ML20217B300
| ML20217B300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1997 |
| From: | Taylor UNION ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217A030 | List: |
| References | |
| ETP-NF-00001, ETP-NF-1, NUDOCS 9803260025 | |
| Download: ML20217B300 (15) | |
Text
l ETP-NF-00001
- i. Revision 0 1 September 4,1997 CALLAWAY PLANT l ENGINEERING TEST PROCEDURE ETP-NF-00001 MDAFW PUMP (DPALOI A) START INHIBIT CIRCUIT TEST, LSELS RELAY K1102 RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT [ve;f agf# m 9 WRITTEN BY 1 moi,r, /</a w u PREPARED BY I [.,Mfe/[M m c.
APPROVED BY #
r DATE ISSUED 9- Y- 77 This procedure contains the following:
Pages I through /r Myynf Attachments through Tables through Figures through Appendic s through CheckofTLists through This procedure has checkofflist(s) maintained in the mainframe computer.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS SectiOD Page Number .
1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE., ..... . .. ... .... .. . .. ......1 l i
2.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA . ... . ... . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . -I 3.0 NOTES AND PRECAUTIONS.. ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........1 4.0 PREREQUISITES .. ...... ... .. . ... ................................2 l l
5.0 TEST EQUIPMENT. . .... .. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........2 6.0 PROCEDURE . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 7.0 RESTORATION.. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .4 l l
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MDAFW PUMP (DPALO1 Al START INHIBIT CIRCIIIT TEST. LSELS RELAY K1102
- 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE To verify the proper opriation of the Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump start inhibit circuitry on a simulated loss of vital A/C bus vohage (NB01). This test will verify that the LSELS circuitry will initiate a 50 second time delay (F.elay No. AL62RP330TDDAL1) that inhibits the MDAFP (DPAL01 A) from starting on an Aux Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS).
- 2. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA e All reqv. ired relay contact conditions are met as described in this procedure.
- Time delay relay AL62P.P330TDDALI actuates in 50 i 2.5 seconds.
- 3. NOTES AND PRECAUTIOtM e ESW Pump DPEFol A will receive a trip signal, and SHALL be declared inoperable, e The "A" Train of LS ELS SHALL be declared inoperable during the performance of this procedure due to this test defeating the l
NB01 Main Feeder 13reaker (NB0112) loss of voltage trip function.
- The "A" MDAFP (DPALO1 A) SHALL be declared inoperable during the performance of this procedure due to this test defeating the auto start function on an AFAS.
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- 4. PREREOUISITES
- A control room briefincluding compensatory actions has been conducted prior to the start of this procedure.
- Compensatory Actions, if an actual 2/4 UV or Degraded Voltage signal were to occur during the test perform the following:
- 1. Manually open the NB01 Bus nonnal Feeder Breaker
- 2. Remove power supply from K1102, and reland wire to terminal 6. ,
e The ShiA Supervisor has given permission to conduct this test procedure.
- Servios water supplying both ESW trains.
- An 1&C brief will be conducted by the Test Engineer.
- QC Termination Verification required.
- 5. TEST EOUIPMENT
+ Portable 48-vdc isolating power supply, capable of carrying a I-amp load.
- Simpson 260 Voltmeter
- Digital Multimeter, Keithley 197A or equivalent.
- Stopwatch, calibrated.
- Test leads for meters and power supply.
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- 6. PROCEDURE CAUTION Care must be taken not to short the liAed wire in Step 6.1. Shorting of this wire could cause the NB01 Bus Normal Feeder Breaker to trip.
6.1 At NF039C "A" train liR field wire (INBB12AG, black) landed on TB2 point 10 and tape. This disables NB01 MN Feeder Breaker (NB0112) l loss ofvoltage trip function from LSELS, Performer: / / Initial / Date / Time Ind. Verfication: / / Initial / Date / Time QC Verification: / / Initial / Date / Time 6.2 At NF039C, LiA vendor wire from relay K1102 terminal 6 and tape. This disables automatic load shed capability of the "A" ESW Pump and the AFAS inhibit for the"A"MDAFP.
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Performer: / / Initial / Date / Time Ind. Verfication- / / Initial /Date / Time QC Verification / / Initial / Date / Time 1
6.3 Connect the DEENEROlZED portable 48-volt dc power supply to relay K1102. The positive lead goes to pin 6 and the negative lead goes to pin 7. ;
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6.4 At SA036A, Connect a Digital Multimeter (NOTE: Set on the 200vdc l j range) between terminals 8 and 9 on TB 3. This will monitor the 50
! mecond AFAS inhibit circuit from time delay relay l AL62RP330TDDALI.
