ML20205S914
| ML20205S914 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1999 |
| From: | UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205S912 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904270083 | |
| Download: ML20205S914 (200) | |
Text
i I
RTS Instrumentation
, . B 3.3.1 i
i BASES i
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS In addition, control room operators periodically monitor redundant indications and alarms to detect deviations in channel .
outputs. )
I SR 3.3.1.3 gg y CA-IS W l l 823-43h SR 3.3.1.3 compares the incore system to the NIS channel output every 31 EFPD. If the absolvte difference is a 22. the NIS l channel is still OPF LE., M must be read.iusted. cg-y,gg )
p v
. * .' fl4dGBDEkkr7's*y*9"PN^
er m me nn enannel ceinm. ue rivywriy reaajusted, the channel is declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(aI) input to the Overtemperature AT Function. l Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.3. Note 1 indicates that the excore ;
NIS channel shall be adjusted if the absolute difference between ;
sc"y% "
the incore and excore AFD is a 34 22. ^q (Jtil01MfDiddap4sh/ Note 2 clarifies that the @% fi4 Surveillance is required only if reactor power is 2 E4 Set RTP l and that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is allowed for performing the first Surveillance after reaching M4 50% RTP.1NJE#T 8 F.3-42 83M4 The Frequency of every 31 EFPD 1.e. adequate. It is based on unit j operating experience, considering instrument reliability and l operating history data for instrument drift. Also, the slow charges in neutron flux during the fuel cycle can be detected during this interval.
SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.4 is tne performance of a TADOT every 31 days on a ,
STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This test shall verify OPERABILITY b I 4 /. /-/
l actuation of the end devices.(TNJdAT {
The RTB test shall include separate verification of the i undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms. Independent verification of RTB undervoltage and shunt trip Function is not required for the bypass breakers. No capability is provided for performing A such a test at power. The independent test for bypass breakers 1sY i (continued) l l
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 62 5/15/97
~
9904270083 990421 PDR ADOCK 05000483 e l
P PDR j
INSERT 2 a 1,1 1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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I RTS Instrumentation f B 3.3.1 i
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.6 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Tin Frequency of 92 EFPD is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift.
1 1
((fkad hew Ql SR 3.3.1.7 is the performance of a COT every p2 days.VA COT is g7g ggf ,
performed on each required channel to ure the ent4ee channel I will perform the intended Function. .rNJ /~ @ /./-/ )
.Setpoints must be within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.1 1.
Tk diff;,;;n Mt nn th ;;rrer.t "a fand" ni;n ad tk pr;vi;;; t;;t *;; left" vela;; ;;;at k ca;i;t.r.; with tk drift ellr:r.x n;d in t k xtp; int u tk i-i g . T k n tp; int ; Mil gig'
-+
M 1;ft at c a ;i;t;;t with tk n r ,ti a ; ef tk sirs t unit
- paific ntp; int ut;.edelw.
)
T k * = fa nd" ad ";; 1;ft" velan m ;t el;; k ru erd;d =d revi;.;;d fer ca;i;t;x3 with tk nr ;-tix; cf Rfer;..a 7.
SR 3.3.1.7 is modified by a tggagegggpjeg that provides a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> delay in the requirement to perform this Surveillance for source range instrumentation when entering MODE 3 from MODE 2.
This Note allows a normal shutdown to proceed without a delay for testing in MODE 2 and for a short time in MODE 3 until the RTBs are open and SR 3.3.1.7 is no longer required to be performed.
If the unit is to be in MODE 3 with the RTBs closed for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ;
this Surveillance must ce performed prior to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after entry l into MODE 3. NoteRrregujresjt. hat 3helquarterlyiCORforAhe a
source; range;instrumentationysha))Mnc}Ddeprettficat!onitty observation sofjthelasso,ciatedlpermissiyelannur!cigMndonGthat thefi6MndfPJ10?iinter]ockjs areJjnfthejrMitedjstateXorfjltife existjngiunjt;condjtionsj.
The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 7 5~.
(continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 64 5/15/97
1 INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 1 l
A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the ,
verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an !
acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all i of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications '
and non-Technical Specificcions tests at least once per rebeling interval with applicable extensions.
I
RTS Instrumentation m B 3.3.1-
, BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.8 .2WEAT / l REQUIREMENTS @l'I-/
(continued) SR 3.3.1.8 is the performance of a COT as described in SR 3. 1.7 except and it is modified by a thejsame Note that this test hall include verification that the P 6 and P 10 interlocks are in their required state for the existing unit conditions O (mevd (observatinn'af the acenMataCnem1mve annunciamp..er4Wv The Frequency is modified by a Note that allows this surveillance to be satisfied if it has been performedWGTthin 32 days of the F Auencies prior to reactor startup;Mhours";aftetM
[,hgl powerJbelowM0; and four hours after reducing power below Me end P 6Kas3 dis _cdssedjbelogy The Frequency of " prior to startup" ensures this surveillance is performed prior to critical oper W ns and applies to the source, intermediate and power rans Iw instrument channels. The Frequency of ~4 i;32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> after Wacing power below P 10" (applicable to intermediate and power range low channels) and "4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P 6" (applicable to source range channels) allows a normal shutdown to be completed and the unit removed from the MODE of Applicability for this surveillance without a delay to perform the testing required by this surveillance. The Frequency of every 92 days thereafter applies if the plant remains in the MODE of Applicability after the initial performances of prior to reactor startup,12;hoursjaftelr teductrig; power;belowf3R; and four hours after reducing power below l' 10 re P 6. The MODE of Applicability for this surveillance is < P 10 for the power range
, low and intermediate range channels and < P 6 for the source range channels. Once the unit is in MODE 3, this surveillance is no longer required. If power is to be maintained < P 10 forlsene thanjl2ihours or < P 6 for more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, then the testing required by this surveillance must be performed prior to the expiration of the 12Lhout!or 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> limit'Jias:applicablel Four teur; i; ; rs ;;nbk tin Jheseltime31mjtslattfrea_sonable; basedionJoperatingi.experjence; to complete the required testing or place the unit in a MODE where this surveillance is no longer l required. This test ensures that the NIS source, intermediate.
and power range low channels are OPERABLE prior to taking the reactor critical and after reducing power into the applicable MODE (< P 10 or < P 6) for the periods discussediabove;
= 4 raur;.
l (continued)
NARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 65 5/15/97 L
F INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.9 REQUIREMENT (continued) SR 3.3.1.9 is the performance of a TADOT is nerformed every 92 days, as justified in Reference 7 5. NIE#T .2 S /, /-/ ,
This SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT. Sina thi: SR spplic; t; RCP undcry;1t;;; xd undcifr;qxxy reicys. Setpoint verification requires ci;bret; kxh celibration ;pd is accomplished during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
SR 3.3.1.10 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The j test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
M.e*%
2 CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the unit ;p;;ific Ca11away setpoint methodology.
L- The differenc; kt'.;xn th; current " s f;und" V 1u;;; and the pr;Vieu; tut *;; 1;ft" V;l;C ;;;;;t k an;i; tat with tk drift i 11;a n x a nd in t k xtpcint E t hdel;;y.
The Frequency of 18 months is based on the Os;;;;;ption of :n 10 ;;.sth a.s.suard calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipner.; drift in the setpoint methodology.
SR 3.3.1.10 is modified by a Note stating that this test shall '
include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values where applicable. This;doesinot;1nclude verification optimeldelayyelayspS7hesetareyer.if:1edNia response; time 3esting tpeCSRZ3;136'.73ee;theidiscussionlofinI, in7the Applicable 1SafetyTAnalysesjorftheKf$emperaturegland Overpowet;nlitdpfunctionsi .fN. RENT 54 f.7./, /0 ~FR-7.7-004-Although1not:requiredfor anyvsafetyyunction;)the! CHANNEL CALIBRATION of Function ~10EReactorl Coolant!FlowjLow'liw1111 ensure proper perfo,rmance_and:normalizationlofatheJRCS2flowindic_atorg 9 MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 66 (continued) 5/15/97 l
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INSERT 2 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicaole extensions.
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RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 l s -
BASES _
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.12 Not"Used; REQUIREMENTS (continued) S" 3.3.1.12 is the Frier;ma of e 0".'""JL CALI""ATIO'!. es dcscribcd in S" 3.3.1.10, cycry 1" renths. This 0" is r;dificd by ; ;;;t; st: ting th:t this tat sh ll includ; verificati;n ;f !
the RCS raistenu tc gr tur; d;tector (""} bg,ns leep fi;w rete-This test will verify the retc les c ,,cr.setic. for n;W free the
____.. ,.._ u. m_n.
n.m., . .
The frequer.cy is justified by th; ear. ptien of en 1" r; nth ,
- lib 7;ti;- ir.t;TGl ir,th; d;t;T.iriti;T. .. ..~ . ,.... - .. j
- qui, st drift in the s;tp; int =; lysis. 1 i
SR 3.3.1.13 i
SR 3.3.1.13 h the perfo of a COT of RTS interlocks every "m.
un 7 18 months. 2"N.rsg 7 /
w
$ /, /-/ ) I 1
c The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the interlocks and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to .
be acceptable through operating experience. _- !
on f4e ge.cb %tp Syfa.r.r $reskee adeow SR 3.3.1.14 hijo neb,*,cu, r
SR 3.3.1.14 is the performance of a TADOT of the Manual! Reactor j Tr 0" "rnker ";sition.
Nke j T is performed every 7.d .m+months.the SI Input from ESFAS/ SErr @hish- C o n t. /1%,] geach,, ~7~e.*r ~D1WI~ r con-luchr'Avr Aofh Gl.l-/ 4 g The 4estVshall independentlyverifytheOPERABILITYofthe44d.rvd4 undervoltage a'd shunt trip"=chmi.,ea im t;e lenuel "r etar g,q/ -Trip F=cti= f;r the Reactor Trip Breakers and Reactor Trip CA-3.7-26 Bypass Breakers. The Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker test shall include testing of the automatic undervoltage tr m ec4 *nT.cm.
The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Functions and the multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to j be acceptable through operating experience.
(continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 68 5/15/97 s )
r INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 i
l A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
1 l
l 1
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INSERT 2 Q i.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical i Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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RTS Instrumentation ,
B 3.3.1
.._. ...s a !
, BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1 10 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints from the TADOT The Functions affected have no setpoints associated wi hem.
Eteee//7-Me 4 fn./e,.l,ek SR 3.3.1.15 .rN.r4X'7 .2 * #^8 V8e '/55 Anil-b lem
$/,l-l '^ $bO. *7hi.r _
SR 3.3.1.1% is the performance cf a TADOT of Turbine Trip Functions.f This TADOT is a d; ;rik d in SR 3.3.1.4. cn ;pt th;tW this te;t is performed prior t N #7 GTH3f::tED Surveillance is not required if it has been performed within the previous 31 days. Verification of the Trip Setpoint does not have to be performed for this Surveillance. Performance of this test will ensure that the turbine trip Function is OPERABLE prior t g act er~ cal in t c no w ac a and st er .or or o ac st tup exceedly $$a Of In'ferlock, y
- SR 3.3.1.16
% ~ e:r.2-S5~
SR 3.3.1.16 verifies that theMindividual channel Meein actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response time testing yerificationM acceptance criteria are included in Techaini ;;quir ..t; ".==1. BefEE Individual component response times are not modeled in the a lyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, rom the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint alue at the ;
sensor t; th: p; int et J.ich th ;guign at r; nt I furetix;l stetc (i.e. satr:1 ad :hutde.;. r p tk r; quired ;
in tk renter ard. untTL11oss.mtstationaryh. oner cci3 fully inxite i
'*U'9'I -{n ken ir, -//,DeG i,,1ly.rne fh[,f$*,'/, l iM r*rreosse % a /44<./or N.A.L For leadchannels
/ lag, rate that
/ lag,mciuue etc.), the uyuamic response transier time testrunmuns nyg 7.,c.g. , lag, -
verification-is performed with the tr=sfer Functien with t k resultin; = =ured ra pnx tin c a pr;d 'j cttkte-ene 7
- ppreprietc F;"' rapan tin. Alteratcly, tk ,0ppenn thcir tin l tcst eenvalucs, neainel k perfernd providedwith thethe tin watents rcquired rcsponxn'7.E
' is !
-M
~( (contiQued) 2M l MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 69 N,Wam 5/15/97 M
-l-e r **gnmewf:r a /,m A/.A. t<
- adin ReRP.
INSERT 2 Q 1.1 1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channe! relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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i ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 r
l
('- BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.5-REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.5 is the performance of a COT.
A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the entice channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be found wit Allowa f,1ed in Table 3.3.1-1.
3;3;211; ten / 4 /, /-/ c-C Tk diff;rera; kt xn th; curr;nt ";; f;;nd" v;1ac ad tk pr;vieu ; tat ";; 1;ft" vel;;; ;r.u;t k an;i; tat .;ith tk drift elle;.;=c; and in tk xtp; int sicuietien. The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.
T M "= f;;nd" nd "n 1;ft" velua ;;;t ,1;; k ru erd;d =d ini s;d f;r ;;mi;t; xy with t k n ;;ptien Of th; nr aill a x interv;l ata:ica =;1y;i'; m;f. 3) w'.;n ;pplic;bic.
. The Frequency of 92 days is justified in Reference 8.
M nL ' * ' -
, s i; u-u SR 3.3.2.6 ;
I SR 3.3.2.6 is the perfo' nce of a SLAVE RELAY TE T. The SLAVE i
RELAY TEST is the energ izing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified if one of two ways. Actuati n equipment that may be operated ir the design mitigation pode s either 4 7.7b-I allowed to function. or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the l equipment. Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation modevis prevented from operation by the SLAVEQ 3,7,4-/ !
RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case. contact operation is i verified by a continuity check of the circuit conta$ ping the slave relay.
. , _ ... . .This
. . . .test . . .is . .wrformed
. ... ...... .. every
.. . 92 days (C. . ;.=___
=.
x _-m- _ . avcv.n . - auc%. . -snm.
x_s- -
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7 -A nn14 .-a. . -. ~ _w- i.~r m ~ .. -t~., vw -u .
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__ Aanne -r -- - r- h- m _a t- * -
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- . . .* h?.%F6 LlE! u.,.,La a; gy,Ip,5HggM1 u a -*-a----_=m
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.a v....= .
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) Q 2.2--I4 9
Q (continued)
HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 141 5/15/97 L
INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
{
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r ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.6 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS 4_;.__ - .__, - - - _ _ _ , .m.__,,._.._m__.______, - m ggur.:.7: ...~w s-nw _ q g . w . .=- -- = m _w.= g:5g-_
= w uns--- ra__,m.e w',_..
,=,m_. '
. 4. % _ _ =~.-wale =.ce wi=cwv. w.L:.L=.mzi!ws=
->__m
. ; n . n L&m.m .O'"J' u"'l " '"".l.TLaTA- 2 ?'.-M" *.*'86"l ''1. .?%"'" L'L ',.*.
^
- E".?9 i .
"e a, .a. s ILu i LTT 3us vua y > TM.73 v'cqu ' a su ;
- .7.t./~7, ^b;en 1The Frequency is adequate, based on industry S.3'.'JL /4 operating experie ce, considering instrument reliability and operating histor data.
rNJERT J2 T.T.;t.fo & T.2-l4 SR 3.3.2.7 llmonNJ.
SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a TADOT everyMYThis CA-7.7-c/,
test is a check of the Loss of Offsite Power. 'Jadervelt.;; ",0".
end APJ "u;p Su;ti a Tra ;fer = Su;ticr. "rcs;;r; L;w gfgg.7- Function.:. 0;;h fuxtion i: t;;ted up tc. =d i xlading, th;
- t aster tren;fer r-ley ;;ils.t[he"t plactuating!deMees3 J tested 4 /,l-/ Nithin
- the3co rofrSRT3?2Waj
- elt.h6 _ 3 _w;- na-ggV
- f#~
'~
m 699998MkMMO 7
~-
.ZWZEKr 8 T.3-/+2 Th; t a t al;; inclui ; trip t vi n- th;t previ e ;;ta ti;, ,
sig=ls dir stly to tre 00"_S.
___,..;__..__m__m_ _, _ .__,_i_
The S"_,i
, _ _ _ 7;dified_,_..
, _ . . _ by _; "_;;t; m__ m _
th;t !
1 bab6wwbd TbI 45 5 bu b s vu e WB eFb bfV 5 II b d 5 WI 5h3MJd. n,b5WJ 3
erb bfV E Iybd
.xquir; cleberet; b;xh alibr:tian g.d er; urified tria; l S=rt CAL:"",AT:=. r== ppt M A A ppe>Q Qflgspyg" W n g att p M b
& pr, M.rs mn f j
( '77 /V)anual /*Sefy 'Cnjec h3r, TAber.rla //
i y SR 3.3.2.8 hon .r enole,cH wi c4 ,J yeerf, 0/VMAtzb1Yy+of e a,) s/en fa9e corrhe}r +Ae Ar- !
A* H ,M e +K e.c h ,.e ,y , -
abeer amol ,.
SR 3.3.2.8 is t be p[ ford [n7e "of U . iY'lsfksa'Xea c /*
- h of the Manual 6::tuation Functions and AFW pump start on trip of '
all HFW pumps.1 It is performed every 18 monthsj Se;h ."n=1 gyy g ,
Actu; tion Function is t;sted up tc. =d includi,y. the aster 7-1;y ^;il;. In ,en in t m a ,. th- to t ini th; ad i via (i. .. pu;p st;rts. =1v; cyti; p .Cetc.). n ta The ti;n of Frequency is adequate, based on industry oper ing experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cyc1. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verificatio of setpoints during the TAD 0T for maqual initiation Functions, he manual initiation i Functions have no associated setpoints. !
.rNTERY 2 :
Gl.1-1 l
)Y (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 142 5/15/97
INSERT 2 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
l 1
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
,e i
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS oneEtrajnssuch]that>oth.; trains 9.reJyerjfied3t11easEengemer 36,7 months; Testing of the final actuation devices, which make up the bulk of the response time is included in the test 4ng verification of each channel. The final actuation device in one train is tested with each channel. Therefore, staggered testing i results in response time verification of these devices every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical refueling cycle and is based on unit operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentatior. components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are )
infrequent occurrences.
This SR is modified by a Note that clarifies that the turbine driven AFW pump is tested within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reaching 4000 900 psig in the SGs.
,4 SR 3.3.2.11 re q v. .
SR 3.3.2.11 is the performance of a TAD 0T ;; d; xri k d ir. l SR 3.3.2.0. ;n;pt tMt it i; grfaud for the P 4 Reactor Trip l Interlock. a. tk Tra,.cey is ce; pr "O cy;k. Thi; The-
$N.. .I.N..., ...##. . . .!I*
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L The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Function tested has no associated setpoint. Thi.s1TADOTfdoes'notlincludelthelcircojtry ,
associatedjw1_th)steamJdump;operationtsincedty s1contro]2 grade I ci_r_cuit.rv; l SR Tr2:12 3 SRQ3.2 12"i sithe:performancelofia;montt0 yJCORon ESFAS FunctionJ6thj" AFW fay LA ~Gnder en cA-7.3-dar l
Juch**n frenure -Lew. "
A COTiis per_ formed:togns .e]_the;channehwil]2 perform).the intendedjFunctiong3etpo . ts:aust;be cfoundlwithinithe_@lowab]e valuerspecifiedungab173;2g _
. .rWree7~/ 1 M S/~/ (continued)
- w. > l MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 145 5/15/97
INSERT 2 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
.,.-~.
B 3.3.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS gress chenal f;ilur;. tb:. it is k;y t; nrifyir.; tMt th; in;trun nt; tion centinues t; eg ret; pre g rly k t.;x a e x h GMNNEL-GAL 48 RAH 9h t.;r n a nt criteri; ;r; it; rein d by t k unit :teff, h ad en ;
- 4irati; . Of tk ;Mrxl in
- trux..t exert;inti;;. ir.cluding indi stien er.d ra tbility. If ; ;M a xi is cut:i i th; crit;rie, it ;;y b; = indic;ti;n tMt th; nr ,cr er th; sigral prx;; sin; ;quipant Ms drifted cutsit its li;it.
The fr;qu_xy i- Mxd en egr; tin; t#p;riens tMt i en;tre:::
- L ar.cl f;ilur; is r
- rc. Tk 0l"J.*:L 0 :ECK ;;ppi;n .t; 1:33 f; nl. but ni; fr;quent. ch;;b of ;b anis durin; nor;;l
$ f.M egr; tier.;l un ;f tk dispicy; ;;;;;iet;d with tk LOO requ' ;d
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SHJEK ,7~ g Lie 2reakerg52NG0116Iap,d*S2NG02162shaflJlbelver4f1R _ Jegot gf.3-/N g ~ evetyZijays7C0111s?fr cyMsYbased W Reference W.
len of yolh e anol dege.}e.] volkge inyd
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SR 3.3.i,.2 is the performance of a TADOT.n This test is performed every 31 days. The test checks trip devic es that provide v CA-7.T-622 1 d"Am ner.eC r = s ,- # n _. :
Y:--- -i :: ;; .t.bFor these tests, theggvTr p Setpoints are y verified and adjusted as necessary. The requency is based on
]
the known reliability of the relays and controls and the j multichannel redundancy available, and h s been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
ItJ rEKT~ 2
.rNJER7- $2.7-l?tla) Q l.l-l OA~ 'M SR 3.3.5.3 -
SR 3.3.5.3 is.the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delayW s -howa-iti CA-7.M
- o. m_ ..
- m. _ _ _..._ _ .
,g (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 188 5/15/97
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INSERT 2 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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Containment Purge ;r.d Di;;;t Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6
,4.
- 3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) ISR 3 .6.2 ' the rfo ce of I TE ._
tr n be' g tes is aced 1 .c s nd on hu even ng i dvert actu on i ou t sem ut tic test . al possi e logi c n on wi a wit a icab pe ssives re es f ea pr ect f eti add ion, he ma rr a oil s
^
se st for cont' it This eri es at 1 ic ul are LE a the is a .nt v tage ign pa to ter 1 ils This est s fo eve 31 ys a BAS . Sur ill ei erva is cep le on <
1 1ab tv a irwh try pera ng su=_r
_ 1_ ~ n a _ -
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$ 3.1-T3 TNreer 8 2.3-/11 O o 1.s-22.
- 3. . the rfo nce o a mad ' RE TEST. The i ener zing
~
Y is t the ster lay. v ify1 e act per on a a low olta conti ity of s ve
-- ay 11 Upon ster lay c act o rati a1 volt is j to slav relay 11. is vol ge is uff ient pick the si ve rel . but rge gh o rate 'gnal h cont uity. is t is fo e ry 31 ys on ST TEST IS. Sur eill i rv is ceptab based inst t rel abilit and str atingj experi e.
SR 3.3.6. F A COT is performed every 92 days on each required channel to ensure the entire channel will perform the intended Function.
The Frequency is based on the staff recommendation for iner sing the availability of radiation monitors according to NUREG- 66 (Ref. 2). This test verifies the capability of the instrus.entation to provide the containment purge ;r" J.;;;t system isolation. The setpoint shall be left con nt with the curr;r,t unit ;p;;ific ;;11br;ti;n pre;;dur; tel n;;. NoteX4) of.,Tabley.3.6j;1. --- _ --
.IWEri /
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continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 197 5/15/97
INSERT 1 1.1-1 A successful test of the required conta::t(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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Containment Purge and Shoust Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 m
. BASES SURVEILLANCE S R 3.3.6.5 REQUIREMENTS '
(continued) SR 3. 6.5 is the performance of a SLAVE RE MY TEST he SLAVE RELAY is the energizing of the slave relay _ndWertffestTon ofmequ,ipmengetdatsbn. Cent ct operation p scrified in on of two w;ys. ActaQ,cquiF.;.t that m y p grated in tk isign
- itig; tion ;;;;i is 'tk condition wkrc tkh' r allowcd t;-f"at4on mtionconer kisverified pined in ;
without egr; tion of ttby yg~contact -Actuation equip ent that ;r.cy not k egrated in the i si g ig; tion ei is prciented fi x icuit. I;r this 1;ttcr x x.
egr; tion by tk SLAVE P,E'p if; c ;tinuity d;d of the centactegr;tionisv;p;,cdby circuit containing tr el vc rci;y. T- test is performed every 02 tys on!slhvel y!K_63.04thfetMir'M_s5 aired @eC181monttts and3r1odtoient~
4 ~ ;MODE 54"Ithene?er'thebdueCIFnW op6TforA24 f15Et12i6:iicMraddRet.t_h1h@ Fired,a
[ RETE %. 98TsibnthtFfQi[geNasedtoiGi',s.M1tbMele tKSurvef713ncennder-the*condit'idnsethatrapplyrdurf 7455s o@ age ndgjg%tentia_MforgannmplaIggKl@gsli_ent*'Itt SutF Hance @erMIperformedistithitheteenctorsattpowec: Th F uency is acceptable based on instrument reliability and
. ndustry operating experience.
=
SR3.3.6.[-4 $ 7/5-72
+
SR 3.3.6 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every IB months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested th@ ugh 3 tie BOP;ESFAS31ogTgup t;. ;nd including, th; =stcr rci;y coils.
In sex instex . the test ixluis atuation of th; ;nd ivia
'i .c. . pq st( ='= :=1cs.3ctc. 'Q l. l-l rWJeRT Oc tcst als; ixluis trif dev;c:; tr.;t provii xtuation signals dircctly t; the SSPS. bypassing the enclog process control cquipx nt. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.
1 The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Function and the redundancy available. and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
gg' (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 198 5/15/97 -
i
]
INSERT 2 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required co itacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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GREFS CREVS Actuation Instrumentation
~,.
B 3.3.7 i
BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE - A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table
. REQUIREMENTS 3.3.7-1 determines which SRs apply to which GREFS CREVS Actuation Functions.
SR 3.3.7.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation I,as not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
W@ Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a
- combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria. it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency is based on operating experience that' demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, c:ut more frequent, checks of channels during normal operatioral use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.
&#e, He Ant / or RMas di.e l y my eLu.ra) sot je,/ , na CHAWrtt CMM CA-3.~belR
-Ar-He Con-h,/ Koom Ag,9,a sdar 1%;4,,(c&eesss4. ,J cexeass).
A COT is performed once every 92 day o h' ed c a ensure the ent. ire channel will perf rm the intended function.
This test verifies the capability the instrumentation to provide the GREfS CREVS actuation. The setpoints shall be left consistent with th; urit ;r aifi: celibr; tier, ;,racir; telcre,.a. Note $oflTable?3:3J7M The Frequency is based on the known reliabili ty of the monitoring equipser.t and has been shown to be accept ble through operating experience.
