)-jg7_gg M 7-5A /@/- I 2.
!^tpcint, rc:t r: th^ in:p;r:ble :h: = 1 1: OP:PAOL: :t tu:
/-/7-A prier t: % = :i g THEP"/.L PC'?ER :b= th: P Sj :t; int; ;r-h"TATn<3Fd,are)
- b. S:"^ + % "-5 (?-ter--dist D.sr.; "^ ut r. . . .r.iacri:d;jp g S-tp; int but bel a 10% :f PATED I" RP.'L POL':2," restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE statu pri:r to,incr:::in; i
"3 !
THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THE ALPnWFR,,. celue
/bWEA -b 'It N*^
h*, IN,rERT* f-t e e ine reae y,/+ 3 ,$ g L l-61-l 3 l /TmLS ~
~
$3.2-/:20 Amendmer,t No. f.7,6f, 94 3/4 3-5 i
kk%QTVrsg,ur,ej l' C LLAWAY'- f e f e r.;,m* AUNIT)
^ D [~m x/sm g nf FIs
-le & t rg nef i.e o.erable.
rw ~.gy>x;.,c7,yg~~,~ --
- w. - r7 eryypryyy ce Kaye Neakon
1 l l TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) yq
..M ACTION STATEMENTS (Centinued)_
1 * ' l-M
% l-+3- A ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the " 'mur
/emfre/
Channels,P:1'2L: :;;irementguspend all operations involv no-di-M positive reactivity cnanges. ;rnenedidelY f W'% ',d & u1/ -o f-d
~D if E R 7~ 3/ + J_j p . _ .y.
l ACTION 5 - a. W he less than the /-04-/ G 8eguire/ ' "_ith 'mu- Channels the numberj CP'"'IL: of:;.iOPERABLE
- q:nt,$ estore thechannels /_47-A inUperable cnannel to OPE?AELE statusene3ry3 or*'ep;r the ":: t:- t-ip b : hort, cu penc 21' ope ::'em g _/_f g 4~f '"'r; prit ze -a nt ' ty ch;ng n :nd c i f, ";1, c; i em i ****as :: m : =d 3: n:1 :r: :l=:e =d :=cred_ 9 :=i tier.
ie '- tu: n = - u:u . arms <umme-bl/ i r 7ff
, ,5g_z1 '
I'3 -#dla _l?o d d " ' f L d /n @ N,'[ei V M___ ,'[ !C_ . 7 ._
. m no neis urennot-, -
..~.., j fgg operations involving positive reactivity i
suspend a ma changes and verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN wrUt g, requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as /~MA applicable, within 1 hour and every 12 hours thereafter, - and verify valves BG-V178 and BG-V601 are closed and secured in position within 4 hours and verified to be closed and secured in position.every days. jgg
. - g ACTION 6 - ith the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the -T:::1 /_.py_A
~.. ) geguires[ W' Ember of- Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may
. provided the following conditions are satisfieg:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours ,-+ed--or
- b. ~5: "' 'mur Ch;rn:1: OPEP*ILE equi ement #: :: ; he efte, f_ 4 g A/cfe; "Tne inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to a hours /-//,-L S for surveillance testin f other channels $
.C= = =,c = 3)go Q3.s.;
b Aedu ce ~T'HEginAL gicg & Ias 4Lan f-] wo k:n j3 hoarr., j_,q z,g nCTION 7 - With an inoperable
, e ay timer in the irlp T}1me Delay circuitry, STARTUP and/or PCUER OPERATION may proceed provided that the Vessel Delta-T (Pwer-1, Power-2) channels in the affected l
protec!jon sets ara Mkerwose be in a+ lest+ placed in the tripppd 807 5-rprJbdf wo+Mnconditjon within
+La rollsw*y & Lourt. 6 hours. l-42-M
"~iOF A - With less tnan ihqH-H. ':vmbr d Charn:1; CEP'2LE, within Z::ined p: -iM M j_ 4 g f #g_
bpire CAanneJf P nour cetermine 2F2'2I2r 'd^ 4:}4 thatebnrtheW :- cf P: is in its recuired , interlock jhA_g 0/ ERA 8LE> state for the existing plant condition, or-ap; e 5;nt-:=:: - /-/2-M
- . C . " . Le in a+ lee + Hr7- STAm8f w;+Lin +Le f flo w;g i kours.
l-l>-/1 i rNSEgT~ 2/+ 3-48 --+-- With the number of CPERABLE Reactor Trip Breakers one less than the AC. GN 9 Kegw're2 "' 'n.;- Channei y s :I:P.*;;~_ :;.i :m:r:gbe in at least HOT STANDSY /_g Lg. to within 2 hours '1ours; h0vever, one breaker may be bypassed for j_jy upor g~c break
] provided in other breaker is OPEPABL'.
mainienance er for re thee 4ks Irv er*ble Art *ker .L J in l ho w ee gl g{
'l 5 ofERA8LE v
Amendment No. J7, .42 ; M CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6
- ..g 5
~
/
/N \
4>w .-- ,0rini-ltk e'lfenbhMllINe*h*l/
-x _
x - 4
~ BL .;-l icontinued) ~
g ACTIC N STATEMENTS (Continuef wffb*n $7 l wars lM-L With the number of OPERABLE cha ne ne iess tnan the " ' .: ACTION 10 / Channels ge[uirr OPERABLdstatus?'t- E r:eCFCC"I: i :: r: ,. restore the inoperable cnannel
#3 h: r; ; :per the E::::: -i? b : 9 -: - 7)E-3.7-45
~
wi thin the next hour. [ dem,...,l ^ !! n-r&ond *y }sce He 0 Confrsl / l-SS-LS tv in a condtlion egalle of ro wi&ln,ws ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE channels ress thari the -T t::
~
*:3b;r gegire/ r,5- Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable /-jy_[
channels are placed in the tripped condition wittLin 6 hours 0%eewi.ra he in of lent + Her.Prwb/f a#rn He +i//oq & Jrur.r. j qa_g ACTION 12 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or Shunt Trio Attachment) inocerable, rest' ore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or-d ire tte :ffected breiher in :pe sti: :nd
- ;;;ly ACTIC" C. T e breaker shall not be bypassed while one of /-/f,,g the diverse trip eatures is inoperable except for the time required for perf rming maintenan;e to restore tne breaker to CPERABLE status. Le on *+ lea,r+ Hrr.tTA Nb9f Wilk'n +Ae nexf
. . - ' T G hour.r.
ACTION 13 - "ith th; n;. td if C*E*f2LE ch;rnc!: 10:: th:r the T:t:1 "et:r /-fa-q cf Chann;1 , !T""T".' ;nd/o r "CL'"" CPC"STIC" may pr;;;;d p r;. i d;d
- th;; th; C;ntairm;nt "ra:ur; :n.ir;r .cnni Alican;c cc;;f:c. fqy,,j
,r" ch; nacl; in'the dffc; tid pr;te;;ica seu are pl;;d in ..u /~Yl-A
--ipped tenditier ith4- E 5:ur:. gA/,fEft 7/f y-ggj_./
(NOTE: ACTION STATEMENTS 14 THROUGH 30 ARE LOCATED ON OTHER ! TABLES.) ACTION 31 - With the number of OPERASLE channels one less than the "inic : /~d -46 geguires/ Channels 3 0":TJ.;L: , a, . . emin;, be i n a t leas t HOT STANDBY wi thi n /~ 7-/) 12 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed, with the associated reactor trip break r bypassed. for up to 4 hours for logic surveillance testing ' T M O M . provided the other channel is OPERABJA.
/~~$d-M O E 3-)
i ecalle e L nnaI h l-20-A L ofen r-e,r+o tLEe HeNM ~TMin C Aouer o ,- TNSERY +. /- ll-L. S 3/+ 3-t(a)-2 m . cud w 5M, CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6(a) Amencment No. M. 47 + E4 __ U
l ' ' ~ INSERT 3/4 3-12a l l (19) The CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) shall be performed /-y-g within 12 hours after reducing power below P-10 for the power range and intermediate range instrumentation and within 4 hours after reducing /-x7-/_S ! power below P-6 for the source range instrumentation, if not performed ; within the previous 92 days. With the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal orgods not fully inserted, the COT is not required Tg-y.g prior to entering MODE 3 from MODE 2 until 4 hours after entering MODE 3. Qg (20) Smveillance shall also include verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 /-22-M , l are in their required state for existing plant conditions. (21) Includes verification of time constants, where applicable. /-75-4 1 l l I i 4 i .- f
CHANGE l , 12BIR H2iC. DESCRIPTION flux trip. These actions actually provide a more timely and appropriate redress to the condition than entering i LCO 3.0.3. These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 1 08 H Current ACTION Statement [4], for one source range channel I inoperable in H0DE 2 below P 6, is revised to require the , immediate suspension of operations involving positive reactivity changes. The CTS does not specify the timing for this ACTION. A new ACTION Statement [4.1] is added to address the condition where both source range channels are inoperable in H0DE 2 below P 6 [ ]. The new ACTION l Statement [4.1] requires that the RT8s be opened immediately. This action essentially accomplishes the reactor trip function. In such a condition with the current TS, LCO 3.0.3 would have been entered. This is more conservative since immediate rod insertion will take l the plant to MODE 3 [ ] much more quickly than [the 7 hours] allowed by LC0 3.0.3. These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 1 09 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 1-10 LS 32 ihis Callaway specific change redefines the Actions for i the sourco range neutron flux channels in current TS Table l 3.31 during MODES 3, 4, and 5. The source range neutron flux channels are required to provide input to the Reactor Trip System to mitigate potential uncontrolled rod withdrawal events only when the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or 1A+4 rods are not fully 7A-8,7-tW inserted (See CN 1 55 LS 39). #rie a-/Nrre If one source range neutron flux channel is inoperable in H0 DES 3, 4, and 5 when rod motion is possible ACTION ' Statement 5.a is entered If the channel is not restored jy M k ,ef-, within 48 hours, the Applicability is exited byt.C..; g l i b4// *f hele'*M
- " :t and precluding rod withdrawal. If both source range channels are inoperable when rod motion is possible,
- rew ACTION Statement 4.1 is entered and the reactor trip breakers are immediately opened.
~
The current Action Statement 5.a requirements regarding 2 ' the suspension of positive reactivity changes and closure
~~
of dilution source valves are deleted since they are not related to the reactor trip function nor are they required to exit the function's Applicability.g Requirements for mgy 9 Ho-U 12 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 4 5/15/97
. - __ - . - - - ~_ - - - .- -. _. .. . ..
CHANGE t NUMBER EllC DESCRIPTION 1 26 LG This change moves the details concerning NIS detector calibration to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.11, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. This information is more appropriately controlled outside of the TS while the calibration requirement itself and its Frequency are unchanged. l 1 27 LS 10 Surveillances on the Source Range Neutron Flux trip l function are reorganized to reflect plant status in accordance with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. New Note [(19)] requires that the quarterly COT be performed within 4 hours after reducing power below the respective source range instrumentation Applicabilities, if not performed 4 // rw/.rese 844/l)' within the previous [92] days. Since the COT is valid for
- . fe,y,) .d -ble [92] days, there is no need to repeat it if one has been l
performed within the prior [ quarter]. The 4 hour l i jg/4 j allowance permits a normal shutdown to proceed without a l It rYMar #9'# " delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 [n,/ w$dra[we/j untir th; n;nts T-ip S. ni;c., r; :;r:d rd this trip 7F--29'#4 4 whfe/, function no longer provides protection. Since the current ! = TS has no Specification 4.0.4 exception, this 4 hour allowance is less restrictive. 1 28 A Note [9] is revised to require the P 6 and P 10 interlock l verification to be performed during all source range COTS. These permissives are verified to be in their correct state prior to entry into MODES 3, 4, and 5 during shutdown and after leaving MODES 3, 4, and 5 during startup. This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. 1-29 LG This change moves the details regarding measurement of j loop specific ATVvalues to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.6. CA-SS-do7 consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. This information is more appropriately controlled outside of the TS while the requirement to perform the quarterly calibration itself is I unchanged. 1 30 M ( ;w?? e- Diluti= "itig:tien Syst- 'S"_m.C._ ;i;n;1 n;- k f y _._.._ m ____ ___.4_--_._ __- _ ~ . - , , bl=Ed
. wear J m:;="~ a:aCT="~::'_ r'~. T Y // e tb- 5$n t$ h btb . b S ((d r$$ ; $- b 3
-M'reently hr = LCO r ACTIO" requircar.tc. In the proc'ess of adopting the new LCO and ACTION Requirements (see also CN 1-10-LS 32 and 1-34-A), it was determined that to be consistent with current DG operability requirements in MODE 5, only one BDMS train should be DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 11 5/15/97
)
- d. -~
l CHANGE NUPEER lQlq DESCRIPTION 1 54 LS 37 ACTION Statement 5.b of current TS Table 3.31 is revised to change the 14 day recurring verification of the closed l status of the unborated water source isolation valves to 31 days. This is consistent with the recurring manual valve position verification interval in 0;her sections of l NUREG 1431 Rev. 1 (e.g., 3.9). 1 55 LS 39 Applicability Note [*] and ACTION Statements [5.a and 10] , for Functional Units [1, 6.b,19, and 20] of current TS Table 3.31 are modified to provide an alternative to opening the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) while still assuring that the function and intent of opening the RTBs is met. As currently worded, these ACTION Statements result in a feedwater isolation signal (FWIS) when in H0DE 3 with a T., less than [564*F. FSAR Table 7.3-14 and y FSAR Figure 7.2 1 (sh 3) detail the FWIS generation on the coincidence of P- and low T .] ' A more generic . W-2M Q**d 4e8m e. action, which% ssur the rods are fully inserted and inffsr/e/ /s cannot be withdrawn, . replaces the specific method of m precluaing rod withdrawal. .The revised Applicability and ACTION Statements still assure rod withdrawal is
.' precluded. This change does not involve any safety impact and is consistent with traveler 15TF 135.
l 1 56 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1 57 LG Current TS Table'3.31 Functional Units [12.a and 12.b] are combined per traveler TSTF-169. The Required l Channels, ACTION Statement, and Surveillance Requirements are the same for both Functional Units. The only difference between the two is the Applicability which could lead to entry into ACTION Statement 6 for Functional
. Unit [12.a], followed by a power reduction below P 8 exiting the Applicability and required actions for that Functional Unit, and subsequent re entry into ACTION l Statement 6 for Functional Unit [12.b]. This would !
involve an improper cumulative A0T of 12 hours before tripping an inoperable channel, beyond that evaluated in l WCAP 10271 and its Supplements. The relationships between these Functional Units and permissives P-7 and P 8 are , moved to the ITS 3.3.1 Bases. 1-58 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1 59 Not used- .n/p//c,//c I Oa Mwy. b Cs,m,-f/m j $~5 Cenyoner.ron% Ale (Gecfo. rare 28), () l-SI-LG DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 16 5/15/97
J q CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 3 of 26 1ECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 1 08 Current ACTION Statement [4]. for one source range channel Yes Yes Yes Yes M inoperable in MODE 2 below P 6. is revised to require "imediate' suspension of operations involving positive reactivity changes and a new ACTION Statement [4.1) is added to address the condition where both source range channels are inoperable in MODE 2 below P-6 [ ] to require , imediate opening of the RTBs. 1 09 This DCPP specific change revises CTS Action 5 to require Yes No No No M the imediate suspension of positive reactivity additions. Reference to specification 3.1.1.2 is deleted since the ITS reference is only to 3.1.1.1 which is more conservative for MODE 5. 1-10 This Callaway-specific change redefines the Actions for the No No No Yes LS-32 source range neutron flux channels in MODES 3. 4. and 5. The source range neutron flux chaanels are required to provide input to the Reactor Trip System to mitigate potential uncontrolled rod withdrawal events only when the ~ Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or% rods are not fully inserted (see CN 1-55 LS-39). thearagre #NS If one source range neutren flux channel is inoperable in MODES 3. 4. and 5 when rod motion is possible. ACTION Statement 5.a is entered. If the channel is not restored within 48 hours. the Applicability is exited by ' - ^' ; [n//r~ed"ag,A b d all rods and precluding rod withdrawal. If both source v 8th ',* range channels are inoperable when rod motion is possible, new ACTION Statement 4.1 is entered and the reactor trip breakers are imediately opened. The current Action Statement 5.a requirements regarding the suspension of positive reactivity changes and closure of dilution source valves are deleted since they are not related to the reactor trip function. CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS i NSHC LS 10 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Surve111ances on the Source Range Neutron Flux trip function are reorganized to reflect plant status. New Note (19) requires that the quarterly COT be performed I within 4 hours after reducing power below the respective source range instrumentation Applicabilities, if not performed within the previous [92] days. Since the COT is valid for [92] days, there is no need to repeat it if one has been performed within the prior [ quarter]. The 4 hour allowance permits a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in H0DE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until * " rt ' rip Oc; A re er; g:7.d er" this trip function no longer V-7.7-det, provides protection. Since the current TS has no Sp[cification 4.0.4 exception, this 4 hour allowance is less restrictive. (. .TNfg Lf-/g l The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it ! ! involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below: ! "The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in ! 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility 1 l licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no j significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance ) l with the proposed amendment would not: ! l l 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any j accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards: 1
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or l
consequences of an accident previously evaluated? ! Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. l This change allows a 4 hour deferral of a Channel Operational Test after entering the Applicability of the source range trip. This will not affect the
- operability or functionality of the source range channels. Their calibration is still valid and daily channel checks are still performed. The probability j NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 37 5/15/97 i
l
r
..s INSERT LS-10
- .y ,
all rods are fully inserted and the Rod Control System is rendered incapable of rod N-7.544 i withdrawal, after which. l l f l L f l' I I i i l i l
_ -. - . .. -- -. . . -_ .-_ - ~ .. -- - IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 32 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMERTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS This change redefines the ACTIONS for the source range neutron flux channels in , current TS Table 3.31 during MODES 3, 4, and 5. The source range neutron flux channels are required to provide input to the Reactor Trip System to mitigate 3 potential uncontrolled rod withdrawal events only when the Rod Control System is 7T-27-444 ! capable of rod withdrawal or e% rods are not fully inserted (see LS 39). l one or- more j If one source range neutron flux channel is inoperable in MODES 3, 4, and 5 when rod r motion is possible, ACTION Statement 5.a is entered. If the channel is not restored ! within 48 hours, the Applicability is exited by 'nnta; all rods and precluding T--2f.oog rod withdrawal. If both source range channels re inoperable when rod motion is possible, new ACTION Statement 4.1 is entered nd the reactor trip breakers are immediately opened. 74-j. g. 4 g ,. The current Action Statement 5.a requirements regarding the suspension of positive l reacti-vity changes and closure of dilution source valves are deleted since they are j not related to the reactor trip function nor are they required to exit the - Function's Applicability. Requirements for the source range channels related to 4 HO L S-33. indication are addressed ~n ITS 3.3.3, ITS 3.3.4 ITS 3.3.9, and ITS 3.9.3 Requirements for the so ce range channels related to inadvertent boron dilution events are addressed b the Boron Dilution Mitigation System in ITS 3.3.9. GVffER7~ LT-32 The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it l involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been ; performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted i below: l l
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in
- 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no '
( ~significant hazards consNeration, if operation of the facility in accordance
- with the proposed amendment would not
- l l
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an l
accident previously evaluated; or ( 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of ac:ident from any accident previously evaluated; or _
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards: l NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 56 5/15/97
)
l t i IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS : l
..m NSHC LS 39 o' 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS g g/fg 1 l inih'h No Applicability Note [*] and ACTION Statements [5.a and 10] for Functional nits [1, 6.b.19, and 20] of current TS Table 3.31 are modified to provide an a ernative to opening the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) while still assuring that the unction and (
intent of opening the RTBs is met. As currently worded, these ACTION tatements , result in a feedwater isolation signal (FWIS) when in H0DE 3 with a T,, less than n [564*F. FSAR Table 7.314 and FSAR Figure 7.21 (sht.13) detail the i IS gegration C on the coincidence of P 4 and low T ,.] A more generic action, whichi'assureg the "77-rSttM rods are fully inserted and cannot be withdrawn, replaces the specific method of l precluding rod withdrawal. The revised Applicability and ACTION Statements still , assure rod withdrawal is precluded. This change does not involve any safety impact i and is consistent with traveler TSTF 135. The proposed change allows more freedom in how rod withdrawal is precluded and is thus less restrictive. However, the [ a j intent of using physical plant characteristics to prevent rod withdrawal is not l diminished. The specification now acknowledges that the Rod Control stem can be ; l effectively disabled m -ene rzi O W CKbM.rg opny he Ye ns ,orte-ensja other han opening -fhethe&,- RTBsrn egl.) e@ 1 Q $3.3'l3Y This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it , involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been , performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoto I below: )r "The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the prxedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no {'; significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance y with the proposed amendment would not: i i
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: or I
i 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any c accident previously evaluated: or l 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety." l The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant ) hazards consideration standards: g
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 70 5/15/97
-----em. -s.__
TNDUSTRY 1RAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.3 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS p r Net-Incorporated NA 4hrt NRC approved,4; ;f "TE-IF#f-(u "s ITSTF-19. Rev. 1 -tr u m L=ler mn u =t ls. :f' . tte. 8ms- , TC'" 25.' P.: V 2- Ixap. o;.4 3.3 '" # y,3 9(. l TSTF 37. Rev. 1 Not Incorporated NA ITS 5.6.8 still addresses PAM reports. Sections after ITS 5.6.7 were not renumbered. TSTF 51 Not Incorporated NA Requires plant specific l , ! reanalysis to establish decay I time dependence for fuel handling accident. mm ,_______ > n _4. e_m__2_m_ 2, .,, <,- 4M-1 , ... . .- n . . . . . . . . . c. . . . .r -- r. . . . - - .. .. a n . . --u i s - , u_,. __ m__ ,- _, .._,m.__ __a v w . ME e3 l V3 4VJJ U. TV. .wyw -,,, 6;r:d:d alt:;; .:'" -^-"- j y-h i. the D. -TR-13 M.C ; TSTF111Rev.d Incorporated NA g/,0jp.fg / i TSTF-135;gey,3 P:t :"; 2341.3.3-44; ' = ;1 r i: t:: bre:d = p: in Incorporated f 'J.3 93 -n:ture: ebald kn k;n
-!:'!: 31 r^^r 3.3 95. te t : =l a .
q] 3.3-122,3,$-14Q ": Mi r.; ;f i k t = :1;. t t l l t l 3,q$, 3.S- ci; d'ic:ntla ;1 r ify l
"J.F/84 f ca-9i'it; . ; qui. ag..' - h;.
1 b: n '= = p ;tcd. [-YM gyg v __ - TSTF 161, rey,/ Incorporated 3.3 79 Agraye/ ly N#d,
- Q2'P-W TSTF 168 Incorporated 3.3 43 Age,ve/ ly Ngc, A F.9-f3 _
TSTF 169 Incorporated 3.3 42 Agen,/ jy Ngc, ry_y,y,y3 E '0C 73yrm Incorporated 3.3 49 423-49 ar p = d tr:veler Incorporated 3.3 107 "^C ".ini Croup Acti:n !t'- 13'rF~-::n.9f 4% & 3.3- M7 l i k i
% .] 9 l J' I i
l MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97 1 1
l I RTS Instrumentation )
.. 3.3.1 2
3.3. INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation - i l LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be . OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.11. , ACTIONS !
........................................N0TE- -- -- -- -- - ---- - --- -- - --
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. ; 1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME , ,;$h
~
A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more referenced in Table 3.3.11 f.s.-#2 required channels p- . ggg
-/ rem, .r inoperable. forthechannel(s{f,a(r) ,,.
B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE 48 hours channel inoperable. status. E B.2-1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours 3.3 106-6 Hit
" 2.2
. Ogr. r;;;ter trip 55 b rs br; dcr; '",' ;).
(continued) MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 1 5/15/97 1
l . - - . . . . . . RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ! /N
- (%< - f ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i
! 'e m .m _ Nu g g ; a 2 C.1 Restore channel or 48 hours 3.3 135 i WK135' 3r;3Ms20t' met train to OPERABLE l ? = - Wrvi r. status. e .t _ : rQ_ - ~[' kkT.L
~~ ~
. .[nih1-0t aehn-/s 7f-3.5-606
/p '-it-~_ O f C.2g 1 0g ",TZs.%]l.]%" insect 4ghours -3.3-122 Y O b h bg tn ~5~she) YW - y/
i k , ? u,-r
- .;; b &'K J, q . %'d' egmlie rP m/~HUnmIQ 3 3-11 s*
l C.s.rOne~+ channel or train I inoperable. C322 .P.JacdRheiRifd!C5Htto] 49LhoWs 13.3-122-SystengthEaito~ndition E!L 6 M FiDidiLEB l 1
~ D. One Power Range Neutron ------- - - NOTE -- -- --- - I
,., :, Flux-High channel The inoperable channel may be inoperable. bypassed for up to 4 hours for .
surveillance testing and ! l setpoint adjustment of other channels. I D.1.1 Place channel in trip. 6 hours l l M D.1.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to 12 hours s 75% RTP. E I D.2.1 Place channel in trip. 6 hours i i M 1 (continued) U s.- MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3-2 5/15/97
i RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 j l ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED' ACTION COMPLETION TIME l l I G. "lC""X ~".lCR : P 0 end G.1 Suspend operations involving Immediately 3.3 95 P 10. Two Intermediate positive reactivity Range Neutron Flux additions. 1 channels inoperable. l' AND G.2 Reduce THERHAL POWER to 2 hours
< P-6.
-H. Ad@ sed! li.1 0;;ter; ch;ax1(;' to. Prior to 3.3-95
"::P"X ^~.lCR : P 0 en; OPERAiH:E-stetus- wereeseg or t w !ater a di;t; WiERNAL-POWER-to i 2;ag ";;trea Fl a . W l
ch;anc1; ineg r;bi;. l
- I. One Source Range Neutron I.1 Suspend operations involving Immediately' Flux channel inoperable. positive reactivity additions. -
l J. Two Source Range Neutron J.1' Ope TB . Immediately Eb Flux channels rea Areakers N inoperable. - K. One Source Range Neutron K.1 Restore channel to 48 hours Flux channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
.4i}la-he en&-/g &
K.23 Oga R";.Tully Mhours 3.3-122-l insent;allsrods: I L 8HD 1
,;.7 g K72:2 P1 ace;the1 Rod: Control 49; hours 3.3 122-1 System;iniafcondition incapable l,of rod withdrawal;
/, continued)
MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 4 5/15/57 l
RTS Instrumentation l 3.3.1
- Table 3.3.1-1 (pose 1 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrtmentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER l SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE HHf 3.3 08 i FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE"' GETPOEM* l l
- 1. Manuel Reactor 1,2 2 8 SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA Trip l 3 , 4 *', 5 2 C SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA i
- 2. Power Range Neutron Flux l
- a. High 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 sil.12.3% RTP . ::;^: ::: :B PS l SR 3.3.1.2 4+ht j SR 3.3.1.7 '
SR 3 3 ! !! ' 3.3 55-
- b. Low 1(c) 2, 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 'C283% RTP s 2 % ;;TT -8*PS l SR 3.3.1.8 Oht SR 3.3.1.11
= :.:.: . ; , 3.3-55 i
l l Power Range Neutron Flux Rate e- High Positive 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7 k63 6:e . ';; ;;;r Rate SR 3.3.1.11 % RTP l with time conotent B PS-constant h a 2 sec
;, . ,..;, _....... +r2 4 e = :.:.;.7 s :..= ;;;; e-s**w 3.3 01 Rete = :.',.. 10 ; ;,, ; ,- ... .-
= :.3.1.14, conetont constant h e-E-eve j
- 6. Intermediate Range 15, 2'* 2 F,G SR 3.3.1.1 2"35 3% s =% ;;TT g.p3- l heutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 5Hi RTP SR 3.3.1.11 2" e
- g33.].] s ::: ;;;r . : ::: 3.3 95 r : : : L,,
I (continued) (0) ;;. . ; ._ ; ^ . Li . . ' . . , . ., .;;;. . , ; _ . . . . i . J ,_ , . .; . . . , . ; , M : L ; . L ; J.,,.. .J , , , ,,, , :; ; ,,,, , ; n .dy l
;;..J. ; , ..J L, i;.. ,l : The; AllowabletValue. defines 1the3f atting;.sofety; system setting. :See.the Bases 3.3 08 forfthe*Ttip?Setpoints.'
(b) With L. i.. : . ; ,, l; . ..;. . . ;";;;;.; u;...J .d Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or ods'.not p3.3W/s . ! fullyaineerted. 3 .3 1P.2-(c) Below the P-1D (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. @f 8F'" N l (d) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron F, Lux) Interlocks.
;.; n ;- .:.. r , ; ; . .; . . J . . . . : .. .. . . . ; ; ,, ,; . ;- ; a. .
3.3 95 i l MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3-16 5/15/97 l i I I
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1 1 (pege 2 of 9) Reactor Trip System Instrtmentation . APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWABLE fRte 3.3 08 ' FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE'" SE4PGIM " 3*3-41
- 5. Source Range 2* 2 1,J SR 3.3.1.1 s!1'6 in s-4-0-E5
"*" Y 8.7-ddS '* *P' 'P' 3*,4*,5* 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 ki;6 id S-t-e-f5 3.3 41 SR 3.3.1.7 E5 cps epe g-SR 3.3.1.11
- x :.:.1. :, 3.3 55 s*r-s*&* i
+
- E3,2,-]!.. #f* */* 3.3 41
- 4. Overtemperature af 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer-to g SR 3.3.1.3 Note 1 Wott--+
SR 3.3.1.6 (Page tPope SR 3.3.1.7 3.3-23) 5-5-eet sR W 3 x 10 3.3 50 r.m : : : :7,. . . . . . . 3.3-55 .
- 7. Overpower ai 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer-to g SR 3.3.1.7 Note 2 Wete-e sosm1:10 (Page tPose 3.3 50 sR--3-ht-+e 3.3-24) h5-est 3 3 55 (continued)
(a) ;; . . . . . . ; , . . . a . . . .r . . . ; .. . .; . ; . . , .. . . . . . .; , :. ; ; -.;,; . v. ; A, , .c . . . ;. ;, . . ; : ; e, 3.3 08
.:. 4,,' .,,,
. ..d L, .; .; .. The!AllowabletValimRdqtfihes;the lf alting' fetyl system ;settingC See *the' Bases forithe*Ttip Setpoints;
...d Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal of 'T inotifulliifpsetted!
.E..E-M d- ; q^ ,
(b) With ;;;. ;,.ed 34 (2) Below the *-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. m g o,. m
..c.
77
+e- w; ...y.. : ;.y. . .......J. . . . . . , _
.: [ t ..j
...g . ,
, H. A . g ..:a.
~ 3.3 41 e ' " ~ " " : . . :_ : :::.; .:.: .. ,.. _ .... 7 g 3.2. g g I
l l MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3-17 5/15/97 l l t
l RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 l j. 9 , i Table 3.3.1-1 (page 6 of 9) l
,;gg Reactor Trip System Instrumentation I
APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER . 3.3-08 ! SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWABLE +RtP 1 FUNCTION COND!T!ONS CHANNELS. CONDIT10NS REQUIREhENTS VALUE"' GE4PGIM" l i l
- 17. Safety 1,2 2 trains o SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA Injection ($1)
Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
- 18. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
- a. Intermediate 2* 2 S SR 3.3.1.11 2 6E E asp . ;- " ; ,, _B.
Range Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 Flux, P-6 l
- b. Low Power 1 1 per T =414* I d 7 ,*8 ,/. I NA $ ,'2 3-S b ]*aj,g Reactor Trips train n : .: .1. ". . I
^ ' ' '
Block, P-7
- c. Power Range =4i 4- i SR 3.3.1.11 Se:e a ::::: :T; B _PS Neutror. Flux, 1
d y,y hg SR 3.3.1.13 33'@% RTP g p
'r f f
//s
- d. Power Range T SR 3.3.1.11 SihE . - . . .
4=>* h 1 1 ~ Neutron Flux, p g?g SR 3.3.1.13 k'Ji3;l5% RTP
.8-PS <
l P-9 4 1 js 1
- e. Power Range Neutron Flux, 1,2 4h + S SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.13 h6 GQX RTP
. := ;;;
y f,7 and +ihe B-PS: P 10 C E45 RTP ! l
- f. Turbine 1 2 T = !. ...; +ihe r-+en B PS l I
lopulse SR 3.3.1.10 3]32ll$1 ttertrtne Pressure, P-13 SR 3.3.1.13 turbine power power m ,
- 19. ifenctor Trip 1,2 2 trains R SR 3.3.1.4 7 A- im -- )
Breakerrfk) (gy 3*,4*,5* 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA 7 (continued) , (::) : . . . e .. ^ ; ; ,, . . . u, . . . . . ' . . ,A -. . . . . ; . - , . . ; . . . . a , ;d ; -.;A , ^; . ; - 4. .J . . .i, _ . ;, ;,,, . , ; ; .J , 3.3-08 ' I
- 1. .m ; .2, e J L, J.- . .. ThesAllowable.Naluetdef.ines&the; Limiting. safety, system > setting 2:See-the : Bases f or 'the"'Tylp* Setpoints. 1 (b) With Ri;e e;.. J -4 Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or.' todsanot;tullyfinserted. 3.3-122/
l (G) Below the P 6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks. p g pp. q q */~g-f,*.F-ddf (k) Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB. _s i: 1 MUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 21 5/15/97 i i l 1 l l
4 RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 i ' I Table 3.3.1 1 (page 7 of 9) > Reactor Trip System Instrumentation i l APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVE!LLANCE ALLOWABLE f*te 3.3-08 l l FutiCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE" 6ETMIM" I
- 20. Reactor Trip 1,2 1 each U SR 3.3.1.4 NA M I Breaker per RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip 3 *', 4*', 5 *' 1 each C SR 3.3.1.4 NA M i Mechanisms (It) per RT8 3.3 124 l
- 21. Automatic Trip 1,2 2 trains o SR 3.3.1.5 NA M Logic 3*', 4*', 5 *' 2 trains C SR 3.3.1.5 MA M '
i l ca) ::....-. . .... u. . ; ; .s : . . . v; ._ .;.: . . -, .;.... .:, M ; a;. w ; , . a c., . :.; w.... :;.;, 3.3 08' i
;...;.: , ...; L, ;:.. .;.. thelAQainblefVaWis3idsfit i sss$iitimitlpi stilg gtamiset.tjpg C Sig M Bsses 1 Ser2th*2timisptpoiM ar-/PNor-a (0) With Rite cissed-and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawat ph in6t;?fst%Mneetted) l _
(k) Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that er,e racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB. 3.3 122' l l l W ~$. N 0$ ' i l l l l l { l l ! l ! I l i l l r i l MARKUP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG-1431) 3.3 22 5/15/97 l
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 m.
%Y BASES BACKGROUND Reactor Trio Switchaear (continued)
~SSPS. Either the undervoltage coil or the shunt trip mechanism is sufficient by itself, thus providing a diverse trip mechanism, r %~
The decision logic matrix Functions are described in the g .g .g,g% ) functional diagrams included in Reference'(I). In addition to the reactor trip or ESF, these diagrams also d0 scribe the various
" permissive interlocks" that are associate l with unit conditions.
ftdlind Each train has a built in testing device that can cuten ticcily test the decision logic matrix Functions and the actuation devices while the unit is at power. When any c:: train is taken 7.out of service for testing, the other train is capable of
' providing unit monitoring and protection until the testing has
~ been~ completed ~. The testing device is semiautomatic to minimize testing time.
7 APPLICABLE The RTS functions to maintain the a2P11sabJg SEs Dmitj during , SAFETY ANALYS . all A00s and mitigates the consequences of DBAs in all MODES in whi h t e T ;cc clexu. Teo r emfnl fyr+em jr caf LCO, and APPLICABILITY "
's orde er e n d My m#cd,a e of 7T-33-dos Each of the analyzed accident 1ents'can Ih M y one or more RTS Functions. The accident analysis described in Reference 3 2 takes credit for most RTS trip Functions. RTS trip Functions not specifically credited in the accident analysis are qualitatively credited in the safety analysis and the NRC staff approved licensing basis for the unit. These RTS trip Functions aay provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient demonstrate Function performance. They may also serve ' - to RTS trip Functions that were credited in the accidenu .. .n15.
The LCO requires all instrumentation performing an RTS Function, listed in Table 3.3.1-1 in the accompanying LCO, to be OPERABLE. Failure of any instrument renders the affected channel (s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions. The LC0 generally requires OPERABILITY of four or three channels l in each instrumentation Function, two channels of Manual Reactor l Trip in each logic Function, and two trains in each Automatic Trip Logic Function. Four OPERABLE instrumentation channels in a v (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 7 5/15/97 i
l l 1 RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 v . BASES APPLICABLE 1. Manual Reactor Trio (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The LC0 requires two Manual Reactor Trip channels to be l APPLICABILITY OPERABLE. Each channel is controlled by a manual reactor trip switch. Each channel activates the reactor trip breaker in both trains. Two independent channels are required to be OPERABLE so that no single random failure will disable the Manual Reactor Trip Function. l rone oraner* In H0DE 1 or 2. manual initiation of i reactor trip must be OPERABLE. These are the MODES in which the shutdown rods and/or control rods are partially or fully withdrawn l from the core. In H0DE 3, 4, or 5, the manual initiation 1 i Function must also be OPERABLE if tt# shutdown rods or 7R-J.1-#d4 control rods are withdrawn or thc Cm. .. el r,M Di i. "
'C.C -
MMC 4rdrsl ystem is capable of withdrawing the shutdown rods or the control rods. In this condition, inadvertent control rod withdrawal is possible. In H0DE 3, 4, or 5, manual initiatior of a reactor trip does not have to be OPERABLE if the4RE WSystem is not capable of withdrawing the 7W-3.H14 shutdown rods or control odsa If the rods cannot be withdrawn from the core ther e is no need to be able to g_3g tripthereactoy,L.~oues sil '4 div i W o. s .uaci wu. In H0DE 6, neither the shutdown rods nor the control rods are permitted to be withdrawn a the CRDHs are disconnected from the control rods and s utdown rods. Therefore, the a gg g 4 manual initiation Function s not ired.
- 2. Power Ranoe Neutron Flux A "N *
- The XIS power range detectors are located external to the j reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core.
The NIS power range detectors provide input to the Rod Control System and the Steam Generator (SG) Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, l and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal to prrvent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to initiating a reactor trip. Limiting l further rod withdrawal may-terminate the transient and l eliminate the need to trip the reactor. l (continued) i MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 9 5/15/97
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 i BASES . APPLICABLE 4. Intermediate Ranoe Neutron Flux (continued) l SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO and In MODE 1 below the P 10 setpoint, and in MODE 2 abo.Welthe APPLICABILITY PEsetpoint? when there is a potential for an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident during reactor startup, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip ; must be OPERABLE. Above the P-10 setpoint. the Power ' Range Neutron Flux-High Setpoint trip and the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate trip provide core ' protection for a rod withdrawal accident. InMODEElb_elow thePP163etpofgtS3.4.or5,theIntermediateRange 7'f-7.'J-d4
J'
- Neutron Flux trip does not have to be OPERABLE because the l
4/e. b F7ax control rods must be fully inserted and only the shutdown 4 4,fg rods may be withdrawn. The reactor cannot be started up
/ .j" in this condition. The core also has the required SDM to mitigate the consequences of a positive reactivity i
i P[#b'b addition accident. In MODE 6. all rods are fully inserted Also, the NIS reac/fr,p 4ec/Mr,,4, and the core has a required increased SDM. i (y ggg intermediate range detectors cannot detect neutron levels present in this MODE.
- 5. Source Ranoe Neutron Flux
! The LC0 requirement for the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function ensures.that protection is provided against an ! uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a . subcritical condition during startup. This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low L.,~.... and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux ~7A'-7.3-A0 6 trip Functions. In MODES 3. 4. and 5. administrative controls also prevent the uncontrolled withdrawal of rods. The NIS source range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS source range detectors do not provide any inputs to control systems. The source range trip is the only RTS automatic protec - function required in MODES 3. 4 and 5 withithel 1 Control?Systemicapab]eioRrod T)f-3.y-og withdrawallor, rodsinotifu]ly2 inserted; Therefore, the functional capabi ity at the + xificd Trip Setpoint is assumed to be av ilable. doew mere The LCO requires two channels of Source Range Neutron Flux 3 to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to f (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 14 5/15/97
i RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 i BASES i l APPLICABLE 5. Source Ranoe Neutron Flux (continued) l
- SAFETY ANALYSES, I
l LCO, and ensure no single random failure will disable this trip I l APPLICABILITY Function. T_his;Functionf usesMout-ofj twoltpJplogic; TheUniplSetpointMis1'.'OTES"cpst The LOO els; rquires l m; cranici eMe S;uricl=U li;~;tren fin t; b; 1 l OPEMBEC in "00 ?,, 4. er 5 with I,0s egn. In this as;, th; sourc; ra ;; Turation is to previd; centrol re a l indic; tion ad input t; th; Sc,ren Oilution Pretation l Syst;;;; '30"S). The outputs of the Function to RTS logic l arenotrequiredOPERABLEjn]IODEi63qtwhenth;P,0ser; l L open alErgsraret'faDrgsetted:a#3heKCMtrol l SyJLtgelslin_capattle?dfRtiodN1,thdraWhl3 The Source Range Neutron Flux Function provides protection l for control rod withdrawal from suberitical, boron dilution and control rod ejection events. The ruration els; previda vi;21 re;tren fia indicati;n in th; cer.tr;l re s . In MODE 2 when below the P 6 setpoint during a reactor l startup, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be j l OPERABLE. Above the P 6 setpoint, the Intermediate Range i Neutron Flux trip and the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low l Rtpint trip will provide core protection for reactivity 78-Z'FW4 l i accidents. Above the P 6 setpoint. the NIS source range neutroniflux d;tators er; de crer;ind ad irep;rebic.
~
teactoratrj pfmayittelmanGapy31ocked,Olhen Mtee raogeltedPlts21JxgedEt_hegi j ghfgiltageltoithefllgtteton isla]soltemov_ed; ewl dos ethere In MOD h 4,Y.ee 5 the Rod (Co#tto]. M enicapablyIof rodiwithdrawaltor: .. Enot;;fnURnEerted2 feeeter 7X-2H4 shut dor., the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function must also be OPERABLE. If the C4E RodIContro] System is capable of rod withdrawal. the Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE to provide core protection against a rod withdrawal accident. If the C49 Roditonttol System is not capable of rod withdrawal, the source range detectors are not required to trip the reactor. However, their i monitoring Function must be OPERABLE to monitor core l neutron levels and provide indic; tion of inputsitolthe BDMSIasiaddressedNn1LC0~3I3 9~,TdBoronTDilution1 Mitigation l Systemf(B.DMS O to; protect;against0 inadvertent reactivity (continued) I . MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-15 5/15/97 l
l RTS Instrumentation l B 3.3.1 l l BASES APPLICABLE 19. Reactor Trio Breakers (continued) l SAFETY ANALYSES, I LCO, and br;;k;r. d;gading spa the ;y;ta ;;nfigur; tion. Two APPLICABILITY OPERABLE trains ensure no single random failure can disable the RTS trip capability. These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in H0DE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In H0DE 3, 4. or 5. these RTS trip Functior.s must be OPERABLE wh'in the R"3 or
- s;;;i;ted t g;ss br;;k;rs er; cic;;d. ;nd the CR0 Rod Contrb] System is capable of rod withdrawal orl imd.s TK-7.'Jd4 l acef,got"_f,ilDMi,nserted2 ane or mere !
- 20. Reactor Trio Breaker Undervoltaae and Shunt Trio Mechanisms The LCO requires both the Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms to be OPERABLE for each RTB that is in service.
The trip mechanisms are not required to be OPERABLE for trip breakers that are open, racked out, incapable of supplying power to the GRB RodIContgo] System, or declared inoperable under Function 19 above. OPERABILITY of both trip mechanisms on each breaker ensures that no single trip mechanism failure will prevent opening any breaker on a valid signal. These trip Functions must be OPEIMBLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In H0DE 3. 4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the R"s c.nd
;;ss;;;ted byp :; br;;k;rs ;r; cle: d, c.nd th CR0 Bud 1 Cont ~rol System is capable of rod withdrawal ot; ,. 'TA'-F.Sd4 l agnotiftlllEinsertidy ,,,,,,,,,, l
- 21. Automatic Trio Loaic The LC0 requirement for the RTBs (Functions 19 and 20) and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 21) ensures that means are provided to interrupt the power to allow the rods to fall into the reactor core. Each RTB is equipped with an undervoltage coil and a shunt trip coil to trip the breaker open when needed. Each RTB is equipped with a bypass breaker to allow testing of the trip breaker while the unit is at power. The reactor trip signals generated j (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3-42 5/15/97
I l RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE 21. Automatic Trio looic (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO. and by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and ) APPLICABILITY associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the ! reactor, l The LC0 requires two trains of RTS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel will not prevent reactor trip. These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in H0DE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In H0DE 3, 4, or 5, these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the RTEs cad ! etsociatedbypassbrcckcrsarcclosed,andthcCR0 Bod j Contr;o] System is capable of rod withdrawal ppfred_s TR-3.3,004 ate 2LotLiGTRiiinetted; one or. more The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of th NRC I'clicy Statcocat.10_CFR50Q6(c)J2LR11! ACTIONS . A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in l Table 3.3.1 1. In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LC0 Condition (s) entered for the protection Function (s) affected. Whenithe Required @annels2n~FabreT371 TTare3pecifled[on?aiper3 bog Per! SGKper:busgetegbas1Qthert the2 Condition 'maylbe: enter _ed separately 5for;e.aghj;1oopgSGEbust etegas;appropr;f ate! When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceed those specified in one or other related Conditions associated with a trip Function, then the unit is outside the safety analysis. Therefore, LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered if l applicable'in the current MODE of operation. (continued) t
- MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-43 5/15/97 l
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS Rc'. Ncr's Notc. Certain LCO Ccapiction Time; crc based on (continued) cpprovcd topical rcports. In ordcr for ; licca;cc to u:c thcsc timc;. th; licca;cc mu;t Justify thc Ceapiction Timcs as required by the staff Safety Cvaluation Rcport 'SER) for the topicci i report. LL1 or & ns Condition A applies to all RTS protection Functions. ition A addresses the situation where one or more required channelsYfor TA-EM one or more Functions are inoperable at the same time. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.1-1 and to take the Required Actions for the protection functions affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions. B.1 and?B T. 0.2.1. and 0.2.2 . Condition B applies to the Manual Reactor Trip in MODE 1 or 2. l This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for this Function. With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel l' must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the safety function. The Completion Time of 48 hours is reasonable considering that i there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation channel OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event i occurring during this interval. If the Manual Reactor Trip Function cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 additional hours (54 hours total time). felicwed by opening the "T0; within 1 odditional hour '55 hours total tim:). The 6 additioyal hours to reach MODE 3 and the
..m. .. mr., .. ...~ . heasonable, based on operating W-77-N4 experience, to , m .. .mm ., mme mr . . . ~ . s . ~ egit[the Applicability from full power operation in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. With the n.~ vr. , m. m ..m (continued)
MARK-UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 44 5/15/97 i
l RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1
,M l .M 9
BASES ACTIONS B .1 ahdT2. " . 2.1. ;nd " .2.2 (continued) uhit in MODE 3. this trip Functica is ac lengcr rquircd to bc 0" "J."LE. Conditfon?CKsFent M 'hmemanuauCNNn Functionihasjnot;beenge,sto _ Iand2he_RodTGdntr.o]Ws r cap 3ble;c.codiwithdraWah rodse reino M H y @ Lsef,ts!I ge.y,y g one er mar 1t C.1': emi C.2 rNandVCT7 i Condition C applies to th(following reactor trip Functions in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the n s closed cad th; C'O RSW System capable of rod with awal ^ocdKh;; -..n- '- ww __ m -7,.9 d 4
, 8~ ans or avre j
. Manual Reactor Trip: '
. RTBs:
. RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Tr Mechanisms: and
. Automatic Trip Logic. ack
*N4Tn-/4a murfje inika-ltl rama fifaarcle j fafly Interf n/l redr. J W This action addresses the trai 1 orientation of the SSPS for these Functions. With one channel o' train inoperable, the inoperable channel or train must be resto to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. If the affected Fun : ion (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the alloied 48 hour Completion Time, the i unit must be placed in a H00E i i which the requirement does not apply.
To achieve this status l'th; g
""; g.nd2 gr.cd CJ
-e1R rn-Re_ __..f._
_.. - .. m. m h ~S_ m-- ofModwit_hdrawa] within the next hou The additional hour
.f,.ne 1.-Her provides sufficient time to accomplish e action in an crderly manner. With the nod.s_af@ydnsentC- -T;U+1sr6dWonttd15y5 tem
.incap'ab1 Eof: cod 5withdrawaE ""s cir' heseFupn ions are no joigerrequired. ~7 't I 8-ene at i CAbk 3 *r .- le >** *fT *" * ' as,w/22 The Completion Ti/#T reasona f con *dering that in)this 1
Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function, and given the low probability of an event ' occurring during this interval. ' Conditionf1simodif; led:byta Noteistating;thatn...a _a n
@puutyto)Gli7S yffh,tfie'PjkPCpritrpK5yft gea bl 30 rod whr(e 4 hrs LCs it no+na+ -A, Snefron 19 oesto p.7.pg
,h 2 ' '
,, #/ onlinued)
B 3.3 45 5/15/97 MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES l
1 RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 l BASES ACTIONS L1 (continued) Condition J applies to two inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip ch nels when in H0DE 2, below the P 6 setpoint, and perf ing a reactor startup, or in H0DE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs cic;- ond the ORO RodICo.gttol System capable of rod withdrawal oC rods'no p fdl] Minserted? With the unit in this Condition. g -g g_ut;, below I'-6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functio [. With both source range channels inoperable, the RTBs must be opened immediately. With the RTBs open,jhe core is in a more stable condition. and thc unit catcr; l Condi .cn L. LoneortNre K.It end K.2M N and7K T 2 / Of one or M '*L Condition K applies to one inoperablejsc rce range channel in
;10DE3,4,or5withtheRTB;cle;cdj the CR0 Rod;f,orgol System capable of rod withdrawal orgdeds@notsf01.]ytinserted4M-3.F-W4 With the unit in this Condition, below P 6, the S source range performs the senitoring and protection functiond With one of g gJ. the source range channels inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to fnff7 A g 4 , restore it to an OPERABLE status. If the channel cannot be
.//,e agh,,, returned to an OPERABLE '- status,+1 additional hour is allowed I to #-#8-44
./ , A / ,nse,.,/-
_mm"_* m, = ""._mRT.a.._N.__
=m. mm ___W_ _o_d'C_om_._m_ ...e..s3. _va..
,// 7,
,,,,m m.~. Oncethese q
~ cond$tiorC1ficapable3farodiwithdrawa]4,a, the core is in a more ACTIONStare2 completed, ,,~ m ~ ..m p stable condition. ord the unit cater- Candition L. The allowance j
of48hourstorestorethechanneltfOPERABLEstatus,andthe additional hour to ogn the RE. 7JGAfC:'.r. ;;r;;CplaceR-33-af, the Rod;C.ontroESystemsinta~condit _n;1ricapable:.ofirod withdrawal'l are justified in Refe ence 5. _ _ (e. I de-e.ne rzt all L.1. L.2. and L.3 Cfbeis> L ofenin e KT8.r.> or de-
- gI= Ty Not'Used; -fle n/yve g enerefer [M) rek), pg,-) j ba b bb 6 hy..cb scb bsuc a c O E[ bbb [b w bu b Rangt. Neutron fi a chenaci; i; not ;ct in tiODE 3, 4, or 5 .ith the Rlb ogr. With the unit in thi; Condition, the N!: ;;urce ran g perform; th; ;cnitoring and protection function. With ic;;
then the required numbcr of ;;urcc rangc channcl; OPERABLE, , cpcration; iniciving p;;itive rcactivity addition; : hall bc (continue _d) HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-51 5/15/97
RTS instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS 0.1 and 0.2 (continued) l l The Required Actions,have been modified by a Note that allows bypassing one train up to 4 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE. R.1 and R.2 Condition R applies to the RTBs in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RTS for the RTBs. With one i train inoperable. I hour is allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable. l based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in l an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss l of RTS Function. Placing the unit in H0DE 3 r-~f:: thc T4-ZM ! ! '4 r-~tt 5 tMr prticir run; tic,n. refu/fr Tn Can/hb d eg+_ en oy T.P one R76 -fynin it inojermLle, y The Required Actions have be modified by two three Notes, t d) 4 Note 1 allows onhchonoci o be bypassed for up to 2 hours d 7,7-0 3 i / for RTB surveillance testing or: maintenance, provided the other chonncl train is OPERABLE. Note 2 allows one RTB to be bypassed j i pnlyforfthe time required for,; performing for up to 2 houro for maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms per l Condition U if the other RTB train is OPERABLE. Note M110ws I one.RTB'to be:bypassedrfor up-to9 tours'for logic survemance testing per-Condition-QTrovided.the other-train is .0P.ERABLE. l The e-heue time limits:are +s justified in References 7 5.andi13_. l ! S.1 and S.2 l Condition S applies to the P 6 and P 10 interlocks. With one or more. required channel (s) inoperable, for onc cut cf two or two-cut of four coincidcacc icgic, the associated interlock must be verified by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window to be in its required state for the existing unit condition within 1 hour or the unit must be placed in H0DE 3 within the next 6 hours. Verifying the interlock status manually accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of (continued) ~ MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 56 5/15/97
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS U.1 and'UT2 ".2.1. nd ".2.2 (continued) y (~ N armere With the R2 ; eg a ad the unit in H0DE 3. Condu 'onjC" ;ttentered f CtheyinoperableEtrip;mechani sm;has:notibeenjcest.. ~ andjthe < Rod),Controlffystensijsicapable@f rodtwithdriuljijo6laLidje W-y,yg n_ot @ p yfinsented. thi; trip Turation i; n; 1 2 ;;r r; quired to be-0PEiWel:E- The affected RTB shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse features is inoperable except for the time required to perform maintenance to ,restoreiheCWTe;tCb]gnidhanism r to*'ORERABL'E2 status",_ consistent'withmefM331 era of tra discre; futur;;. ";; eilc:21; tin for p;rfer ;ng ;r.; int;nau of the di;;r x f= turn i; 2 h;;r; for tre ra ;;n; ;t;ted m ir Cadition R. The Completion Time of 48 hours for Required Action U.1 is reasonable considering that in this Condition there is one remaining diverse feature for the affected RTB, and one OPERABLE RTB capable of performing the safety function and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. L.1 NotLU_sedt "ith t.;; R5 trein; ines.;ble, n; ;ut;= ti; a pbility i;
;s;il;ble t; ;h;t d;.;n the r;;;ter, and i n diet; pi nt ;hatd e .
in x ;;ri an with LOO 3.0.3 i; r;;;ir;d. ( ciwllt)inge,Jis o r o ne or n ee. M"d" .;2 2 ,4 / % , Cbndition;WrappliesttolthegnipYfmeID 0:am m egnsy enabled;fogtheESG7Matec! Leveld EotEE nt h. Ty Emiributwbain NPOWERMs]Sesszthaniot equal %_.-.r.ne ,. m u s e m s-M W '8 M WitJGonesotmostWesseMEILowerwa r s ,,mgic-E~,emos.s-of timet(s)Rinoperab]eZtheiassociatedgesseljMRchanntT{sKadstgbe pl aceid Pi rrthe*. tripped: condition i within s6Thoues"r EAtSWss;than5mr
/2 f/'/e- equal .todeer;hTPiltheselchannel2ardtMVess51fa(5Paverj@ y channels 4 rat;greatet-than RTP,T.these:channelstare3t glet.RTP"but*3ess-than:otequalliyy;(,
e Vessel"ATXPowerET.'channe~Tsf;:23,f/ P1 acing a yessel AT cha !T4n3tripputomaticaT]y,TinabTes;;a;2eco timecdelay,for5thateprot ionn:hannellwithJefther;1heinormalror adverse containment *;envi onnent"; level"bistablaienab1_ed@ , CompletionTime~of 3 h s-is' bas.ed:on
Reference:
7'JECthe la.+1'/, (continued) MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 58 5/15/97
7- - --__ CHANGE NUPBER JUSTIFTCATf0N G / d 3.3 41 ITS 3.3.1 Condition L is deleted to match the plant-specific design-end gp/ m --- m
," for the Source Range Neutron Flux Function in MODES 3, C4-37-d/4
- 4. and 5 with the Rod Control System incapable of rod withdrawal and
., all rods fully inserted. Under these conditions, the source range instrumentation does not provide a Reactor Trip System Function. The source range channels provide onit indication [and inadvertent boron dilution mitigation] when in this Applicability. Requirements related to the source range neutron flux channels in H0 DES 3. 4, and 5 when all rods are fully inserted and are not capable of being withdrawn have therefore been [ moved to ITS 3.3 3 Frtrte C cf !TS Tik 3.3.11
- 1: :ff:f t: F =tir 5 ;-d r=i :d ::::rdin; Z. This change is 7R-7,7-sW(,
i consistent with traveler TSTF 135. 3.3 42 This change deletes ITS 3.3.1 Condition N per traveler TSTF-169. Condition M is appropriate for Function 10.a to prevent sequential' entry into Condition N followed by M and exceeding the evaluated Completion Time in WCAP 10271 P A. Supplement 2 Rev.1. With this change, there is no need to list separate Functions 10.a and 10.b and combining the Functions eliminates Applicability questions similar to the Condition H vs. N concern above. 3.3 43 This change revises ITS 3.3.1 Condition R Notes 1 and 2 per traveler TSTF 168. The 2 hour A0T should not be limited to only UFA/STA'
~, maintenance. This is consistent with the current TS and is acceptable Ff*-
because the specific maintenance activity which requires that a reactor trip breaker be bypassed does not affect the impact of having the breaker bypassed. [ Notes 1 and 2 are combined to reflect current TS Table 3.31. ACTION 9.] ( 3.3 44 This change revises ITS 3.3.1 Conditions S and T and ITS 3.3.2 Condition LAs ysTTyr'tbe Tguset,,ar BeatrgedCJanrfeJvfhA8Msd gS,7-44 CMC 1Ean5 3X.2-V.jfo reflect current TS Ac110N 5tatements 8 and 20]. The Conditions apply to one or more channels [ ] because the l safety function is served with the interlock in the apprapriate state . 3 gg 3.3 45 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.3 46 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68).