1 Performer: / Initial / Date I Ind. Verfication: / Initial / Date i NOTE: The next Step will generate a TRIP signal to the "A" ESW Pump if running.
6.5 Energize LSELS relay K1102 with 48 vdc from the temporary power supply and verify proper operation of relay K1102 and relay )
AL62RP330TDDALI by observing the DMM installed at SA036A for i the following change in indication: l l e Prior to energizing K1102 the DMM should indicate the presence of 125 vdc.
- AAer K1102 is energized the 125 vde indication should go to 0 ydc and stay.
I Performer: / Initial /Date l Ind. Verfication: / Initial / Date l l
t 6.6 Deenergize relay K1102 and verify proper time delay function of relay
' AL62RP330TDD ALI by the following change in indication.
. 50 seconds i 2.5 seconds nRer K1102 is deenergized the DMM installed at SA036A should indicate the presence of 125 vdc.
Performer: I Initial / Date Ind. Verfication: / Initial / Date 6.7 Notify the 1&C Supervisor or I&C Engineer if any step failed to meet it's f required test result.
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ETP-NF-00001 l Rev. 0 g
- 7. RESTORATION 7.1 Remove test equipment installed at NF039C and SA036A.
Performer: / Initial / Date Ind. Verfication: / Initial / Date 7.2 Reland vendor wire at Relay K1102 terminal 6.
Performer: / Initial / Date Ind. Verfication: / Initial / Date QC Verification : / Initial / Date CAUTION: Care must be taken not to short the lined wire in Step 7.3 Shorting of this wire could cause the NB01 Bus Normal Feeder Breaker to trip.
7.3 Reland field wire INBB12AG, black at TB2 point 10 in NF039C.
Performer: / Initial / Date l Ind. Verfication: / Initial / Date QC Verification : / Initial / Date 7.4 Verify proper circuit continuity for relay K1102 by connecting a Simpson 260 (set on the 2.50 vdc range or lower) positive lead at relsy K1102 terminal 6 and the negative lead at terminal 7. A small meter i defection WILL occur when a ATI test pulse is present. The ATI test j steps that are applicable to relay K1102 are 2,4,45,50,55 and 60. Only ;
one step / meter deflection is necessary to verify continuity. l Performer; / / Initial / Date / Time Ind. Verfication: / / Initial / Date / Time 7.5 Verify proper circuit continuity for cable INBB12AG, black by connecting a DMM (set on the 200 vdc range or higher) positive lead to TB2 point 10 (vendor side) at NF039C and the negative to cabinet l ground. Verify the presence of approximately 67 vdc. l Performer: / /_ Initial / Date / Time Ind. Verfication: _/ / Initial / Date / Time 7.6 Ensure all test equipment is removed from NF039C.
Performer: / Initial / Date Ind. Verfication: / Initial / Date 7.7 Notify the I&C Supervisor or IAC Engineer if any Restoration step failed to meet its required result.
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7.8 Notify the SS that the test is complete and the Technical Specification actions of this test may be exited.
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l PROCEDURE RIX)UEST FOftM l (Insowestons on BacU
/-
1.0 PROCfoURENUMBER ! --
/.* NEW REVISION NUMBER PROCEDURE TITLE Y#M///[ he-[E[f[ f N g 7 tj M g y/gy g r
1.1 NA [ YES Q This ision natisfies the required l2 month nview of EIP-ZZ/SDP-CP/SDP SF procedures?
NO ure Deletion? Revision to be deleted l 1.2 YES O 8.3 CU O RU N^ O le the new revision a Continuous (CU) or Reference (RU) Use procedure?
2.0 REVISION
SUMMARY
(Descryllon ef/ Anasonfor) l f0Csn'WW,rl- $" b W/'C p Ol'/ 0 f A'wi wi# se K54 a So w 6;,4/ 7 dad p n aeA />G ~/7".-w./.4FP & vd.,';9 L j ~ & s a s 6./ upn l
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3.0 THIS REVISION REPRESENTS:
(Use addntoonalpages frequire4 k h g I $
3.1 YES O NO proposed change to the facility as described in the FSAK7 3.2 YES O o A ch=asc io procedures as descrih.d is inc rSAR7 ;
d' NO M 3.3 34 YES NO O[ A iast change arto the== PertSpec= cat aal d**cribcd i. ihe rSAR or Technical Specifi YI'.S Q Technical 6fications?
eM 3.5 YES O NO change aNecting the environment or the NPDES Permitt 40$
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36 3.7 38 YES YES YI.S O
O O
NO No [ A change NO chaass which which affects arrects the the RERP7 Security Plaat change for which a Licensing Document Change has been Initiated? Change #
3.9 YES O NO change nquiring a new/ revision to a Surveillance Task Sheet or an EQ PM Task Sheet?
to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) or Procces Control Program (PCP)7 g 3.10 YES O NO 6 3.18 YES O NO change requiring revision to the Acocptance Criteria Insuumentation (ACI) Program?