(L) Q 3.2-31 (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 207 5/15/97 l
r INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other reouired contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
CREFS CREVS Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE .5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS circuit ;;ntcining ..c. > c reicy. This t s performed every
- once;per 18" months T days on Mlavefpelay.K630 and;pfior;thenteningiMODE;43 hen w . Js t ~ecunitihas;beenJ n fM E3
_ .m or16 fore 241hoursMRno .. _.ormedseit_ 'theWreviodsF90Tday_s Refpgh%mont.h .. _ uency. tis 3ased?n meed'to"peIfdre thil5ugeillance; _ _ry!_theiconditionsithat%gp]En nggrunit outig6tandith65 _ entia]_Mqrjatgunp]annbd} transient"1f Survailla .wereWr,; formed 1with the: reactor. tat pbiWerg Th Frequ y is acceptable based on instrument reliability and stry operating experience SR 3.3.7 g y,y y2 SR 3.3.7 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions and is performed every 18 months. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested throug@t_he By-AnAS" lids &fup to. =d ircluding. th; : stcr rci;y ceil;.
In ;;n in;texa the test inluda xtu; tion ;f the ad device
' i . c . , pump ;t;"- ";1vc cvcic:. etc.}
( -
ERT~ A $l.l-l ,
The t a t ci;; inclur.c trip T its chdt providc x:uction sig=ls dirstly to th; Solid 5t;tc Pr;tcction Sy;ta. byp;ssing th; =;l;g pres;3 control cquip ent. The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the Function and the redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them, SR 3.3.7$.r5 Q 3,3-3,'2 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
The Frequency is based on operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle.
h (continued)
MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 209 5/15/97
INSERT 2 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required ,
contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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i FBAGS EES Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8 g
BASES ACTIONS 0.1 rd 0.2 (Rati=;O unit a-diti m; fra full F.;r sidition; in = orirly nani l
- rd withat ch
- 11 sgin; unit ;y;te;;.
SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table REQUIREMENTS 3.3.81 determines which SRs apply to which FBAGS EES Actuation Functions.
SR 3.3.8.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that l
a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL '
CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one ,
channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on l the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an
>4' '
indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels j
l or of something even more serious. .A CHANNEL CHECK will detect '
gross channel failure: thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staffe based on a combiaation of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. l The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal i operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. . ;
ONer Ne XMll n- EmT3 olirf layr m de wed S f'S 4h CN^h!A/EL CHECK C&WOIA :
A - N e $ */ S ur/ /i Eykaggah W M,,,,% (Genesin 1 J ceassar). l A COT is performed once every 92 days on each required channel to i ensure the entire channel will perform the intended f ion.3 Ong-.
.1M,ERT & l.I-I (cont 1nued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 217 5/15/97
INSERT 1 g 1,1,1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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FBAGS EES Actuation Instrumentation B 3.3.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS This test verifies the capability of the instrumentation to provide the FBAGS EES actuation. . The setpoints shall be left consistent with the unit specific calibration procedure tolerance. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the known reliability of the monitoring equipment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.
sa r s:s m SRamag2metelperforeanoaa rlanwantgujNymn.guarte acmattersogicistestedieve@M4MIMDMTAGGEREDJEi!
BASI 5imelltpossme3og!cicombinatto.nsmagassgd.gminee ppgecgod!gnettonPr2heWrentricapibesedtog@Deg!g te11 ab1gynthelreldEendjgeniroMMmogichaRDl0
-r:qeTacce tedspdancymajabw;and111as;been;;15Ehad1 openat%gtexpAe ence: Tk sn is m Aladalptabieyhrough
, ,e
""~m .rbky -HEA. con +rnar4y cia.k ~ , fj, excludad. a s.2-?2 7kr ER i.e mytral+ Ma L I.me op l.,,+ a,.h. kon SR 3.3.8.4 in r + a //a d bfoy,e and a Bem codinaref, +y efAook.
jf,+44e}c no%g SR 3.3.8.4 is the performa e of a TADOT. This test is a check of the manual actuation functions and is performed every 18 months. Each manual actuation function is tested thgguggg$e
_ b N m!!' ..~ ..I . .NI. ~ . _._!. ...5 .!. . I5. [.E!i_U$
. .~ ..
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- t; . v;17; ;y;1;;. etc.). The Frequency is based on operating e rience and is consistent with the typical industry ref ing t. _, The SR is modified by a Note that excludes veri icatio: dtpoints during the TADOT. The Functions te ed have no setpoints associated with them.
.rAlfcgf 2. p /,/-/ N SR 3.3.8.5 ACHANNELCALkBRATIONisperformedevery18acr.l.ns,or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The Frequency is based (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 218 5/15/97
INSERT 2 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
)
BDNS Beps
<' B 3.3.9 BASES rareAv i e/./-/ I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.9.13 .[/ug mu/$//'e.Nb
' REQUIREMENTS g 7,7--Q7 l (continued) SR 3.3.9.13 requires the performance of a T every g2 days, to ensure that each train of the B9P5 BDMS an associated trip setpoints are fully operational.VThis tes shall include verification that the boron dilution etpoint is equal to or less than an increase of tw+ee 1Ztimes the count rate within a 10 minute period. SIE3Ji9@slaod_1fiedibyzaI4 tote,3;h8.t proyides931houridelaydnIthe;teguirement*tolperfo33hls sunetD ance;aftetxeducippowettbe3 acthe167tntenloemIt!1s Note]alles,ialdelagigttlelpgfotaancefof;the3XEtoireBJMt3;he delqp41LoitedXorIthe'soittcegaggeit:hannelg*L7Jfithe J ]ag*1gte rematgjtelowiei Toramote3hatrSS;houtsithissurve1Ungooggstjtte peJ1 formed;pr. tore w hourgaf Ler meducinginownr M ._ a. The Frequency of J2 days is consistent with the requirements for source range c annels in 'JCA" 1"271 " ^ ("ef. 23.
rqar,, l- 02.24! W'Y SR 3.3.9.24 SR 3.3.9.24 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. [he]@R.1sIsodifiedlbyfaINote;2hatjagggn detectors]arelexc]GdedIfrom;the2 CHANNEL"; CAL 1BRAFONJ I;r tre "0^:.
, tre c e rt CAL:""AT:ch ;h:11 i =1;d; a rifi uti m trat on
- ;i;;;;1;t;d ; ;;tal bien dilution ax dablin; ;ie ci tra
- ntrif;;;l ; tar;in; i,=;; L;ti; nix;; fre;;; tra ~C egn. =d the a; ni 0"0 ni;= centr
- 1 tak dinh;;';; aln
- ; cien in th; i; quired cie nt; tin of s 20 ;ece.d;.
Th; ircqx x y i; M x d en egr; tin; cap ricre; and cerai:; ten;y with the tyr.,ic;1 inde:;try r;fa;1in; cytic.
TheICHANNEL1 CAL 1BRATION.lforithe,isourceZrangefneutron; detectors consistsfof0btainingTintegraEblas3 2 curves;^;evaluatingithose curves Band; comparing 3hejeurvesito;the;manufa_cturerls; data M ihe 182 monthZrequencyji sibasedion : operating [experjencel.andiog;the needfo sobtainlintegra];biaslcurveslunderjthelconditi.ggsjthat applyldurdnglalplaDtioutageliThelothetitesainiDg.plo t,1Jmslofithe
@ (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 226 5/15/97
s INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval w".h applicable extensions, i
l
[
M B 3.4.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.8 RE0VIREENTS d'7T (continued) Performance of a COT (is red within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after decreasirs RCS temperature to J and every 31 days on each $3.+8-3 required PORV to verify and, as necessary, adjust its lift
.rMTE setpoint.j The COT will verify the setpoint is within the PTLR
'/ allowea maximum limits in the PTLR. PORV actuation could 8 /. /-/ depressurize the RCS and is not required.
The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> . .
Tr;; ..cf considers the unlikelihood of a low temperature overpressu during this time.
,- u ,kt nk A Note has betn added indica ng that this SR isVrequired to be met M12 hours after decreasing . RCS cold leg wc-3.60A8 temperature g ].c g ;;. .';,{be g rfp..~gi}fSA//-3
. .. ... . .~ . g .... .....~..m.
... ..~ . . .
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7 .~ . .
N r mr;, r..n ;;n.;;,.g W 7- [ )-D
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fl;?k 7709' 1 ,
1 -
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Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required PORV actuation channel is required every E months to adjust the whoi.
channel so that it responds and the valve opens within the )
required range and accuracy to known input.
REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.
- 2. Generic Letter 8811.
- 3. ASE. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III.
- 4. FSAR, Chapter E
- 5. 10 CFR 50 Section 50.46.
- 6. 10 CFR 50. Appendix K.
- 7. Generic Letter 90 06.
(continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.4 80 5/15/97
r
]
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INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once por refueling interval with applicable extensions.
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3 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation
, B 3.4.15 BASES ACTIONS F:t g3 (continued)
With all required monitorem inoperable, no automatic means of monitoring leakage are available, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.15.1 REQUIREENTS SR 3.4.15.1 requires the performance of a CHAlelEL CECK of the required containment atmosphere mammummumumuumuumumE radioactivity monitor- The check gives reasonable confidence that the channe1[ 4e M operating properly. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is based on instrument reliability and is reasonable for de' ecting off normal conditions.
>. . . n .
p@)- SR 3.4.15.2
~
SR 3.4.15.2 requires i.hs performance of a COT on the required containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor - The test ensures that the monitor [ can perform M e . function in the desired na re.TA4.rEfr/
The test verifies the alars setpoint and relative accuracy he p /,/-/
instrument string. The Frequency of 92 days considers inst reliability, and operating experience has shown that it is proper for detecting degradation. ,
llEERIMF
- SR 3.4.15.3 These SRs require the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION for j each of the RCS leakage detection instrumentation channels. The j calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, l including the instruments located inside containment. The Frequency of 3 months is a typical refueling cycle and considers channel reliability. Again, operating experience has proven that this Frequency is acceptable.
.o .-
'c ^ 1 - rem 4 a-egn v Nr e..< oe- ' g. v - . c a m ; ... . . - .N um .gr r.m i.;,
(continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.4 103 5/15/97 )
l i'
INSERT 1 Q 1.1-1 A successful test of the required contact (s) of a channel relay may be performed by the l verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clanfies what is an l acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all i of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. ,
l l
I
ADDITIONAL INFORIM..vN COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1.1-2 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: CTS 1.3, Analog Channel Operations Test CTS 1.5, Channel Calibration CTS 1.35, Trip Actuating Device Operational Test [ Wolf Creek]
CTS 1.36, Trip Actuating Device Operational Test [Callaway)
CTS 1.37, Trip Actuating Device Operational Test [ Comanche Peak)
CTS 1.38, Trip Actuating Device Operational Test [Diablo Canyon)
DOC 1-32-A ITS 1.1, Channel Calibration i ITS 1.1, Channel Operational Test (COT)
ITS 1.1, Trip Actuating Device Operational Test (TADOT) '
JFD 1.1-1 These are changes to both the CTS and the STS and are considered gerieric changes. Therefore, they are beyond the scope of the conversion review. The DOC states that these changes are consistent with TSTF-64.
Comment: If NRC has not approved TSTF-64 by the time the draft safety evaluation is prepared, then these changes should be withdrawn from the conversion submittal at that time. These changes will not be reviewed on a plant-specific basis.
FLOG RESPONSE (original): TSTF-64 has been withdrawn by the TSTF. However, changes addressed in TSTF-64 have been subsumed by TSTF-205. Revision 1 of l
TSTF-205 is currently undergoing final review by the TSTF members. After final wording !
changes for the COT definition as well as Section 3.3 Bases changes to establish the I requirements for relay contact surveillance testing (issue originally raised at Peach l Bottom) are agreed upon, Revision 1 will be submitted for NRC review. The attached pages represent the definition changes to be included in Revision 1. The Section 3.3 Bases changes will be addressed under that Section's review.
FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 1): The FLOG proposes to incorporate Revision 3 of TSTF-205 which has been approved by NRC. The only changes required involve the l definitions of MASTER RELAY TEST and SLAVE RELAY TEST. ITS Section 3.3 Bases j changes to relax the requirements for relay contact surveillance testing, which per the j traveler may be performed during COTS and TADOTs by the verification of the change i of state of a single contact of the relay, have not been incorporated. See also the response to Comment Number Q 1.1-1.
FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 2): See the response to Comment Number Q 1.1-1.
i ATTACHED PAGES:
None
i 1
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 1.1-9 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: CTS Table 1.2, Operational Modes, added footnotes (b) and (c)
DOC 1-25-LS ITS Table 1.1-1, Modes, footnotes (b) and (c)
JFD 1.1-8 New footnotes (b) and (c) are proposed to be addea pr traveler TSTF-88. This is a change to both the CTS and the STS and is considered a generic change.
Therefore, it is beyond the scope of the conversion review.
Comment: If NRC has not approved TSTF-88 by the time the draft safety ;
evaluation is prepared, then this change should be withdrawn from the l conversion submittal at that time. This change will not be reviewed on a plant- l specific basis.
i FLOG RESPONSE (original): TSTF-88 has been withdrawn by the TSTF. Comanche Peak, Diablo Canyon, and Wolf Creek have deleted the changes discussed in TSTF-88 I and have adopted the STS footnotes. Callaway intends to pursue these changes as an out of scope item given the plant-specific NRC safety evaluation cited in new DOC i 1-34-LS-2. DOC 1-25-LS-2 has been reworded and revised to be DOC 1-25-A (see l attached), applicable to all FLOG plants. New DOC 1-34-LS-2 is only applicable to l Callaway.
FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): In response to NRC reviewer comments received on April 8,1999, notes (b) and (c) of ITS Table 1.1-1 have been revised to reflect the current licensing basis for Callaway, i.e., at least 53 of the 54 reactor vessel closure ;
studs must be fully tensioned prior to making the transition from MODE 6 to MODE 5. 1 ATTACHED PAGES:
Attachment 4, CTS 1.0 - ITS 1.0 Enclosure 2, page 1-9 Enclosure 3A, page 7 and insert 1-34-LS-2 Encl. 3A Enclosure 3B, page 4 and Insert 1-34-LS-2 Encl. 3B Enclosure 4, pages 16 and 17 Enclosure SA, page 1.1-7 Enclosure 6A, page 2 Enclosure 6B,1
N TABLE '_.: /,/-/ j}hC ii6
, C" * :"'i MODES AfiA c7eg ;
REACTIVITY -%- RATED MODE CON 0! TION [K THERMAL POWER
) AVERAGE" TEM?ERATURE COOLANT
/_gy_
-/2
- , _A ,
- 1. POWER OPERATION > 0.99 > 5% p,& NA 'y ),"f__"y '
- 2. STARTUP > 0.99 1 5% t :::"~ NA
\
- 3. HOI STANDBY < 0.99 : NA > 350*F .
- 4. HOTSHUTDOWN(9 <. 0.99 : //A "50*F > T 7J1*F avg
- 5. COLD SHUTDOWN < 0.99 0 MA 1 2u0*F
- 6. REFUELINF(c) ;, -- + yA ; y;oe_ NA I NA
)
9' (a) Fcxclucing cecay heat.
- ~
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J CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 1-9 Amen :nent No. 15 l l
J
, . . CHANGE NUMBER HSliC DESCRIPTION TNreer-l-3/-A o 1.1-7 1-31 A Lt applic:ble to Cell:=y. 500 C=; rsier. C- .p:riter Table 'Er.cle=re 30. rr77~-
por [~)
1 32 A The definitions of Channel Cal bration, COT, and TADOT are reworded to be consistent with ..,TI- M to clarify the "# !.3 #3 phrase " entire channel," thus reducing the potential for O / /~2-inconsistent interpretation of the phrase as experienced ,,
by a number of plants. A rimilar c Inriff enh*on it f'*vil'd Fo.- Ac+aa-h*en Log ic rrer+.
1 33 A This change revises *6he current TS definition of Core Alteration to delete "or manipulation" and " conservative,"
consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. The words as used in I the definition are redundant and deleting the words does q not alter the meaning of the definition.
ns _ i , ~
l-3+ LS-2 r Alf E R~r~ /-3+-L S *2 - ' ' * " " 7 I N r E R ~i' l-- TS~-A O -2 C l~l 0~I S' T~ l j gg- A l zt, A rNsEAT l- 24 -A Q-3.4.I-l O'~2. 4. *2- I
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/- 79 A f l- + o A Q-S:fr*I-I Q-3. 4
- l l-+l A znisen,- l- +I- A
INSERT 1-34-LS-2 ENCL 3A In ULNRC-1663 dated October 29,1987, Union Electric submitted a justification for operating Callaway Plant with one reactor vessel stud detensioned. NRC reviewed that O /, /-j ;
I justification and concurred with it per the safety evaluation attached to their letter f om Thomas W. Alexion to Donald F. Schnell dated May 26,1988. As such, new notes b and c to current TS Table 1.2 are worded % reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned
- and " reactor vessel head illosure bolts less than fully tensioned",
respectively. The requir number of closure alts has been established by an analysis which demonstrates ad quate O-ring compre sion to prevent leakage and ensures that j ASME Section lli stres limits for affected co ponents are not exceeded. ,
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._ INSERT 1-34-LS-2 ENCL. 3B In a Callaway-specific change, new notes b and c to current TS Table 1.2 are worded
$ /, /-9 reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned" and " eactor
.vesselh d closure bolts less than fully tensioned", respectively. 7 ,- ,m,
~ ^~
A + le d S 5 A &
1 O
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 2
. 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ef $ lal-9 Current TS Table 1.2 (improved TS Table .11) is revised such tIiat the required "
reactor vessel head closure bolt requireuents for MODES 4, 5 and 6 are clarified.
Currently a footnote applicable only to ODE 6 defines that Mode, in part, by reference to " vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned." That footnote does not specify the transition point between MODES 5 and 6 with regard to the j number of vessel head closure bolts that must be fully tensioned, leaving the issue j open to interpretation. The proposed change provides the necessary clarification by adding a footnote to MODES 4 and 5, conuistent with the approach used in NUREG 1431 Rev.1, to define those Modes as havincfN reactor vessel head ]
i closure bolts fully tensioned. W W would I !
also be clarified as occurring when er tor vessel) head closure bolts are less than fully tensioned. The required n rojlMIr%fbolts, which aEE2hTrche p less than the total number, is established by analysis that demonstrates adequate 0 ring compression to prevent leakage and ensures that ASME Section III stress limits for affected components are not exceeded. This change is consistent with
-tr :&- Tsir 30. -He NKc LSe+v Ewlush (T:w. Alexion +o b.T.fchell
,, ol.+ed May .2t> MPP) e uwec'- ItL3 (dsd o cme. .24,19r1.). g u-m l This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it 4 /./-7
%. involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:
"The Carimission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility i licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no i significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an j accident previously evaluated; or l
- 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any l accident previously. evaluated; or i
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."
The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 16 5/15/97
IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 2 (continued)
'Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the accident analyses, since no hardware changes are proposed. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the proposed change affect the ability of any safety related equipment to perform its intended function. There will be no degradation in the performance of nor an increase in the number of challenges . imposed on safety related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
m e. el.l-y There are no hardware changes nor are there an; . s in the method by wh en any safety related plant system performs its sofety function. The method of plant operation is unaffected. Leakage would le precluded by the analysis: I however, if leakage were to result from havingUless than the total number of J closure bolts fully tensioned it would be detected by an increase in the temperature on the leak off line from the annular space between the inner and outer vessel head 0 rings. That temperature increase would be detected by
^ installed temperature indicators and alarmed in the control room. Any leakage
( ",
would be detected as an increase in RCS identified LEAKAGE. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single I failures are introduced as a result of this change. Therefore, the proposed ]
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident I from any previously evaluated.
- 3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed ,
event. There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant' systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions. There will be no impact on any margin of safety.
N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS-2" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c); and accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.
O NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 17_ 5/15/97 I i
Definitions 1.1
(-
Table 1.11 (page 1 of 1)
MODES AVERAGE REACTIVITY
- RATED REACTOR COOLANT MODE TITLE CONDITION THERMAL TEMPERATURE
( k,,,) POWERN (*F) 1 Power Operation 2 0.99 >5 NA 2 Startup 2 0.99 s5 NA 3 Hot Standby < 0.99 NA 2 BE B 4 Hot Shutdown *) < 0.99 NA 39p > T.,, > 300 B-5 Cold Shutdown") < 0.99 NA s gg B
_. 6 Refueling") NA NA NA !
Excludino decay heat.
(a)
N I d S3 A f+ Q /,l-1 (b) AR 6eactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned. 1.1 8 --
f (c) h er are 6 reactor 4 vessel head closure bolts less than fully i
tensioned. g, ,y j g f_9
- 1 O !
MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 1.1 7 5/15/97
CHANGE NUMBER JUSTTFfCATION l figures, as well as the methodology for developing the [COMS)
$/,/ !
oi 0F5FX.4 isgan isgog with r el i 1.1 7 w setp&gnsg /tr l Not applicabi' e*ltDEl awa.rT'.t'
~ $i. g' ' l*#V I'A'NlSy cwerrlen-l-
- y. 5 onversion omparison Table (Enclosure 6B). y
% ,f r + % o,- n, e ,
& t./-4 1.1 8 The reactor vessel ad closu t requirements for .a * , a ad are clarified. The proposed change revises note b ' ~or MODES 4 and 5 to refer to ~ eactor vessel head closure bol fully tensioned" and note c for HDDE 6 is revised to read ~ reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned." nn re i e
' v oficded&The required number of closure bolts, which Aless than the totalQM ntaber, is established by analysis that demonstrates adequate 0 rinP compression to prevent leakage and ensures that ASME Section III limits for affected components are not exceeded. This change is consistent l with ax9esTerzw^sm 1%e IVAC Enfeh &*/*r/rk (1~W. Alextin~fr $/,/y
}>.&l'c4ne // dmot Msy 26, /9/1,) of IKMC-/Qf (o/a/sof & frleo .a 9, / 917), \
1.1 9 Consistent with 6 4the definitions of Channel Operational l Test (C0T) ] and Trip Actuati Lg Device Operational Test (TADOT) are '
j n/Yaf/vr ff, g fe/,7 {i expanded tf[ include the details o+
Performance of these tests in a series of sequennai, overlapping, or g j 7,_j c . y, y total @ steps provides the necessary assurance of appropriate operation of the @ channel This change also makes the COTPand TADOT definitions consistent wi the definition of Channel Calibration which already contains similar rding.
) rwlap ordevice, rerjoeelivey. l 1.1 10 This change is based on the current TS definition of CONTROLLED LEAKAGE. This change is a clarification only and does not affect the way RCS water inventory balances are performed. '
1.1 11 new example to ITS Section 1.4 to clarify surveillance frec eles that contingent on both a specified frequency and plant itions.
A/#Y The ITS ains many Surveillance Frequencies that are ntingent on
//Je2. both a " spec 1 ed Frequency" and plant conditions. r example.
"Within 7 days p r to the initiation of Physi ests," and " Prior to d l Y~[ entering MODE 4 from - E 5 if not performe ithin the previous 92 days." These Frequen do not fal clearly under any of the l existing Section 1.4 examples. h oposed example is needed to make clear that 1) the SR 3.0.2 ext 1 of 1.25 times the specified frequency applies, and 2) t the int 1 allowed to perfonn a missed Surveillance by SR 3.0. pplies.
SR 3.0.2 il cle hat the 1.25 extension may be ap ed to "the interval s C -ied in the Frequency". so the proposed c e does not change t intent of the Specifications. SR 3.0.2 applies
- a Surv ance is not performed within the "specified Frequency Again.
@) t example does not change the intent of the Specifications but nly JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 2 5/15/97 l
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.3-04 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: This change represents the Callaway plant design as it relates to the SG Water Level-Low Low Environmental Allowance Modifier (EAM) and Trip Time Delay (TTD) circuitry. ITS Table 3.3.1-1 and Table 3.3.2-1 entries and the associated Required Actions have been enhanced to remove the redundancy in the current TS and add shutdown actions when inoperable channels aren't tripped per their Completion Time.
Comment: Beyond Scope - because piant unique actions are modified as stated ,
in the DOC.. . " Enhancements to remove CTS redundancy in the CTS and added shutdown actions." [ sic) Revise ITS Actions E (as applied to function 14), and X to adopt CTS requirements without modification. [see 1-19-LS 8]
Provide a separate DOC for changes made to CTS Action 7 for Functions 13.a and 13.b. CTS Action 7 is translated into ITE Condition W. Condition W applies only to ITS 14.c functions for Vessel AT Power-1, and Power-2 which are equivalent to CTS Function 13.c.
Based on 8/14/98 meeting {CW) to provicie 163 M and 162 LS.
CTS Action 35 provides actions for a single inoperable timer. ITS Action N allows one or more timers to be inoperable. This change is neither noted nor justified in the CTS markup. l FLOG RESPONSE (original): DOC 1-19-LS-8 has nothing to do with the SG Water Level Low-Low EAMTITD trip functions at Callaway. That DOC concerns only those reactor trip functions interlocked with permissive P-7. DOC 1-42-M (DOC 2-14-M for corresponding ESFAS changes) addresses the changes to Actions 7,11, and 13 in current TS Table 3.3-1 to require entering MODE 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> rather than in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (as would be the case with an LCO 3.0.3 entry).
Contrary to the Reference 4 meeting minutes, there should be no need to provide a new "1-62-LS" change and a new "1-63-M" change only to move the TTD timer Action Statement 7 to the Functional Unit to which that Action has always applied. Moving this Action Statement number in CTS Table 3.3-1 is administrative; no change to current practices is involved. New DOC 1-62-A has been written to cover the movement of Action 7 from Functional Units 13.a and 13.b in current TS Table 3.3-1 to Functional Unit 13.c in that table, with a detailed discussion as to why this change is considered to be administrative in nature. Actions 7 and 11 now apply to Functional Unit 13.c since they both involve tripping the Vessel AT (Power-1, Power-2) channels. New DOC 1-62-A also discusses the corresponding ESFAS changes which mirror the RTS changes.
JFD 3.3-04 has been revised to reflect DOCS 1-42-M (DOC 2-14-M for ESFAS) and 1-62-A.
n in ITS 3.3.1, Condition E correspondito Action 6 (which has been rewritten as Action 2.1 in the conversion submittal) for current TS Functional Unit 13.a. Condition E has been revised in response to Comment Number 3.3-40 (setpoint adjustment deleted from
_ Note).
Condition W corresponds to Actions 7 (added per new DOC 1-62-A) and 11 for current TS Functional Unit 13.c. The format and wording presentation of Condition W and Required Action W.1 are retained for clarity given the discussion in new DOC 1-62-A.