- 3.3 47 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table -
t (Enclosure 6B). I 3.3 48 Not ^rp * " : t C;; Cc... . .o., Ce...p. . .,; , T;1 - $ J,7-ff \ u = = :; =: a. red,:y. JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 6 5/15/97
~ , . _ . - -
l CHANGE NUMBER JUS'IFICATION jg 3.3 83 Y g This change addFNotedSW3erSWTM to reflect the currentgygg l l g*2 TSLOGrc wf4L regard-h j YErrfon &excluofrh/?.gfRqf n}mfre, /o TcceMnuf-ly . 3.3-84 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion-Comparison able (Enclosure 68). l 3.3 85 Not applicable to Call.away. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). l 3.3 86 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). l 3.3 87 Not used. S 7,"iit-PP 3.3 88 This change revises ITS 3.3.9 to apply in MODE 2 only belowYP 6 and to ACTION tat 5.b /,c/r
- GcreN'r'$nr
> rrr . cu%.
.1 TSvrn Table 3.3-V T A ceytak,,,
3.3 89 i chh bR'3~.3'.9.3toaddthe4 hour 47M allowance from ITS SR 3.3~.I iamlTM h(, //mx mu/h7//orken tw/ /wrnf, 3.3-90 This change excludes neutron;deta+nes from CHANNEL CALIBRATION ITS SR 3.3.9.4 per current T5 Table 4'.3-1, Functional Unit 6. Note 4 e8~
*M + reveler 7Trrf-/ts".- 31 4 3.3 91 This change adds CHANNEL CHECK and response time surveillances (ITS c SR 3.3.9.1 and SR 3.3.9.5) per current TS Table 4.31 Functional l s Unit 6, Note 12.'7%s ed/th s[ f(e dNM4WEL CMEcN 84 /r l ~iR-J.f-dg C*wirlenhihk -/rnye/eo- TW-/fC . .
3.3 92 This change adds SR 3~.3~.4.rNote that the ASP controls for the TDAFW pumphM are not required to be verified prior to entry intog 7g MODE 3, consistent with current TS SR 4.3.3.5.3. 3.3 93 ITS 3.3.1 Condition V is deleted. It is not entered from Table 3.3.1-1 nor do the Bases clarify wherr it would be needed, raising the concern of misinterpretation. Condition V does not replace LCO 3.0.3 requirements to assess when the plant is outside the licensing basis. There is no similar ACTION Statement in the current TS for the Reactor Trip System. This change is consistent with traveler TSTF 135. 3.3 94 ITS 3.3.4 is revised per current TS [3.3.3.5] with regard to [ auxiliary I shutdown panel ASP] controls. [ ASP] controls are added to the LCO, i Condition A, and SR 3.3.4.2. By explicitly including the controls, the L specification is clarified to be more than instrumentation. This change is acceptable because it does not change the meaning while retaining the clarity of the current TS. , 3.3-95 ITS 3.3.1 Condition H. Required ACTION H.1, and the second part of Function 4 Applicability (H00E 2 below P 6) in ITS 3.3.1 are deleted since they provide no real compensatory measures. [With their deletion, there is no need to repeat the > P 6 Applicability in 1 Conditions F and G.] In accordance with LCO 3.0.4, the intermediate l JUSTIFICATION' FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 10 5/15/97 l
~
CHANGE NUEER JUSTIFICATf0N the next one hour. Therefore. ISTS Required Actions B.2.2 and U.2.2 for Functions 1 and 20 in Table 3.3.11 are not necessary since the ) l performance of Required Action B.2.1 and U.2.1 takes the plant to MODE 3. exits the Applicability, and requires entry into Condition . This change is consistent with ITS 1.3 and 3.0.4, an/ 0=ve/cr- 7g.-S,m is i f-/S C 4 3.3 107 Based upon operating experience to change Thermal Power in a controlled fashion without challenging the plant and consistent with the current TS which does not have a Completion Time for restoring one channel to Operable status; but does prevent going above P-10 until it is restored, the Completion Time for ITS 3.3.1 Required Actions F.1 and F.2 should be increased to 24 hours. Condition F of ITS 3.3.1 is for one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable. Reactor ! protection would be provided by the Operable Intermediate Range Neutron i Flux channel and Operable Power Range Neutron Flux channels. ' Indication would be available from the Operable Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel [. from Operable Gamma Metrics neutron flux detectors.] and from Operable Power Range Neutron Flux channels with g.7,pjp7 P# appmacMng {g]g gpfgg ;.p_ { n g nw~=.. ~ =.. ... :. =. - y: = .
=-
See y:s1r-a+f,- 3.3 108 ff c lt 0* S . See Dwe erren doyeres, p 3.3 109 l Callaway. fee Con verrisn G y a ,,,., ,$ p jj 3.3-110 Not tese6- affl(cdlt h Ca llowy. See Cowever,,, 0 9,, m y ygg 3.3 111 TAlle (Enelaure /4)' . This change adds a note to ITS SR 3.3.1.7 for source range instrumentation to verify interlocks P 6 and P 10 are in their required i state for existing unit conditions. This is consistent with the current TS and is an enhancement which is easily performed and provides ! additional assurance that the interlocks are functioning correctly. 3.3-112 Not 7;Jle med-- (&fuu offlTedle a jg). h D&w/. See Con ver.rien 0qvison & h-d.f(2.l) 3.3 113 N
/rcalle Calla y. See Coversisn 0 prism & .1-o.s-(.2.& l 3.3 114 : i-Jh j ), Caffway. See Connersion on AS' 3.3 115 Not used.
3.3 116 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). l 3.3 117 This change to ITS 3.3.1 Condition R reflects current TS Table [3.31. ACTION Statement 12] which was based on NRC Generic Letter 85 09. 3.3 118 This change is for consistency with ITS 3.7.10 Condition [G]. JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 13 5/15/97
. . - . - - = - - -_ - - __-_ - - _ _ _ - -
CHANGE NUPEER JUSTIFICATION f 3.3-119 This change reflects BDMS analysis restrictio sociated with-RGS- S .7.7-//9 dilution flow rate (i.e.. ITS SR 3.3.9.2). creseawshnadministratively controlled under the current TS. as approved in OL ndment No. 94 i dated March 7, 1995. However, with the conversion ITS 3.3.9, 6
-/4r.c analysis assumptiord should be included in the body of the TS.
4 Tht.e Tr Nof .nr 2 ,
* .r.c in 3.3 121 ITS 3.3.9 is revised to reflect 13aETa>WDemrraxawum--,-2 Wa.ZTS NN that the suspension of positive reactivity 3M additions and accelerated SDN verifications are required only if no source range neutron flux indicator is OPERABLE. dPE5E'FEDER'Be k' MA ;-: Suspension of positive reactivity additions and accelerated SDM verifications 8 7.%/1/
should not be requiredlift source range flux indication is available.
"Z$ cri2E8Ktge entry intiqo itio B is pr securin RCS 1onndr, bfwredA-- % / wea/fipitated b eshy *Yal}e b*f"'ni'y
~
^
. (Qrsit% h.osak b e j'o.rthve A1TC s.f+
a apa a e (b) for Functions 1. .19c21 af egd) va or etw/s/o a cycle 3.3 122 IB 3.3.1 ApplYcab111t Mrc)* Corditions C and K are revised to replace Actions requiring the RTBs to k be opened with agns that ensure subcriticality is maintained (1. t '" ' . bf' fully inscrtep all rods and ensuring the Rod Control System is 14-27-d# incapable of rod withdrawal) yet do not initiate a feedwater isolation (P 4 and low Tm) in MDDE 3, consistent with traveler TSTF 135. 3.3 123 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.3 124 Consistent with the current TS Table 4.3-1, Note [17], the notes for ITS SR 3.3.1.4 and Table 3.3.1-1 Function 20 are modified to clarify that the SR is required for the reactor trip bypass breaker local manual shunt trip only. The Bases for SR 3.3.1.14 clearly state that j SR 3.3.1.14 includes the automatic undervoltage trip of the reactor trip bypass breakers. The Note (k) added to Table 3.3.11. Function 20 clarifies the Applicability of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms to include those functions of the reactor trip bypass breakers when in use. 3.3 125 ITS SR 3.3.1.11 is modified by a Note that requires verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values. The addition i ' of this Note is consistent with SR 3.3.1.10 and is required because SR 3.3.1.11 is used for the Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate [ ] trip function which has a time constant associated with its ; calibration. '
?3 "-' 3.3 126 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table i (Enclosure 6B).
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 14 5/15/97 1
CHANGE l Nl#EER JllSTIFICATION i 3.3 127 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table I (Enclosure 6B). l 4 3.3 128 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). . 3.3 129 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table i (Enclosure 68). 3.3 130 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table I (Enclosure 6B). l l 3.3-131 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.3 132 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). l 3.3 133 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). ! 3.3 134. Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table l (Enclosure 6B).
., 3.3 135 A MODE change restriction has been added to ITS 3.3.1 Condition C per j b
the matrix discussed in CN 102 LS 1 of the 3.0 package (see the LS 1 i l NSHC in the CTS Section 3/4.0. ITS Section 3.0 package). l 3.3 136 The TADOT performed under ITS SR 3.3.2.7. includes verification of r'elay setpoints since the trip actuating devices being tested are the same ; circuits tested under ITS SR 3.3.5.2. !
.ryretr iA-IS.
l 3 lU I JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 15 5/15/97
-w-..4,,-. . - . . - , . . - . . - , ..
i _ , , . INSERT 6A-15 1,ul l 3.3-137 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table CA_y,7-d/1 , (Enclosure 68). l 3.3-138 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table C[-2 7-d/S (Enclosure BB). 3.3-139 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conyersion Comparison Table bd ~AD/1 . , (Enclosure 68). ) ! I 3.3-140 Changes to RTS and ESFAS AT Functions are made to reflect Callaway CA-2 5W7 OL Amendment No.125 dated April 13,1998. < l 3.3-141 Changes to ESFAS Feedwater isolation Functions are made to reflect CA"Z7-441 l Callaway OL Amendment No.126 dated April 23,1998. 1 . 3.3-142 hdds "or trains" to ITS 3.3.1 Condition A, consistent with ITS 3.3.2 and Tf .1P,7-d44 ) travelerTSTF-135. ' 3.3-143 Not used. ! 3.3-144 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table g 7.7-/M (Enclosure 68). . l
< l l -
l t t l i i 9
A
! % li .
>t
! m_ *> '- '
p hh ^m (f , ., e
.p%. , f[. +
1 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FRON NUREG 1431, SECTION 3.3 Page 7 of 21. ! TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION r+ DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY (ly i 3.3-36 Revisions reflect revised BDMS setpoint in current TS. No not in current
}U No not in current No not in current Yes (current TS per' TS. TS. TS. OL Amen hent No. 94 dated,3.7 95) ,
s 3.3-37 Several ITS Required Action Notes are modified to allow a Yes Yes No - not in current' No not in current' channei to be placed in bypass for surveillance testing. design or TS. design or TS. [This change incorporating bypass test instrumentation, was approved for CPSES through Amen &ents 47 and 33 for Units 1 and 2. respectively.] 3.3-38 The CPSES design uses the N-16 based overtenperature and No Yes No No overpower protective functions. Several changes to the setpoints. Required Actions and Surveillances of NUREG-1431 are required to maintain the current licensing basis.
'3.3-39 g5ro T5 ble .7- is a. to be onst ent h No not in current No not in current Yes Yes
) ent Tabl .3- Act ton L ic spli to TS. TS.
efle the 5, ho 1-4 lic lity, nd 80 SFAS rtio and ssoc ed equi, nts n the fggg w
^ 1 stMWT' &B-?
3.3 40 y "rf M*-'-t:dA "" 3 3.3. M;th E, - Ti. siminar 6v we nute eu. u,~,....... /4/ t,gd. -N/4 -Vee- 4/h f -Yes--N[A -Tes - y g33@, 3.3-41 ITS 3.3.1 Condition L is deleted to match the plant- No - see CN Yes Yes Ye specific desigr, ; ,4 tb :.. . _... " for the Source Range 3.3-123. Neutron Flux function in HDDES 3. 4. and 5 with the Rod -2 3--g)/g Control System incapable of rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted. Under these conditions, the source range instrumentation does not provide a Reactor Trip System Function. The source range channels provide only indication (and inadvertent boron dilution mitigation] when in this Applicability. Requirements related to the -
,.3 source range neutron flux channels in MDDES 3, 4,'and 5 *-
when all rods are fully inserted and are not c=hl* of Sing withdrawn have thererore oeeri [ moved to ITS 3.3.'9} l A yn. _ . . . _ _ _ n m. . . .. . u . 3.3. m = 7 =. m-xw i
# 4
;s !
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - NUREG-1431 5/15/97 e~
- si /
CONVEP.SION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FRON NUREG-1431 SECTION 3.3 Page 13 of 21 i TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NVMER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY Mil 'ch u no -L
- ^
3.3 81 r sis (.o itt = Fi- L r,et 17, ;., . .. . t' x; C" 3.3 70. m G 3.5 - . hI 3. 7a I 3.3 t ef w rn fnt h ' ~ W N[g N/A NA [--
-Vee gA. d a 30 Ta e3 6. r y./ ug,
~
Ek) 3.3-82 The CONDITIONS. REQUIRED ACTIONS. etc. are revised per the Yes No No No DCPP current licensing basis. The plant FBACS does not perform any accident mitigation functions except during the fuel handling accident. 3.3 83 Add NMM,to reflect the current No - see CN 3.3-82. No LCO does not Yes Yes g y,g_g TS. a A/rfe -/y e i 4 JA8 2 7,7,*3 apply. 3.3 84 The note of SR 3.3.4.4 is deleted since Table 3.3.4-1 does Yes No No No not have a neutron detector specifled per the DCPP current , TS. j 3.3-85 The Note in Required Action 3.3.5 A.1 would be deleted as No Yq No No I it is inconsistent with the current CPSES design and TS. i
)
3.3 86 Surveillance Requirement 3.3.5.2 is revised to reflect the - No Yes see also CNs No No ! current CPSES plant design and licensing basis. A Note is 3.3-31, 3.3 130 l . added to SR 3.3.5.2 indicating that setpoint verification and 3.3 131. lI is not applicable for the performance of the TA00T. This , verification is performed during Channel Calibrations (see SR 3.3.5.3). e /n-/e,-/,el-3.3 87 Not used. (" O NA NA NA NA gy,ygp 3.3-88 Revise ITS 3.3.9 to apply in MODE 2 only belowk-6dnd to ' No - not in current No - not in current No - not in current Yes reflect ACTION Statement 5.b per current TS Table 3.31- TS. TS. TS. 3.3-89 Revise COT in ITS SR 3.3.9.3 to add the 4 hour allowance No not in current No - not in current No not in current Yes from ITS SR 3.3.1.7[ad 6-f/ux m //77 / re,/$n mQg TS. TS. (Q F,7.-9g7 3.3-90 Exclude neutron detectors from CHANNEL CALIBRATION ITS No not in current No - not in current No - not in current Yes SR 3.3.9.4 per current TS Table 4.3-1. Functional Unit 6. TS. TS. TS. Note 4, ank TJ'!".5--/35', ~1X~~3.3'Q& ).
~
h CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - NUREG 1431 5/15/97 n . - - - - . - , - , _ .
rs ki f.
%g) .
._ -- w Page 14 of 21 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431. SECTION 3.3
, APPLICABILITY TECH SPEC CHANGE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY DIABLO CANYON CGNCIE PEAK , NUMBER DESCRIPTION ' F No - not in current Yes .; No - not in cwin,t 3.3-91 Add CHANNEL CECK and response time surveillances (ITS No - not in current TS. TS. \ .
~
SR 3.3.9.1 and SR 3.3.9.5) cujrentTSTabig411. TS. *TM-J.9-g Ji Functional Unit 6. Note 1 7"37/~'/Fs", ,
^
No . adopted ISTS: No - not in current No 4 ted ISTS Yes -- N .i I 3.3-92 Adds SR 3.3.4.2 Note that the ASP controls for the TDAFW foriant. ; pug 6 are not required to be ytrified prior to entry into N)DE 3. consistent with current TS formet. , TS. b//--A 3- i j SR 4.3.3.5.3. < L Yeg. Yes Yes 3.3 93 ITS 3.3.1 Condition V is deleted. Itisnotgnteredfrom Ygg '! Table 3.3.1-1 nor do the Bases clarify when it wqgl4 be i . 'f r ' cl , needed.raisingtheconcernofmisinterpretation. : Condition V does not replace 1.C0 3.0.3 requirgnents to l l assess when the plant is outside the licensing basis. S M8'*dT* _66 Yes ! Ng' 3.3-94 ITS3.3.4isrevisedpercurrentTS[3.3.3.5]withregard .r#TThrwher/, , T ygg ,
,i M$$ .r j
to [ ASP] controls. f Y,3 Yes i Yes 3.3-95 ITS 3.3.1 Condition H. Required ACTION H.1. and the second Yes i
' l part of Function 4 Applicability (MODE 2 below P-6) in j ITS 3.3.1 are deleted since they provide no real ,
cogensatory measures. [With their deletion, there is no l need to repeat the > P 6 Applicability in Conditions F ; , and G.] In accordance with LCO 3.0.4. the intermediate range detectors must be OPERABLE prior'to entering the : Applicability of the retained part of Function 4 (i.e.. { H00E 2 above P-6). Condition H and Required ACTION H.1 ensure the same thing and. therefore, can be deleted. } j This change is consistent with TSTF 135. l l t i ! I
\
5/15/97 l l
w J s - CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1431. SECTION 3.3 Page 18 of 21 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY u s* r T hr Fr 3.3 119 This change eflecthCallaway-s cific BOMS analysis No No No Yes restrictio associated with G 6 ' dilution flow rate. N bdninistratively controlled under the current TS. as approved in OL Amendnent No. 94 dated March 7. 95. However,withtijgjonversionto
, h 2 7"-//Y i, ITS 3.3.9. nalysi assumptiorgshould be include ( !
1n the body of the TS. CTn,hrig vs/ume Er &AetradideXT32+,f-3A P$n.rer, r 3.3-120 g gg ><27 -Vee-A//A Yer N/A ter-M/A -Vee A//A 7 t 3.3-121 For Callaway. ITS 3.3.9 is revised to reflectAH5)3p$yr- No No No Yes that the suspension of positive reactivity additions and p ~P.f-/.2/ accelerated SDM verifications are required only if no source range neutron flux indicator is OPERABLE. 3.3 122 ITS 3.3.1 Applicability Note (b) for Functions 1. 5, 19-21 Yes Yes Yes Yes and Conditions C and K are revised to replace AcH- [n/ffa 4 *((sn VD I requiring the RTBs to be opened with a [cthat ensur subcriticality is maintained (i.e., byvfully insert all 7Z .E"F-dd/, rods and ensuring the Rod Control System is incapable of f ) rod withdrawal) yet do not initiate a feedwater isolation ( (P-4 and low T,.,) in H00E 3. consistent with traveler TSTF-135, 3.3-123 This change deletes ACTION L.2 and renumbers L.3 since the Yes - refer to No - see CN 3.3-41. No see CN 3.3-41. No - see CN 3.3-41. requirement to close the unborated water source valves is LA 28/27. not in the CTS. 3.3 124 Consistent with the current TS Table 4.3-1. Note [17] the Yes Yes Yes Yes notes for ITS SR 3.3.1.4 and Table 3.3.1-1. Function 20 are modified to clarify that the SR is required for the reactor trip bypass breaker local manual shunt trip only. The Bases for SR 3.3.1.14 clearly state that SR 3.3.1.14 includes the automatic undervoltage trip of the reactor trip bypass breakers. The Note (k) added to Table 3.3.1-1. Function 20 clarifies the Applicability of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms to include those functions of the reactor trip bypass breakers when in use. CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - NUREG-1431 5/15/97
m- g, i b ;, b ( .a . . CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROH NUREG 1431, SECTION 3.3 P ge 21 of 21 TECH SPEC CilANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 3.3 136 The TADOT performed under ITS SR 3.3.2.7 includes No - adopted ISTS No adopted ISTS Yes Yes verification of relay setpoints since the trip actuating format. format. devices being tested are the same circuits tested under ITS SR 3.3.5 2. R3-/31 7/w C*ndrNon -$r 5 nc}fon 4.c fr chayaj No - rnra, + 1
)les No- x ~.,+ i 4.-x,,a ;
[n,n Con];fion b -/s E Consfrl'es} Wr/h lls a b cft' C7~1. O A~2 hl *1 TJ,rs ifrEr-spe;};a c/wa,ye eewirer 72J/t 7.T.H, NY Al0
/"**lAlt l -$D
- yy Q, A/,
at reflech e5,<0vt*e}coh$,,ye}ure N-l$ f*<<
/,*k'Nelilpw v0 si+ 2 Ame,,Jmen+sy4i, n
rst, Or Ur,if / in lad 91-081 W-22M 2 2-/39 j'eeA m,L =~ee ,,.jj,new
-p a x x r. r. 2. ty w I,,,4 7 , y , y* y, y
/? nan +4 TAboT. SR 223.?
/f*hyn.,,ce op a TAboT every M C-AL W1 Znre,-l / : Sy,part A c iron .77 I ta r h c a n h ,rnm..J ,,,,,run, 4 it,3-3,n,4-y,34..t(~,/, ppa,.,n.;,/,g, g 3.-jg Changes -le R rs a,) EJFAs a T~ &c/fons No No N, CA-3.7-do j t era m,Je -lo reflec+ Calkway DL Ana j en+ fer No. las~ da-leof 4/a/11 2 3 -14 / Ch yer -lo EsfAs faado /e-Iro/.Hoo, K ,dr,,a- o N, N, No ya, cA-L2-N1
~ ~de -1. c.si.c+ c.ii..l. oaas~.,i-
/1/o. ial, a.-foof f 4/es,47,
- r. 2-/+ 2 AdJr "o. &-rne" -f. rrv Csnd-isn A, conris}eo,-l w f}$ r TS 2.1 3 se d yer fe' f*' Y ne-xx-sa 3.T-/+3 $s#l$},R-a 3' 3-/+4- crr- S- Ye, No No N, azz-p7
.L NURE)-1431 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE u 5/15/ e
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-8 GEN APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Generic Bases Changes RAI Comment: (1) For all topical reports listed in the Section 3.3 Bases provide documentation of an NRC staff letter approving plant-specific use of topical report TS changes. (2) Respond to reviewer comments on ITS Bases deviations from ITS which will be provided once agreement is reached on the LCO requirements and the supporting Bases changes are provided to the reviewer. Based on 8/1.4/98 meeting no response is required to item (2). FLOG RESPONSE: This RAI must be addressed on a plant-specific basis. Plant Specific Discussion The Callaway ITS 3.3 Bases references two WCAPS. WCAP-9226 is taken from current TS Bases page B 2-6; it discusses small steamline breaks for which the overpower AT trip provides protection. The only other WCAP referenced is WCAP-13632-P-A which has been generically approved by NRC, contingent upon 4 SER conditions. Those 4 conditions are addressed in NSHC LS-1 in Enclosure 4. WCNOC took the discussions in NSHC LS-1, minus the text on the NRC SER conditions, and submitted a separate license amendment request (LAR). They received one RAI related to the SER conditions already addressed in LS-1 and received an amendment on October 20,1997. Those FLOG members that continue to pursue approval of LS-1 consider it an unnecessary expenditure of resources to submit a separate LAR on this issue (WCNOC did so only under outage schedular concerns). It is noted that this issue is also the subject of traveler TSTF-111 Rev. 4. ATTACHED PAGES: None l l
I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-01-A APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l REQUEST: A Note, " Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function,"is added to the l ACTIONS for the Reactor Trip System, ESFAS, [ Remote Shutdown, including each required ASP l control], and Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. This change clarifies those situations where the current TS ACTION Statements are not uniquely associated with a particular Function or where the required channels are specified on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, per bus, etc., basis. l Comment: The new note Separate Condition entry allowed for each function is justified
- as an administrative change reflecting the current interpretation of the technical l specification requirements. This is inconsistent with the fact that CTS LCO 3.3.3.5 explicitly provides for separate condition entry (Action c). If separate condition entry is the i i general practice, one would expect that explicit provision for this would be unnecessary in l LCO 3.3.3.5. Thus, adopting " separate condition entry" where CTS actions are not j uniquely associated with a particular Function can not be evaluated as " administrative changes" as stated in this DOC. Evidence that separate condition entry is the current l interpretation for the other LCOs should be provMed.
)
FLOG RESPONSE: The reference to CTS LCO 3.3.3.5 Action c applies to DCPP only. PG&E l received an amendment in 1994 (LA 94/93 for Units 1 and 2, respectively) that was based on adopting some of the language of NUREG-1431 regarding separate Condition entry. The separate Action or Condition entry language is not found in the old STS, NUREG-0452. Separate Condition entry is, in fact, the established plant practice at all FLOG plants where required Functions are listed in tables and often use common Action Statements. DOC 1-01-A has been l revised to provide further discussion. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 -ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 1 Enclosure SB, page B 3.3-177 4 { I
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS SECTION 3/4.3 This enclosure contains a brief description / justification for each marked up change to the current Technical Specifications. The changes are identified by change numbers contained in enclosure 2 (Mark up of the current Technical Specifications). In addition, the referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs) are contained in enclosure 4. Only technical changes are discussed: administrative changes (i.e., format, presentation, and editorial changes) made to conform to ' NUREG 1431 Revision 1 are not discussed. For Enclosures 3A, 3B, 4, 6A, and 6B, text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location. CHANGE NUMBER MStjC DESCRIPTION 1 01 A A Note, " Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function," is added to the ACTIONS for the Reactor Trip l System. ESFAS, [ Remote Shutdown, including each required ; ASP control), and Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. i This change clarifies those situations where the current ! TS ACTION Statements are not uniquely associated with a particular Function or where the required channels are specified on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, per bus, ) etc., basis. This change is consistent with current ' operating practices and NUREG 1431 Rev.1. [ Relaxations associated with this change are discussed in CN , 2-46 LS 42.] . ZWJEU 5A-/ $ /-9/M 1-02 LG The current TS require that response time testing be [ performed 18] months on andeach reactortrains that alternate trip and ESFAS be tested in function everyDC.- successive tests. The current TS description of the channel testing protocol matches the improved TS definition of STAGGERED TEST BASIS. However, several trip functions do not require response time testing, as indicated by N.A. in the tables of response time limits [previously relocated to a licensee controlled document]. The improved TS specify that 6lilf3Eh response time d2 'S. Mf testing be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS and do not impose any requirements as to which train should be tested. Therefore, 6(45WwnerWM4emo S 7.3 -55 M>r@ the requirement to ensure that each train is tested every[36'] months is moved to the Bases for ITS bC-ALL-M/ l SR 3.3.1.16 and SR 3.3.2.10. 1 03 LS 1 In current TS SR 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.2.2, the active verb is changed from " demonstrated" to " verified". This allows Reactor Trip System and ESFAS sensor response time verifications to be performed per WCAP 13632-P A Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 1 5/15/97
_. INSERT 3A-1 Separate Condition entry is the established plant practice at all FLOG plants where required kNM instrument Functions are listed in tabular format. The inoperability of one instrument Function has no impact on the operability of unrelated instrument Functions. The tabular format of the instrumentation tables with common Action Statements for many Functions mandate separate Condition entry, otherwise a single isolated problem with one instrument channel could unduly restrict plant operation. Unless separate Condition entry were the current practice, no plant could have more than a single inoperable channel for all of the RTS Functions. Likewise, the inoperability of a channel in one loop for a Function specified on a "per loop" required channel basis has nothing to do with other channels in other loops of that Function (barring a common mode failure which is addressed by LCO 3.0.3). Since this change does not affect the operating limits or manner in which the plant is currentiy operated, this is an administrative change. l
m**'p -i=w.- Remote Shutdown System m B 3.3.4 LQ ' BASES (continued) j APPLICABILITY The Remote Shutdown System LC0 is applicable in H0 DES 1, 2. , and 3. This is required so that the unit can be placed and l maintained in H0DE 3 for an extended period of time from a l location other than the control room. This LC0 is not applicable in H0DE 4, 5, or 6. In these MODES. the facility is already subcritical and in a condition of reduced i RCS energy. Under these conditions, considerable time is available to restor if M' control room instr nu ar ranten h w unavailable. A henh Jhabwnindrumerd: a reyuid L Mf' cmfreir -
- L ACTIONS Note 1 is included which RcTDiliis the MODE change restriction of l LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into an applicable MODE l while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may !
eventually require a unit shutdown. This exception is acceptable ; due to the low probability of an event requiring the Remote Shutdown System and because the equipment can generally be ' repaired during operation without significant risk of spurious
.c -. trip. i y;,\ _
- m- ote 2 has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application ;
" a of Completion Time rules. Separate Condition entry is allowed '
I for each Function listed on Table 3.3.4-1 antiPMniest) l fhe,i.ji s The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable @ l channel (s)/ train (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for g g I each Function startinc from he time the C ndi ion was entered I forthatFynctjon.lA5 hen a-Aef uk 0 *nnelt in~T OIe E M ~I tre NZ.rfesiths en a fef N breake< f ume,. yer&ere j NenS DontINon may be ,e,f ec EG, L1 each if re b ke<, SG, fwf, e+e., a.r og he. Condition A addresses the situation where one or more required l Functions of the Remote Shutdown System arc incpcrabic. Eis includcs any Tunet4en listed in Table 3.3.41 as wcil as the control and transfer switches. onion _elotmor,elre_quinedMSE controlslate rinoperablej The Required Action is to restore the required Function a~ndPASP cpntrols to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The Completion Time is based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room.
,4
_ (continued) l HARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 177 5/15/97
- .. . --- - _ . - . - - _ _ _ . . -- . _. - - ~ _ - .
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET i l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-03-LS-1 APPLICABILITY: CA, DC, WC l l REQUEST: Changing " demonstrated" to " verified" allows Reactor Trip System and ESFAS sensor l response time verifications to be performed per WCAP-13632 P-A Revision 2. This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-111. l Comment: Reject - (OOS] The ITS proposes generic changes to the STS that are not l included in an approved TSTF. Adoption of WCAP-13632 for eliminating selected sensor l response time testing requires staff review independent of the Conversion TS review. l l FLOG RESPONSE: This change is the subject of TSTF-111 Rev. 4, currently under active NRC l and TSTF discussion. This DOC no longer applies to WCNOC based on Amendment No.113 dated October 20,1997 (see their licensee identified change WC-3.3-009). The response to Comment Number Q 1-B-GEN provides additional discussion. l l l ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 l Enclosure 3A, page 2 1 Enclosure 4, page 15 I Enclosure SA, Traveler Status Sheet l l l l l l 1 a 1
s CHANGE I l p NUMBER EBC. DESCRIPTION i Testing Requirements." This change is consistent with 8/Ob l traveler TSTF 1116 which revises the Bases for ITS I SR 3.3.1.16 and SR 3.3.2.10 to allow the elimination of pressure sensor response time testing. i 1 04 LG In current TS Tables [3.3-1 and 3.3 3], the [* Channels to Trip" and] "Hinimum Channels OPERABLE" columns are deleted, consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1, [In current TS Table 3.3 6, the " Channels to Trip / Alarm" column is deleted.] ACTION Statements are also revised tc delete references to " Minimum Channels OPERABLE" requirements. The ITS terminology, " Required Channels," is used. The logic coincidence information has been moved to the ITS l Bases for each applicable specification. Operability I _ requirements for each Function are addressed by the j Required Channels and applicable Conditions in the ITS. 1 1 05 A The LCO 3.0.4 exception [ footnote f] in current TS Table 3.3-1 is deleted entirely. ACTION Statements [2, 6, 1
- 11. and 13] in current TS Table 3.3-1 permit continued operation for an unlimited period of time. Thereforr. no exception to ITS LCO 3.0.4 is needed for these ACTION Statements. [The LCO 3.0.4 exception [ footnote *] in current TS Table 3.3-3 is deleted for ACTION Statements
[19, 33, 36, and 37.] As above, these ACTION Statements permit continued operation for an unlimited period of time and no exception to ITS LCO 3.0.4 is needed. ACTION Statement [15 for Functional Unit 6.h] will retain the LCO 3.0.4 exception [ footnote *] in current TS Table 3.3 3 since this ACTION Statement allows operation for only a limited period of time.] These changes are consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. 1 06 LS 2 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, a new ACTION Statement [2.1] is created which is essentially the same as current ACTION Statement [6], and 'is similar to current ACTION Statement [2], but does not require a reduction in THERMAL POWER to less than 75% RTP or the measurement of the QPTR if above 75% RTP. This new ACTION Statement is applied to the Power Range Neutron Flux. High Positive Rate [ ] trip and Low Setpoint trip functions. The latter is an administrative change only since its Trip Setpoint of 25% RTP and Applicability (below P 10) are well below l the reduced power of 75% RTP. The Power Range Neutron
, Flux, High Positive Rate [ trip is a rate function and its]
~
effectiveness is not improved by reducing power: therefore, this new ACTION Statement is also applied to l [that trip], as discussed in LS 2. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 2 5/15/97
- f. IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-1 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION 7 _ . _
FOR TEClelICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
~
l In current' TS SR [4.3.1.2 and 4.3.2.23, the active verb is changed from
" demonstrated" to " verified." This allows Reactor Trip System and ESFAS sensor response time verifications to be performed per WCAP 13632 P A Revision 2
" Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response. Time Test Requirements." This cha ggg /
B consistent with traveler TSTF-111@which revises the Bases for ITS l L SR 3.3.1.16 and SR 3.3.2.10 to allow the elimination of pressure sensor response l
. time testing.
In 1975 response time testing (RTT). requirements were included in the Westinghouse Standard TechnicallSpecifications and were required for all plants licensed after that date. # . . . . The current TS 'contain definitions for both Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)' response times. The response time definitions are: f
'#' "The REACTOR T' RIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIE shall be the time interval from when l
" the monitored parameter exceeds its trip setpoint at the channel sensor until loss of stationary gripper coil voltage."
c "The ESF RESPONSELTIE_shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their l required values, etc.)_ . Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable." The current TS Bases state that the response time may be measured by any series of bC-Au.-#3 sequential, liverlapping, Tr total channel test measurements such that the total channel response time is measured. This approach is also consistent with ISA Standard 67.06. Given this guidance and the complexity of te. sting an entire instrument channel fros'the sensor to the final device, plant surveillance ' l procedures test the channels in several steps. One individual step is the. instrument sensor. Separate procedures using specialized test equipment are used ( solely for testing the sensors. l The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if the deletion of periodic response time testing could be justified for specific pressure, level, and flow functions ' that utilize pressure and differential pressure sensors. IEEE Standard 338 1977 - defines a basis for eliminating RTT. Section 6.3.4 states:
. fy@3 Q- j
" Response time testing of all safety related equipment, per se, is not
( required if, in lieu of response time testing, the response time of the safety NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 15 5/15/97
++-n=
1NDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION'.3.3 q TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS D:!fh'
! yTSTF-19. Rev.1 Net-Incorporated NA -Net NRC approved,c of "TE-Tht$
treLmar
- 1 r cutanlu:f'.date. gn a T TT 35.' P. / 2- - acerperas 2.2 24 - 4 y,3 $
TSTF 37. Rev. 1 Not Incorporated NA ITS 5.6.8 still addresses PAM reports. Sections after ITS 5.6.7 were not renumbered. TSTF-51 Not Incorporated NA _ Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. i TOTT-;l "-t In;;rporated -Mir U-ip S d e: int; and; All d ule-
"al m Tui ivoa of ?;1t;;; r d d::;=d;d alt:;; .:'" -rg-3.3@f g
vv 4 iat.% Z. m = TSTF-111.Rev.g Incorporated NA ( g/,gg/ u-a rti TSTF-135;/ey,3 "y 13 41.3.3-4+, ' = :T r i: t:: b r d :xp: in Incorporated P 'J.3 93 - =tre: deeld b x k s 3.3 95 -er'r-21 :~;r ste trd el a;.
";di:= ;f tk t=:le. thet m.3 3. n 3.3-1243;5-14Q
& I 3.5-il -ci;;-*#irrtt cirify !
'J.9-lef f ep91'ity r;quirc;-_c.ta hea !
500 dnarp;reted. -rp-y,yg TSTF-161Aey,/ Incorporated 3.3-79 Appewe/ /,y Ngc, - Q.T3-71 ;
. y. , 1 TSTF-168 Incorporated 3.3 43 Affnvel ly Ngc, 4 F.S-f3 TSTF-169 Incorporated 3.3 42 Agny,/jy Ngc, ry-3,ysy3 HM 105 73yFm Incorporated 3.3 49 4 y,3y or :p n d trrte'e- Incorporated 3.3 107 '400 "ini Cr;;p ^.:tir !!^~
737F-::t# +145- S 7.T- 97 kg g ," i MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97 l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET , ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-05-A APPLICABILITY: CA, DC, WC ! REQUEST: The LCO 3.0.4 exception [ footnote #) in current TS Table 3.3-1 is deleted entirely. I ACTION Statements [2,6,11, and 13] in current TS Table 3.3-1 permit continued operation for an unlimited period of time. Therefore, no exception to ITS LCO 3.0.4 is needed for these , l ACTION Statements. [The LCO 3.0.4 exception (footnote *) in current TS Table 3.3-3 is deleted l for ACTION Statements [19,33,36, and 37.) As above, these ACTION Statements permit i . continued operation for an unlimited period of time and no exception to ITS LCO 3.0.4 is needed. l ACTION Statement [15 for Functional Unit 6.h) will retain the LCO 3.0.4 exception (footnote *) in current TS Table 3.3-3 since this ACTION Statement allows operation for only a limited period of time.) Comment: {WC, CW, DC} The LCO 3.0.4 exception is deleted in ITS LCO 3.3.5. This i change is not evaluated in 1-05A. For this change, explain the administrative nature of the change per the guidance provided at the 8/14/98 meeting.
- FLOG RESPONSE
- This DOC is correct as submitted for Callaway and Wolf Creek. For those plants, current TS Table 3.3-3 contains ACTION 19* for Functional Units 8.a and 8.b. The
- l footnote provides an exception to LCO 3.0.4. Based on the wording of LCO 3.0.4 in the current l
TS, this exception would allow entry into the Applicability of Functional Units 8.a and 8.b while i relying on provisions contained in ACTION 19, i.e., the plant could enter the Applicability with one inoperable channel in trip. Further, based on the wording of LCO 3.0.4 in the improved TS, the plant is allowed to enter the Applicability of ITS LCO 3.3.5 when the " associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation ...for an unlimited period of time."In this case, LCO 3.3.5 Applicability may be en% red l for one inoperable channel under Condition A since tbs plant can operate in that Condition indefinitely. l The plant can not enter ITS LCO 3.3.5 Applicability with multiple channels inoperable since l restoration activities must be completed. Likewise, the mark-ups to current TS ACTION 19, l which did not originally address multiple channel inoperability, do not provide an LCO 3.0.4 l l exception. l Since DOC 1-18-LS-5 in the ITS 3.0 package (accepted by the NRC staff reviewer) addressed the changes associated with revising CTS LCO 3.0.4 to match ITS LCO 3.0.4, no further discussion should be needed here in ITS 3.3. For DCPP, the Loss of Power Functional Unit in Table 3.3-3 has no CTS 3.0.4 exception. ATTACHED PAGES: None i 1 -- , -
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 1-06-LS-2 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: A now ACTION Statement [2.1) is created which does not require a reduction in THERMAL POWER to less than 75% RTP or the measurement of the OPTR if above 75% RTP. Comment: The new action referenced for the power range low setpoint and the two flux rate trips (functions 3 & 4) no longer require a reduction in power. The Discussion of Change (DOC) and No Significant Hazards Consideration (NSHC) justify this on the basis that the rate trips are not sensitive to the initial power level. This is true. However, the rate trips may be sensitive to the fact that with one channel inoperable one core quadrant is not directly monitored by the power range neutron flux function. Neither the DOC nor the NSHC discuss the impact of this on the possible need to reduce power. Revise the justification. FLOG RESPONSE: NSHC LS-2 has been revised to provide additional discussion. The impact on the rate trip Function is of no consequence since other Functions provide the required protection. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 4, page 21 4 P i l
}
f
-- _ .. - _ - . = - -- . .- . _ .
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGN 8FTCANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS f NSHC LS 2 (continued) The high positive rate [ ] trip function is insensitive to the static power level . The proposed change will not affect any of the analysis assumptions for any of the' accidents previously evaluated. [No FSAR Chapter 15 analyses specifically credit this trip function. It provides back up protection for an RCCA Ejection.] gThe proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the proposed change affect the ability of any safety related jquipment to perform its intended function. There will be no degradation in the performance of nor an increase in the number of challenges ; imposed on saf :y related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation. refore, the proposed change does not involve a significant I increase in t probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. gg.7 g,f g g /4_ gg 2 i i
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? l l
There are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the me' hod by which. l any safety related plant system performs its safety function. The change in
. required ACTION will not affect the normal method of plarrt operation and, in fact, will relieve the operators from performing actions not required for plant safety. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure )
mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this ' change. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
- 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed event. There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions. There will be no impact on any margin of safety. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS 2" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c): and accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified. I NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 21 5/15/97
l l INSERT LS-2 i g / -gg 4f--2. Asymmetric reactivity transients that could be postua.e,d to occur in the core quadrant with an inoperable high positive rate channel (e.g., uncar, roiNd RCCA bank withdrawal from a subcritical or low power startup condition, uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal at power, withdrawal of a single RCCA, and RCCA ejection) are mitigated in the accident analyses by other reactor trip functions (e.g., power range neutron flux -low, power range neutron flux - high, or overtemperature [AT]), depending upon analysis assumptions regarding initial power level and reactivity insertion rate. 1 4 l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 1-07-LS-3 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: With one intermediate range neutron flux channel inoperable when the plant is above P-6 but below 10% RTP (the P-10 interlock setpoint), current ACTION Statement [3.b)is revised to establish a 24 hour Completion Time for channel restoration or changing the power level to either below P-6 or above P-10. Although this change is less restrictive since a power increase is an allowed option, the ACTION Statement would ensure protection by entering the range of the four power range neutron flux channels. The Applicability for Functional Unit 5 is revised such that current ACTION Statement [3.a] can be deleted. With both intermediate range neutron flux channels inoperable when the plant is above P-6 but below P-10, LCO 3.0.3 would be entered under the current TS and the plant would have to be in MODE 3 within 7 hours. New ACTION Statement [3.1] requires immediate suspension of operations involving positive reactivity additions and a power reduction below P-6 within 2 hours. Comment: Explain how the 2 hour and 24 hour repair times provide protection and ensure the low probability of occurrence of a reactivity transient that would require the need for an IR flux trip. Explain why the ITS actions will provide for continued safe operation of the plant. This change references TSTF-135 which is not approved by the i staff. Provide discussion to explain the relation of this change to proposed TSTF-135 changes. Note that not all proposed TSTF-135 changes are acceptable to the staff for implementation in ITS. l l FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-07-LS-3 and NSHC LS-3 have been revised to clarify the suspect wording. This DOC is unrelated to TSTF-135, discussed under Comment Number Q 3-LS-GEN. The 24 hour Completion Time is taken from TSTF-246. See the response to Comment Number O 3.3-107 for additional discussion of TSTF-246. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 -ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 3 Enclosure 4, page 22 i I
CHANGE
,. NUMBER GC. DESCRIPTION
. 1 07 LS 3 With one intermediate range neutron flux channel inoperable, current ACTION Statement [3.a] applies below the P 6 interlock. For those times that the plant is above P 6 but below 10% RTP (the P 10 interlock setpoint), current ACTION Statement [3.b] applies. ACTION Statement [3.b] is revised to establish a 24 hour Completion Time : for channel restoration or changing the power level to either below P-6 or above P 10. The intermediate range I neutron flux channels provide protection between these power levels and the APPLICABLE H0 DES have been revised to
- indicate this via new footnote [(a)]. With the revised i 1
Applicability, current ACTION Statement [3.a] is deleted since it is outside the new Applicability. The source ! 4 range neutron flux detectors provide protection below P 6 i ! and the power range neutron flux detectors provide l protection above P-10. The addition of the 24 hour ! Completion Time (current TS has no Completion Time) limits
- the window of operation during which the intermediate range neutron flux trip function provides protection in a l 1 of 1 logic configuration, =d c;w u . low probability $/ of occurrence of a reactivity transien during this time Lf 3 period that would require an intermed te range flux trip. i Although this change is less restrict ve since a power I increase is an allowed option, the A ION Statement would j ensure protection by entering the r ge of the four power ,
j range neutron flux channels. f: Q 4 . -/-(. % 6 , With both intermediate range neutron flux channels < inoperable in H0DE 1 (below P-10) and H00E 2 (above P 6), !' ! LCO 3.0.3 would be entered under the current TS and the
- plant would have to be in H0DE 3 within 7 hours. With both intermediate channels inoperable, new ACTION Statement [3.1] requires immediate suspension of i operations involving positive reactivity additions and a power reduction below P 6 within 2 hours. New ACTION Statement [3.1] is less restrictive since a reduction to MODE 3 would no longer be required; however, the current TS are overly conservative in this area. Below P-6 the source range channels provide protection: therefore, the required action for both intermediate range channels inoperable should be to exit plant conditions where this i trip function provides protection. New ACTION Stat,ement [3.1] will preclude any power level increase and require a controlled power' reduction to less than P 6 where the source range channels provide protection. The 2 hour Completion Time ensures the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the intermediate range neutron DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 3 5/15/97
l TV. SPEC 1FIC NO SIGNIFiCANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 3 , 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION l FOR i TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE l REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
&r-l$r9 -f$t a
re f.t With one intermediate, range neutron flux channel inoperable, current ACT Statement [3.a] applies below the P 6 interlock. For those times th the plant is above P-6 but below 10% RTP (the P-10 interlock setpoint), current CTION Statement [3.b] applies. ACTION Statement [3.b] is revised to ablish a 24 hour Completion Time for channel restoration or changing the power evel to either below P 6 or above P-10. The intermediate range neutron flux chann s provide protection between these power levels and the APPLICABLE H0 DES'have bee revised accordingly. I The source range neutron flux detectors provide protection low P-6 and the power I range neutron flux detectors provide protection above P 10. The addition of the I 24 hour Completion Time (current TS has no Completion Time) limits the window of operation during which the intermediate range neutron flux trip function provides protection in a 1 of 1 logic configuration,=d == tl-diow probability of d /-47-Lf-6 occurrence of a reactivity transient occurring during this time perica that would require an intermediate range flux trip. Although this change is less restrictive since a power increase is an allowed option, the ACTION Statement would ensure protection by entering the range of the four power range neutron flux channels. With both intermediate range neutron flux channels inoperable in MODE 1 (below P-10) and MODE 2 (above P-6). LC0 3.0.3 would be entered under the current TS and the plant would have to be in MODE 3 within 7 hours. With both intermediate channels inoperable. new ACTION Statement [3.1] requires immediate suspension of operations involving positive reactivity additions and a power reduction below P 6 within l l 2 hours. New ACTION Statement [3.1] is less restrictive since a reduction to MODE 3 would no longer be required; however, the curtent TS are overly conservative in this area. Below P 6 the source range channels provide protection; therefore, the required action for both intermediate range channels inoperable should be to exit plant conditions where this trip function provides protection. New ACTION . Statement [3.1] will preclude any power level increase and require a controlled i power reduction to less than P-6 where the source range channels provide protection. I The 2 hour Completion Time ensures the low probability of occurrence of an event ; during this period that may require the protection afforded by the intermediate ! range neutron flux trip. These actions actually provide a more timely and appropriate redress to the condition than entering LC0 3.0.3. The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 22 5/15/97
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-10-LS-32 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: This Callaway specific change redefines the Actions for the source range neutron flux channels in MODES 3,4, and 5. The source range neutron flux channels are required to provide input to the reactor trip system to mitigate potential uncontrolled rod withdrawal events only when the rod control system is capable of rod withdrawal or all rods are not fully inserted (see CN 1-55-LS-39). If one source range neutron flux channel is inoperable in MODES 3,4, and 5 when rod motion is possible, ACTION Statement 5.a is entered. If the channelis not restored within 48 hours, the Applicability is exited by inserting all rods and precluding rod withdrawal. If both source range channels are inoperable when rod motion is possible, new ACTION Statement 4.1 is entered and the reactor trip breakers are immediately opened. The current Action Statement 5.a requirements regarding the suspension of positive reactivity changes and closure of dilution source valves are deleted since they are not related to the reactor trip function. Comment: This change references TSTF-135 which is not approved by the staff. Provide discussion to explain the relation of this change to proposed TSTF-135 changes. See Comment 2-LS GEN for specific discussion of TSTF-135 changes. FLOG RESPONSE: See revised DOC 1-10-LS-32 and revised NSHC LS-32. Also, refer to the response to Comment Number Q 3-LS-GEN for a discussion of TSTF-135. ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 A, page 4 , page 56
CHANGE s .y NIM ER NSBC DESCRIPTION flux trip. These actions actually provide a more timely and appropriate redress to the condition than entering LCO 3.0.3. These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 1-08 H Current ACTION Statement [4]. for one source range channel inoperable in H0DE 2 below P 6. is revised to require the immediate suspension of operations involving positive reactivity changes. The CTS does not specify the timing for this ACTION. A new ACTION Statement [4.1] is added to address the condition where both source range channels are inoperable in H00E 2 below P 6 [ ]. The new ACTION Statement [4.1] requires that the RTBs be opened immediately. This action essentially accomplishes the reactor trip function. In such a condition with the current TS. LCO 3.0.3 would have been entered. This is more conservative since immediate rod insertion will take the plant to MODE 3 [ ] much more quickly than [the 7 hours) allowed by LCO 3.0.3. These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 1 09 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 1 10 LS 32 This Callaway specific change redefines the Actions for the source range neutron flux channels in current TS Table 3.3 1 during MODES 3. 4. and 5. The source range neutron flux channels are required to provide input to the Reactor Trip System to mitigate potential uncontrolled rod withdrawal events only when the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or % rods are not fully 7A-8.7 2W inserted (See CN 1 55 LS 39). #nea-Aart If one source range neutron flux channel is inoperable in w H0 DES 3. 4. and 5 when rod motion is possible. ACTION Statement 5.a is entered If the channel is not restored Q,f-),4# d' e4T within 48 hours, the Applicability is exited by97.L :.i., g f ri and precluding rod withdrawal. If both source d d range channels are inoperable when rod motion is possible, v new ACTION Statement 4.1 is entered and the reactor trip l breakers are immediately opened.
~
The ' current Action Statement 5.a requirements regarding the suspension of positive reactivity changes and closure i i of dilution source valves are deleted since they are not related to the reactor trip function nor are they required to exit the function's Applicability.g Requirements for
.17vssgrSh-+ Q Ho-U-;ra DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 4 5/15/97
INSERT 3A-4 $ /-/4-l./-f2. l In addition, the 48 hour allowed outage time in current Action Statement 5.a prior to l implementation of restoration activities for a single source range channelinoperable is j relaxed to a 72 hour Completion Time in ITS 3.3.9 Condition A. In the ITS, positive reactivity addition suspension and valve closure verifications aren't required for one inoperable BDMS train since the other train is available to automatically initiate valve swapover. The 72 hour Completion Time for a single BDMS train rendered inoperable by an inoperable source range channel input is acceptable since one BDMS train (with input from the remaining OPERABLE source range channel)is adequate to provide valve swapover, continuous indication of core power status, and flux multiplication alarms. The 72 hour Completion Time is acceptable based on the low probability of an inadvertent boron dilution transient occurring during this period and the 72 hour duration is also consistent with ESF Completion Times for loss of one redundant train. t i i j
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS
~'
NSHC LS 32 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l l This change redefines the ACTIONS for the source range neutron flux channels in l current TS Table 3.31 during MODES 3, 4, and 5. The source range neutron flux i channels are required to pro' tide input to the Reactor Trip System to mitigate potential uncontrolled red withdrawal events only when the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or e% rods are not fully inserted (see LS 39). 7T-27-#6 one or more If om ..ource range neutron flux channel is inoperable in MODES 3, 4 and 5 when rod q moi. ion is possible. ACTION Statement 5.a is entered. If the channel is not restored within 48 hours, the Applicability is exited by '=P.t; all rods and precluding */R-27.o4 rod withdrawal. If both source range channels re inoperable when rod motion is possible, new ACTION Statement 4.1 is entered nd the reactor trip breakers are imediately opened. 7,.gj. g. 4 g ,. l The current Action Statement 5.a requirements regarding the suspension of positive , reactivity changes and closure of dilution source valves are deleted since they are l not related to the reactor trip function nor are they required to exit the , Function's Applicability. Requirements for the source range channels related topgf g indication are addressed 'n ITS 3.3.3, ITS 3.3.4. ITS 3.3.9, and ITS 3.9.3 Requirements for the s ce range channels related to inadvertent boron dilution events are addressed b the Boron Dilution Mitigation System in ITS 3.3.9. j ~ZWEAT~ LT-3'3. The proposed TS change has been evaluated and.it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below: ! "The Comission may make a final determination. pursuant to the procedures in ! 50.91. that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no i significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance l with the proposed amendment would not: l 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previou, sly evaluated; or i
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
j The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant i hazards consideration standards: NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 56 5/15/97
n INSERT LS-32
$ /-/4 d.f-73.