3.12 YES O NO A new or a change to a checkofTlist maintained on the Plant Maintame Computer?
See back qfPRFfor actions reporedfor n Yes* repense to 3.1 3.12,
[e [p 88 9- r.:[-9 ~[
W-4.0 FRI. FARED BY v s. C i 5.0 QUAUTIED REVIEWER A) aT 6/ *f'#D pais sepanne Tale 6.0 CROSS DISCIPUNARY REVIEW YES 1 d' NO DUE DATE P. # Sywes / Does Deparanent / Sipsewe 1 Due ht! l Ih Ymr I &f7 I I I N I / /
1.0 RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENT IIEAD/ MANAGER OPS SUPPORT Q Additional Reviewers on attached page Q Approved forIssueiDeletion l
g ApprovedforORCReview g g [g ()P., y Q 8.0 MANAGER,CAIJ.AWAY PLANT (APA EIP) fr - f)
, CA433 /[
05/1987 Al90.0001/Al 90.0002/A 190.0035/A210.0062 Page 1 of 2 APA-ZZ 00101 l
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FORMAL SAFETY EVAt.UATION COVER SHEET
- 1. iustion appiicable to: Frp-Nr-doooi[t) . AloA FW Pum#
bPAt a t A %b MAA f is/He Q VT GE C u or ATMe L. t El5 Q ELA,4 Klto L ,
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O[ OUTSIDE UNION ELECTRIC SAFE AGENCY 1Y EVALUATION SAFETY EVALUATION ATTACHED 2.1 May the proposed activity increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in the FSAR7 Yes No [
2.2 May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in the j
< FSAR7 2.3 May the proposed actMty increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previouslyin the FSAR? f Yes No V 2.4 Ms y the proposed activity increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the FSAR? /
Yes No* V 2.5 May the proposed activity create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previousfy in Yes No 2.6 May the proposed activity create the possibility of a malfunction of equipmentimportant to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR? .p Yes No V 2.7 Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety as determined in the basis for any Technical Specification?
Yes No 3.0 SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUSION Based upon the results of this Formal Safety Evaluation, the Change Does not involve an unreviewed safety question, involvee an unreviewed safety question.
4.0 APPROVALS 4.1 Responsible Engineer: Data:
4.2 Qualified Reviewer. a/d/fMA / Date: 9 / +'/ 9 s --
4.3 Approved By: Date: $
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' Super)dsSg Engineer As defined in APA-ZZ-00140 CA-#1340 10/12/96 Page 1 of1 APA-ZZ-00140 0** INFORMATION ONLY *** 01/23/98 0 09:20:23 HRS
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Callaway Plant Formal Safety Evaluation ETP-NF-00001 and ETP-NF 00002
- 1. EVALUATION APPLICABLETO:
This evaluation applies to the perfonnance of ETP-NF-00001 and ETP-NF-00002 which verify the proper operation of blocking contacts that are in the auxiliary feed water pump breaker control circuit. The blocking contacts are initiated by the Imad Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer (LSELS) and prevent / inhibit the starting of an auxiliary feedwater pump at the wrong time, during a lead sequence from LSELS.
This formal safety evaluation is performed because the procedures are a test not described in the FSAR. l l
- 2. INTRODUCTION 2.1 Description of the activity and its expected effects.
During the review oflogic testing per Gencric Letter 96-01, Engineering has determined that the blocking contacts in the auxiliary feedwater pump control circuit are not being verified as part of the normal 18 month LSELS surveillance.
The function of the blocking contact is to prevent the auxiliary feed water pump from starting at the wrong time during sequencing of LSELS.
This test will verify that the LSELS will initiate the 50 second time delay relay that prevents the motor driven aux feed water pumps from starting at the wrong time, during an LSELS loading sequence. The proper operation of the time delay relay is also verified.