Several of the RTS Conditions identify the affected Function and Required Action W.1 must be clear as what channel (s) to trip to remove the time delay in the event of an inoperable timer.
Condition X corresponds to Action 13 for current TS Functional Unit 13.b. Required Action X.1 has been retained and DOC 1-46-A has been revised to provide more discussion. FSAR Figure 7.2-1 sheet 7A is attached to illustrate the EAM logic.
Condition Y corresponds to Action 11 for current TS Functional Unit 13.d. Required Action Y.1 is reworded to delete the identity of the affected channel since that identity is already established in the Condition.
In ITS 3.3.2, ESFAS Required Action O.1 has been revised to reflect the change to RTS Required Action Y.1.
The last paragraph of the comment was answered in the September meetings, as reflected by Reference 6.
FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 1): Based on comments received from the NRC reviewer on February 16,1999, the changes to CTS 3.3.1 ACTION 13 and CTS 3.3.2
' ACTION 36 that were previously evaluated under DOC 1-46-A are now evaluated under DOC 1-46-M. These ACTIONS have been revised to handle the SG water level low-low (normal containment environment) channels the same as the SG water level low-low (adverse containment environment) channels, i.e., with one channel inoperable place it in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Corresponding changes to Enclosures 2, 3A, 3B, 5A, and 5B have been made.
FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 2): Based on comments received from the NRC reviewer and discussed on April 6,1999, ITS 3.3.1 Condition W and ITS 3.3.2 Condition M and their Bases have been revised to reflect the corresponding Functions as described in Tables 3.3.1-1 and 3.3.2-1. Since the TTD delay timers are part of these Functions, as defined in the Tables and as reflected in the Required Actions, the Conditions have been revised to delete the delay tirners. The Bases have been revised to discuss ITS 3.3.1 Required Action W.1 and ITS 3.3.2 Required Action M.1. If the inoperability is limited to either the Vessel AT (Power-1) or Vessel AT (Power-2) portions of the TTD circuitry, then only the corresponding Power-1 or Power-2 bistable in the ,
affected protection set (s) is placed in the tripped condition. However, if the inoperability I affects one or more timers, both the Power-1 and Power-2 bistables are tripped consistent with CTS Table 3.3-1 ACTION 7 and CTS Table 3.3-3 ACTION 35. The ,
discussion of "TTD test interlock" added to the Bases in the fifth follow-up letter (Reference 9 of the cover letter) has been deleted. That terminology was taken from the
licensing topical report submitted in support of OL Amendment No. 43 dated April 14, 1989, i.e. WCAP-11883, but has no meaning for the plant operating and engineering staff. The Bases sections were revised to discuss which bistables are to be tripped using terminology familiar to the plant staff.
No changes are required to the CTS mark-ups or DOCS. Condition letter references in JFDs 3.3-17 and 3.3-59 are corrected to reflect the changes submitted in supplement 1 above.
ATTACHED PAGES: ) , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 A, pages 3.3-9 and 3.3-31 l
' 8, pages B 3.3-58, insert B 3.3-58, B 3.3-136, and Insert B 3.3-136 A, pages 3 and 8 8, pages 3 and 10 l
l l
l J
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 e -
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED' ACTION COMPLETIO.N TIME T. One or.,tmore; required T.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 3.3 44 channelts) inoperable, required state for existing unit conditions.
DB T.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> U. One trip mechanism U.1 Restore inoperable trip 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> inoperable for one RTB. mechanism to OPERABLE status.
DB U.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> 3.3 106 ANft ,
v L' . 2. 2 Opn "," .
I l
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. I n dietely 3.3 93
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QaInnla& K34 W. Onerot;noreEVessel;lTV W"I Pla T "M 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> T I 04 c m ans c A pwepsty; annel(s)rin. trip.
channe'L(s)Mnoperabje.
@)
WG Be in'H00E'3. 12' hour.s ir 1 (continued)
P
\
MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 9 5/15/97 l
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued) 2-CONDITION. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME c--
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g WV G 6%oons 3.3 04
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MID r2 Be;1n. MODE;O M
(continued)
,&m} .
MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 31 5/15/97 i
RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 y%
'. " r BASES ACTIONS U.1 and'U 2 U.2.1. ad ".2.2 (continued) r-Oneor more With the R":; epen ad the unit in H0DE 3, Condi. on]C- isientered if the/ inoperable $ rip; mechanism:has nobbeenfres. red andjthe Rod [ Control;$ystem:is icapable;off rod twithdrawal or_ J ods,3 re TR-S g not:ful.lydnsergedi thi; trip runctica i:; as 12;;r .; qui.ed t; be-OPERABEE- The affected RTB shall not be bypassed while one of 4 the diverse features is inoperable except for the time required i to perform maintenance to restorettheNnoperablettr;ip; mechanism to:0PERABLE. status # consistent;with1Ref;;@. n; cf tre dia aCA-3Mf i futur;;;. Th; ;11;=b1: t i n . .. r . .. . ..,-........,.3.. ..
diurn futur;; is 2 heur:; for :Pe is;;; ; ;tet;d ur. der Cer.ditica R. -/2 The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> for Required Action U.1 is reasonable considering that in this Condition there is one l s remaining diverse feature for the affected RTB, and one OPERABLE I I
RTB capable of performing the safety function and given the low probability of e. event occurring during this interval.
L1 Not U. sed.
"ith twe RTS treins ir.;p;. ;bic, r.; ;;t;= tic sp;bility is
- nil;bic t
- :; hut d;;r. tra TG;ter, ad i; ,.di;t; plat :;hath ,
in ;;;;rden;; with LOO 3.0.3 is r;;; ired.
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ConditioniWCappliesytolthe Tr.ip] Time %1ay;(TID circuitry V 4M '
enabled -for/the!SGtWaterJ1.e ve]E5 Low $ W;ttip ? . ontwhen THERMAL POWERJs] Jess:;than. or equ_all:td h :in10DE53EandgCksw7 Withionelor more?Vesseli@jPowerG7Pader:2mT.-- 3 y, 6the cassociated : Vessel;'ATichanneT,(s)1must~be -
placed'irrthe tripped condith, within<5~ hours 5 pu; .. ss; an r o' !K ,, tt e- nna la thip4Ss f;A P. 31 nne .; .g. er: n J1 _ :bu ,.es .tha _or2 alj j j he .cha ls? e 3 ;Ve 1: 1P r- reha is /
P cin a7Ve el- cha 1 'tr Gutomatically,'; enables zarzero y time delay _forathat-protection;chan 1 with'either;thefnormallor adverse containment! environment lev l' bistable.enabledCThe
~
Completion Time of:6 hours-is bas onReferenceT~~:3f the (continued)
MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 58 5/15/97
INSERT B 3.3-58 Q 3.3-04 kg.4h if the inoperability impacts the Power-1 and Power-2 portions of the TTD circuitry (e.g.,
Vessel AT RTD failure), both the Power-1 and Power-2 bistables in the affected protection set (s) are placed in the tripped condition. However, if the inoperability is limited to either the Power-1 or Power-2 portion of the TTD circuitry, only the corresponding Power-1 or Power-2 bistable in the affected protection set (s) is placed in the tripped condition. With one or more TTD circuitry delay timer (s) inoperable, both the Vessel AT (Power-1) and Vessel AT (Power-2) channels are tripped. This s
4 4 48'*
4
1 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
.m.
- s. ' BASES ACTIONS L.1. L.2.1 and L.2.2 (continued) complete loss of ESFAS function. If the interlock is not in the required state (or placed in the required state) for the existing unit condition, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and H0DE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable; based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
Placing the unit in H00E 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of these this interlocks. _.
uinnlonY $33~9+
M 14ndrW2 c2MI% s CA-13-co1 Condition _'NJapplieslt< LthegripHileIDiljlyl!TTDEci_
a Ljtry enab]ed;for@heMyai erftevel}IoW Low;ttipifuncti _ _. 3HERNAL {
POWERMsflegsahanior. egua]Ito@QMnMJI'andM'yith CA-319007 one ;or.wreWesse17EI' TPower:17 Power-2)Tchanne11sMinoperable Massoci m >( A e 2* tat w m s w a m erthe ated;yessel~;aTMannel.(s)?must"be.Ip_ laced 2in' the?. tripped
,conditionNithin.[61hoursWpt.. ss; _n_ 1 p .-
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nt a utomaticanytenantesaperggtmesielay. gor;that v Protectionte n .119fthLei_thetitheporma11er;advenserontainment environmentge ];bistablelenabledr5The;Completjongjme.;p_f 6' hour,sjisiba.s lonfReference,31%If;thejjnoperablejchanne]
cannottberpla _tinItheItrip? condition (within3he tspecified Completion 71 rJthetunittausttbe!pl acedfinza;MODEd where;this Functjonjst trequj red 3o;be10PERABEEC3he punit ;mustfbej p] aced in: MODE;3~.wi in anyMgjonaDsixihouns
.;CNff.A7~ 8.T.3-/SQ _
N^'1b:T(YadN32/ Q33 . ion: _ pplies'- _the3G' aterie . ljlow. ?(No tai .t;Envir nt):c nels f . the75G' ater;te el Low ow trip- nctiond MODEST ,;and: .iWith' q or.no norm ainment; vironmen _ channel inoper le,;t inoper le
{c annel(sF r the _a.s ciated'_ jchanne s).mus be,p1 ed jn he tripped ndition thin'61 rs!'P1 ingran~ 'ch 1-1 tri (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 136 5/15/97
INSERT B 3.3-136 Q 3.3-04
. .Q
%g)
If the inoperability impacts the Power-1 and Power-2 portions of the TTD circuitry (e.g.,
Vessel AT RTD failure), both the Power-1 and Power-2 bistables in the affected protection set (s) are placed in the tripped condition. However, if the inoperability is limited to either the Power-1 or Power-2 portion of the TTD circuitry, only the corresponding Power-1 or Power-2 bistable in the affected protection set (s) is placed in the tripped condition. With one or more TTD circuitry delay timer (s) inoperable, both the Vessel AT (Power-1) and Vessel AT (Power-2) channels are tripped. This 1
i
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,.. NUteER JUSTIFICATION if 3.3 13 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).
3.3 14 This change retains the monthly COT for Function 6.h of ITS Table 3.3.21, per current TS Table 4.3 2 Functional Unit 6.h.
No TADOT is performed.
3.3 15 The CHANNEL CHECK surveillance (SR 3.3 2.1) is deleted from the P 11
[ ] interlock because CHANNEL CHECKS are not applicable for permissive functions. This change is consistent with the current TS.
3.3-16 This change [ adds Note (n) and] deletes SR 3.3.2.9 from Function 6.g in >
ITS Table 3.3.2 1. [ Note [(n)] is added to avoid auxiliary feedwater actuations during normal plant startups and shutdowns.] The deleted surveillance is a CHANNEL CALIBRATION which is not applicable to this trip function, since it is not credited in any accident analysis. l These changes are consistent with current TS [ Table 3.3 3 Note W and]
Table 4.3 2 Fu Unit [6.g]. I 3.3 17 New Conditt n i add for Function 6.h of ITS Table 3.3.21, consistentQcurrent Table 3.3 3 Action Statement [15].
3.3 18 This change revises ITS 3.3.2 Condition K to be consistent with current TS Table 3.3 3 ACTION Statement 32, as revised per Enclosure 2, for '
Functional Unit 7.b.
3.3 19 These slave relays were granted an 18 month test interval in the original license, due to the plant trip or upset they would cause if tested at power.
4 3.3 20 [Th cha a s no 2 [C ai t diat n el igh nge libr ion nI SR .3. . ] t nsis nt th rren TS Tab [4. -7 e (2 . is ei acce abl as i re cts he l que librption equifement of se igh ange radi ion n' ors as d ined/ht currpht TS ,g pg, 8.7 3-24 3.3 21 ITS 3.3.3 was revised to reflect current TS 3.3.3.6. This change:
deleted Containment Isolation Valve Position (and Notes) and Condensate Storage Tank Level: [ combined the power and source range neutron flux entries into a single neutron flux entry):d5H55THREElF5Mb g y,y a/
MI:mbLeonew.-mcar-fswimmer erftrasB changed number of required channels for RCS temperature to 2 for both hot and cold leg temperature; changed Containment Pressure Wide Range to Containment Pressure Normal Range; added Refueling Water Storage Tank Level, Steam Line Pressure, and SG Water Level (Narrow Range) Functions as these are e current TS requirements: changed the required number of channels for SG
~..
' - Water Level (Wide Range) and AFW Flow Rate from 2 per SG t}o gw-unnm><>nus
+(i.e.,oneper r4-um pane,An-). CoJ. Won C Tr noAIRd&
eliminda adr conArron wm r,,,p/anne c[y/ [ane
.M;,Manc.
CoJrk,,,-R,-
JUSTIFICATION FOR DItttKLNCES T5
.5 {Ifge /15/97
CHANGE
- m NUPEER JUSTIFICATION f
"f7 3.3 58 This change adds new ITS 3.3.2 Condition [ ] to reflect current TS Table 3.3 3 ACTION Statement [24] cn manual [ ] initiation.
3.3 59 S
This change adds new ITS 3.3.2 Conditi n ho re ect current TS
[ .7.74 Table 3.3 3 ACTION Statement [21] on ESFAS port on of AFW initiation.
3.3 60 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). ,
3.3 61 This change revises the ITS SR 3.3.2.11 Frequency tof8hnths per current TS Table 4.J 2 Functional Unit [11.b]. which is the ESFAS P 4 N# 1 permissive. Theh8,, month frequency for the survreillance of the basic switch logic associated with the opening of the reactor trip breakers is the value specified in the current TS. [ ]
3.3 62 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table f (Enclosure 6B).
3.3 63 This change revises ITS Table 3.3.21 [ Note (g)] per current TS Table
[3.3 3] Note [#]. This revision is a clarification to the operator that describes the circumstances under which the [Steamline Pressure '
Negative Rate High function may be blocked when below the] P 11 permissive.
3.3 64 This change revises ITS Table 3.3.21 Note (j) to exclude the MFRVs.
consistent with current TS [3.7.1.6]. []
3.3 65 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68).
3.3 66 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68).
3.3 67 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).
Ure). .
fff"fYY
- Y '
3.3 69 Not h a /ced/c d d e//4 '
. dea b6Wr**; bm[ err *% %A/e-(Enelwuee 8.).
3.3 70 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table l (Enclosure 68). i
,. 3.3 71 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table
'~
(Enclosure 6B).
3.3 72 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 8 5/15/97
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.3-119 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: This change reflects Callaway-specific BDMS analysis restrictions associated with RCS mixing volume and dilution flow rate. These are administratively controlled under the current TS, as approved in OL Amendment No. 94 dated March 7, 1995. However, with tha conversion to ITS 3.3.9, these analysis assumptions should be included in the body of the TS.
Comment: Revise LCO 3.3.9 to require one RCS loop in operation and two channels in Modes 2, 3,4 and 5. The staff notes that the RTS requires two channel of SRMs in Mode 5. Thus, for inoperable SRM channels both LCO 3.3.1 and LCO 3.3.9 will apply. Explain the difference in Applicabilities between LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.9.
Provide separate ACTION conditions for loop inoperable and channels of SRMs inoperable in LCO 3.3.9. Explain why a train configuration should apply to BDMS.
FLOG RESPONSE (original): ITS 3.3.9 has been revised to require two BDMS trains throughout the LCO Applicability (see also the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-121). The difference in Applicabilities between ITS 3.3.1 and ITS 3.3.9 is due to the safety function being performed. In ITS 3.3.1 the safety function is reactor trip. If the Red Control System is incapable of rod withdrawal and all rods are fully inserted, the sourco range neutron flux channels are not needed for reactor trip. However, those channels are needed for BDMS in the shutdown modes since an inadvertent dilution can occur, and must be mitigated, irrespective of the status of the RTS.
A separate Action has not been added for no RCS loop in operation. BDMS Operability requirements are established by LCO 3.3.9, with the details discussed in the ITS 3.3.9 LCO and Condition B Bases. In addition, the Applicable Safety Analyses Bases of ITS 3.4.5 through ITS 3.4.8 also contain discussions of RCS mixing volume requirements.
Notes to those RCS LCOs were considered, but were concluded to be inappropriate since the MODE A and MODE 5 LCOs do not require an RCS loop to be in operation.
Therefore, a Note should not be added to expand those LCOs.
At Callaway, the " channel" terminology is used to refer to analog channels in the 7300 Process Protection System or to the NIS functions. Channels provide individual inputs to logic processors. The " train" terminology is used to refer to logic functions which take the channelinputs and provide an output based on the nature of those inputs. The " train" terminology applies to the BDMS.
FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): As discussed with the NRC reviewer on April 6, 1999, the LCO for ITS 3.3.9 has been revised to require that one RCS loop be in operation. New Condition C and new SR 3.3.9.6 have been added to ITS 3.3.9. New Condition C contains Required Actions C.1 and C.2 if no RCS loop is in operation during this LCO's Applicability. New SR 3.3.9.6 specifies that one RCS loop be verified to be in
operation with a performance Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. It was decided to number this new surveillance as SR 3.3.9.6, at this late stage of implementation preparation, rather than re-number SRs 3.3.9.2 through 3.3.9.5. This helps to minimize the implementation impact.
The Applicable Safety Analysis Bases of ITS 3.3.9 has been revised to discuss RCS mixing volume requirements. in addition, the LCO Bases of ITS 3.3.9 has been revised to clarify that new Condition C addresses the impact of no RCS loop in operation.
Condition B of ITS 3.3.9 is entered only when both BDMS trains, as defined in the LCO Bases, are inoperable.
The attached pages contain mark-ups to ITS 3.3.9,its Bases, and JFD 3.3-119. No changes to the CTS mark-ups or DOCS are required. See also the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-121.
ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure SA, pages 3.3-76,3.3-77, insert 3.3-77,3.3-78, and insert 3.3-78 B, pages B 3.3-220, insert B 3.3-220, B 3.3-221, .B 3.3-224, insert B 3.3-224, B 3.3-227, and Insert B 3.3-227 A, page 14 and Insert 6A-14a B, page 18 and Insert 6B-1.8
i l
l BOMS PS
. , _ _ _ . . BBPS 3.3.9 i
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION g N fenrn.rr[ ESe 8 7. 7-/J /
3.3.9 BoronDilutionPretectionMi :1.gation System fBOPS) IBDMS) g:y //f PS i
shal di33-l/ n,, i LC0 3.3.9 M h j f f j fe- B BP @ OPE F An de A Md8 /##[
APPLICABILITY: MODES El(bel % i 9 3, 4 and 5. '
g g7 pp 3.3-88 !
g4 j,.4 ................T...........N0TE-.-.. - --- .-- - - !
4 ,g4 The boron dilution flux detM4eg milti;i]jcation signal may be blocked in MODES 2 lbelow:P; _3.3 36-and 3 during reactor startup. 3.3 88 x) nde,fek - ........................ ::. .................................. -
Q 22-PP ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One train inoperable,@ A.1 Restore train to OPERABLE 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> , // f, pyg status. .
j
.. / t & S.1-I2 I
,@i. _ <
.. .I 3. 12 m_=.,_=~: ;=.&. .. . . .
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~ _ . . . . . . ... . Q 11-/2/ m-i __ _ _CS . . p; .
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1 B. Two trains inoperable. Suspend operations involving Immediately I positive reactivity @ A 2f/) ,
e additions.
p 2.3-/21 E AND l
)
f Jkf . n' S.2.1 Pa;ter; en; trein to 4-heter 3.3 88
/__ OPEPJ.SLE ;tetu;. l l 'g Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not (continued)
MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 76 5/15/97
i BDMS PS
, . _ . . BOPS 3.3.9 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) E -- nc-,:isu --+-
Y/ ; Q 3.*3-l.3l
_ f _. ' .1 .3 E 1 Celr .ge (,'V3427,
.j uf ._1 ty its - '
OP .
. .... g ... ,. ... . . .., .,, ,, 4 O *" Wc 3. o%
Ferform SR 3.1.1.1. I hour 3.3-88 8.3 ggg Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter 8NQ S.2.2.1 Close gndjsecu_re 4-hetr Ohouts 3.3 88 s
1,i,.n".,v.
. . B3,1 unborated water source
- a. A isolation valves; p y,3-jf BGV0178@nd:BGV0601T y4 pnce:per;31; days aure ?s~st 'm ym re
/\ are e sued and sseund. _
N s mm~ U-77 s 2-ll1 x-iai& 3.2-ll$g.g.ia.r)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SRJ3.'3;93 PerforsliCHANNEQCHE_CKJ 12jho0@ 3.3 -
1 SRJp;%2 . NOTE:n-- - n--- -- +- ------ l Only; required [to; belperformedJinfMODE~ 5; l d 2 5-???~& i?!ib ih-li H f*?i2 EEiE i? M it l l
VenifyJBGV0178]isJecured tin 'the3cl osed 31; days 3.3 119-Posit 1og
, ++
(continued)
HARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 77 5/15/97
i l
INSERT 3.3-77 Q U-121-CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. No RCS loop in operation. C.1 Close and secure unborated 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> water source isolation valves, BGV0178 and BGV0601. l AND C.2 Verify unborated water source Once per isolation valves are closed and 31 days ,
secured.
i l
4 i
l I
BDMS PS sops 3.3.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.9.13 =-J~iEEi-;- ;=32W-2~e -E~c ==:?Kiy Not! requited!tolbeper, formed;untJEE.h.ours 3.3-89 atteE2educin@oweribeDEP' ' rnkr/gk. d T 7-8P F '*- m ?- = 5 5 f-Tt-~*7-_ _ TET& --~K.~5 PerformCOT[fI.7.ed 92 days ver/[7 [/ux rhu/hp/,ce-/b y,g_g B
.re +p r,+ r o 3. g.-g SR3.3.9.2{ E :=------+-i-I;3t-isutt.-w--2-im2ZL;;5mii Neutronidetectotsla,refexchsdedEfrom CHANNEL 3.3 90 CAE18RATLONI
- -= .= = =.. =...._ w y. 3 = g;;.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months B SR3 1 9;5 Verifylthe:centrifuga]! charging;pumpisuction 181manths 3.3 91 yalves!framf thelRWSEopengend.l.thelCVCSivolume control;tanktdis.ct.wirgemalvestcloseanness e
than[or p 1 M SOIsecondslonia;simulatedlot actuallactuationssignan f l t'4 T.?-lI9-ZN.rERTk3~11 Q r.2-714 e
l l
]
MARKUP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 78 5/15/97 1
l l
I
INSERT 3.3-78 Q 3.3-119 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.9.6 Verify one RCS loop is in operation. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> I
l I
i l
i j
B.S BePS f B 3.3.9 s
B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.9 Boron Dilution Proteet4en KitJgation System 49 BPS) (80HS) .
BASES BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the BBPS BOMS is to mitigate the consequences of the inadvertent addition of unborated primary grade water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) when the' eeeeter plant is in ; :h;ti.;, ;;.diti; . (i.;.. MODES ggttelow 2 ;3 4 and St. gp27-ff
]
The BONS utilizes two channels of source range .)
, instrumentation. Each source range channel provides a signal to 5ts L.th tr; ira ;f th; ",0"S. A ;r.it ; ,,.t;r p 61
- Which i; ;;;d t; continuously records the counts per minute; previid by th;;; :1741;. At the end of each #1screte onehinute tinterval; an algorithm compares the ayerage counts per minute value (flux rate) of that 1 minute interval with the eg@ v aVetage counts per minute value for the previous nine,1 minute intervals. If the flux rate during a 1 minute interval is
~
/
greater than or equal to twice 3; Mines the flux rate during any of the prior nine 1 minute intervals, the BOPS BDMS provides a signal to initiate mitigating' actions.
Upon detection of a flux doubHng M1_tipiticagon byy either source range instrumentation train.' an alarm is sounded to' alert the operator and valve movement is automatically. initiated to terminate the dilution and start boration. Valves that isolate the refueling water storage tank (RWST) are opened to supply "000 ,., borated water to the suction of the tentrifuga] charging pumps, and valves which isolate the Ch;;;;;l ;r. t';l;;; 0.r.tr;l
,- -~ Vojume;controlgank are closed to terminate the dilution.
APPLICABLE The BOPS BOMS senses abnormal increases in source range counts SAFETY ANALYSES per minute (flux rate) and actuates GVGS VCT and RWST valves to mitigate the consequences of an inadvertent boron dilution event as described in TSA". Ch;pter 15 ("ef. 1). The acciden nalyses rely on automatic BOPS BONS actuation to mitigate the consequences of inadvertent boron dilution events. tp2W/9 Zh0E 8 2.3-23e
, continued)
-MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 220 5/15/97
n INSERT B 3.3-220 Q 3.3-119 The operation of one RCS loop in MODES 2 (below P-6 setpoint),3,4, and 5 provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification, and produce gradual reactivity changes during RCS boron concentration reductions. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the transient mitigation capability of the BDMS. With no reactor coolant loop in operation in the above MODES, boron dilutions must be terminated and dilution sources isolated. The boron dilution analysis in these MODES takes credit for the mixing volume associated with having at least one reactor coolant loop in operation.