In addition, the 48 hour allowed outage time in current Action Statement 5.a prior to implementation of restoration activities for a single source range channel inoperable is relaxed to a 72 hour Completion Time in ITS 3.3.9 Condition A. In the ITS, positive reactivity addition suspension and valve closure verifications aren't required for one inoperable BDMS train since the other train is available to automatically initiate valve swapover. The 72 hour Completion Time for a single BDMS train rendered inoperable by an inoperable source range channel input is acceptable since one BDMS train (with input from the remaining OPERABLE source range channel) is adequate to provide valve swapover, continuous - indication of core power status, and flux multiplication alarms. The 72 hour Completion Time is acceptable based on the low probability of an inadvertent boron dilution transient occurring during this period and the 72 hour duration is also consistent with ESF Completion Times for loss of one redundant train. e
..m.
_.._- =-- . -_. . _ . - - . - _ . . _-. _ _ 1 , ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET !' ) l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-11-LS-5 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, WC l REQUEST: [New) ACTION Statement (39) is applied to the low fluid oil pressure and turbine stop l l valve closure trip functions. Rather than entry into LCO 3.0.3 if current ACTION Statements (6 ;
- and 11] are not met or if multiple low fluid oil pressure channels are inoperable, the new ACTION '
Statement requires inoperable channels to be tripped within 6 hours or power reduced below P-9 within 10 hours. ; l l Comment: By adopting the STS, Turbine Stop Valve Closure channels are given a 4 hour l bypass allowance which is related to WCAP-10271. The ITS proposed is not evaluated. I Provide additionaljustification. l l Based on 8/14/98 meeting this comment will be responded to as part of the JFD 3.3-02 comment response. FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-02. ATTACHED PAGES: None l t
_ _ . . . - _ - . . . . . - . - - _ _ - - ~ . . . _ - . - - - -- . _ - - . - _ - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-13-LS-6 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC , REQUEST: [ ACTION Statement [9] is revised to note that the 2 hour [] reactor trip breaker , bypass allowance for [] breaker surveillance testing can also be used for maintenance.] t ACTION Statement [9] is (also) revised to require restoration of an inoperable RTB within 1 hour ' or the plant must be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. This is less restrictive since an , additional hour is provided for the transition to MODE 3. Comment: 1) Pending TSTF review - this DOC discusses adding a 2-hour AOT for l instrument maintenance. Use of maintenance AOTs have not been approved by the staff. I TSTF-168 for maintenance bypass is not approved by the staff. Revise the ITS to adopt the STS note to Action R for reactor trip breakers in Modes 1 and 2. i Based on 8/14/98 meeting this comment will be responded to as part of the JFD 3.3-43 comment response.
- 2) CTS requires 2 channels of RTBs to be operable. ITS requires 2 trains of RTBs to be I
operable. The ITS action R Notes 1 and 2 address both channel and train inoperabilities. l Provide DOC discussion for each CTS change. FLOG RESPONSE: See the responses to Comment Numbers Q 3.3-03, Q 3.3-43, and O 3.3-117. Although the ITS will use the "RTB train" wording, the words " channel" and " train" mean the same thing when there are only two separate entities involved. This wording is an artifact of the last STS, NUREG-0452. ATTACHED PAGES: None 1
)
I l l 1 l
i l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-14-A APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC i REQUEST: In the ISTS Table 3.3.1-1, Function 20, the reactor trip breaker (RTB) undervoltage i and shunt trip mechanisms are separate from the RTB Functional Unit. The current TS have been revised to reflect these requirements. New [ footnote (d) has] been added to the RTB Functional Unit to note that the same OPERABILITY requirements and ACTIONS apply to a bypass breaker if it is racked in and clused , for bypassing an RTB. The bypass breakers were already handled in this fashion. ACTION { Statement [12] in current TS Table 3.3-1 has been revised accordingly. l Comment: 1) Adopting a current practice as a TS is not an administrative change to current TS. Provide a separate DOC for the footnote change which is consistent with the
" change"in current TS requirements that results from adopting the NUREG STS.
- 2) The staff presumes that the CTS were retyped and that the CTS markup represents a comparison between the retype and the additions made to the CTS to adopt the iSTS.
The staff continues to find mistakes in the retype, changes that are neither redlined or i shown in strike out but which are obviously not consistent with the CTS. For example, I T3.3-1 Function 19 (RTBs) the applicability in Mode 5 has footnote "k" whereas the other applicable Modes have footnote "a." Footnote "k" does not exist. Based on 8/14/98 meeting Rev. O is accepted and this comment does not need a response.
- 3) CTS action [12) contains a requirement not to bypass the breaker while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable. This prohibition is not included in the actions for Condition U. Neither the CTS markup nor the DOC cover this deletion.
FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-14-A has been revised to demonstrate that this change does not just formalize " current practice", rather it is consistent with the current TS. The CTS ACTION Statement allows the RTB to be bypassed for the time required to restore an inoperable trip attachment to OPERABLE status. This is covered by ITS 3.3.1 Condition R Note 2. See also the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-117. l l ATTACHED PAGES: l Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 6 l
c i 1 CHANGE NUMBER HSBC DESCRIPTION
'a In addition, current ACTION Statement [8] is revised for l l l those interlocks required to be OPERABLE in H0 DES 1 and 2. 1 N If one channel is inoperable, the interlock must be i determined to be in its required state or the plant must j be in at least HOT STANDBY within 7 hours. i t
i The changes to current ACTION Statement [8] and the ! i addition of new ACTION Statement [8.1] are more restrictive, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. Current ACTION Statement [8] will continue to apply to Functional i Units [18.a and 18.e.] Revised ACTION Statement [8] and new ACTION Statement [8.1] provide one less hour to exit Applicability, i.e. 7 hours, than the current ACTION i Statement [8] which has the 1 hour interlock state verification or entry into LCO 3.0.3 which allows an ! additional 1 hour plus 6 hours to exit Applicability, for a total of 8 hours. l 1 13 LS 6 [ ACTION Statement [9] is revised to note that the 2 hour l [ ] reactor trip breaker bypass allowance for [ ] breaker surveillance testing can also be used for maintenance. j This change does not impact the conclusions of WCAP 10271 P A Supplement 2, Rev.1 since there is no change to the bypass time. This change is consistent with traveler TSTF-168.] ACTION Statement [9] is [also] revised to require restoration of an inoperable RTB within 1 hour or the plant must be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. This is less restrictive since an additional hour is provided for the transition to MODE 3. 4 1 14 A In the ISTS Table 3.3.1-1. Function 20, the Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Hechanisms are j separate from the RTB Functional Unit. The current TS have been revised to reflect these requirements. New [ footnote (d) has] been added to the RTB Functional Unit to note that the same OPERABILIT) requirements and ACTIONS apply to a bypass breaker if it is racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB. The bypass breakers were already handled in this fashion. ACTION Statement [12] in current TS Table 3.31 has been revised accordingly. l
;mvsER T 3A-4 Q l-lFA 1 15 A The Applicability for the Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip i function is modified by new footnote [(c)] such that this i
function is only required to be OPERABLE above the P 9 interlock setpoint (50% RTP). This is acceptable since the trip function is blocked below P-9. [New] ACTION DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 6 5/15/97
. _._._ _ _.. . . _ . . . - _ ._ . _ . - _ _ . _ _ .m..._ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ___._.
INSERT 3A-6
$ /-/f -/) .
This change is administrative in nature since the current TS already specifies operability
. and surveillance requirements on the diverse trip attachments and the bypass breakers (when racked in and closed), as evidenced by CTS Table 3.3-1 ACTIONS [9 and 12] for Functional Unit [19], [ Table 3.3-1 ACTION 31 for Functional Unit 20], Table 4.3-1 Note f,(16)] for Functional Unit 1, Table 4.3-1 Notes [(7) and (11)] for Functional Unit [19], and Table 4.3-1 Notes [(17) and (18)] for Functional Unit [21].
l 1 l 1 i-i l f 1 l r l f _ -. , c -,
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-16-LS-40 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: The requirement to verify the setpoint during the quarterly TADOT for RCP Underfrequency [and RCP Undervoltage)is deleted. Comment: Based on 8/14/98 meeting a 2-LS GEN response will be provided. The extension of the allowed outage time for one CRVS channel inoperable from 1 hour [ sic) to 7 days is justified based upon the fact that the AOT for a single inoperable mechanical train is 7 days. The bases, however, indicate that the two channels are used in a one-out-of-two logic to start both CRVS trains. A single inoperable instrumentation channel, therefore, degrades the operability of both mechanical trains. This is a different condition than inoperability of a single inoperable mechanical train thus the justification provided for the 7 day AOT is not germane. FLOG RESPONSE: LS-40 is revised in the response to Comment Number Q 2-LS GEN. The remainder of the comment does not apply to this DOC, as discussed in Reference 6. It applies to DOCS 2-16-LS-12 and 3-05-LS-14. See the responses to the comments on those DOCS. ATTACHED PAGES: None 1 I i i i
)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-18-LS-7 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: The current TS requirement to reduce the power range neutron flux trip setpoints in the event a power range flux channelis inoperable is deleted. The time to reduce power below 75% RTP is increased from 4 hours to 12 hours and, if actions are not completed as required, the unit must be in MODE 3 in 12 hours. (See also CN 1-53-A.) Comment: (1) The CTS requires QPTR to be monitored per SR 4.2.4.2 if one channel is inoperable and power is not reduced to less than 75%. The markup relaxes this requirement to only require QPTR monitoring if the input to the QPTR function is
- inoperable. This change has not been justified. The justification provided for not reducing l power presumes that the QPTR is being surveilled. It is likely that what is intended here is i that QPTR be surveilled in all cases where power is not reduced below 75%, however if l
the input to the OPTR monitoring function is OPERABLE then that monitoring may be accomplished via that function using the power range inputs. If the OPTR input is inoperable then QPTR must be monitored per SR 4.2.4.2. The ITS actions should reflect the NUREG-1431 STS and the CTS changes should be evaluated. (2) The CTS markup eliminates the requirement to change the power range trip setpoint after power is reduced. The DOC justifies this on the basis that the loss of a channel does not indicate an abnormal flux tilt. The proposed change also places the power limitation under administrative control rather than enforcing it by changing trip setpoints. The basis for this change should be discussed. Provide a technical basis for changing the power reduction completion time from 4 to 12 hours. J (3) The CTS requires resetting the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint to 85% of rated thermal power on loss of one channel of power range neutron flux - high setpoint. The ITS markup requires restricting power to 75% of rated thermal power. No justification is provided for change in power level or from change from " trip setpoint at 85% power" to
" restriction to 75% power".
Neither the DOC nor the NSHC provide specific justification for extending the AOT for two inoperable channels by 11 hours (or by 3 hours when a tie breaker is closed). FLOG RESPONSE: Comment (1) is addressed in the response to Comment Number O 3.3-120. : NSHC LS-7 has been revised to address comments (2) and (3). The last paragraph is written against the wrong DOC, as discussed in Reference 6; see the response to Comment Number Q 2-18-LS-31. l ATTACHED PAGES: ! Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 4, page 30 l l t I
IV. SPEC 1FIC NO SIGN 1FICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 7 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS In current ACTION Statement [2c], the requirement to reduce the power range neutron flux high trip setpoint is deleted. The loss of one power range neutron flux channel does not impact the reliability of the reactor trip system because the channel is required to be placed in trip. With an NIS power range channel inoperable, tilt monitoring for a portion of the reactor core becomes degraded. To address the impact on measuring QPTR, the OPTR TS provides conditional notes to the surveillances that verify QPTR. Although the loss of one power range channel may affect the ability to measure OPTR, there is no basis for reducing the power range high flux trip setpoint and increasing the potential for an inadvertent reactor trip. The existing surveillance requirements in the OPTR TS provide adequate r al measures (increased surveillance frequency and/or different method for moni oring QPTR) when an inoperable power range channel affects the input to QPTR. ZNJEtr- LS-1(a) & HP-LS-7 In addition, monitoring of OPTR every 12 hours will no longer be required if the input to the OPTR from the power range neutron flux channels remains OPERABLE. A consistent completion time of 12 hours is imposed on either of the three required actions, i.e. power derate. OPTR surveillance, or shutdown f.1-7[] to H0DE 3. M The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or l
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from ary accident previously evaluated; or ,
! 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
~
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant. hazards consideration standards: i NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 30 5/15/97
l l l INSERT LS-7 (a) l 0 /-l?-/_ S-7 l k There is no accident analysis basis for a setpoint reduction to 85% RTP with one I inoperable channel in trip. All accident analyses crediting power range neutron flux high are based on meeting a safety analysis limit of 118% RTP (109% RTP trip setpoint plus instrument errors). Reducing the power level to 575% RTP prevents operation of the core with radial power distributions beyond the design limits at a power level where DNB conditions may exist. Placing the current TS Action Statement's option for a power reduction under administrative control, rather than enforcing it by a reduced trip setpoint, does not render the requirement any less valid. The vast majority of Technical Specification Action requirements are enforced administratively, not by equipment changes. 1 I INSERT LS-7(b) $ / _ /p_Lg_ j l l The relaxation from 4 hours to 12 hours to reduce power below 75% RTP is acceptable based on this being a more controlled evolution to take load off at a reduced rate when it is known the power range monitoring capability is degraded. This is a reasonable time to reduce power given that QPTR changes relatively slowly at full power. The action to place the inoperable channel in trip within 6 hours already addresses the RTS unavailability concern. This change ensures the power reduction is performed in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems.
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 1-23-A APPLICABILITY: CA,CP, DC, WC REQUEST: This change adds notes to the RTS and ESFAS SR Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 that explicitly require the 18-month calibrations to include verifications of affected time constants where applicable. 1 Comment: Provide CTS Table 4.3-2 and Note (5) for staff review of proposed changes. ! The A-DOC discusses additional requirements and should be evaluated as an M-DOC. , 1 The A-DOC discusses the addition of surveillance requirements to include time constants l and should be evaluated as an M-DOC. Amendments 126/124 include 24 month surveillances for CTS function 1.b,11.c,1.d,1 e, l 2.c, 3.a.2, 3.b.2, 3.b.3, 3.c.1, 3.c.4,4.c, 4.d, 4.e, 5.a, 5.b,6.b, 6.c.1, 6.c.26.d, and 8a ! which are shown as 18 months in ITS SRs 3.3.2.9 and 3.3.6.7. Provide CTS /ITS markup revisions. {WC, CW, DC, CP) CTS TADOT surveillances are modified in the ITS with a note that
" verification of setpoint not required." This change is not evaluated. For CW this change is also not identified in the CTS markup. Provide justification for all proposed changes to CTS as they are reflected in the ITS.
l FLOG RESPONSE: The first and second comments were discussed with NRC staff during a meeting on 8/14/98 whereupon NRC agreed with the FLOG's contention that, since this represented current plant practice, the DOC was indeed administrative in nature. NRC concurred in the meeting minutes (Reference 4 to the cover letter). In response to the third comment, the changes to the DCPP CTS and ITS associated with ! Amendments 126/124 are provided via Additional Information Number DC-ALL-005 Please note that the Functions listed in the comment include Functions revised via LA 122/120 and LA 123/121 as well. Not all of the Functions revised by these LAs are listed. Additional information Number DC-ALL-005 includes all of the revir.,ed Functions and the revised SRs 3.3.2.9 and 3.3.6.7 as well as other affected SRs. In response to the last comment, new DOC 1-64-A has been generated as well as the associated CTS mark-ups. ATTACHED PAGES: l Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enciosure 2, pages 3/4 3-9,3/4 3-10(a),3/4 3-33,3/4 3-34,3/4 3-35,3/4 3-35a, and 3/4 3-37 i Enclosure 3A, page 17 j Enclosure 3B, page 12 l l l
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CALLAVAY - UNIT 2 3/4 39 t. mon & m No. 79..f 57. 9
.. n. ,
}
(0$?q,$h 1
%fP v
l (w./ -# - ) n TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) N 9 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 9i '
' TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING - "00CS-E CHANNEL DEVICE f"", inl: C"- f_. g _f 'l Q CllANNEL CilANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SUO'ic !LL ANCC -- !
J FUNCTIONAL UNIT CllECK CALIBRATION TEST M tOGIC TEST 'S RC00;RCC , l
- 17. Safety injection Input N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. - 1, 0 /-7/-A from E5F
/.-ff A
(/g) A l-2TA
- 18. Reactor Trip System ,
Interlocks - i w a. Intennediate Range '
) Neutron Flux, P-6 N.A. R (4) R N.A. N.A. -eft- I u
- b. Power Range Neutron
.L R Flux, P-8 N.A. R (4) R N.A. fl. A. -t-O
- c. Power Range Neutron ,
Flux, P-9 N.A. R (4) R N.A. N.A. - : N R. 3 o o. a ,. - 4 _.-.___._.____m. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . _ . - _.-___.__.____.___m_ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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t W W tt .O u =c- m .c Amendment No. 64,117 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-35
O'+ TABLE 4.3-2k stinuedl ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION r- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E R TRIP -
. ANALOG ACTUATING MODES - /-ffy c- - CilANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR L"lICM -
5 CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPER/ AC ON RELAY RELAY -SUR"EILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST i LOGIC EST TEST TEST -IS REOUIRED-
- 4. Steam Line Isolation 4
- a. Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. N.A. Rb) N.A. N.A. N.A. -1, 2. 3
- b. 1) Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1 M(1) 0 1. 2. 3 Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS) v - ' ' ' '
- 2) Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1) N.A. N.A. -1, 2. 3 E'
logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)
% NN -
w 23
- c. Containment Pressure- S R (5) Q N.A. N.A. .N.A. N.A. 1. 2. 3 /-23-4 liigh-2
- d. Steam Line Pressure-Low S R(5) 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1. 2. 3 /-27-A
- e. Steam Line Pressure- S R (5) 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 3
/--23-A Negative Rate-High
- 5. Feedwater Isolation & Turbine Trip CA-17-42 g a. 1) Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1) M(1) O(3) -1.
to Logic and Actuation 2[} 3 a Relays (SSPS) %- v - N.A. ' - @Q 2) Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1) N.A. r /i 1 Logic and Actuation 1. 2.Vb Hyp 8 l Relays (MSFIS) - m ( Steam Generator Water S R(5) Q N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. I 2 /-27-/} ]/b. Level-High-High J, . Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety injection Surveillance Requirements. l U \ St f W
' i 6
I LJ- V h$0'
- .ccc R Ri R i
' . . ()-J*- N h D I i
- dj3 c) i c) et , n c) et n c) t7EELJLJ = . l ' l . I . .
l l [y LJ ,j;Ci CJ CJN CJN CJ \ J CJ
- C
)
I , 55 ** L, . . . . . . i t L G eA en em ra e4 e4 I l i j I W >= ~ l
><H t
<.JW
. ._J w w
< i
. j m % F-- z z z z z o t i
e w>- r<f
-J m ww . . .
e* v
%H z = z z. z E t 6--
H -- h U l E W_g 4 4 4 4 4 = E a z z z z z E
@ q
=
ss pwp S W W <u n i Mp zE h?~gM l
@ w a: U w c. m r<cor w
d. z d. z 4 z 4 z v* e z 4
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= z C
a.J ro
,u b, c M. -
b i o . .a L - I w re L o re L 0 -
< L c)
CC OO i l 3 4J J a 4.J J re -- l a.J C e-l i l rc C^ r0 d.J ^ A rD r0 O M 4J l LT L- O 4J L - C 4J v 4J 4J rc rc l Ow CJ W UC C) QJ O C C C d.J 33 4.J C> CJ C>U e c) CJ tc 4J 4.J ^ r0 Q) c) C) E c) CJ ^ WEL UU H e-a LJ c) e CJ mC LO C J-re 0 -' N r-L C c)
- 3 0 r-G)
LL. r-4J
<<m c m
i 2 C EL c) L ELEL OL remL% C U "O m O c) to C) >w to C) Le m ) a m <- e-* w Cw
. . CJ C) w t> C) d J O> m C C) >V r0 4J re
; "' J 4J ro <C d.J re z C C) OLC - - re m
< E- m3 ww m3ww > C4. U c. w - re EOh n
z to G) *r- 3 Oe to i O C) > K C sJ ~ e a c) ^ ^ ^ ^ B to 3 C) ! v-- mJ e-o N M v < E <J% ! U z V' 5 D 0 b - _ cA .s,7-an. CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-35a' Amendment No.126 l
JABLE4,3-2 (Continued) U gg j_ggggg12Sb n ; ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATb d[",TUATION SYSTEN INSTRUMENTATION (.rea rwgl-khf*g h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS V ' ANALOG ATING To6E5- /YA CHANNEL DEVICE NASTER SLAVE 45R Wiiius 5! CilANNEL CilANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY Juni'EiLLAiEE y FUNC110NALilNil CilECK EALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TESI TEST lLSL 'S "COU:^ED
- 9. Control Room isolallon f
' h /-g ,
,t'
'Rd)pfgp$.A
- a. Manual Initiation ~ N.A. N.A. ,' N.A. N.A. N. A. , --Att--
- b. io Faut 6 1 a o W M f / W f p y s x,m!y /ptrLAln1A XXs_G i c d sJ5SP t n gg -
n 2-57-A . g y y-n ,
- c. Automatic Actuation N.A. H.A. N.A. N.A. N(1)(2) N.A. M.A.- -Att-togic and Actuation M
= Relays (BOP ESFAS) Isolation {
- d. Phase "A" See item 3.a. above for all Phase "A" Isolation Surveillance Requirements.
- 10. Load Shedder Emergency N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A, M(1)(2) N.A. N.A. -1, 2, 3, 2-/31A Load Sequencer ,
, 5;, 5: M3-u
- 11. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks
- a. Pressurizer Pressure, N.A. R(.f,) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.-1,2,3- /-2 3-A P-11 /-(
Reactor Trip, P-4 _ N. h _ N A. N.A. R(b N.A. N.A. N.A. -1, 2, 3-D, N p '[' , / :12--A TABLE NOTATIONS ka pEachtrainshallbetestedatleastevery62daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS. i Continuity check may be excluded from the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.
$ K622 K624, K630, K740, and K741 which shall be tested at least once per 18 months 1ExceptRelaysK602,g,K620during
' 'cring r:rcelina-an eac,h 00LD SilUIDOWN exceeding 24 hours unless they have been tested E previous 4eways. 7J2 1- W -/l (9 2-+r-1 G 46 (4,) Tic Breakers 52 NGoll6 and 52 NG0216 shall be verified open. 2-1/-Al
$ . Thc sptcified 10 acr,th frequency m&y bc waived fer Cycle .1 j,revidcd the survctlhatt i: perfor;ad pr!:r t:
.J,ichever occurs first. i..e previsions or /~
- A rc:t:rt r:11: win- th first rcruellsg autage cr A..a :, ::3 Spref f te:tien 4.6.2 cre reset fra;; p;ris,;;;;acc cf th's ;;rvd. l?;acc.
@$Es$$1l2 r m ity t- --b r PSiUS? ,Hrra irr - nntated !!a!?!!!P'""'
errre: "r hm "4"i"# '" '" s"'"r.d'"c. in M,dr- ' ""NI@Ad'
/-ff- 5#E"I'2M 2-Il-A (S) .rneluder ve-ifie<k of -We cms +*n+9 w 4ers ajylaable . 1-23-A
t i-J TABLE 4.3.- h ontinued) l ' k) i, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION n
- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 5
'~ I TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING 4 00ES /~ M CHANNEL DEVICE- MASTER SLAVE F0" h"!CH- la 9 CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL CTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE , M FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CAllBRATION TEST TEST l LOGIC TEST TEST TEST -IS "ECUIREC- ,. ~ tu ~
- 9. Control Room Isolation /-SA lj
- a. Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. N.A. R (4) d /-2M. A. N.A. N.A. M+- l'
- b. (W . u 1 (bY/.WK//W/W/M /XVXMG^,.CC n-57-/)
1 gg
~
~ ~
A i (S g y.7-72. . w c. Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1)(2) N.A. N.A. -M+- i;: Logic and Actuation u Relays (BOP ESFAS) O d. Phase "A" Isolation See Item 3.a. above for all Phase "A" Isolation Surveillance Requirements.
- 10. Load Shedder Emergency N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1)(2) N.A. N.A. I. 2. 07 d-/I-A load Sequencer A 51 51 2-43 4
- 11. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks
- a. Pressurizer Pressure. N.A. R (5) Q N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. - 1. 2. 3 - / .2 7-A P-11 _
- /-M-A k Reactor Trip. P-4 N N.A. N.A. R [4) d# A. N.A. N.A. 1. 2, 3 E -b R (() b.Vem roperer+Neab
*/ rS
/-23-r9 '. 'h*In$ f. A.
' y nolg35ons -
a (1) -EJchc train shall be tested at st every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. (2) Continuity check may be excluded from the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 2]Q (3) Except Relays K602. K620. K622. K624. K630. K740. and K741. which shall be tested at least once per 18 months p Tj f each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours'.ur11ess they have been tested within thea_45_gg 1 auring previousre Mac " and 93 durin4 F-A & 2 -ff-l G
~
J' , ; g (4) Tie Breakers 52 NG0116 and 52 NG0216 shall be yerified open, . 2-//- A
+ -Thc s cificd 10 month ficqueAy may Le naiy:d ier Cycle 1~ prdy1M.. t% survei!hnce is :crformed pricr to f_yf_f
-restart following the o rst refueling culegc Or Junc 1. 1900, whjchcycr occurs first. I;c provisions af-4ccific6 tion 4.0.2 cre recct frem perference of thi: ;urycilDhdee f_44.j
- Only the shutdo:n pcrtien of enc acquccccr i; required to bc 0"EP^"LE 4" Mode 5 sad C nhich correspond; tc # f3;g
-the 0"E"A"LE E;wrgency niete! Generater J a-+3.te,
-+r- mperability is caly rc uired for~ cided CPERA"LE bus in ticde: 5 and n [__% ;
7a-)'- teedwater isolatior on1y_. c/t-7.3-oo2- 3 l (W xmtukr veerHea% ,.F +ra,,e conr%+n wke-a nylre-W. 1- 13-A
CHANGE
, .. NUMBER HStjC. DESCRIPTION
... 3 (,) 1 60 - Not used. 1 61 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). , 2 01 A The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation [ ] Allowable Values are moved to ITS Table 3.3.21. 2 02 A CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.21, and the values for Total Allowance (TA), Z, and Sensor Error (S) are deleted, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. The TA, Z, and S parameters were developed by Westinghouse. If the as. measured value of a trip setpoint were found to be less conservative than the Allowable Value, current ACTION b.1 provides 12 hours for the adjustment of the setpoint without declaring the affected channel inoperable, provided that Equation 2.21 was satisfied. This would have avoided the necessity of writing a Licensee Event Report (LER) prior to the revision of 10CFR50.73. Since the revision to 10CFR50.73, an LER would no longer be required. Setpoint adjustments required by current ACTION h.1 for analog channels are performed with the affected channel removed from service. Equation 2.2 1 effectively allows rack error to increase above its
~
nominal value by an amount dependent on the available i setpoint margin; however, this margin is available for i utilization at any time and is not restricted to whether ' the ACTION is entered. As such, current ACTION b.1 l effectively provides no different recourse than current l ACTION b.2. With a nonconservative as measured trip setpoint, current practice is to enter ACTION b.2. Therefore, CTS ACTION b.1. Equation 2.21, and the values for TA, Z, and S can be deleted as they are no longer required. 2 03 LG The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints are moved to a licensee controlled document, consistent with one format allowed by NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. This information is more appropriately controlled outside of the TS. The parameter used to assess operability, the Allowable Value, is retained in the ITS. 2 04 LG The requirements stipulated in ACTIONS a and b are moved to ITS Table 3.3.2-1, with explicit direction contained in the ITS ACTIONS Bases. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURREKT TS 17 5/15/97
INSERT 3A-17 (page i of 2) c L. 1-62 A ACTION 7 in current TS Table 3.3-1 is moved from Functional Units 13.a and 13.b to Functional Unit 13.c. ACTION 7 applies to the delay timers in - the TTD circuitry that delay reactor trip at reduced power levels upon reaching the SG Water Level Low-Low setpoint. The EAM/TTD design modification added NPL cards to the 7300 Process Protection System which use Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM) modules to perform timing functions. The NPL timer module plugs into the PROM sockets on the NPL card and provides an adjustable range of time delays. ACTION 7 was written in recognition of the fact that these new NPL cards require a separate Action Statement since they are not part of the SG water !evel analog channels and are separate from the circuitry added to implement the Environmental Al'owance Modifier (containment pressure bistable comparator cards and normal containment environment SG water level bistable comparator cards) and Trip Time Delay (vessel AT bistable comparator cards). ACTION 7 has no applicability to the SG Water Level Low-Low (Adverse Containment Environment or Normal Containment Environment) analog channels since the timers are not part of those channels' circuitry. Neither the inoperability of the delay timers nor placing the Vessel Delta-T (Power-1, Power-2) channels in trip affects the OPERABILITY of the SG Water Level Low-Low analog channels. ACTION 7 affects only Functional Unit 13.c since the action trips the channels associated only with Functional Unit 13.c. Since this change does not affect any operating limits or the manner in which the plant is
~
operated, this is an administrative change that moves an ACTION Statement citation next to the equipment it affects. 1 The same changes are made in current TS Table 3.3-3 for the related ESFAS Functions where ACTION 35 (the ESFAS counterpart to RTS ACTION 7) is moved from Functional Units 5.d.1) and 5.d.2) to Functional j Unit 5.d.3) and where ACTION 35 is moved from Functional Units 6.d.1).a) and 6.d.1).b) to Functional Unit 6.d.1).c). The same change would have been made for ESFAS Functional Unit 6.d.2) had it not been deleted by DOC 2-09-LG. 1-63 A All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is in accordance $ /74NN ' with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. During the development certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted. As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the TS were made unless they were identified and justified. 1-64 A The refueling interval TADOTs for Functional Units [1 and 17] in CTS $ /-c'd-A Table 4.3-1 have been revised to include existing Note [10, "Setpoint verification is not required.] Likewise, refueling interval TADOTs for Functional Units [1.a. 2.a, 3.a.1), 3.b.1), 3.c.1), 4.a, 6.a, 9.a, and 11.b] in CTS Table 4.3-2 have been revised to add a new Note [6], " Verification of
~'
-. Zl i 1
INSERT 3A-17 (page 2 of 2) Q:j 1-64 A setpoint not required." This change is administrative in nature since the t9 / .23d l subject Functional Units have no setpoints associated with them. This change does not affect the operating limits or manner in which the plant is operated. There are no changes to current plant practices for the performance of these TADOTs since there are no setpoints to verify for l these Functional Units. This change is stridy an acknowledgement that i the corresponding ITS SRs 3.3.1.14,3.3.2.8, and 3.3.2.11 have an explicit Note to this effect. ) 1-65 A Seven slave relays are listed in Note (3) to CTS Table 4.3-2 for an exception to the quarterly SLAVE RELAY TEST. These slave relays are t)>@O I associated with the following ESF actuation signals: K602 (SIS); K620 ' (turbine trip and main feedwater pump trip); K622 (CIS-A); K624 (CIS-A)- K630 (CIS-A and the CIS-A input to containment purge isolation and i control room ventilation isolation); K740 (SIS, RWST low-low); and K741 l (SIS, RWST low-low). ITS SR 3.3.2.6 has been revised with a Note per JFD 3.3-19 that excludes these seven slave relays from the quarterly i sunreillance. Based on the-differing Functional Unit MODE Applicabilities, new ITS SRs 3.3.2.13 and 3.3.2.14 have been added under JFD 3.3-19 to cover the surveillance frequency applicable to these slave relays. The 1 only slave relay associated with containment purge isolation and control room ventilation isolation, K630, has the extended surveillance frequcacy under new ITS SR 3.3.2.13. Based on feedback received from the NRC reviewer at a meeting on September 16,1998, the 90 days cited in Note (3) has been changed to 92 days to follow standard convention for an exception to a quarterly surveillance frequency.
~
1-66 LS-45 The CTS allows certain inopeiable channels, or for some plants one other [F,Ej , channel, to be bypassed for testing per Specification 4.3.1.1 or 4.3.2.1. ) The intent of the bypass is to allow testing that will verify that the channel i has been restored.to an OPERABLE condition and can be retumed to service. The allowed bypass time for testing has been evaluated for its impact on the safety analyses. It has been determined that the impact of the allowed bypasses is minimal. Whether the bypass is for setpoint , verification or response time verification has no impact on the safety l analysis. This change would delete the reference to Specification 4.3.1.1 l and 4.3.2.1 in the allowed bypass notes contained in certain CTS ACTION statements, thus permitting any testing needed for restoration of j the inoperable function. ! 1-67 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table $ 7. 34 (Enclosure 38). 1-68 LS-54 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table dC-7,7-444- ; (Enclosure 38). i ' f 1-69 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table DC-Z7'ddf (Enclosure 38). i t
. , C
['i V.\ - g% i a-
. :.:9 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 12 of 26 5
I TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCIE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY < NUMBER i No No i 1-56 The DCPP CTS 3.3.1 Action 2.c requires that power be reduced to less than 75% or that SR 4.2.4.2 be performed Yes No INM ! whenever power is a 50%. This power level requirement Lf47 should be a 75% since if power is decreased below 75% per the first part of Action 2.c. the required Action is couplete and in addition. SR 4.2.4.2 is only required for i power levels a 75% with one power range detector inoperable, Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 57 Current TS Table 3.3-1 Functional Units [:2.a and 12.b] are LG con 61ned per TSTF-169. The relationship between the Functional Units is moved to the Bases. The proposed change would allow Reactor Trip System and No - See CN Yes No - See CN No - See CN 1-58 ESFAS sensor response time testing to be performed per 1 03-LS 1. 1-03 LS-1, 1 03 LS-1. A L WCAP-13632-P-A Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements." or other similar * " methodologies. This change Isi consistent with traveler ' TSTF-111 which revises the Bases for ITS SR 3.3.1.16 and SR 3.3.2.10 to allow the elimination of pressure sensor response time testing. Agu m rusev 32-12A WYu +AM4 -*uA-A4 -*va- 4 4 & t .su+i c N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 60 Not used. If the requirements of current CPSES ACTION statement 6 are No - see CN Yes No - see CN No - see CN 1-61 ' 1 19 LS-8. 1-19 LS-8. 1-19-LS-8. M not met. LCO 3.0.3 would be entered. In accordance with ; the ISTS. this ACTION Statement is revised to state that. [ if the ACTION requirements are not met. the plant must be taken below the P-7 Interlock setpoint within the next
- 6 hours.
Yes I2 01 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Yes Yes Yes . [ A Instrumentation [ ] Allowable Values are moved to ITS 1 . Table 3.3.2-1.
- No - not in current No. not in current Yes Yes l l 2 02 CTS ACTION b.1. Equation 2.2-1 and the values for Total '
Allowance (TA). Z. and Sensor Error (S) are deleted. TS. TS. A consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1.
" rNnser 32-/28 ^l (G VFD%Tf? CflHPARISON TARI F - CllRRENT TS 5/I5/97 !
O Y
, ; ,q - ,- ;
i INSERT 3B-128 ; e j
- f; NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO , COMANCHE WOLF CALLAWAY, , !!
CANYON ' PEAK CREEK , 1-62 In a Callaway-specific change, ACTION 7 in CTS Table No No No Yes A 3.3-1 is moved from Functional Units 13.a and 13.b to . $ T ,'J - o f : Functional Unit 13.c 1-63 All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial wording is in Yes Yes Yes Yes A accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical f7 /-A--ggg; ' ' Specifications, NUREG-1431. ; 1-64 Notes are added to Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 to exclude Yes Yes Yes Yes A setpoint verifications during TADOTs on Functional Units $ /-23-A that do not have setpoints associated with them. 1-65 Explanation of ITS treatment of seven slave relays with No No Yes Yes g 3,pg,g ' A extended surveillance frequency. 1-66 This change would delete the reference to Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes , LS-45 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1 in the allowed bypass notes contained in certain CTS ACTION statements, thus g 7, g,d permitting any testing needed for restoration of the , inoperable function. 1-67 This change revises DCPP CTS ACTIONS 13 and 29 to Yes No No No M provide specific shutdown requirements to exit g gg pf Applicability, in lieu of applying CTS LCO 3.0.3. This change is more restrictive by one hour than the CTS. ! 1-68 This change deletes DCPPP CTS Table 4.3-1 note (8) Yes - see No No No LS-54 which is applicable to the source range. The verification also CN cannot be performed in MODE 3*,4* and 5*, since the 1-69-M b O'UN ! power and intermediate range channels are not required to be operable until MODE 2. 1-69 This change applies new note (20) to DCPP CTS Table Yes - see No No No M 4.3-1 function 6, source range neutron flux. also CN DC-7 I-ddf , 1-68-LS-54
l 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l l
\
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-25-A APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: NUREG-1431, Rev.1 incorporates the current TS 4.0.4 exception from Table 4.3-1 Notes (2), (3), and (6) into the ITS SR 3.3.1.2, 3.3.1.3, and 3.3.1.6 surveillance frequencies. i Comment: No justification has been provided for changing the power level in CTS Table 4.3-1 note 3 from 15% to 50%. For note (2) the addition of the time period for completion of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION does not provide clarification to this surveillance as this is a daily surveillance and if not performed within 24 hours, this functional unit would be declared inoperable. Furthermore, this change is categorized as an administrative change when, in fact, the change results in less restrictive TS requirements. FLOG RESPONSE: The 50% RTP level establishes the lower safety analysis boundary for the AFD and QPTR LCOs. Below 50% RTP there are no corrective actions required for off-normal power distributions. DOC 1-25-A has been revised and changed to an M" DOC, since the new limitations are more restrictive than the current TS with its SR 4.0.4 exception. For DCPP, the CTS specifies the conditions and time requirements for performance of the surveillance, thus the exception from CTS 4.0.4 is not required in the iTS. Note (2) specifies >15% RTP and a completion time of <24 hours or before increasing power above 30% RTP. ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 , page 3/4 3-12 A, pages 8,9, and 10 B, page 7 l 2 I j
. _ _ -" " 4- - , , , . . , _,
(myy _of m f _ _ Y -i y . w }/
)
m= (AGE LA7a;* AMeNbeb W , p (( G 'O r: w mous e - n ... n .
& Mk * "*dm~huy G) ma b .try fa.,,,) l s I* Only if the Reactor Trip System breakers happen to be tiosed and the q_g 7 3 Control Rod Drive System is capable of red withdrawal. . a
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## Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Tiux interlock) Setpoint. M 1 fifBelow P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutrou Flux interlock) Setpoi 6. R I
qu gl-apf I '2N I . " (1 If not performed in previous iVdays. l~PS-M '
*Cf rd f e rfo rn.el in prv vie ur 3I dyr, w i # in ~. M k e.- o f+ce 0 5) Compar1' son of calorih.etric to excote power indication"W": 25" :f "J~ : '
/ T .' h ye T2)
THERMAL POWER /3. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric /-2f-Al ( I N: ;-r" 'r-r c' i^
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sr.h/S%#TRSower u aosoiute r:...:.. r - d,ifference ... .-. is.creat,er
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h Kin.24 W-iRee rki&L fowsR G metad+1[oY ejusT teso*h 3 i l-2M
,' " o' . -W (3) Single point com;,arTEtfiTi incore to ucore nionL FLUX DIFFEREM.EN:o:. /-2 f-M N Wi-of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate iffthe absolute difference is 5 ::i'ic::r i.0.' : : b/
C - 2. A - greater than f:r'or equal
- r tr- to'n'- 2%.MO* ' h;: pr;; : :..i:n: ;Kr;#, furfuer e F 4Aff l,\
nt : :'ic;b1: JurvefilancayH.e in+erval~irlefine) at 71 ePfo.c4t*vs hil fower d*ft (Effb). l~O-LC f4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CAllBRATION. ri T:r ::r:: ":n;; f:t::t:r:, '-t:;r:1 b':: cu-"n :re bt:in ', :t':';:t:" -
. Ii
/-24-l G g
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n ' n ;;r:t t: ::nufutur:r': d-t . F:r :ntern ft:t: :n ; :.nd 6 :r 4j 1
' L.- "n;: :t:r :':, >:t::':r ;':t::_ :u-":: For :F:'1 b: cit:( . ', :t':lt:: ',
the Intermediate Range and $.!l n ' ::: :r:d i; ::nuf:::tr:r'; i:1;. Power Range Neutron T1ux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 @l T' are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1. # gpf MI wi#in 73 Gr.r affee achevr~3 egur/fle,am conoNMn.t woYh 'MMML ~-he-l 0W $"'p*r**jI_J ,; - 6;, ' Incore - Excore Calibration, .t+e@75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. (6)
; :"i 'er: c' !;ni'intier ' .0. ' :r: .:* :;;1?nt': f:r :rtr; int: MO:- jgg % '
- :r .. ::'.:r ".:ti:r :f th: i n ; : ; n i ".. .: . ',> 3,. n n.c.' .", s 'w:'.n e.::"-: ul..-se-d5: 4
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- l'. : :n!iti n. . /Gr +$e furpud oE 4h E surveillso,ee' .H,N in%,1 Tr
- [' :.iat e fined or % ef4ecHve full f ewee doy: (EFfb).
(7) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST -
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(8) Deieted fer-Isemel gu*rfeely *m l rior-h y the hf f M
'(*) ""- * - 'r Mrveillancts" "Ef ", % ' ' ** shall also include /-at-A QL "N
verification that permissives'P-6 and P-10 are'in their required state ',. - for existing. plant conditions.-b; ot::rv:.ti:r f th: ;; " n:<:- / l
- - uni:':r 'nd Quarterly surveillance shall include verification S, Th .
of the Boron Dilution Alarm Setpoint of less than or equal to an - increase of 1.7 times the count rate within a 10-minute pericd. . l , . s-h,.?
! ) #
UNIT 1 3/4 3-12 Amendment No.# ,24,L.4 SI,94 7 7- CALLAWAY mm
g 3 i N 1 ? MR TABLE 4 3-1 (Continued)
\ s TABLE NOTATIONS g,y * - <
vc , ;-
*' Only if the Reactor Trip System breakers happen to be closed and the. -:
Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal. p' 4 D e :; =,i' icd 18 cr.th ' : La,; ..,ce- " mav ha waived fnr rvcle 1 nr-udw 3x,+w/-2/-A e >l
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iii Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux interlock) Setpoint. 2 y ii?# Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux tnterlock) Setpoint. l' 9:2 ' (1) If not performed in previous-C& days. y i wi+4t,,2+ fuer aShe I""*' l .
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(la) ZFno+feenemed in prevroar 21 days, (2) Comparison of calorfmetric to excore power indicatiorMm/e '.5* ' T / @., ,, ,
- 4 y/5*4
, THERMAL _POWERy, Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetri j_3g_g b 9 gvwei ai euw ute difference is, greater than 2%. n: :re.icien:,-.,- ,Of- . , __m s arm,-4 ,o , m _ 4 n 4 . __ _-.,~,o,u,<-~._ m . ~n r w-p-- 6 : n E1 ,v M1 - -- s e.r ' w -Vi -ai Y IiILU .V V y L UL a 0+/.,ner e/V.,7Weemet or incore6mr#4jm**,%e@l*
Sing re point cumpochun w excus e utnt t-LUA utrrentm%t ,f24-- a n __c!: m (3) '
-ieiF of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 2% ne p c"dr'er: :f Sp :i'i x tion e.:.4 ;r: -/-as-.
/ .~ ^y k
- c* 2:p'itab': f:- entr" "tc MODE : ;r i /q,. W ej - er fArr eamr//.,, ,,l~W '
+4s inheva/ is oloftneN as 3/ eWeah y a A//powee fp (,Effb),,
-. (4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
<c , 3.' (5) - C'r S: urn teg; detxt:r . "*c;- ' bM: = ~:= :r: ;bteir.ed. ;,:1..;*:d. /-:NW. G nd x m;;r:d t: = nufxtur:r'; d:tz. E r :nt:r di:*: tn;: and nc- ~4 D E T -"erro'- dete *~ ;'-*: u =~/= ch:!' ' dt:ixd. ?!: lusted. -d xmp;r:d t C rufx*ur:r':-d t . For the Intermediate Range and Power & Range Neutron Flux channels the provisione of Soncific=rinn 4.0.4 ara - applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1. = - f2 A, ~ . Ave a*Fert
'rWE M 4L h u,
rede - b f' o n- -- (6) Incore - Excore Calibration. :t;ca :. 5% or es tu 4nt e . YOUER. _ 'ch- f W .
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~
/Ge He jourj>wer oChr.r sueveillance, He. jg5 n in4*eva/Tr lle e ar h:st]9: =rdi!M1 eMachve Au (7) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 da s on a 5 AGGERED TEST
( fewee of ,
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(8) Deleted g g a f , g ,, 4 g . ,47 (9) Cu:rt:rl.,furveillances-i- "CDE: :* 4*. :nd : "shall also include /-M-A verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state g for existing plant conditions,by :bxrv:ti:n of *": p:r-ini / /-62-/ G i a ~-.. :q::- "d:r Quarterly surveillance shall include verification of j, , . . , the Borca Dilution Alarm Setpoint of less than or equal to an increase or mm
' " ' " [J E->]) 1.7 times the count rate within a 10-minute period.
(~ CA--3'.740-1 : 125 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. i.._ d .:. 7
. . _ . _ _ ._. _ . _ . _ . _ _ . .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . ._ _ _ . ~ _ ._. _
e- ,-i--- w_e...-s.-. .m% l.p- CHANGE
- y. y; NUPEER !GlC.
DESCRIPTION NUREG 1431 Rev. 'I also allows 12 hours to reduce the ! thermal power to less than 75% RTP rather than the 4 hours i required by the current TS. 4 If the Power Range Neutron Flux trip function is l inoperable, but the input to the QPTR is operable, the ISTS do not require that the QPTR be monitored every 12 hours. If the above actions are not completed, the plant must be j in MODE 3 within 12 hours. g $ 7.5-/2d 1 19 LS 8 This change reflects a revision to current ACTION 1 i Statement [6]. If the requirements of current ACTION ) , Statement [6] are not met. LCO 3.0.3 would be entered. In )
- accordance with the ISTS, this ACTION Statement is revised
( to state that if the ACTION requirements are not met, the plant must be taken below the P-7 interlock setpoint within the next 6 hours. [The APPLICABLE MODES for Functional Units 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15 in current TS
. Table 3.31 are also revised to add new footnote (b).]
i 1 20 A Current ACTION Statement 31 is reformatted per NUREG 1431 4 Rev.1 to require restoration of an inoperable channel within 6 hours or the plant must be taken to MODE 3 within 12 hours. This is an administrative change since the {' total time to exit the Applicability is unchanged. 1 21 A The monthly and quarterly channel calibrations associated with Notes (3), (4), and (6) of current TS Table 4.3 1 have been moved from the Power Range Neutron Flux High i j Setpoint Function to the Overtemperature [aT] Function. 4 This change clarifies the relationship of these ; j surveillances to the f (aI) penalty portion of the t l i Overtemperature [AT] Function. The primary purpose of l 4 these surveillances is to verify correct ft (aI) input to j Overtemperature [aT]. Although these surveillances affect l all power range neutron flux channels, and appropriate action must be taken for any affected power range neutron flux channel, this change groups the surveillances with the most appropriate reactor trip function for operability concerns. [The frequencies of these surveillances are revised in f, accordance with CN 140-LS 41.] The applicable portions of current TS Table 4.31 Notes (3) and (6) are incorporated directJrfnTo ITS SR 3.7.T.3 and SR 3.3. .6, as discussed in CV1-25 . Note (4) has been deleted from
& A l~WA DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 8 5/15/97
m CHANGE NUMBER RSBC DESCRIPTION the daily, monthly, and quarterly surveillances associated with Notes (2), (3), and (6) of current TS Table 4.31 since these surveillances are not CHANNEL CALIBRATIGNS, rather they are comparisons and adjustments as needed. These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 1 22 M Quarterly COTS have been added to current TS Table 4.3-1 for the Power Range Neutron Flux-Low and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip functions in the event extended operation within their Applicability (i.e., MODE 1 below P-10 and MODE 2) takes place. The current TS only require a COT prior to startup for these functions. New Note [(19)] has been added to require that the new quarterly COT be performed within 12 hours after reducing power below P 10 for the power range and intermediate range instrument 6 tion (P 10 is the dividing point marking the Applicability for these trip functions). if not performed within the previous 92 days. [In addition, new Note (20) has been added] such that the P 6 and P 10 interlocks are verified to be in their required state during all COTS on the Power Range Neutron Flux Low and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip functions. These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 and traveler
-W9fr4fM>t- 73%M2. $ 3,yy _ g 7,y_a;,-
1-23 A This change adds new Note [(21)] to current TS Table 4.31 and new Note [(5)] to current TS Table 4.3 2 that explicitly' require the 18 month calibrations to include verifications of affected time constants, consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. 1 24 LS-9 This change reflects a relaxation in the performance of COTS prior to startup, consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev.1. These COTS, for the Power Range Neutron Flux Low, Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, and Source Range Neutron Flux trip functions, will not be required if performed within the previous 92 days. Note [(1)] of CTS Table 4.31 has been revised to extend this period from 31 days to 92 days. Note [(la)] is added for use with the turbine trip function TADOTs, for which no such change was provided. 1-25 Ty NUREG 1431 Rev.1 incorporates the current TS 4.0.4 (Q /-25-A exception for the surveillances covered by current TS
- Table 4.31 Notes (2), (3). and (6) into the ISTS SR 3.3.1.2, 3.3.1.3, and 3.3.1.6 surveillance frequencies.
In the current TS, these surveillances have no time DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 9 5/15/97 f
l i '.c CHANGE NUMBER HSHC DESCRIPTION 1 requirements [ ]. In general, the combined effect of l current TS 4.0.3 and current TS 4.0.4 would allow [ ] for l the completion of a surveillance if it were not performed l upon entry into the specified H0DE or other condition for that surveillance. Current TS 4.0.3 allows [ ] for the completion of a surveillance once the appropriate MODE or plant condition is established. In the improved TS, the l TS 4.0.4 exceptions are incorporated as a NOTE in each l affected surveillance. In converting to the NUREG 1431 format. ITS SR 3.3.1.2, SR 3.3.1.3, and SR 3.3.1.6 require these surveillances to be performed within [24] hours after THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 15% RTP (current TS Note (2) for the comparison of NIS power to calorimetric power), within [24] hours after 50% RTP (current TS Note (3) for the comparison of excore Axial l Flux Difference (AFD) to incore AFD), and [within 72 hours j after achieving equilibrium conditions with THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 75t] RTP (current TS Note (6) for the incore excore calibration), respectively. Since these surveillances are conditional on THERMAL POWER levels greater than the MODE 2 to MODE 1 breakpoint, there is no need to retain the current TS 4.0.4 exception, as l discussed in ITS Section 1.4, as long as the ITS Surveillance Notes allow the plant to reach conditions j appropriate for the performance of the surveillances. The power level at which the monthly surveillance is performed to compare incore vs. excore AFD, and adjustment of the NIS as required by Note (3) of current TS Table 4.3 1, is changed from 2 15% RTP to a 50% RTP. This change is also precipitated by the conversion to the ITS l format which replaces the current TS 4.0.4 exception with a finite time interval after exceeding a specified power level . With the deletion of the current TS 4.0.4 ; exception, the specified power level in ITS SR 3.3.1.3 i should reflect the applicable safety analysis basis ! ! consistent with the [ Applicability and) Required Actions l l of ITS LCO 3.2.3 (AFD) and LCO 3.2.4 (QPTR). As with the ! l changes discussed above, there is no need to retain the ; ! current TS 4.0.4 exception as long as the ITS Surveillance Notes allow the plant to reach conditions appropriate for the performance of the surveillances. nre rth*b'HE Thes'e changes are .=:it f:d ;iir.i;tr;tiv: Vin nature 4e-
- ttt th; ci;'y "ef' it th: ir.;;ri,;r; tier. ;fghe current Ob TS 4.0.4 exceptionsp; the i ,,. .._ . . .r/nce are nd /Mel.