The Tech Spec (TS) note to TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.2 says the surveillance shall not be performed in Modes 1 and 2, and note TS4.8.1.1.2.g states that the surveillance shall be done "during shutdown". However, this test only tests the aux feedwater pump inhibit contact and not the whole LSELS sequence, for which TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.2 was intended. Engineering has determined that we can test the aux feed water pump inhibit portion of LSELS, since the Tech Spec note applies to the entire surveillance. 'Ihe Engineering position is substantiated by BASES section 4.8.1 which states that the mode restriction is due to perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation. Since we are not shedding buses nor causing electrical perturbations in this test, and since this test is a very small portion of the overall surveillance, the mode restriction does not apply, i
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The following paragraphs describe the testing that will be performed. The testing setup for B train is different than the setup for A train. %e testing difference is w==e the relay under test in A train can shed the normal feeder breaker to the NB bus, while the B train relay only sheds the attemate feed which is normally open. Thus we only need to prevent a bus shed on A train. He test for A train will be described in detail, followed by a paragraph describing the differences for Btrain.
ne A train test will be performed by lining some of the leads from relay K1102 in Train A LSELS (NF039C), and then energizing K1102 via a portable power supply. The liAed leads will remove the normal power source from the coil and will also disconnect the contacts in the circuit that feeds a load shed to the L incosning NB bus breaker 152NB0112. The remaining leads will not be disconnected from K1102. De leads supply the time delay relay in the auxiliary feed water pump circuit (AL62RP330TDDALI) and also supply a load shed to the A ESW Pump. To perform the test, the LSELS relay K1102 will be energized by a ponable power supply, and the blocking contacts supplied by the time delay l relay will be verified to be in the open state. Then the relay will be de-energized, and 50 seconds later it will be verified that the contacts reclose.
L ne load shed contacts to the ESW are not lined because ESW will not be
! running at the time of the test, thus a load shed is not relevant.
l ne leads on the coil are lifted to accommodate energizing relay K1102 without energizing the other relays in LSELS whose coils are connected in parallel with this coil. It is also necessary to lift the leads on the load shed contacts to avoid tripping the feeder breaker to the NB bus.
For Train B, the only lifted lead will be to the coil of K4102 in NF039C. Unlike the A train test, we will not be lifting the leads on the load shed contact for B l
train, since the shed signal goes to the alternate feeder breaker (152NB0212) which is already open prior to the test. The B train time delay relay number is AL62RP330TDDAL2.
This test will be performed one train at a time. Prior to beginning a test on one train, the integrity of the opposite train will be verified as a prerequisite.
2.2 Identification of parameters and systems affected by the activity.
No parameters are affected. This affects the following systems i
l e Auxiliary Feedwater (ability of automatic Aux Feed Actuation Signal, AFAS, to start the pump during performance of the test) e LSELS (ability to shed NB01 for loss of offsite power or degrcded voltage) l e ESW (ability to start a pump during performance of the test) i
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2.3 Identification of credible failure modes associated with this activity.
Credible failures modes for this activity are as follows:
e Failure of the relays under test to function properly. 'The purpose of this test is to determine if there are any equipment problems. Any failures will be reworked per the WR program.
- Incorrect removal of relay wiring resulting in a shed of the NB bus for Train,A. Indapandant Verification steps and QC verification steps during the performance of the procedure will climinate inconect wiring concerns.
- Incorrect restoration resulting in an inoperable condition. Independent Verification steps and QC verification steps during the performance of the procedure will climinate incorrect wiring concerns.
- Occurrence of an actual loss of voltage / degraded voltage condition during performance of the test, occurrence of a valid Aux Feed Actuation, or occurrence of a demand to start an ESW pump during performance of the test.
This will be addressed during the pre-job brief with the Reactor Operators.
The manual mitigating actions are covered in the procedures.
- 3. EFFECTS ON TIIE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED AS THE DESIGN BASIS 3.1 May the pmposed activity increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in the FSAR?
No. This testing will be accomplished by entering the action statements for loss !
of one train of LSELS (on A train only), one train of aux feed water pump, and one train of ESW. Since we will be performing the test in action statements, there ,
is no impact on the accident analysis. All of the activities associated with this test ]
are within the boundaries of the acticn statements. In general, the accident i' analyses assume you lose one entire protection train. This test will only be done one train at a time, with precautionary steps to ensure the opposite trains are operable prior to starting.
QC inspection and Independent Verification of the restored wires ensure proper restoration after testing.
3.2 May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in the FSAR7 .
No. The accident scenarios using this equipment are listed in FSAR Table 15.0.6.
The assumptions are listed in Table 15.0.7. Basically, all the scenarios requiring ESF equipment assume one train of the equipment is unavailable.
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1 nis testing will be accomplished by entering the action statements for loss of one -
train of LSELS (on A train only), one train of aux feed water pump, and one train of ESW. Since we will be doing this in ' action statements there is no impact on the accident analysis. All of the activities associated with this test are within the boundaries of the action statements Note that in general the accident analyses '
assume you lose one entire protection train. This test will only be done one train at a time, with precautionary steps to ensure the opposite trains are operable prior to starting.