I 3
l l
BD.MS BePs B 3.3.9 BASES
- v. _ _ _
(G.T.7-//4 YSES -
y jjg (centinued) r The B9PS BDMS satisfies Criterion 3 of th; ""C "clicy St;t;.-.;.t. ,,,,
!10CFR*$0~36(c)(2)(ii);
nH,ggf./,N A ona RlaasrLallle mL cs y,7.1 guTm.r enfm, LCO LCO 3.3.9 provides the requirements for OPERABILITY of the D instrumentation that] provide,sa;on_tr51.RoomJn_d1. cation 2T" ;
Deutrorfgevels,:and er.d centrel; that miticates the consec nces of a boron dilution event. 4 r;dur.d at trein; ;r; requi r;.
te 7347
( b; 0"C"O LE t_; presid; pr]t;;ti = g ;in;t ;ingi feilur;.U Because the BOPS .BDMS utilizes the u a$gNes u nTahn
- in es its detection system, the OPERABILITY of thatMrQdgAY the detection system is also part of the OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System. The flux d;ubling WQTtip]1 tat ~ibn algorithm, the alarms, and signals to the motor.g
- on_troircent_er.ssfor'the guction v;ri;;; valves all must be OPERABLE for eneh p train in the system to be considered OPERABLE. Myeq0i_redforgh.is]D;0J
', - tM]B.1MS.Wegdsitothb~.%tpMf3. SP.Sp] ave';relayJK648Mo3_he ,
motor;controVcenters'(MCCs)Tfor.3he. MIST;suctionj:;tsolation ka]qsJ-(BNLCV0n2D; ET_'bnd the5VCTJ.suctipn." isolation'.t. valves @7-/.2 /
IBGL'CV0n2B~IT.rl,_; cu ed 1 . ,he , n , Je;bsTeig,._ . J
'~
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. _1. ey r 5,';t 3fil _ ion] _egtl _1115~ 113 -
i ....i ed" nee . . IV J .4re: .jser j a y tt ,ri ._1
{ clo jp ,powe. ,la. erst J nter.ockd ;sati fi, .b.y; i El )
a in of t m.r r-~ -@ a'tra .suct M la or Y W" 1s ssfu' 173termi nated fafter -thepo] ume ' oT, eater y,y.ffy fromWhe? norma.x. sed RWST3isectjon"Isdlation3va~1vesF.tojtheJRCS via.the normal . charging 11ow; path:is., Purged andfinadvertent f
(.NV 8- criti cal itri s .avoi ded ("'The.".prfmary. success : path:.fogij t1 gati on M) f ;i s :Tul fill edwhen . thelVCTJsucti on;p.ath.js .j sol at.ed @owever';1t_he ana]ysi.sjalso accounts?for :the~ volum%that austibe.ipotged)since its' boron content is dependent;on -tia rin' cycle;11feand may itself represent .a dilution source. --
- s. - _
_1/1 /
W[M [n.rgkeTen~Y" $ 0I AIN])4!*") 8 II~//k ww,mggine tcr luf in oferahm, f ' Con /ih%dRLharf Le e h k ,
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\
J c y c s y_r( r 9 .n e.a gg ii4 MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 221 MW* M 5/15//
QDMS eses
^
( B 3.3.9
. BASES ACTIONS B.1. B.2.1. S.2.2.1. xd S.2.2.2 BT2 r ^ B 4M.lt.(., -
- 8. 3. 2continued) Q 2.Hf valves listed in LCO 3.9.2 (Required Action A.2)EM78 Land BGV_060E to be secured to prevent the flow of unborated water-into the RCS. Once it is recognized that two trains of the BBPS BDMS are inoperable. the operators will be aware of the possibility of a boron dilution, and the 14 hour1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is adequate to complete the requirements of LC0 3.9.2. INe recutrang31phoriverificati sunesj;ttwselvajyes"43W20sedaf pr.3-ff thqDMs.3 outage;:islagtexte.
Inne;fegur,ed
- Ach% f.3.1
=;;ir;d .ctim :.2.2.: 2 g ni a .aquir;d ret 1 2 e.:.:.1 t; v;rify th; S0" n arding t; S" 3.1.1.1 within i h ar ad a ;; g r 12 ha r; ther;;fter. Thi; bakup xti;n i:; intsid t; cafi ;;;
th;t a; unint s i d b;ra dilutien hn n a rred J il; th; 30^5 wa ir.;grebi;. er.d th;t th; r;;; ired "." h= Enn = int;ind. The
- g;i',_i;d m_ 0,1;tien Tin t;ka inte sa
- ;iir;tix _u__
- ;uffici;u,;
m __ _ 2 _ m 2 ., m m _2 _ _ 2 _ _, eno _; 2_,__ _ 2__
b s uurw a vi bun 3 315 b s u a ww wwu seu u y su b vs 4 ws manav a wssw w hu ms 5 i s a wt susw > u vs s . _ _ _
,g ;; 11; ir th; c atr;l res r;l;t-d t: = .
g gg___
u ' Condition 3 1st _ thinojglSJlk" O inJaperatjonZ
."'The_qtiagof one2CS.Iloopiproyjdes:adeguatetfl,_oWZiolensure;aixipgni,ix._ d stnatigcation!@ndiprodocelgraduaT2reactivitylchagges31urjpg'RCS bote;copoentrat.1on; reductions;she3reactivitylchangersee associatedjMithjborontreductionMW.itherefoteTMritig!fRhe transient]eitigationicapability;oftthe3oron]1!1Jation] Mitigation System 3BDMSEMith*noireactopicoo]antfloop2inloperatj oni dilution; sources!.aust;belisolatedgThelboronid1]ution; analysis takes'creditiforlthermixinglvolume associated!91thThayingfat
] east m?rea*T=1 antg oopM n* operation;
& ZAtrEW /.1C7 .;w+ d 2. 3 -J / 4 )
Q 3.s-l.2 l SURVEILLANCE The BOPS BDMS trains are subject to a CHANNELTCHECIC" valve REQUIREMENTS closure;1njMODEJE COTS end-e CHANNEL CALIBRATIONEand~ Response p y,y_ff T.saeResting: .rn J/ ikon 4Aa o-a ut<ame.& -lo va r, e,,a L Ac,t loof ni op.,.kon rr,ruLja, y ant,,t,c ruo-. e,- m.
SR#3:3?9~1 Per.formance;of3he;CHANNELECHECK;oncelevery L21 hour.siegsuceslth_at grossya11 uretofjource f range: instrumentation 1hasingtloccurred; (continued) l MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 224 5/15/97
INSERT B 3.3-224 Q 3 3-121 Required Action C.1 requires that valves BGV0178 and BGV0601 be closed and secured to prevent the flow of unborated water into the RCS. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is adequate to perform these local valva manipulations. The recurring 31 day verification of Required Action C.2 ensures these valves are closed and secured if the duration that no RCS loop is in operation is an extended one.
j se
r 1 BONS 8995
(~ ' B 3.3.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3M (continued)
REQUIREMENTS PMNELXXIBRATIONM@ejpetformed Withe 6during!alplant'oucage oriduring; plant;operatig SR'f3:9:5 SR;3;3.3JSIisKhe perfomance'32ffgtespon_seltjmeltestleyety ,
181aonthsWo2yerf.ffjthat! Ion"aMimulated;ocactuatboronjd1 Mig l flELaultiplicationisjsnalgthelcenttifuga]Igatgingnangr.guction galyectnnlthemoneniand the CycS;volumecontrelaa!*
Nle# k ?blfr$"$g Y i$ h h%l f A22-9/
Iheytaquenemistbasedfanloperatigrexpertenoezan. dfcons1s_teme With3thegyp)caNatry; refueling 7cyclg
- -3..rurErr 82 7-or7 & 21-//O w
gy.. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Ch;pter Section,S5316J o ;
- 2. WCAP 10271 P A Suppl;;;at 2, Pccisien 1. Jun; 1^^0.
Cal) awayjDL3 Amendment" No.-'17JdatedjS_eptember:B ;M; s i l
1 l
l l
Q-MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 227 5/15/97
l INSERT B 3.3-227 Q 3.3119 SR 3.3.9.6 SR 3.3.9.6 requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that one RCS loop is in operation.
Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing adequate mixing. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RCS loop performance.
l l
l l
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i CHANGE NUMER JUSTIFICATION F i I
, g 3.3 119 isefng[r d DMS aly s res rict ocia d wi - ' +
= -- - T'2K .= = .: = rw_ =;_w - - = -
di tion flow ate i.e.. ITS 3.3 .2). G=iNAdmini trat vely y c stro ed u der t cur ent , as ppro d in JL ndmen No. 94 ated arch 7,19 ever with the c nyer on %
ITS .3.9 s
-/dr.c anal sis a sumpti s uld inc ded the bod t TS.
~
~ TA T.e e/~ t '
f g e} n o
3.3-121 ITS .3.9 is revised to reflect tNowawrrLerwrwe-,,w 4e h-MA that the suspension of posfive reactivity 3 -
Rcf /
r.Qdditions and accelerated SDM verifications are%uired @ if no -
y.
In ofth en.)CEiW M E== M^M F FP3K
~
[.r7v'f6#T-)ofppmacJHrs,-eTscussgo-Jn-tIlw 7 Suspension positive reactivity additions and accelerated SDM verifications i
L /A/f).,/ should not be required ihe -et-46 8 7.7--/2 / -
fff&}fl b,Y ! ' "'
o 4 in i 3.3 122 Amece n
- 9 J f ? i: ,, , '
l ITL 3.3.1 ApplTcability o e (b) for Functions 1, 5,19tz1 ana Corditions C and K are revised to replace Actions requiring the RTBs to lI l ^ O l be opened with agens that ensure subcriticality is maintained (i.e.,
bf' fully inserts all rods and ensuring the Rod Control System is -ThSS-d# 1 incapabie of rod withdrawal) yet do not initiate a feedwater isolation (P 4 and low Tm) in MODE 3, consistent with traveler TSTFe135. l u ;
3.3 123 @i Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table K (Enclosure 6B).
4i 3.3 124 Consistent with the current TS Table 4.31 Note [17], the notes for h ITS SR 3.3.1.4 and Table 3.3.11, Function 20 are modified to clarify I that the SR is required for the reactor trip bypass breaker local manual shunt trip only. The Bases for SR 3.3.1.14 clearly state that SR 3.3.1.14 includes the automatic undervoltage trip of the reactor fl a
trip bypass breakers. The Note (k) added to Table 3.3.1 1. Function 20 p!
l clarifies the Applicability of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms to include those functions of the reactor trip bypass ki breakers when in use. :7 i
- 3. 125 ITS SR 3.3.1.11 is modified by'a Note that requires verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values. The addition of this Note is consistent with SR 3.3.1.10 and is required because SR 3.3.1.11 is used for the Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Qlgi Rate [ ] trip function which has a time constant associated with its s; <
ps Calibration. "
4
- 3.3 126 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 14 5/15/97 '
INSERT 6A-14a Q 3.3-119 This change reflects BDMS analysis restrictions associated with RCS mixing volume (i.e., tl..s additional LCO requirement that one RCS loop be in operation, which also corresponds to new Condition C and new SR 3.3.9.6) and dilution flow rate (i.e., ITS SR 3.3.9.2). These requirements are administratively controlled under the current TS, as approved in OL Amendment No. 94 dated March 7,1995 However, with the conversion to ITS 3.3.9, these analysis assumptions should be incluud in the body of the TS.
l lNSERT 6A-14b Q 3.3-121 '
the BDMS circuitry, including the input from the source range neutron flux channels, is functional. New Condition C has been added to address the required actions to be taken if no RCS loop is in operation. These actions are the same as those that establish 1 the basis behind ITS 3.9.2, i.e., closure of the unborated water source isolation valves. i l
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F INSERT 6B-18 Q 3.3-119 This change reflects BDMS analysis restrictions associated with RCS mixing volume (i.e., the additional LCO requirement that one RCS loop be in operation, which also corresponds to new Condition C and new SR 3.3.9.6) and dilution flow rate (i.e., ITS SR 3.3.9.2). These requirements are administratively controlled under the current TS, as approved in OL Amendment No. 94 dated March 7,1995. However, with the conversion to ITS 3.3.9, these analysis assumptions should be included in the body of the TS.
I i
l I
i
i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORIWIATION NO: Q 3.3-121 APPLICABILITY: CA R iQUEST: For Callaway, ITS 3.3.9 is revised to reflect that only one BDMS train is n quired OPERABLE in MODE 5 and that the suspension of positive reactivity additions r.nd accelerated SDM verifications are required only if no source range neutron flux indicatoris OPERABLE.
Comment: Deviations from STS require justification based on plant design features, licensing basis or operational hardship.
FLOG RESPONSE (original): ITS 3.3.9 has been revised to require two trains of BDMS throughout the LCO Applicability and Conditions A and B have been revised accordingly.
The Notes above Required Actions B.1 and 8.2 have been retained (also, for prope-formatting B.1 and B.2 have been moved up to the corresponding Note). These Notes specify that those actions are only required if no source range neutron flux indicator is OPERABLE. Condition B will be entered if no RCS loop is in operation. During startup at the beginning of a cycle with a positive MTC or during shutdown at the end of a cycle with a negative MTC, Required Action B.1 would prevent heatup to the point at which the first RCP is started or prevent cooldown to refueling conditions after the last RCP is removed from operation. The Note is needed in order to operate the plant. Likewise, Required Action B.2 should not be required if Condition B is entered due to there being no RCS loop in operation. While the OPERABILITY of the BDMS trains is dependent on the RCS mixing volume associated with at least one RCS loop in operation, in order to prevent inadvertent criticality within the analysis time acceptance criteria, the OPERABILITY of the source range indicators is not dependent on RCS loop status. As long as a source range indicator is OPERABLE, the operator knows there has been no impact on SDM and accelerated SDM verifications should not be required. The Notes above Required Actions B.1 and B.2 reflect the analysis basis, i.e., if BDMS is ;
unavailable the dilution source valves must be closed. This is consistent with the respective Applicabilities of ITS 3.3.9 and ITS 3.9.2. ITS 3.3.9 does not apply in MODE 6 because the dilution source valves are closed per ITS 3.9.2.
FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): As discussed with the NRC reviewer on April 6, 1999, the Notes preceding Required Actions B.1 and B.2 in ITS 3.3.9 have been deleted and new Condition C has been added to address the required actions to be taken if no RCS loop is in operation. New Required Actions C.1 and C.2 are taken from the basis behind ITS 3.9.2, i.e., closure of the unborated water source isolation valves. See also the response to Comment Number Q 3.3-119.
ATTACHED PAGES:
Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure SA, pages 3.3-76, 3.3-77, and insert 3.3-77 Enclosure SB, pages B 3.3-223, B 3.3-224, and Insert B 3.3-224 Enclosure 6A, page 14 and Insert 6A-14b Enclosure 6B, page 18
BDMS PS a9PS
~~. 3.3.9 1
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION g 7 7vo frarn.r s[ Me
~
8 7.7-/,2/
3.3.9 BoronDilution."retccticr.Hj :1,gajlon System fBBPS-> l(B_DMS) 2.2- //9 - PS LCO 3.3.9 g k7 ; ffj(e BOPS s 11 be OPE LF[An #nd [d8 A ja APPLICABILITY: g g7-pp 3.3 88 MODES 23belogigI 3, 4 and 5.,
(gg.A ................
...........N0TE - - - -- - - -- - - -
4 , g,4 The boron dilution flux tieubMng mu]tip]jcation signal may be 3.3 36 blocked in MODES 2 IbeloitIP? and 3 during reactor startup. 3.3 x) /n-/er/,e/c ............................ ..................................
O xg-PP ACTIONS CONDITION RE0'JIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Onetrcininoperable,@ A.1 Restore train to OPERABLE 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> , ./ / f ,
-- g .-/.2 /
3$4.
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- - - ~~.-1-~ -t ~~~ = = , = ~ - \
P . Q ~2. 7--ll 9 Two train inoperable.
(50*"+/Y e r s$o -
B. Suspend operations involving I l positive reactivity Immediately
@AX/)
e M additions.
l
$ 2.~2-/21 08 AND f)RI _, in I _ . J ".2.1 "csterc ere tr;in to hetr 3.3 88
/ _
OPERELE st;tus.
fE Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not (continued)
MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 76 5/15/97
BDMS PS
.._ BBPS ,
3.3.9 it ACTIONS (continued) j CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION ff COMPLETION TIME l
B. (continued) C'3r g
net-;hu.
F-'r'_L i % __
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i! 150 .ce!r ,9e (S(3427[, l
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Ferform SR 3.1.1.1.
f WC 3.
I hour o$
3.3 i
'9 t
m !
Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> {
thereafter l
.E 0.2.2.1 Close aldDecure t-heur 4" hours 3.3 88.- '
.,Q. Q. l unborated water source )
'a ' ^ isolation valves'l gy,3yf BGV0178TaridIBGV0601J 8.3. W' un U&
s ure isola 'sn w M M ll are e aseel and secu re2.
N 2 war U-77 s s-ll1 x-ini& 3.2-ll1 s.gi;r SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY EM-@
G Petfont. A_NNELICHECKJ 120ioedt 3.3 .
SR_7_ M 2 __, ,,,_, , _ggggg gg .n gn_ ,
On]ylrequi red 'ito lbelperformed :d n TM00E'.5
= - ~ _ ====== . .;_;;h_55. -_ ~ ,
.+2_ _,. . .
Ven11yJBGV0178:is 3ecuredl1n.1hejcl osed 31@ys 3.3 119 posjtTon. ,
(continued)
MARKUP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 77 5/I5/97
, INSERT 3.3-77 Q 3.31_19 O
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l
C. No RCS loop in operation. C.1 Close and secure unborated 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> water source isolation valves, BGV0178 and BGV0601.
AND l
C.2 Verify unborated water source Once per isolation valves are closed and 31 days secured.
\
i .-
l l
l
~BOMS Bops
<' B 3.3.9
'.D BASES ACTIONS /L1 (continued) _ g gy_p f With one train of the BBPS BDMS OPEWel:ET inoperable 6
,RequiredActionA.17equireithatthe inoperable train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. In this Condition, the remaining BOPS BDMS train is adequate to provide protection. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is basedontheBBPSSOMSFunctionandisconsistentwithEngineered Safety Feature Actuation System Completion Times for loss of one redundant train. Also, the remaining OPERABLE train provides continuous indication of core power status to the operator, has an alarm function, and sends a signal to both trains of the 89PS BOMS to assure system actuation.
B .1. S . 2.1. S . 2. 2.1. ; ,d S . 2. 2. 2 B"2" [ 6 :3,j j ad 8. 3. 3 N #*WI S 7.7-/2 /
associated Completion Time of Condition A not met, the initial
.. action (Required Action B.1) is to suspend all operations involving positive reactivity additions immediately. This includes withdrawal of control or shutdown rods and intentional boron dilJtion. , . r,ed ( _ , _ _ . _
5 a; U'MI i e i f it x .- I t g y ,
, c ,,,.
m .
u.. .. , --. . , .... : ..r..
. _ , . L .. . . . .....- . .. :
E.,.. .7:p OPEMBi:E-stetus-Required :ActionJB:2 'verifiesithe:SDMIaccording.itoISA T1!1 within;1;hourlandynce :per.'121hourstthereafterJ"!Thi si actionfjs intended 7to confirm thatinotuni.ntendedJboron; dilution)as l
occurred M ile?the3BDMS was; inoperable'.pndethat.;theJrequired3SOM has 'been; maintained.T The;specified:. Completion ; Time; takes 11nto con _ sideration;; sufficient;timejor 'the11nfti al) determination'. of SDM aand Lother;information d avail able' tin itheicontro1
- roon pl ated to SDM5IR 'Tj by :N e. . at g. _
yyg r . . i ~un : ., ;
'v if ti s?
- i con 1,1 f ' _r !
r i at is _ __ ;
A: Or, ;1t;rr,;t- t; r ;terin; en; tr;ir, te ^^E"","LE -t;tus
(",; quired Actier, ".2.1) . Required Action ".2.2.1 B4l requires ' ( 3.*f f.
^
@ (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 223 5/15/97
t BDMS Bees
'/ B 3.3.9 l
BASES ACTIONS B.1. S. 2.1. " .2.2.1. =d S .2.2.2 B 2. darB anj3.l{.(.,
8.3.;2 continued)
Q 2.?-97 valves listed in LCO 3.9.2 (Required Action A.2)QMiV0178"aNd R0601~, to be secured to prevent the flow of unborated water into the RCS. Once it is recognized that two trains of the BOPS BDMS are inoperable, the operators will be aware of the possibility of a boron dilution. and the -14 hour Completion Time is adequate to complete the requirements of LC0 3.9.2. T_h~e recpr,rjagplJdgywegifi ensuresIt_heselvalvestareElosedaf$r'NP theJMS]outagelisian; ext _ jone'.
of fe d Ach% f.3.2
."e;; ired Acti= 0.2.2.2 ;agnic gura ;;uired Action ".2.2.1 t;
- rify the 50" n arding t; 5",0.1.1.1 within i h;ur ad ac; g r 12 teur; there;ft a Thi; red;;; stic i; intent'
- cafia th;t n; unintad;d bara dilutien ha xsried uhil; the ".0^: ;;
s iregidic. ad th;t the r; quired Z ha ban nint;ir.;d. Se
- g;ified C41;ti;n Tin tda int; an;ider; tion ;;fficier.t ti= fx th; initi;1 J;;;rainetion of S0". ;r.d other infu;;ti;n
- il; ir th; an; mi rea rel;ted t; = .
g g g ., fgg
~
C 'r "InY ti dNeAhh onemCSylggp tproy1derad_guateg!aw2tolensulmajx_jtig 5mgLvent j stritifistion!ferid!prodgc~jgradQaMactWitMnge_sDr;ini'RCS e
borgnrcogeentraiton;teductiongghereactsvitweharaemate associjltediWithiborgnzredQttionLwEf1therefote M gittDff5the tnanstanthitigationtcap;eb111ty;o.fwheporro1TotTonmitmatm SystemLSD_MS)MthJnoireactgr! coolant 3Ibopy rgoperatYon! .
d111Mgn;s_ourcesMst;bef:1 sol ated.TfT_he@ggon7 dilution;analy_s1s l takesicredj tNor2thef a1Xing1vol ume "associatedisi_th1having?at l leastionelrea.c_tqticm,1 antHmplin;op,etatf or}; I k zur a r- 1 xt .u + e .z2-ll4_
SURVEILLANCE OP-@L)
The BOPS BDMS trains are subject to a CHANNEL"!CHEMyalye i REQUIREMENTS closureljnJHODE:Si COT; and-e CHANNEL CALIBRATIONGandjRe.sp;onjle g y,y_fy 4 Timelestil1gi. n doli$on, #a re s.r,-amed /n vero ons Acs loof ni yam.kon er ruLp a pnidc rana,- ,,
SR T E 9~1 Performance ~of2the^CHANNEfCHECKLoncejegery 121houtsiins~ urbs 3that gross:'; fail urelofjourceyrange gnstrumentatj on3asIno_t;occurfred (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 224 5/15/97
F INSERT B 3.3-224 Q_3.3-11 D_9_
Required Action C.1 requires that valves BGV0178 and BGV0601 be closed and secured to prevent the flow of unborated water into the RCS. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is adequate to perform these local valve manipulations. The recurring 31 day verification of Required Action C.2 ensures these valves are closed and secured if the duration that no RCS loop is in operation is an extended one.
i l
1
1 i
l CHANGE l NUMBER JUSTIFICATION g
, 3.3 119 isr/ng[reflcts d DMS aly s res rict n ocia d wi :
=__ m.#rM m - - * - - -i = c e 1 im s.-r i - . -m w _a -
S .7. 7-//9 -
di tion flow ate i.e. , ITS 3.3 .2). C D dmini trat vely c ro ed u der t e cur ent , as pprov d in L [
ndmen No. 94 )
ated arch 7, 19 H ever with the c nvers on ITS .3.9
-/4r.r anal sis a sumpti s uld inc ded the body of t TS.
~
_ TA f.r n 2
Nof- o 2
sa dd dn
(
' Q 3.3 121 ITS 3.3.9 is revised to reflect t2pt-1;porms savo6 e= '
6\
[
[8CS /nf, T.r NN that the suspension of p"os tive reactivity 3 f i
(!
dditions and accelerated SDM verifications ar uired @ if no k, j 1 (inoj % k n. 0++=mWM MFTW P m \
[.rA/IEpr) ofy;enutc5-1r positive reactivity additions and accelerated SDM verifications x Suspensio d 1.7-/2 / n.
1 L /A-/(f,,,/ should not be required i h _ , - e - G ^
f ff a f * "~
o } fo, i 3.3 122 IT!
ow-3.3.1 AppWcabilitge (b) for Functionsi 165,19<Z1 y i: - . anav '
.y ~* a .
Corditions C and K are revised to replace Actions requiring the RTBs to be opened with ac$tfns that ensure subcriticality is maintained (i.e., ,
bf' fully insert @ all rods and ensuring the Rod Control System is 7h3'!i'-##
incapable of rod withdrawal) yet do not initiate a feedwater isolation (P 4 and low Tm) in MODE 3, consistent with traveler TSTF 135.
u..
3.3 123 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table is (Enclosure 6B).
f 3.3 124 Consistent with the current TS Table 4.31, Note [17], the notes for i k
ITS SR 3.3.1.4 and Table 3.3.11, Function 20 are modified to clarify -
that the SR is required for the reactor trip bypass breaker local I.
manual shunt trip only. The Bases for SR 3.3.1.14 clearly state that b SR 3.3.1.14 includes the automatic undervoltage trip of the reactor trip bypass breakers. The Note (k) added to Table 3.3.1 1 Function 20 n f
clarifies the Applicability of the undervoltage and shunt trip %:
mechanisms to include those functions of the reactor trip bypass 7 breakers when in use.
3.3 125 ITS SR 3.3.1.11 is modified by a Note that requires verification that ,
the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values. The addition of this Note is consistent with SR 3.3.1.10 and is required because y SR 3.3.1.11 is used for the Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive t;
Rate [ ] trip function which has a time constant associated with its
,. yu calibration. @
t re
E 3.3 126 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68).
JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 14 5/15/97 '
INSERT 6A-14a Q 3.3-119 This change reflects BDMS analysis restrictions associated with RCS mixing volume ;
(i.e., the additional LCO requirement that one RCS loop be in operation, which also l corresponds to new Condition C and new SR 3.3.9.6) and dilution flow rate (i.e., ITS SR 3.3.G.2). These requirements are administratively controlled under the current TS, as approved in OL Amendment No. 94 dated March 7,1995. However, with the conversion to ITS 3.3.9, these analysis assumptions should be included in the body of the TS.
INSERT 6A-14b Q 3.3-121 l
the BDMS circuitry, including the input from the source range neutron flux channels, is !
functional. New Condition C has been added to addrest the required actions to be taken if no RCS loop is in operation. These actions are the same as those that establish the basis behind ITS 3.9.2, i.e., closure of the unborated water source isolation valves. I i
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l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.3-027 APPLICABILITY: CA l
REQUEST (original): ITS 3.3 Bases are revised in response to NRC reviewer '
comments.
REQUEST (supplement): Additional ITS 3.3 Bases changes are made in response to NRC reviewer comments.
ATTACHED PAGES:
i Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 58, pages B 3.3-17, B 3.3-19, B 3.3-20, B 3.3-43, B 3.3-59, B 3.3-137, B 3.3-140, insert B 3.3-140, B 3.3-143, B 3.3-154, B 3.3-189, B 3.3-191, B 3.3-193, and B 3.3-199 I
4 I
i l
RTS Instrumentation [
B 3.3.1 t l
BASES 7 q.
APPLICABLE 6. Overtemperature AT (continued) -
SAFETY ANALYSES, ,.
