Text

Proposed Improved TS Section 3.7, Plant Sys
	ML20154Q119
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	05/15/1997
From:	; UNION ELECTRIC CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20154Q089	List: ML20154Q119; ULNRC-03905, Forwards Response to RAI on Proposed Conversion to Improved TS Section 3.7, Plants Sys;
References
	NUDOCS 9810230142
	Download: ML20154Q119 (400)
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- .- _- - - _ _ ..-.._- -.- _ _ .-.- - - .- .-_.--- . - -

MSSVs .

i B 3.7.1

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)

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (HSSVs)

BASES

( BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the HSSVs is to provide overpressure l protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide

! protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water System, is nct available.

l l Five MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside l containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, as l described in the FSAR, Section RFBE (Ref.1). The MSSVF l capacity critcria i; 110% cf rated stam 'ica at tnustwave suT:rar Tentum owxca pa cnymo m mitunesseco na a rdssystemIp r1es s ure,

M 110% of the steam generator design pressure. This imIotdel l

E meets the requirements of the ASME Code Section III (Ref. 2).

The MSSV design includes staggered setpoints, according to Table 3.7.12 in the accompanying LCO, so that only the needed valves will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential l l for valve chattering that is due to steam pressure insufficient I to fully open all valves following a turbine rcxter trip.

l l

I APPLICABLE The design basis for the MSSVs comes from Reference 2 and its SAFET( ANALYSES purpose is to limit the secondary system pressure to s 110% of design pressure whcn pa;;ing 100t of dc:ign ; tam ficw. Thi-e l daign basi; is sufficicnt to apc-with QB any anticipated cperational occurrence (A00) or accident considered in the Design l Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis.

N The events that challenge the relieving capacity of the MSSVs, N

N \

.\

and thus RCS pressure are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, which are presented in the FSAR, Section gF(_2 D

T g (Ref._31 nf these, the full power turbine trip without steam dump (typicalk is the limiting A00 GTfthTrespect'Yto secofid8Q ffitemW. This event also terminates normal feedwater j flow to the steam generators.

t j 9810230142 981021 PDR ADOCK 05000403 .

P PDR (continued)

HARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.7-1 S/15/97 l

MSSVs B 3.7.1 1

BASES APPLICABLE The GGhlipt&terEirdEst is M transient response for SAFETY ANALYSES turbine trip 613MTN21ZiMEMEED5W611 without a direct reactor (continued) trip presents no hazard to the integrity of the RCS or the Main Steam System.

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Mii+ r M WWO nTt ATae e li0%ih ei>GG sqE T G li W W 9 J Unquer4 #r WA4GT19FFWFHGMaii DRripr:55 If a ainimu;;; reactivity fccdbeck is assu;cd, the icector is tripped on high pr- suricer picssurc. In this c;sc, the pressuricer .sofcty velv s epca, and IsCS picssurc i ;;. ins bc1cu 110% of the dcsign voluc. Oc ti: Vs also ^ pen to limit the :

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ggsg+ g3,3,q e s. - m .,. . ... r ee s. :

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f maximum rcuctivity fccdbeck is assu;ci, the ccactor is tripped on evertemgreture aT. Oc departure free nucleete boiling retic incicescs thicaghout the tren~;icnt, and nce r drops bcic, its )

initial valuc. Pressuricci rclicf v-ivc ;rd lis:Vs orc activated end picy nt ev;rprc- uric;tica in the pri;;ry ord c cadery systcas. The MSSVs are assumed to have two active and one passive failure modes. The active failure modes are spurious opening, and failure to reclose once opened. The passive failure mode is failure to open upon demand.

l The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NPs0 Policy :tstcrent luaxxcunserroun@!.

LCO The accident analysis requires fote Enomtve MSSVs per steam generator tieTOPERABG to provide overpressure protection for design basis transients occurring at 102% RTP. An MSSV will bc The LCO considcccd requires that fEin[e-- MSSVs4bic if it fails to epcnbe pi@fsTeTm20ener_atim enOPERABLE dc;;rd. in compliance wi ference 2-g cycn though thi- i not a < 3

') rcquircacnt of thc OCA caalysis. This is bccousc cpcretica with ' l v ica than the full necr of n::vs ccquircs limitations on clicwabic Ti'EPJiAL P0ZPs (tc acct Asti: Ccdc rcquircacnts). Thcsc

Q 39 G^ d & In5A -

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.7 2 5/15/97

MSSVs .

B 3.7.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 EdHTM (continued)

E Ms25160rItcomp litT6MHiiE21013RoposeSt@0GE3RRBM0]

With one or more MSSVs inoperable, rcducc pcwcr Isphugame M so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets Reference 2 requirements for the applic;bic unhOiCP,"AL

@ PO',,'CR.h CEtDUEUERiperation with less than all SSVs OPERABLE for i 1

each steam generator is permissible, if L POWER is l picperticaelly limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished bqstrictMRMAL POWERg$5,EE@!)