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 10 5/15/97
j - ,
,f 3 :
(_ n[
.4 )
j s t CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 7 of 26 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY r k 1 25 f NUREG-1431 Rev.1 incorporates the current TS 4.0.4 Yes Yes Yes Y -
-A-y exception from Table 4.3-1 Notes (2) (3), and (6) into the g /_qyg-i m .2. 3.3.1.3, and 3.3.1.6 surveillance 4
1-26 This change moves detail concerning NIS detector operation Yes Yes' Yes Yes . LG and testing to the BASES for 115 SR 3.3.1.11. ! it 1-27 Surveillances on the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Yes Yes Yes Yes-LS 10 function are reorganized to reflect plant status in i' accordance with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. New Note [(19)] requires that the quarterly COT tie performed within 4 hours after reducing power below the respective source range i instrumentation Applicabilities. if not performed within the previous [92] days. Since the COT is valid for [92] days, there is no need to repeat it if one has been ! '; performed within the prior [ quarter]. Since the current TS l has no Specification 4.0.4 exception, this 4 hour allowance is less restrictive. e i 1-28 Note [9] is revised to require the P-6 and P-10 interlock Vee-d/ d -Je.e Yes Yes Yes A verification to be performed during all source range COTS. Q / f p_gfg 4 These permissives are verified to be in their correct state e
/g N hC;-Z N :
prior to entry into MODES 3. 4. and 5 during shutdown and i after leaving MODES 3. f4 and 5 during startup. , 1-29 This change movesThNtahegarding measurement of No - not in current No - not in current No - not in current Yes LG loop specific alhalues to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.6. TS. TS. TS. CA-Udr7 ; 1-30 Boron Dilution Mitigation System (BDMS) M - :? i?:d % cd No - not in current No not in current No - not in current M r .;ill _ requirements are c r:f '- ITS LCO 3.3.9. This TS. TS. TS. Yes g f_ y g i is a more restrictive requirement si the BOMS other than the inputs from the source ra hannels currently has no LCO or ACTION requirements, m/h yde,- ! 1 31 One-time surveillance waivers are deleted. They are no No - not in current Yes Yes Yes A longer applicable. TS. CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97
l I i l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 1-30-M APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Boron dilution mitigation system (BDMS) signal blocking and surveillance requirements are moved to ITS LCO 3.3.9. This is a more restrictive requirement since the BDMS, other than the inputs from the source range channels, currently has no LCO or ACTION , requirements. l l Comment: Revise 1-30M to clarify which CTS changes are more restrictive. Two train ACTIONS are included in the ITS. The LCO fails to identify the trains of BDPS required to be operable. Revise LCO 3.3.9 to require two trains of BDMS. l CTS Note " to T3.3-1 allows the boron dilution flux multiplication signals to be blocked during startup according to approved procedures. This allowance is modified in ITS and is neither identified nor evaluated.1-30M does not address changes to Note " to T3.3-1. I Provide a revised CTS markup and justify all proposed CTS changes. l l FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-30-M has been revised per the attached pages to identify which CTS I changes are more restrictive. ITS 3.3.9 has been revised to require two trains of BDMS throughout the LCO Applicability. See the responses to Comment Numbers 3.3-119 and 3.3-121. DOC 1-30-M has been struck from the mark-up of the ** Note to CTS Table 3.3-1 and revised DOC 1-34-A has been added to the mark-up of CTS page 3/4 3-5. There is no change in meaning between the " Note and the Note in ITS 3.3.9. The ITS Note includes the applicable MODES, but that is also present in the CTS since the " Note is placed against MODE 2 below P-6 and MODE 3 for RTS Functional Units 6.a and 6.b. The only difference between the CTS and ITS Notes is the CTS Note contains the words "in accordance with approved procedures." New DOC 1-63-A has been added in response to Comment Number 1-A-GEN to cover instances such as this where wording differences have no change in meaning or operation of the plant. There is no need to carry this CTS phrase over to the iTS 3.3.9 Note. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, pages 3/4 3-3 (deleted 1-30-M against " note and added 1-34-A),3/4 3-6 (deleted 1-30-M against ACTIONS 5.a and 5.b),3/4 3-12 and 3/4 -12a (deleted 1-30-M against notes (9) and (12) and added 1-34-A) Enclosure 3A, pages 11 and 12 ! Enclosure 3B, pages 7 and 8 l 1
b** 3 4 (In+ern,she}e k,,1 , g.,_y g t _7 (Lou, dwee geac},,0 7 ,pr f/,ck)7 4 ,.j,cy, ;N2 rben fin);Je,j,ek,
, ,,, 4,,,_
(Y N*** N*l~4 (fewe yr Alcu , Guy) t,+e,.feep , ,_,g_ , Y f*' **y "* < bit f.r?,?NaW#&are caeke)in an} elued ,_,q_p
*{ -
- Only f th ":::t:r 'ri; 0 :t a brt;h r: h:p;;r to be " th: :1:::d j_gy g
;;;iti:n :nd th: C trol Rod Drive System is capable of rod 7-)t gm withdrawalJ on. edt are ne+ fully intee+ed.
R' " The boron dilution flux maltiplication signals may be bloc ' reactor startup in accordance with r: n:tapproved :ppl!::bi; procedures, gdg' The pr:ci:icn: Of Sp::if t:: tion 3.0.4
## Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.
i
### Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) l Setpoint.
l I (1) The* applicable MODES for these channels noted in Table 3.3-3 are l l more restrictive and, therefore, applicable. ACTION STATEMENTS l . /--b+-LG t ACTION 1 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than th: "'r':=l-W-ge T MChannels$LE t t0"E"23LE r:; ir ::nt, restore the inoperable to OPERA s a us within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. l /-ty A ACTION 2 - With the number.of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tet:1 S; b:r :f Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed Aguirv/ . provided the following conditions are satisfieg:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition
, within 6 hours,and
+.
- b. n e ui 4 r- Chan-el: DEER ^.9tE -equire ent it --t; W:v r,#M f Ma4e:'The inoperable channel may be bypassedp:r for!;;;if up to 4t::ti;r hours /_/ for 7 4 l o l i
surveillance testing - *ad3n+f/*in+ otherd,juet channel 7,y_fy ' l 4.2.;.1, ;nd(1 FKa. fewer range'nean~~ Tin inget-ts) ( ieh in6a or e qua
- h. -<-r Either, THERMCrum.R W res incu w i
75% of RATED THERMAL POWER :nd th: P .;; "_:ng; S; ;t, en F.M
+,-,,u.- - . . , ._em 1 J 4, _a.--., _ _
" " ~"
v u e . _4 .
. . .:.W:i,Gu ;; ; .*,~. .:.;'wiT'h t 'i n "'" '"~"hours; * "eor,vth QUADRg POWER //1.lI !
rm w .n e .o
-m uti RAuctis monitored at i ast once per 123 hours per g 4A,arrR J A it eneper,ble;# or 5pecification 4.2.4.2,NMbtf wiO*n 12 heur.r.
g y,y_/x C. 0%eewise be in hot ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one " less than the "' rim g Xcgu/rel Channels OT:PA:L: rezwe :nt end with th; T":". AL P0k':" 1:v: clur i nterk:k) /.g747 2N'7-SA /-04~LI 2. Febo the 'J-6 (I-te-ediate te;e Wutrer th;nn:1 1 OP:"a"L: ;t:1~
/-/~/-A S:tpcint, re:t:r: th: in p;r:bi prier t: i ncre::ing ' HEP."f1 P0"E" 150;: th: P C X :i-t, cr-
%:ve tS o 5 (!-termediate S ng t utr.. W im. r: =h, jg g hifkin '3FAsur b.
50tpcint but bein 10% of PATED I" ""Ji P0k'E"p* restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE statu pri r to,incre::ing
?~, THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED ,,. THE At NR
- ,ehea THEAl'1A L
~
w. fewer-b {en San
- .rgt,rggy-
}. l--/M f-t e e ine eaan gj+ 3-S g > l-e 1-U p.7,7./.@
~
- Amendmer.t No. ,U ,H , 94 b! 3/4 3-5 Mtz.4%Vr/ L AWAY" - UNIT /~~ A'M' ^ sig A.L& s 74* * g *y* NtJ5* en egu- )C g ele e;,*JeW r /" Q Q> f' f y r s q ~ ~ -
4e a t-rg i.r ,.nof e, 'ble* rY r r :nvyysny!yyy= fin
l TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) g-M ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)
- l-04-L
% I43-A ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the "'- % r 8cgwTre/ Channels j 0?:F12LE re;.irem:n:guspend all operations involvino l positive reactivity cnanges. finmed, fry / M*,n Murr/-4 /-o8-hif-DirEM.7/+ 3>_;A.-_y.
ACTION 5 - a. 8cguire/ '-W"ith the number H.ur Channels j OPE'"3L: of
- OPERABLE i r ut,. estore the channels /_47-Ac e less than
- inoperable channel to OPED.ABLE status r p p m ryl g ,4 oW per th: %::::- :-ip b ::bre :u: pend al' oper::ic-: g Lf
< ~+ y p= i ti z: -uni'tych=gn ud.u m ;c,a
- g,O : 'm : =d 3 v501 :r tiend =d =:ured 9 =:iti= inre -h// -. "$f j_55 a i n=-"
Le $ ,:m sesarseA *n* conn ve-A//gRe ot>*n in e*j* *f rod Yg-3, -ppf, ang:Hrth: ace fn
- b. Ntnn'oc
- Te shAkyyf'9:.r. , 8 42 t: -ig f aker: j_g_q suspend ai operations involving positive reactivity f x,,,,.,3 changes and verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARG w1 g w/,, J
~3t-A requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within i hour and every 12 hours thereafter, -
and verify valves BG-V178 and BG-V601 are closed and secured in position within 4 hours and verified to be closed and secured in position.every days. 7gg j_.g_A g ACTION 6 - t-ter of- Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed _ ) /f[uires[ providedWith the number the following conditions areofsatisfieg: OPERABLE channels o 1
- a. the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition wi thi n 6 hours ,-+ed--o r l
- b. ~h: " ' ' ;r Charn:1: OPEP'SLE equi emert i ::; S m"- ,
/_4g I Alefe: Tne inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours /-44-/ S for surveillance testing of other channels,@
.simam maa;7s) Isu 4Lan l-] wo'-fk:n Os.r.;
- b. Aeda es ~T'HGgmAL sacr b I 3 lu urr . . j_,q_.,_g nCTION 7 - With an inoperable e ay timer in the irlp T1me Delay circuitry, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that the Vessel Delta-T (Power-1, Power-2) channels in the affected I pl the t[f ipppe condition within 6 hours. j-42-/1 prStection D orw.re be sets in arisss+
a+ aced Ho-rinNtrJbt m H:n +La fo low: s 3 & Laues. ArTICLB - With less tnan the r V "; c r c' 2:rnS g O^EP'2LE, within f_.gg. ncur cetermine e, ob n >n Mr # S ::=::':d ._.-. f_47_ j deguiredCAannejf 7 nun 2:0- de ( } that the interlock is in its reauired , j_.h Ag_g l of6AA 8l.4) state for the existing plant condition, or apt . .cu r : c:: - . ' : . C . L be in a+ le n.r+ Her MArhGy! w;+L:n +Le fe Ho w n3 4 hours. /- ID-M l
>- l-t*2-/1i rNEEg@r ACi N, 3f 3-48 -With the number of OPERABLE Reactor Trip Breakers one
/-g_Lf.
less tha Kegu,"cel "' 'n c- Channeisy07:*".~_ -: ., . ! = - . g e i be n a t least HOT STANDBY b bvoassed for uo to within-4 *1ours; however, one breaker mi 2 hours .or breaker surveillance testi19 y ## # # # M 'D,f44_A /-/ -u
] provided tn > cther breaker is OPEPAELT O'
thainMance er for re:We -fLa Inotcha Ireak'*r /4(Q - 7 h DfEAABLE s&ba En I hau.-er V kaendment Nc. J7, A3; M CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/c 3-6 i I
pr [ g,Oy f %> _ _1. _ _ _ _ i %&ps s s
;m i ffgg jf754 ggggggp N V }(\ u w , ., _ , m, n ,,,,, n um cu mn 0 d **4WP -
M/= M ==.r 6 .rr:r /mr
# I* Only if the Reactor Trip System breakers happen to be closed and the G;L.gg7 y.
Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal. N :? id ?? ::t'. frcartacy ;; be u:ted f or Cy:1: : r- '.+J - '- th: / y/.-A }
.-- 4 7, 57 g p_ j _ ;; _ .;;.; r.a l g i.; ;5: r:7;; 7;; g ,4
-"-vein ,
- c
^;t ;; :: An: 1, 1%C,-chi;h:v; _ _ _ _ _ _ . , r ; ; ; u"_r:t r, _ ...r. . u .. :t. -.:.vi:icn.:... _'__
~ .: ...__ > n . ..
.. . . _?~
- m. _ : . . . . g w ..r.s. .u... , . . . . . . .mm. . . ... r . . .
if Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux interlock) Setpoint. [" t. I '. fifBelow P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux interlock) Setpoint.
/~~2M (3) If not performed in previous ays. bM-M wi#'n Maur.-
- Nee Id e rfe rn.el *n : f "J T ~~ - / Y ,'. -
- 2) XS Compar rt4[ son of caloribreviour etric to exc 31 )N.oower indication %": ' E /-25 Af -
THERMAL POWERh Adjust excore channel' gains consistent with calorimetric i^ than Z%. '.':. v^:"'r' m.' , .-
-n dr.h./5'jtT/L? ower it aososu,te
.:re...<-. - d,ifference
... is,creater
- u. ,. z.- . . . - . . . r ..
~ ~
&.:n24W.eiiAse YbE5 i fows[lj 9eenssloTe&T550*jQ l-2W
, ' - T -M" .
(3) Single point comr,aristTYt incore to excore ,vM ~FLUT. DIFFERENCENu . ; /-25 -M 1;i 4E+-of RATED THERHAL POWER. Recalibrate if 'the absolute difference is Sp :i'ic:t':r i * . '. : n / Cli 'M greater than or equal _ to 2%. Th; ;r ;;;i:n; :Kr +:4afurfeeneofVAff n:t :-- f::t1: f:r :rtn ir* M*'" ~ : :7 : h
'r"rve((l'nce.gke in+erv*l'ir b:kne) a.r .7I efPee+i*vs fu!I fowce dayr (EFfb), l-O-LS f4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
- s ~D
~
;r ": r;; *:n;; det::ter:, '-t:gr.i bi::F:r:urv:: tre ett:S M , er:h:t d,- /-24-L.G
) - : d :::;;r:' u ::nuf::tur:r': d:::. :nter: Mi:t: ":ng: :M P:=r A
": ;: :h:r :1:. d::::' r pi: M curv:: :h:7' 5: :ht:in d , :v:le:t d ,
For the Intermediate Range and
- n:' :::;;rd u : .cf;:tur:r'; d;;;.
Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1. #
)Q"g-p j ,.
wr4in 72 hur.e afhe achieving egulll1e um eonMion.c wfH 'MKMt / MR y"re. Q Incore - Execre Calibration, e ~re#75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. ~e - f"' w.r-A - (6) ' . 0. ' :r: .:t :;,'!::51: f:r cr*n inn M*"E j2gg 3;
; : .:icn: c' !;;;i'i::t i t;
- cr :.
-g. a:- -- <- <-
^:'.:m ":t.:
.w.
- f 15: 1::: :;:: f '.':.v::::' .. ..
C,":l e: : h : r'. ' +5 :
..y .... n . , . .
7.-. q - Fie +Le purpo.rs.e *F +kte .rueveillsnee' +Ls i,d- I Tr j.-#-LS 4 dy :::u ::ditT:::.
- de; fined *r % effech've fall pwee do q y
(7) Each . train u.. s,hal,l,,
-, ,n b.e
- u. .~...
.t,e..st,,ed
--..ry 62.. days on eve ,-o r
.....t..
at,,least.y: a,,STAGGERED
<.s _ .;.....
. . . . ~ . . .
(EFfb). TEST
.r j-g2-te ,m M
n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s,,,,,,,.-... - ~+.,,r.> (" L.o.+- :**+..k.-..*. i;. rt .*k.,. et, ..-- . .s ..
+.. Jto *Lr --.Dae*,trynDr - - . . . . ....1 g. .. .y d: ,
%4-- .D-c.ve--..
: S'- _ f i -ra t +=e+"f lyi \
(8) Deleted ,. f eefsemel gu*rhely *~lf r or s%i
;-a f-A
- n. - . . ' " Jb rv e i l l a n c es" """" "' * , ' *
r* shall also include
-(c) , q,g l{>Tl veridcationthatpermissives'P-6andP-10are;intheirrequiredstate -
tor existing . plant conditions, t; :t::m;;;;- :: th; ; r ;;;'.<
~rrri:ur ' d :: Quarterly surveillance shall include verification /-?',. l of the Boron Dilution Alarm Setpoint of less than or equal to an - . l increase of 1.7 times the count rate within a 10-minute peried. ,
- W
(
, ) %
.% 4 P
Amendment No./J ,IE,E.4,37,94 7 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-12 i 1-T
.~
N
/
f ' t i M TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) t
\g . ., TABLE NOTATIONS ln:@:* )
- Only if the Reactor Trip System breakers happen to be closed and the l;;g;-
i Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal. , E We E;::1'i:d I? :rt" # - m v he waived for rvelo 1 nc~rddeH +w
--r._s.r,.?uerre o . . . ;. . e __ /-7/-A em - ,,
- ~ .. .- u.. r..
e
.n.~;....m.,
.,,,,__ ...;.m m
.a m. m, f c"*? : cr 'unc 1. 1"SS. M :he:0 re: '" :: "h: prezi:Mer :< ...
Spe :'iction 4.:.2 ;r: r:x ' : ;:r':rranc of thi: :;r ;;il l;nc ._ [. t l # Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux interlock) Setpoint. A ~ t l
## Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux tnterlock) Setpoint.
M i (1) If not performed in previous-C Vdays. /- p( l Cin) .rF no+fcefomad in prevroar 21 days. wr+1,:n a+ J,,ars aRar***%p+-/_s t-25:jy ! (2) Comparison of calorfmetric to excore power indication V ="m 15* c' ST:: /~m THERMAL POWERh Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric f_,2g.jy g
,r _/.5'4 % puez
_er m. , <ii ucuso - . m mte n difference 'is,
, ~,great,er than 2%. _ .
79: pr '.1:1:n: ,of- ,-_m 9 H- u' u: -
-- u o - s , <--
- - ' ' - 'v'
' ' - ' 'i'kU
'W w 2- a
, ~n r &-0+Aoser &/er ~TNUML fawrA' irjrad**&orga=l 40 S5Q- l~3S~f1 Q Single point wayen don or incore w eu.ui e eL FLUA UgrchtNLt"UJ: sm (3) n [
i :+ of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is /-25 .y e greater than or equal to 2%. 3"e ?rc""?" : Of Spri'iCati n f.0.4 r: ,'-- W so* 3:pH ?bh f:- Cetr~ 't s'
+4* inlawai fr deSr.,oy as .7/ efreeWy, res sfHrr.twrver//*,ee,l~W
*CCE2crMM,.Harukr A//fower s (Effb,),
- . (4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNtl CALIBRsTION.
!- (5) rt-c es S - --- =_rn s z. ,;;_ ,d:: xt: :. ". +:s;-.:,' b"x
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o rna s- es3cro_ie _ __ .. - . .- . . xmp:r:d t: :: u':::u r': d.t:. For the Intermediate Range and Power P*i , Rance Neutron Flux channels the provisione of Sopcifireicn 4.0 a are nQt _ - [; l applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1. c & Mr/t4,w, wf,,a.1h am Ao ~.Aer 3.hr] f 1 .
.ent -rw u s st ps e N.
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(7) in4*rvalir hehnol a=t 91 eWackre Att powee elaIr (EF?b)AGGER . i& L Each train shall be te. m rstedn at,,least every 62 da/s on a,S,i BASIS. rw ,~, n or-o -
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1 (8) Deleted , 4 ,/ , g , ,j , ,f j,,,,,../,, g . s .jo (9) 4u rt:rif f rveillance e "00:: *. 4*. = d : "shall also include /-M-A i verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state m for existing plant conditions,b; :bxrv:'.i= ^f "^ ;crt zi / /42 g
'~":"t- '-d:= Quarterly surveillance shall include verification of f .
,.._, the Boron Dilution Alarm Setpoint of less than or equal to an increase o7 , -.
,.f ,1 1.7 times the count rate within a 10-minute period.
~y .
CA-3.T-40~1 l CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. ...i .:c.i 7125 ; u h 9
9 1 IABit 4.3-1 (Continueet TABLE NOTATIONS ! i (10) Setpoint verification is not required. (11) 4a
".L.._
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4-d:pe-dent v:r ft:: tier d f th: Und:rv:!t:g: :n ' hunt t '::. d
/-W-A l c or ac+a I eb den S / .TW (12) At least c'nce per 18 months during shutdown, verifhhat on a - e ,y simulated 1 Boron Dilution Flux Multiplication ':.t mignal the normal CYCS discharge valves will close and the centrifugal charging pumps/-ss-yg i l
{ suction valves from the RWST will open within 30 seconds. < (13) Deleted (14) Deleted . l (15) The surveillance MODES specified for these channels in Table 4.3-2 , are more restrictive and therefore, applicable. AP 11 (16) *t.._
.. m. T. f.,f 8m".P..
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/ 7:2-LG
- u. s_ . 4 f. ,u + k. a. M. D f D. A..D f. f T. Tv .a t. +.. k. a. I.t .a.. A. . . a .u. a l. +. .s a. . d..e k. . , a. . +. T. 4.a a. 4..e..4.+..
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Trip y... fur.:t e _.. i:n. _ .a ._. _ ...,....:. l (17) Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service.
'I (18) Ster:ti: Und:rv:lt:g: T-ip. /-72-LS.
. .rwrser7/+7-/3 4 /-a 2-M l LS l-17-A
- C:mp1:t: v:rificaticr. Of 0"E" ABILITY Of th: ::nu:1 re::ter trip /-7/-A r.; itch circuitry :h:11 5: p;rfer::d prt:r t: :t:rtu fir:t
--c h u t d e .-:- t : ".e d : 2 :::er 4 g :fter a.uge:t ', 1992.'p frc: th:
CALLAWAY -~ UNIT 1 3/4 3-12a Amendment No.)),M,)f , N .E/ ,7) , 94
l t CHANGE l . . NUMBER NStiC DESCRIPTION l 1 26 LG This change moves the details concerning NIS detector ! calibration to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.11, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. This information is more appropriately controlled outside of the TS while the I calibration requirement itself and its Frequency are unchanged. 1 27 LS 10 Surveillances on the Source Range Neutron Flux trip l function are reorganized to reflect plant status in l l accordance with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. New Note [(19)] ; requires that the quarterly COT be performed within l 4 hours after reducing power below the respective source l range instrumentation Applicabilities, if not performed 4// ra/.r M S/lf within the previous [92] days. Since the COT is valid for f u e M Q ff.e [92] days, there is no need to repeat it if one has been ' l g performed within the prior [ quarter]. The 4 hour gjg/4 l allowance permits a normal shutdown to proceed without a ) l It reMar IM'f'
- delay for testing in H0DE 2 and for a short time in H0DE 3 '
[rs/w$ draw / untiF 2: n=W ' rip S=hm = :pred rd this trip 7f-GMd A ,. w h fe 4 function no longer provides protection. Since the current TS has no Specification 4.0.4 exception, this 4 hour allowance is less restrictive. 1 28 A Note [9] is revised to require the P 6 and P 10 interlock verification to be performed during all source range COTS. These permissives are verified to be in their correct state prior to entry into MODES 3. 4, and 5 during i i shutdown and after leaving MODES 3, 4, and 5 during i startup. This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. 1 29 LG This change moves the details regarding measurement of loop-specific AT4alues to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.6, cad 3-dO7 consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. This information is more appropriately controlled outside of the TS while the requirement to perform the quarterly calibration itself is unchanged. 1 30 M 1 ??-c- Oihtien "iti;:tien Syst-- 'S0"I' ;i;=1 bh:hing g j.y
- nd ;;r;;ilku regirmat; er; ;;;r;;d to ITS LC0 3.h9-
, :ZNJF.A7~ mu o , ,,,,, .. + . u w - --..< _ :-- a. -
* // et55 rih 5n+h: U AE"f$ STidr$[r$ [cEd d37 e- --t,y h= = m -- ra= cqmme. :n the pr;::::-;f edepting the ac., LCO end ACTION Requ.i s..~.a.s
-( = else CN 1-10-LS 32 :nd 1 3' *). it u n deter-ined-4 het iv im wn istent with curr:rt M opr:bility
-r^';uira..t in M00: 5. enly vue ^DHS trair. hould be -
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 11 5/15/97
I INSERT 3A-11 g j_g_g l The current TS do not cover the entire Boron Dilution Mitigation System (BDMS). The current TS include operability requirements only on the source range channels which l provide inputs to the BDMS and surveillances to verify the flux multiplication setpoint (quarterly) and valve swapover (18 months). The current TS do not address operability of the BDMS past the source range channel inputs (e.g., the BDMS microprocessor is not covered in the current TS) nor do the current TS cover other boron dilution analysis , assumptions now covered in ITS 3.3.9 and its Bases (i.e., requiring at least one RCS l loop in operation to provide mixing and the Mode 5 isolation of BGV0178 to limit dilution flow rate in that Mode). Since ITS 3.3.9 now covers these items, this is a more restrictive I change. Other DOCS cover specific changes to current TS ACTIONS 5.a (see DOCS 1-04-LG and 1-43-A for format and terminology changes and DOCS 1-10-LS-32 and 1-55-LS-39 for specific relaxations) and 5.b (see DOCS 1-10-LS-32 and 1-34-A). The current TS surveillances addressed by Notes (9) and (12) to Functional Unit 6 in Table 4.3-1 are moved to ITS 3.3.9 with the only change being the use of a simulated or actual signal to test the valve swapover function, as discussed in DOC 1-33-TR-1. I i
CHANGE
, NUMBER EljC DESCRIPTION l r9"had. *: r;tienek fw Unis peit.ieii is ccr.t;i cd
- t M ITS 3_3.9 LCC Co m . / 70-d '
1 31 A One time surveillance waivers are deleted. They are no
- longer applicable.
l 1 32 LG [ Note [(7)] of current TS Table 4.31 is revised to move i the independent UVTA and STA verification to the BASES for ' i ITS SR 3.3.1.4.] [ Note (11) of current TS Table 4.31 is l deleted since it is redundant; every TADOT requires l independent UVTA and STA verification per ITS SR 3.3.1.4, j not just those TADOTs following maintenance or i adjustment.] Notes [(16) and (18)] of current TS l Table 4.3 1 are moved to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.14. These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 1 33 TR 1 Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, the BDMS actuation SR is changed to allow the use of an actual signal, if and when one occurs, to satisfy surveillance requirements. I 1 34 A Callaway's current TS Table 3.31 ACTION Statement 5.b I requirements for two inoperable source range channels are divided between the reactor trip indication, and BDMS functions served by the source range channels. New ACTION Statement 4.1, added to current TS Table 3.31, retains CumM U the requirement to open the reactor trip breakers to serve 7d//c F,'f-/ the reactor trip function. The requirements regarding the 744 Neh4 ' suspension of positivo reactivity changes and verification a y74/, of SDM are related to source range indication only, 4 7,f g u g g whereas the mitigation of boron dilution events is satisfied by the closure'of the dilution source isolation 4 g,gg valves. Closure of the dilution source isolation valves N d"* E8 represents the only BDMS-related function in current TS
/h,y,/ -4 .rry27 9, Table 3.31. ACTION Statement 5.b. This plant condition establishes the basis for the respective App 11cabilities for ITS 3.3.9 and ITS 3.9.2, i.e., the BDMS is not required in MODE 6 since these valves are closed. The ACTION Statement 5.b requirements that are not related to reactor trip are moved to ITS 3.3.9.V See also CN 130 M. S / ~fo-M This approach is consistent with traveler TSTF-135.
1-35 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Tabl.e (Enclosure 3B).
~
1 36 /J-gy Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison .hC-S.7-S'l l Table (Enclosure 3B). i l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 12 5/15/97
&, n.s F G'% '7 w.( )s-
\
Q \ cc-) CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE. - CURRENT TS g'4'.3 , Page 7 of 26 TECH SPEC CHANGE i
-B , APPLICABILITY
, a ,
NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK' CALLAWAY 1-25 NUREG-1431 Rev. 1 incorporates the current TS 4.0.4 Yes Yes Yes Yes, ! exception from Table 4.3-1 Notes (2), (3), and (6) into the
-A--y g f_qgf-4 ITS SR 3.3.1.2, 3.3.1.3, and 3.3.1.6 surveillance frequencies.
1 26 This chanrp moves detail concerning NIS detector operation Yes Yes Yes Yes s. LG and testing to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.11. i 1-27 Surveillances on the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Yes Yes Yes Yes l, function are reorganized to reflect plant status in LS-10 accordance with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. New Note [(19)] requires that the quarterly COT be performed within 4 hours after reducing power below the respective source range instrumentation Applicabilities. If not performed within the previous [92] days. Since the COT is valid for r92] days, there is no need to repeat it if one has been performed within the prior [ quarter). Since the current TS has no Specification 4.0.4 exception, this 4 hour gliowance . is less restrictive. i 1-28 Note [9] is revised to require the P 6 ind P 10 interlock verification to be performed during all source range COTS. hMd .re.e Yes Yes Yes A G / fp gpq j These permissives are verified to be in their correct state prior to entry into H00ES 3, 4, and 5 during shutdown and e f N () C.M N4 after leaving H0 DES 3. f4 and 5 during startup. 1-29 Thischangemoves[the td@egarding measurement of No - not in current No - not in current No - not in current Yes LG loop-specific alWalues to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.6. TS. TS. TS. CA-S. Jar 7 1-30 Boron Dilution Hitigation System (BDMS) d ; :1 b u d' g d No - not in current No - not in current No - not in current H r xii k _ -requirements are r ;;d t- ITS LCO 3.3.9. This TS. TS. TS. Yes g 7_ y is a more restrictive requirement si the BDMS, other ' than the inputs from the source ra channels currently has no LCO or ACTION requirements. a/M gspu[a,. 1-31 One time surveillance waivers are deleted. They are.no No - not in current Yes Yes Yes A longer applicable. TS. CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS ; 1, 5/15/97
( CONVERSION CONPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 8 of 26 . TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY l NUPSER DESCRIPTION- DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK- CALLAWAY 1-32 [ Note [(7)] of current TS Table 4.3-1 is revised to move Yes Yes Yes Yes - LG the independent UVTA and STA verification to the BASES for ; ITS SR 3.3.1.4.] [ Note (11) of current TS Table 4.3-1 is 'f deleted since it is redundant: every TADOT requires , independent UVTA and STA verification per ITS SR 3.3.1.4 I not just those TADOTs following maintenance or adjustment.] i Notes [(16) and (18)] of current TS Table 4.3-1 are moved ! to the BASES for ITS SR 3.3.1.14. ; e 1-33 The BOMS actuation SR is changed to allow the use of an No - not in current No - not in current No not in current Yes . 4 TR-1 actual signal, if and when one occurs, to satisfy TS. TS. TS. l t surveillance requirements. j i 1-34 Callaway's current ACTION Statement 5.b requirements for No No No Yes ! A- two inoperable source range channels are divided between the reactor trip. Indication, and 80MS functions served by i the source range channels. New ACTION Statement 4.1, added l to current TS Table 3.3-1 retains the requirement to open ! the reactor trip breakers to serve the reactor trip - function. The ACTION Statement 5.b requirements that are not related to reactor trip are moved to ITS 3.3.9. See g [ /-.3% [
~TT TZ$he 3.3-/ '77esle Abbr lin ,6 *Y Ta$l* $ 2 WSdetbMffer H er- b60er[4)*d03 h M alAr &
Qog 1-j0;M Curved y i 1-35 Thischenh s response time limit tables to the updated Yes No - already moved No - already moved No - already moved f LG FSAR per Generic Letter 93-08 and NLREG-1431 Rev.1. to TRM. to USAR Section to FSAR ' 16.3. Section 16.3. j 1-36 This DCPP-specific change adds a requirement to perform a Yes No No No
-$h/S-f3 Channr1 Calibration on functional Unit 17 every 18 months. ) C-7. 3-@2 i
I I f i i CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97
l l l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET , 1 l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 1-37-A APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l l REQUEST: In the current TS, the " Minimum Channels OPERABLE" is one less than the " Total Number of Channels" for Functional Units [18.c] (P-8), [18.d](P-9), and [18.e](P-10) in Table 3.3-1 and Functional Unit (11.a](P-11) in Table [3.3-3]. For these Reactor Trip System and ESFAS interlocks, current ACTION Statements [8 and 20] for an inoperable channel are based on the
" Minimum Channels OPERABLE" columns in Tables 3.3-1 and [3.3-3]. In the improved TS, only the " Total Number of Channels" information is retained in the LCO and that column is relabeled as the " Required Channels", as discussed in CN 1-04-LG and CN 1-43-A. Required Actions in improved TS 3.3.1 Conditions S and T and improved TS 3.3.2 Condition L are tied to the Required Channels. Therefore, the required permissive channels for these Functional Units are revised in the current TS. Refer also to CN 1-51-LG for P-7.
Comment: [ DOC]- The CTS markup changes the total number of channels for the P7, P8, P9.and P10 interlocks (CTS functions 22b, c, d, and e) from 4 channels to 3 and the required number of channels in the ITS is 3 instead of 4. This is counter to the format of the improved TS. Allinstalled RTS channels should be required to be OPERABLE and actions provided for any channel out of service. If the impact of a single inoperable channel is very low, the Required Action may be minimal. Revise the ITS Table to require 4 channels for P7, P8, P9,and P10 interlocks. [OOS issue] The CTS markup changes the total number of channels for the P-11 interlock (CTS function 8a) from 3 channels to 2. The interlock enables on any two of three channels, thus proposed required channels do not account for single channel failures. This is counter to the format of the improved tech specs and this is a change to the CTS. Allinstalled channels are required to be operable and actions provided for any channel out of service. If the impact of a single inoperable channelis very low, the required action may be minimal. This change in conjunction with JFD 3.3-44 (multiple function entry for inoperable interlock channels) are OOS issues. Single channel inoperabilities can be verified and operation is indefinite, but multiple inoperable channels as proposed could place the plant in an unsafe condition if the applicable P-11 setpoint (AV)is disabled because poweris lowered and then re-enabled because power is raised again. At the transition back into the power range when P-11 is required the iTS would not require subsequent reverification of setpoints per Required Action L.1. {not WC} The CTS markup changes the total number of channels for the P11 interlock (CTS function 8a) from 3 channels to 2. This is counter to the format of the improved tech specs. Allinstalled RTS channels should be required to be OPERABLE and actions provided for any channel out of service. If the impact of a single inoperable channel is very low, the Required Action may be minimal. i l FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number O 3.3-44. All permissive channels will be required OPERABLE in the ITS and DOC 1-37-A was changed to 1-37-M. ATTACHED PAGES: I None i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 1-40-LS-41 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: Surveillance intervals applied to Notes (3) and (6) of CTS Table 4.3-1 will be defined in terms of effective full power days (EFPD). However, EFPD may be longer than calendar days as specified in the CTS. Therefore, this change is considered less restrictive. Comment: The justification is inadequate for changing the CTS SR frequency to 92 EFPD and for proposing the CTS incore/excore calibration for Power Range Flux, High Setpoint be spplied instead to Overtemperature AT in the ITS. Adequate justification would be the current requirements represent unsafe practices or may result in an operational hardship. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-40-LS-41 and NSHC LS-41 have been revised, as per the attached. The second part of the comment is misplaced since that change is discussed under DOC 1-21-A. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 13 Enclosure 3B, page 9 Enclosure 4, page 74
1 ~+ CHANGE ! q , NUMBER H2iG DESCRIPTION j 1 1 37
-A% In the current TS, the ~ Minimum Channels OPERABLE" is one()yT '
less than the " Total Number of Channels" for Functional ; Units [18.c] (P 8), [18.d](P-9). and [18.e](P 10) in l f- -/f e Z ~ r f Table 3.31 and Functional Unit [11.a](P 11) in i CanMIN8^ II ""4"g Table [3.3-3]. For these Reactor Trip System and ESFAS I interlocks, current ACTION Statements [8 and 20] for an inoperable channel are based on the " Minimum Channels su ffd ene-[ emf'/Iv8 c/4nne / mefeJ') OPERABLE" columns in Tables 3.31 and [3.3 3]. In the g g,, _//, crf improved TS, only the " Total Number of Channels"
*J'* j, information is retained in the LC0 and that column is N#I" b# relabeled as the " Required Channels", as discussed in lagenl/ej Nf II CN 104 LG and CN 143 A. Required Actions in improved q m,.e reffn e-/fys TS 3.3.1 Conditions S and T and improved TS 3.3.2 Condition L are tied to the Required Channels.4 ",;. eTeii-J'[* -
tb -% p-ic:ive ch:nn:'; f:r tMr Fun:^ien;l - N 884
" nits are r;vi::d " th; curr;nt TSr Refer also to CN 151 LG for P 7.
1 38 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 1 39 A This change adds Note [5] to Functional Units [2.b and 3] in current TS Table 4.31. Note [5] is currently listed against Functional Unit [2.a]. Testing methodology and the timing of that testing for the power range channels apply to all power range functions, not just power range-high. As such, this is an administrative change only. i ITS SR 3.3.1.11 applies to all power range functions in a ! similar fashion. 1 40 LS-41 Surveillance intervals applied to Notes (3) and (6) of current TS Table 4.31 will be defined in terms of effective full power days (EFPD). EFPD is defined as the integrated energy output of the fuel at rated thermal power over 24 hours and is a measure of fuel depletion. This is more reflective of the changes occurring by basing the surveillances on core burnup. This is intended to correlate NIS detector performance with core performance A I4rVtI//ance and represents a minor change for a base load plant. In M VA! 4t h on However,tEFPD may be longer tha calendar days as d /-46-Lff/ specified in the current TS. T refore, this change is considered less restrictive. gn, f,f,/,n
~
1-41 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). a
~'
1 42 M This change adds direction to ACTIONS 7, 11, and 13 in current TS Table 3.31 to be in MODE 3 within 12 hours, in DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 13 5/15/97
," , t s . .q CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 9 of 26 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 1 37 In the current TS the " Minimum Channels OPERABLE" is one Yes Yes Yes Yes
+-pi less than the " Total Number of Channels" for Functional Units [18.c] (P 8). [18.d](P 9), and [18.e](P-10) in Table 3.3-1 and Functional Unit [11.a](P-11) in Table [3.3-3]. For these Reactor Trip System and ESFAS interlocks, current ACTION Statements [8 and 20] for an y g gg gg.g inoperable channel are based on the ,Mininas Channels s
/ e.ns w//aj vf e,.,y ./4, c77 OPERABLE" columns in Tables 3.3-1 and [3.3-3). In the [* #*I##' > a cAenne 6/ , g [, ,jee, improved TS. only the " Total Nunter of Channels" information is retained in the LCO and that colum i re[uf,,, Q Y %ff,/ f 7, g, relabeled as the " Required Channels", as discussed n 08 *t. P8MricYive o eye.
CN 1-04 LG and CN 1-43-A. Required Actions in 1 oved TS 3.3.1 Conditions 5 and T and improved TS 3.3 Condition L are tied to the Required Channels.1 L ,cim c. - 4 "f,74 2; .: ,d - M M e= " " M ; = tr a '- ~;;m. ' ..;L m r t;;d R. ;tm m.ma 3. Refer also to CN 1 51 LG for P 7. 1-38 The source range channel operability requirements in No - see CN 1 09 M. Yes - relocated to Yes - relocated to No - see CNs R MODES 3. 4. and 5 when incapable of rod withdrawal are the TRM. Chtpter 16.3 of the 1-10-LS-32. 1-30 M. USAR. and 1-34 A. relocated to a licensee controlled doctment. This change adds Note [(5)] to Functional Units [2.b and 3] Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 39 A in current TS Table 4.3-1. r a J wegef/M see A/wrun//mtw[ses 1-40 Surveillance intervals applied to Notes (3) and (6) of No - already in No - already in Yes Yes LS-41 current TS Table 4.3-1 will be defined in tares of current TS. current TS. effective full power days (EFPD)- However.vEFPD may be b M longer tha calendar days as specified in the current TS. Therefore, his chpnge 1) considered less restrictive. u one ca.reen an Yes No No No 1-41 This DCPP-specific change moves the first sentence of A note (1) of Table 3.3 2 to ITS SR 3.3.1.16. and moves the rest of note (1) to the Bases. This change adds direction to ACTIONS 7, 11. and 13 in No - not in current No not in current No - not in current Yes 1-42 design or TS. design or TS. design or TS. H current TS Table 3.3-1 to be in MODE 3 within 12 hours. In lieu of LCO 3.0.3 entry, if inoperable EAM/TTD timer (s) or channel (s) aren't tripped within 6 hours, enuvrocinu enupaDTROM Tapi r . OllppFNT T9 5/15/97
i IV. SPEC 1FIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS l l ' NSHC LS 41 ! 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES E AT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN T}iE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l The surveillance intervals applied to Notes (3) and (6) of the current TS Table 4.31 will be defined in terms of effective full power days (EFPD). EFPD is defined l as the integrated energy output of the fuel at rated thermal power over 24 hours and l 1s a measure of fuel depletion. This is more reflective of the changes occurring by basing the surveillances on core burnup. This is intended to correlate NIS detector performance with core performance and represents a minor change for a base load plant. "~re f r . 4.d ~.7 b; kn;r tbn ;;k..da dm ;; ;;;;;i'W " th current -
-4s .zurec- L/-+1 & /-le-Lf-+l This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been i performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
3. The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
l Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The frequency change of the surveillance requirements is intended to correlate NIS detector performan'ce with core' performance and represents a minor change for a base load plant. This is more reflective of the changes occurring by basing the surveillance on core burnup. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the proposed change affect the ability of any safety related equipment to perform its intended function. 74 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
l l INSERT LS-41 p /-/d-LJ-f / i-3 l 4 A surveillance interval based on EFPD may be longer than one based on calendar days, as ! specified in the current TS; however, a review of operating experience has shown that l instrument drift is sufficiently low that any surveillance interval increase corresponding to this ! change would be accommodated without impacting nuclear instrumentation system i performance. The capability to effectively monitor core performance is not affected since ; neutron flux shapes change relatively slowly during steady state operation. ; i i l i I
}
i i l 1 l l l
i 1 i
~
1 i l L Date: November 23,1998 , l t l To: C. W. Mueller - R. A. Kelley { i l G. L. Rainwater M. J. Montana j P. A. Agathen G. W. Moorman l D. E. Brandt C. D. Nelson ! L C.J.Schukaii G. L. Randolph M. P. Barrett R. J. Schukai p J. T. Birkett W. C. Shores C. A. Bremer S. E. Willis j D. W. Capone R. C. Zdellar !. W. J. Carr W. L. Baxter ! J. M. Hannis J. E. Birdsong From: P.' J. Weigel Re: ' Competitive Analysis i i Attached is the 1998 edition of the Competitive Analysis. This document is based on 1997 data and compares Ameren, UE and CIPS against a group of 26 other utilities in the areas of generation costs, production and non-production costs, average revenues and staffmg levels. If you have any questions concerning this document, or if you would like additional copies. please call me at extension'43088. Attachment l cc: D. F. Cole R. W. Huelsmann M. A. Borkowski D. R. Hunt S. Gallagher S. C. Nayak l: U. A. Heinze District Managers R. J. Kovach Power Plant Managers C. C. Scanlin R. L. Powers (EEine) L. M. Bames Rick Davidson (CIPS-Mattoon) l l l T. D. Finnell 1 l l t f f. 1 <. i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-51-LG APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: This change moves the description of the P-7 inputs, i.e., P-10 and P-13, to the Bases since they are duplicated by Functional Units [18.e and 18.f) and lists "1 per train" under the Required Channels column. [] Comment: The requirement for a channel operational test of the P-7 function should not be deleted. The P-7 function is a distinct function for which surveillance must be specified. Eliminating the channel calibration requirement is acceptable since P-7 has no setpoint of it own. The COT, however, should be retained because the P-7 function has elements which are not part of P-10 or P-13. I FLOG RESPONSE: The P-7 logic function is tested under CTS Table 4.3-1 Functional Unit 20 (Functional Unit 22 for DCPP) and will be tested under the ITS as described in the response tc Comment Number Q 3.3-54. This comment is directed to DCPP, which has surveillance requirements associated with P-7 in the CTS. As explained in the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-54, the testing requirements specified for P-7 are inappropriate for a logic circuit. DOC 1-59-LS-46 has been created to justify the deletion of the CHANNEL CALIBRATION, per the reviewer's suggestion. In addition, the new 4 LS DOCjustifies the deletion of the COT and the adoption of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST on a refueling outage basis. As a result of this revision, DOC 1-51-LG is revised to delete the bracketed sentence at the end r the DOC (empty brackets for the other FLOG plants). ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 . Enclosure 3A, page 15 Enclosure 38, page 11 I 1 l ! l
)
l I
\
l
CHANGE l g NUMBER ffSiG DESCRIPTION mn Ntf' setpoint. In addition, the 4 hour surveillance testing bypass allowance for one inoperable channel accorded the I" 0 " g l JSGchannelsfis Water also Level Low applied to the SGLowWater (Adverse Level Low Low Containment j ~/m4/s.r U-/ * (Nornal Containment Environment) channels. The testing l 2,7-7 option included in the current TS would allow any number of SG Water Level Low Low (Normal Containment Environment) l channels to be bypassed for surveillance testing with l their corresponding Containment Pressure Environmental Allowance Modifier channels in trip; however, these surveillances would be performed with a higher SG water level trip setpoint which is not always desirable. These changes are considered to be administrr se since the
- above operating and testing capabilities are the same as
! originally reviewed by the NRC in Callaway OL Amendment No. 43 dated April 14, 1989. l 1 47 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). f l 1 48 LS-4 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison , l Table (Enclosure 3B).
,[ 1 49 LS-18 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ;
Table (Enclosure 38). 1 l 1 50 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). 1-51 LG This change moves the description of the P 7 inputs, i.e., P 10 and P-13, to the Bases since they are duplicated by Functional Units [18.e and 18.f]. The Required Channels column for P 7 lists "1 per train" since that is a more , appropriate convention for a logic function. ese ! changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. .@ 4/d O 1-52 LG This change, moves the specifics o
- Mt illeeri
+fys-/ NdeE93fa,. A>ry l
permissive functions of ACTIOh [8 and 0]nto the Bases, i consistent with NUREG 1431 Ig Th- s infc rmation is NC-7.347 more appropriately control outside f the 5 while the underlying requirement to verify pro permissr OrETFM
. operation is unchanged. Acr24/
ij7re s 1 53 gP - ( r Ta e 3. 1 IO St eme [2 A to e nsi ent th TS 3 .4. . a disgatse i C
, 0 S-1 in +.e 3 .2 ack e. g79jg Na+ ned.
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 15 5/15/97 l
i l7-; c. . . ( i;[ '5' ' Q: ) j CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 11 of 26 ; TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 1 49 For DCPP, CTS ACTION 9 is deleted and revised ACTION 6 is Yes No No No LS-18 used which allows a power reduction below P-7 in lieu of tripping the inoperable channel. Note (g) is added that specifies that Functional Unit 19 of the CTS does not have to be applied until the power level associated with P 7 is reached. ACTION 6 also allows the tripped channel to be bypassed for up to 4 hours to perform surveillance testing on other channels. 1-50 ACTION [28] of the CTS duplicates CTS ACTION [C and is Yes Yes No - not in current No - not in current A deleted. TS. TS. 1 51 This change moves the description of the P-7 inputs. i.e.. Yes Yes Yes Yes LG P-10 and P-13. to the Bases since the re duplicated by Functional Units (18.e and 18.f: lists - per train" undertheRequiredChynnelscolt Q /-S/-f4 1-52 This change moves functions of ACT! . c nNikvWif ksW Yeb Yes Yes
~
Yes LG [8 nd 0] ,to the Bases. p,,, g g -
- WC-8,3-dt 7 on en it S 3.2 d ]
0 5-1 nt 3/4 pagkfger g m), ' h $*S~~NO 1 54 ACTION Statement 5.b of Callaway's current TS Table 3.31 No No No Yes LS 37 is revised to change the 14 day recurring verification of the closed status of the unborated water source isolation valves to 31 days. 1 55 Applicability Note [*] and ACTISN Statements [5.a and 10] Yes Yes Yes Yes LS 39 for functional Units [1. 6.b.19. and 20] of current TS Table 3.3-1 are modified to provide an alternative to opening the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) while still assuring that the function and intent of opening the RTBs is met. j CONVFRSTON CfNpARISON TARI F - CIIRRFNT TS 5/15/97
i j ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1-53-A APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC ) REQUEST: Current TS Table 3.3-1 ACTION Statement [2.c) is revised to be consistent with ITS ; SR 3.2.4.2, as discussed in CN 4-04-LS-12 in the 3/4.2 package. l' Comment: The note *" on CTS markup action 2.c is justified as changing the completion time to be consistent with ITS SR 3.2.4.2. This change is categorized as an i administrative change to the CTS. Approval of ITS SR 3.2.4.2 is pending staff approval ! because it represents a less restrictive change to CTS 4.2.4.2. We staff concludes
- note "* is also less restrictive to CTS T3.3-1. Provide a revised DO'
- for this change.
- I
- The note *" is also shown in the CTS markup to apply to Source Range shutdown i
. modes. This note is not included in the BDPS LCO. Provide clarification of the intent of
- the CTS markup.
1 i ) FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-53-A has been withdrawn. See also the response to Comment l Number Q 3.3-120 and the attached pages for that response. ! The second comment refers only to Callaway and was resolved during meetings with NRC staff between September 15-18,1998, as discussed in Reference 6. ATTACHED PAGES: None l I i \ )
- _ _ - . ~ . . - --. -- . . _ - . - _ . . . . .. . .-.
l
, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 1-54-LS-37 APPLICABILITY: CA i
) REQUEST: ACTION Statement 5.b of Callaway's current TS Table 3.3-1 is revised to change the 14 day recurring verification of the closed status of the unborated water source isolation valves to
; 31 days.
1 Comment: Additional information is needed for the justification. Action 5 applies to . l Source Range, Neutron Flux, Sh' tdown (Functional Unit 6) in Modes 3,4, and 5. The t explanation cites consistency with the recurring m:inual valve position interval in other sections of NUREG-1431 (e.g., Section 3.9) as justification for the valve position i verification requirement change from 14 days to 31 days. Section 3.9 is the refueling i section which is only applicable to MODE 6. The NSHC refers to consistency with CTS : j surveillance requirements frequency for the unborated water source isolation valves in ! j MODE 6 forjustifying the change from 14 days to 31 days. Revise the NSHC to reflect ,
; the applicable MODES to which this Action statement applies.
l ! l l FLOG RESPONSE: NSHC LS-37 has been revised per the attached. j l i l i ATTACHED PAGES: i
., 1 l Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 l i Enclosure 4, page 66 1
i l l i i
-. . .- - _ - - . - . . . - -- - .- -- - - _ ~ - - - - . . . -
1 IV. SPECIFIC NO SfGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 37 i 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION ; FOR < TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE h hSu-7 / j i REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i 1 (, wr.g-lu AbME M ineferuble wee rays s ch-/ rqah l
- ACTION Statement 5.b is modified such that9the unborated water source isolation i
- valves are only required to be verified closed and secured in position every !
31 days, rather than every 14 days. This change is consistent with the current TS l 1 surveillance requirement Fr uency for the unborated water source isolation valves in MODE 6. .ZMIGR7~ Lf- : This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted l below
The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in :
50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance ' with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: or 5
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any '
accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety." ,
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change, to modify the periodicity at which the unborated water j source isolation valves are verified closed and secured in position, does not ! result in any hardware changes. As noted in the Bases of NUREG-1431 Rev.1, I the 31 day Frequency of SR 3.9.2.1 is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls that will i ensure that the valve opening is an unlikely possibility. The proposed change will not affect any of the analysis assumptions for any of the accidents 4^ previously evaluated. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the proposed change affect the ability of any l
~~
safety related eouipment to perform its intended function. There will be no degradation in the performance of nor an increase in the number of challenges NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 66 5/15/97
i i I INSERT LS-37 g /_ggg, ! (g ; . Administrative controls are used in MODE 6 to preclude an inadvertent boron dilution event. Once the dilution source valves have been closed after both source range channel inputs to i BDMS have been determined to be inoperable, the same level of administrative control is in i l place for precluding an inadvertent boron dilution event in MODES 3,4, and 5. The same 31 ! ! day Frequency is acceptable in view of administrative controls that will ensure valve i reopening is an unlikely possibility. l L 1 L i i : l i l i 4 W l I
i 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-02-A (3.3) APPLICABILITY: CA, WC l i REQUEST: CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.2-1, and the values for Total Allowance (TA), Z, and i Sensor Error (S) are deleted, consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1. Comment: Explain the LG classification for deleting CTS requirements. The staff position is that this change is less restrictive because limits (required operator actions) contained in the CTS are deleted and now given elsewhere in licensee controlled documents. {WC, CW} The staff also notes this CN is a duplicate of CN 2-03 A for LSSS changes. Additional CN 2-03A comments are provided with that CN in this table. i FLOG RESPONSE: New DOC 2-54-M nas been written regarding elimination of ACTION b.1 in l CTS 3.3.2. DOC 2-03-A in the 2.0 package has been revised to reference DOC 2-54-M in the 3.3 t package. ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 2.0 - ITS 2.0 A, page 2 !
* , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 , page 3/4 3-13 ; A, page 25 B, page 20 i i
l
CHANGE NUMBER NSliC DESCRIPTION
- k. effectively allows rack error to increase above its nominal value by an amount dependent on the available
, setpoint margin: however, this margin is available for l utilization at any time and is not restricted to whether l the ACTION is entered. As such, current ACTION b.1 effectively provides no different recourse than current l ACTION b.2. With a nonconservative as measured trip l setpoint, current practice is to enter ACTION b.2. Therefore, CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.21, and the values for TA, Z, and S can be deleted as they are no longer required. fee 4 /.r, bdC 2-M fn fAe 7,7/ael y e. g{4,3) y, 2 04 @ tued N# /- the
,f nsi ionnt ua NURE 1431 y si s to 1 K., , aof1(,,
- v. 1 ndic es ty M M con rvati direc)t on f thes val s.f b'b 2-05 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ,
Table (Enclosure 38). 2 06 LG The requirements stipulated in ACTIONS [a and b] are moved to ITS Table 3.3.1 1, with direction contained in [the ITS Background (Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values) Bases. ACTIONS Bases, and SR 3.3.1.10 and SR 3.3.1.11 Bases]. This change removes details more appropriately controlled outside of the TS while retaining those aspects necessary to assure the protection functions are performed if necessary. 2 07 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). pg Neh a liesLlr. -b O*II'wf. See D^vertron Omf*riten p le Encletar-e 28) Of~IA~003 l i i DESCR:PTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 2 5/15/97 l
i 2 1
- cINSTRUMENTATION 3 /4.3.2 D;GfNEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEN INSTRUMENTATION l-C--A i
p / A Qy j
- p. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i Wl 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation W channels and interlocks shoun in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE rith th& v-'; 2-o/-A i -E:t; t: =t copsistent with thegalues shown in th T-!p S:t;6t =1r. :f 2-03-u.
j Table 3.3-4. 3aaA A ;;,,y, 1 APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3. - l , ACTION: # /-oI-A
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) - s,- With an ESFAE instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take j the ACTION shown in Tame 3.3-3.. ' ena # Aces #cb i SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTF Ten ~ gA.rrt , l 4.3.2.1 J actuation Each logic and ESFAS relaysinstrumentation shall be demonstrated channel OPERABLE and interlock by the and perfothe nee autohtic of i i G M hesS t ESFAS Ind n=antation eve SF e,111ance Requirements specified in Table
.3-2. !
4.3.2.2 . NEERLD SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS func tion y ' shall be t : .:tutene be within the limit at least once per 18 monthW(the 1 proYisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for the steam turbine-driven I" W !
; auxiliary feedwater pump for entry into MODE 3. The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES j RESPONSE TIME testing for the steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is
! required to be completed within 24 hours after attaining it900 psig in all steam j generators). ,E=_ h t=t ill ' =_1 d :t i n: t =: trd :=,h thi hth trW:
. . . ... . . . . . . . . _u . . . ___, __ ..... ,__ .....u....