LCO, and Dynamic compensation is included for system piping delays ggg,3py -
APPLICABILITY from the core o the temperature measurement system ed > ...
aT .as'us w,.u1Ltri , Q represent (gin'the]0.vettemp@erature
.thef100t'RTPlyal s.neasured*byli ;. 4.^.g thelplar!t1T '
each'iloopAfgr;the!startup;of;altef_ueledicorejuntil" _
re CA- M $*
m n# g# to? actual;ne_asur,edlyaldest(atI903100tJgTPf;inTiis 1 7 initial]MatlaNalue Nhichlts?consenativelyllower g @
m than:thec last+mempaelanenTorrr-h*.ach100pH" -
_ng4 f ed T , ;-P j
$yer@p tolthe:measuredivallu jnormalizesteachsloop@eT,[ttj thggangDgigiggggenditjengexj'stingMtGtheit$=w CA-17-u7) :
CA-q7-4 7 U ##88 seasurenegt;1thus g 31theJttipR *A ) ~ ~t 1"
equivalent;f411Xpowgby; condition _s _ . . . _
2-8T8r#"j@
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=CLderHhese31fferencesninwesse1___
f 69pa]Ifactots7j & M U " < a he .
% g 9 # measurea m s tfjowstgreater;thansjn_3---; ; ,.g j
- ? Sow [and: .. syumietticipowerffistMbut.1onsibetwee(n a quadrants]Mh1WRCSEloopiflowsfareLnotit-tadito
,~
chanF - =-radiaWpowerir1! distribution betd quadrantstmayfoccur[rerA1}jngddsma.15changestin j 1 - 'i 1ficl'vesselfihYvalues Ispecifjc;vess2 int' val
! determination i t iw performingsthe;Incore/E : cod k_qu. _ ErecaMbratijjiinjand under;. steady;stateIcond ltio isg(1:e /;powerJ.distrjbutions h &
not2affected;by p or3 ther tra g*; conditions); _ '
xam
- c k G.1- W 7 =
Theitimefconsth lintheTTa scampensattomisof measured;aT ,andiseasured[I _
"H27): -
0,?
at:0 ' uis;settingicorres _ _ .__moolat
- car ..
. _ lag [ compensation.;ofjthese M gnals gjS'fety a 14 analyses;thaticredjt?Ove_ aturefaTEforlprotection @
must;accountifor;tilese;fiel_ just.ab]ej.lagicards;asfpil (1;emthe; combined g
as7alltothet'firsttorderala v g4
^~
RTD/thernowell;; response; time; nd.ithe;scoopJtransport' delay andithermalElag)EThelsafet analysessuseia(totalifirst '
I otder:1ag:ofJ1ess;thanjor eq al M w ando Thu1 ion.r) i The Overtemperature aT trip Function is calculated for g each loop as described in Note 1 of Table 3.3.11. Trip occurs if Overtemperature aT is indicated in two loops. G' Ma At a u ;it , t The pressure and temperature signals are y (continued)
MARK UP 0F NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 17 5/15/97 .
f RTS Instrumentation :
B 3.3.1 i-
.y BASES CA4:ht1 s AP L CAB 7. Overoower aT (continued
- 8 are LCO, and consequencesiofismalP teamline: breaks 3astre rtedrin & * -
y APPLICABILITY Re C 11~ 1"
. It uses the aT of each loop as a 8 measure of reactor power with a setpoint that is p automatically varied with the,following parameters: :d 4
e reactor coolant average temperature-the Trip L Setpoint is varied to correct for changes in coolant h, '
density and specific heat capacity with changes in ?
0 coolant temperature; and .
e rate of change of reactor coolant average ~t temperature-including dynamic compensation for the delays between the core and the temperature measurement system. @19*~1 AI in MA ^ 7.KE4 Ante-aW '
~
ih .g3s300 d
^
sensured W 3the31@N '
each11oopgForfthelgartuplof3Oefueledicoreiuntil- ory i .
~ '
tolactualineasured Jati9071MRTP) FAT,*js verpswer]
initia1Jy; m lvalue;whichDs?,conserv ,_]y3cwor hd*g>d thanrthe'3memmmuid;100ERFj4T,Eforleacht _ _1"E to.gne mivataegg 11zeszeachiltog_ T;tet tha"-- ---- - - -
AT M cA-tw7[a
---_:1tions] existing 38t3theltimelGf [f,,. & 4/47 F is g5 lae _ M 2thgE M mthe;trjp g tef1 @ h equivalent #u]l1 power;acondjtions;@l=Wnt):pe accidentianalysesNJtjeseld17erences 4n?;Wissel gH g s
6e.r# . -
1factorsF ~ - >=1ng J BOW !? measured E T Tflows3reaterithan1HinjaumlNeaG 4 Fil.oWMndL _ ymmettictpowersdistrjbutions3 : tween O quadrantsEtwhilestCS~Toopl flows?agnotlexpect_edito g, chair 3r'Mftadi typowerliredjistrJbution 4' betdiquadrant~ spay;occurg _tesultinglinismaljilchangeslin y 1oogpeciffcHesselsAgvalues"E urate rdetermination of the?T.oopJspecific;vesse i4Tfval de*when PerformingttheIIncore/Etcor ;quartetly;,recalibrationtand underJsteadyfs_tateicond' tio is1(ij;eZpower, distributions . T, notiaffectediby@grZop"heQans xen.n .p, ondjtions)li cA-s.s-ar N Theitime: constants: irtthe3a gospensa }, measu. red;AT and;measu. 7, ~( are(set-UC , (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 19 5/15/97
i i RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 r BASES APPLICABLE 7. Overoower AT -(continued)' SAFETY ANALYSES, S
/"'
LCO, and- at10f h_ .y,/ mas
._ "ET!hispJgMotrespuiddhM3.00JWL't 'g APPLICABILITY carcqe_ sedfor;9agiccupenssi tonpf;thetejs1.gnalsR*Safat analyses 3 hatscredit L M ggTjfork.pMienE-t :
accountMorpheseMeld ade te+3hlel1Ag3:ardslasInsell'as n'11Xctherstirstorder21aM1Mffthe2combinedRD/ e thersaweEtesponseltimejandJttemooop; transport?sely,iand t_ hema 124gWThelsafet9]anabsesjuseja3stellflestibrdler laglofjgesgghan,porgegisa11*oJ63 seconds; p edirnD The Overpower ATl tr p F tion is calculated for each loop as per Note 2 of Table .3.1 1. Trip occurs if Overpower. AT is indicated - nt loops. At ;; ; unit;. th;
,,;;; ::: ;isi:i ;;; ;;;d f;; ::l.;; ;;;:::: f;;;tl:n:.
At th;;; unit;. Q1e actuation logic must be able to $7,7, Gen-1 withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation and a single failure in the remaining channels providing the g* protection function actuation. Note that this Function also provides a signal to generate a turbine runback prior to reaching the All;;dl; '!;l;;. Trip 2SetpointJ A turbine runback will reduce turbine power and reactor power. A reduction in power will normally. alleviate the Overpower aT condition and may prevent a reactor trip. The LC0 requires four channels fer tw ;rd f;;r 1r,ep unit; (thre; cher .;l; f;r thr;; leep unit;) of the Ove' power r AT trip Function to be OPERABLE (inojloutiofjfourgtrjpj]egi_c5 Note that the Overpower AT trip Function receives input from channels shared with other RTS Functions. Failures that affect multiple Functions require entry into the Conditions applicable to all affected Functions.- In MODE 1 or 2, the Overpower AT trip Function must be OPERABLE. These are the only times that enough heat is generated in the fuel to be concerned about the heat generation rates and overheating of the fuel. In MODE 3, l 4, 5, or 6. this trip Function does not have to be l OPERABLE because the reactor is not operating and there is ! insufficient heat production to be concerned about fuel overheating and fuel damage. O (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 20 5/15/97
RTS Instrumentation 6 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE 21. Automatic Trib Loaic (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO and by the RTS Automatic Trip Logic cause the RTBs and APPLICABILITY associated bypass breakers to open and shut down the reactor. The LC0 requires two trains of RTS Automatic Trip Logic to be OPERABLE. Having two OPERABLE channels ensures that random failure of a single logic channel will not prevent reactor trip. These trip Functions must be OPERABLE in MODE 1 or 2 when the reactor is critical. In MODE 3. 4. or 5. these RTS trip Functions must be OPERABLE when the R",s ;nd associ ted bypess terricrs ;rc ci;scd. ;nd th; CR0 Bod Control System is cavMe of rod withdrawal ppfrods TM-J.3.o04 are]no1&f0]lVMnser!W on, ,,. m,re The RTS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of th NRC gig Policy St t; ;nt. 10CFR5q36J g 2)lii); ACTIONS . A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.1 1. s In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the transmitter, instrument loop, signal processing electronics, or bistable is found inoperable, then all affected Functions provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition (s) l entered for the protection Function (s) affected. Whenit_he i Requiredichannels3nTableI3@E1EarelsacigedigagperIloop,, l Per;SG.7.peribusT sisrthenithe?Conditiontaay;belentered CA-E91.2~1 j separately?forjeachg p;ZSGEbust-66CGfpspA or Arn, - or fer +rmin When the number of inoperable channels in a trip Function exceed those specified in one or other related Conditions associated . with a trip Function, then the unit is outside the safety ( analysis. Therefore. LC0 3.0.3 must be immediately entered if { applicable in the current H00E of operation. i @ l (continued) , i MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 43 5/15/97
-l
~
RTS Instrumentation i B 3.3.1 I W% i.-{i , BASES l ACTIONS _ -~. mandWCCfbn5fiDed) t#f@ tab]eychinn_eT. lgngq1Mbe31acedqnMegdyE.on~ditgtfrf3/11Mn thspecif.iedEompIed5nMmeT, ithewiE9; _M31ani&M0!LE
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. .jiouMDteNecfocaing'survegancCtestijmuTd ;_ _ i anneis@9?tiour@me7:lWitgjfstif.iiidttifERefe '
f,ahP2s X.I and L *2-Conditfon[pp ij8r267.theZEnvironmentaTATTowancefM_odif.ie' ?(EAM) r Y ci ccuitryff.or,2he E.Waterlevelj- i. Low , Lo4;t;rj p_;functi onfi n H00ES randMSWithlone.ordmore'EAM! channel (sBinopecable,Mhey . must.:.beiplacedXnlthe;tr:1 pped mondit_ionwithini6ihouns.3 P. lacing ! anJAMAhanneT9filtrj pfautpmaticall;yzenablesghiC5GlWatec;teyiT!; ! Low 7.Eow - (KdverseXontainment Protectiokichanne1Jwithitsrh'gh'rjSGIlee'1Tfip5etpoin. i e .Tnvi ronmentT[vltbi ~The WW stabl e';f (e hl her te id "Y
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(continued)Me// i occur MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 59 5/15/97 tsour)*
ESFAS instrumentation B 3.3.2
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- m. u.s_t%be..@ lace.d_rd. n.".. MOD. E5.'a_it.h.i..n."/_a.n.:a_d_d1gunaD_X_mhoursan.d_?Xn. .1 MODE 3:4Withi n-the dfall owingtsix 200cs" ((, f L,, .f.rp;7 0 4 M=*
innd $ .9,*8 Y eeur f ,,,. [ Condjtjon ppl iesito 3he ALxiJ.iatyIFeedwater@umplSGetign Transfer:on Lowc: Suction Pressure.fEunctioni?aheiCondensate Stotagegankj.is.~the ' highly' reTiabla2and ' preferred' suction !. source i O' ..k,, (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 137 5/15/97
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS tha semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with
- end without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE master relay coils.tTheand that there Frequency of everyis31an intact days on a voltage signa STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry - - -
operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.
.ZhnGTT $ '? *T~/+]0 CA-1.snkr9 SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST Wst3 es d;;;rikd i;; 2 3.3.2.2. cx;;A tMt the BOPJjSFRS sem+ automatic tester. i; at and ;r.d The continuity check does not have to be performed, as explained in the Note. This SR is applied to the balance of plant actuation logic and relays that do not have the
. p; * " SSPS-4est circuits installed to utilin tM x;ist; ;ti; t;;ter or perform the continuity check. This test is ; h; gr'e d required every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency is adequate based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.
\ ..
SR 3.3.2.4 ) SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED _ TEST BASIS. The time allowed for the testing (4 hours) and the surveillance interval are justified in Reference 8. e (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 140 5/15/97
- -- INSERT B 3.3-140 cf y,g.gg
~
In addition, SR 3.3.2.2 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST of the _ MSFIS PLC actuation logic, initiated from the SSPS slave _ relaysg is I t is r uir d
', cA-3342"7 ca7d. e Ffr qu cy ad uat as d oa ys a av ncyit -
dust ope in pe ' cep, nsi rinpnst men)feli ilit nd per ng _ st a k e
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2
.(. 'o ,
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.9 l REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The i test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. r l%.ferenes 4, CHANNEL CALIBRhTIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions ofiT W m r M w r e The C4-3.3 -0.2'7 b$[55N!iUU.! _5 BIN ![UY.!N5UN$b5 55! I J.'
. '.' . .".. 'J
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The Frequency of 18 months is based on the n: /ic. cf = 18-month assumed calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint methodology. O"4 i-This SR is modified by a Note stating that this test should include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the j u' prescribed values where applicable. !hisidoesinatCinclude verificatMcCtime.gelay/rehysMhe,seAreAettfledWia response;ti m itesting;per m a.;2;1oj rivreer- CR z. 3. a 9 8 'X~3 M 0+ \ SR 3.3.2.10 e L. s g g,y, gen _/
. , i. . . m .f This SR verifies the 6 individual channel ESF RESPONSE 4 7M TIMES are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Response time verification 6
@ acceptance critgria are included in th; T=t.c.i=1 p y,y_gy R.wi. ;...t; ".221 (Ref. 9; Individual component response times are not modeled in the an yses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed tir.a. rom the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip set int value at the sensor, to the point at which the equipment both trains reaches the required functional state (e.g., pump at rated discharge pressure, valves in full open or closed posi on).
For channels that include ynamic transfer functions (e.g., lag, lead / lag. rate / lag, etc. . the response time verification is may AIo credT M r~h ker,i,,-h4e.,r
% . Qgg,,at.r win rygg&,Qw aulpw .
MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 143 , w g- 5/1 Q"" n4t:r,&
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 o ,, :.
.i BASES BACKGROUND Thefrequired.nonf T ype A,l Category l:yariables_ @
CADA"7 (continued) include: _rndreak Jfm {RVLrf) ReactorlVessel & Leveg SGlater Levelf(Wide 1Rangeb Anal ContainmentJydroger#r yser~s-,li;rs GW;7and Core ~ExitTemperature; 6' A In? addition /JAuxT11aryTeedwaterTl oW'Ratejs@ required - non-Type:K, JCat.egoryR var.iable 2tT,illaway;IFThese : vari _ab7epare
, considered;e_ssentiallto j;he}opergto3;fp_r_;accidentfaanagement.
e90.tyil variables 1rosjNUKw-3,431TRe '7 notTequiredamsw' nt' Pressure 7tW L _"Gontainment
.. Isolation'Valv_eJositionaa e"StorageHaylkiefeTy Although;these!are' _. variables!"they, ?esseistia14and their u i_ ity-wouldmotgreduce-thefeffectiv _ _ tof.3.he
_atorgesponselo;m;DBAI.as_ discussed 3n] Reference'.3. p
% vi scr*; %tc. Til; 2.2.31 p evi&; ; li;t ;f v;ritic typic;l ;f then iintified by tre unit ;g;ific %;;l;t;ry 0;ii 1.07 =;1yx;. T el: 3.0.0 1 in unit ;g ;ific T; 1..i =1 Sg ;ifi s tien; (5' ;teli li;t ;11 T3 g A xd % t; pr3 !
v;ri di a ii..tified by tre unit ;g ;ific % ;;1et;ry 0;i i 1.07
=;1yx;. n asid by tre %C'; %f;ty Enlatien %g-t (00'".
The specific instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.31 are discussed in the LCO section. APPLICABLE The PAM instrumentation ensures the operability of Regulatory SAFETY ANALYSES Guide 1.97 Type A and required'non Type'A Category 11 variables so that the control room operating staff can:
- Perfore the diagnosis specified in the emergency operating procedures (these variables are restricted to preplanned (continued)
MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 154 5/15/97
LOP DG Start Instrumentation l B 3.3.5 l j BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The Frequency of 18 months is based on operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the
~
setpoint analysis. SR T 3iS M SR'ES55'isjthe*perfomarqwfnthelteguj.tydjgtemponsejtLine Ver#1catjonNassesMagr CE51Reyecygs3monthsmg C44.3-02'l 4 SI8GGEREDmLgASISlendmosefusionspitpj!!Mpl3Lr$5]Jgojtttled
""3N '
sw] Reference 3]EEachMr.tficationghelMincludpMjpletjene
^~= tra#1suchithatIbothjtrajns3areRecifiedjatMeattJoD_ee]Per 362 months!
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 82 H g DJ
- 2. FSAR, Chapter 15;
- 3. 'Jnjt 0;;nific RTS/EPZ Set = int "et4h;;y Stdy. dA-7.7-82C Ca
_ 1.2_ ... Jffyy& O a.,,. [. . a.s u. ,+ une..a.sn Callawa 0E8mendmentlNoK991dateidIApl113B el nne: 5; ESARIrable36A2J 6*. EC @ ranch 3echnica13os.ition LESB3J MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 189 5/15/97
Containment Purge end Exh;;;t Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES BACKGROUND Mini Purge System and the Shutdown Purge System. These systems
-(continued) are described in the Bases for LC0 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves."
The safety analyses assume that the contai r4e+) APPLICABLE nt remains intact SAFETY ANALYSES with penetrations unnecessary for core c ling isolated early in the event. within s pr;xis tely 50 n a- The isolation of the purge v:las _has not been analyzed mechhs.tically in the dose gg,3 g2 calculationi lth=;h it; r;pid i;;istibn i; es;; ;O)*inmg
~
n? ls e
- rk he containment purge er.d exhsst isolation radiation monitors act as backup to the H Mase"A' isolation signal to
, ensure closing of the purge suppJy and exhaust valves. They are CA.J. 1so the (ii3EEEP means for automatically isolating containment in the event of a fuel handling accident during shutdowne Pt y Containment isolation in turn ensures meeting the containment __7 leakage rate assumptions of the safety analyses, and ensures that ,
'p. the calculated accidental offsite radiolo*al anses are bel
~
10 CFR 100 (Ref 11 j **vereq F#WW c A , -e
# He ojr g /cuh kokr The containment purge and ex (so a 1'o711@rbn ati*on MI ' ~
satisfies Criterion 3 of th: NP,C Policy Stat;ar.t. E ' '
/
10CFR50~36(c~)12)R1X , r e ) LCO The LC0 requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessar to initiate Containment Purge er.d Exhnst Isolation, listed in Table 3.3.61, is OPERABLE. 8 ^*
"M *' *-
CA-7% au fonwb.e
- 1. Manual Initiation '.ro/.&
,, o ff,
[//e darer The LCO requires two channels OPERABLE. The operatorcan.grt.co k initiate Containment Purge Isolation at any time by using ,p, y either of two switcha push] buttons in the control rxn. eUb" d E4ther :.; itch actuatcs both trei = . Thi; n tion wil i c= = xt=tia cf cil 2 p =nt: inth: == unar a /Endm&r, any ;f th: w tentic =tuation sigal;. U O (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 191 5/15/97
)
Containment Purge er.d Exh;;;t Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES LCO 3g Containment Puroe~ Exhaust Radiation (continued) $ 3,3- D 1 For sampling systems, channel OPERABILITY involves more than OPERABILI f the channel electronics. OPERABILITY
-meralso requi rrect valve lineups pnd sample pump CA-M4#
operation, erd . ..tcr ;;;;ter agr; tier., as well as detector OPERABILITY, % these supporting features are necessary for trip to occur under the conditions assumed by the safety analysesLyfnce, j l I
- f. @' Containment Isolation - Phase A -
JL6aA2W Wbb}$b l WW
/efer to LC0 3.3.2 Function 3.a. for all initiating 4 7,7-M A Functions and requirements.
L .rsker7 B 2. 2-I43 APPLICABRITY The Manual Initiation Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (WEdtVAe**M6~ - - M tQ 7,7-72 ggy [ BOP,WM Containment Isolation Phase A, and Containment Rurge h hau_st Radiation Functions are required OPERABLE in H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4. end The30ptainment+Putgeyjchaust [tadiationRHanual?InitiationdndTBOP j ESFAS;LogicM_onsMne alsolrequirediOPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Under these conditions, the potential exists for an accident that could release fission product radioactivity into containment. Therefore, the containment purge erd exh;;;t isolation CA-F<742~b instrumentation must be OPERABLE mese nuut.d. While in MODES S and 6 without in progress, the containment purge ;r.d cxh;u;t isolation instrumentation need no
#3lTM E A L7 aii O m 13 N E o r irrm l i Y b
- be OPERABLE since the potential for radioactive releases is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of Reference 1.
fppH;d4*fforthe containee.nt@0r . 1 u mf]the ESFASTontainment:Isolatio _ __ nction::isfspecifiedin . LC03 32l: ,Re _ . 2 asestfor'.LC03.L._ f " discussion 3f B j ther _ nt;IsolationMPhase A'FunctjonLApp1,1__ @ (continued) HARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 193 5/15/97
Containment Purge end '&houst Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 g%. - .., BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6. 4 3 7~33 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every IB months, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. The Frequency is based $y,3, Gen.) on operating experience and is consisten with the typical industry refueling cycle. , SR 3T3.
- h
$37-72 SR3 376' .~ s2helperformanceiof2themiredysponse21me yerificatifon LeeMMever,y38tmonthsWD CA-7 7-027 S,,T_M41wJBASFjon tnoselunctionswithjtjue,9Jaitsjprpided s 1_n'Re.ference , Each'vetificationj;shall,dnc]ude';ataeastyne traj.n_suchlt t Lboth :tr.ainstar.e_v_erified;atj]eastpnceJer 36_,n_onthy 3 g y,g yp REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100.11.
- 2. NUREG 1366, dete- D.0].y22]g9_93; O rf ,aO K M M rfn M Q 3.3-3'2-J. @
ESARTab]e.t6mzI 4, @ cat 1 awayyL] Amendment'* OHO ~datedJApr,j] 304M S; CsiIaway ot Amendmas No. IM- ddd Q12-32 J~uly IF, IM&.
*i .I e' b MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 199 5/15/97
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.3-028 APPLICABILITY: CA l REQUEST: ITS SR 3.3.5.3 and Bases Tables B 3.3.1-1 and B 3.3.2-1 are revised in response to NRC reviewer comments with regard to " nominal" Trip Setpoints. I ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 5A, page 3.3-58 Enclosure SB, pages B 3.3-73, B 3.3-74, B 3.3-75, B 3.3-148, B 3.3-149, B 3.3-150, B 3.3-151, and B 3.3-182 l l i l 1 i l l l l
LOP DG Start Instrumentation g, 3.3.5 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l SR 3.3.5.1 Perfera C"." CL C"CCK.11e!breakerslbetweenl480 10 h;;rs 3.3 28 ! Vac;;busesING01]and;NG03 andsbetween]480;Vac 7;. day.s buses 1NG02"and"NG0_41shall'.beNerif[ejd open] E'Y*5*f ~/5$af[~nr/-h~5 - hhh:g I SR 3.3.5.2 Perform TAD 0T. 31 days B knominal CA *3.3-0 SR 3.3.5.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with_ t setpe u& 1.8 months B PS Alle;.;dl; ValueTripj}etpolnt'and?Allcitable Value as follows: a; msColn1,tageI@Mb]e]Value 833Mifas;3Vg120VisasraithwetimetdeDy PE ILO X O g r;20;s:see" -- / nomiml CA-3 3-04 w'8h._ LossInfdyoita _n __;wimAVE1zu.y BusEWithlaltineidelaflof310Jseg b; Degraded woltage:Allowabl e1 Val.oe 10MK*19.38Et120gsush*1ttta;41me delayactiggirgsect ^ - n,mrn. I CA-7.7-ost
~
Degradedyp]ta .m_, m.mgwan p20V;Bospwith;a31meJje yylof3193sec; e m ESFREsfor/rE 7%MEQ SR'3_;I5:4 , JStart3DREiBiBRER5We Verify 5 ff C 187 months;on;a 3.3 31-c- m hreiwitttin11mit_ pyEggg3
~
STAGGEREDJESI WM- ' g ,y_ g BAS 1_S MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 58 5/15/97
TablejB?.~Jan
-- .:::. 2 .J:Z2. r'n n'n " MPage;12offd) c A T. 2-0 2 8 1 w nun c uL m *)
i FUNCTION TRIP Ata vle.1 CA-2.F-4/f ! [K Mapual@eactongtjp Ng [2; PaeriRange2Weutron; flux a: Righ IC109t! RIP b; Lw R25t3TP 1 l EN Pwet~ Range; Neutron;f]uxiRate2 k24t@TPiwith;; time HigQosjtive; Rate constant 6;2:sec; [6 Intiermediate3angeJeutrogHux R25t))F [5; Source 3apge3euttorESux iG1;0E53PS [6'; Ove_rtemperature;6T SeeRable%3g3]Notegi
/ h m,r Z Overpower;4T Seepable??3 nill'Hote;2i EB) Pressurizerfressure al La E_"18852psig b] High E223851psjg
- 3. PCessurizer;WaterfteveEHjgh b32tjofligstrumentispan 10.~ ReactorjCoolant' Flow, Low k;90t;ofjoopjainimum me_asured. Gow319tL=95;660;gpm) 11.. Not[Used.
- 12. Undervoltage_RCPs -
k1301584]Vac
- 13. Underfrequency RCPS h"572Hz (cpntinued)
(a) The inegaeliG se}n onl y indicg/es cor,nennfive dio-ech5n. The A.r-leN
~) Vafue will le wiNin n */ue-side) celo%}ron -frferanea je) M.E3-on ether- ride J He non,iv/ vafue . This a/ro af,.ker -/n L #5 Over/e,yenh.-e aT nJ eve MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3. <(~<<
73 aTK valaer fe.- Ae9 qcg1+. yg
/
Jab]e~B"3~3.T-7
- - . E ? C Z.7_ 1 Z. 2.If f Zl.. C S M age K oC3)
FUNCTION in[PbEibINT18) CA-27-4/f 14- Steam;. Generator;:(SG)Jaterf teve'l Low]Eow
- a. Steam;GeneratoriWater; Level i;320'2%iofJnatrowiragge LoWitoWJ(Adyetse in~strumentf;spap ContainmentiEnvironment) b: Steam;GeneratoCWater2 Level d4;8tJd.ffnatrowirange Lowilow~(Norma 11Cppta_inment jnstrumentIspan Eny1ronment)
, ,gf,/ gg A g c; Vesse156T3quivalent; & 3'. 7 ItipTTime'D.elay (1) Vessel %IREquivalent Messel;3TIEquivalent";tp K44MRTPJVesse]MT ._
(iirith alt 1.neldel4y 435q (Po..wer'1) /2.f/*/, T232'secg p ,g ,, (2) .