QC inspection and Independent Verification of the restored wires ensure proper restoration after testing.
3.3 May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the FSAR7 No. This testing will be xcomplished by entering the action statements for loss of one train of LSELS (on A train only), one train of aux feed water pump, and one train of ESW. Since we will be doing this in action statements there is no impact on the accident analysis. All of the activities usociated with this test are within the boundaries of the action statements. Note that in general the accident analyses assume you lose one entire protection train. This test will only be done one train at a time, with precautionary steps to ensure the opposite trains are operable prior to starting.
QC inspection and Independent Verification of the restored wires ensure proper restoration after testing.
His test will not cause an electrical perturbation because the wiring to the load shed contact is being !ifted from K1102 for A train. This will prevent a trip of i the normal power source to NB01. Since the B train test involves the alternate feeder breaker which is already open, there will be no perturbation on B train.
3.4 May the proposed activity increase the consequences of a malfunction of.
_ equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the FSAR7 No. This testing will be accomplished by entering the action statements for loss of one train of LSELS (on A train only), one train of aux feed water pump, and g one train of ESW. Since we will be doing this in action statements there is no impact on the accident analysis. All of the activities associated with this test are within the boundaries of the action statements. Note that in general the accident analyses assume you lose one entire rmiection train. This test will only be done one train at a time, with precautionary steps to ensure the opposite trains are operable prior to starting.
The actual testing is performed using independent verification of the lifting and restoration of wires. Any failure of the M&TE used to perform the test would at worst cause a failure of relay K1102 which would be replaced under the corrective maintenance program.
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l 4. POTENTIAL FOR CREATION OF A NEW TYPE OF UNANALYZED EVENT.
l 4.1 May the proposed activity create the possibility of an accident of a difTerent type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR?
No. This testing will be accomplished by entering the action statements for loss of one train of LSELS (on A train only), one train of aux feed water pump, and one train of ESW. Since we will be doing this in action statements there is no impact on the accident analysis. All of the activities associated with this test are within the boundaries of the action statements. Note that in general the accident analyses assume you lose one entire protection train. This test will only be done one train at a time, with precautionary steps to ensure the opposite trains are operable prior to starting.
The actual testing is performed using independent verification of the lifting and restoration of wires. Any failure of the M&TE used to perform the test would at worst cause a failure of relay K1102 which would be replaced under the corrective maintenance program. l 4.2 May the proposed activity create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the FSAR? l l
No. This testing will be accomplished by entering the action statements for loss i of one train of LSELS (on A train only), one train of aux feed water pump, and one train of ESW. Since we will be doing this in action statements there is no impact on the accident analysis. All of the activities associated with this test are within the boundaries of the action statements. Note that in general the accident analyses assume you lose one entire protection train. This test will only be done one train at a time, with precautionary steps to ensure the opposite trains are j operable prior to starting, his test will not cause an electrical perturbation because the v < ring to the load shed contact is being lifted from K1102 for A train. This will p.went a trip of the norraal power source to NB01. Since the B train test involves the alternate feeder breaker which is already open, there will be no perturbation on B cain. l The actual testing is performed using independent verification of the lifting and restoration of wires. Any failure of the M&TE used to perform the test would at worst cause a failure of relay K1102 which would be replaced under the corrective maintenance program.
- 5. IMPACT ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY 5.1 Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety as determined in the basis for any Technical Specification?
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Since this is the performance of a go/no-go test there are no acceptance limits associated with the results obtained from this activity.
l Regarding the performance of the test with the plant on-line, the Tech Spec note to 4.8.1.1.2.g.2 states this surveillance shall not be performed in Modes 1 and 2, i and only "during shutdown". This test can be performed in any mode, since the l Tech Spec note applies to the entire surveillance. This conclusion is substantiated l by BASES Section 4.8.1 which states that the mode restriction is due to {
I perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation. Since we are not shedding buses nor causing electrical l perturbations in this test, and since this test is a very small portion of the overall )
l surveillance, the mode restriction does not apply.
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i This test will not cause an electrical perturbation because the wiring to the load shed contact is being lifted from K1102 for A train. This will prevent a trip of l the normal power source to NB01. Since the B train test involves the altemate feeder breaker which is already open, there will be no perturbation on B train.
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- 6. SAFETY EVALUATION CONCLUSION There is no unreviewed safety question associated with this test.
- 7. 10 CFR 50.50 REPORT
SUMMARY
6 This safety evaluation pestains to performing a test to verify the capability of the actuation blocking contact in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump control circuit. The i blocking contact is designed to prevent the pump from starting at the wrong time, during operation of the Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer.
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