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& =_:1 :. .:r:_ ~,...m.. tu ted : t i n:,_ t=,__ _=. .ga. r.r ,.::._ th.c e'," n r. tb t ,.:r: X'; th
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- SebAY - UNIT 1~+e Cedi %3/4en3-13 CALLA Amendment No. M4,108 i
~ . - - - - - . - - - . _ . - - _ . - - - _ - - -._._. - - - --.-
l
.cs CHANGE I i NUtBER NSBC DESCRIPTION <w l
1 out of 2 logic on the second bus would be reduced to a i 1 out of_.1_ logic to accomplish the safety function. l t For Functional Unit 6.g in current TS Table 3.3-3, Auxiliary Feedwater - Trip of all Main Feedwater Pumps, , l the. " Total Number of Channels" column lists "4 2/ pump" with a ** Note (one channel in separation group 1 and one l channel in separation group 4 for each main feedwater ' pump) and the " Minimum Channels OPERABLE" column lists i "3". Current ACTION Stitement 19 allows continued ; operation with one channel inoperable as long as it is 1 l tripped within 1 hour and the three remaining channels are l OPERABLE. Two inoperable channels result in an LC0 3.0.3 l entry, requiring preparations to exit the Applicability l and go to MODE 3 at the time the second channel becomes l 1noperable., Function 6.g of ITS Table 3.3.21 lists "2 per pump" under the " Required Channels" column. With separate Condition entry per pump,. ITS 3.3.2 Condition J would allow one inoperable channel per pump as long as it is tripped within 1 hour. This would allow a second channel on the other pump to be inoperable for up to I hour prior to the commencement of any additional action, 1.e. either placing the second channel in trip which may or may not result in an auxiliary feedwater actuation l signal (AFAS) for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater l _ _ pumps or. reducing power. P1 acing the second channel pn l the other pump in trip will result in an AFAS only if the j second channel is in the same separation group as the I channel already in trip (as depicted in FSAR Figure 7.31 l sheet 2). If the two channels are in different separation groups, no AFAS will be initiated and continued operation will be permitted. 2 47 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). wJ 2 48 & 2^ - p pyon)E-7.'J-40/ l zWZErr$A .*1r j 3 01 A The requirements of this specification [ CTS 3.3.3] are moved to separate specifications in the improved TS. The RCS Leakage Detection requirements are moved to improved TS 3.4.15. [The Fuel Building requirements are moved to improved TS 3.3.8.] The Control Room requirements are i n @+r; moved to improved TS 3.3.7. [ ]
- [.{" y _
(Sa2% 3 02 H T q' ts 1pul d in ION are ved T l l abl .3.7 and . 8- . with lic direc n DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 25 5/15/97
INSERT 3A-25 (page 1 of 2) i { 2-49 - Not used. y jl 2-50 LG
- L The CTS (##] note of Table 3.3-3 is ravised to move the f)27-f3 h, descriptive material related to the automatic blocking of the interlock to the ITS 3.3.2 Bases. Moving these details does not effect the Applicability or the Operability of the Function which will continue to protect the health and safety of the public.
2-51 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison $ 27-79 j Table (Enclosure 38). 4 2-52 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison f 1,7-gg-Table (Enclosure 3B). i 2-53 LG In this Callaway-specific change, the tie breaker closure discussion in ACTION 19 of CTS Table 3.3-3 is moved to g gg g ' the LCO Bases for ITS 3.3.5 as one example of multiple channels inoperable on one bus. Moving this detail to the iTS Bases has no impact on the system attributes required for OPERABILITY. In addition, moving this detail to the ' Bases is acceptable since OPERABILITY requirements and supporting surveillances are retained in the ITS and the moved information will be adequately controlled under the Bases Control Program of ITS Section 5.5.14. There will be no change to current plant practices nor any impact on safety. DOC 2-18-LS-31 contains the justification for l i extending the 8 hour breaker closure allowance to 12 hours. 2-54 M Although DOC 2-02-A characterizes the deletion of l
$ p-pq ,
ACTION b.2 from LCO 3.3.2 as admiristrative since the ! l ' change is consistent with current plant practice, since the trip setpoint adjustment is done for a majority of analog {y,3) j channels with the channel in trip and therefore declared inoperable (i.e., no different in effect than entering ACTION b.2), there could be scenarios where ACTION b.1 would present another altemative. For instance, since containment pressure High-3 has an installed bypass design feature, ACTION b.1 could allow trip setpoint adjustments in bypass. This would eliminate logging requirements for equipment out of service. Since this change is eliminating ACTION b.1 as an allowed recourse, this is a more restrictive change. 2-55 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison g74-) Table (Enclosure 68).
/h, jB f f'S
\l:41 47 Q:&
w LL w- ) I NSE#T~ 78 20 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 20 of 26 l TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 2 TA t is a appl to nct al Un s W N/A e mm
- N/A L m Cs W/A L n C% g[4 j tPfe- .2) .1) at a ows t affe ed E rgenc Die 1 4 32-L3-23. 2 loc 1. 2-1; LC ?L ne or o be clar i able r tres ry nto 5 cif ation .8.1. when re th one lay is YMP/. '
no able. Curre ACTI 16 of he P TS s.t a ess t . abov situat n and equir s ent in , 0 3.0 f-- M ./- m [ 3 01 The requirements of this specification [ CTS 3.3.3] are Yes Yes Yes Yes i A moved to separate specifications in the isproved TS. The RCS Leakage Detection requirements are moved to improved TS 3.4.15. [The fuel Building requirements are moved to improved TS 3.3.8.] The Control Room requirements are , moved to inproved TS 3.3.7. [] 3 02 The requirements stipulated in ACTION [a] are moved to ITS Yes Yes . Yes Yes H Tables [3.3.7-1 and 3.3.8-1]. with explicit direction , contained in the ITS ACTIONS Bases. The 4 hour A0T for setpoint adjustment is eliminated. 3 03 The requirements associated with the criticality monitors Yes - moved to No - not in current Yes - moved to USAR Yes - moved to FSAR LG are moved to a licensee controlled document. These FSAR. TS. Section 16.3. Section 16.3. monitors are required by 10CFR70.24: however, there is no i requirement for [them] to be in the Technical Specifications [nor do they meet any of the four criteria for inclusion in the ITS). 3-04 This change adds the Applicability for movement of Yes Yes No - see CN 3-12-A. Yes H trradiated fuel assenblies. The current TS Applicability of "All" HDDES does not cover the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies when the core is offloaded. 3 05 Yes Yes Yes Yes i AC110N Statement [38] for the [ Control Room Air Intake] LS.14 [and ACTION Statement [30] for the [ Fuel Building Exhaust)) radiation monitors have extended Coupletion Times, from [72 hours] to 7 days for one required channel inoperable.
, i CONVERSION COMPAf:iSJh ' 481 E CURRENT TS 5/15/97
INSERT 3B-20 (page 1 of 2) .; l i NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CALLAWAY & CANYON PEAK CREEK ! 2-49 Not used N/A N/A N/A N/A 2-50 The CTS [##] note of Table [3.3-3] is Yes Yes Yes Yes ! LG revised to move the descriptive material $ 7.3-63 i related to the automatic blocking of the interlock to the ITS 3.3.2 Bases. 2-51 The channel identifiers RM-44A and B Yes No No No LG are moved to the ITS Bases for ITS O 7.'7'~d 3.3.6. i i 2-52 Note (e) to CPSES CTS Table 3.3-2, No- Yes- No No i A applied to the Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation Functional Unit 5.b, h pg ; is reflected in ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Functional Unit 5.b., footnote (p). 2-53 in this Callaway-specific change, the tie No No No Yes i LG breaker closure discussion in ACTION g .p, .y 2 P l 19 of CTS Table 3.3-3 is moved to the ! LCO Bases for ITS 3.3.5 as one i example of multiple channels inoperable on one bus. ; 2-54 Deletion of ACTION b.1 eliminates one No - not No - not in Yes Yes ! M possible recourse for an Allowable in CTS. CTS. p 2-o2M j Value not met. j c [-f,2)J ! l t I f
. . . . . - . . _ _ . . - _ _ . = . - _ ._. . .- - .~. .. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-12-M APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, WC REQUEST: This Functional Unit [ CTS 9.a-9.d) is moved to improved TS 3.3.7. The Applicable MODES have been expanded to include movement of irradiated fuel assemblies to cover fuel handling accidents. Comment: Previous CTS changes resulting in requirements moved to other specs in the ITS format the change is noted as administrative. What is different about this change that it is more restrictive? FLOG RESPONSE: As stated in DOC 2-12-M, the APPLICABLE MODES are extended from MODES 1-6 to MODES 1-6 and during the movement of irradiated fuel. In accordance with the CTS applicability, movement of irradiated fuel when the core was off-loaded (i.e, not in any defined MODE), would not be covered by this specification. Because the additional applicability, beyond that required by the CTS, is being adopted, this change is considered to be more restrictive. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 19
. _ . . . ~ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _
-.2- l
.y_ . _
a ! 1 CHANGE l g NUMER HStic DESCRIPTION i ~e.- l consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, since it reduces by 1 hour the Completion Time to reach MODE 3 as compared with entry into LCO 3.0.3. 2 11 A The Functional Unit for Loss of Power [ CTS 8.a. 8.b] is moved to improved TS 3.3.5. 2 12 M This Functional Unit [ CTS 9.a 9.d] is moved to improved TS 3.3.7. Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, the
- Applicable MODES have been expanded to include movement of
! irradiated fuel assemblies cover fuel a i accicents. 8e sure Ne
- Ih* NN f & Q-lWN l -fkr T a , % rr y it 2'13 A ThisFunctiona'JyCTT Et[ .s moved to ITS 3.8.1.
l 2 14 M This change modifies ACTION Statement [20]'for permissive P-11 [and ACTION Statements 35, 36. 37,_and new 37(a) for
. SG Water Level Low-Low] to provide ~ specific shutdown requirements to exit Applicability in lieu of. applying I
LCO 3.0.3. This change is more restrictive by one hour, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 2 15 M Action Statement [16] has been expanded to specify additional actions and options if an inoperable channel is not placed in bypass within the specified time period. In the current TS. this would have required an entry into
~ ~
, LCO 3.0.3, wh'ich would necessitate that the plant initiate ! a shutdown within 1 hour and be in the next mode in 6 hours. In the ITS, the requirements to place the . . inoperable channel in. bypass within a time. constraint and the reduction, by 1 hour; in the time to exit i I Applicability [ ] ZAfrErr SA-Mare more restrictive than the current TS. WIM l 2-16 LS 12 ACTION Statement [26] for an inoperable channel in the l current TS Table [3.3 3] Functional Unit [9.a 9.c] is l modified to be consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 (i.e., a i j 7 day A0T in ITS 3.3.7). 2-17 LS 13 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).
- 2 18 LS 31 Current TS Table 3.3-3 ACTION Statement 19 is revised to reflect ITS 3.3.5 for the Loss of Power Functional Unit.
(
.-) Relaxation is obtained for multiple inoperable channels on
> one bus in MODES 1 4. This situation currently requires DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 19 5/15/97
. - _ _ - - . . _ , - - - - _ _ - . - - - ._ - - - .-. = _.. -_~- - - - -. _-
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-15-M APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Action Statement [16] has been expanded to specify additional actions and options if an inoperable channel is not placed in bypass within the specified time period. In the ITS, the requirements to place the inoperable channel in bypass within a time constraint and the reduction, by 1 hour, in the time to exit Applicability are more restrictive than the current TS. [] ! Comment: The completion time for bypass of an inoperable containment high-high l pressure signal (Functions 2.c and 3.b.3 - Action 17 and Function 4.c - Action 17.1) is l changed from unspecified (immediate) to within 6 hours. Justification is not provided for the new completion time. This also appears to be a less restrictive, not a more restrictive l change. The completion time for bypass of an inoperable channel in action 16 is changed from unspecified (immediate?) to 6 hours. Justification is not provided for the new time. This also appears to be a less restrictive, not a more restrictive change. FLOG RESPONSE: In practice, because a time for completior, of an action is not specified, no rigorous completion time is applied; the action is completed in an unspecified, " reasonable" time frame. For the functions where a completion time is not specified, the operability of the channel has no safety significance. The required number of channels remain sufficient to initiate the required protective action, even if a single failure is considered, regardless of the state c.f the one inoperable channel. Because a specific time would be required by the ITS, this change is l considered to be more restrictive. DOC 2-15-M will be enhanced to reflect this discussion. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 i Enclosure 3A, page 19 l l l 1 i
6 CHANGE NL#BER HSE DESCRIPTION consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, since it reduces by '~~ 1 hour the Completion Time to reach MODE 3 as compared with entry into LCO 3.0.3. 2 11 A The Functional Unit for Loss of Power [ CTS 8.a. 8.b] is moved to improved TS 3.3.5. 2 12 M This Functional Unit [ CTS 9.a 9.d] is moved to improved TS 3.3.7. Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, the Applicable MODES have been expanded to include movement of cover fuel a irradiated accieents. fuel nuassemblies re Ne *H tp,Ih*l *ff ik 3NN J Q2-1.1-M k- j y c T T , Fr k i ed y k , % f.e key it 2 13 A iona N t [ b ] is moved to ITS 3.8.1.
~
2 14 M This change modifies ACTION Statement [20] for permissidi P 11 [and ACTION. Statements ~ 35, 36, 37, and new 37(a) for . SG Water Level Low Low] to provide specific shutdown requirements to exit Applicability in lieu of applying LCO 3.0.3. This change is more restrictive by one hour,
. consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1.
[ ,; s i 2 15 M Action Statement [16] has been expanded to specify additional actions and options if an inoperable channel is not placed in bypass within the specified time period. In the current TS, this would have required an entry into LCO 3.0.3, which would necessitate that the plant initiate a shutdown within 1 hour and be in the next mode in 6 hours. In the ITS, the requirements to place the , inoperable channel in bypass within a time constraint and the reduction, by 1 hour; in the time to exit Applicability are more restrictive than the current TS. [ ] ZNCGTT~SA-M NIW 2 16 LS 12 ACTION Statement [26] for an inoperable channel in the current TS Table [3.3 3] Functional Unit [9.a 9.c] is modified to be consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 (i.e., a 7 day A0T in ITS 3.3.7). 2 17 LS 13 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 2-18 LS 31 Current TS Table 3.3-3 ACTION Statement 19 is revised to reflect ITS 3.3.5 for the Loss of Power Functional Unit. a Jih 5;I h" Relaxation is obtained for multiple inoperable channels on one bus in MODES 1-4. This situation currently requires DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 19 5/15/97
7 __ . 7--_ . _ _ . _ 7_
..~..-,-...,..,
4 INSERT 3A-19
$ 2-/M l In practica, because a time for completion of an action is not specified, no rigorous completion time is applied; the action is completed in an unspecified, " reasonable" time frame. For thifunctions where a completion time is not specified, the operability of the l channel has no safety significance. The required number of channels remains sufficient to initiate the required protective action, even if a single failure is considered, regardless of the state of the one inoperable channel. Because a specific time would be required by the ITS, this change is considered to be more restrictive.
l I
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(_ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 2-16-LS-12 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, WC REQUEST: ACTION Statement [26) for an inoperable channel in the current TS Table [3.3-3) i l Functional Unit [9.a-9.c) is modified to be consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1 (7 day AOT in ITS 3.3.7). l I Comment: Insufficient information is provided to justify extending the allowed outage time for one CRVS channel inoperable from [1 hour)[48 hours) to 7 days. If the system i arrangement is such that each instrument channel is dedicated to a single CRVS train (one-out-of -one starts one train), then the effect of a single inoperable instrument - channelis similar to that of an inoperable mechanical train and the extended AOT may be acceptable. If, however, the two channels are used in a one-out -of-two logic start both CRVS channels, a single inoperable instrumentation channel degrades the operability of both mechanical trains and the justification provided for the 7 day AOT is not germane. {WC} CTS Action 26 provisions of 3.0.4 not applicable are deleted without evaluation. ! Provide a justification for this change. FLOG RESPONSE: The premise behind the NRC comment is that the 7-day AOT is acceptable , for a design where the cross-train feed aspect is not present. The FLOG plants disagree since this design feature increases isolation function availability. Given one inoperable radiation ; monitor channel for a design without a cross-train feed, the associated isolation logic train is ' inoperable. Given one inoperable radiation monitor channel for the FLOG design with a cross- l train feed, both isolation logic trains remain functional since the OPERABLE radiation monitor i channel will provide inputs to both isolation logic trains. However, the isolation logic train l powered by the same train as the inoperable radiation monitor channel will be declared inoperable. The isolation logic train powered by the same train as the OPERABLE radiation monitor channel will remain OPERABLE, meeting the same safety system status as provided by a design without a cross-train feed. Since the FLOG design is superior to a design without a cross-train feed, the 7-day AOT is justified. i PLANT-SPECIFIC DISCUSSION The Control Room Ventilation isolation design is depicted on FSAR Figure 7.3-1 sheet 2. Radiation monitor GKRE0004 is powered from separation group 4. It provides an input to that separation group's isolation logic train, as well as providing an isolated input to the opposite train's (separation group 1) isolation logic. The same cross-train logic input design applies to radiation monitor GKRE0005, which is powered from separation group 1. ATTACHED PAGES: None l t
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-18-LS-31 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC l REQUEST: Current TS Table 3.3-3 ACTION Statement 19 is revised to reflect ITS 3.3.5 for the Loss of Power Functional Unit. Comment: [OOS] - Reject. Proposed change extends CTS AOTs for 2, 3, and 4 inoperable channels to 12 hours. The CTS AOT changes are not evaluated. AOT extensions not consistent with ISTS loss of redundancy and loss of function actions and CTS are OOS. Adopt ISTS for loss of redundancy and loss of function for inoperable LOP actuation channels or translate CTS requirements into ITS format. I The NSHC discussion on entry into LCO 3.0.3 specifies this change "does involve any relaxation in the allowed outage time currently required by LCO 3.0.3." Please clarify this l statement. The staff notes that the NUREG gives a one hour repair AOT for loss of l function conditions which is allowed based on the one hour in LCO 3.0.3 given that the l LCO includes a LCO 3.0.3 equivalent shutdown requirement. FLOG RESPONSE: The last comment under Comment Number Q 1-18-LS-7 is also applicable
- to this DOC.
1 As discussed during meetings with NRC staff on September 15 and 16,1998, ITS 3.3.5 Required Action B.1 has been revised in response to Comment Number Q 3.3-99 to immediately declare ; the associated load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS) inoperable. The extended AOT for multiple inoperable channels on one bus in MODES 1-4 is evaluated in DOC 2-18-LS-31 and is consistent with Vogtle's approved ITS. We agree that this is an out of scope change, as identified in Attachment 3 of the original ITS submittal. However, we feel that this change is
- justified and the attached pages include revisions to DOC 2-18 LS 31 and to LS 31 to further
! support this change. t The NSHC LS-31 discussion referenced in the second paragraph above is based on a comparison of shutdown time requirements in CTS LCO 3.0.3 vs. ITS LCO 3.3.5. Since ACTION 19 of current TS Table 3.3-3 for Functional Units 8.a and 8.b does not address the inoperability of l more than one channel, the failure of multiple channels would result in entering current LCO l 3.0.3 which requires that the plant be brought to MODE 3 in 7 hours and MODE 5 in 37 hours. ITS 3.3.5 Conditions C and D also require that the plant be brought to MODE 3 in 7 hours and ! MODE 5 in 37 hours. While ITS 3.3.5 Condition C explicitly allows one hour for restoration, ITS 3.3.5 Required Action D.1 (i.e., be in MODE 3 in 6 hours) effectively eliminates the one hour for action initiation present in CTS LCO 3.0.3. Under the current TS, if LCO 3.3.2 were restored in the first hour the plant would exit LCO 3.0.3. Therefore, this is not seen as a relaxation; however, DOC 2-18-LS-31 and NSHC LS-31 have been revised to more correctly characterize this sentence to say that this Condition has the same shutdown track time in both the CTS and ITS. ATTACHED PAGES: j Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 20 . Enclosure 4, page 53 l l
hm
~-
.- Y_-.
.} tr..- - --. --
4 u CHANGE
- a.
; ;~
12BER HStiC DESCRIPTION l-- entry into LCO 3.0.3 since it is beyond the scope of ACTION Statement 19. f) 0-/P-LS-7 de aMeefeSI /'d2 For multiple inoperable channels 1 one bus, the new d e //er e/ e** *ne . ACTION Statement would direct thafY to cna el en V N h:/.reguance.-[ E .) unc n ykis gs pvage A d/g d @fl ) /2 ,%meM-/e/y Mec/.re/ ' r orerinZ2 hpd'rs./For multiple inoperable channels n @' fu[,, j/, , /4 7 two buses, the new ACTION Statement would require #f,,p 7A+g3
.g,eru /. '
p" b["I'#j j#p" . ITN A / /a a restoration of all but one channel per Fu voltage and/or _ degraded voltage) on one bus in 1 houh." which doerner inwnve4vMaxacen EhvlimEB&- l
/2 /surComp/e/rm'/ke 7 (!
f y,,./m g Lfggf GEElp time currently If the Completion required Time for multiple by entry channels on oneinto bus %LCO 3.0.3(f.e., gI inoperable were not met in MODES 14, the plant must be (4 g_ - shut down to MODE 3 in 6 hours and MODE 5 in 36 hours. If MMES). 4. j rg, the Completion Time were not met at other times in the F'i l r" Applicability, the associated DG and offsite circuit would
~
l be immediately declared inoperable and corresponding ACTIONS would be taken. Since LCO 3.0.3 applies only in MODES 14,, a relaxation of hours would be involved for g multiple inoperable channel on one bus as compared to 5 h- Mm l:3. %ec %g)reJ/ap, p Bo'r*-Ae +hr.r condrW. yg [For the special case of tie breaker closure for repairs, affecting one bus only with an 8 hour A0T in current A[ @U ACTION Statement 19, the relaxation would bed hours.] 8 2-/8-LI 7/ - #4 [,.Y J sm 2-19 LG [Tgh n mo sf cti s pr ided ya fety n]ect~ l Q, Ai dt A pu star entr' s [a ** te] f g n 'onal ni [6. 6. . and .g] i curr t TS l T e[ 3 to IT 3.3. ases cons' tent jth f)2-/f LG u REG- 431 ev. _ ggggggy ' 2 20 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison p Table (Enclosure 3B). k; 2-21 LS 22 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison !@@ Table (Enclosure 38). @" m k l 2-22 0A - u a d. r^/sw gA-pog f23.9-43 CA-33-as2 2 23 A This change revises ACTION Statements [14, 27, 27o.#34 **A[CA-7q ,
. x.
gf. 1
\
- =d 1] in current TS Table 3.3 3 to clarify that the Y- O 12 hour A0T to get to MODE 3 includes 6 hours for restoration followed by a 6 hour shutdown to MODE 3.
W4 3 consistent with WCAP-10271 and NUREG-1431 Rev.1. ,, DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 20 5/15/97 i
. - . . . - . - _ . - . - ~ - . - - . _ - _ . . . - _ _ . - . - - - . - . . . . .
XV. SPECTFlC NO SfGNIF2 CANT HAZARDS CONSZDERATIONS l NSHC LS 31 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION $.?-/P-//-y/ FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE y REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SP oe b e in p)obE3 In f$t nex4 $ blW/y i Current TS Table 3.3 3 ACTION Statement 19 is revised to reflect ITS 3.3.5 for the l Loss of Power Functional Unit. Relaxation is obtai for multiple inoperable j channels on one bus in H0 DES 14. This situation c rrently requires entry into ! LCOc 3.0.3.rNJEKr since/J-2/( it is beyong})the scope of ACTION Sta ement 19. .TMSE87~ L ; For multi le inoperable channels on one_ bus, the newiACTION Statement would direct th C 1 t a 1 sef EwrctiartloWof4oltadFstf/# Wad (voWa#twd r to i 1 > Tor multiple inoperable channels on two buses, the new ACTION Statement would require restoration of all but one ch annel per Function (loss of l voltage and/or degraded voltage) on one bus in I houd,' whic die 2!!EENBEIEP i l dehDenarrXhwM currently required by entry into LCO 3.0.3(/,e 7/em 7 r ! ( If the Completion Time for multiple channels on one bus i rable were not met in f le in l H0 DES 14, the plant must be shutdown to MODE 3 in 6 hour and H00E 5 in 36 hours. Mo2E h, 1 If the Completion Time were not met at other times in t Applicability, the 4 associated DG and offsite circuit would be immediately eclared inoperable and ! 1 corresponding ACTIONS would be taken. Since LCO 3.0 applies only in H0 DES 14, a
~y relaxation of I hours would be involved for multi ei nnels on one bus l as compared to m Tgfg.r i
\ -h% e ! [For the special case of tie breaker clos re for repaws, oiieu.ing one bus nly : with an 8 hour A0T in current ACTION Stat nt 19, the relaxation would be urs.] The proposed TS change has been evaluat and it has been determined that it l ! involves no significant hazards conside tion. This determination has been l l performed in accordance with the criter a t forth in 10'CFR 50 M as q %ted be1ow: b* r no ADT
~
+Ae
.Re -Mis CTS w4tc/'hren . _3 csnds "The Commission may make a final e liiInation, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility
! licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated: or I
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any i accident previously evaluated; or
) 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
c NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 53 5/15/97
i INSERT LS-31(a) /Q 2-/ P- L f- 7 / Required Action B.1 of ITS 3.5.5 would direct immediate entry into ITS 3.8.1 Condition F v 1 which has a 12 hour Completion Time for equipment restoration. Loss of two or more channels (loss of voltage and/or degraded voltage) on one bus is no worse from an overall safety system perspective than the loss of that train's load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS). The associated LSELS will be declared inoperable even though Condition B of ITS 3.5.5 may be entered with two channels remaining OPERABLE and capable of satisfying the necessary two-out-of-four logic. The 12 hour equipment restoration time allowed by ITS 3.8.1 Condition F is a reasonable allowed outage time for these instruments that is consistent with the LSELS allowed outage time and that takes into account the low probability of an event occurring during this interval that would require the LOP DG start instrumentation. INSERT LS-31(b) the associated LSELS be immediately declared inoperable. This Required Action in ITS 3.8.1 has a 12 hour Completion Time to restore the LSELS to OPERABLE status. l l l l 1
l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 2-19-LG APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: This change moves functions provided by a safety injection signal and the AFW pump start entries [and ** note) for Functional Units [6.e,6.f, and 6.g] in current TS Table [3.3-3] j to the ITS 3.3.2 Bases. Comment: Clarify the intent of this change is to state that descriptive text regarding ESFAS functions is moved to the Bases with the limitation and restrictions of the CTS ! unchanged. Provide a citation giving the location of the text in the Bases. ; FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 2-19-LG will be enhanced to provide the requested infonnation. i ATTACHED PAGES: ! Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 20 I I l
--- .L - - J . - - :': .W
- Q
- y. CHANGE NUMBER NStiC. DESCRIPTION .
w. entry into LC0 3.0.3 since it is beyond the scope of ACTION Statement 19. @M
- de a/ h ere O I /#d l f) R-/f-Lf 'F/ g For multiple inoperable channels one bus, the new F
#/ < M/er eri/ em'r e a se V E
. ACTION Statement would direct thami~ to cna el er N
/ss/#cgusoce / -[M / /
unc 'n r ore #inA2 p s hpcfrs./75r fs vpttage/d/W' multipled inoperable channels Y
*f *,'"e$bE3 ib la ,,Tmme/Tc/ekec /A J/, , are two buses, the new ACTION Statement would require d l. g restoration of all but one channel per Function (loss '"">
k"'/Ac/>*". o Z7'T P A / la a which WmOnwaveAhv3eTasanen strafGQ5R-voltage L an
/2 /sur Ca /ekm 7Ee 7 , , .c f re ,/,, , Lfg <EEED time currently If the Completion required Time for multiple by entry channels on one into bus %LCO 3.0.3(f.e. M
. 4 4g inoperable were not met in H00ES 14, the plant must be M4MS). T shut down to H0DC 3 in 6 hours and H0DE 5 in 36 hours. If y the Completion Time were not met at other times in the Y Applicability, the associated DG and offsite circuit would l i be immediately declared inoperable and corresponding ACTIONS would be taken. Since LCO 3.0.3 applies only in }
H0 DES 1-4,. a relaxation of hours would be involved for . l multiple inoperable channel on one bus as compared tog I ,) Mm j;z %eC'77wfrcj/azso y/ u.
~
ftb7~ Ar -fhr.r cond,1ron, , y [For the special case of tie breaker closure for repairs, A Y affecting one bus only with an 8 hour A0T in current b ACTION Statement 19. the relaxation would bed hours.] $ 2-/8-484/ ,;dy; 2 19 LG [Tgh L+ ER n mo sf cti s pr 'ided ya fety nJect ~l ' I.M Ai dt A pum star entr' s [a ** ' nc 'onal ni , 6. , and .g] i curr t TS te] f i j g T e[ 3 to((6e IT 3.3. ases cons' tent ith f} 2-/f LG l s C REG- 431 ev. I_ mgg7 yA_g i 2 20 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison f4d Table (Enclosure 3B). 46 2-21 LS-22 Hot applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison
$5 Table (Enclosure 38). @
~"
2 22 0A - = a d- r ^/SERr 3/}-208 d2 7. N 3 en CA-23-l%2. 2-23 A This change revises ACTION Statements [14, 27. 27c.#34[C./pg,q f
-rd 3t] in current TS Table 3.3-3 to clarify that the 12 hour A0T to get to MODE 3 includes 6 hours for hj ;.
gty A restoration followed by a 6 hour shutdown to MODE 3, ei j consistent with WCAP 10271 and NUREG-1431 Rev.1. i DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 20 5/15/97 1 h
._ ..~ _ _ _ _ _ _____ ._.
l
,, , INSERT 3A-20A e;5.h bt8d we if 2-/4-LG The text in Functional Units [1,6.e,6.f, ana 6.g] of cairrent TS Table [3.3-3], describing l the ESFAS functions provided by a Safety injection signal and the AFW pump start l entries [, and the " note for Functional Unit 6.g], are moved to the APPLICABLE
! SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY Section of the ITS 3.3.2 Bases. The list of functions initiated by a Safety injection signal and the particular AFW pump (s)
- started involve clarifying information for the retained Functional Units; the limitations and ;
restrictions of the current TS are unchanged. The Functional units are retained in the ITS l while the descriptive material is moved to the Bases. l l i l l INSERT 3A-20B l l l 0 S3~$3 l The CTS [#] note of Table [3.3-3] is technically equivalent to ITS note (b) in Table l 3.3.2-1. < ..._.ge
+ 6e I
l 1 I ! I l I l l t i I i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET : l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-26-LS-21 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, WC REQUEST: The Required Action for an inoperable control room (Isolation) [ manual initiation, SSPS, or BOP-ESFAS) channel is modified to provide appropriate actions with the number of OPERABLE channels [two) less than the number of required channels. , Comment: Provide a safety basis discussion for the proposed changes. ! Neither the DOC nor the NSHC provide specific justification for providing a no channels ! OPERABLE condition or for the actions required in that condition. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 2-26-LS-21 and NSHC LS-21 have been revised to provide additional justification. i ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 21 Enclosure 4, page 51 i i t l l l l 1 l l I f i
= -m
.,.s _ . _ _
l CHANGE ( , ,, , NLM ER NSHC DESCRIPTION u 2 24 LS 19 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 2 25 _ __ - Not ;;F reb'r t C:" rry. S g 2- 25-A
' dle (Er & rr: Z. We[:^ C:=:r;i;r. Ce-;-orinr-2 26 LS 21 The Required Action for an inoperable Control Room '
[ Isolation] [ Manual Initiation, SSPS. or B0P ESFAS1 MN channel is modified to ira a 1_ consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.14 Depending on the in 1 mode of operation, the modified action requires eit rN . w .r e t 2A-2th ;
- 1) [CREVS] to be placed in its [CRVIS mode] or a plant I T-
_]i ' - shutdown to be initiated, or
- 2) iimmediate suspension of movement of irradiated -1 --
assemblies and Core Alterations.
.1NCEg7~2A-0)$ $ Q-WE*2l 2 27 -
Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison
]
Table (Enclosure 38). 2 28 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosu're 38). 2 29 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 2 30_ A This change deletes Note (3) from Functional Unit 2.b of ; current TS Table 4.3 2. The slave relays listed in i Note (3) were never associated with containment spray. 1 [ This is an administrative change since the required quarterly surveillances have always been performed and the Note (3) never was used to extend the test interval. 2 31 A The *** Note for Functional Unit 6.g of current TS Table 3.3 3 is deleted. This note is no longer needed given i that the ITS provides separate Condition entry on a per l pump basis, as evaluated under CN 2-46
.II-2/d. A 2-isy-A j 2 32 LS 23 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison
@-y Table (Enclosure 38).
,y
." 2IC" St:t- .c-ts 276 end 34e of curr:r,t T Til; 3.0 g.y 2 33 -A--
- are eeu b d ta 61cte infeis.etien rege, ding the les3 of-N & u. rad.
. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 21 5/15/97 l
3--- - - - - - - - . l l l l INSERT 3A-21 A f) 2-24-Lf-a/ (.. 3 1 %s l l The proposed change would provide appropriate actions to be taken, in lieu of shutting down the plant per LCO 3.0.3, if [two] channels of Control Room [ isolation][ Manual Initiation, SSPS, or BOP-ESFAS] are inoperable. INSERT 3A-21B $ 2-24-LS-2 / l l These actions, which include the actuation of one train of [CREVS] and initiation of the i appropriate compensatory measures for cne inoperable train of [CREVS], are sufficient ' to maintain the habitability of the control room. INSERT 3A-21C O}3~ l l l ACTION Statement 21 for Functional Unit 6.c in CTS Table 3.3-3, " Automatic Actuation l Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP ESFAS)," directs that with one BOP ESFAS logic train a.
~
inoperable, the plant is to be shutdown to MODE 3 in 6 hours and to MODE 4 in 12 hours. The BOP ESFAS logic trains are powered by separation group 1 and separation group 4. Each turbine driven main feedwater pump has two pressure switches, one in separation group 1 and one in separation group 4, used for indication of niain feedwater pump trip and AFW start per Functional Unit 6.g in CTS Table 3.3-3. If one BOP ESFAS logic train were de-energized, and ACTION Statement 21 entered, one pressure switch on main feedwater pump A and one pressure switch on main feedwater pump B would , - be rendered inoperable. Since ACTION Statement 19 for Functional Unit 6.g covers only j l one inoperable pressure switch, i.e., the ACTION covers "one less than the Total l l Number" which is listed as "4 (2/ pump)" in Table 3.3-3, de-ener0izing one BOP ESFAS l logic train would result (absent the "* footnote) in an LCO 3.0.3 entry for Functional Unit l 6.g. The only reason the *" footnote was added in OL Amendment No. 6a dated l October 9,1991 for Callaway and Amendment No. 43 dated March 29,1991 forWCGS was to avoid the reporting requirements associated with an LCO 3.0.3 entry. 4 DOC 2-46-LS-42 describes how the ITS format, listing "2 per pump" as the Required Channels for Function 6.g of ITS Table 3.3.2-1, would allow separate Condition entry per pump. Two inoperable channels (one per pump) would not involve an LCO 3.0.3 entry under the ITS. Under ITS LCO 3.0.6, the supported system (Function 6.g) Conditions
- and Required Actions are not required to be entered if its LCO is not met solely due to a support system (Function 6.c in this case) LCO not being met. In this scenario, i.e., one train of BOP-ESFAS de-energized, ITS 3.3.2 Condition R would be entered with a 6 hour shutdown to MODE 3. Therefore, the "* CTS footnote serves no purpose in the j ITS and it has been deleted.
- 1 i
J
_ - - . - . - .~ m IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS h NSHC LS-21 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ZNTEftT*LT-2/ d?D-%-Lr*2/ In accordance with the current Technical Specifications, the Required Action if both required channels of Control Room [ Isolation] [Hanual Initiation, SSPS, or B0P-ESFAS] are inoperable is to enter LCO 3.0.3 and take the plant to Mode 5. The proposed change would prevent unnecessary plant transients by requiring that specified compensatory steps be taken to assure control room habitability would be maintained if an accident were to occur. Thus, depending on the initial mode of operation, the proposed actions [ ] would require either:
- 1) the [ Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)] to be placed in its
[ Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal (CP.VIS) mode] or a plant shutdown
~
to be initiated, or
- 2) immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and Core Alterations.
The proposed T5 change has been evaluated and it has been deterrined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) es quoted below:
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves a no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or con::equences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident fro i any accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following- evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant Mzards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or.
4 consequences of an accident previously evaluated? Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 51 5/15/97
^~
- ~ - . w n- e-- a .._.
., INSERT LS-21 L
, ' ., 0 3-14-LS-2 /
.bgj' The proposed change would provide appropriate actions to be taken, in lieu of shutting down the plant per LCO 3.0.3, if [two] channels of Control Room [ Isolation] [ Manual Initiation, SSPS, or BOP-ESFAS] are inoperable. These actions, which include the actuation of one train of [CREVS] and initiation of the appropriate compensatory measures for one inoperable train of [CREVS), ace sufficient to maintain the habitability of the control room.
)
-1 1
i i I l I l I I
l ., ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-31-A APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: The *" Note for Functional Unit 6.g of current TS Table 3.3-3 is deleted. This note is no longer needed given that the ITS provides separate Condition entry on a per pump basis, as evaluated under CN 2-46-LS-42, and given the adoption of ITS LCO 3.0.6 and the Safety Function Determination Program. Comment: Explain in more detail why the ITS testing does not result in changes to the CTS required testing with the deletion of the proposed note. FLOG RESPONSE: This DOC does not reflect just a testing issue. In the attached pages this DOC has been clarified. Taken together, DOCS 2-31-A and 2-46-LS-42 describe the intended change; however, additional detail has been added to DOC 2-31-A. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 3A, page 21 Enclosure 3B, page 16 1 i i I r
i
.a CHANGE l
, NLM ER H2E DESCRIPTION I 2 24 LS 19 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).
2 25 - Not 0;pl4 M le t Call?"?y. See C=:rci;n Csperi;ca -p_2s-f I t 1: (Ericar: 30. We/, 1 2 26 LS 21 The Required Action for an inoperable Control Room [ Isolation] [ Manual Initiation. SSPS. or BOP-ESFAS] N ~ channel is modified to ta 1 _ consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.14 Depending on the in 1 mode of operation, the modified action requires eit rbe .wret .7A-2th
- 1) [CREVS] to be placed in its [CRVIS mode] or a plant
[ ' shutdown to be initiated or ]r
- 2) immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and Core Alterations.
.1NTEAT 2A-318 Q *-*' " -'I 2 27 -
Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison f 7) u, :+ Table (Enclosure 3B). - l 2 28 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison . Table (Enclosu're 38).
~~ 2 29 -
Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).
~
2 30 A This change deletes Note (3) from Functional Unit 2.b of current TS Table 4.3 2. The slave relays listed in Note (3) were never associated with containment spray. This is an administrative change since the required quarterly surveillances have always been performed and the Note (3) never was used to extend the test interval. 2 31 A The *** Note for Functional Unit 6.g of current TS Table 3.3 3 is deleted. This note is no longer needed given that the ITS provides separate Condition entry on a per pump basis, as evaluated under CN 2 46 LS 42, 2/d. d M/M 2-32 LS 23 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison f.7% Table (Enclosure 3B). c... h
- 2-33 4r- 'CTION State =nts 275 Er.d 34; cf current-TS T;bic 3.3-3 ~ CA 27M are revised M d:letc inicissticci regsido,; the less cf ~
Nelu. cad. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 21 5/15/97
l y, INSERT 3A-21 A f) 2-2 6--/_I-3 / i i w The proposed change would provide appropriate actions to be taken, in lieu of shutting down the plant per LCO 3.0.3, if [two] channels of Control Room [ isolation] [ Manual l Initiation, SSPS, or BOP-ESFAS] are inoperable. I l l INSERT 3A-218 f) 2-24-/_J .2 / i These actions, which include the actuation of one train of [CREVS) and initiation of the appropriate compensatory measures for one inoperable train cMCREVS), are sufficient to maintain the habitability of the control room. INSERT 3A-21C O }3 ACTION Statement 21 for Functional Unit 6.c in CTS Table 3.3-3, " Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP ESFAS)," directs that with one BOP ESFAS logic train
~
inoperable, the plant is to be shutdown to MODE 3 in G hours and to MODE 4 in 12 hours. The BOP ESFAS logic trains are powered by separation group 1 and separation group 4. Each turbine driven main feedwater pump has two pressure switches, one in separation group 1 and one in separation group 4, used for indication of main feedwater
)
pump trip and AFW start per Functional Unit 6.g in CTS Table 3.3-3. If one BOP ESFAS logic train were de-energized, and ACTION Statement 21 entered, one pressure switch on main feedwater pump A and one pressure switch on main feedwater pump B would be rendered inoperable. Since ACTION Statement 19 for Functional Unit 6.g covers only one inoperable pressure switch, i.e., the ACTION covers "one less than the Total Number" which is listed as "4 (2/ pump)" in Table 3.3-3, de-energizing one BOP ESFAS logic train would result (absent the *" footnote) in an LCO 3.0.3 entry for Functional Unit 6.g. The only reason the *" footnote was added in OL Amendment No. 64 dated October 9,1991 for Callaway and Amendment No. 43 dated March 29,1991 for WCGS was to avoid the reporting requirements associated with an LCO 3.0.3 entry. DOC 2-46-LS-42 describes how the ITS format, listing "2 per pump" as the Required Channels for Function 6.g of ITS Table 3.3.2-1, would allow separate Condition entry per pump. Two inoperable channels (one per pump) would not involve an LCO 3.0.3 entry under the ITS. Under ITS LCO 3.0.6, the supported system (Function 6.g) Conditions and Required Actions are not required to be entered if its LCO is not met solely due to a l support system (Function 6.c in this case) LCO not being met. In this scenario, i.e.. one
- train of BOP-ESFAS de-energized, ITS 3.3.2 Condition R would be entered with a 6 l hour shutdown to MODE 3. Therefore, the *" CTS footnote serves no purpose in the ITS and it has been deleted.
f-i 1
a up
'{
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 16 of 26 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON C0 HANCE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 2-26 The Required Action for an inoperable Control Room No - not in current Yes Yes Yes LS-21 [ Isolation] [ Manual Initiation, SSPS, or B0P E5FA5] channel TS. is modified to provide appropriate actions with the nueer of OPERABLE channels [two] less than the number of Required Channels. 2 27 The CPSES Action Statement for the loss of offsite power - No Yes No No A start motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps is modified to require that if the Action Statements are not satisfied. the plant be taken to MODE 4 to exit the LCO Appitcability. The CTS requires that MODE 5 be entered; however, because the function is only applicable in MODES 1, 2 and 3. the LCO would be exited prior to MODE 5. and MODE 5 entry is not a requirement. 2-28 This change moves DCPP information inserted by LA 114/115 Yes No No No LG on containment spray and safety injection coincidence to the Bases. gqf4 2 29 A new functional unit 9 1: added to the DCPP CTS, per-e- Yes No No No M License Amendment Requestythat incorporates ACTION 09-4-M (new) and the appropriate Surveillances for the residual [C-3,3-4D/ heat renoval (RWt) pump trip from low refueling water storage tank (RWST) level. 2-30 This change deletes Note (3) from functional Unit 2.b. The No - not in current No - not in current Yes Yes , A slave relays listed in Note (3) were never associated with TS. TS. containment spray. 2-31 The *** Note for Functional Unit 6.g of current TS Table No - not in current No - not in current Yes Yes , A 3.3-3 is deleted. This note is no longer needed given that TS. TS. the ITS provides separate Condition entry on a per pump basis, as evaluated under CN 2 46 LS-42, g 4 . g gf_ A i t CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE CURRENT TS 5/15/97 _ _ - . . _ . _-_. _ - ~ _ .
. . - . . . - - ---- - - - _ _ _ ~ - -. - - - ..- _.
a ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET 4 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-34-LS-34 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC 3 REQUEST: ACTION Statement 19 of current TS Table 3.3-3 Functional Units 8a and 8b is 3 revised to require an inoperable loss of power channel to be placed in trip within 6 hours and an allowance to be bypassed for surveillance testing for up to 4 hours is added rather than the current 1 hour and 2 hours, respectively. This is consistent with ISTS 3.3.5 Condition A. Ccmment: Extended test AOTs for bypass and surveillance are based on approved topical report WCAP-10271. Revise the DOC to document a safety basis for similar changes to LOP instrumentation for staff review. l FLOG RESPONSE: As discussed during meetings with NRC staff on September 15 and 16, 1998, NSHC LS-34 has been modified to provide additional justification for the proposed change. , 1 ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 4, page 61 e e 4 1 J 2 1 2 i r-
IV. SPECTFlC NO SIGN 1FICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS l NSHC LS-34 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l CTS 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation." Functional l Unit 8 for Loss of Power is moved to ITS 3.3.5. The CTS Completion Time of placing j the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is being revised to 6 hours and the allowance for bypassing the inoperable channel while performing surveillance testing i of other channels is being revised to 4 hours. ENJEf7 Z.f-3y. p 74 L.f yp l l The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been : performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted l below:
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility j licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no j significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance '
with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated: or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The proposed change adds a relaxation to the Completion Time and the allowed time to be in a bypass condition while performing surveillance testing associated with an inoperable channel in the Loss of Power 4 kV Undervoltage-Loss of Voltage and Grid Degraded Voltage functions. The Completion Time generically approved by the NRC based on WCAP 10271 P A. Supplement 2.
~
Revision 1 for this function would provide more time to place an inoperable channel in the tripped condition. thus providing more time to analyze and restore the channel. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 61 5/15/97
l I i
.. 7s INSERT LS-34 \
t .3 l 'Q,$ & 2-sv-u-2+ Revising the Completion Time to 6 hours to place the inoperable channel in trip and revising the time allowance for bypassing the inoperable channel for surveillance testing from 2 hours to 4 hours are acceptable considering the Function remains fully OPERABLE on every bus and the low probability of an event occurring during these l intervals. M l l l
'E&
I i l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-41-LS-36 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ACTION Statements 27a and 34a of current TS Table 3.3-3 for the Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS), Functional Units 4.b.2 and 5.a.2, are revised to specify action "with the number of channels less than the required channels". Those ACTION Statements currently require action "with the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the minimum number of channels", but no action exists if none of the required channels per train are OPERABLE. Comment: All proposed CTS changes are not evaluated. CTS action statement markup bundles different categories of changes under a single DOC discussion. The CTS markup changes the total number of channels for the MSFIS automatic actuation logic (CTS function 4.b.1) from 3 channels to 2. This is counter to the format of the improved tech specs. Allinstalled channels should be required to be OPERABLE and actions provided for any channel out of service. If the impact of a single inoperable channelis very low, the Required Action may be minimal. FLOG RESPONSE: See licensee-identified item CA-3.3-009. This change has already been approved by NRC. ATTACHED PAGES: None
_ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ . _ . . _ _ . ~ _ _ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-45-LG APPLICABILITY: CA, WC l REQUEST: Current TS Table 4.3-2 Note (3) is revised to move the "during refueling" clarification of the 18 month surveillance interval for the seven slave relays to the Bases for ITS SR 3.3.2.6, SR 3.3.6.5, and SR 3.3.7.5. Comment: {WC, CW) This change is identified in T4.3-2 to table notation for the slave l results in a less restrictive change because additional test flexibility results in optional l testing during refueling. Provide less restrictive documentation. l Removal of the requirement to conduct certain slave relay tests only during refueling has not been specifically justified. The justification should explain why it is acceptable to perform testing at other times. Provide a DOC explaining why note 3 to SSPS slave relay test is not copied in ITS SR 3.3.6.6. 1 FLOG RESPONSE: These comments were discussed during a meeting with NRC staff on September 18,1998. The outcome of that discussion was a commitment for Callaway and WCGS to generate a new "A" DOC to explain how footnote (3) to CTS Table 4.3-2 was translated into ITS requirements. New DOC 1-65-A is included in the attached pages. ATTACHED PAGES: ( i Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, page 3/4 3-37 Enclosure 3A, page 17 Enclosure 3B, page 12 l
)
,--p re -
. TABLE fJ,E iContinued) gg p-f- gg n ;
b ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATbb6.TUATION SYSTEN INSTRUMENTATION (.rta ik/'*ga,) nerf h $URVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 1 m
- TRIP
' ANAL 0G ACTUATING -MODES- /- II $
CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE -fLR wnius E CilANNEL CllANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY -StfRVtittANet-p FUNCTIONAL Unit CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TESI TEST TEST.- S 3000;;;0
- 9. Control Room Isolation /.g + ,q
- a. Manual Initiation ~ N.A. ;N.A. N.A. . R (4) M. N.A. N.A. -AM-- ;
- b. (A i a o WMfffff)Cy/JttLY /DtiL^11KAXAL) '
o c d t n g , 2 -5754,. ' s P g y,-3-72
- c. Automatic Actuation H.A. N.A. N.A. N,A. N(1)(2) N.A. N.A. -AM--
Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP ESFAS) .i M. . Isolation {
- d. Phase "A" See item 3.a. above for all Phase "AY :l' solation Surveillance Requirements.
N.A. L:, 2, 3,
- 10. Load Shedder Emergency N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N(1)(2) N.A. 2-/3-A Load Sequencer -4, 5;, 5: MM
- 11. Engineered Safety features ;
Actuation System Interlocks 'l
- a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-ll N.A. R($ Q N.A.
.gf4 N.A. M.A. N.A. - , 2, 3 /-23-A l-22-A
- b. Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A. N.A. N.A. R (4 N.A. N.A. N.A. -!, 2, 3 S '*f feid S p (g) Verif<cdhjn g f , f-:12-A TABLE NOTATIONS i [ flp Each train shall be tested at least every 62 da s on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
~ a i i Continuit check may be excluded from the ACTUA 10N LOGIC TEST. 3" K620 K62 K624 3 K7 and K74I which shall be tested at least once er 18 months (hExceptReaysK602,dmuringeac
' ' ring - ' c e St I ext ding 2 hours unless they have been tested w thin theQ-f6:-!
E reviou a s. 9 42 t-iT _ & 3-4S-LG A LG (4) le Brea e NGGii6 ana 52 nhozl6 snall be h liieu open. 2-//-Al ,
;g : The spccified le ;;ath frcquancy say be weived far cycle : provid:d the survatth::: i: perf:r;;d prt r i:
whiche m, ecc . 3 first. T..a prov:sians af /'MA: restri fellowin-5;::!!!::t!: the rc::t 1.6.2:r: first refuel;ag out wcforth': fr; ; p;rf;r;;;;; A..a;;, :,;;: ;;!!!::::.
*"' ' == '" " '
Nk"N! !$Nf!Nb5N$I ![a!)!t$N "'*' " ar> r, "NELNN555NEINS 2-n-A i
"t v 1 r-iv r rsrr? rr- : --ta; > cara a: r t;;; ja n+; /-H-A (S) 2ncImler vecificaMn of we condan+r, w 4e e *,ylaabte . /-n-A
TABLE 4.3Montinued) , ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM' INSTRUMENTATION N[ I O SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 5"- o l TRIP E ANALOG ACTUATING diCCES- bM CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE F0" "!!ICll ' .!E CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY -SURVEILLANCE q FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST TEST TEST 4S ",ECUIRED- . e '
- 9. Control Room Isolation /444A g
- a. Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. N.A. R (4) d /-2M. A. N.A. N.A. -A H - Ih
- b. fbut6 u 1 Vfff/W/W/M LMclVWM^,.D gg 1 n A
~ '
2-S M i (5 g y.2-22 : w c. Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1)(2) N.A. N.A. -AH- l 2 Logic and Actuation ; w Relays (BOP ESFAS) S d. Phase "A" Isolation See Item 3.a. above for all Phase "A" Isolation Surveillance Requirements.
- 10. Load Shedder Emergency N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. M(1)(2) N.A. N.A. -1.2. 3. M -A Load Sequencer A
. St 9 2-43G
- 11. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks
- a. Pressurizer Pressure. N.A. R (5) Q N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. -1. 2. 0 /-27-A k b. R tor Trip. -4 H.A. N.A. N.A. R [4) O #~ A. N.A. N.A. 1. 2. 3 h ['c* [ / + TABLE NOTATIONS h .
a (1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. z (2) Continuity check may be excluded from the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.
]Q (3) and K741. which shall be tested at least once per 18 months Except Relays K602. K620. K622. K624. K630.
gT kgj -during previo &P {v f=' " and 14 MS LOLU SHUIDOWN exc S-A & 2 -+S-l G ing 24 hours unless they have been tested within thea g _f_g d 4 - Tie Breaxers~ 52 nou116 and 52 nGU210 Wioil tc vci iiIed open. 2-//-A i A (4) Qf -Thc spccificd 10 month frequein.y inay be neived for Cycle 1 prm/ided the rumei42nce is :crformed pr:cr to f_yf_f restart following the " rct refueling cutagc.or dunc !. IS0u; whjghcycr occurs first. I;c-provisions Of- t
-Spccificeticii 4.0.2 crc recct frc"' perfer"'ance of thi;.;urVeillance, p
- Only the shutdo.:. partica of enc acqucaccr i;; required to bc OPEPfSLE in Mode: S and G which'ccrrc; pond; to f3 >#
-4he 0"E"^"LE Emergency Dicce! Generator - L jm , a-+s u
'"d 6_ i_.y-y e -----
nper2ility is _caly rcquired teedwater isolation only_. cA-Tf"Maica Oi' ERA"LE bus in fiadefh. .5 l Wa)~.n,aan va mw..e +,,,,, conn +n .A{ .- wtredta.. i i-1s-A .
~ mmmammassammma-e
CHANGE l
.,,,, NUMBER EC DESCRIPTION .
l l r: }}
%,7 1 60 -
Not used. I 1 61 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison i Table (Enclosure 38). l ZNMtT~ 3A-M 2 01 A The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation [ ] Allowable Values are moved to ITS Table 3.3.21. 2 02 A CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.21, and the values for Total ; Allowance (TA), Z, and Sensor Error (S) are deleted, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. The TA. Z, and S parameters were developed by Westinghouse. If the as-measured value of a trip setpoint were found to be less conservative than the Allowable Value, current ACTION b.1 , provides 12 hours for the adjustment of the setpoint I without declaring the affected channeT inoperable, provided that Equation 2.21 was satisfied. This would have avoided the necessity of writing a Licensee Event Report (LER) prior to the revision of 10CFR50.73. Since the revision to 10CFR50.73, an LER would no longer be required. Setpoint adjustments required by current ACTION b.1 for analog channels are performed with the affected channel removed from service. Equation 2.21 effectively allows rack error to increase above its nominal value by an amount dependent on the available setpoint margin: however, this margin is available for utilization at any time and is not restricted to whether the ACTION is entered. As such, current ACTION b.1 effectively provides no different recourse than current ACTION b.2. With a nonconservative as measured trip setpoint, current practice is to enter ACTION b.2. Therefore, CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.21, and the values for TA, Z, and S can be deleted as they are no longer required. 2 03 LG The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints are moved to a licensee controlled document, consistent with one format allowed by NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. This information is more appropriately controlled outside of the TS. The parameter used to assess operability, the Allowable Value, is retained in the ITS. i - 2 04 LG The requirements stipulated in ACTIONS a and b are moved ! to ITS Table 3.3.21, with explicit direction contained in the ITS ACTIONS Bases. l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 17 5/15/97
I INSERT 3A-17 (page 2 of 2) l 1-64 A setpoint not required." This change is administrative in nature since the 8 /-G 7'A subject Functional Units have no setpoints associated with them. This change does not affect the operating limits or manner in which the plant is operated. There are no changes to current plant practices for the performance of these TADOTs since there are no setpoints to verify for these Functional Units. This change is strictly an acknowledgement that the corresponding ITS SRs 3.3.1.14,3.3.2.8, and 3.3.2.11 have an explicit Note to this effect. 1-65 A Seven slave relays are listed in Note (3) to CTS Table 4.3-2 for an d 3YO exception to the quarterly SLAVE RELAY TEST. These slave relays are associated with the following ESF actuation signals: K602 (SIS); K620 (turbine trip and main feedwater pump trip); K622 (CIS-A); K624 (ClS-A); K630 (CIS-A and the CIS-A input to containment purge isolation and control room ventilation isolation); K740 (SIS, RWST low-low); and K741 (SIS, RWST low-low). ITS SR,3.3.2.6 has been revised with a Note per JFD 3.3-19 that excludes these seven slave relays from the quarterly surveillance. Based on the differing Functional Unit MODE Applicabilities, new ITS SRs 3.3.2.13 and 3.3.2.14 have been added under JFD 3.3-19 to cover the surveillance frequency applicable to these slave relays. The only slave relay associated with containment purge isolation and control room ventilation isolation, K630, has the extended surveillance frequency under new ITS SR 3.3.2.13. Based on feedback received from the NRC reviewer at a meeting on September 16,1998, the 90 days cited in Note _O (3) has been changed to 92 days to follow standard convention for an
~"
exception to a quarterly surveillance frequency.