.J g essel; W R
' Vesse]i:hTfEquiyalegt4o Equiya]entA .. -B9%RTP.TOirithiaftimeldelay Vesse176Tl(P_ owe ) .22.4/*f;Cri2;secD
#; D241% iG5J,psfg
$3% Conta~1nmentIPressure"$
~
EnvironmentallA11oWance Hodi.fjer 15lJ2Not31 sed; W ,U urbine; Trip al Low))ujd101)2ressure d 98 E psfg b- Turbine .S_ top'Va]vefClosure i"~1r;ppen 17, Safety / Injection; (SI) ?Inputifrom NIA. Engineered, Safety' Feature Agtuation;Systemi(ESFAS)
- 18. Reactor Trip? System l Interlocks
- a. Intermediate Range: Neutron C1.0E-101 amps Flux, ;P,i6 b; Low:PowerfReactor Trips N;W.
O Block. P-7 (pontinued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 74 5/15/97
Tab 11sa z1:1 g w7. y,7 , _7 m r ~ 7 -g. r- _~. q p,,,3.1, g ) (. - u. cA-z.3-amy
- . ,n , __
i FUNCTION TRIR 5urubi78) CA-27-d/f 18j Reactor 3 rip;Systesl Int.er]ocks' (continued)
- g. PowegapgelNeutronfFlux. LM7tTP Pl8 d: Power 1RangelNeutrong]ux; C
' .5051RF Pj9 e; PowerBagge2NeutronJ]ug 10ERTP P30 -
f; Turbinejupu]selressure, 's'10JlurbineJowe.r P;13 19] ReactorJ r g Sreakers NE 20; Reactor;Ttip7BreakerEUndervoltage N.A; , andishuntgrfp; Mechanisms j ca.s. 4# 21~.' Automatic 3riptiogic N:A: i i
\:9 MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 75 5/15/97
/
TableJB'342i1 tZZ" ISIE~IZri222ZZi25Z~Z.I&ge toc 4) .. cA-7.t-c2p MCTION
&& Gfv'^ '
TRIPatidn ') CA-27-d /t LE Safety,Ugj_ection a; Napualprli.tiatiop Nfg b; butoma_ticActuationitogic N.31 andlActuationJRelaysilSSPS) c; ContainmentJPtessutei D_;Spsig U19hR d; Pressucizer;Ptessute;i:LW R18493sig
- e. Ste.am*14ne] Pressure E low E';615l psi _g E2] Cgfgainmen_tJSprAy al Manugl5Initiatjpg NIAJ b] Automatic l Actuation' Logic N[A!
andlMuatjon" Relays 3SSPS) c; ContainmentIPtessute3jghj3 D7J0;psig 87D.
- 3. ContainmentJsolation aj PhaseIAJ so]ation ID MayaEInitiation NX
[2) Butom_aticfActuatjon K:A; Logic!andiActuatjon Relays 2(S_SRS) (3) Safety 3njection Seefunction~1 (Safetyllnjection);
- b. Phas_e .BMsolatjon II) Manual:3nitiation NJAj (2) Automatic"Actuatio.n N;A!
Logiciand:Actuatipn Relaysf(SSRS) (3) Containment Pressure 's;27"0;psig High9 (contjnued) C %d (a) The (negualif .tryn only indicdes comervaNve lIrecNion . 7~Ae n.r-/ef4-vaiae
.,a..+ wii sa w.wr, a n.cach c ta 4 N ~~ca L,) - c.s
- u. ,.i <,i .
cn.~i+ 1 i MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 148 5/15/97 I
Iable:B13:3;2:1 rg~_rne:ny gLym.,_.qagey.__or_:4.) g nt - ins . FUNCTION TidfiSET[b$iT*) CA-E u/4 E4; Steaninegsolat.im a; Hanual;2nitiation NW b; ButomaticrActuationjlogic NJAi and:ActuationTMlaysMSSPS) et Automatic;Actuatiorfilogic NW and Actuation 1 Relays IttSEIS) di Containsegt7fessure,E EM7;03sig tL1gh2 e; SteamJtinezassure
- 11) im k51S+psts r2) NegatitejRateFjtigh si1001psilwith]altatgjag cont @1eC*t.tmey:anstant inggec:
LW gnigne;aT ipfatndjfeedwater
-@h Isolation ~
a; Butomatic: Actuation: Logic NTA; and:Actuatjon1RelaysRSSPS) bl 8'Mc.MuatjonJLogic N;N andIActuatieg]Re_ lays
!!tSEIs) s cf SG3atetileve]5High]Ligh AR8tMfinattowyange LPJ14) instrumentgan d; SafetyJInjection SeeJEunctionJ1
~
G. SG Un4re LeveI 1sw-/-sw (Safety
~Jae G eho 1 Injection);; f.),D W.M E@ Auxiliary,Teedwater gm a; NanualT.:Init_ia. t._ ion.
. - NW -
bJ Automatic %ctuationJLogic HTAE j andjActuation_Re]ays2(SSPS) c2 Automatic (ActuationJLogic ICA; and Actuation; Relays 3(BOP ESFAS) Icontitlued) e MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 149 5/15/97
Tableis 3:3;2i1 E5:1I;E22XEEEEEE~521EEXPage71ofi4) p A /A MA /A I cA-3.2-b1 FUNCTION TRihSEThblM") 4-7I'O/f
@ gux13tarfE,esater3 continued) d; SEWate.C.Leye]ILoWil.ow
{1) Steam;Genetator kJO:2tjoffnarrgwyange WaterjteveEtowjtow instrumegtyspan (AdverseJcontai_nment gnytronme_ntj m Steamisenerator Sp4;sEofinarrow2ange lister 3ieveBoditow instrument;sjon mognaEconta.inment Enviginnent) p) tessetSEEquisaient inefuN 6 1rjpI Deer elay y dei *f b**r- 02.3 4 m gessel37 kyesse1%T31guivalent fg'#* ' t*1 ** cA-T.s-a 1 vesseraT gpawigj [ /2 +/% (b) [' yesse M T syesseUEEquiva1_ent to . RT33withXtime Equivalent IsRsec') gm_ _.~y ;;o +1'lo . yessel;%T pa ,f /'4 KPower2) W ContainmentIPressure Rg;5.;ps19 EEnI[ronmental 811owance; Modifier
- e. Sa.fetyfIrtjection See.; Function;1 (SafetyJInjection).
f, Los_siofs0ffrite: Power NJAi
- g. Trippful[.MainfFeedwater N.A; Pumps ,
I
- h. Auxiliary]Feedwater. Pump it;21ghsia Suction 2ransfeton' Suction Pressure M Low ;
}
(continued) e MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 150 5/15/97
Iable:s3;3 v1 , P,_ E522r.'Z1252SHI10i3.NEage;i.of24) Aratken/Ar CA-3 3_-429 0#~#'#/ FUNC110N N[P dd hYd *) UJ Mtomatic;switchover2to catainmentisump al Mtomatic3Actuationlogic N.A. 1 apd'ActuatimIRehys3sSPS) h;' Refueling! water;stonage iigst Lang1(RWST); Level Z Low] Low Coincideptlyithll Safety SeeLFunctipp;I Ig3ectim Isafetyanjectimp LB_; f.S L C nter1 2 al Bea;cto f !11p R i4 , [lg bl Pressurizer 7PressureXP 11 EG970'Dsig .!CD_r_ e 4 1
\
@ l MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 151 5/15/97
LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 a.1 d).s BASES BACKGROUND Fouridegradedivoltagelbi_s_tablesiwjthiassociated i timeldelaniare (continued) providedtfor2eachi47161kVIClass"1E; system bus'foridetecting*a sustai ned ! degraded ? vol tage ?conditi on P1Rie . r . is _1 , _ 49-7.7-02f 1 i al id= al ro - a L 1.1 [~CNER7' 8 S.7-/P: , Trio Setooints and Allowable Values The Trip Setpoints andpssociated; time delays used in the relays are based on Referencesg E2;2and"6) th :nc1 A ical licits pic;cated in IS??, Ch;ptcr 1S (Rcf. 2). The selection of these Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the relays is normally still more conservative than that required by the Allowable Value. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE. Setpoints adjusted in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providtnged the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and that the equipment functions as designed. norninaI V cA-3.3-02 Allowable Values ndh8TripSetpoint are specified for each Function in the-tf4h SR2;3) . . %;cinal Trip S:tpcints arc el;c
;pccified in the unit sgcific sctp; int calculation;. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by the surveillance procedure does not exceed the Allowable Value if the relay is performing as required. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE. Operation with a Trip Setpoint less conservative than the nominal Trip Setpoint, but within the Allowable Value, is acceptable provided that operation and testing is consistent with the assumptions of the unit :pccific setpoint calculation. Each Allowable Value and/or Trip Setpoint specified is more conservative than the analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident analyses in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip function. These
- m. uncertainties are defined in the " Unit Spccific RTS/ESTAS C4-27@S Sctpcint
&iAellyde"cthodel-aveme 3y -$r- Study" OWAOrJref S leymle f s/nfl ca/Mhdene VIN =jeChnnelr.
(continued) MARK-UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3-182 5/15/97
' ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.4.11-3 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Change 4-05 LS 31 and Difference 3.4-39 Comment: TSTF-113 (presently Rev. 4) has not yet been approved by the NRC staff.
FLOG RESPONSE (original): TSTF-113 Rev. 4 revises the shutdown requirements of ITS 3.4.11 to allow the plant to reduce T., to <500 F within 12 hours, rather than MODE 4, to address the concem of entering LCO 3.4.12 Applicability with one or more inoperable PORVs. The shutdown requirements of ITS 3.4.16 are also revised, for consistency, to allow 12 hours to reduce T., to < 500 F. ITS 3.4.11 Condition B and C Bases changes have been made to the Callaway submittal to reflect Rev. 4 of the - traveler; no changes are required for any other plants'submittals. The FLOG continues to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler. FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 1): Based on the present status of the generic change process for the STS, it appears that traveler TSTF-113 will not be approved by the NRC in time to support the 'aitial license amendments for the FLOG plants. In order to facilitate the issuance of these initial license amendments, an attemate approach has been developed by CPSES and DCPP which relies on the CTS, plant-specific information, and/or the NUREG but does not rely upon the traveler. This alternate approach is hereby provided as an interim submittal to allow issuance of the initial
' license amendments for CPSES and DCPP. The changes which rely upon the traveler can be processed in subsequent license amendments following approval of the traveler by the NRC.
Callaway and WCGS continue to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler as a beyond scope change, primarily due to their high COMS/LTOP arming temperature of 368 F. Required Actions in STS 3.4.11 for one or both PORVs inoperable would bring the plant to MODE 4 (350 F). This could involve entering the COMS/LTOP LCO Applicability (ITS 3.4.12) with no means to mitigate a cold overpressure event since RHR is just being aligned for shutdown cooling during this time frame. Callaway and WCGS propose to terminate the shutdown tracks in ITS 3.4.11 at an RCS T., < 500 F, rather than 350 F. At T., < 500 F, saturation pressure is 666 psig. The lowest MSSV lift pressure is 1185 psig with a +3/-1% setting tolerance. The SG atmospheric steam dumps (ASDs, WCGS refers to these valves as the SG atmospheric relief valves or ARVs) have a set pressure of 1125 psig. Operation in MODE 3 with RCS T., < 500 F renders the offsite release of radioactivity in the event of an SGTR extremely unlikely given: 1) the difference between the initial SG pressure for this RCS T., and the ASD/ARV set pressure; 2) the secondary side pressure increase would be driven by RCP and decay heat only since the plant is in MODE 3; and 3) operation of the steam dump to the condenser. The licensing basis SGTR analysis discussed in
FSAR/USAR Section 15.6.3 uses worst case assumptions (e.g., 3636 MWt initial core power,18 MWt RCP heat, and 939 psia initial SG pressure for Callaway corresponding to 15% tube plugging) and ignores the steam dump to condenser to intentionally drive the secondary side pressure above the ASD/ARV lift setting to evaluate offsite doses. When consideration is given to the extremely low probability of lifting the ASDs/ARVs after an actual SGTR with RCS T., < 500 F versus the real potential for entering COMS/LTOP LCO Applicability with no mitigation pathway, Callaway and WCGS maintain that the proposed change results in an enhancement to net plant safety. FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 2): Based on NRC reviewer comments, Callaway and WCGS have withdrawn all changes associated with TSTF-113. Based on NRC approval of OL Amendment 124 dated April 2,1998, Callaway has attached pages that support the lowering of the COMS arming temperature from 368 F to 275 F. The PORV setpoint curve (CTS Figure 3.4-4), moved to the PTLR under DOC 9-01-LG, will be revised to incorporate the arming temperature change when the PTLR is issued pursuant to ITS Section 5.6.6. WCGS will maintain their CTS at this time, but may revisit this issue via a future amendment request. FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 3): Additional changes to one Bases page and to JFD 3.4-18 are needed to reflect the changes requested in supplement 2 above. FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 4): Consistent with the draft Safety Evaluatien. DOC 1-05-M is revised in Enclosures 3A and 3B to show that it does not apply to CaFaway. The Notes revised in CTS LCOs 3.4.1.3 and 3.4.1.4.1 reflect the relaxation covered by DOC 9-18-LS-39 added in supplement 2 above. l ATTACHED PAGES: Attachment 10, CTS 3/4.4 - ITS 3.4 Enclosure 2, pages 3/4 4-3 and 3/4 4-5 ' Enclosure 3A, page 1 Enclosure 3B, page 1 l l
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' REVISlay ;
3 , i REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT SHUTOOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION t' 3.4.1.3 At least two of the loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least one of these loops shall be in operation:" Reactor Coolant Loop A
' ' ' - - - ' " " "-- - - "- - " /9/-/_G ,
- a. y
- b. Reactor Coolant Loop B e..d it n.x i;;;d :t: = ,.n..eter .nd
- =tr ;='.ac.; e _ ; ,"* i
- c. Reactor Coolant Loop C : d fi: n:::f:t:d :ts:. ,.....e;.e. and r n ;t.. ...: ..; r p, **
- d. Reactor Coolant Loop D r d it: un:f:t:d :t:= ;:xr_t.c xd }
rn:t:- r 9 -t 72- ,"* ~
- e. RHR Loop A, and .
- f. RHR Loop B.
APPLICABILITY: H0DE 4. , r i ACTION:
~
ent e above required reactor coolant and/or RHR loops /-d7-#/
- a. WithYless than OPERABLE. imme ately initiate corrective action to return the '
required loop to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; if the remaining OPERABLE loop is an RHR loop, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours, no Ints ofEMBLE pr /-d'/-j6f
- b. WithVno reactor coolant or RHR loop in operation, suspend all *'
operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Ccolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return th: .;a.ir:d :='.=t4 1oop togoperation. Ont OfGAA8LE.r M at Y remed k.n ef.en+Tmx... ;ia;f for up to I/-4/-M hourd
'All reactor coolant pumps and RHR pumps may b. /-/f-A provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature}
is maintained at least 10*F below saturation temper a ~ l -h y water , j t '
**A reactor coolant pump shall not be started unie 0*F above each of the temperature of each steam generator is les than Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatur s. erYlaryeired l \
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CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/A 4-3 I i
i g .. REACTOR C00 TANT SYSTEM . . c. . * . .. } COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS FILLED ( LIHilING CON 01i10N FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.4.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop snall be OPERABLE anc /-d /-/ S in operationK and either: i One additional RHR loop shall be OPERABLE #, or a.
- b. The secondary side water level of at least two steam generators /-/f-/y ,
shall be greater than-MA g ot th_e wide range. _
##. f APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with rea ACTION: ' J.
- a. With one of the RHR loops inoperable and with less than the reouired steam generator level, immediately initiate corrective action to return the inoperable RHR loop to OPERABLE status or restore the .
requireo team generator level as soon as possible. , r-eguir-ad KHK fyer*Jia or- /-/4-/y - i;
- b. WithVno RH loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a --
reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop tojoperation. ' Afd504fl.2 & Y
.- SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS e
4.4.1.4.1.1 The secondary side water level of at least two steam generators when required shall be determined to De within limits at least once per 12 hours.
- 4. 4.1. 4.1. 2 At least one RHR loop shall be determined to be in operation-ar4- /-4/-/_f'-
'""r' t! q :::t r ;;;;.r.: at least once per 12 hours. l (Wh &ZGAT A /-H-bf
#0ne RHR loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.
##A reactor coolant pump shall not be starte g ur,less the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50*F above,,,,-g each of the
- s. ,, p g y Reactor Coolant Syst old le temperature urVprovided (1) no operations /-84Y "TheRHRpumpma[Dh"^-- :c $r up to J ethReactor Coolant System boron /-/ 6-A are permitted that would cause dilution oconcentration, and (2) core outlet tempe belnw saturation temperature.
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- CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-5 /c -/ e ..r caid arco er /wre
. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRE!E TS SECTION 3/4.4 ~
This enclosure contains a brief description / justification for each marked up change to the current Technical Specifications. The changes are identified by change numbers contained in Enclosure 2 (Mark up of the current Technical Specifications). In addition, the referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs) are contained in Enclosure 4. Only technical changes are discussed; administrative changes (i.e., format, presentation, and editorial changes) made to conform to the improved Technical Specifications are not discussed. For Enclosures 3A, 38, 4, 6A, and 6B, text in brackets [ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcomittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location. CHANGE Nl#EER H21C DESCRIPTION 1 01 LG The definition of OPERABLE and operating for the RCS loops is moved to the Bases. Moving this information to the Bases is consistent with the NUREG-1431 Rev.1 philosophy of moving clarifying information and descriptive details out of the TS to the Bases. 1 02 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1-04 M This change removes the allowance provided by special test exception from the applicability of the specification. This test exception allowed for suspension of the requirements of the specification for the purpose of performing hot rod drop time measurements. These measurements are done with full RCS flow and the test exception is not needed for safe operations. Since this was an exception to the LCO, its deletion is more restrictive. Tnis change is in conformance with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1. 1 05 -@ te s ded o LC of c ren TS .4.1. to b [fA on t t wi t col over ess ea yses Thi no e ab she atur res icti so star ng an idl P hen low he S] in t ratur of 3 "F. T s a .ing r ~ ure i in E and t s new not ons ute an a ition res ict'on not ound nt cur ent T . H ver, ei consis ent wi h es g?4 _ und i the es 4 nd 5 C0sl or ns en w e' IS fo t, g r tu is dd t t orr n 9 no s cu ent S p .1 a c re ; TS .4. 4. Qg (;,jja .jy &Ilawsy.Se* &v'"% W f**I% DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 1
- b* 5/15/97 ,
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- e - vqee s s s s s L v4 I O e oa/ oaehe e e e e e B W Y Nh3 Nh rtS Y Y Y Y Y A
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T 0 e e e e oS e e e N C Y Y Y Y NT Y Y Y _ E _ R R t n U t o e C N n n r O e r Y si e h t u c E N oR L A dS n n B C i i A P Pi s . tS t
'T O Ch1 oi o L Dt NC N N B - e 4
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.rC eO ooon oi i fd eco i O S v R 0 r P g2 L l ti nn o st I C Y o d 1 e n C n s or fi a S
R R T r I g t o ar 3 p s a R ha 1. i n i en Jiu o wd tt nih r o .T ep E h e L I i B h t e h ( e nt h ig sn yi f c 4. "d d o s3en r i e n r i t4 a .o V t A e tt o sl t ni za oeof rE p4 N r Rh n i g Oar o si fh co eD o O o Et et t n C na i) Ogs T pO oE C f P On i ma pi er Lat s t sCrO t n eN oMl D O g eh rt . cu S) anLeC ro nL e mE
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r e5 rmr ed sL e . e[ s r n mrn" h ot e t tR wl SE a uEan sD O yi o T G p n crh t ss rt o rsrd Pd n . N N o en i i t it uci f errn NO eod oMbt E A d go f ui i qw l h n at e cet ruoi cw O I sutd di e t mds i R I n i ce m nfd l i l ao T pl id eoen R C a mt ac ee erd p o i cge enr ien roc v o n rohe o"n C ocd a A ond crd a nfi r U C C E tS sl r p1 u d mhfTi l i as a vt s a s eo t e wgo E L s 4- a et rid .ar h owe i onrr - P S B A R . ynd f a erf' h eo t n e h pm ae i st m (wi1 oe t noh s nT u l i pe l d h E E s i ee t s v 1.i e t r r p sf t aegt L H P e r2 s gl ue r 4. ic ere4 o eos a eno B C O s e e b ssm e t up o t i .t ns ncio aoem A E a v3 cea ar p vrt i th r 1 m o at raEo rbs T fB 1 . t r sp T o e o l oa pmc oo 4 s e r u 4. f o ahLiE ptBtL d N nh t4 e mf p e o 3 r h oI h3 e A aB d n s. a N O ot s3 ret rd r sr d smRrA ae e O e - o8d e oE eR h d S I T i t o cR et n g h o ew god ed d s nt an df e rao nv erP pE gfO oP e w vv g 'a i I P it n nS a nh e nl o e wse m2 n O nsoo R I id l o atb al r r ogp .e aE sn a pmr A R C f e ev l t hi cwm e h a c t a.r l l ur 3. "r 4 hL pi o cB o t h mep cur P M m, i S d o ed h o s a p uo 1. h 1 A os s p o O ve e 1. u i sRl pp tt e m snt sch . C E rv i es ii t4 qP e R h 4.it4 iE oo ira D h s uo h py hhf o eC hf TR13 w3 hP ooo TOnl l hF es TRhi N Ti S m T os T wo N3rR O I R S E ft R E E U 1 0 2 0 31 0 - 4 0 5 0 l 6 0 7 0 82 0 - S V N G - - S - - - - O N 1L 1A 1L 1M 1 M (f 1M 1M 1L C
r ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-26 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: DOC 11-05 LS-14 JFD 3.6-4 JFD 3.6-22 JFD 3.6-23 STS 3.6.3 Conditico A and B Note STS 3.6.3 Action C The CTS markup for CPSES and DCPP adds a new condition to cover the case where one containment isolation valve is inoperable in a penetration flow path of the type ) configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system (GDC 57). This new ccndition is STS 3.6.3 ACTION C. The CTS /ITS markup for Callaway and WCGS does not add this new condition but deletes it based on the justification that these ! plants do not have GDC 57 valves, in addition, the Note associated with STS 3.6.3 Condition A and B is deleted for the same reason. Based on the rejection of the change described in Comment Number 3.6.3-10, the staff position is that the valves listed in that change are 10 CFR 50 Appendix A GDC 57 type valves and STS 3.6.3 Action C and the Note to STS 3.6.3 Conditions A and B are applicable. Comment: Revise the CTS /ITS markup to add STS 3.6.3 ACTION C and the Note to STS 3.6.3 Conditions A and B, and provide the appropriate discussions and justifications. FLOG RESPONSE: (original) No changes required. The containment isolation system design bases are documented in Section 6.2.4 of the Callaway FSAR and the Wolf Creek USAR. As noted in Section 6.2.4.3, Safety Evaluation Seven and in Figure 6.2.4-1, none of the containment isolation valve arrangements are covered by GDC-57. All applicable containment penetrations for Callaway and Wolf Creek fall under either GDC-55 or GDC-56. This information was reviewed and incorporated into the licensing basis for Callaway and Wolf Creek during , the initial plant licensing. Also, see response to Comment Number 3.6.3-10. ! FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As discussed with the NRC on March 18,1999, Condition C of ISTS 3.6.3 will be incorporated into the ITS. This condition also applies to GDC-55 and 56 type penetration valves that meet the altemate containment isolation provisions specified in SRP 6.2.4. As discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the containment isolation ; provisions for the RHR System suction lines and Containment Spray System suction i lines from the containment recirculation sumps and the RHR System shutdown lines are ! considered to be the normally closed containment isolation valve (s) and the closed, ESF-grade systems outside containment serves as the second isolation barrier. FLOG RESPONSE:(second supplement) i For Callaway, an additional change (SR 3.6.3.1) was identified where a reference to Condition C should also have been changed to Condition D. ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.12 CTS 3/4.6 - ITS 3.6 Encl. 5A Page 3.6-14
Containment Isolation ValvGs 'O_;pt.crk. Ed-;; ;;pt,;ric, k; ce,-;;7,;;7 ;rd 0;,c," ps j 3.6.3 l l g., . ACTIONS (continued) j i- .,.a i
@ COWITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIE D
g . (continued) ele Perform a^ . Once per E days , . ; ED - -
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SR 3.6.3.7 for the "3""6"iS resilient seal purge valves closed to comply I O 8 6 3'2h with Acti ..
.y
. Required Action and .1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours ED ; --
associated Completion Time not met. 3,c,3, g AIR _ i s Be in MODE 5. 36 hours f 7. ' . s SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS I SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY MM / Q 3.4.3-2-Y] M Verify each 4iHneh 31 i;y;; ;-.B-PS : valve is sealed closed -
~EDi '
except for one purge valve in , penetration flow path while in Conditi gE f M this LCO. p .. u
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M muumusman M (continued) MARK UP 0F W3G STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.6 14 5/15/97
i l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.7-013 APPLICABILITY: CA i REQUEST: ITS 3.7.4 and Bases are modified to incorporate changes concerning the steam l generator atmospheric steam dump lines. The amendment request for this l change was originally submitted to the NRC via ULNRC-3854 dated June 29,1998. As part of the ITS review process, and as transmitted to the NRC in ULNRC-3953, dated February 19,1999, AmerenUE withdrew one change i rquest and instead retained the current licensing basis of a total of 12 hours to achieve MODE 4. The NRC letter dated 4/20/99 issued Amendment 131 to the Callaway Operating License and indicated staff review and acceptability of the revisions to the CTS Specification. ATTACHED PAGES- l Att. No.13 CTS 3/4/7 -ITS 3.7 7-9b ' A 8 l B 6 ' 1,41,42,43 Enclosure SA 3.7-11 Enclosure SB B 3.7-18, B 3.7-19, B 3.7-20, B 3.7-21, B 3.7-22 l
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% PL , ,'T SYSTEMS,
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( ,/ STEAM ~NERATOR ATMO5PHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES 01-l3- A Q 3.'7. l-l } l LIMITING 01T10N FOR OPERATION / A tus ot.- os- m 3.7.1.7 At leas three steam cenerator atmospheric steam dum g;;' :: (A50's) shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2 and "3. - ACTION:
\tes c:,. e7 -Ls:,5 o'. a-n af With one of the r uired ASDN inoperabl . 6 : :: ::.::: ::'.; W~^
t .;r :::::: :: :::: 1:u:;;, with.in Id ys re .; tore the ASE.:c OPERABLE status, or in HOT STANDBY ithin 6 hours and in"d G M 4~ 4 "N~ HOT SHUTDOWN wi:nin tn following # ~ s_ I ._%.s c' -ci-*
- b. With more than ene of th requir ASD'%. inoperable L: ::
- ' :.k: :, within 24 hours "**
- .::i :-' - -":r ;x:::: '
' restore at least two of the uired A505 +c OPERABLE status G ' *7' .,9 or be in HOT STANDBY w. .hin e nen 6 houkand in HOT SHUTDOWN 24o-t 535 within the following,5 acu .. ti a a
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The prevision cf Specifica:icn 3.0.4 ar. net applicable. C L CS- R
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l SURVEILLANCE RE00!c MENTS \ I a.7.1.7 No ac. ional recuirements other than nose recui c by Specifica ten 4.0.5. The previsions ef Specifica:icn 4.0.4 re nc: , a:plicacie ' r entry into Moce 3. . A C*" gew) ec.Q owe miA e.v.v of eu\ . Ashu ma%a.\ , i h e kk ,. p* in g,Cggp(davv & J%I s.4. UdSS C #Sf I6 C, W N =% ..e w-3/'. 7-9" 2.? e Pi-'e F.~ N:. J'? , 55 "ALLAWAf - L' N '. "'
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PLANT SYSTEMS N 3*NN U STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES A LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Q 3.7.1 -I c4 3,').og o (, M 3.7.1.7 Four steam generator atmospheric steam dump (ASD) lines shall be OPEPABLE. l APPLICABILITY: Modes 1,2 and 3. ..