G 3,e},l LI __5&-siuxek '=r==%- un-n= c0Eiangemttff so that the energy' W ansfer to the most limit ~ing team genera or is not greater than the available relief capacity in that. steam generator. For cxcepic. if cac liSS" is incpcrobic in cac stc;; scacreter th; rclicf capacity of thet stc;;

scacrotcr is r;duccd by ;pproxiaetcly 20!. Tc offsct this rcductica in rclici cepecity, cacrgy tren;fer to that stc;;

scacrator aust bc similarly icduccd by at icest 20!. This is accomplishcd by rcducing B'ER"AL I"L'ER by at icest 20!. hich cen;civativcly limits th; cacrgy trenafcr tc all stc;; scacretors -

tc oppicxiactcly 500 cf total cepecity, consistcat with thc I relicf cepccity of " ir s' ";r*- stc;; gencretor.

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ORERABW N U M

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rclicf capacity (TT'C' cf cach "SS'! is etermincd as fcilcws.

_, A

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B (continued)

MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7-4 5/15/97

l l

{

MS!Vs .

B 3.7.2

! B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l B 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (HSIVs) l l

BASES BACKGROUND The HSIVs isolate steam flow from the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break (HELB). MSIV closure terminates flow from the unaffected (intact) steam generators.

One HSIV is located in each main steam line outside, but close to, containment. The HSIVs are downstream from the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump turbine steam supply, to prevent MSSV and AFW isolation from the steam generators by MSIV closure. Closing the HSIVs isolates each steam generator from the others, and isolates the turbine.

C_5fidensilF5 Steam Driliid System, and other auxiliary steam supplies from the steam generators.

! actuators 51 nevntsumectsi ng l eMaT40teRowcDeIOTFIhegt;edundant' Net 1Tatots%w1 urgnotsocevent"thMiyazcommtosvirR

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The HSIVs close on a main steam isolation signal generated by low Q, N-steam TR gerccstor pressureRh1cnzsteamcianernegatavehressure j

F tj or high M containment pressure. The HSIVs fail e+esed EsKi on loss of control or actuation power.

Each MSIV has an MSIV bypass valve. Although these bypass valves are normally closed, they receive the same emergency closure signal as do their associated HSIVs. The MSIVs may also be actuated manually. _

A description of the MSIVs is found in the FSAR. Section M (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The design basis of the MSIVs is established by the containment SAFETY ANALYSES analysis for the large steam line break (SLB) inside containment, discussed in the FSAR. Section 6 T E * (Ref. 2). It is also affected by the accident analysis of the SLB events presented in e the FSAR. Section 15?175 (Ref. 3). The design precludes the blowdown of more than one steam generator, assuming a single

(

l (continued) i MARX UP GF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 8 5/15/97

- . -. . . . - . . -- ._ - . - . - .- - .. - . . . =

l HSIVs B 3.7.2

)

l BASES APPLICABLE a. An HELB inside containment. In order to maximize the mass SAFETY ANALYSES and energy release into containment, the analysis assumes (continued) that the HSIV in the affected steam generator remains open. For this accident scenario, steam is discharged into containment from all steam generators until the remaining MSIVs close. After MSIV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator and from the residual steam in the main steam header downstream of the closed MSIVs in the unaffected loops. Closure of the MSIVs isolates the break from the unaffected steam generators.

b. A break outside of containment and upstream from the MSIVs is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of more than one steam generator must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled RCS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the HSIVs isolates the break and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.

c. A break downstream of the MSIVs will be isolated by the closure of the MSIVs.

d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the HSIVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generators to minimize radiological releases,

e. The MSIVs are also utilized during other events such as a feedwater line break. This event is less limiting se H far as MSIV OPERAP.ILITY is concerned.

The MSIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of thc RC Policy Statuent j MCER50'35E)mtt1T. -

g. g g, g ,, i LC0 This LCO requires that four .SIVs in the steam lines be OPERABLE.

,A The MSIVs are considered ERABLE when the isolation times are

/ I l

\ 1,M wit; hit imitsp[end isolation they R,etcapab~leTorscrosma elese on an actt ation signal.

A This LCO provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their q design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents

' O g .O i

that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the (continued) l l MARX-UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3 7 10 5/15/97 I

1 HFIVs end-HFPWe-Eend-Atseetetcd Cypcas Valvc3}- .

s B 3.7.3 1

BASES APPLICABLE cocidcan. This failurc also rcaults in additionci mass cnd SAFETY ANALYSIS cncrgy rcicascs fcilowing an SLO cr IWLC cvcat.

(continued)

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satisfy Criterion 3 tifEIEFRR5W36TcT(2EM cf th: l0C Policy S tc tc.T,cnt .