~
1-66 LS-45 The CTS allows certain inoperable channels, or for some plants one other [2,h channel, to be bypassed for testing per Specification 4.3.1.1 or 4.3.2.1. The intent of the bypass is to allow testing that will verify that the channel has been restored to an OPERABLE condition and can be retumed to service. The allowed bypass time for testing has been evaluated for its impact on the safety analyses. It has been determined that the impact of the allowed bypasses is minimal. Whether the bypass is for setpoint verification or response time verification has no impact on the safety analysis. This change would delete the reference to Specification 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1 in the allowed bypass notes contained in certain CTS ACTION statements, thus permitting any testing needed for restoration of the inoperable function. 1-67 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table $7T4 (Enclosure 38). 1-68 LS-54 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table d C -7,7-B44-l (Enclosure 38). 1-69 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table bO-Z7'dOY (Enclosure 38). l l
w
.m ;
I ' . y ,. 7 I CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Pagi12 ' of- 26
' APPLICABILITY TECH SPEC CHANGE NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON CONANCE PEAK WOLF CREEK CAllAWAY The DCPP CTS 3.3.1 Action 2.c requires that power be No No 1-56
-*- reduced to less than 75% or that SR 4.2.4.2 be performed Yes No
!NM LI-f7 whenever power is a 50%. This power level requirement should be a 752 since if power is decreased below 75% per i
I the first part of Action 2.c. the required Action is conplete and in addition. SR 4.2.4.2 is only required for , l power levels'a 75% with one power range detector inoperable, , Yes Yes Yes Yes 1-57 Current TS Table 3.3-1 Functional Units [12.a and 12.b] are LG conbined per TSTF-169. The relationship between the Functional Units is moved to the Bases. 1 58 The proposed change would allow Reactor Trip System and No - See CN Yes No - See CN No See CN A ESFAS sensor response time testing to be performed per 1-03-LS 1. 1-03 LS-1. 1-03 LS-1. 1 WCAP-13632 P-A Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements." or other similar ~ ' methodologies. This c%enge is' consistent with traveler ' i TSTF-111, which revises the Bases for ITS SR 3.3.1.16 and SR 3.3.2.10 to allow the elimination of pressure sensor response time testing. y% 2:2
^' '
Z~h/MK7~ 3$-/.*2A niA--Ver M asea-A4 ' M Q t-2 4:
'N/A N/A N/A N/A b60 Not used.
If the requirements of current CPSES ACTION Statement 6 are No - see CN Yes No - see CN No see CN 1 61 1-19 LS-8. 1-19 LS-8. 1-19-LS-8. M not met. LCO 3.0.3 would be entered. In accordance with ! the ISTS. this ACTION Statement is revised to state that. if the ACTION requirements are not met, the plant must be taken below the P 7 interlock setpoint within the next 6 hours. I 2 01 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Yes' Yes Yes Yes A Instrumentation [ ] Allowable Values are moved to ITS Table 3.3.2 1. 2 02 CTS ACTION b.1. Equation 2.2-1, and the values for Total No - not in current No not in current Yes Yes i Allowance (TA) Z. and Sensor Error (5) are deleted. TS. TS. A l consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. . l G .rhu3ser .TR-/28 5/15/97-! CONVFRSTON COMPARISON TARIF - CilRRENT TS
2 F\ 1 (%) INSERT 38-128 t NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CALLAWAY ! CANYON PEAK CREEK l 1-62 In a Callaway-specific change, ACTION 7 in CTS Table No , No No Yes A 3.3-1 is moved from Functional Units 13.a and 13.b to @ T.T-of li Functional Unit 13.c 1-63 All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial wording is in Yes Yes Yes Yes A accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical p /-/)-gg , Specifications, NUREG-1431. 1-64 Notes are added to Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 to exclude Yes Yes Yes Yes A setpoint verifications during TADOTs on Functional Units $ /-23-A that do not have setpoints associated with them. 1-65 Explanation of ITS treatment of seven slave relays with Na No Yes Yes g 3,g4 A extended surveillance frequency. ' 1-66 This change would delete the reference to Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes LS-45 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1 in the allowed bypass notes contained in certain CTS ACTION statements, thus g y, g,d permitting any testing needed for restoration of the inoperable function. 1-67 This change revises DCPP CTS ACTIONS 13 and 29 to Yes No No No M provide specific shutdown requirements to exit g gg pg Applicability, in lieu of applying CTS LCO 3.0.3. This change is more restrictive by one hour than the CTS. 1-68 This change deletes DCPPP CTS Table 4.3-1 note (8) Yes - see No No No LS-54 which is applicable to the source range. The verification also CN cannot be performed in MODE 3*,4* and 5*, since the 1-69-M b O'U#f power and intermediate r6nge channels are not required to be operable until MODE 2. 1-69 This change applies new note (20) to DCPP CTS Table Yes - see No No No M 4.3-1 function 6, source range neutron flux. also CN I)C-7 T-def 1-68-LS-54
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-47-M APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: This change adds the Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Function to the ESFAS Functional Unit for (Control Room Emergency Recirculation). Comment: Notes contained in Attachments 2 and 4 of Reference 6 to the coverletter indicate that this CPSES-specific DOC was accepted for CPSES but that the Comment should also apply to Callaway with regard to the containment purge radiation monitors. ' FLOG RESPONSE: It was not initially clear why this Comment would apply to Callaway, since Functional Units 9.b and 9.c in CTS Table 3.3-3 already specify requirements for control room isolation logic functions. However, upon further review, Callaway believes that additional CTS mark-ups are warranted. DOC 2-05-M is correct in stating that the ITS is more restrictive in its addition of operability requirements for the containment purge radiation monitors. However, the CTS mark-up doesn't establish the extent of the new operability requirements since these radiation monitors are currently addressed only in FSAR Section 16.11.2.4. In addition, changes made to ITS 3.3.6 in response to Comment Number Q 3.3-74 need to be reflected in the CTS mark-ups for Table 3.3-3, ESFAS Functional Unit 3.c, ACTION 17. A new Functional Unit 3.c.5) and new ACTION 17.1 have been added to CTS Table 3.3-3, and corresponding changes have been made to CTS Tables 3.3-4 and 4.3-2, to explicitly cover the purge monitors. DOC 2-05-M has been revised within the plant-specific brackets at the end of the change description. ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 , pages 3/4 3-16,3/4 3-20,3/4 3-24, and 3/4 3-34 A, page 18
D $3 (continued) j Q v.
^' *
.) *
, t n
L. ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURi.. _,110ft SYSTEM INSTRUMENTAT10!i b M- j 20 . f- #EWrMb _ g;;;;j;g;j , i E - TOTALi;G. -C:AfiUCLS - C::A!;;;EL3 - APPLICABLE fetc
'E FUNCTIONAL UNil -ef- CilANNELS -TG TRIP -ePERABLE MODES ACTION f_gg_g ;
i s< .,
- 3. Containment Isolallon (continued) 1v? -9 m c-z
=
p_ m M 2) fpoto. 1 c t V///W WfdMAY ^> M fffyg.g-32
.- L c d I b e /r /-e d L i p p , 2d QW 't .. a- :
I e s P i' I di' f.sM P*E ", -
~, 2-05-A1
- 3) Automatic Actuation 2 q -t- . , . a -ih !U 3, 4 17 1 Logic and Actuation ;
i $pjig 1,
- d :.l 1krfry # 2, C de/ A clrdMTrtWJ j L Relays (BOP ESFAS) !
~W j W' ' ; /, nyso<nt,Pimdrds/ ',
- j j fue ing ArterJItar pi cernm ,th
- 4) Phase "A" Isolation Se It m t a. for all Phase. "A . W"e 'atl'o n' initta d- - -
un -
# 2-os-Af ,
C m h m.n>m+lun< SJ,eaNc ions and a requirements. /1, !1./ pm ?
- 4. Ste -
ne Isol ation g,/,,,/,bW,ur 'dt,un.z 3, c+egA ;
" dwin n ve >, m+ i s i 1niiSYon 2 t^"U'1
$ ,, .,_,,,g ;;,, ,,;p,,, c,, 7 ,, a g
~ ##$~fSb Y
~
w 1) !ndividttal 1/3tEEmlinE 1/5tEEElinE 1/spgitIIig---1,E,7
- 4. :ter n: j, g 1 '. ' (
m j System 2 + -0 ' 1, ,3 g 22 2-07-4J j
)-
- b. 2 -1 + - 1, 2,f 3 34 3,7_t,stf "
- 1) Automatic Actuation .
Log lc and Actuation _- (ACE LATFA' AMEAlbGb gi Relays (SSPS) cA.-S,7W9 (.nie W Nk ja pge) ,2_33 4 j 34a 2-07-LI j
- 2) Automatic Actuation -3/MPS- Train Logic and Actuation 2/SSPS T eln 4 / SSP T..ln
- 1,2f' d, 3 ,
Relays (MSFIS) j, {, 3 2.
- c. Containment Pressure- 3 -e- 0- 1, 2,I 3 l) -33^ 77.1 N,M F I> /-or-A t-2 liigh-2 ed)b
=
~
- d. steam Line 3/ steam line 2/:ttam line' /il ;t:= !!n: 1, 2, 3l -33*-3 7.1 a-o ?-LJ Er 937 3 teen U-# # ~d (b Pressure-Low '. ), Hs-A y
% e- 'l T'
U e. Steam Line Pressure- 3/ steam line 2/:te;mI.{AC4/2tumline- 3f( ) -33*-731 3-07-LI O C Hegative Rate-liigh 4n7 3 t t aG - !
#~# #'
l-os-A iq.
-ftu- CA-3.34 3 q 4
.- c ,
. , 7, i.
TABLE 3 3 - 1(Continued) 'c .- y we ..y, b ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION I - g (
> AantaMEb -"d"ib"a; /sg T^TE Z. - C".^.""ELS- C'# % LS APPLICABLE f_#f._g .-l T FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF OIANNELS -TO T"!i'-- 0"ER*"' E H0 DES ACTION I$
~
j t
!E "
'n 1 M 3. Containment Isolation (continued) -
2)
# a o
W///N//A///XXXX/2TAfsh1 bele+ed E
?
v -)_ .
,l 1
- 3) Automatic Actuation 2 1,2.3.4 17 a-osvf ;
Logic and Actuation duri ' Relays (00P ESFAS) da" cue ****a+ Mtdttmruer#M
- F /m/,
[ ;i Cat anemifrer wr,%, , 4 Pha m "A" Isolation See Itm "La. for all Phase "A" Isolation initiating ce,rbi,w ,d- ! i; Cm&nm functions and requirement.s. - v - 2-dS-M a 4. St m inNElaiof/'g,,i ~ 2 g y ,.c ' 1 > h.s-
~
N'7'*1 E Manual Initiat.non ' ~ oba **v raid /I/ Y g ,. y .*". .'M. IM_ **Ma ur/%
,, u__ u
,...m..
_ . . . . . m. m m m ,. o. ,i % _,,,a_,.._ _ _ i, m, , m- _4 n.,h. m. , ~. .e g i, _ . . . ~
)- System 2 - 1. 2 22 2-o 7- LS g
- b. 1) Autcmatic Actuation 2 1.[.3 34 2-07-LS Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS) _ _ _ fh - '
2 -s~1-L5 g 2) Automatic Actuation 2* " - 2* " 1. 2(.f 3 (f 34 -s 8 f,, g Logic and Actuation c,4-sys-e9 c1 Relays (MSFIS) __' s . - R kg6 2-o, Es
?+ c. Containment Pressure- 3 -e-- - 1. 3 -33*-27. / a-o r-o1 g liigh-2 g g, /-05-A i m d. Steam Line 3/ steam line - 2/$n.ri 'ir.c -2/5teeia 1ini 1. '[ 3# -G3*-W. I 2-#-'# f!'
Pressure-Low ' arg r.tbr, " . 2~d M l ! 1 jr,c . /-of-A o j; 4 b"/ " I 1
- e. Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate-liigh 3
'q/steamlir-i
-2/:;tca; lins woi. ilne 3##
ryde,;R+..pWf m= cA-s.s-a1 t
-33* ~77./ 24~N I'* f
>dP-A1 1-or-w ,
I 1
' % i j
9
WF _ . _ _ __ _. . _ y m.aw ,m 4.]cm p _ y,n , TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) p g g7g gg ? p, TABLE NOTATION
, Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressureh Interlock) Setpoint.
## Tri; fun ti;r ::te st40:1b bh :k:d bev: " 11 :ndfy be blocked below P-112-SM when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked. 42 2 'S -// 3 4
### Trip function may be blocked just before shutdown of the last operating main ,
feedwater pump and restored just after the first main feedwater pump is put . into service (following its startup trip test). s
- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. ;
i
** On: '- 5:;:r:ti:r'...y ..~um . . . ., y . . u . u . . u.wog ,. 4 f *** Ne d :n rgi::ti:r :f ::: tr:1 :f SOP ESFa! ::tuttier le;ic :nd :: tutti g!'~A re' y: ender: tw er the f:ur ch:nnel: n ; i r:ble. ^: tier ~ Ftit:: nt 21
- 110
- t
- both Functier:1 Urft: '- 5. rd 64 4a thi: _ . ,
+
~ = 4:2 & & ,. [
t
****The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable in. Modes',5' -- and 6. p y-f
~
onif thb chutd:; ;:rti:r :f :n: .,__.,__.1: r:quir:d t: b: OPEPfaLE 4: ":d:: 133 l 4 :nd 5 4ich ::rre:;:nd: t: th: CPEPf3LE Emir;;ncy Dic::T C:F :t:r e - um j r+ E bus i~n' p-//%
.] .rn.rstr- OperabilifisonlyrequiredforassociatedOPE T + T-noA CA-11A#Tbunu+ i y.y.z, ACTION STATEMENTS CA-1.9-52 mark-off*
l R-57-A e 47,7-y2 C 'ZWSS7~38 7M bWith the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the "'ni... ... / Of LG S
/ .fy.A $
nCTIONgegafw 14 / Channels-0I:Pl:LE hoursa/dinCOLDSHUTDOWNwitinthefollowing30 b cg.ir;; int',f ehours;however, in at least HOT a.g.A~ ST one channel may be _ bypassed fdr up to 4 hours for surveillance testing F"MM"~', provided the other channpl is /MS ' OPERABLE.' -
ajM%*enMg t*e Ad/rsur/n r M n.
W cA m et n N r (,Laur.r w SEy of OPERABLE channels one less than the * "" /47-A ACTION 15 / With the num peration may proceed until performance of the next gegurav e6 Channel s, _ L required AN LOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable ! channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour. y a
~
/-f3-A S ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the T:t:1 "...6.
geguTrdd+f- Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is
?
placed in the bypass conditior :nd th: ".inimum Ch:nn:t CPE?l:L: /-ef4G l rt;uir:::nt is nt. One addi onal channel may be bypassed for up to 2-/5-/1 b 4 hours for surveillance test ng $MT~.*?N 1 WMMCS MF 7 ,,g
.5 &Y.je,.,g 7.g" A ash legirad ^
j,; , ACTION 17 - With _,, Lless _ ~than _ _ the x wm "ininr C n L. ~ r: qui r:m:n x_sTPEPJEt ;, yiG,J . /,v1
,7377my gy - wny-wr> . -w ,-
A, a a. m,r
- _m y s M Sft.3.yc p-eS.tf 2.gg.p9 ,
yp,. ,,- ,-r v v m , Mq LG, c r & M7-M 7
*~ ,
or au-lawh~c a ch Sanua l 6
'~
Amendment No. 24,64,69,85
.ALLAWAY - UNIT D 3/4 3-20 Correction letter of 1/6/94 rNsskr- 3/+ 3-24h DM
{ A crzoW l1. I Q 347-f) ,
+
i _. _ _ . . _ - '. '- _m__- < TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) _. . _ ~ ' ~
' 5pl Le_j TABLE NOTATION l 2-2:2-4 . hjj]dh M
t x # M Trip function may beSetpoint. blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer g,g_.gg
..V Pressure Interlock) %
## -Trip furtica cut =:tially bic&d abcvc " 11 :nd[y be blocked below 2'N
- P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked. 82.243 ,
### Trip function may be blocked just before shutdown of the last operating ~ ,,
l main feedwater pump and restored just after the first main feedwater pump I is put into service (following its startup trip test). [' The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. I !. . ' C = in Separation Croup 1 nd onc da Separatier Peup A 7_ g g $
~ Re de-energization of onc tr;in of SOP ESPA: Octu;tica lc-ic
-actuation rclay:-rcaders two cf the feui donnelsinopcrobie.and Action- 3-7/-A
-Statamant 21 appliet *c both Fu=ticnol Units 6.c and G.g in thi cc:e.
**** The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable in Modes 5 and g ,;
-rc' uired to bc 0fEreSLE ' =
Da'y the chutdcwn Sc H en of one requenccr i: [."~~
"cdcc 5 :nd 5 whic ccriespend; tc the OP re0LE Emergcncy~Cic c! ~
~
I !
~~
Ccncrtter _ l
++ Operability is only required for associated OPERABLE bus in Modes 5 l
2-//-A l and 6- - - 1
*+ Each MSFIS channel (train) requires a minimum of two programmable logiccA-r,3HH . - .- l a control _lers to be OPERABLE % s; (a) Feed _ water 1 solation only. ' CAD.2 ~
#~N l
"# #/+ 7-*
~
ACTION STATEMENTS M_, .. ith the number of OPERABLE channels one less'than the*i-imum /-04-LG j ACTION tegun 14Channels,CIEPADL:
/ rehun cant.- be in at least HOT STANDBY within/-+y_A h<
^
12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN ithin the following 30 hours; a_2y 4 INf however, one channel may be b assed for up to 4 hours for 3/f'F-M a-s surveillance testinc other channel is OPIRABLE.
^ - - '" m a. rovided the /dl'l S 47'#/
k
& s.n 2-s2- oM d "**hfaa M & leebne/-hr % 4 4 ~ *r &
ACTION 15 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tctal g,gur*/ "utcr of-Channels operation may proceed until performance of jyyj M. the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 g%p . l hour. gl #
'4 (
ACTION 16 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tctal /-f3-A c gegurrel"u-tei vP Channels. operation may proceed provided the . .
-F s.
inoperable channel is placed in the bypass condition and the J
. One /-0+-LG sl
/--t g /_f *imum channel Char,=ls OPEP/SLE may be bypassed for up cquir=cnt to 4 hours for is metrfsurveadditional illance A- Ar- fygg '
L JNN >$ tem g y,7,}- testingf~ "Kebur n [ W -
$l+ 3-20 g "Q \ '"Zg W;
s- ACTION 17 - With less than,mne the ,"'.snim_um-Channels 47,
-_ h w m L :RASLE icw n a m.c.
_ < _-, - a m'" j_ - - - j G, Z.. % C,,vvK XX. 7-
, - wy .7
- ,,,XRC7"" " " Qd
--on.f.
.g _
.+),a nkleo- of ofEA%dLE g chinnll 24 4 A-3.3 e CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-20% fgen n . .J .E . EE . _a 26 i orsukdie ackkon k;g g.g,g4 Acmst 17.1 - lyreer 2/j9-Q gy 1
l - _. INSERT 3/4 3-20C M-O M l b2~N~N or with the Required Action and associated Completion Time for ACTION 17.1 not met: NOTE Only applicable in MODE 1,2,3, or 4.
~
l i
- 1) immediately enter the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.3 for containment purge isolation valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation, ;
I I ! l l NOTE- l Only applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS cf movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
]
- 2) (a) immediately place and maintain the containment purge isolation valves in the ,
closed position, or
)
- 2) (b) immediately enter the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.9.4 for i containment purge isolation valves made inoparable by isolation instrumentation.
INSERT 3/4 3-20D With one radiation monitoring channel inoperable, restore the affected channel to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. l l I b Y a
I/LBJ.E 3.3-4(c ntinucd) . ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ~ACTUAi. .. STEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS i 9 F ' TOTA!. - 3EN50R - -TRIF ALLOWABLE :2-d/-A E
> FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLO"ANCE l tai ERROR i5i SETNINT VALUE 2.-o.2-A
- 3. 2-03-LG i Containment Isolation (Continued)
C 5
" 3) Automatic Actuation -N.A. -Ek -&A- N.A. N.A.
~
Logic and Actuation Relays (B0P ESFAS)
- 4) Ph_ase "A" Isolation See Item 3.a. above for all Phase "A" Isolation Trip Setpoints and
% _7
~
'""Y e EX N ur*l &&}- aluat
-fg <m Gb CtY) lim;} r are n,f exce</e/'
]
- 4. Steam Line 1sofat1 ( O E .;6% 6ar m N
@ M7 h
- a. Manual Initiation M.A. N.A. -EA- -Ek- N.A.
u b. 1) Automatic Actuation -&A-- -N-Ar -&k- -Eb- N.A. l
'A logic and Actuation w Re1ays (SSPS) 4*
- 2) Automatic Actuation -N-A-- N. A. - -E A:- -fHb- N.A.
Logic and Actuation Relays (HSFIS)
- c. Containment Pressure- 0.71- -t:9 ~ ; 17.0 ;:!g s 18.3 psig High-Z
- d. Steam line Pressure- 13.0 - 14.Gi --ibe-- t 515 p:13 2 571 psiga low
- e. Steam Line Pressure 3.0 - --4-- -s 100 psi 5 124 psl**
Negative Rate - High w 2 5. Feedwater Isolation & Turbine Trip E. E a. 1) Automatic Actuation -EA-- - N. A. --tHb -WA-- N.A. l A logic and Actuation
- - Relays (SSPS)
P m c) Automatic Actuation -ft-A- -EA-- - N. A. -th*- N.A.
" logic and Actuation Relays (HSFIS)
i'
, %u -Q ' '
I- _ 's 5 ' f,)
&~ , <
~
TABLE 4.3-2 (Centinued) 3
- ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION ii SURVEILLANCE REQUIREHENTS TRIP ANA10G ACTUATING 9%S- /qg A CilANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE J0" Z:ICii i OIANNEL CllANNE L OPERA 110NAL OPERATIONAL ACTilATION RilAY RilAY .-CU""I ' ; ; ^ MC P
- PUNCT10HAL UNIT CilECK CALIBRAil0N TEST TEST LOGIC IEST IL5I II SI -:5 "'qu a: 0
- 3. Containment Isolation
- a. Phase "A" Isolation /d b
- 1) Hanual Initiation H.A. H.A. H.A. R ([) & {-23-A fl. A. N.A. H.A. 1, 2, 3, 4
- 2) Automatic Actuation N. A H.A. N.A. H.A. M(1) M(1) ',( 3 ) -;, 2, 3, t-g g togic and Actuntion Relays (55PS)
Y See item 1. above for all Safety injection Surveillance Requirements. $ 3) Safety Injection
- b. Phase "B" Isolation
- 1) Hanual Initiation H.A. H.A. N.A. (4) N.A. H.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3, 4- [.3[-d H.A. N.A. N.A. H(1) H(1) -1, 2, 3, s
- 2) Automatic Actuation N.A. Q logic and Actuation Relays (55PS)
N.A. N.A.
- 3) Containment Pressure-liigh-3 5 R[O -Q N.A. ii . A . 1. 2, 3- l /-27.-A .
?" c. Containment Purge Isolation f 2-05.jpj g 1) Hanual Initiation N.A. H.A. N.A. R(g) -
N.A. H.A. H.A. 1, 2, 3, 4 f p
- 2) ( x5 A u ($X/,. -)1.k./]pprfy p hyypsy/yety/M3 V,% - ,.-,,
- t n a g N(mg . D-S7-A O
- Y S i &3.3-31
- 3) Automatic Actuation togic and Actuation Heiays (00P LSI'A5) N.A. H.A. N.A. H.A. M(1)(2) N.A. N.A. t, -', ;, -
g
- 4) Phase ",A" See Item 3.a. above for all Phase "A" Isolation Surveillance Requireme Isolatinn - -
2dM f R a WA "^ "^ "' &nw s) c. + r-~ s tu r s atugny ~ .
.- _ - ~.
CHANGE
, NUMBER !CitiC DESCRIPTION 2 05 H The Functional Unit for Containment [PurgeEIsolation, QM7_Aj CTS 3.c. is moved to improved TS 3.3.6. improved TS 3 3.6 adds requirements on the OPERABILITY of the containinent !
[purp radiation 3 monitors and extends the Applicability for j thet Manual Initiation and B0P ESFAS] actuation logic to j incGde during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies , within containment}nd Core Alterations.ZvJsr7-34-/t} 2 06 LS-33 Functional Unit 4.a.1) of current TS Table [3.3-]. manual p25-A { initiation of individual steam line isolation, is not an ESF function and it is therefore deleted along with its I ACTION Statement [23]from the ESFAS TS, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 2 07 LS 11 [ Note (a) is added to current TS Table 3.3-3 for the Steam Line Isolation Functional Units 4.a.2, 4.b. 4.c. 4.d, and i 4.e to state that the LC0 requirements are not applicable l in MODES 2 and 3 when the MSIVs are closed.] Note [(b)] J is added to current TS Table [3.3 3] for the Feedwater Isolation and Turbine Trip Function [ Functional Units 5.a. 5.b] to state that the LCO requirements are not applicable when the [HFIVs] are closed [ ). When these valves are closed [ ], they are already performing their safety l function. These changes are consistent with NUREG 1431 ! Rev. 1. g), p 2 08 M [New ACTION Statements 33.1 and 33.2 replace ACTION Statement 33 in current TS Table 3.3 3 Fanctional Units 1.c.1.d.1.eJ 4.c, 4.d 4.e. 5.b,"6.d.1.a. and Ch@#C. 6.d.2.a]. These ACTION Statement [s]. Written to reflect the Applicability of the affected channels and consistency with ITS 3.3.2 [ Conditions D and I), are more restrictive, by one hour, than the current ACTION Statement [s] which invoke [ ] LCO 3.0.3 if the inoperable channel is not placed in trip within 6 hours. 2 09 LG Separate ESFAS entries for the motor driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are no longer necessary, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. The only difference in the requirements (an SR 4.0.4 exception for response time testing of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump) has been addressed in the ITS by a Note in Surveillance Requirement 3.3.2.10. [ITS Table 3.3.2-1 has eliminated the unnecessary repetition in CTS Tables 3.3 3 and 3.3 4]. l 2-10 M New ACTION Statement [19.1) is added to current TS
- Table [3.3 3] for one inoperable Main Feedwater Pump trip AFW start channel. This is a more restrictive change.
l l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 18 5/15/97
t a INSERT 3A-18 g 74% i , J l The revisions to ACTION Statement 17 and the addition of new ACTION Statement 17.1 to CTS Table 3.3-3 are more restrictive in nature in that no time limits for the completion of these actions are specified in the CTS. i I I t 1 l 1-i f I i I i
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3-01-A APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC l l l REQUEST: The requirements of this specification [ CTS 3.3.3] are moved to separate specifications in the improved TS. The RCS leakage detection requirements are moved to improved TS 3.4.15. [The fuc! building requirements are moved to improved TS 3.3.8.] The Control Room requirements are moved to improved TS 3.3.7. [] Comment: {WC) CTS T3.3-6 (F1.a) ### alarm /setpoint is moved to ODCM. Also CTS Action 26 modified to include ITS Action A 4 hour repair allowance. These changes are neither identified nor evaluated. Provide a less restrictive justification and a revised CTS markup. {WC, CW) Several CTS Action 30 changes are not evaluated. The CTS requires operation of the Emergency Exhaust System within 72 hours. The ITS uses FBVIS mode. The CTS requires maintaining Fuel Building at a negative pressure. This requirement is deleted without discussion. {CW) Several CTS Action 38 changes are not evaluated. The use of CRVIS mode to replace the CTS recirculation mode. The shutdown to Modes 3 & 5 or the addition of the requirement to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS when in Modes 5 & 6 when this is not included in the ITS applicability. Provide justifications for all changes to the CTS. The DOC does not provide specific justification for providing a no channels OPERABLE conditions or for the actions required in that condition. Furthermore, this is not an administrative change. FLOG RESPONSE: The first portion of the first comment concerning the ### notation in Table 3.3-6 is addressed in the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-32. The second portion of the first comment is addressed by revising CTS Action 26 utilizing DOC 3-11-M which was used by CPSES to make an equivalent change. Reference 5 in the WCGS cover letter indicated that DOC 3-11-M was acceptable. The second comment and the portion of the third comment dealing with system lineup nomenclature were discussed during meetings with NRC staff between September 15 and September 18,1998. These are the same comments resolved under Comment Number Q 3.3-80 in those meetings. In response to the third comment, new DOC 3-18-M has been generated to discuss more restrictive requirements added to CTS ACTIONS 30 and 38 for Callaway and ACTIONS 27 and 30 for WCGS. l The last comment is incorrect in stating the DOC should address a provision for no channels OPERABLE. Current ACTIONS 30 and 38 for Callaway and ACTIONS 27 and 30 for WCGS already have a 1 hour HVAC system lineup action for no channels OPERABLE and the mark-up retains that Completion Time. For CPSES and DCPP, the last comment does not apply (see DOCS 3-13-M and 3-15-M, respectively). l l l
.l ATTACHED PAGES:
Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 , Enclosure 2, page 3/4 3-40 and inserts 3/4 3-40A and 3/4 3-40B i Enclosure 3A, page 27 ! Enclosure 3B, page 22 l l 1 i l l i 1 l 1 l. i l l 1 l i A I
't ,
p%le ) pQw ;) \ c .:
. . . ,2.;-e ICentinued)
( ' s+ t:5LE t:Ot: :0NS . i
- ';' f ;i : :n. ..;;;; ..
1 es** L a . 2 !* t.
- _. r * . *::__
- . . . . . . ai.
.. .... . 94-7g
# Trip 5etpoint concentration value (.Ci/cm3) is to be established such !
that the actual submersion dose rate would not exceed 2 mR/h in tne 4 control room.
*sTrt;' 5etpoint contentration value ( Ci/cm?) is to be established suen .
that tne actual suomersion dose rate would not exceed 4 mR/h in the ! fuel building. i ACTION STATEMENTS j (NOTE: ACTION STATEMENTS 26 and 27 ARE LOCATED ON OTHER TABLES.) ) i A I$C'I 1 .'.h '.;;; th;3 th; "#T i . u S Ch:rE:l: $ E $5LE "eEC '" e~ S *
- 7a dM 1;;r;ti;: m;, ;;ntin ; f;:.
; :: 20 d;,; ; ; 'dd ;' ;;; ':; ':::
? -titi: ::rt' nut.; m:r't:r 't' t.; ;;m; *1;r h t;;i-t .: :
;..;.,ided .a . e f.el ace;. T,n ;;..'- th; ic.;;;rs. tic m;ri1; .
. 1; !
'g[- 0F F.A acLa m;i.... :: d;.,; ;r ;u::-:r,d ' :;; ':
)
in.:1 in; f ; m;. ;m;: . 'r th; f.;l be. i d E; . j ACTION 29 - Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1. ACTION 30 - yith the number of OPERAELE channels one less than the "'. . . . . /-&f-LG. C': 7.*.:L: ;_ F;--;nt,- isolate the Fuel Building /4 ],A gep~rthannels; Ventilat ion System and initiate operation of tne Emergency Exhaust System to maintain the fuel building at a negative
- r. : C'E'"2L E c h: m ' ; '*'-
pressure within ': -....,gr
't' _ gggy C#
~1Noy3s SAISE O 3 $ 3'-40 ;
ACTION 38 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the ~ c /-8.$./_(r i
;;,.";m;rt, isolate the Control Room / fy.A R g ,w / Channels j ':'*IL:
Emergency Ventilation System and initiate operation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation mode within _ . : g: ; . ! 0 *: *.*S L E 5 : * :e' ~ '*H"' "" y l
~7d*f T. MEWNf M&y ~ 3 J g- _
j (NOTE: ACTION STATEMENTS 31 THROUGH 37 ARE LOCATED ON OTHER TABLES. 5l 7-dM CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3 40 Amencment No. 20,H , 64 j
ri . m - INSERT 3/4 3-40A ! J r ! ked - 7_/Aq l With no channels OPERABLE: -7 /4 l i (a)Immediately declare one EES train inoperable and take i t l appropriate ACTIONS and within I hour place one EES train I in the FBVIS mode, or ! (b) Within I hour plac'e both EES trains in the FBVIS mode, i , With the Required ACTIONS and associated Completion Times not met, ( immediately suspend movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel i building. I I l
> l l
1 l 1 l l 1 l I l l l l l _ - a
ll l
,s INSERT 3/4 3-40B o
g:eg 1 i With no channels OPERABLE: J J/J ! (a) Immediately declare one CREVS train inoperable and take T-l?-F) \ appropriate ACTIONS and within 1 hour place one CREVS train ' in the CRVIS mode, or 1 (b) Within 1 hour place both CREVS trains in the CRVIS mode, ' l With the Required ACTIONS and associated Completion Times not met: ! (a) When in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, be in MODE 3 in 6 hours and in MODE 5 in 36 hours. l (b) When in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement ofirradiated fuel ! assemblies, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies.
,c. . :
s ( l l f i e
CHANGE l -) NUl6ER HSlic DESCRIPTIGil l 3 08 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 3 09 LS 24 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 3 10 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 3 11 - Not applicabic to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). l 3 12 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 3B). I 3 13 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 3 14 LS 29 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 2 3-15 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l ! Table Notg l( .nclosure 3B)./ 3 16 -
,p ne:0!e te Cel' " y. ' " Cer'errsie- C 7 2rit:n hC- 73--#3
[21: (En:1er're ?'" 3 17 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l T e losure 38). ZN.TERTSA .T7 & 3-6I-A 4 01 Not plicable to Callaway. See Corwersion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 5 01 - Not-:;;1i:21: t: R Co..m.ne.. Ceve-i::n bgg l
-Td!: (Er leter: 3S'. C:" umr
=a ./. l 6 01 -
Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). g 7 01 A The requirements of current TS Table ,[3.3 9] are redefined I on a functional basis, with Required I;DWi6e54. rather than & 7-of-A on a per channel basis. consistent wit NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. The point at which the ACTION Statemen are entered is unchanged. 4 g y g. g:3 g/,f 7, 7 02 - Not app 1' able to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table ( closure 3B). , [7Xe "MINZ$ win CHANNEL 3 Of'F.DeNflE" co/unsn Ae* der Om,d is ee vi. red .fo "REpmgb DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 7 *
- b b fM d/er 5/15/97 2~c. rec & v.r . hue.r.]
)
. ~ . - - - ., - __. . _ . , _ _
l INSERT 3A-27 l .
\ 'ci +] ;
ap ; 3-18 M Current TS LCO 3.3.3.1 contains an LCO 3.0.3 exception and Table 3.3-6, ACTIONS [30 and 38] for the Fuel Building Exhaust Radiation g ggjf l Monitors and the Control Room Air intake Radiation Monitors do not contain any default actions if they aren't met. Therefore, the addition of a ; default action to immediately suspend movement of irradiated fuel l assemblies in the fuel building if ACTION [30) were not met for inoperable i Fuel Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor (s) is a more restrictive ; requirement. Similarly, the addition of default actions to bring the plant to MODE 5, when originally in MODES 1-4, or to immediately suspend i CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies when i in MODE 5 or 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies if ACTION [38] were not met for inoperable Control Room Air intake ; Radiation Monitor (s) is a more restrictive requirement. These additionc impose new and more stringent limitations on the manner in which the ! plant must be operated. , 3-19 LS-50 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table p 7-/f-/d j (Enclosure 3B). 3-20 LS-51 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table p g,y fq , (Enclosure 3B). 3-21 LS-52 Not applicable to Cal!away. See Conversion Comparison Table O f.7-P.2 l (Enclosure 3B). 3-22 LS-20 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table $ f. 7-77 , (Enclosure 6B). l l l I l l i 1 l i l j
l
, I c
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 22 of 26 TECH SPEC CHANCE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 3-13 The proposed change would provide an ACTION STATEENT for No - see CN 3-15-H. Yes No - already in No - already in M the case where the nunter of Control Room air intake current TS. current TS. radiation level instrumentation channels was two less than required number of channels. The ACTION STATEMENT would require that the air supply from the affected air intake be secured or that the emergency recirculation mode be initiated and maintained. Otherwise, restore one channel within I hour or shutdown to MOCf 3 in 6 hours and MODE 5 in the next 30 hours. 3-14 This proposed change adds an ACTION and an allowed outage Yes No No No L5 29 time of 4 hours for one inoperable Containment Ventilation Radiation instrumentation or actuation channel to the DCPP CTS. 3-15 This change revises DCPP CTS ACTION 34 and adds new Yes No No No H ACTION 36 to require appropriate N00E changes or condition changas for the CRV5 with one or two inoperable normal intake monitors. These actions specify a shutdown requirement for M00E51-4 that is one hour less than LCO 3.0.3, and innediate action for inoperability in MODE 5 or 6. and innediate action for inoperability during fuel movement. Refer also to CN 3 08-M. CN 3-04 H. and CN 3.3-51. / ' 4 g, 4 g 3-16 g3 . of irradiate for DCPP includes HDDES
. . 11
_- lp4 a ttnfi containment, in vement M[A d/A h kA .hA[A addition to . .e lity. These dC ,gg_,gg A requ s are inferred in CTS 3.6.3 and a ted for clarity. - gg gg 3 17 The CPSES restrictions on opening of the containment No Yes No No A pressure relief valves are moved from the Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Specification in the CTS to ITS 3.6.3 and the ITS Administrative Controls Section 5.5.1 for the 00CH.
/
4-01 DCPP LCO 3.3.3.2. Hovable Incore Detectors is relocated to Yes - See No No No. R a licensee controlled document. Attachment 21, page 11.
.3~Al[EKT' 70 ~13- $ 2-0l-/)
CONVERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/I5/97
,e
'- i L;
{Osh INSERT 3B-22 NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CALLAWAY CANYON PEAK CREEK 3-18 Addition of default actions if current TS Table 3.3- No No Yes Yes M 6 ACTIONS [30 and 38] are not met. O. NIM 3-19 This change replaces the DCPP CTS action Yes No No No LS-50 requirement to place the CRVS in the recirculation mode for an inoperable monitor with a $ 7-/f-A7 requirement to place the CRVS in the pressurization mode. 3-20 WCGS CTS Table 3.3-6, Functional Unit 1.a, No No Yes No LS-51 Containment Atmosphere-Gaseous $ f,7 79 Radioactivity High (GT-RE-31&32), requires i operability in "All" modes. ITS Table 3.3.6-1 (as modified by TSTF-161) requires this Function in Modes 1,2,3,4, During CORE ALTERATIONS (footnote (a)) and During movement of irradiated , , fuel assemblies within containment (footnote (b)). i The CTS has been revised to specify the ,1 applicable modes for this function consistent with j ITS Table 3.3.6-1, LCO 3.6.3 and LCO 3.9.4. 3-21 Notes (a) and (b) in DCPP CTS Table 3.3-6 are Yes No No No ! LS-52 deleted since RM-45A and 45B are not installed [ 7,7-P2. and there is no intent to install them. ' 3-22 The MODE 6 requirement for CVI instrumentation Yes No No No j LS-20 of DCPP CTS Table 3.3-6 is revised to be MODE f 7,7_ J q 6 during CORE ALTERATIONS. I i _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ --..._,we.---.e_.n- . . . ~ im ~.. ..--+me- n . . , , + - - - - _ . . - . . . ---n _ - ,.. -_ _ _ *_ _._ _ _ _ _ _ ___.__ _
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET t ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3-02-M APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC i REQUEST: The requirements stipulated in ACTION (a) are moved to ITS Tables (3.3.7-1 and 3.3.8-1), with explicit direction contained in the ITS ACTIONS Gases. The 4 hour AOT for i setpoint adjustment is eliminated. 6 Comment: Evaluate how the CTS requirement changes for each use in the ITS. The 4-hour AOT for setpoint adjustment appears to be extended. How can it be that a TS is deleted (moved to the Bases) and the justification is more restrictive. This change should be documented based on how the ITS treats a channel with the setpoint not met. I FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 3-02 M is revised to indicate that the CTS action that permitted adjusting the setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours is deleted. As discussed in the ITS B 3.3.7 Actions Bases, if the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified by the calibration procedure, the channel must be declared inoperable immedistely and the appropriate condition entered. DOC 3-02-M is revised to state:
"OTS 3.3.3.1, Action (a) is revised to delete the 4 hour allowance to adjust the radiation monitoring channel Alarm / Trip Setpoint if the setpoint value has been exceeded. The CTS allowed a 4 hour window in which to adjust the Trip Setpoint to within limits before declaring the channelinoperable and taking the appropriate Action specified in the Table.
NUREG-1431 requires declaring the channel inoperable immediately and entering the appropriate Condition if the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance ; specified in calibration procedures. The proposed change is considered a more restrictive change which reduces plant operational flexibility." ATTACHED PAGES: i , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 ; A, pages 25 and 26 ' i
. . __ -. = . -
e, CHANGE NUMBER @E DESCRIPTION
....s 1 out of 2 logic on the second bus would be reduced to a 1 out of 1 logic to accomplish the safety function.
For Functional Unit 6.9 in current TS Table 3.3 3. Auxiliary Feedwater - Trip of all Main Feedwater Pumps, the " Total Number of Channels" column lists "4 2/ pump" with a ** Note (one channel in separation group 1 and one channel in separation group 4 for each main feedwater pump) and the "Hinimum Channels OPERABLE" column lists "3". Current ACTION Statement 19 allows continued operation with one channel inoperable as long as it is tripped within I hour and the three remaining channels are OPERABLE. Two inoperable channels result in an LCO 3.0.3 entry, requiring preparations to exit the Applicability and go to MODE 3 at the time the second channel becomes inoperable., Function 6.g of ITS Table 3.3.21 lists "2 per pump" under the " Required Channels" column. With separate Condition entry per pump, ITS 3.3.2 Condition J would allow one inoperable channel per pump as long as it is tripped within 1 hour. This would allow a second channel on the other pump to be inoperable for up to 1 hour prior to the commencement of any additional action, i.e. either placing the second channel in trip which may or may not result in an auxiliary feedwater actuation signal (AFAS) for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. or_ reducing power. Placing the second channel on the other pump in trip will result in an AFAS only if the second channel is in the same separation group as the channel already in trip (as depicted in FSAR Figure 7.31 sheet 2). If the two channels are in different separation groups, no AFAS will be initiated and continued operation will be permitted. 2 47 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). und 2 48 C^^- gonvgproppon[C-7.7-Od/ ruxer3A-af 3 01 A The requirements of this specification [ CTS 3.3.3] are moved to separate specifications in the improved TS. The RCS Leakage Detection requirements are moved to improved TS 3.4.15. [The Fuel Building requirements are moved to improved TS 3.3.8.] The Control Room requirements are i JEIr moved to improved TS 3.3.7. [ ] l'g # _
. Sh7.2-A) 3 02 H ui nts 1pul d in ION are ved T l le .3.7 and . 8- . with y lici direc n DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 25 5/15/97
gm CHANGE 69 ..f NUMBER MStiC DESCRIPTION con ned t 5A ONS ses he u T r tpoi adj men se inat SS-42-A1 rWJ1 Err 3A-a4A 3 03 LG The requirements associated with the criticality monitors are moved to a licensee controlled document. These monitors are required by 10CFR70.24: however, there is no requirement for [them] to be in the Technical Specifications [nor do they meet any of the four criteria for inclusion in the ITS). Since Part 70 is invoked in the Operating License, these monitors will be retained in the p1 ant design. ZNSMT" @f~248 Q 3-03-L G 3 04 H This change adds the Applicability for movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. The current TS Applicability of "All" H0 DES does not cover the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies when the. core is offloaded. 3 05 LS 14 ACTION Statement [38] for the [ Control Room Air Intake] [and ACTION Statement [30] for the [ Fuel Building
~
Exhaust)) radiation monitors have extended Completion Times, from [72 hours] to 7 days for one r%&ea channel inoperable, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1.{ ] f) 7-dS-(.r-/4 3 06 A ACTION-[c] of current TS LCO 3.3.3.1 is revised to state the Specification 3.0.3 exception is [ retained only for
~
the Fuel Building Exhaust Gaseous Radioactivity Instrumentation and to note that the Specification 3.0.4 exception is only needed for the RCS Leakage Detection System instrumentation]. The LCO 3.0.3 exception is not needed in ITS 3.3.7 or ITS 3.4.15 since Required ACTIONS are provided with the appropriate remedial measures for all combinations of channel failures, including shutdown actions, or reference is made to the associated plant system TS for the systems affected by the inoperability of the radiation monitors. [The LCO 3.0.4 exception is retained for the RCS Leakage Detection radiation monitors, as discussed in ITS 3.4.15; however, that exception is not needed for the Fuel Building Exhaust or Control Room Air Intake radiation monitors since their ACTION Statements allow continued operation for an unlimited period of time.] 3 07 LS 16 The Applicability for the Fu 1 Building Exhaust radiatior n~ monitors has been revised to read "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel [ ] building," consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. [ ] DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 26 5/15/97
INSERT 3A-26A l CTS 3.3.3.1, Action (a) is revised to delete the 4 hour allowance to adjust the radiation I monitoring channel Alarm / Trip Setpoint if the setpoint value has been exceeded. The CTS allowed a 4 hour window in which to adjust the Trip Setpoint to within limits before ; declaring the channel inoperable and taking the appropriate Action specified in the l Table. NUREG-1431 requires declaring the channel inoperable immediately and entering i the appropriate Condition if the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance I specifiea in calibration procedures. The proposed change is considered a more restrictive change which reduces plant operational flexibility. 1 l l lNSERT 3A-26B pg [For WCGS and Callaway, Section 9.1 of the USAR/FSAR indicates that the design of the spent fuel storage racks, new fuel storage racks, the fuel handling equipment, and the administrative controls are such that subcriticality will be maintained under normal and accident conditions.) As such, the requirements associated with the criticality functional unit are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. The licensee controlled documents containing the moved requirements will be maintained using the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the , descriptive information that has been moved continues to be maintained in an appropriately controlled manner. l l l i l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3-03-LG APPLICABILITY: CA, DC, WC REQUEST: The requirements associated with the criticality monitors are moved to a licensee controlled document. These monitors are required by 10 CFR 70.24; however, there is no requirement for (them] to be in the technical specifications (nor do they meet any of the four criteria for inclusion in the ITS). Comment: It is not clear that DOC 03-03-LG is referring to a change to the CTS. This DOC appears to relate to notes *a_ and "b) which appear to be already in the CTS. How does DOC 03-03-LG related to the tech spec conversion? If notes (a) and (b) are changes to the CTS, they need to be identified as such and more fully justified. If changes are moved outside of TS to a licensee controlled document then provide a " relocated" evaluation for changes not meeting 10 CFR 50.36. FLOG RESPONSE: For WCGS and Callaway, DOC 03-03-LG is specifically related to CTS Table 3.3-6, Functional Unit 2.b., Criticality High Radiation Level, and associated Table notation "*" The change (DOC 03-03-LG) moves the criticality monitoring functional unit and associated requirements to the USAR/FSAR. DOC 03-03-LG is revised to add the following information:
"[For WCGS and Callaway, Section 9.1 of the USAR/FSAR indicates that the design of the spent fuel storage racks, new fuel storage racks, the fuel handling equipment, and the administrative controls are such that subcriticality will be maintained under normal and accident conditions.] As such, the requirements I associated with the criticality functional unit are not required to be in the TS to ;
provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. The licensee J controlled documents containing the moved requirements will be maintained using the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. Therefore, the descriptive information that has been moved continues to be maintained in an appropriately controlled manner " For DCPP, the requirements of notes [* and "] of CTS 3.3.3.1 are directly related to their function as " criticality monitors" as required by 10 CFR 70.24. The criticality monitor requirement is removed, but the monitors are retained in the TS since these monitors also function to transfer the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation system to the lodine Removal mode of operation. Note ["] is revised to incorporate the applicability requirements associated with the movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building that have always existed, but were enveloped by the criticality monitor requirement. ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 A, page 26 l l
g, CHANGE ; La tfUtBER ti2iG DESCRIPTION ONS ses he our f6I rWREWr 3A-:4A 3-03 LG The requirements associated with the criticality monitors are moved to a licensee controlled document. These monitors are required by 10CFR70.24: however, there is no requirement for [them] to be in the Technical ; Specifications [nor do they meet any of the four criteria l for inclusion in the ITS]. Since Part 70 is invoked 1 l the Operating License, these monitors will be retain in the p1 ant design. ZNSMT" :41-24 8 Q 3-03-L G 3 04 M This change adds the Applicability for movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. The current TS Applicability of "All" H0 DES does not cover the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies when the core is offloaded. . l 3 05 LS-14 ACTION Statement [38] for the [ Control Room Air Intake] l [and ACTION Statement [30] for the [ Fuel Building Exhaust)) radiation monitors have extended Completion Times, from [72 hours] to 7 days for one required channel inoperable, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1.{ ] g 7 d5-c.r-/4 3 06 A ACTION [c] of current TS LCO 3.3.3.1 is revised to state the Specification 3.0.3 exception is [ retained only for , the Fuel Building Exhaust Gaseous Radioactivity Instrumentation and to note that the Specification 3.0.4 exception is only needed for the RCS Leakage Detection System instrumentation]. The LCO 3.0.3 exception is not needed in ITS 3.3.7 or ITS 3.4.15 since Required ACTIONS are provided with the appropriate remedial measures for all combinations of channel failures, including shutdown actions, or reference is made to the associated plant system TS for the systems affected by the inoperability of the radiation monitors. [The LCO 3.0.4 exception is retained for the RCS Leakage Detection radiation monitors, as discussed in ITS 3.4.15: however, that exception is not needed for the Fuel Building Exhaust or Control Room Air Intake radiation monitors since their ACTION Statements allow continued operation for an unlimited period of time.]
~
3 07 LS 16 The Applicability for the Fu 1 Building Exhaust radiatio
~ ; monitors has been revised to read "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel [ ] building."
consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1. [ ] l l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 26 5/15/97
i INSERT 3A-26A g CTS 3.3.3.1, Action [a] is revised to delete the 4 hour allowance to adjust the radiation monitoring channel Alarm / Trip Setpoint if the setpoint value has been exceeded. The CTS allowed a 4 hour window in which to adjust the Trip Setpoint to within limits before declaring the channel inoperable and taking the appropriate Action specified in the Table. NUREG-1431 requires declaring the channel inoperable immediately and entering the appropriate Condition if the Trip Setpoint is less conservative than the tolerance specified in calibration procedures. The proposed change is considered a more restrictive change which reduces plant operational flexibility. INSERT 3A-268 .pgp (For WCGS and Callaway, Section 9.1 of the USAR/FSAR indicates that the design of the spent fuel storage racks, new fuel storage racks, the fuel handling equipment, and the administrative controls are such that subcriticality will be maintained under normal and accident conditions.] As such, the requirements associated with the criticality functional unit are not required to be in the TS to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. T he licensee controlied documents containing the moved requirements will be maintained using the provisions of 10 CFR 50.f'9. Therefore, the descriptive information that has been moved coritinues to be maint. ,ined in an appropriately controlled manner. l l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3-05-LS-14 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: ACTION Statement (38] for the [ Control Room Air intake)[and ACTION Statement [30] for the [ Fuel Building Exhaust)) radiation monitors have extended Completion Times, from [72 hours] to 7 days for one required channel inoperable. Comment: Insufficient information is provided to justify extending the allowed outage time for one CRVS channel inoperable from [1][48][72] hours to 7 days. If the system arrangement is such that each instrument channel is dedicated to a single CRVS train (one-out-of-one starts one train), then the effect of a single inoperable instrument channel is similar to that of an inoperable mechanical train and the extended AOT may be acceptable. if, however, the two channels are used in a one-out-of-two logic start both CRVS channels, a single inoperable instrumentation channel degrades the operability of both mechanical trains and the justification provided for the 7 day AOT is not germane. FLOG RESPONSE: The response to this comment is addressed under Comment Number Q 2-16-LS-12 for Callaway, CPSES, and WCGS. l The DCPP control room is common to both units. The normal air intakes are separate, but are in close proximity to each other. There is one train of control room ventilation for each unit. The pressurization air intakes are at cyposite ends of the turbine building. There are two radiation monitors at each normal air intake either of which will initiate the opposite unit's pressurization system. The system is designed so that if radiation is detected at one unit's normal air intake due to a LOCA or other design basis event, the system starts the opposite unit's pressurization fans which take suction from the end of the opposite unit's turbine building. With this arrangement, a l single monitor can be out of service without affecting the operability of the ventilation train. Loss of the second required monitor renders that train of control room pressurization inoperable. The ; loss of the radiation monitors for a single train only affects that train, thus it would be similar to a mechanical failure rendering a single train inoperable. Since the loss of the required radiation monitor would be equivalent to a mechanical failure, the allowed outage time of 7 days permitted by CTS 3.7.5.1 and LCO 3.7.10 of NUREG-1431 for inoperability of a single train of ventilation is , appropriate for loss of one train's required radiation monitor. LS14 has been revised to include this system description and justification for the 7 day AOT. J In addition to the above, DCPP submitted a version of NSHC LS14 authored by one of the other FLOG members. The corrected copy is attached. ATTACHED PAGES: 1 None j l 1 l l l
l l l l i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 7-01-A APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: The requirements of current TS Table [3.3-9] are redefined on a functional basis with Required Channels. The point at which ACTION Statements are entered is unchanged.
- Comment
- {CP) Revise ITS T3.3.9-1 column to " REQUIRED NO. OF FUNCTIONS."
FLOG RESPONSE: 1) The generic NSHC "A"(administrative changes) has been revised to better define administrative changes.
- 2) The CTS table markup has been revised as necessary to provide the correct column titles.
DOC 7-01-A is revised to read as follows: 1
- "The requirements of current TS Table [3.3-9] are redefined on a functional basis, with Required Functions, rather than on a per channel basis, consistent with other Section 3.3 tables in NUREG-1431 Rev.1. The point at which the ACTION Statements are entered is unchanged. [The " MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE" l column header format is revised to " REQUIRED CHANNELS" consistent with j other ITS Section 3.3 tables.]"