'for rersens sege ASDb& h 41 sent h_ ) E ACTION: -
^
- a. With one of the required ASD lines inoperable %6e tAFcausesttbFr tkan#xcatas@ 06-00* Af n waummerwKs as within 7 days restore the required ASD line to OPERABLE status, o in iOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the O i followi hours. The pwdheii of A=49-2 3.0.4 are not applicab ~
j de roere.r - _ + cA 3.~T-413 p 1). J l
- b. With two the required ASD lines anoperableails W cluslinTbther than excessive !'
ASD seat leakage, restore all but one required ASD line to OPERABLE status vdthin 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the followi M h84- - mg). _ 7 CA 3/T-0/3
- c. With three or more of the required D lines inoperable r than excessive ASD seat leakage, restore all but two required nos to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least OT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the followin 6 urs. 4 gg
- d. With one or more of the required ASD(s) inoperable because of excessive seat t leakage, close the associated manualisolation valve (s) and restore the ASD(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in CA3ff-Ol3 e HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 8 hours. The provisions of Specification u 3.0.4 are not applicable. j e
SURVFil1 ANCE REQUlppuENTS !l 4.7.1.7.1 Verify one complete cycle of each ASD in accordance with Specification 4.0.5. The l provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into Mode 3. CA STI-013 4.7.1.7.2 Vertfy one complete cycle of each ASD manualisolation valve in accordance with cA 3/}. 0j3 Specification 4.0.5. l
,4 r i cA 3 l-013 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/47-9b Amendment No. , , 21 l
t
CHANGE NUMBER EC DESCRIPTION 06 02 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison h h'f Table (Enclosure 3B). 06 03 H Consistent with NUREG 1431. the specification is revised to be applicable to the " atmospheric [ steam dtap] lines" , rather than only to the atmospheric [ steam dtmp] valves [ ]. This teminology extends the applicability of the specification to include the atmospheric [ steam dump] valve [ manual isolation] valve. This is more restrictive than the CTS. , 06 04 M A surveillance is added that requires the manual cycling of the atmospheric [ steam dump] valve [ manual isolation] valves [in accordance with the IST program]. This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and ! 1 consistent with NUREG-1431. 06 05 g Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 06 06 - Not" applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison o Table (Enclosure 3B). atmos heric [s eamMalves nope bl
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06 07 ACT ON f Sea leakage s no o r c A 3.1 - Ol"3 t seat eakage is delet . a co itio of o ability. This ange is ccept le as di ussed in the ases to G1 1 and i NSHC - ause he a spheric team ] val s ca per/o r ired ction they can be 11y o ned o
/ los on nd and c n provi controlled relief
- CY g0 Cgyp MS 06 08 H This change ves tne exception to TS 3.0.4 from the action dealing with more than one inoperable [ atmospheric steam dump] valve. NUREG 1431 only allows this exemption for one required atmospheric [ steam dump] valve line inoperable.
06 09 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 06 10 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 07 01 A The LCO is changed from the OPERABILITY of each main feedwater line to the OPERABILITY of four feedwater flow _' path isolation valves [ ). DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS. 8 5/15/97
T . 5 5 7 1 - J . 9 8 S / f o ?. S T C
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~" NO SIGNIFICART HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC)
CONTEKf5
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. Organi zation . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
,._, I . . .
II. . Description of NSHC Eval uati ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 III. Generic No Significant Hazards Considerations "A" - Admi ni strative Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
. . ..u . . . .- - Relodated Techni cal . Specification. . . . .' . . . . . . . . w. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
,T" .-- ' "R" .
"LG" Less Restrictive (Moving Information Out of the Techni ca1 ' Speci fi cati ons) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 13
.; . "M" , .. More Restri ctive Requi rements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
_. r.. . . . , . , .
^ "LS" IV. Specific No Significa.nt Hazards Considerations 15 o 'j;
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LS-1...................................................................used LS 2..............................................................Not l'Jf . LS-3................................................................... 21 18 LS 4................................................................... 23 LS 5...................................................................
^
2A. d .6................................................................... used LS 7..............................................................Not 28 LS 8..........................................................'......... LS 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LS 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LS 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30. . . . . . . . . . LS 12.................................................................. LS 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LS 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LS .15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LS 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LS 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .3,a
. . . . . . . . Not u s
.LS.,B...... ............ .............._..
LS 19............ ....... ..... .......................... ............ 36 i LS 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .l LS 21. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 .......... LS.22.................................................................. LS 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . . .o . . ead ......... LS24........................................ .od . 5. y; LS 25.. ......... .. ... . ......... ...
... ot used LS 26...... . ......... . 8'. /. tsyn . i LS 27..... .. ................ .... ... .. . ..... .. .. 7.7./O- / 7_/ l 5/15/97 1
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
CA 3J7-013 IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS r. NSHC LS 25
- 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The action r atmospheric [ steam dump] valves inoperable due to seat eakage would be eliminated. Seat leakage is determined not to be a cause of i rability as discussed in t Bases for improved Technical Specification (ITS) .7.4, Atmospheric
[ Steam Dep) Val s. However, because the elimination of this ired action would be less restrict 1 , it is evaluated as an "LS" change. When the atmospheric steam dump] valves TSs were incorpor ted into the unit TSs, the various allowed age times (A0Ts) were evaluated the EC staff. The original TS proposed b the utility included action irements for atmospheric [ steam dep) valves with ssive seat leakage whi included closing the block valve within one hour. proposed ACT for one o more atmospheric [ steam dep] valve (s) with excessive sea leakage was unlimit based on the ability to open the block valve (s)sif required t relieve steam th h the atmospheric [ steam dump] valves. The EC staff found t t a 30 day was acceptable rather than unlimited based on the reliability of the lock valve which must be manually operated in the g,. Auxiliary Building. If the exces ve sea eakage could not be repaired in the 30 day period, a unit shutdown was 1 . Nevertheless. the EC provided sample
._- 'TS (from South Texas Project) that approved by the NRC staff which did not include any requirements for excessiv eat leakage. In the evaluation of the atmospheric [ steam dump] valve TS, C also concluded that " Closure of the block valves of all ARVs because of exc sive s t leakage does not endanger the reactor core because decay heat can be ssipated th the steam line safety valves. Also, consistent with SGTR analysis sumptions, a lock valve can be used to control release of steam to the ateo e."
The ITS have not included ny requirements deali with atmospheric [ steam dep] valve seat leakage. Bases state that an a spheric [ steam dep) valve is considered OPERABLE it is capable of providing ntrolled relief of the main steam flow and capab of fully opening and closing demand. A block valve is considered OPERABLE it is capable of isolating a iled open atmospheric [ steam _ duep] valve. The ases also state that a closed block y lve does not render it or , its atmospheric steam dump 3 valve inoperable if operator ction time to open the l block valve i supported in the accident analysis. Elimi ion of the requirements involving ex ssive atmospheric [ steam dep] valve seat leak would bring the unit l specific T requirements into alignment with the ITS in NUREG 431, as well as with approved for other units. 9 This sed TS change has been evaluated and it has been deterni that it invo es no significant hazards consideration (NSHC). This determi tion has been i pe ormed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 a quoted below: 41
\ 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
l' cA 3.7-013 IV.' SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS 7 NSHC LS 25 (continued)
"The Conn sian may make a final determination pursuant to the procedur s in 50.91, that proposed amendnent to an operating license for a facili licensed un 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves o significant ha rds consideration, if operation of the facility i accordance with the propos amendnent would not:
L Involve a s1 fficant increase in the* probability or nsequences of an accident prev sly evaluated: or
- 2. Create the possi lity of a new or different kin of accident from any accident previous evaluated; or
- 3. Involve a significan reduction in a margin safety. "
The following evaluation is provided or the three cat ries of the significant hazards consideration standards:
- 1. Does the change involve a si ificant nerease in the probability or consequences of,an accident p vious y evaluated?
N; "1 The accident analyses t6t credit the ILITY of the atmospheric [ steam
- dump) valves require them to relieve s to the atmosphere in order to provide their safety-related functio . Se leakage through one or more I atmospheric [ steam dump] valves doe not r them inoperable; even closing the block valves should the leaka become ex ssive would not render them inoperable. As stated in the NR staff's eval tion, the block valves may be opened manually and used to co rol release of s as to the atmosphere.
Elimination of the requir involving seat le age is consistent with the unit accident analyses and ld not affect the p ility or consequences of 1 an accident. Therefore, the propo change would not involve a si ficant increase in the probability or con es of a previously evaluated ac ident. l
- 2. Does the c create the possibility of a new or d ferent kind of act.ident f any accident previously evaluated? l i
( The proposed nge would not involve any changes to the unit ign or operating p edures (with the exception that excessive seat lea ge would not require r ir of a leaking valve within 30 days and would not res it in a i unit s ). As indicated in the ITS Bases, a closed block valv does not render ts associated atmospheric [ steam dump) valve inoperable rega less of the ation that the block valve is closed. Operation of the unit in G ace dance with the proposed change has been thoroughly evaluated under a ident analyses that credit atmospheric [ steam dump] valve OPERABILITY nd u'd not create the conditions for a new type of accident or malfunction. SIGN: ; ANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 42 5/15/
cA 3.'l-of 5 l p IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 25 (continued) Therefore, the p sed change would not create the possibility of a n or different kind of a ident.
- 3. Does this change i olve a significant reduction in a ma in of safety?
l l Operation of the unit in acco nce with the proposed cha e has been I evaluated previously under unit cident analyses and und to be acceptable. The pmposed change would not alte the margins of ety provided in those analyses. In addition, the OPERABIL of safety elated equipment would not be affected by the proposed change. refore he proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a mar n safety. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS ERA DETERMINATION Therefore, it is concluded that, based n the above sa ty evaluation, the activities associated with this cha satisfy the NSHC andards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, an NSHC findi s justified. ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION b The proposed change has n evaluated and it has been determined t t the change does not involve (i) significant hazards consideration, (ii) a sign icant change in the types or si ficant increase in the amounts of any effluent tha may be released offsite, r (iii) a significant increase in individual or ctmula ve occupational rastiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets eligibility iterion for categorical sclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)( . Therefore, rsuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment of, the propo change i not required. I e NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 43 5/15/97
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3.7.4 Atmospheric 5 teas Dump Valves (ABVG IASDE 4-2,9. - - Foue CA ~5.7-413 hupsia i #U 1.C0 3.7.4 M g 11'nes shall be'0PERABLE.
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11 CA 37-013 ! X hours 43L7e19 ^^
~ B. Two&F)lupFF) required NW B.1 Restore RE[itit!f one mPsw;r !
@ lines inoperablesfcir 6 MW @ line to OPERABLE status.
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- g. Required Action and f.1 Be in KfET C A '3,7-013
&, associated Completion I 6t0. ~a 7.7.+ - +1 Time not met. 12.
i urs 3 f.2 Be in MODE 4. witt,cd _m._ 3.7 4 g . _._..____ _. , . . . . . . . . . _ . gcre. eter 'er tact . ;.T.s c-1. i t 9g 9,t p >1
~u 5/15/97 3.7-11 MARK UP OF W(r2 STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)
INSERT Y CA 3.7-013 C. Three or more required ASD C.1 Restore all but two 24 hours lines inoperable for reasons required ASD lines to other than excessive ASD seat OPERABLE status. leakage. D. With one or more of the --------N OT E---------- required ASD(s) inoperable LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. because of excessive seat ---------------- leakage. - D.1 initiate action to close the immediately. Associated manualisolation valve (s). AND D.2 Restore ASD(s) to 30 days OPERABLE status.
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'.....i.. ASDs B 3.7.4 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.4 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDs) BASES BACKGROUND The ASDs, provide a method for cooling the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions should the preferred heat sink via the Steam Dump Valves to the condenser not be available, as discussed in the FSAR, Section 10.3 (Ref 1).. This is done in conjunction with the Auxiliary Feedwater System providing cooling water from the condensate storage tank (CST). The ASDs assure that subcooling can be achieved to facilitate equalizing pressure between the reactor coolant system and the W steam ] generator 'following a postulated steam generator tube rupture j event. The ASDs may also be required to meet the design cooldown rate during a normal cooldown when steam pressure drops too low d I' S for maintenance of a vacuum'in the condenser to permit use of the Steam Dump System. One ASD line for each of the four steam generators is provided. Each ASD line consists of one ASD and an associated manual
;? isolation valve.
The ASDs are provided with upstream manual isolation valves to provide positive shutoff capability shculd an ASD develop seat leakage and to fac.. state maintenance activities. The ASDs are equipped with pneumatic controllers to permit control of the cooldown rate. The ASDs are provided with a pressurized gas supply of nitrogen that, on a loss of pressure in the normal instrument air supply, automatically supplies nitrogen to operate the ASDs. One nitrogen accumulator supplies one ASD and one auxiliary feedwater control valve per steam generator, The nitrogen accumulator supply is sized to provide sufficient pressurized gas to operate the ASD for the time required for Reactor Coolant System cooldown to RHR entry condition. A description of the ASDs is found in Reference 1. sino to 3.M The design basis of the ASDs is established by the capability to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions, unit can be cooled to RHR entry conditions with only one steam generator and one ASD. utilizing the cooling water supply available in the CST. (continued) CALLAWAY PLART ITS BASES B 3.7 18 5/15/97 l
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ASDs B 3.7.4
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BASES BACKGROUND The valves will pass sufficient flow at all pressures to achieve (continued) a 50*F per hour plant cooldown rate. The total capacity of the four valves is 15% of rated main steam flow at steam generator l no load pressure. In the accident analysis presented in Reference 2. the ASDs are i assumed to be used by the operator to cool down the unit to RHR D % p entry conditions for accidents accompanied by a loss of offsite power. The main steam safety valves (HSSVs) are assumed to
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operate automatically to relieve steam and maintain the steam
,g generator pressure below the design value. For the recovery from s v
a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) eventf the operator is also
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required to perform Ni-4tcd cooldowyto establish adeocate 35In$ subcooling as a necessary step to terminate the primary to %p secondary break flow into the ruptured steam generator. The time in Q s required to terminate the primary to secondary break flow for an gM SGTR is more critical than the time required to cool down to RHR , conditions for this event and also for other accidents. Thus, the SGTR is the limiting event for the ASDs. The number of ASDs required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the SGTR accident analysis G3M
", recuirements is;&r;;. If a single failure of oneTeturs and p#
i
} another is associated with the Su't #SG. ?AS'Dswou'id remain OPERABLE for heat removal. uphs f400 V The ASDs are equipped with manual isolation valves in the event an ASD spuriously fails to open or fails close during use.
The ASDs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii). CA 3'7-0I3 m A W LCO ffour) 2' r :: ASD lines are require to be PERABLE. One ASD line is
/ feo ind recuired from each of tMsteam generators to ensure that at leastI: C ' l_ i: available to conduct : r? 00chN
- by@
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- following an SGTR. in which one steam generator becomes -
s unavailabh. accompanied by a single, active failure of a second ASD line on an unaffected steam generator. The manual isolation r valves must be OPERABLE to isolate a failed open ASD line. -A-b g Ou C J m.ensel M ; w =' h "- " - "-"" '" -
}c imp.;-J.c=tEcause ams.ww epcr;tcr ;;ticn t. .c Lv fpe i ;he I ' g rrl j m.- i aem m.. .a m ia auppuj .ee s the : = t.; cr.c v; u-gg q b ft7 The accident analysU that credit OPERABILITY of the ASDs require)( them to relieve steam to the atmosphere in order to perform their safety related function. @ )3 00 3 (continued)
CALLAWAY PLANT ITS - BASES B 3.7 19 5/15/97
ASDs B 3.7.4
)
BASES LCO Failure to meet the LCO can result in the inability to achieve (continued) subcooling, consistent with the assumptions used in the steam generator tube rupture analysis, to facilitate equalizing pressures between the reactor coolant system and the f="^d,rUphtch steam generator.
. 1 5 An ASD is considered OPERABLE when it is capable of providing controlled relief of the main steam flow capable of fully opening and closing on demandg Insert 1. CA 3.7-o/3 Each nitrogen accumulator tank supplies one TDAFP control valve and one steam generator atmospheric steam dump valve. The tanks must be maintained at a pressure sufficient to ensure a five hour supply for the ASDs and the TDAFP flow control valves to be considered.0PERABLE. The five hour supply is the minimum
.s required for mitigation of a SB0 or SGTR (Ref. 4).
APPLICABILITY In H0 DES 1. 2. and 3 the ASD lines are required to be OPERABLE. ; P In MODE 4, the pressure and temperature limitations are such that the probability of a SGTR event requiring ASD operation is low. (g gjg ' In addition, the RHR system is available to provide the decay heat removal function in MODE 4 Therefore,theASDj(arenot required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4. n, XL % ~ In MODE 5 or 6 an SGTR is not a credible event.
- N -
3 ACTIONS u
- A%W h ,hn s(% koN w)
With on required ASD line inoperablef, acticht be taken to
'2 ).9 ,Q h resterdDPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time allows for the redundant capability afforded by the remaining h OPERABLE ASD lines, a nonsafety grade backup in the Condenser Steam Dump System, and MSSVs. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.4 does not apply.
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&cw %d l With twe or more required ASD lines inoperabi action must be taken to restore all but required ASD linesto OPERABLE ,
) k100 (continued) !
CALLAWAY PLANT ITS BASES B 3.7 20 5/15/97
I INSERT 1 CA 3.7-013 and not experiencing excessive seat leakage. Excessive seat leakage, although not associated with a specific acceptance criterion, exists when conditions dictate closure of the manual isolation valve to limitleakage. INSERT X CA 3.7-013 IL1 With two required ASD lines inoperable for reasons other than excessive ASD seat leakage, action must be taken to restore all but one required ASD line to OPERABLE status. Since the manualisolation valve can be closed to isolate an ASD, some repairs may be possible with the unit at power. The 72-hour Completion Time is reasonable to repair inoperable ASD lines, based on the availability of the Condenser Steam Dump System and/or MSSVs, and the low probability of an event occurring during the restoration period that would require the ASD lines.
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i g t i ASDs B 3.7.4 I BASES C ACTIONS I I (continued) l . -
- status. Since the manual isolation valve can be closed to isolate an ASD. some repairs may be possible with the unit at power. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable to repair i inoperable ASD lines, based on the availability of the Condenser Steam Dump System and HSSVs. and the low probability of an event occurring during this period that would require the ASD lines.
( {INSER7 13 } > ' g (1 ng (2 . G 3 LO If'the required ASD line(s) cannot be , restored te OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Tir.e. the unit must be placed in a H00E in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status. 12,
. the unit must As placed in at least H00E 3 within 6 hours. and 1n s H00E 4 within 2 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required hN~ unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
9 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7 A 1 REQUIREMENTS To perform a controlled cooldown of the RCS. the ASDs must be l able to be opened remotely and throttled through their full i range. This SR ensures that the ASDs are tested through a full control cycle as described in the Inservice Test Program. The conditions that best verify the operability of the ASDs is , with the manual isolation valve open and nominal steam line l operating pressure and temperature. The ASDs are designed such that steam line pressure acts on top of the valve plug. When the ! valve is required to move to the open position the actuator must act against steam line pressure. For this surveillance requirement to best verify the operational readiness of the ASDs. it should be performed at nominal SG cperating temperature and pressure, which is in the upper portion of HODE 3 (Ref. 5). Use of an ASD during a unit cooldown may satisfy this requirement. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the (continued) CALLAWAY PLANT ITS - BASES B 3.7 21 - 5/15/97
INSERT Z CA 3.7 013 D.1 and D.2 Requiring a 30 day limit for restoring an ASD valve to OPERABLE status from inoperacle, due to excessive seat leakage from the valve, provides assurance that the required number of ASDs will be available for plant cooldown. This action limits the period in which a manual isolation valve is closed due to excessive seat leakage of the ASD and minimizes the delay associated with manually opening a closed manualisolation valve (due to excessive seat leakage of the ASD. Required ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.4 does not apply. - l 1 l
' , ) ', A ,.
ASDs B 3.7.4
,)-
BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS required Inservice Testing Program Frequency. The Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. This Surveillance Requirement is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which acceptance criterion was generated (Ref. 5). SR 3.7.4.2 The function of the manual isolation valve is to isolate a failed
.s open or leaking ASD. Cycling the manual isolation valve both closed and open demonstrates its capability to perform this function. Performance of inservice testing or use of the manual isolation valve during unit cooldown may satisfy this
.- requirement. Operating experience has shown that these .
a components usually pass the Surveillance when performed in ! accordance with the Inservice Testing Program Frequency. The Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 10.3, Main Steam Supply System.
- 2. FSAR, Chapter 15.2. Decrease in Heat Removal by the Secondary System.
- 3. FSAR. Section 15.6.3. Steam Generator Tube Failure.
- 4. FSAR. Section 9.3.1, Compressed Air System.
- 5. _
Operating License Amendments 45 and 5_9. fG. Da1ea nT LM FW -M I3I. .h g
- b g.7-013 CALLAWAY PLANT ITS BASES - B 3.7 22 5/15/97
1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET I 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.7-ED APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: (Original) Various changes that do not impact the technical content of the submittal or other FLOG members. Changes are noted with CA 3.7-ED in the margin and noted below:
- 1) CTS 3/4.7.1, Turbine Cycle, Safety Valves: the footnote to Table 3.7-1, Inoperable Main Steam Safety Valves versus Allowable Power and Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint in Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, is modified in two places by replacing "% RTP" with " power".
- 2) ITS LCO 3.7.1, Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs): the footnote to Table 3.7.1-1, OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus Maximum Allowable Power, is modified in two places by replacing "% RTP" with
" power".
- 3) ITS LCO 3.7.2, MSIVs, Condition D: two items under " Completion Time" should be highlighted.
I
- 4) ITS LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System: Action "B"(the designation letter B) should not be highlighted, i
- 5) ITS LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System, SR 3.7.5.4: The "s"in
" NOTES" should be struckthrough. 1
- 6) ITS LCO 3.7.6, Condensate Storage Tank, APPLICABILITY: a redlined period should be placed at end.
- 7) ITS LCO 3.7.8, Essential Servico Watar, Action A: Under A.1 Notes, item 1, the period at end should not be struck out, but redlined.
- 8) ITS LCO 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink, Action B: under " Completion Time" the "s" after 36 hours should not be highlighted.
- 9) ITS LCO 3.7.11, Control Room Air Conditioning Systern: Title line should have (CRACS) highlighted.
- 10) ITS LCO 3.7.13, Emergency Exhaust System, SR 3.7.13.3: "SR 3.7.13.3" should be highlighted.
- 11) ITS LCO 3.7.17, Spent Fuel Assembly Storage: Title should be highlighted.
- 12) ITS LCO 3.7.17, Spent Fuel Assembly Storage: " Figure 3.7.17-1" should be highlighted.
l
)
- 13) ITS Applicable Safety Analyses Bases 3.7.16 has editorial corrections to delete "an" in two places, and to revise " assembly" into " assemblies".
- 14) ITS Background Bases 3.7.17 has editorial corrections to delete "a" from the phrase " inadvertent loading of a"; ITS Applicable Safety Analyses Bases 3.7.17 correction to remove "an" from phrase " movement of an assemblies"; and ITS 4.3, insert 5A-4b (Item f) corrected to add "will" to Phase
- Figure 3.7.17-1 be stored in Region 1".