The conversion comparison table (Enclosure 38) is revised as follows to be consistent with DOC 7-01-A: l "The requirements of current TS Table [3.3-9] are redefined on a functional basis with Required Functions. The point at which ACTION Statements are entered is unchanged. [The " MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE" column header format is revised to " REQUIRED CHANNELS" consistent with other ITS Section 3.3 tables.]" i l See also the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-24 for CPSES, WCGS, and Callaway and Q 3.3-128 for DCPP. ATTACHED PAGES: i Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, page 3/4 3-50 , Enclosure 3A, page 27 Enclosure 38, page 23 Enclosure 4, page 6 1 1 s 1 i
REVISI y ,t - A.h;
- T/.BLE 3.3-9 ~7"O - -
b- REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTE/4 fth W M N C Q ~74 l 4
. ~~
~ $EduGtEb ~/-dI-A
-TOT 5L ;0. "I.':I G i~
7 6 P.C."O UT ~7 6 -ef-r :: m : fj gify-CHANNELS
/GA/ ' '- g 7_gf,A A -L0 m n 4' -= ns -
' 1. REPressure-WideRange -*9P"- -t- 1
$ ht-LG
- 2. Reactor Coolant Temperature-Cold Leg e
. 4- 1
.=.
- 3. Source Range, Neutron Flux # -*SP*- 4' 1
- 4. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication e* -1/;. .e bra. swr 2/ trip breaker
- 5. Reactor Cnolant Temperature - -ASPa- -t- 1 Hot Leg
- 6. Reactor Coolant Pump Breakers " 1/?r; 1/ pump
~
- 7. . Pressurizer Pressure -*$Pa- -t- 1
- 8. Pressurizer Level -ASPa- 1
- 9. Steam Generator Pressure ASPa-s~ 2/;^ 9 fr:- 1/stm. gen.
- 10. Steam Generator Level -*SP8- -#e4e--ve n.- 1/stm. gen. .
- 11. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate -*SP8- -+- 1
- 12. Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure -*$ta- 1
*
- d'. -: . . , ;Ld.L.. . T.. .. i "Em. te, ' *p L . Li.y... ~7-d[M
***12.G LV L.LLv;er '
#Not required OPERABLE in MODE 1 or in MODE 2 above P-6 setpoint.
e
^
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-50 *
- CHANGE
) NUMER HSlE DESCRIPTION 3 08 -
Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38), l 3 09 LS 24 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). j l 3 10 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 3 11 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1 3 12 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ! Table (Enclosure 3B). i 3 13 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ; Table (Enclosure 38). 3 14 LS 29 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).
'F 3 15 -
Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (fnclosure 3B). fed. ./ l 3 16 - Not @ ::Me te C31h'2y. c- Cer//crrie- C& peri :.. gc M2 l [:51: (Er'es're ?") _ 3 17 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). ZNrGR7-3A' Y7 & 3-6I-A 4 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 5 01 - Not-:--lic:ble t: C:"n:3 S;; Co..m isiei. Ce.i g i::n - b g g ;
-T:ble (Erlerure 3S'. 84.nel.
6 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). g 7 01 A v ( The requirements of current TS Table ,[3.3 9] are redefined on a functional basis, with Required I;D6htfeIA rather than & 7-0M l on a per channel basis, consistent wit NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. l The point at which the ACTION Statemen are entered is unchanged. g g , 4 g:3 g/y7, 7 02 - Not appl' able to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table ( closure 3B). Em "Mrucmwn canaveu weegur"coInn I A ** der -Arr>>cl* I.c re vised -/s "RECitrA'Eb DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES T URRENT TS 7
" 5/15/97 e r .re e s#I#N8*TM der-z y . hue.r.]
x _
'q '
t CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 23 of 26 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY
's-relocated-to- &
" ' ' ^ ^
5-01 e-Instr & & 4-- -44tcensee-contrelkd L A-4 --- A/p./- ug Z-U A//A 4/[A YA 4/A
/ dC-ALLqL 6 01 DCPP LCO 3.3.3.4. Meterological Instrumentation, is Yes - See No No No R relocated to a licensee controlled .6. Attachment 21. page
(~~$neNons. NR The requirements of current ITablelI3.3-9) are redefined No abady in N 7 01 es Yes Yes ~ A on a functional basis with RDquired M The point at current TS. ) whichACTIONStatementsaregteredisunchanged.C7,4ehVtmuA CHAWSt.S G"6CAdtE'edu% beo/e M M inev&a[ _ [ /-d/-- / 7 02 H The shutdown requirement for inope oie Ecume controls is changed from HOT STANDBY to HDT SIUTDOWN. NrhaTF"'Yfs omien6 TS. P***
- 2Wafie'- %M/r'ewy in , J}Icurrent T5. current n.
7-03 /. 4 M ed. k'y [h ' Q." , /g %4r-[<r -4MA-Adr -th%-M, g -Agg 7 04 This change exNs the bemotbtd'wn o A0T from 7 days to No - already in Yes Yes Yes LS-15 30 days. current TS. 7 05 Consistent with the ITS the modifications would clarify Yes Yes No - already in No - already in A the requirement to be in HOT SHUTDOWN in 12 hours by current TS. current TS. replacing the requirement with a new requirement to be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours and in HOT SIUTDOWN in the next 6 hours. 7 06 The Readout location and Total No. of Channels columns in Yes lYes Yes YesO b LG current T5 [ Table 3.3 9] have been moved to the Bases of inproved TS 3.3.4.-f-t- , , , L Z - 3", 7 M 7-01& "-t "* L f,gYyh/h gf/flf,. AfA- N. 'ns N.
<hs-yes Wes ar.3 a2.
7-08 The CPSES requirement to submit 3 special report if the No Yes No No TR 2 nunter of remote shutdown monitoring instruments is less than the required nunber would be deleted from the CTS. This requirement is covered by other regulatory requirements. CONVFRSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97
, III. GENERIC NO SIGN 1FICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERAT10NS DR A" 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR XMrf.ATA ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMATTING AND REWORDING zg d W/d
@ proposed TS revisiohncludef reformatting and rewording the#EBERi5jk C7T requirements in accordance w1th the NUMARC Technical Specification Writer's Guide and the improved Standard Technial Specifications in NUREG-1431. This is intended to make the TS more readily understandable to plant operators and other users.
Application of the 10 CFR 50.92 Writer's Guide will also assure consistency between specifications. During this reformatting and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) were made to the TS unless they were identified and justified. This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Cortmission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in '
. 50.91. that a proposed amen &ent to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration. if operation of the facility in accordance
~
l with the proposed amenhent would not: l 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or l 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident frorn any accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
l The proposed change involves reformatting and rewording of the current Technical Specifications. The reformatting and rewording process involves no technical changes to the current Technical Specifications. As such, this change is administrative in nature and does not impact initiators of analyzed
- ' events or assumed mitigation of accidents or transient events. Therefore, 1 this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 6 5/15/97
I L INSERT A
&7-e/,4 !
Administrative changes sre TS changes that do not affect operating limits or the manner ! in which the plant is operated (e.g., simple re-wording of the TS; deletion of a TS whose l applicability has expired, or which duplicates regulatory or other requirements; or word i changes to incorporate a previously implicit understanding of the TS). i I I i l l t e l t t I i l i t t k 4 4
! I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 7-04-LS-15 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC i REQUEST: This change extends the Remote Shutdown AOT from 7 days to 30 days. l l 1 l Comment: {WC, CA} Revise 7-04 to include a synopsis of the safety analysis discussion . from IPEEE Report, ULNRC-3232, dated June 30,1995 which justify extension of the i function repair times to 30 days. i l FLOG RESPONSE: ULNRC-3232 is the Callaway-specific IPEEE report that demonstrated no , importance to remote shutdown equipment irrespective of their allowed outage times. Since this l l reference is not generic and not needed to support the DOC, it has been deleted. l l ATTACHED PAGES: ; l . Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 '. Enclosure 4, page 45
?
l 0 l : i
)
i l l l f { 1 i 2 1 I
i l IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 15 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The allowed outage time (ADT) for ACTIONS [a and b] of current TS LCO [3.3.3.5) is increased from 7 days to 30 days. As discussed in NUREG 1431 Rev.1. this is based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room during the conditions covered by the A0T. The extended A0T will not increase the core damage frequencies,C--^rted in $~7-df-LJ"-/5-M ti:n 4.3.5.5 Of th: C:lin::y I^EEE R m i 6 UueC-3232 Jo nd b 3;. 1;;;.] The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been ' I performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted l below: l "The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in ! 50.91. that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility l licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no l significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance i with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or ;
consequences of an accident previously evaluated? 1 l l Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the I previously performed evaluations since no hardware changes are proposed. The ! proposed change adds a relaxation to the A0T associated with remote shutdown i functions. The proposed change in the A0T will not affect any of the analysis assumptions for any of the scenarios previously evaluated. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the l proposed change affect the ability of any safety related equipment to perform ' its intended function. There will be no degradation in the performance of nor an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety related equipment , assumed to function during an accident situation or control room evacuation. ' NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 45 5/15/97
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 7-06-LG APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: The Readout Location and Total No. of Channels columns in current TS [ Table 3.3-9] have been moved to the Bases of improved TS 3.3.4. [] Comment: {WC & CA} 7-06 LG is applied to Action b, but this change is not evaluated. Revise DOC 7-06 LG or change CTS markup. {WC, CW) CTS changes to T3.3-9 Note " as applied to Reactor Trip Switch Gear are not discussed. Provide a revised DOC. (CW) Apply 7-06 LG to the CTS LCO statement. l FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS markups have been revised to correctly reflect the information that is being moved. Additionally, DOC 7-06-LG has been revised to reflect the changes to the CTS markups. For Callaway, the CTS mark-up has been revised to apply DOC 7-06-LG to LCO 3.3.3.5. ATTACHED PAGES: ! l-Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, pages 3/4 3-49 and 3/4 3-50 l Enclosure 3A, page 28 j ! Enclosure 3B, page 23 l l i l i l i 1 l
INSTRUMENTATION
/-t2-A REMOTE SHUT 00VN FN {K.PTEM g g_gg i~
W LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERAT 0N QV &n c&rv 3.3.3.5 The remote shutdown e: :' : Vgiven in -J' gj A Table 3.3-9 and the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls shall be OPERABLE, (* ilk't**COMMMEMWM5=n W/f 4M APPUCABIUTY: H00E5 1, 2, and 3. (N***' P **N' I~cl-A 0"E".*ed nrf eon +,a l.)&c4n and retur $ I 'll*"'I ACTION-* ' n ,:gu.,t.,,(,_)
- a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring th:nn::: Mess -7 d/ -A than -in: "' ' un Ch;.....i . 0"C*L*." LC n required by Table 3.3-9, re store the inoperable c..nn:1':) to OPERABLE status within days; otherwise, -/qs Lg be in at least HOT STAND within the next 6 hours a in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 h urs. yg NancNml.r)
- b. With the ASP controls inoperable, restore the inoperable ASP controls to OPERABLE status within ays; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY 7 gf Lg within the next 6 hours an n HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. yo
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. 1 y M}.' 1 f
p' f l SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentati channel shall be demonstrated OPERASLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHEC nd CHANNEL ~/-87-/,5 CALIBRATION at the frequencies given in Table 4.3-6. 4.3.3.5.2 The ASP controls shall be demonstrated CPERABLE at least once per ~7-/?-LS 18 months,gy-ep,s.espap es ( p oli M D 4 S 7-/T 4.3.3.5.3 The previsions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry 7_ffg into MODE 3 for the turcine-driven auxiliary f enewater ^ pump,cxce-1:m:nserm
& !7-/I MjYM h $r- eoch r egur*resl In.drumedd1% c Lanne / ./f,.j-7, n,,.4 j ' er:eyr,z . 7-M Ls 3/4 3-49 Amencrnent No. 45 i CALj.AWAY - UNIT 1 l
1 j l
4r -w.~i,- REVISlay ,t - T/.BLE 3.3-9 7"O/-A - s-REMOTE SHUTDOWN game v.gi.A g . . . ~ , ": ::ss ( 7.g,.fg,, K.".**UT -~1- #-L G -6F- CHANNELS Q frw [S463( g 7_of-A ) 3 - 2:s. 4 - :=_m . - :=:m (&
- 1. RCS Pressure-Wide Range -*SP*- - 1 Q1-o&LG
- 2. Reactor Coolant Temperature- A
, Cold Leg M -+- 1
- 3. Source Range, Neutron Flux # *5t*- +- 1
- 4. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication 1 e* * '-
~>+uraam 1/ trip breaker
- 5. Reactor Ccolant Temperature - t e + 1 Hot Leg
- 6. Reactor Coolant Pump Breakers 'r-.---
1/ pump r-r
- 7. , Pressurizer Press'ure -*SP*- 1
- 8. Pressurizer Level e -B- 1
- 9. Steam Generator Pressure ASP *- 2A=. ;;i.. I 1/stm. gen.
1 A-
- 10. Steam Generator Level *SP*- 2/:t. g... 1/stm. gen. .,
- 11. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate -+-
;3 " n -*SP8-1
- 12. Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Pressure -*SP"- - 1
-* m ; _ .
--~ > e. . ., . . . . . . . . . . . , -
l 74Q
. i p .,,- a k;,ys ,
1 _
~ ~ -.
l ....,"~.u.av 6.3
.,w,.w,,yag, 8
#Not required OPERABLE in MODE 1 or in MODE 2 above P-6 setpoint.
I ^ l \ - l 1 l o' r ' CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-50 f d
. _ . . - .~.
b-CHANGE l i. , , Hilf1R HSBC DESCRIPTION 7 03 f/- G -NOL uueu. Alo-l- lreaAle ]s 0alla s See Convea:rion p y Coy %'ron ~TE le Enclostwe 2f}, 7 04 LS 15 Thischangeincrease(sthenumberofdaystheFunction in current TS Table [3.3 9] and the [ ASP] controls may remain inoperable before imposing mode change requirements from 7 days to 30 days. This is based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room. This is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 (ITS 3.3.4 Condition A). 7 05 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1 7 06 LG The Readout Location and Total No. of Channels columns in
' current TS [ Table 3.3 9] have been moved to the Bases improved TS 3.3.4, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. f-t-7 07 h L uacu. ZNJER7~ 3A-DVA Q 2 3-:12.
7 08 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 7 09 LS 43 The current TS require that CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS are performed for instrumentation used in the P -Acciden Monitoring [and Remote Shutdown] Systems on an 18 month O'lMb basis. Some of these instruments are then'de energized U and remain in this state until re energized for use in the management of plant events or for the performance of the CHANNEL CHECKS. CHANNEL CHECKS are performed more frequently thcn CHANNCL CALIBRATIONS for the purpose of detecting gross channel failures or excessive drift of one channel relative to other channels monitoring the same process variable. During the period that the channel is de energized. it is not subject to the failure mechanisms or conditions that typically lead to instrument failure or excessive drift. Recognizing that de energized channels are not subjected to the same failure mechanisms as energized channels, the current TS was revised to exempt instrumentation that is not normally energized from the performance of the periodic CHANNEL CHECKS. consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. ! 7 10 E 20 - Not :pplice'a scc ;gnger3ign ;gayari;cn l - Tivi c (Enciesers+nem113e3y,/,
- 30. Are d 7-/0-/_f."2(,
x M' ' y 7-11 C7f --N0t applic210 t0 Call?"?y. Sr Cenici:10n C0mp2rhon-T;bic (Enciessr; 2S) gyp ggg 6 7--//-A r DESCRIPTION OF. CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 28 5/15/97
%e d CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 23 of 26 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 5-01 TPP LCO 3.3.3.3. %fWe-in54rwentet4eer 5*- 404 sd-te-- ~ LW -Ne-- -No- h-4- -a-11censeo_ controlled L-
.6/\/g g .g,_ TA7 /(r/A N/A gg bc-Aggt, DCPP LCO 3.3.3.4. Meterological Instrumentation, is Yes - See No No No 6-01 R relocated to a licensee controlled document. Attachment 21. page 13- *
(~$n eNons. 7 01 The requirements of current TS TablelI3.3 9] are redefined No - already in Yes Yes Yes A on a functional basis with RequiredUntlif5 M 51 The point at current TS. which ACTION Statements are entered is unchanged.C T[ie %rVrmum CH&Wu #E#AgtE"ce/u% b eco[e r b w N e mvha[ ,8 M/--/) _ 7-02 The shutdown requirement for inoperable Remote Shutb NrkaTF" Y
' # YNa[y iY
- DYlrNy #
in M controls is changed from HOT STANDBY to HOT SHUTUOWN. current TS. current TS. current TS. 7 03/.G L;. me. k'y [h' 'hj (,. (Dpp- -N#t-[<5- -N#rA/s -th4r-Als gWg 7-04 ThischangeexMsth htbEthownA0Tfrom7daysto No already in Yes Yes Yes LS-15 30 days. current 13. 7-05 Consistent with the ITS. the modifications would clarify Yes Yes No - already in No - already in A the requirement to be in HOT St0TDOWN in 12 hours by current TS. current TS. replacing the requirement with a new requirement to be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours and in HOT SiUTDOWN in the next - 6 hours. Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 06 The Readout Location and Total No. of Channels columns in have been moved to the Bases of - O b LG current TS [ Table 3. irtproved TS 3.3. -f-t- ,, , LU-F.C M I'0I f Y& Cr 7 / / la +*- No m-No ms-Yes enr}4r a s.3-22. 7-08 The CPSES requirement to submit a s tal report if the No Yes No No TR 2 number of remote shutdown monitoring instronents is less than the required nunter would be deleted from the CTS. This requirement is covered by other regulatory requirements. e,mura n nu enunantenn Teni r . conDFNT TS 5/15/97
. _ . ~ . . .. _ . . _ - - . _ - . - . _ . - .- , .
I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 7-09-LS-43 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC i REQUEST: Clarification is provided that Channel Checks are only required for normally energized instrumentation channels by adding "for each required instrumentation channel that is normally : energized", per ITS [SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.4.1) to CTS [4.3.3.5.1 and 4.3.3.6]. Comment: [See LS 1 GEN) FLOG RESPONSE: The applicability of DOC 7-09 LS-43 has been revised to include DCPP Per the agreement at the 8/14/98 meeting, a list of the de-energized instruments will be included in LS-43. ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 4, page 80 Enclosure SB, page B 3.3-178
\
J i
i l TV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS l ' \ O NSHC LS 43 l j ; 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR
- TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE f REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
! The used incurrent the PostTS Accident require that CHANNEL Monitoring CALIBRATIONS [and Remote Shutdown] Systems on5nare performed for in la =onth ] basis. Some of these ins':ruments are then de-energized and remain in this state until re energized for usa in the management of plant events or for the performance l of the CHANNEL CHECKS. CHANNEL CHECKS are performed more frequently than CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS for the purpose of detecting gross channel failures or excessive drift of one channel relative to other channels monitoring the same process va'riable. j During the period that the channel is de-energized, it is not subject to the failure mechanisms or conditions that typically lead to instrument failure or excessive i drift. Recognizing that de. energized channels are not subjected to the same failure 4 mechanisms as energized channels, the current TS was revised to exempt instrumentation that is not normally energized from the performanca of the periodic pggg; f CHANNEL CHECKS.1% felleser an he inhumdr Ms+ m homlf lde-*^* in/: [Co,dured HyJ 3an An, aar ra, r r:t' 2r.2 a,,/.1)..-es )(a a Aler a e, _ This proposed TS ctrange has n evaluated and it has been determi I involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been that it .r 7::t'.7,J,f, J
~~
performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted ~
. below:
**The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility '
licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: j 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an j accident previously evaluated: or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The instrumentation affected by the proposed change does not provide any automatic reactor protection or ESFAS functions. The instrumentation is used to provide indication to the reactor operators following a plant event. This NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 80 5/15/97
' g h
Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.4 t ])) \ BASES u ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 k (continued) f If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of l Condition A is not met, the unit must be brought to a H0DE in ;; which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit a-l must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 ~.'? within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, p' based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditicns from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. I y SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.4.1 ] REQUIREMEKTS - @ Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that I a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL %. CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one l channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on I the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same Lk parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant % i deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels i J or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect ? gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying that the t instrumentation continues to operate properly between each . CHANNEL CALIBRATION. h~ y Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a g combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including y indication and readability. If the channels are within the d criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. If $ a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that g 3,3.n Q outside %f the sensor or the si nal processing its limit 5 N* *W hp"s fath *nd e uipment driftep*sil% NcN
*N*' ??
D d8 . C L CHEC s on y i
~
4 ior Inose channeis which are normalTy energized.7As. %- 1 Huse ! S[ce ny*- newinn 4 fax channel is nr}- tQ1-91-LC-+3 ;) norna eneret Th_e Fr ency df 31 days is based ugLnpoerating experience which , demonstrates that enannsi failure is rare. The CHANNLE CHECK l supplements less formal, but more frequent. checks of channels $j si i during normal operational use of the displays associated with the >g LCO required channels. l r (continued) [ MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-178 5/15/97
)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 7-11-A APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: CTS SR 4.3.3.5.3 is deleted. This is duplicated in CTS 3.7.1.2 and covered in ITS 3.7.5 for AFW System operability requirements. Comment: This change is to delete the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 as applied to RSS turbine AFW pump and ADVs. Because the 4.0.4 provision is eliminated for RSS an L-DOC is needed for this change. The existence of a similar provision in Plant System TS l is irrelevant to the assessment of the RSS change. Altematively, revise ITS to delete proposed note to SR 3.3.4.2 and move it as a Note to the LCO ACTIONS. Provide a DOC for changing the SR to an Actions note. In either case, explain why the ISTS cannot be , adopted without this proposed exception. ! I FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 7-11-A was applicable only to Wolf Creek. Wolf Creek subsequently determined that a similar Note should have been placed in the Wolf Creek ITS as pre ,osed in JFD 3.3-92. JFD 3.3-92 added a Note to ITS SR 3.3.4.2 that the ASP controls for tt ? TDAFW pump and SG Atmospheric Steam Dump (ASD) valves for Callaway and Atmosphenc Relief Valves (ARVs) for Wolf Creek are not required to be verified prior to entry into MODE 3, consistent with CTS SR 4.3.3.5.3. This JFD applicability was identified as applicable to Callaway only. Therefore, this Comment Number is applicable to both Callaway and Wolf Creek. A more restrictive DOC has been initiated to delete CTS SR 4.3.3.5.3 for WCGS since deleting the SR would prevent going into MODE 3 to perform this surveillance on the TDAFW pump and the ARVs. Current WCGS plant procedures perform this surveillance in MODE 4. For Callaway, CTS SR 4.3.3.5.3 is revised to maintain the 4.0.4 exception for the TDAFW pump and delete the exception for the ASDs. The note to Callaway ITS SR 3.3.4.2 is revised to apply only to the TDAFW pump. DOC 7-11-A is revised to 7-11-M and states:
" CTS SR 4.3.3.5.3 which provides a 4.0.4 exception for entry into MODE 3 for the
[ ] ASDs (Callaway) / ARVs (Wolf Creek)is deleted. [ ] This exception is not necessary for the ASDs/ARVs since the ASP controls can be tested in MODE 4. ITS SR 3.7.4.1 ensures that the ASDs/ARVs are tested through a full cycle at least once per fuel cycle. This change is considered a more restrictive change since it eliminates the flexibility to perform the surveillance in MODE 3." ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, page 3/4 3-49 Enclosure 3A, page 28 Enclosure 3B, page 24 Enclosure SA, page 3.3-53 Enclosure 58, page B 3.3-179 Enclosure 6A, page 10 Enclosure 6B, page 14
-l w '\
j INSTRUMENTATION
/-4.7-A lBW M; REHOYE SHUT 00VN d][FNf@1@tR$ .S*/Mfy W LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERAT'ON SPY }'5ncb'ent
- 3. 3. 3. 5 The remote V shutcown 6 et:mm:1:Vgiven in / oj A Ta_ble 3.3-9 and the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls shall be OPERA 8LE, Gj.5k'T.**"CoM WPMF FM5=nwe#fy] ^ ~7-64; L4;
& 7~##~/ G APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1, 2, and 3.
~
ACTION'- .[ "#^ p:Qu-/fon(g f>neNOn and re[uferd N/ codes l.) ! a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring ch than-in: "' r Ch;....1; 0F F/r.: : required by Table 3.3-9 restore l the inoperable -;h;nn:iO' to OPERABLE status within ays; otherwise, -7 g 4 L g be in at least HOT STANO within the text 6 hours'a in HOT SHUTDOWN l i within the following 6 h urs. y, 5nclion (.c)
- b. With the ASP controls inoperable, restore the inoperable ASP controls to OPERABLE status within ays; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANOBY~/ g.f 4g within the next 6 hours an n HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 l ,
hours. yg
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
. fD s
i ! SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS l 4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentati channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHEC d CHANNEL 7-M-45 CALIBRATION at the frequencies given in Table 4.3-6. 4.3.3.5.2 The ASP controls shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per ~7-/?-t S 18 nonths,{F egere MMD S 7-/9 4 ~ 4.3.3.5.3 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the tureine-criven auxiliary feeowater ^ pump,Nm & l7-//-A 7_ffg
@WM 1
on c $ anne l -/-ho-l-is no rmn / cp, e ige), ~/-pf l.,3 g & gae[ r- u o're ins'fruin e 3/4 3-49 Amencnent No. 45 1 i CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 i . l 1
l _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . --___ __ O. CHANGE (l,.,g WIMIER MiBC DESCRIPTION 7 03 G " L u au. No-l-0e lihaAlt $a 0*l lay. See Onmer.rrm g yg fron ~~IE~ le Ene/osua2f}, 7-04 LS 15 Thischange. increase (sthenumberofdaystheFunction in current TS Table [3.3 9] and the [ ASP] controls may - - - remain inoperable before imposing mode change requirements from 7 days to 30 days. This is based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room. This is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1 (ITS 3.3.4 Condition A). 1 j 7 05 -
.Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison i l
Table (Enclosure 38). 7 06 LG The Readout Location and Total No. of Channels columns in current TS [ Table 3.3 9] have been moved to the Bases of _ y _^ ,
~
improved TS 3.3.4, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. f t-f
- . ,n -.
7-07
% " ,,;. . u. .:Z~X/IEA7 SA-OFA p 'F-3'2.
7-08 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison e Table (Enclosure 38). - j 7 09 LS 43 The current TS require that CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS are performed for instrumentation used in the Po t Accident - Monitoring [and Remote Shutdown] Systems on n 18 month] S M &
; basis. Some of these instruments are then'de energized and remain in this state until re energized for use in the
_Y l management of plant events or for the performance of the -- CHANNEL CHECKS. CHANNEL CHECKS are performed more - . _ frequently than CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS for the purpose of E detecting gross channel failures or excessive drift of one: " - , channel relative to other channels monitoring the same i process variable. During the period that the channel is de energized, it is not subject to the failure mechanisms or conditions that typically lead to instrument failure or ! excessive drift. Recognizing that de-energized channels l are not subjected to the same failure mechanisms as I energized channels, the current TS was revised to exempt l instrumentation that is not normally energized from the performance of the periodic CHANNEL CHECK $. consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. l
- l 7-10 ' ' C Not :pp M s h N Nr::ey. Sx CGaversion C @ eri;;r T.Lic (E.n.1eem, w Sid.-A.re/, N 7-/0-/J ~24 l
~
h 7 11 h e!:t :pplic:ble t c:11eeey. T;bic (Enciescr; 3 % WM M--2F6 e: Conver:1:n c- p:ri: r O ~/'~//~A l l DESCRIPTION OF. CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 28 5/15/97 l
j= l INSERT 3A-28A
, g'.'h $ S.7-::22.
P 6 Applicability in Conditions F and G.] In accordance with LC0 3.0.4. the intermediate JUSTIFICATION' FOR DIFFERENCES TS 10 5/15/97 i
3 ~ m. , Page 14 of 21 CONVERSION COHPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431. SECTION 3.3 APPLICABILITY TECH SPEC CHANGE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY DIABLO CANYON COMMCHE PEAK NUMBER DESCRIPTION No - not in current 'Ifo.notincurrent No not in current Yes , 3.3-91 Add CllANNEL CHECK and response time surveillances (ITS ,i TS. . TS. SR 3.3.9.1 and SR 3.3.9.5) gpr current TS Table 4.3 1. TS. 78-J7-ef; Functional Unit 6. Note 17mM T.17/~.-/y5~, No - adopted ISTS Yes No adopted ISTS No - not in current Adds SR 3.3.4.2 Note that the ASP controls for the TilAFW 3.3 92 TS. format. . format. pump 6 are not required to be verifted prior to b//-A ! entry into MODE 3. consistent with current TS SR 4.3.3.5.3. i Ye; Yes Yes Yeg 3.3-93 ITS 3.3.1 Condition V is deleted. It is not entered from Table 3.3.1-1 nor do the Bases clarify when it wguld be , I needed. raising the concern of misinterpretation. 1 Condition V does not replace LCO 3.0.3 requirements to l ! assess when the plant is outside the licensing basis. ITS 3.3.4 is revised per current TS [3.3.3.5] with regard S Me-a fd M Yet i V Yes MUN l 3.3-94 .r.f7"T [P M , ygf , to [ ASP] controls. I Yes Ypq Yes i Yes ,' 3.3 95 ITS 3.3.1 Condition H. Required ACTION H.1. and the second ' part of Function 4 Applicability (HODE 2 below P 6) In ITS 3.3.1 are deleted since they provide no real compensatory measures. [With their deletion, there is no need to repeat the > P 6 Applicability in Conditions F i andG.] In accordance with LCO 3.0.4. the intermediate range detectors must be OPERABLE prior'to entering the Applicability of the retained part of Function 4 (i.e.. HDDE 2 above P-6). Condition H and Required ACTION H.1 ensure the same thing and, therefore, can be deleted. This change is consistent with TSTF-135. 5/15/97
- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO
- O 7-12-A APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: New Note excludes neutron detectors from CHANNEL CAllBRATION consistent with current TS Table 4.3-1, Functional Unit 6, Note 4 and with improved TS SR 3.3.4.3.
Comment: Insufficient discussion to make a determination that the change is administrative. The RSS CTS does not contain an allowance to exclude neutron detectors from CHANNEL CAllBRATIONS. Delete the proposed Note to ITS SR 3.3.4.3 or provide a DOC to justify the relaxatior. to CTS. FLOG RESPONSE: Wolf Creek and Callaway believe that the proposed change is an administrative change. NRC accepted the same change at Vogtle as an administrative change, 1 as discussed in Section 3.1.3.3 item (21) of the Vogtle SER wherein it was stated that this l change "is essentially an administrative clarification of existing requirements and is therefore 1 acceptable." j DOC 7-12-A is revised to include: l "Since neutron flux is one of the required channels and the detectors are normally excluded from . CHANNEL CAllBRATIONS in other specifications, this Note applies to the SR Frequency in CTS l Table 4.3-6. Neutron detectors are one type of sensor that can not be adjusted per the definition of CHANNEL CALIBRATION. As discussed in the ITS SR 3.3.1.11 Bases, the CHANNEL CAllBRATION for the source range detectors consists of obtaining integral bias curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. This Note in ITS SR 3.3.4.3 is consistent with other CTS requirements for calibrating channels containing neutron l detectors. This change is considered an administrative clarification of existing requirements." . > ATTACHED PAGES: l Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 l Enclosure 3A, page 29 i I J
! l l CHANGE ] i NUMBER HSBC. DESCRIPTION MW i 7 3A-29A \ l (fg M 7 12 A New Note excludes neutron detectors from CHANNEL 7-/?d CALIBRATION consistent with current TS Table 4.31. l Functional Unit 6, Note 4 and with improved TS SR 3.3.4.3. 7_g z,g 4 WW 7A-218 , f) 7._jg l B 01 A This change. consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. revises l
" Channel" and " Instrument" to " Function."
l l 8 02 - Not used. 8 03 A This change revises current TS Table [3.310] to clarify the number of channels ri. quired to be operable. This is an administrative change which deletes the " Minimum Channels Operable" column [and revises the "[ Total] No. of Channels" column to be the " Required Channels" column]. The required actions are now based on one channel inoperable or two channels inoperable, rather than "less than the Total Number" or "less than Minimum Number." This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 8 04 LS-17 Consistent with NiREG 1431 Rev.1 (ITS 3.3.3 Required Actions C.1, E.1, and G.1), this change deletes the requirement to initiate an alternate means of monitoring within 72 hours when two channels of Containment Radiation q _, Level [or RVLIS] are inoperable as specified in current TS [3.3.3.6 Action c]. 8 05 A In conjunction with CN 8 03 A. this change rearranges the ACTION Statements for the single channel Functions (i.e., j SG Water Level - Wide Range and AFW Flow Rate). No change L in A0T is requested, therefore this is an administrative change. 8 06 LG Specific equipment ID numbers are moved to the ITS Bases. E 8 07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ! { Table (Enclosure 38). 8 08 LS 27 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).
~
8 09 lG M m. .rNSGR7~ 3'A-MC h 8 10 - Not used. 8 11 LS 30 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison p p_// Table (Enclosure 3B).
- + +
P-// - + a ! P-// L 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 29 [
N' " r fsund 4."abe- M l l INSERT 3A-29A A t t@ 7-/2-4
%gy Since neutron flux is one of the required channels and the detectors are normally
~ excluded from CHANNEL CAllBRATIONS in other specifications, this Note applies to
~
the SR Frequency in CTS Table 4.3-6. Neutron detectors are one type of sensor that can not be adjusted per the definition of CHANNEL CALIBRATION. As discussed in the ITS SR 3.3.1.11 Bases, the CHANNEL CAllBRATION for the source range detectors consists of obtaining integral bias curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. This Note in ITS SR 3.3.4:3 is consistent with other CTS requirements for calibrating channels containirig neutron detectors. This change is considered an administrative clarification of existing requirements. l
- [ _ INSERT 3A-298 Q >l3 CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 requires the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating each actuated component from the ASP. The proposed change revises CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 to delete the phrase "by operating each actuated component from the ASP." The OPERABILITY of the ASP
.;.- ' controls ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to place and maintain the unit in MODE 3 should the control room become inaccessible.
~ CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 verifies that the ASP controls perform the intended function. The CTS requirement to operate each actuated component is overly restrictive since the specific components associated with the ASP are verified OPERABLE by other specifications.
For example, FSAR Section 7.4.3.1.1 identifies the automatic / manual control for each power operated atmospheric dump valve as an ASP control. ITS SR 3.7.4.1 verifies that the atmospheric dump valve is OPERABLE by performance of one complete cycle of , each valve. Operation of the equipment from the ASP is not necessary. The surveillance ' l can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check. Performance of this surveillance in conjunction with the performance of other required surveillances on equipment associated with the ASP will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3. I
l i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 7-13 APPLICABILITY: CA, WC , REQUEST: This item was identified during the licensee /NRC meeting on August 11,1998. The NRC requested a DOC be initiated to identify either moving portions of CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 conceming operating each actuated component from the ASP or deletion of the requirement. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 7-13 LS-44 was initiated. The DOC states: ;
" CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 requires the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls be :
i demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating each l l actuated component from the ASP. The proposed change revises CTS SR J l 4.3.3.5.2 to delete the phrase "by operating each actuated component from the l ASP." The OPERABILITY of the ASP controls ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to place and maintain the unit in MODE 3 should the control room become inaccessible. CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 verifies that the ASP controls perform the intended function. The CTS requirement to ! operate each actuated component is overly restrictive since the specific components associated with the ASP are verified OPERABLE by other ; specifications. For example, FSAR Section 7.4.3.1.1 identifies the automatic / manual control for each power operated atmospheric dump valve as an ASP control. ITS SR 3.7.4.1 verifies that the atmospheric dump valve is OPERABLE by performance of one complete cycle of each valve. Operation of the equipment from the ASP is not necessary. The surveillance can be satisfied i by performance of a continuity check. Performance of this surveillance in conjunction with the performance of other required surveillances on equipment i associated with the ASP will ensure that if the control room becomes : inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3." ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, page 3/4 3-49 Enclosure 3A, page 29 Enclosure 3B, page 24 Enclosure 4, pages 2 (new LS-44),82 (new),83 (new), and 84 (new) I i i 1 l l
THSTRUMENTATION
/-43-A REHOTE SNUT00W 23 W 6 5'p'f72!!'M gggg s LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERAT!ON Q shutdown'6 m :1:V &nchnt
.1.3.3.5 The remote given in Wg Table 3.3-9 and the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls shall be OPERABLE, WMcMMP1WP FMwwMp) ^ JL.pf Lf:
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. (N'Y #*l'*"Y' 0"ES *h I' 'll' "'I A b ' l~cl-A ACr10N.'
&ne-la and rer.ur-rd MW con +rsI.)
n F5ukon(z.)
- a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring chrul: Mess ~/g/ g than-tn: "2 Chn.mi; OP: Pal: n required by Table 3.3-9, restore the inoperable 4hnn:1':' to OPERABLE status within ays; otherwise, -/ g g g g be in at least HOT STAND within the next 6 hours a in HOT SHUTD3W within the following 6 h urs. 3
/~5nclim (.c)
- b. With the ASP controls inoperable, restore the inoperable ASP controls to OPERABLE status within ays; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANOBY 7 g.f Lg within the next 6 hours an n HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. yg
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
1 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentati channel shall be deconstrated OPERABLE by perforinance of the CHANNEL CHEC nd CHANNEL 7-87-L5 CALIBRATION at the frequencies given in Table 4.3-6. The ASP controls shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 4.3.3.5.2
#ddiMD ~7~/ N S 18 nonths,gy-egpc Q 7-/3
+
a.3.3.5.3 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 for the tureine-driven auxiliary f esowater pwo.afxbed:.spenra 7_ffw
^ & l7-It-A wWM y i g pg,. e,ek r e(utecd in.c+wed h% clonel +h -l-i.e normall er,ey zed. 7-09 3/4 3-49 Amenanent No. 45 i CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 l
J
me ~* m, _ y CHANGE c ~. NUPEER giK DESCRIPTION MW p Qpf 7-12 A New Note excludes neutron detectors from CHANNEL 3A-14A \ CALIBRATION consistent with current TS Table 4.31, @7dM gg -unctivu ' e 4 and with improved TS SR 3.3.4.3. g , , LNJ1GtY 2A-3 48 $"7,jg 8 01 A This cha'nge, cons 1s ent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, revises l
" Channel" and " Instrument" to " Function."
8 02 - Not used. I l 8 03 A This change revises current TS Table [3.310] to clarify the number of channels required to be operable. This is an administrative change which deletes the " Minimum ! Channels Operable" column [and revises the "[ Total] No. of J Channels" column to be the " Required Channels" column]. l The required actions are now based on one channel 1 inoperable or two channels inoperable, rather than "less : than theTotal Number" or "less than Minimmt Number." ' This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. 8 04 LS-17 Consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1 (ITS 3.3.3 Required
- Actions C.1, E.1, and G.1), this change deletes the requirement to initiate an alternate means of monitoring within 72 hours when two channels of Containment Radiation m .,
Level [or RVLIS] are inoperable as specified in current ;
- TS [3.3.3.6 Action c].
4 8 05 A In conjunction with CN 8 03 A, this change rearranges the ACTION Statements for the single channel Functions (i.e., j SG Water Level Wide Range and AFW Flow Rate). No change
- in A0T is requested, therefore this is an administrative
! change. . 8 06 LG Specific equipment ID numbers are moved to the ITS Bases. f 3. 4 8 07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). [ 8 08 LS 27 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). A'*
- 8 09 . LG .:.._,.ryssg7 JA-24c 4
3 8 10 - Not used. 8 11 LS-30 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison p p__jj '
- Table (Enclosure 38).
- + +
P-// p-ll - + " , 29 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS
l lNSERT 3A-29A Q S 7-/2-4 s.w Since neutron flux is one of the required channels and the detectors are normally excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS in other specifications, this Note applies to
~
the SR Frequency in CTS Table 4.3-6. Neutron detectors are one type of sensor that can not be adjusted per the definition of CHANNEL CAllBRATION. As discussed in the ITS SR 3.3.1.11 Bases, the CHANNEL CAllBRATION for the source range detectors consists of obtaining integral bias curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to the manufacturer's data. This Note in ITS _SR 3.3.4:3 is consistent with other CTS requirements for calibrating channels containing neutron detectors. This change is considered an administrative clarification of existing requirements.
.N ~
~
INSERT 3A-298 g sig CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 requires the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating each actuated component from the ASP. The proposed change revises CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 to delete the phrase "by operating each actuated component from the ASP." The OPERABILITY of the ASP controls ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to place and maintain the unit in MODE 3 should the control room become inaccessible. CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 verifies that the ASP controls perform the intended function. The CTS requirement to operate each actuated component is overly restrictive since the specific components associated with the ASP are verified OPERABLE by other specifications. For example, FSAR Section 7.4.3.1.1 identifies the automatic / manual control for each ; poweroperated atmospheric dump valve as an ASP control. ITS SR 3.7.4.1 verifies that I the atmospheric dump valve is OPERABLE by performance of one complete cycle of 1 each valve. Operation of the equipment from the ASP is not necessary. The surveillance 1 can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check. Performance of this surveillance in conjunction with the performance of other required surveillances on equipment associated with the ASP will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3. I i l
. 1
-Y .
y* s 'y q, CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 24 of 26 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 7-09 Clarification is provided that Channel Checks are only Yes Yes Yes LS 43 required for normally energized instrumentation channels by . ,,,,_ adding "for each required instrumentation channel that is s . , um -- normally energized", per ITS [SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.4.1) to CTS [4.3.3.5.1 and 4.3.3.6]. 8 ~/ dfy 7-10 LS-26 In t 11ab TS. or de ay he remov , using ina n that steam rumen rat i a WA// f} v4/[/) A .a in G. A//A m ic.a W iw - nu in cuisen c 4 ava le he r e shut pa , is bas on eam rat level aux 11 ry f ter fl ot steam g ~/-./d -/ f .2g ge or. the ITS t is r ognized at e of se indi tions i sufficie t. A/ ue , 7-11 CTS SR 4.3.3.5.3fs e . Als ic n No - not in current No - not in current Yes "; rd e d '-- -*-h u r c er nts i or TS. TS. .MS- e.r r ir
.rMrce7 1Pg-a+A g 7-y-A 1 7-12 New Note excludes neutron detectors from CHANNEL No - not in current No - already in Yes Yes A CALIBRATION consistent with current TS Table 4.3-1. TS. current TS.
Functional Unit 6. Note 4 and with improved TS SR 3.3.4.3. 8-01 This change, consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. revises Yes Yes Yes Yes A "CNnnel" and " Instrument" to " Function." 8-02 Not used. N/A N/A N/A N/A ! 8 03 This change revises current TS Table [3.3-10] to clarify Yes Yes Yes Yes A the nunber of channels required to be Operable. This is an < administrative change which deletes the " Minimum Channels Operable" column [and revises the "[ Total] No. of Channels" ; column to be the " Required Channels" column]. The required actions are now based on one channel inoperable or two channels inoperable, rather than "less than the Total Number" or "less than Minimum Nunber."
$0-rwh I'n CT[,
SSEA7~ .?$~e2$( h lc -tsc h In W . er feI h Y-/3 t CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97
.z_.
_ _ . . . _ . . q _g. _, ,. . . . - - . # _. . _ ,. _.. . , INSERT 3B-24A sn Q 1-II-A g - . .
~~~
~;~which provides a 4.0.4 exception for entry into MODE 3 for the [ ] ASDs (Callaway) /
__- ARVs (Wolf Creek)is deleted. INSERT 3B-24B
%/
CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 requires the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls be demonstrated _ OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating each actuated component from
-Fsy '
. m. :-the ASP. The proposed change revises CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 to delete the phrase "by n ._
~:-
7;.; .
'Joperating each actuate d component from the ASP." p~
1 P* e ~a.
.,4
-y __
6-tme s, a e+ m-m-- 9 {. $ 8 W'
-< ~ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . ~ . . . _ _~. .
1 l NO SIGN 1FICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION (NSHC)
. CONTENTS (continued) aA<
ww t) ?' .-
^
g.re
~ LS~- 28. . ~. T.~.'.~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not :;;l Mi e .hC-3.3- #d /
_.- LS-29......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No t a ppl i cabl e ~ LS - 3 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N0 t a ppl i ca bl e LS 31................................................................... 53 LS-32................................................................... 56 LS-33................................................................... 58 LS-34.....................................,.............................61 LS- 35. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not a ppl i cabl e LS-36. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Wo.kMN.d. . . :4+- CA-1.3mWy LS-37..............................................................2...66 Ls.38. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Naf. m . . 48 c4-s.s.ea LS-39................................................................... 70 LS-40................................................................... 72 L541..x.......'..~........................................................74 1 LE-42_.......................... ........................................ 76 ._ LS-43^..................................................................... 80
\
V. Recurring No Significant Hazards Considerations "TR"
.- .TR-1.................................................................... e t M.. h>
87 ,
.wx ..
. g:n & 1-1.L 1 U-H \
Ls-+C PC A 5 y_ +g No+ *tt fre.1le & l- Q U-+1 N'+ "MI ' d I' A I~W u -.q-r y,+ yIrcJta & 2-o!(3.*d U-+1 Wo+ afy I reJla a2-M + L/-CD N,+ egircJIs & SW U s~l N,+,y/re,Lla 03.2-7f U-sa. y,+,ylicJle Q 3. 3 - 9.2 i_.5-s3 N,+ og/ ruble b 6-7.1-*c1 , l-~f-S~+ Als+ yIrcJ/a bc-2 %+- syw .
.m
?D)
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 2 5/15/97 t i
. . _ _ m._
r ---mass .
. . INSERT LS-44 YM t
o b;:- , I IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS 1 NSHC LS-44 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION l FOR l TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE I REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 requires the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating each actuated component from the ASP. The proposed change revises CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 to delete the phrase "by i operating each actuated component from the ASP."If tempcgary evacuation of the j control room is required because of some abnormal condition, tne operators can establish and maintain the plant in a hot standby condition from outside the control room. The OPERABILITY of the ASP controls ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to place and maintain the unit in MODE 3 should the control room become inaccessible. CTS SR 4.3.3.5.2 verifies that the ASP controls perform the ' 1 intended function. The CTS requirement to operate each actuated component is overly restrictive since the specific components associated with the ASP are verified - OPERABLE by other specifications. For example, FSAR Section 7.4.3.1.1 identifies the automatic / manual control for each power operated atmospheric dump valve as an ASP control. ITS SR 3.7.4.1 verifies that the atmospheric dump valve is OPERABLE by performance of one complete cycle of each valve. Operation of the equipment from the 4 ASP is net necessary. The surveillance can be satisfied by performance of a continuity check. Performance of this surveillance in conjunction with the perfomiance of other required surveillances on equipment associated with the ASP will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3. This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 orfor a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facilityin accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated; or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new ordifferent kind of accident fmm any accident previously evaluated; or P2
l IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION NSHC LS-44 i (continued)
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards: 1 ! 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? l l The proposed change involves surveillance requirements for ASP controls that are used l to place and maintain the plant in MODE 3 from a location other than the control room. This type of change would have no effect on the probability of occurrence of previously evaluated accidents. The equipment required to be operated and monitored from the ASP are not modified by the proposed change and will be maintained OPERABLE in accordance the equipment-specific surveillance requirements. ITS SR 3.3.4.2 will ensure that the ASP controls are OPERABLE such that, if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 from outside the control room. No changes in the ASP controls would result from the proposed change, and the consequences of postulated accidents would not be adversely affected. Therefore, the proposed change would not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident. l 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? The assumptions of the accident analyses are unaffected by the proposed change. The surveillance requirements that remain in Technical Specifications provide assurance that the unit can be placed and maintained in MODE 3 from outside the control room. Also, no new permutations or event initiators are introduced by the deletion of the requirement to operate each actuated component from the ASP. Therefore, this proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.
- 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed change has an insignificant effect on OPERABILITY requirements of the ASP controls necessary to place and maintain the unit in MODE 3 from a location other than the control room. The remaining surveillance of controls and equipment-specific surveillance requirements assure proper mitigation of assumed events. In addition, the accident analyses are assumed to be initiated from conditions which are consistent with the Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operation. The proposed change would not have a significant effect on ASP controls' OPERABILITY. Therefore, there is no change in the accident analyses and all relevant event acceptance criteria remain l i valid. Further, the proposed change has no effect on any actual or regulated failure point which is protected by an event acceptance criterion. Because there is no change in any failure point nor in any event acceptance criteria, there is no reduction in a margin of safety.
0 7-/3
,s IV. SPECIFIG NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION (i '. G
'Qg NSHC LS-44 (continued) NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS-44" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified. A P+
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 8-01-A APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: This change, consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1, revises " Channel" and
" Instrument" to " Function."
Comment: Insufficient discusdon b make a determination that the change is administrative. Ravise DOC. Ali occurrences of this change in CTS 3.3.6 are neither identified nor evaluated. FLOG RESPONSE: See response to Comeant Number Q 1-A-GEN and new DOC 1-63-A. ATTACHED PAGES: See attached pages for Comment Number Q 1-A-GEN. 1 l 1 l l l l I i l l l
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 8-04-LS-17 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1 (ITS 3.3.3 Required Actions C.1, E.1, and G.1), this change deletes the requirement to initiate an altemate means of monitoring within i, 72 hours when two channels of containment radiation level (or RVLIS) are inoperable as specified in current TS [3.3.3.6 ACTION c). Comment: What is the basis for deleting the requirement to initiate the alternate method , of mordtoring in the case of containment high range radiation monitoring? The NSHC indicates that this automatically happens in the case of RVLIS, but implies that PASS monitoring of the containment is not initiated under condition G. i' FLOG RESPO"SE: NSHC LS-17 has been revised as per the attached. ' 4 ATTACHED PAGES: ! Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 4, page 49 4 i
l IV. SPEC 1FIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDEPATIONS i NSHC LS 17 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS This change deletes the requirement to initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring containment radiation [or reactor vessel water level] within 72 hours when two channels are inoperable. This makes ACTION [c] of current TS LC0 [3.3.3.6] the same as ACTION [b], except that a plant shutdown is not needed if the 7 dsy A0T is not met for these functions with preplanned alternates. Containment radiation indication is used to assess whether the fuel cladding and reactor coolant pressure boundaries have been breached such that a significant portion of the core activity inventory is available for release to the environs. The preplanned alternate for this variable uses the PASS system which is administratively controlled outside the TS. [The preplanned alternates for RVLIS include a combination of the core exit the mocouples, RCS wide range hot and cold leg temperature, wide range RCS pressure, pr ssurizer level, and RCS subcooling monitor indications to verify adequete core c ling.] These variables are already continuously monitored under the LCO and do t require an action directing that they be initiated. 1 Metr L.E-/~7 0 P-M-LT-1~1 The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Comission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change i'nvolve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. l NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 49 5/15/97
i-I INSERT LS-17 g 7_gg_f7 Implementation of containment air sampling via the PASS will be initiated as required by i ITS 3.3.3 Condition G. There is no safety benefit to activating the PASS earlier than < required by Condition G considering the other indications available to detect inadequate core cooling. > l I
\
1 i
l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 8-05-A APPLICABILITY: CA, WC i i REQUEST: In conjunction with CN 8-03-A, this change rearranges the ACTION Statements for . the single channel Functions (i.e., SG Water Level- Wide Range and AFW Flow Rate). No
- change in AOT is requested, therefore this is an administrative change.
l Comment: Insufficient discussion to make a determination that the change is I administrative, Revise DOC. , FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-21 conceming the required l number of channels for wide range steam generator water level and AFW flow rate. Based on maintaining the CTS for these functions, DOC 8-05-A provides the administrative changes to reflect single channel actions. ' ATTACHED PAGES: i l None i l 1 I l
I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 8-07f APPLICABILITY: CA, DC, WC l l REQUEST: ITS proposes steam generator water level (Wide Range) and auxiliary feedwater flow l functions as diverse variables because the ITS includes only one required instrument channel for each function per steam generator. Comment: The staff does not credit Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Range) and l Auxiliary Feedwater Flow functions as diverse PAM variables. However, the staff does credit Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Ranoe) instrumentation in redundant loops in three and four loop Westinghouse plant designs. The staff also credits Auxiliary l Feedwater Flow instrumentation in redundant loops in three and four loop Westinghouse plants. Therefore, credit for redundant loop design is given for specified PAM functions. If credit is taken for the redundancy provided by the instrumentation in the other loops, the l STS LCO wording applies and the required number of channels is "2." Provide a design l basis justification for deviating from the STS required number of channels for steam ; l generator water level (Wide Range) and auxiliary feedwater flow. ! l FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-21 (4) for WCGS and Callaway and Comment Number Q 3.3-71 for DCPP. I l ATTACHED PAGES: l None l i i i
- . - ., .. . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - ~ _. . ._ _ .
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-03-A (2.0) APPLICABILITY: CA, WC REQUEST: CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.2-1, and the values for Total Allowance (TA), Z, and Sensor Error (S) are deleted, consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1, as they are no longer required. Comment: Explain the justification that administrative TS changes include moving CTS requirements that permit adjustment of trip setpoints to a licensee controlled document 4 (TS Bases or FSAR). Additionally, the 12 hour limit to sdjust the trip setpoint in ACTION ] b.1 is deleted. The staff position is that this change is less restrictive. FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number Q 2-02-A (3.3). I i ! ATTACHED PAGES: None ) 1 4 I i
l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 2-04.M (2.0) APPLICABILITY: CA, DC, WC I l REQUEST: Addition of the inequality signs to K , K4, Ks, and Ke, consistent with NUREG-1431 i Rev.1, indicates the conservative direction for these K values. i l Comment: Potential OOS - Provide a source document to justify this change, preferab!y a document that has staff review and approval. l l FLOG RESPONSE: This DOC is deleted and the CTS is retained. JFD 3.3-10 is revised for l Callaway and WCGS and new JFD 3.3-108 is added for DCPP to justify the revision of the ITS to i be consistent with the CTS. ' l ATTACHED PAGES: '
' Attachment 5, CTS 2.0 - ITS 2.0 Enclosure 2, pages 2-7,2-9 and 2-10 Enclosure 3A, page 2 -
Enclosure 3B, page 1 l Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 j Enclosure 5A, pages 3.3-23 and 3.3-24 , Enclosure 6A, page 2 r Enclosure 68, page 2 - l ! l l l i l-A l
1 s <- J ]'.), 'w f))GE LATER AlnENbEb TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) h e e h e M
- d -* f [ *# * )
TABLE NOTATIONS n
?
E NOTC 1: OVERTEMPERATURE AT r Aikw*Lle Valsoe cl.// nt excad +4a f.thary a . ,_,.L c M l The .re Ow,-}ege>*lare idbyg **' O.3*AAT
- funffy'" ,
~
- 8~ 2' 3 i (l47,5) 14r35 (1+r35) 147,5 Where: AT - Measured AT; ,
J11,1 - Lead-Lag compensator on measured AT; 1 + r,5 ri,r, - Time constants utilized in lead-l' ga compensator for AT,r:18s,r,s3s; 1 1 - Lag compensator on measured AT; 1+r35 - ' '- , U , t - C/!me constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, r3 - Os; , AT, - , Indicated AT at RATED TilERMAL POWER;
- K, ^== g h 1.15; & 2Mf-M
- 0.0251/*F; _
bd MS - The function generated by the lead-lag compensator for T,, dynamic ; 1+r35 compensation; y r e ,r3 - Time constants uttilzed in the lead-lag compensator for T.,, is 2 28s, kk is 5 453
$ T - Average temperature,*F;
[ l - Lag compensator on measured T,,; ! 1+rgS
.M r6 -
Time constant uttilzed in the measured T,, lag compensator, r, - Os;
.'u .