FLOG SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: The attached page corrects the dc3cription associated with DOC 07-16 LS-34. This is an editorial change to correct the statement. This revision is only applicable to Callaway ar,d does not impact Commanche Peak, Diablo Canyon, or Wolf Creek. FLOG SECOND FWPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: The attached ITS page 4.0-2 was originally transmitted as p;n of the request CA 3.7-010. This page incorporates " Insert 5A-4b". An editodal correction is made to item f of this insert. The attached ITS Bases pages B 3.7-4 and B 3.7-5 are revised to delete a reference to Action A.2 which is deleted in the response to O 3.7.1-4. These revisions are apphcable to Callaway only. FLOG THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: The attached ITS Applicable Safety Analyses Bases 3.7.16 page is revised to delete two unnecessary "an" s and to make " assembly" revised into " assemblies" Attached ITS Bases 3.7.17 and ITS 4.3 are revised with corrections. These are editorial revisions and are only applicable to Callaway. ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.13 CTS 3/4.7 - ITS 3.7 Encl. 5B New page (Applicable Safety Analyses Bases 3.7.16), B 3.7-89, B 3.7-90 Att. No.17 CTS 5.0 - ITS 4.0 Encl. 5A 4.0-2 (Insert SA-4b)
Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration B 3.7.16 BASES (continued) .. B
~
APPLICABLE ta SAFETY ANALYSES l ea iet on iu ns do ot e;upt in an iiy f it r f t e t o r lio er se n hs a c'de t am es of n ti s e e ss f c ol' g e t v' y in e e th det easjng ater de it of d 1
' \
r pp n o a na as em v _n t Ve t n o f t h rtk d he Store e fool < we' erJJt:cidents can be pos w toht net, reac'avityjW6'".crene *"tulated m:: diat
' 't could' increase the o unacceptable with unborated water ~in the$ storage pool. Thus, for these "- Q accident occurrencest the presence of soluble boron in the s_torage poolErc';;- t: cr i d _]t '- Mt' _r:t c 5 The postulated a'ccidents are basically of twit ~ es. G$ fuel gg assembig could b nw. . cctJy t enW te ed- r- u s - D to J
S" 6dcr M, 6g. P: f"(e.g. @ unirradiated fuel assemblMtorrno nsufficiently e leted fuel assemblW). Ine second type of ' utlk ECEE of 0 % p stulated acciden cini.eu wi s s-fuei assemo J which is dropped adjacent to the fully loaded ".Wr 2D i Q
- storage rack. M,'" ceu k . 2 /c n W-- -
- ~ s. . 5 JD "r m - O he ne_gative reactivity s @effTctC hof,the M so}
icr. N ron coUpensates for the increased reactivity caused by either one of the two postulated o M accident scenarios. The accident analyses is orovided in the FSAR, g DE. ] (Ref. f). g The concentration of dissolved boron in the fuel storage
)' W- 43 9.Ib pool satisfies Criterion 2 of 'hc ' T p _ g te:M .
m Q 50,3(, (cD 9
- m ;
'LC0 The fuel storage pool boron concentration is required to be U "2 [Ej@gi ppm.gThe specified concentration of dissolved "
g Doron in the fuel storage pool preserves the assumptions used in the analyses of the potential c ' ' al accident scenarios as described in Reference . This concentration of dissolved boron is the minimum required concentration for [-- fue assembly storage and movement within the fuel storage I APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever fuel assemblies are stored in the
" fuel storage pool, until a complete @ he fuel laststorage poo verification has been performed following t
-lb M Oep movement of fuel assemblies in the L coi consiS b pFM fuel storage pool, This LCO does not apply following t e verification, since S the verification would confirm that there are no misloaded ca5E fuel assemblies'. With no further fuel assembly movements in
#\,
aw - g . vinsbM4D. (continued)
) tw-
Spent Fuel Assembly Storage B 3.7.17 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS
@ B 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage BASES BACKGROUND h-the-Haxi r Ocncity Rac4-4MDR)--des 9 4 aMhe-4 pent fuel-@ gg 377,gjg g p 3 ,7 - 0 / 0 d4v4ded inte-two sepasate-and di0tinGt4egions-Wh4ch-40r-the purgccc of criticalit" consider 4tries. Orc 4onsider-ed-as-se arate g f qe[Wl ^c.: (Ref
(,3y/cWMoamm 1). Th~elhiihrdEh5~iff{F5EQid6duTe3Ef6,iFKthsdesi
. m t f rancespentafugl.em pen, age &tifdelfst6F5957is3^disignstidSin xegionsa..basec:.u d E4w6UTET~200'~' porro @rpi strit370' c6rfre @'~ Rid 166"l~i~4tli
}n'M Wf ft^6?EqY96titi5nsfis d5sigded fuel with a. maximum no inaDenrichment of 440 commodate new wtt Uwi 235 with CA 3// 0/0 M #c,M"' no burnable absorber (s or up to 5.0 wtt U 235 absorbers.
tearal - pd g 3,1-0@ 46 EF5 designed to accommodate fuel of up to 5.0 wtr U-m - ~ Re initi'31 enrichments which have accumulated minimum burnups within the acceptable domain according to Figure 3.7.171, in the accompanying LCO. Tucl :00:51i0: not =ceting the criteri: of g 3,740 F-igure 3.7.171 chall bc :tered " accor-dance 'ith s paragraph d.3.1.1 " Section d ? N^' Stosage-- ICA n-e b b# cel I ( Pr]IIhWoT51oragefofffuK sibTii5Kiiri" di[r F x D/4tpsviimeMqya@overalbpoo.listocage config s et preparedainiaccordanceMithddhi'nistnativeTcontrolsIVThelp6ol7cA 3 7~@ e, l g il ayosts96dlDBEE50fficishtiRe'pi6nMstBhigi)tofadE6minddate:He4
- b. u hnd'ldischhfisdifuhTJasismblies3ithOdWburiiUpl GneThstorage~
a uti.lH6sfeithen:s?Miked!Zdn'e7ThFEs:Ro i66?d T Y --Q - EhE6ksnb$iFain9 7 E6nfiguFatidhr~~^-~g~~~~~~6nfip~dFationJadd/oEd
~~ ~ ~~~~ ~
y . ~ cf gO d f f' lie 37Hiisd TZ65b7ThFsE REpiBH"c6hfiyUFitiHHU Rsdi6ii3155Y6Eips q tellsinfeldnlyilobatedfaloriskthsfoutsids pehiphehi(of^the: rack d '$ in6d0lss$:andEmustib'e? separated l.bboneMr. mofi. Region r (2.sto' age ^ cA k tr3/ EelTs; JRegiorQ3stohagelc lis5mayq.behlocated:directly across
% fC. N c DL framionehanotheriwhen; separated bydaNatersgapr oThe: outer: rows Bffsit'srd5tihgjRigibH?Tiahd 2Tst'orageRell5 mdst\bdLfurtheh-~
4 3- ' sspahatsdtfrbm:thesihtshna 4RsgioH13Estorage7ceTis b916heichTE6re s S .) n , _3 .'} 'd-2 RecioWC2FstoraasicsTisf de .i eo ass .no es; it . enn nmer a
~eceit n .# p t2/su' o 5 a6 :.w ho tS A od mus+ be o" -~~ CA 3.7-0/0 J s d'.T. Q n fp~ i ' Jr/G fi IT t6 aos c4 " + at' -% rDt a' ^
f ~
.R y ~ ~'et 4 if c
Q In'thE"chehkEFb6aFdini~Eonfiy0Fhti6h'.ifUiEas~sembTihiSiF6Tplaced cA 3.7J/0 6J3 g d cr.3
. it MI "
' infandlternatingicheck'erboardistylefp^atteFniwithEeidpt'
; celt 5C(idet.3fueltassembliis?sretsurrouhdfd:bnjh11Rfourdidss by emptyfstorageicells;except;at:theicheckerboard boundaryT.3 '
?y storage
~
3C 21 , Region lifuelJ assemblies!.;may>not 'be located directiv racross from j h.Yd I oa ther?even'when separatediby'a materJgap., 1 , s r,gae yfay e ; ' eo . ' , ,'
'nt . ned/rb i6 6(b 3-]~0$D re n. .pe o g
${ o di 9- i f th' che e ng ale perp/ma 2
1 n r rip _v(i .a erg is r r_u! to ,r e at ~t 2n ' M A checkerboard area
- 2
,y J [cc,-Ct g assembliestor Region1 3 fuel. assemblies. empty cells;iRegion 2 fuel may.be; bounded by:either(a waterJgap; "
(continued) CALLAWAY PLANT ITS - BASES B 3.7- 5/1 W g,A 3,7,ofo
Spent Fuel Assembly Storage B 3.7.17 BASES CM 3' 7-h U' BACKGROUND The water in the <r i - Jovi jtfid44d6)(.a#f , ,- s normally (continued) contains soluble ron, wi c1 rEsults in large su criticality margins under actual operating conditions. However, the NRC guidelines, based upon the accident condition in which all soluble poison is assumed to have been lost, specify that the limiting k,,, of 0.95 be evaluated in the absence of soluble G) 3,7.go boron. Hence, the design of both b11EtHF66 regions is based on~ use o_f unborated wa which inaidtdThs each region @gejfp kQL operation w1 in a subcritical condition during e regions fully loaded. The double p;"SWI96 po I contingency principle discussed in ANSI N 16.1-1975 and the cA 3.7-010 April 1978 NRC letter (Ref; 2) allows credit for soluble boron under other abnormal or accident conditions, since only a single accident need be considered at one time. F+r-example, the most severe-acc4 dent scen:ric h acccciated "it" the movement of fuel fr-om-Region I to Region 2. and Cecidental -i:10 ding of fuct assembly in Region 2. Tc mitigate these p0:tulated critic 4144y CA 3.7-010 r+kted-asc-idents. 2000 ppr' Of 50luMe-boror is nar-mally diccolved in t lter. Safe Operation of the-MOR "ith no movement of ce._:plict may therefore bc-Oshieved by control"ng s the LGO,-location of cach : cmbly in accordance '.!ithf6hS ForsexampTE%fliiH55stEseveref5EEidEHtWE5EEf6sQ~~ the^g accom Ei8N
" ~ ^ * ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~
bdFBEEfsdif.8Eif_6ehm.
- - ~ ~ ~ - - ~ are:: g 5 ;1."g Dl r
F.55I'Hid7E~tiiifB6EdiB5$ 10jsh!UI235IJdiEfiT5W5is~einbl
~~%WRidisn12yWiyRegion; stoMi5E2el15iiiMHiMEd%ns"~y iThfeERepibhid5hffguFaYi6hisdEi n C aTim
.~
. ,Ic_hs.ckdi-boar'dsconfio. urationJ~~"^~'~~~~'
'^~~~~~'pty?celEinia ^~^ C b7^~^~ ^Mi 5MBE5fiBET6'ffhThsFfEsl5iisEmbl9M.tN5)~#aisb'etsEEn?ths
~..Fa..c. ku._no._du..l m s._i.?a.ii.d.. i_lh~e.~f.h. 6.n~cretelwa_l b ihlth..
o E. i s. p_ent..? fu
" cA 3.7-010 l CA 34-cul led APPLICABLE The hypothetical accidentsLcan only take p ace during or as a SAFETY ANALYSES E.3 result of the movement of Qpassembi (Ref. 1). For these '
accident occurrences, the presence of soluble boron in theI ' .3 gjuvirgagBgsvamn1 ' nyaogwhrp l rny._ 1 P y CA 3. 0 *'# '"' " 'i"9'"""""'"*" ' x 3~ n>.. a u a rn tie lo a o o ea h ,se.b1 af er a I ov 1 le t ',,e p ri d f at nt al c ide ts inay be I t e., 1 f a si n of t . o 1 p ra in ti e. Du in i .i e , e
%{r; {
.r t'o i t me p . d wi;h no pc.e ia fr ci ay be ' d_ r h- atso co en s. 6
- n. tb a en, a ia ro
,G
+
-o
;g h S / eta p Tha
~
o a s pf{
.o y @confiouration of fuel satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 assemblies CFR 20..so in theh '-(cor'2)(1 LCO The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the :*
h fuel Sforaqo
^Mir0sf variNgrikaJjD in accordance with hgJre 3.7.17-1 or Specification 4;3.1.1 in, Sectio'n 4.3. in the
~
I g[. gop accompanying LC0 7 ensures ~the"k
$wg f@ will always remain l4"'of' 5 0.95,thecm assuaiingraythe pagyoT7tFj5 pool to be i ./
(continued) CALUMAY PLANT ITS BASES s 5/15/97 ; B3.7)90 C4 3,7-0/0
.m '. }
x .- Design Features 4.2 ngod cA 3.'7-0/0 ! 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued)
- a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U 235 enrichment B PS
_ - - - of E4-E} 5.0 weight percent: f. :/ wit) _ tct :.en .s . grpater han 4 0 e.ght. . ....rcen U- 35 4, g 2 5A-A >n31 cc tai suf cient ni . rrr- bdr abr
~
bb7,,tb '.jir ch~ t"t . F d' smbn lof' j31.1' ;
~
't e ipet; '
- 4. 0 -9
- b. ke rr s 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Secti E9.1" of' the~FSAR:3 B 9.99 c.] A nominal E9- 1+1 - inch center to center B PS' distance between fuel assemblies placed in the s
thhh dcnsity ,f,0elMgl~a,gs,[tsckM: _ + ~4 .0- A _Er fr . iL.t.eu a. m i~rgd fer T. _ T;, se /p'p$// e..se..c.hi._"o . e. 9 ~ ."t6.:.1T . 80. '.
. 68. .".f..o. . ..s.t.. . -
~R fc 1 % nd A nominci [10.0;] inch ccntcr tc c:ntcr distanee- 'O~
4h [dWt 5A betwan fxl usemblic picxd in cicw dcxity fx1 storagc rocks].} -
~ 4. 0- Q.,
, For,,,s pEj ;,fue ,i w .a',cor inati,n o ~i..ni t .1 //3///
-4 . O ~~ k _
~
0F..?!imygJ ,_d.is , arid" xposu~ ,'~s ih~i F'
.7.p; lih'..egio _2.
llcw or poeticily cpcnt fuci asx:blic , with e discharg burnup in the "ccccptebic rangc" cf Figurc [3.7.171] may Ec clicwcd unicstricted storc;c in [cithcr]fuci stcragc rock (s'. and] [f. llcw cr particily spcnt fuci xx blics with c B-PS discharg burnup in thc. 'unacxptabic rangc" cf Figurc [2.7.17-1] will bc storcd in cc plicacc with th: !Z cpprevcd [spccific dxument antaining the anciyticci acthods, titic, datt.. or spccific configuration cr figurc]. s 3 (continued) 1 MARK-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 4.0 2 5/15/97
CA 3.7-010 INSERT SA-4a For fuel with enrichments greater than 4.6 nominal weight percent of U-235, the combination of enrichment and integral fuel burnable absorbers shall be sufficient so that the requirements of 4.3.1.1.b are met. INSERT SA-4b
- d. Partially spent fuel assemblies with a discharge burnup in the " Acceptable Burnup Domain for Region 2 and 3 s:orage" of Figure 3.7.17-1 may be allowed unrestricted storage in the fuel' storage racks, except for the empty cells in the checkerboarding configuration;
- e. Partially spent fuel assemblies with a discharge burnup in the " Acceptable Burnup Domain for Region 3 Storage" of Figure 3.7.17-1 may be allowed unrestricted storage, except for the empty cells in the checkerboarding configuration, and except in Region 2 locations in a Mixed Zone Three Region configuration in the fuel storage racks; and
- f. New or partially spent fuel assemblies with a discharge burnup in the
" Unacceptable Burnup Domain for Region 2 or 3 Storage" of Figure 3.7.17-1 be stored in Region 1.
w;ll [CA 3A-ED 1 i l 4
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.9-ED (NEW) APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Various changes that do not impact the technical content of the submittal or other FLOG members. Changes are noted with CA 3.9-ED in the margin and noted below:
- 1) CTS 3/4/98, Refueling Operations, Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation, High Water Level, footnote to LCO 3.9.8.1: DOC 08-03 LS-06, is modified in Insert 3A-6a to correct for " greater or equal than symbols".
- 2) ITS LCO 3.9.1, Refueling Operations, Boron Concentration, is modified to Add the word "of" to the end of tt.e phrase "all filled portions...".
- 3) ITS 3.9.1, Actions A.1 and A.2, Bases, is modified to add the word "of" to The end of the phrase "all filled portions...".
- 4) CTS 3/4.9.1, Refueling Operations, Boron Concentration, is modified by unstriking DOC 1-01-A. DOC 1-01-A is applicable.
ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 9-1 Enci 3A 6(Insert 3A-6a) EnclSA 3.9-1 Enct 58 B 3.9-4 l 1 i
s ~. .s. ...v 4 3. -b - T*ac REVgIOy y e . ..
. , . . 3/4.9 REFUEL.!NG OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 sciion c:MCENTuTIC fo 3.9-ikj
~
N'
'bMITINGCDNDITI F0ft CPERATION T.*.I. The ren concentration f all filled partions of .the Reacter Coclant l - l-d et w System and4.he refuelinq -eenel shall .,
be n',-tz' e'."..~4.,4..,~ 2..a. d "._.'. '4.'4 . . .
,m._ , , u_. 1-l3
'~ --_A
. . . . . . _ _........m...______._1..... ,
W 4.4
...._f 4 .-.b4. ___-u.sc.d += ;4.lah.
- u. s,6.;,, 4 t. i.h sf**J.'=d ;a %. can.R . 4. </.m/ p.,;f ,,,, _l02-LG 5 e w .ases; DGvoi 7 9 s d .6 6 v c sot, g a ll be s au.n .
l :.,
, , n ee .. ,... -..
-arr ' ~~~- -
; _ oq.m 7 . ,
......~....._..,._,__.....m.-..
- m. .
= ... . ..
uJ~h 1 -c 5-A
^"' "
- N --)$ % - -
gh, .;sh1 ,. 4. , , Ac7tcN: 5 ,,W, -' 1 l c . Witir the ' requirements. af .he aheve. specification not sati'sfie4 immedia.aly ' suspene all.ccerations involving C::RE ALTERATIONS cr pes.itive reactivity l-0(-LS changes anst initiate _-e r--t' re be-n' . 2* ;- *~^00 r th:n ;- ;.a.C .: :: ;;
=-' te r:n :r ' t; :; .i --
f: ::!: ten' ::-ni ' ; --- ::- - r : ::ui'
' -- * "--" .". ef t. ! : r:r nd i: '::: S:n :r :-=' t: 0. E :r t% t,c.; ;a i
--c:ne:ntr:thr. B : t ;t.t: ; ut:r .:n :r--: 22' t: **00 ;;:, ti . re:r b -
--- th: r n m:t:R fr:. . .
m 4ke. a.l.ad hma, . Jr._ sea h
. b. WA. . <e .s.L %n 4.~r. 1eeJ
- +i--k ee' adet.-o ne H autel- e 6 v L.pos: -
-M i+; ..,' ,g' .Ol-M~
ca.tc
=~'--
- 5-AcrtRarr eius . - - et l .1. i'- u.
- l SURVEIT.I.ANCE EOUIREMENTS
~!. ^.:. ;f in: C rs: rn:ti 'ty ::nt.i.i:n; :h:P 3
".0.'.'. . ~L. . m .
}-OS-LS dete '-E'; 3:- ::i
- . : 'r.; :r unt:'th; tt: m:-::r :::::: h::d, 4 -
'. '. ' . ^2. . .. ;. ; f : ; f ' *:ng-'. :: t.m' nd ' re::: :f '
f::: ' n.: -
't; f.:'y 'n: - : ;::'-': ~'t '- it: - :n- n::: .
- a. 9.1. 2 The toren concent ation of the Reacter C:clant !ystem and the refueling 1-10-L6 M.sna11 te catarninee t : See ' ' - '
- m # .,at least onen par n neurs.
t e..I ' t 6. w. winia v4_ 4.9.1.3 Valves aq.ys73 gne gg.v601 snall te verified 1ccr.ec closec and secured in esitica at least cnce per n cays.
. u d=.83
- f- --
- n ' - t z ' e ' - MO E
- a -- -":- : ::: :-
1-05-A
: :::::- :h:
3::e : ::= reW *::: u :n < r . ::-:' re: ::-
, e c t- .:. :::::
L.% 5::: ,i.... m- 3 's* s so @ * } .ce,-n p ys J:4o Q % d\wd Ese ea sk smb.~.5<1
*' " va lw(
n (, 9.t.t. 4 k< c q M A ' ".e * *b b I5 *^ 4 5
\ M y j,(
. +
~~~'
CALLAVAY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-1
_ ' &n. ,
.s . CHANGE . .
~
gf ggg . DESCRIPTION @ - -A J 8 02 .A- This change removes a limit on RCS temperature. .This is .
~
not a technical change'because the limit duplicated the
-4.< .. ,
. RCS temperature band required for Mode 6 in existing-T.S.- u Although the temperature band would be re.noved from tne definition of Horie 6 in the improved T.S., the SR will maintain a requirement for RHR flow rate sufficient to
- remove decay heat and avoid boiling in the RCS.
'8 03 -
LS 6 This change allows the reioval of the RHR loop from operation for additional purposes other than the performance of core alterations in the vicinity oY the hot
. legs. This allows increased flexibility for core mapping
. and isolation valve testing. No operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the RCS boron concentration. This change is . consistent with NUREG-1431.
4 4 .4 y Rev.1 4 ernset.: - 3 A - (:,&:. - o 3M- /2. / _ 4A 3 9-ED , 3 O 8-04 7'. 'A I ' '.FNot applicable to Callaway. See Conversion / Comparison -
/
-\ -
Table (Enclosure 38). y 8 05 , - Not Used.
,- 8-06 M This change adds an additional surveillance requirement to verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power (D'-$$$) "
available at least once per 7 days. This change. adds.a ' , ' more stringent TS requirement which is appropriate _ arid c.j consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1. 'W 9 01; A "~. . . ;. at- 1 t.'.i; L" ; W N in w.- .wn' ..
. 3.9 "C tal Pene a ons- uld.be '
'C'9%
9 p3 k ~fflSed > lddr sed ITS L 0.3 a O f." s cha ' " pf.V( l
~S A a -
no r u1 in nge i ir a i <ve t ed e+ ._ ud % rr,1 a . ev . , . 9 02 LS 7 , Deletes the requirement to close each purge valve when the Containment Ventilation System is. inoperable. The ITS only requires that core alterations and irradiated fue' movement be suspended. < l IO5acT SA-/ c' -4 3 A-IN 9 03' LS 8 The containment ventilation TS requirements would be integrated into ITS 3.9.4 This has the effect of changing the SR frequency from once per 7 days and within , 100 hours prior tog CORE ALTERATIONS to once per 18 months. . . . ,
. 10$ed lis change is acceptable because it would apply the same' $
3A-fd 18 month frequency to the containment ventilation valves as applied to other containment isolation valves that must [h, w g .3,q j(,
, be OPERABLE for accidents more severe than an FHA. !
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS '6 5/15/97 l 1 l
Q 3.9-12 gm INSERT 3A-6a
\ -
The proposed change would permit the securing of RHR flow through the reactor vessel for up to 1 hourin every 8 hours [] provided that no operations involving a reduction in boron concentration were performed. The current TS already permit these interruptions in RHR operation but under more limited conditions. During this interruption, decay heat removalic assured by natural convection within the large amount of water in the refueling cavi above the reactor vessel flange). Boron concentration concerns are avoided by proh inng Yfft/) evol.ttions that would reduce the boren concentration. Dtuing MODE 6 operation with watery {significahtly below boiling with the typical time-to-boil significa -. heat removal is provided and inadvertent criticality is avoided.
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t 33 4d y ga Qak
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.' cA 3.9 ED , cA s.4-ED ~
. s .
s 8;
'e
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~
c3 3A-ED i q 2 q .h W
- oren Ccncentraticn !
t 3.9.1 l
) ^
j (c'\\ : < 3.9 REFUELING OPERATICHS .
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'O M- N '
3.9.1 Baron Concentration 0h s 1 QA o I a
. LCO 3.9.1 Baron concentrations of thgReactor Coolant System. th; . 7 .; c.g en and __S., the refue' ling ::. : ty p66". shall be
.;'jyg
- j. ..
maintainedwithin the limit specified in the COLR._
.C W"*I C
l
? * :'
. . . g 5 % k uka.a.as A
. APPLICABILITf: H00E 6. -
maor ms<f , a.-~ - -
.n_-_ - ~ . :==Ru1_ - <-_.. w . 5. _. m -- g Q 3'9 -l^-
l
, NK50Efr:ncrsnetMeRtr.vsmt3YE00so-2.r:cmniGGE rsgne- ng;:cpj.u pep:2t'Ei'; . i
=--'-----: . _ ._
-__ +
~ .
, ACTICHS ? ' " " ' ~
I 1 CONDITION . REQUIRED ACTION . COMPLETION T!HE i i I 1
)
A. coron c:ncentration A.1 Suspend CORE ALTEUJI'_0NS. i Imedia eiy I nct within limit. AED. A.2 Serpend positive--- -
-Imediately reactivity adcitiens.
atun A.3 Init.iare acticn to .' I=eciately res :re bcr:n I c:ncen:. arien :: witnan li:1:. s
.t*U C.1]f. i. l.E_L N(2.A. g i.::*a.t't
.. .* . .t
_c'v';.i.tr
. .. i. s 1_wsiC.; 70. . .. f.:O.yCv.
SR 2.9.1.1 Ver:fy tor:n c:ncen:. at en is as- ,in - e ;im:- 72 heers
)
s;ec;fied in :. e C"L:.. 50 MX UP CF WCG STS REV 1 (NU:EG Z1) 2 . 9 ~. . El': Y I
. -- - ..=...._ =.-
Baron Concentration
, B 3.9.1 9: k BASES
- w. . __... _ _ .
LCO , .__.., ,-- Ti's,igspecified in the COLR ensures that a core k,,, of s 0.95 is (continued),, , mai,ntained during fuel handling operations. Violation of the LCO
'.-- . . could. lead to an inadvertent criticality during MODE 6.
APPLICABILITI This LCO is applicable in MODE 6 to ensure that the fuel in the reactor vessel will remain subcritical. .The required boren concentration ensures a k,,e .c0.95. Above MODE 6. LCO 3.1.1
~
"SHlITDOWN MARGIN- (SDM) 4-: C':"" " ar.d '.C': " . ..:. :::CC'm FA"C2! (2' b p..-.. #33 u s w. o c.p.n _,%, men s ensure
;. that an. adequate amount of negative reactivity is available to '
shut down-the reactor and. maintain it subcriticai.
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, r _ . .r.;
,ws= -- . ps-- --
-,.. -=-- .: + n . ..: . . . . . . . - ny , .; . a ::g.x u.r.n
,.3.n.,g_,..
v . _' . . c . Q .l
. '~ .: y: nur: 9 p, q . ><:5. u5 .i T . . ~ . q ,;.y V .wa . ~ . n ;,:W :J.'.g .y wg:.lygr s~ .Ad ; t.- r.Wej gei.gl,*ip ps +st
.. .-__..a -
.a g .7 . . , , . f g 9.g ., . , _ , . g .,, .g. _ , . .y...g ,.g,g t_ g
- : :% c. yt..y Q Fy g.s-:. ,4Cai .q.4;.u.-ig..unqig g. y.nvr.,-V- M Q
.,. , , ir. . .a - n... th +J4 . g.3 g@k ,
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ACTIONS . .._. - --
- -.I.T-"and N.7 - . . . . _ . .
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Continuaticiof CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions
. (incTud.ing actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent
-~
~ ~ ~ ' ' ~ '
e uoon, maintainine thttunit in como11ance with the LCO. If the 8f l# d h ._fxicorEconcentration af any coolant voluma in%he RCS _ m - gg,ED JilWEWUll , the rid'n; nr.d. ;r the refueling eettty - i5 .( f0fhg less than its Timit, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions must be suspended imediately. g S h. Suspension of CORE ALTdRATIONS and positive reactivity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position. N S 3. p y#p In' addition to imedir:ely suspehding CORE ALTERATIONS or h positive reactivity additions, baration to restore the g) d concentration ~ must be initiated imediately. ; 1 f.) (continued) B 3.9 4 5/15/97 MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES _ _ _}}