- 1
n ::. iy, Q' . (%) (v'it
. 4 u v-
. TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS S I' *W* c A_y.g- m 7 { NOTE 1: OVERTEMPERATURE AT 4 4 gjf jf, gfy, ff,// mf_ men,/ -/4e 4 //es#7
~
p,p,
/ 1 (147,5) T 1 e AT S AT,(K, , -T' +K 3 (P- P')- f,(Al)}
z (l47,5) 14r35 (l4r 35) I +r65 4
.. f PS% A*TY CA-T.!-ee~}.
Where: AT - Measured AT; , J11,5 - Lead-Lag compensator on measured AT; 1+r,5 r,,r, - Time constants utilized in lead-lag compensator for AT,r:18s,r,53s; 1 - Lag compensator on measured AT; 1+r35 N de r3 - Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, r3 - Os; To - Ind ed AT at RAT D TilERMAL POWER; l; jirdi 4 -
- 0. :;.gd-*~" dW #'
The function generated by the lead-lag compensator for T,, dynamic
% w !
1+r35 compensation; Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T,,, JR 75,75 - 75 S 4s; r 2 28s, e O T - Average temperature,*F; 1 - Lag compensator on measured T,,; 4< - 1+r gS dt f .M r, - Time constant utilized in the measured T , lag compensator, r6- Os;
.C ,
f i
L i.
'w m- %' /* AGE LATER AthENb&b TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued) 9 2 r-G f!0TE : OVERPOWER oT ewer s'Y funelsen Alton,ste %I e rLall ow+ exeand +1.< fa tt,,73 ,,9,.,g. 2-02-t G-Si
- enoen overg%p D.+*/s of sTrfen :
- T '13_r,(gy);
14 35 5 #* N4- #5 T - #6[T ( r) g , , Where: AT - Measured AT; 1 + r ,_S. - lead-lag compensator on measured AT; 147,5 r,, r, - Time constants utilized in lead-lag compensator for AT,r,18s,r as3s; y 1 - Lag compensator on measured AT;
& 1+r35 r3 -
Time constant utt11 zed in the lag compensator for AT, r3 - Os;
- ndicated AT at RATED TilERMAL POWE'R; N
.090; K4 .__ g ON 20
_a K3 -
' 0.02/*F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing avera e(([
E$o. f A temperature; 6 2-df-M(2,4 e - l r _r 75 1+r75 The function generated by the rate-lag compensator for T,y, dynamic compensation; E Time constant utilized in the rate-lag compensator for T,,,, 77 - 77 2 los;
~g 1 -
Lag compensator on measured T,,,; 14765
-.D r, - Time constant utilized in the measured T,,, lag compensator, r3- Os; E
~ '
i i TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) l l TABLE NOTATIONS-(Continued) l
! 9 2 ~ # @ I M "7 i h "c""'
- NOTE OVERPOWER AT Tl@y:M##;y' "' " " "~&" "~ ;
? ' ~ ~
* '~ ' ' 2 (14r25) 1 +r3 5 1 +r75 1 +r6S 1 +r3S Where: AT - Measured AT; I DY* W QA-9.900~7 '
J11,5 - Lead-Lag compensator on measured AT; 1+r 2S ; r,,r, - Time constants utilized in lead-lag compensator for AT,r,189,rzs3s; m 1 - Lag compensator on measur'ed AT; a 1+735 r3 - Time constant utilized in the lag compensator for AT, r3 bs; AT, - Cjndicated AT at RATED TilERMAL POWER; Kc ::: j .1073; C H - 7. y $ aq pl[2.d}
+k E
K5 =
^
j 0.02/*F for increasing average temperature and 0 fo cr asin average A 4 a temperature; $2 (J. ! ( _ nob l" _t S._ 7
- The function generated by the rate-lag compensator for T,,, dynamic '
1+r75 compensation; j
}% kE r7 - Time constant utilized in the rate-lag compensator for T,,,, r7 2 los;
/
~
d y, 1 - Lag compensator on measured T,,,; 14765 7* 76 - Time constant utilized in the measured T,,, lag compensator, r6 - Os; E
>+
- g, .
ff GE LATEA AMW (.ree nednk-eyf*y JABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) o
~! #
TABLE NOTATIONS fContinued)' E f W NOTE: @ (Co nued) ~ e - T2_tg 7 K6 ::=
^
g 0.0015/*F for T > T" and K - O for T s T"; $ 24M [2.4) e / 5
-4 T -
Average Temperature, *F; -
~
T" - Indicated T,9 at RATED THERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for AT instrumentation, s 588.4*F); 5 - Laplace transform operator, s; and f,(61) = 0 for all AI. NOTE 4: The channel's maxi;;. Trip Scipcint shall not exceed it: : puted T !p setpeint by w re n- g[ ptg m 2.8v ef AT spen
.O e
88 "it
it! tag . . . . .
~
TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) n p TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued) { k NOTE (Continu _ 3-02-G h K, -_ ._ .0015/'F for T >.T" and K 6 = 0 for T s T": $ 2 M (2 4)
-i 4 _ ~
i = Average Temperature. ,F: T" = Indicated T at RATED Ti1ERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for AT. instrumentaEfon.s588.4*F)i S = laplace transform operator, s"; and f 2(AI) = 0 for all AI. 7 "0TE i- The ch :rncl'c ==i = Tri Scipcint shcIl not excccd its cc puted h ip Sctpcir.t by arc thar, 3-02-L6 , G - 1.21% of AT ; pen (1.02: "g") -- l l
<o 3 '
O- t E3 ro
""3 rt ,
Z P
, 2 LO hO co ca (M
in O
-a b Q l fo .
I ~ CHANGE l NUMBER HSBC DESCRIPTION
, effectively allows rack error to increase above its nominal value by an amount dependent on the available setpoint margin; however this margin is available for utilization at any time and is not restricted to whether 4 the ACTION is entered. As such, current ACTION b.1 l effectively provides no different recourse than current I
~ ACTION b.2. With a nonconservative as measured trip setpoint, current practice is to enter ACTION b.2. . Therefore, CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.2 1, and the values for TA, Z, and S can be deleted as they are no longer required. fee 4 /.ra h4 C 2-M fn fAe 7,'?/acl y e, p{q g,3) 2 04 Nah
@ u.rd, ion
,{Ad nsi nt w the ua y si . s to 3 K.
4 , ga , NURE 1431 v. I ndic es ty M g'#M) con rvati dire on f thes val s.f j l 2 05 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). l f 2 06 LG The requirements stipulated in ACTIONS [a and b] are moved j to ITS Table 3.3.11, with direction contained in [the ITS Background (Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values) Bases, ACTIONS Bases, and SR 3.3.1.10 and SR 3.3.1.11 Bases). ! This change removes details more appropriately controlled l
- outside of the TS while retaining those aspects necessary i to assure the protection functions are performed if necessary.
I
- 2-07 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison j Table (Enclosure 3B).
l a-o y No+ a liedh h C*Itawy. J'e, cwa,,u, c,q,.rs,n 7;6te enet ura 28) . cf-2.e-pos DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 2 5/15/97
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT 15 2.0 Page 1 of 1 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON CONANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY No - not in current l Yes 1-01 The specific restrictions on nim 6er of loops and licensed No - not in current Yes A reactor power for power operation would be removed from the TS. TS. SLs. These restrictions are stated in other requirements of the license. The requirements esbodied in separate adntinistrative Yes Yes Yes Yes 1-02 A controls dealing with SL violations are deleted. The requirements of this LCD are moved to ITS LCO 3.3.1. Yes Yes Yes Yes 2-01 A 2-02 The Reactor Trip System instrumentation Trip Setpoints are No - Retained Yes - Noved to Yes - Moved to Yes - Noved to Lb moved to a licensee controlled document. current TS. ITS 3.3.1 Bases. USAR. ITS 3.3.1 Bases. 2-03 CTS ACTION b.1. Equation 2.2-1, and the values for Total No - not in current No not in current Yes Yes A Allowance (TA). Z, and Sensor Error (S) are deleted. TS. 15. consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev.1. as they are no longer required.
^
2 04 /Rddi n of i al' y si st i. . a . -Ves-N/A L;mi A -Vee,h/A G 431 v. .I cat e. . .. .; 'S N/A ($ l 1ste wit wr tive trer f the r ue g,fg,g $ 2% .2,0) This change corrects the OTaT rd "r?- equation in the DCPP Yes No No No 2-05 A CTS by relocating the bracket to the correct position, as described in CN 3.310 of the 3.? pr9= - CTTJ[+.3 af meb'Nnf-The requirements stipulated in ACTIONS [a and b] are moved Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 06 LG to ITS Table 3.3.11, with direction contained in the ITS Bases. This change incorporates the values for T' (NominalyT at Yes No No No 2 07 A RATED TliERHAL POWER). that were inadvertently deleted during a previous License Amendnent for DCPP. y 11,rc ctres .cfeeifre ebqs revint rwe .:1.2-1, h!o yas th A), c/L2 .7-mg A IMe l -fe ref!*c+ ^ew ow -lemperalm IV-Ik (* & yrs *ttraved & dnr4.1 in /Mahd 55f+1, *~J rukrHed -h4r+I in LAt 97-pgy, CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97
l I RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ! i Table 3.3.1-1 (page 8 of 9) Reactor Trip System Instrunentation Note ir overtemocrature AT Th1 Overtenperature AT Function llowable Value shall not exceed the following fetp setpoint by more than ibfHi M **A 'T ' d l ! S % M P . CA-3.3--n 1 B PS 1.23*4 g,g-j4e (1+ T2 s) i (1+ T's) Ar 1
- s a r, < xg3 r
1
- r' #
+ x, (P - P ) - f (6 I) 3
' 3.3 (1+ T,s) ,1+ T 3s (1+ T3 s) (1+ T,s)
Whers: AT is measured RCS AT, *F. aTo is the indicated AT at RTP, 'F. s is the Laplace transform operator, sec'8 l T is the measured RCS average tenperature, *F. T' is the vienrmet N T at m RTP, s 5662f $881 M .g.p3 P is measure pressurizer pressure, psig.
' is th nominal RCS operating pressure e @]IEZ55 psio. B.pS -
K M/,/fSb K t P 9:et38 p,1251/*F K3 = 9-90067+ G101M/psig
'< i i B see te s 3 see 13 T-E see F M hsec OA".9t-/4033"$~/
.7 B PS 3.
t > 55 28 see . Ti s & see t. T-2 see s,.R isec
~'
f i(41) = q - g)) when 4 - q ic SM g A ] 3.3-10;
/ $315Mi 0% of RTP +n?6 (55 5M whenq'q when g - > RTP gg 7.7-/B 031555 + 05 ((q - q) - M qk q - g s M KRTP
'RTP ,/s
-B PS where q and q are percent P in the uppe and lower halves of the core, respectively, 4
d . 2,0 and q $ q is the total THE L POWER in ercent RTP.
-21%
1 b MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 23 5/15/97
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 O' e i Table 3.3.1-1 (page 9 of 9) Reactor Trip Systern Instrtsnentation Note 22 Dvernower AT The Overpower AT Func(ion Allowable Value shall not exceed the following trip setpoint by more than M W of AT B-PS
'P'"( l 12% frf). j,2,y, CA-19e1 Ar (1+ T,s) g
( T,s) 1 g
-r y 8.3~/N 5 A r, < K,- r - K, r - f,(a I)
(1+ T,s) 1+T,s, K, (1 + T,s) 1 + T,s , (1+ T,s) Whers: is measured RCS AT, *F. AT, is the indicated AT st RTP, 'F. s is the L.aplace transform operator, sec'8 T is the measured RCS sverage tenperature, *F. 2 8~/d J_^?=" Q
^ ~
T* is the M tiominet m 'CLT-' " g.p3 e W &~2W(2 , at RTP g h Q&h N _ h , h 2~6i 20) K4 . /,/$73 K5 05E/*F for increasing Tm K6 e:ee+2e 930035/*F when T T* @ 2 M 7 D/*F for ciecreasing T , 0/*F when T s T* g,'3'-/fd ti a 8 see Tr s 5 see 13 T-2-see = p h g.p3 ts -r+we 1,a 30 see _ fi '
"M
(.ur.. ) f (AI) = 0% RTP for all al. l
/
MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 24 5/15/97
l CHANGE NUMER JUSTIFICATION
' t 3.3 08 This change deletes the Reviewer's Note in ITS Tables 3.3.1-1 and l .' 3.3.2-1 and adds a Note reflecting the Allowable Value as the LSSS.
Trip Setpoints are listed in the Bases as one of the allowed formats approved by the NRC. These changes are acceptable as administrative changes.to match an approved format. 3.3 09 The addition of footnote [(m)] to ITS Table 3.3.11 for Function 10 clarifies the low flow setpoint relationship to the quantity identified l as[ Minimum Heasured " Flow 7 consistent with the current f) 7,7.d TS. GEN l 3.3 10 [The Overtemperature aT setpoint equation had a bracket in the wrong l place and was corrected. The OTAT equation in NUREG-1431 Rev. I shows l the lead lag compensation associated with the ters (1 + T.S)/(1 + T,5) l to be applicable to the T' ters. This is incorrect. This error can ( also be found in Revision 4a of NUREG 0452. This error apparently was i taken from Section A 3 and Figure A 1 of WCAP 8745 P and WCAP 8746 as l well as frour Figure 6.1-4 of WCAP-7907 P A, "LOFTRAN Code Description," l April 1984. The latter reference has been corrected in Figure 6.14 of l WCAP 7878, "LOFTRAN Code Description and User's Manual," Revision 5, November 1989. The lead lag compensation applies only to the measured $2M l T ,. This is consistent with the manner in which the electronics have [2 0) ! always processed the OTAT setpoint signal, as depicted on Westinghouse l drawing 8756D37 sheets 710 referenced in FSAR Section 1.7.] pm.ner 0.Q7
~
l nange needed for the Overtemperature AT setpoint equation conce l i sign for the Kr ters. As defined in NUREG 1431 . , this l ters has a "2 In this case, the Overtempera setpoint l would be conservatively if T we reasing above j l l l ,/,- [588.4*F], i.e. with (T T*) a po alue. However, if T were j l decreasing below [588.4*F] t (T - s a negative value, the l g/ , 2 sign could result n unwarranted increase i Overtemperature l l i k N>/>b>h)l A 5 4,e AT setpoint. refore, the inequality sign for K, is equal si , consistent with the current TS. This issue is a to an in , l c4enpe/-/a the struct of the Overpower AT setpoint equation by setting K, K. og/.rpre-/r. zero for decreasing T , i.e. K, and K, are conditionally defined. In addition, the f (aI) penalty function was corrected to reflect g wfg 3 l g4 correct decimal point placement and to ensure a reduction in the i c rt, setpoint if (q, q ) is outside the deadband. The' f (aI) value must t be positive such that it lowers the setpoint when subtracted.' The inequality signs around the deadband were corrected to reflect a zero penalty when (qt - q,) is within the deadband. Decimal point placement > corrections have been made to recognize that the penalty function gains have units of (*F or % AT span per % RTP). C ] l 3.3 11 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table j- (Enclosure 6B). 1 This change corrects a typo in the inequality sign of ITS Table 3.3.2-1 b ). 3.3 12 Note (h). The time constant should be ~2" the specified value. l JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 2 5/15/97
,' Rh o
3 t CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431, SECTION 3.3 Page 2 of 21 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CAL [AWAY 3.3 07 Note 3 is added to ITS SR 3.3.1.11 to be consistent with Yes Yes Yes Yes the current TS Table 4.3-1 Note [5]. This ensures that this exception, for power and intermediate range detector plateau voltage verification as discussed in the ITS BASES for SR 3.3.1.11, is included in the Technical Specifications rather than being only found in the BASES. 3.3 08 Deletes the Reviewer's Note in ITS Tables 3.3.1 1 and No retained Yes Yes Yes 3.3.2-1 and adds a Note reflecting the Allowable Value as current TS format. the LSSS. Trip Setpoints are listed in the Bases. 3.3-09 The addition of footnote [(m)] to ITS Table 3.3.1-1 for .Yes No - not in current No - not in current Yes (current TS per Function 10 clarifies the low flow setpoint relationship TS. TS. OL Amendment No. 15 tothequantityidentifiedas@inimumMeasuredFlow.} consistent with the current TS. dated 4 8-86)I EV
$ EJ, 3.3-10 [The Overtemperature ai setpoint equation had a bracket in -4ee-/ f .re e No - see CN 3.3-38. Yes Yes (current TS per the wrong place and was corrected.] In addition, the f CA/.F,9 -/d A OL Amendment (aI) penalty functi was corrected and t inamlity _ _
No. 102 dated ggal)s1@C g,, &g gM ( ) 8-21-95) d 2.i91L.4[ . 3.3-11 Added*orRbControISystemincapableof rod Yes No - see CN 3.3 41. No - see CN 3.3-41. No - see CN 3.3-41. withdrawal," which makes Note (f) the coglete antithesis of Note (b). 3.3-12 Corrects typo in the inequality sign of ITS Table 3.3.2-1 No - see CN Yes Yes Yes Note (h). 3.3-105. 3.3-13 The equations for Overtegerature aT and Overpower aT are Yes No No No revised to be consistent with the DCPP CTS. The value of the time constant T has always been 0 seconds and the factor utilizing the time constant has not been shown as part of the equation in licensing doctments since the factor value has been unity. Thus, the factor utilizing the time constant has been deleted. 3.3-14 Retains the monthly CUT for Function 6.h of ITS No - not in current No - not in current Yes Yes Table 3.3.2-1, per current TS Table 4.3-2 Functional TS. TS. Unit 6.h. No TADOT is performed. CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - NUREG-1431 5/15/97
l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.3.i APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: CTS Markup Section 3.3.1 Comment: Interlock Action (8] requirements to " apply Specification 3.0.3" are deleted in the ITS. Provide a justification for this CTS change. i Based on 8/14/98 meeting this comment will be responded to as part of DOC 1-52-LG comment response. FLOG RESPONSE: As discussed in the Reference 4 meeting minutes, NRC accepted DOC 1-52-LG with no comments. Therefore, this question should be closed as well. ATTACHED PAGES: None l l l
.O i
6 i
___ _-. . _ _ . ~.___ .. . _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.3.] APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC i REQUEST: ITS Section 3.3.2, Notes to Required Actions G.1 and H.1. Comment: The note allowing surveillance testing in Actions G and H allow bypass of a ! train for any surveillance test. The existing condition [23] only allows bypass of a train specifically for testing per specification 4.3.2.1. This excludes bypass for CTS 4.3.2.2, response time testing. This relaxation is neither noted norjustified in the CTS markup. ! FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 1-66-LS45 has been developed to justify the inclusion of response time testing during the bypass of an inoperable channel or one other channel for DCPP and CPSES.
,. 'El ATTACHED PAGES: -
i Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, pages 3/4 3-6, 3/4 3-6(a) and Insert 3/4 3-6(a)-1 and insert 39, 3/4 3-20,3/4 3-20a and inserts 3/4 3-20a(1) and 3/4 3-20a(2),3/4 3-21(a) and insert 3/4 3-21(a), and insert 3/4 3-21(b) Enclosure 3A, page 17 Enclosure 3B, page 12 Enclosure 4, pages 2 (new LS-45),85 (new), and 86 (new) l v
l I i T'ABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) r Wh ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)
*.N l-04-LG 1
% l-+3- A ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the "'Mur
/cguire/ Channels, CFCLE re;;i :::n:,puspend all operations involv no-d E-N positive reactivity cnanges. *rnmedidej
.ntreR7 3/+ 3-;A y f r w%, +Thur.r/-ot-M ACTION 5 - a. W ,
/cgu,*re/' Mur-Channels "ith the number j C'E* *2LE of;;mOPERABLE i r;m:nt ," restorechannels the /..ff-Ache less than I
- inoperable channel to OPEPABLE statusgrenepey) oW :ptr 05: t::::- t-i; t : hcrt, cuspend al' opt-nien: ./f) /_f
# w :!"ing ;ccit ve -: n .,_,o ti 't; ch:ng;; :nd sc.- f, Valic; a vs- +
7 i
, m. . . a u _,,. m 4e an-/ ., r u - ,- .a - - n e ,, , , _ . , ,s 5 ?5$' LeNN0p55]dbe5/5N/l intr ~f*ll"*dtj 55 j,,
*n a conset**n in e*fUe
- f rod
'7g-3, ppf, anol see. f , frey
- b. N n~o' c Ie 5 "D t nAh. , y[' t h h : : t~ - i g ' : : h c r : ,
operations , involving positive reactivity j jj_j_g suspend a changes and verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN 'W vr /~n WAfus requirements. of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within i hour and every 12 hours thereaf ter. . and verify valves BG-V178 and BG-V601 are closed and secured in position within 4 hours and verified to be closed and secured in position.every days. jgg g ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the -Tn:1 j g_A
~
) gegu,,re/ tmber of- Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfieg:
)
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition I
wi thin 6 hours ,-eed--or-
;ui cr:rt ' :t, W r er, f_ 4 g
- b. ~5: " ' Hur Charn:1: CPE"?ILE
/LI,-fe: Tne inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours /- S for surveillance testin Qs//,.s.5
.sa m s e n :z s=r s )g of other channels, C b Aeda ee ~THEgmAL wg .}, I szt -fkan - 1 suo,-fMn 13 ho arr . ,
j._,p
^CTION 7 - With an inoperable
, eaytimerinthelirlpT1meDelaycircuitry, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that the Vessel Delta-T (Power-1, Power-2) channels in the affected pl i i i 6 hours.
prStectionsetsara D arw.te Le in .,+ 1 ear + aced tWrprpubt in thef :? pppd m.ek:n co+ndition j 42-/n w th nLa f,Ilow:y & Louer,
*r~ ION - With less Onan -hef i- V "urbr c' Ch:rn:'; CE * *2LE , wi thi n f_4g
) f ty korn CA.nnejr icrnuncine- nour cetermine t aburenic- cf -5: n:nined p -i::i :
%dpdg} that the interlock is in its re< uired jM_g g_g ggg state for the existing plant condition, or-cpp,,y % = - kourr.
=:'-
/-/2-?1
- . C . 2. be in a+ 1ea:+ Hrr 2rAWBf w!+kn +Le En llo win 3 i l
I-t2-In i
.Th IEKr' 2/+
ACa ljN 9 - 3-4 8 ---+-With the number of OPERABLE Reactor Trip Breakers one less tnan the
-;.5 ;n:r ,4 e in b at least HOT STANDEY / g,.jf Kep eel "i- S; Channel s yC?~I':'_~
l ; witnin+ 'iours; however, one breaker may be bypassed for uo to2 ho
} provided tn otner breaker is OPEPABL . ~ N'.~.b,.,
mainMance er for rer+see 4La. inotedla leenbe yZg L
~7 b bfEAAfLE & In I ho**< e g .g.y -
v Mendment No.17, A3, M t CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6 l l l
, , or inf}{a}e acl fen 'N Sully ihr *ll'Yr
,Hef.M, - -
^- ^ ^
Q. ?3) ieBLt WJ.a-1 (Continued) g ACTIC N STATEMENTS (Continu e [/Wn [t hour's ~ lM-L 5f OPERABLE cha ne ACTION E ::;uir;;;rtWith the number ,. restorenethe sess tnan the "' 'w :
/c[uir, 10 / Channels CP:"El OPERABLd statusr T '. 'E ':;r: c-- pen Mc '::::: inoperable channel
- -ip b :'E -: "/)S-J.Sdg within the next hour. [ !! *,...,l A:!! &: ad,oloot +ke do Gnfrvl Ey.ehm in a condi/fon in cfdk o+ ro Juilloirnwal l-55xS ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERxBLE channels less than she T :;7 "umb;r gegi-c./ c' Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable /_f.7_j channels are placed in 04kenwi.ra he in *)-lear +the tripped condition within 6 hoursHerVrAN ACTION 12 - With one of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or Shunt J-q3_g Trip Attachment) inoperable, rest' ore it to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or-declar: "' aff::!:d bre ker incpe-:bic nd
;ppij ACT:C" . T e breaker shall not be bypassed while one of / /f ,,A the diverse trip eatures is inoperable except for the time required forstatus OPERABLE. perf rming
. L a onmain *)- l*tenance to restore the breaker to Ghourt. *rf HFT 'tYA Nbf)' avi}4*n +).e n exf ACTION 13 "ith th; n; t:r of CPElaELE ch:n,:1: 10:: th:r the Tot:1 ':::b:r of Ch nnel:, 57".37UP :nd/;r PC'J:3 CP 1"T!C" ::y pr :ctd provid;d /-f2 -$
-th:t th C;nte.in ca: "rc::g r; :ni ironmcat;l Ali c-c.n ", sci;~ ; c. j,,,,47,,.A cht.nnci , in the c.ffcnid pr;t;nica sets eri ple;.ed ic. thm /~YS-A t-f;;cd ::nditier "1th " $ hour:-
J N IE W ~P/f 7- ( p ) / (NOTE: ACTION STATEMENTS 14 THROUGH 30 ARE LOCATED ON OTHER TABLES.) I
~~~
ACTION 31 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the "inic :.- /~d '-/ 6 geguire,/ Channels 3 0P:1ACL: cia.. im;n, be in at least HOT STANDBY within /~ 7-/) 12 hours; however, one channelfmay be bypassed, with the associated reactor trip breakfr bypassed, for uo to 4 hours for logic surveillance tes, ting --
= ' ' % m , provided /~df-@
the other channel is OPERAB . O U-re.r+ ore i
+4e $?erolle c), anne j/ }o g,p ofen /LE o ,-
M wi4 k n G ourc. 1
-TA/JtRT .__---> /-//-/ S 3/+ N(a)-2
.i .. . j
'l CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6(a) Aienament No. 19, G . 6
e INSERT 3/4 3-6(a)-1 ) Qy l ACTION 13 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than /-- + M i' I' the Required Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER f OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied (Note: One inoperable channel l may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testin of other channels 6): %#
$ r.s.; ;
- a. The inoperable channel (s) are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, or l
- b. The Containment Pressure - En dronmental Allowance ;
Modifier channels in the affected protection sets are l placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, or l l
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours. !
l v INSERT 3/4 3-6(a)-2 A c rzoiv 29 - rmser 29 & 2.1-01 l ACTION @3 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the /-//-L5 S9, j ReqQed Channels, operation may continue provided the ; following conditions are satisfiedf e: op b l ly il es e ape se or o fa s eill cMest(/1 ot_ r e an is er j ne 1ay 4o e cifi , tio 4.3 .1[
~
S
- a. The inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than P-9
^ ; within 10 hours.
u-- ==:-. : _ . . ~ . 77..~. . . .
' INSERT 39 With the riurnber of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required Channels, operation may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied (Note: An inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channelsg
/ /-4-45 Qz1]
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than P-9 within 10 hours.
e.-
'h
-6.",
i I l et - g,[I > r i l
i=P= ~ - ( TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) gg g.7g gg } v TABLE NOTATION
, Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure f57 Interlock) Setpoint. ,
## Trip functi:n Ut ?ticilb bh :ked :bev: " 11 :nd j8y be blocked below P-112-N when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked. $22-//3 j
### Trip function may be blocked just before shutdown of the last operating main c feedwater pump and restored just after the first main feedwater pump is put ,
into service (following its startup trip test)..
- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, j i
** On: ' E:;;r:ti:r _ , . ... - .n %.. u .w ci m , . '
. 2-/4-LG l
* * * 'h: dc :ncrgi::ti:r f en: tr:1 f BCP ESP.! ::te: tier le;t: :nd ::tuttier g relsy: ender: tt- : cf the four ch:nn h S:;cr:ble. natier Stat:::nt 22
- lic
- t
- both run:tional "rit: 9. and 9.;. 4 a thir m a ?
x : .. :- ,s},.{). k
****The provisions of Specification 3.0.4. are not applicable (ijn Modes 5 and 6. , , . , , 0
- - ,a -n
~
Only th thutd=- hiFti:r :f :n: ::q: n:dr h requir:dit: 'bh CPEP2BLE in Mede+- .'. j.d:n E #i:5 ::rre:;:nd: to th: CPEP2SLE E drg:ncy "its:1 C:; = t r r wi~ j g 2-//-A F+ Operability is only required for associated OPE E bus in Modes 5 and 6. ' / .ru.txtr- r/+ y-asA CAFz.7,gt One next ACTION STATEMENTS CA-11F-dp2 thark-#f[48) k2M R-57--A
&%3-72 ACTION 14 -Mith the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the ".ir.i..... /-;f LG +! <
r;quic ::nt, be in at 1 east HOT' STANDBY within 12 /-fy.A
?
gegatred Channels-OP:PZL:hoursaddinCOLDSHUTDOWNwitinthefollowing30 g hours;h one channel may be bypassed f up to 4 hours for surveillance
/i h,4-/I testing "'.~ #"" "~il- _ , provided the otherdcha Jae n91 v is Ej". i OPERABLE
%d** M* */*r suTMin 4 Laur.r w
' MDtAtt.KM.
of OPERA LE channels one less than the Tet:1 ::.r.i .c .
/-f7-A ACTION geguire15 ef- lChannel With thes, numperation ma proceed until performance of the next required AN LOG CHANNEL 0 TIONAL TEST provided the inopera ondition within 1 hour.
channel is placed in the tripp 2 ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tet:1 ::.../m /-f7-A $ gegurre/ef- Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is /- # 4 G I. 2 placed in the bypass conditio :nd th: "inimum Ch:.anch OP Pa l: l requircmcrt i mot. O nel may be bypassed for up to n-/5W L g , U- ). f 4 hours gg an e test ng.ES^ #!MC M~ 9.WT&+ f-xj_, 7g g QQ4,,,.g g;,_7 ;
-[,
l OTT/ - With
.-,lessi mthan - -the_. inimur m-ou ChannelsfCpF/m w_ - o _m,.aequiremer
-.t.E.e, y' p,;n f,_ +7,A g
- c y y y ,,.- r - ry3f"Yy.1 r
- V Wv r v 7* y
,p
; fyn.r-y y;t+i y ;l J N < EAT ~3/T.3 20C 2-oSV1 2-b M =
?w% e rwnl er of a Mc .r &MM l 7
or audem#c a edw$4% / L 3/4 3-20 Amendment No. tJ5,6/,,69,85 v
.ALLAWAY - UNIT D Correction letter of 1/6/94 A c774h/ /~1. l - .rN.rE7tT'- S% t 3 M.b WW 4:1-47-5 l
-_ _- O.d-fsi
~ ~~
ZE -
> TABLE 3.3-3 (Continuedf
&s h TABLE NOTATION sA
- 2-22-4 .jM Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer gg,3.gg j Pressure Interlock) Setpoint. T
## -Trip functicr autcm;tically bicd :d bcvc " 11 and [ y be blocked below 2 M ' l P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked. 82.3-l3
### Trip function may be blocked just before shutdown of the last operating ,
main feedwater pump and restored just after the first main feedwater pump is put into service (following its startup trip test). L.? The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. -!G .I Onc in Separation Croup 1 and cnc 4" Separatier Grcup A E
~
7_j9,tg , Re dc-energizatica of cnc tr;in cf SOP E"IAS actuatica ic~ic and
-ectuaticn rclay: cndcr; tec cf thc fcuc anncis incpcrable. Action D-7/-A
- Sta tamant 21 epplies to bctb Functicnol Units 6.c and C.; in this c:cc
**** he provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable in Modes 5 and g Q _
Caly the chutdown 'W on of ena secuencer ic rc uired tc bc OfERABL J $ [W "cdcc 5 and C ahica cccrespcad; tc the 0"ERACLE bergcncy Dic:c' ' [E . 2 "~ ~,- - Ccncratcr _
++ Operability is only required for associated OPERABLE bus in Modes 5 J-//-A and 6. - -
+++ Each MSFIS channel (train) requires a minimum of two programmable logiccA-s/fod
) controllers to_be OPERABLE -
~ _ g (a) Feedwater 1 solation only. CA-1.3 55l
#~N l dh
## #/+ 7-M '
ACTION STATEMENTS ith the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the? '= /-0+-LG [y$e g ACTION Eegut-4 14Channels;0P:PA"L:
/ rehuvaant, be in at least HOT STANDBY within/-+y A 49 12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNhithinthefollowing30 hours; a_2f_ hiW
.3/NT-however, one channel may be'bybassed for uo to 4 hours for SM 7-W ^ -
~eO m, rovided the /--44'/ S a-s surveillance testing " A ' Omae ATa*ex.nn,/ -6 other channel is OPERABLE. "*da~ * /. 4 ~3' 7/
a s.n,-s2 ~ruc, a - .c u ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the T;t;' A,gurd Numbcr cFChannels, operati )n may proceed until performa . of f_4y_j $ the next required ANALOG CH'NNEL OPERATIONAL TEST pr ed the Q. N inoperable channel is place in the tripped con n within 1 j[g hour. k,w=F 2 e: "u ACTION 16 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Tctal r /Numbe, vPChannels, operation may proceed provided the MS-A c geg ee . ,, inoperable channel is placed in the bypass conditionand the ~N One additional /-Of-LG < .. J
/ _tf-Lg mimumCh:nncisCPEPABLErequircm:nti;mctrfsurveillance channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for A-/r-A1 i 5 g 7,g,E testing, " c = m m C s/+ _r w e e r ; g 4 /4
- i N 17 -
js Withle_ssthanthh_ur-d,, K-
"inimum Channels 3-20
$ N cA,,2*N_8
- RAELE
- k. I#+[
- 2. -
iequo eme A , _~- - - - w ,. + m, t ,c , & x X= M .c ,%;; w f g ~ " " 3-poc" ~ _s .. L
.n, ,64e of orcs'Aae eun,,a/.r D-* A-3.3+ v x #
CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 /4 3-20% jpen nt N8. _ .4J . 55 . a.: 26 ; 0" *"kNc 1% -/%s CA-3.3 #3 5 Ac7'm/17.I .1wsee, ggg-Q . Q a-os+]M a , e . -
2 z-p .
- 55) h?M 1ABli 3.3-3 (continued) Ns v '
' . m. ;
- ACTION STATEMENTS (continuedi
\ +--t .
AE. TION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the-""% /~~df-l.G geguire/ Channels r 0?:.:L: . ; , a . m...m . . ; , restore the inoperable channel to /-U-A ! OPERABLE' status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the-T;t;i- /-Y3-A I gegu,'re/R.L. J Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed 3-//-A provided the following conditions are satisfie
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition 7_,g within . o ., .. 4 Asur.r.
- m- (Ale /t:
h ne M -r- Chr :1: OPEP/SLE rc:;uiremert is--t;h:.<:s;r,The /-4+-4G inoperable channel may be bypassed for up tot4hours for D-9f-M surveillance testing of other channels, nes h /-4-z r ,
.rNIERT- 1 smlsh) -
~
M zz- ! 3-//- u
.pgS-mu(/)/For u t' nal ni 8. (L ss o~ Po r- ri d rad d v ta ) i e' ea r
. iGO 6 et en uss i 11 et een uss t r ai fai do de ade equ' men .
NG an NG NG a NG ma be lo d' t ti br k _ t :- os' g - NG bus sie hc/ 57
, 3-//-L L
)
l r ker mak th 4b de ade vo age cha nel for the res et vej bu ino erab - J
~~ ":Li= , W. .c[? e , h q ti p 4 :, c y T, d dD-s&_f._G :::,: p jy_g3 l 2 +.
ygggy-(:t) g-pon ---+- llst.uired Q "J. *3-D? D-lo-M Q ON 20
- Withpless g an the ."j.7}...; Channel { .].:;~, w ghin I hour f_gt g:
'i j ^
h, khakkheinterlbckiskn~iks bquiredstatekoi k
..i ; a 2. f'h8^4.G C . . . Se <
--1 existino e-r rr'g plant bBy wiH,rncondition,
+4e ne& or -:d%; n!;;;d;'in an Ho-r rgu-ruwAh :+4rn &
ACTION 21 - ('tTYM nE6D of OPERABLE channels one less than the "-r.i... ..
/-ofz.s gegwT,elChanneis y 07:T.A;;; . , o c..icut, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 / m ,A hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for jgg surveiiiance testing ypp3.rac<mw">GGQ) provided the other -
channel is OPERABLE. ~ g g gd'. ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the stW 8ccurre/ /N4
- . . ' . . J Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERASLE status within 45 hours ur be in at least HOT STANOBY within the ne),t 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
*:T:C'! : 'a th th; . r..L;c J Cr r).:L: ;h;rc.: ; ;n; ic;; thtr tu T;til p-ep-/ S
; ' =b:r :~ Ch:rr.:1;, rc:: r: th m :;; r di ;. .;h c r n :. i: CT:?!!L: :tti .
' " * ' ? 5 0 '.' - : Cr d^:l:r: th- ::',^:i:'.:d i.l'/. . :;-:-;; J.: ".i,m
- th
- ^!T:S' r quird b; 5;::!'ic:ti;r 3.7 :.E.
AcrI$ 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than tne '" ' - /-Ofd G l . 8 /c,arre/ Channels;^?:IL: r:ni : : ., declare the affected auxiliary /-f7-A l 1 feedwater pump inoperable and take the ACTION required by j j j Specification 3.7.1.2. p.x.,..?f.ALLAWAY - UNIT 3 3/4 3-20a Ana nfme r.: No. :'. EE9
~ -
~
_ _ _ __ E:r~ _
~~ 'i' f INSERT 3/4 3-20a(1)
ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more 2-//-LS
~(cont.) less than the Requirec' Channels on one bus, e or al py,3_99 ,
~ '
c Ton)fiejaffept6dJxfs 1.oo E b spin,,,edra-kI Yofeelaca Ha oract-hdload . sha/senang e~rseg least sagusseer (UEl r) Asefern$ls . With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than the Required Channels on two buses, restore all ' but one channel on one bus to OPERABLE status ; within 1 hou . With the Required ACTIONS and associated Completion g-
. Times not met: ,
i (a) When in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, be in MODE 3 in 6 I hours andin MODE 5 in 36 hours. l (b) When the associated DG is required OPERABLE by {nmQ 'O ITS LCO 3.8.2, enter applicable Condition (s) and Required Action (s) for the associated DG and offsite circuit made ir:aperable. INSERT 3/4 3-20a(2) x_ l ACTION 19.1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than 2-/A-M i the Required Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER l OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied (Note: The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance
/ u testing of other channels
): 422j
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour, or 4 b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.
jed(b
--TABtf 3.3-? IContinuedi--
ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued 1
/_..py-A
- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the A.1
. . /. .,, STARTUP and/or POWER pb gW V
}0N 32/ epi-el OPERATION a Numbn ef-Channels, r::;t f_ proceed for up to 72 hou condition .pgsatisfied- ie 4
-.A - ine inoperable cnannel is placed in the tripped condition
- within 6 hours,-e4-
/-of_t g L. Th; Min'=c Ch =n:1: O P E" *.E' E *e ;"i -a-a 4 ~t: W eve ,
N,ft: The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours /- u -4 g for surveillance tes_ ting of other channels,3
) G3:Q*
Restore the inoperable c annei to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hour s and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. _t....___3..........u...-.u...... . . . m.,..-.,,,,- _._t__ .- o r. uo u...._ . ~ . - - . . r. m.<~- AA
- m cf : Chr":1, th:t chrn:1 I i'.;t.. .'-Chrnel: de: 1: t::ti ~
~
- y-_:5::__,:__ tripped ,
f:r u; t: ' 5:ur: f r tur'!:i'. r t: tuting pr . y - . r. . m . . . ,... ... 2 of-#) a s - ,u, -, ,,, u u- . _r m., .,,,, _t ___ -
..o.. ___
-o_ ._ ,- u.o _o u. n m_.m.
sum . m...s m . v. m _o rm.-u .~ n..o m mm .~t_. m. m
,t____
mumum..., _ , ,. .,. ,n
.-. m... m m
.a..~,._ ,_
. . n _-. . -e.
m. n.. n-.n.m. . . . .. . ,_ cm., pre"ided the feller'ing :=d'tir: r ::tisfied:
~
- . . T5: inoper:ble ch=,nci i: ph::d " the tripped :=diti=
. a. . . o: _ t~_ ._ _ , __ . . ~
Th Minimur Ch nn:1: ^PE"13'_E * ;Ui tr:r t ' : :ti 5 0 u:'/ r ,- W ,; L. th: in p r .ti th =n:1 ::y 5: byp r: d for u; to ' hour: p~ 1;'s Tw. . ~ . veillanc.i tc.:. tin; ;f :thu .h:.nn:.1. pr iIi"; IGG A T 1- 2-0141
.. .ZNFEM~3)l4- 3.-p j gg,.f_g.
7 ACTION 34 - With .ae number of OPERABLE channels one less than the "i .i;_.. l b f 43 p geguired Channels;CaEP*I'_E cc;m c;;;nt,4 e in at least HOT STANDBY 2-2 y. within 12 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within'the /_.g g-zg following 6 hours; however, onk channel may be bypassed for up *J 'P- ] to 4 hours provided the otherfor surveillancechannel is OPEk tettino oLt.. trp">eenme--wr~ O
- r*
- mh wi+L. "fE.M
~
n & kneror- &E .r ria*h
~
f.yy.A ACTION 34a - L'ith th number ^f CPEP/3'_E chen:1:d =: Th; 1::: in;prt.bi th r U.: c. ::= . - N ;bc. ;f Chu ' ' , -;pr .ti:n ::; p rrn . CA-3."*-Wy n:n tripp d ::nditi:n -With the number of gg ch = =1 f.il: - /- 4 t -L 6-OPERABLE chann e_ , s -eae. less than the ? ;r, Channel s C:'./.LE g a :pir;....:.t; be in at least HOT STANDSY within 12 hc;urs and in /--f3t-A at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following '5 hours. One train 2.-23-A I, p-fi-L I may be place in test for up to 4 hours fo surveillance L testing per specification 4.3.2.1 provide t)'eo'heftrainis f "'" OPERABL" > With an inoperev.e a .c.y r- a.k_ Re ret.uired n, ierser in Ine cLsnneirip time is4oDelay OfERABLA rMuw l ACTION 3-3 - circuitry, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERAT]OM may proceed provided l that the Vessel AT (Power-1, Power-2) channels in the affected protection sets are placed in the tripped condition within 6 AM-/y f e { hours [,r de in a lea + W r #7A W / W N a & ne d 5 b e. u- 3
.a j Amendment No. 4;-9, M 7 3/4 3-21(a)
'LALLAWAY - UNIT I i
f
- p. . . _ .
i TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
- ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)
ACTION 32 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the-Tet:1
/ * -A gegurre/"u"cr -f Channels. :": pt f r tutir.g. STARTUP and/or POWER 2-f+-A l OPERATION may proceed for up to 72. hours provided the following conditiop satisfie(:
-a-- The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours -aed--
- b. 3: ".in d
.u- Chea-ak OPEPME "aa'i*e ent 1: =^t: he::v:r. -/
- u (Nele:The inoperable channel may-be~ bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels,6 /-44-2 r l
l N) Restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 72 ST.P[ a hours or.be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l ~ - l uos +so ,,,, s., er neeenoir es m e,, ~,e ,mee % ,, + s. r, + a 5565f th 5aeib
~
du5"tU:5dn[5f 5"dh55531[t';t 3hd553i - A 2
=y be tripped for up t: 4 h ur: f r surnilknce testi g per l
Epa'-i'i nstien d.2.2.1. l no
~ - -
.wn w - wm _u._. ~,,ec, ___,..
. . .n . . . . . m e,m...,,,,n
. ~ . .
. .a . . . , nnes_e ,. e u . ._ u. .. ~e. .o n
.o..
m-
- m. m_ .um,
,a.,
.29
_ ,, ,,. . ,,,,._ a_ i
.um. u. . ,, . .. .....m.. .mm.vr o onm,,...__
m nni .cn,
. m. n,nen.m,m.
.. m.,n u
..~. . . . i pr:vided the fe~c.dag andit10n: Orc = t t fic i l e, . . ;
}
* -a. The iaener=hh th:enel R pkud in the tripp;d c ndition -
4:ithin 5 50er:. =d
- b. 3: "ini = Ch nrch C"E".^2LE require =nt i: =t; heu vcr.
! the in per:bk Chenrel =y be bype::^d f:r up t: 4 h Gr:- 1:r :ur"a11hn:- t::t,ing Of Other ch:rn:k per e --e. . . _ _. n. . ,,,,. a . n . ., . . . ACTION 34 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the "ini= /%g
# ure.IChannelsji3P:PX,L: r quire =nt.abe in at least HOT STANDBY /_#f_.g I within 12 hours and in at leas". HOT SHUTDOWN within the a_2 _
j,y , following 6 hours: however, one channel may be bypassed for up, d ? 7. - to 4 hours forchannel surveillance texy[g1M % $M--P jf g g fj ^'[a#", provided the other is OPERAB.E. Q ACTION 35 - With an inoperable delay timer in the Trip Time Delay CN.F. circuitry. STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provide that the Vessel AT (Power-1. Power-2) channels in the affected protection sets are placed in the tripped. condition within 6
- hours e,- Le in a las.r+ Ho-r .rrMyy w,Hre, ~He ned i kr. ht++1 i
_r . t~ CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-21(a) Amendment No. 12.54. " ' 23
?' W I
n Ygd INSERT 3/4 3-21(a) ACTION 33.1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than N fd1 the Required Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied (Note: The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testin j of other channelsNM: g 7,y .
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within 18 hours.
6 ACTION 33.2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than der-/1 the Required Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER j OPERATION may proceed provided the following i conditions are satisfied (Note: The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testin ! of other channels <neremsoorim): NM l i 42.2)
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours.
ye ,
- d. ',.}
QJ
l I INSERT 3/4 3-21(b) ea - l %D
/- fy-A ACTION 36 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Required Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER /-ff-A OPERATION may proceed provided the following A-/f-M l
conditions are satisfied (Note: One inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing
/-4-Lt of other channels cecanerYWorrnTI):
& 2.2;
- a. The inoperable channel (s) are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, or
- b. The Containment Pressure - Environmental Allowance Modtfier channels in the affected protection sets are placedin the tripped condition within 6 hours, or
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 12 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within 18 hours.
l :4. ' , i r i 4
.A
-+,
._ _ . . . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ ._ _ __ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _
l _. l CHARM
,,.% g NIN ER N$tE DESCRIPTION ;
qu {C 1 60 - Not used. l 1 61- - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparbon ) Table (Enclosure 38). , 2 01 A The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation [ ] Allowable Values are moved to ITS Table 3.3.2 1. 2 02 A CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.21, and the values for Total Allowance (TA), I, and Sensor Error (S) are deleted, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. The TA, Z, and S ; If the as-parameters were developed by Westinghouse. measured value of a trip setpoint were found to be less conservative than the Allowable Value, current ACTION b.1 provides 12 hours for the adjustment of the setpoint without declaring the affected. channel inoperable. l provided that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied. This would have avoided the necessity of writing a Licensee Event Report (LER) prior to the revision of 10CFR50.73. Since the revision to 10CFR50.73, an LER would no longer be required. Setpoint adjustments required by current
,"~.. ACTION b.1 for analog channels are performed with the affected channel removed from service. Equation 2.2-1 i effectively allows rack error to increase above its nominal value by an amount dependent on the available setpoint margin: however, this margin is available for utilization at any time and is not restricted to whether the ACTION is entered. As such, current ACTION b.1 ,
effectively provides no different recourse than current ACTION b.2. With a nonconservative as measured trip , setpoint, current practice is to enter ACTION b.2. Therefore, CTS ACTION b.1, Equation 2.21, and the values for TA, Z, and S can be deleted as they are no longer required. l 2 03 LG The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints are moved to a licensee controlled document, consistent with one format allowed by NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. This information is more appropriately l controlled outside of the TS. The parameter used to assess operability, the Allowable Value, is retained in the ITS. 2 04 LG The requirements stipulated in ACTIONS a and b are moved to ITS Table 3.3.21, with explicit direction contained in the ITS ACTIONS Bases. l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 17 5/15/97 l l
l 1 l INSERT 3A-17 (page 2 of 2) 1-64 A setpoint not required." This change is administrative in nature since the 8 / 4 7'A l subject Functional Units have no setpoints associated with them. This l change does not affect the operating limits or manner in which the plant is ; operated. There are no changes to current plant practices for the performance of these TADOTs since there are no setpoints to verify for I these Functional Units. This change is strictly an acknowledgement that l the corresponding ITS SRs 3.3.1.14,3.3.2.8, and 3.3.2.11 have an l I explicit Note to this effect. 1-65 A Seven slave relays are listed in Note (3) to CTS Table 4.3-2 for an d3-@O , exception to the quarterly SLAVE RELAY TEST. These slave relays are l associated with the following ESF actuation signals: K602 (SIS); K620 l (turbine trip and main feedwater pump trip); K622 (CIS-A); K624 (CIS-A); ) K630 (CIS-A and the CIS-A input to containment purge isolation and control room ventilation isolation); K740 (SIS, RWST low-low); and K741 (SIS, RWST low-low). ITS SR 3.3.2.6 has been revised with a Note per JFD 3.3-19 that excludes these seven slave relays from the quarterly surveillance. Based on the differing Functional UnitMODE Appik. abilities, new ITS SRs 3.3.2.13 and 3.3.2.14 have been added under JFD 3.3-19 to cover the sunteillance frequency applicable to these slave relays. The only slave relay associated with containment purge isolation and control room ventilation isolation, K630, has the extended surveillance frequency under new ITS SR 3.3.2.13. Based on feedback received from the NRC reviewer at a meeting on September 16,1998, the 90 days cited in Note 2 (3) has been changed to 92 days to follow standard convention for an exception to a quarterly surveillance frequency. 1-66 LS-45 The CTS allows certain inoperable channels, or for some plants one other [78j channel, to be bypassed for testing per Specification 4.3.1.1 or 4.3.2.1. The intent of the bypass is to allow testing that will verify that the channel has been restored to an OPERABLE condition and can be retumed to service. The allowed bypass time for testing has been evaluated for its impact on the safety analyses. It has been determined that the impact of the allowed bypasses is minimal. Whether the bypass is for setpoint verification or response time verification has no impact on the safety analysis. This change would delete the reference to Specification 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1 in the allowed bypass notes contained in certain CTS ACTION statements, thus permitting any testing needed for restoration of the inoperable function. 1-67 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table $ 7. T 4 l (Enclosure 3B). d C -7,7-444- ! 1-68 LS-54 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1-69 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table DC-Z7'dN (Enclosure 38). i 1
r 1
!. g '
h) g.
~
CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.3 Page 12 of 26 - a
' APPLICABILITY I
TECH SPEC CHANGE DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION 1 56 The DCPP CTS 3.3.1 Action 2.c requires that power be Yes No No No g 7 "d
-*- reduced to less than 75% or that SR 4.2.4.2 be performed whenever power is a 50%. This power level requirement LS-f */ should be a 75% since if power is decreased below 75% per the first part of Action 2.c. the required Action is ,
conplete and in addition. SR 4.2.4.2 is only required for power levels a 75% with one power range detector inoperable, Yes Yes Ycs Yes 1-57 Current TS Table 3.3-1 Functional Units [12.a and 12.b] are LG conbtned per TSTF 169. The relationship between the Functional Units is moved to the Bases. I 1-58 The proposed change would allow Reactor Trip System and No - See CN Yes No See Cil No - See CN ESFAS sensor response time testing to be performed per 1-03-LS-1. 1-03 LS-1. 1-03-LS-1. A WCAP-13632-P A Revision 2. " Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements." or other similar - methodologies. This change is consistent with traveler ' TSTF-ill, which revises the Bases for ITS SR 3.3.1.16 and SR 3.3.2.10 to allow the elimination of pressure sensor response time testing. QQ 2:t :" l~h/MK7~ .7$-/2A n!A-Wes wM -u!A-A4 4 Q124 M/A N/A N/A N/A 1 60 Not used. If the requirements of current CPSES ACTION Statement 6 are No - ree CN Yes No - see CN No - see CN 1 61 1 19 LS-8. 1-19-LS 8. 1-19-LS 8. H not met. LCO 3.0.3 would be entered. In accordance with the ISTS this ACTION Statement is revised to state that, if the ACTION requirements are not met, the plant must be taken below the P-7 interlock setpoint within the next 6 hours. Yes Yes I2-01 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Yes Yes A Instrumentation [ ] Allowable Values are moved to ITS Table 3.3.2-1, 2-02 CTS ACTION b.1. Equation 2.2-1 and the values for Total No - not in current No - not in current Yes Yes Allowance (TA). Z. and Sensor Error (S) are deleted. TS. TS. A consistent with NUREG-1431 Rev. 1. I
% rht.Dsgr 28-]2.8 CllRRENT TS 5/15/97 CO?lVFRSTON COMPARISON TARI F
v
. c)m INSERT 38-128 NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMANCHE WOLF CALLAWAY CANYON PEAK CREEK i 1 S2 in a Callaway-specific change, ACTION 7 in CTS Table No No No Yes , i A 3.3-1 is moved from Functional Units 13.a and 13.b to @ 7.T l l' Functional Unit 13.c !
1-63 All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial wording is in Yes Yes Yes Yes A accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical g /-/)--g.g Specifications, NUREG-1431. 1-64 Notes are added to Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2 to exclude Yes Yes Yes Yes . i ' A setpoint verifications during TADOTs on Functional Units $ /-23-A I that do not have setpoints associated with them. 1-65 Explanation of ITS treatment of seven slave relays with No No Yes Yes A extended surveillance frequency. p 3g4 ; 1-66 This change would delete the reference to Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes LS-45 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1 in the allowed bypass notes contained in certain CTS ACTION statements, thus g y,g,d .. permitting any testing needed for restoration of the , (A / : inoperable function. 1-67 This change revises DCPP CTS ACTIONS 13 and 29 to Yes No No No M provide specific shutdown requirements to exit Applicability, in lieu of applying CTS LCO 3.0.3. This g g,g pf change is more restrictive by one hour than the CTS. ; 1-68 This change deletes DCPPP CTS Table 4.3-1 note (8) Yes - see No No No
. LS-54 which is applicable to the source range. The verification also CN cannot be performed in MODE 3*,4* and 5*, since the 1-69-M b O'3IN '
- power and intermediate range channels are not required to be operable until MODE 2.
1-69 This change applies new note (20) to DCPP CTS Table Yes - see No No No
'M 4.3-1 function 6, source range neutron flux. also CN I)C-7 T-4dd- !
1-68-LS-54
j- - >>m, ..n_ & .a.=..a-NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERAT10N (NSHC) CONTENTS m . G%> (continued) 1 & a.u) 15 28. . . . ~.T.~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not :;pi M.M e .hC-3.3.-# / l LS - 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No t appl i cabl e ! LS 3 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not appl i cabl e l LS-31................................................................... 53 LS-32................................................................... 56 LS-33.................................................................... 58 LS-34.....................................<............................. 61 LS- 35. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not a ppl i cabl e LS-36. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .}}