LCO This LCO ensures that the MFIVs. timVa. and thcir encciatcd b.gn; vciva will isolate MFW flow to the steam generators.

following an FWLB or main steam line break. These valves will also isolate the nonsafety related portions from the safety related portions of the system. gQ q 3,q G. -j T is LC0 requires that four HFIVs end anociatcd bypan vciva

.,,( -aa? [feur] 'imV: [and a;ccietcd byp;n valva] be OPERABLE. The g *.,O ' MFIVs and timVs and-th; cnociated bypcx valva are considered (continued)

MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 17 5/15/97

i i

HFIVs end-HfRVs-Eevh0cd 03 pass Vcivcs] .

B 3.7.3 BASES LC0 OPERABLE when isolation times are within limits RnenmvenMsti l (continued) p.Lo_seXsigna 1: and theyz grercapaoMETfCIS"HM ebe on an isolation actuation signal.

( Failure to meet the LC0 requirements can result in additional mass and energy being released to containment following an SLB or fNLB inside containment. H-e 5 feedwater isolation signal on i high steam generator level is relied on to terminate an excess j feedwater flow event- @ failure to meet the LC0 may result in l the introduction of water into the main steam lines.

L APPLICABILITY The HFIVs and !;mVs and the assccistcd b3pcss valics must be OPERABLE whenever there is significant mass and energy in the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators. This ensures that, in the event of an HELB. a single failure cannot result in the blowdown of more than one steam generator. In H0 DES 1. 2, M .

l the MFIVs cad liOVs and thc assccistcd b3 pen valves are required l to be OPERABLE to limit the amount of available fluid that could 3 3

s be added to containment in the case a secondary system ni break inside containment. When the MFIV h are closed end dc utivated or isolatcd by a cicacd me.,ual vaivc. they are Q 3.7. G d i aircady performing their safety function.

In MODES 4. 5. and 6. steam generator energy is low. Therefore, the MFIVs. o.,m . mm - naccistcd b pen 3 valvcs are noracily elcscd sincc tirm' i3 g not required tomLitigittMWeliETSCYfo~fra TeTd7 ate mo mste a mT$iiUb r.e a sii'tWeWsES.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each valve.

A.1 and A.2 l

With one MFIV in one or more flow paths inoperable, action must be taken to restore the affected valves to OPERABLE status, or to l close or isolate inoperable affected valves within FB $ hours.

l When these valves are closed cr noicted. they are performing l their required safety function.

i

)

(continued)

MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7-18 5/15/97 l

1

,f

/

HFIVs and MTi1Vs [ cad Asseew2cd Cypen Valycs) .

B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS E B.1 and E B.2 (continued)

If the HFIV(s) cnd MT!!V(c' cad thc anocictcd bypcss valvc(s) 7 cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or closed, or isciated

/ within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in

[ ge a HODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, (j) gthe unit must be placed in at least HODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months an in Ql0DE 4 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months st The allowed Completion Times are reasonabTe, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner l

and without challenging unit systems. :

i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 WC REQUIREHERTS @*M This SR verifies that the closure time of each HFIV, M.~1V, and crocistcd bpan velvcs is s 7 E seconds cn on actuel cr simulatcd actuction sigacl-- MomleaCDEactuaIonEGainEneDBrested pu cs u a ntstMnemise nucer.tes ta tig enog ra m . The HFIV cnd M01V

, closure time W assumed in the accident and containment I

/ analyses. T 1rSurveillance is normally performed upon returning I s

) the unit to operation following a refueling outage. These valves !

' d should not be prie;not tested at power since even a part stroke i O,S exercise increases the risk of a valve closure with the unit generating power. This is consistent with the ASHE Code,Section XI (Ref. 2), quarterly stroke requirements during operation in H0 DES 1 and 2.

The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the girs'env.1ce_

iestoner.ogramr. cr [10 ..-.m. ..m [10] mcnth Ircqucn;y for valic closurc u bescd on thc rcfucling cycic. Opcrcting cxpcricncc hn shoc. thct thnc r.caponcnts u;ucily pcs; thc Survcilicac:. whcn pcrforscd et th; [10] month ;nnrnccJcatjan b oar # Ircqucacy.

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(continued)

HARK-UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.7-21 5/15/97

1 Mt M -

B 3.7.4 l

l B 3.7 PLANT SYSTaiS l B 3.7.4 Atmospheric StEni Du;np Valves fMt'rTASDi{

BASES BACKGROUND The M e s. provide a method for cooling the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions should the preferred heat i

sink via the Steam DUiiiDatves; to the condenser not be available, as discussed in the FSAR. Section ID*J (Ref 1). This is done in conjunction with the Auxiliary Feedwater System providing cooling j water from the condensate storage tank (CST). Ine m u nassure 1 Ina muDCoo l1DQican3DesactiTEVERtoM a Clil tateXeQU61121 ng2D res sure tietweerIIthRreactoratooj antTETstWa'lidunerraultlRf"Rteam UdHe25tDWdlToWinUEif563t0ThtVdEsteamroeneEKtUdiEuoenupture Nip. The Me 55D3 may also be required to meet the design cooldown rate during a normal cooldown when steam pressure drops too low for maintenance of a vacuum in the condenser to permit l use of the Steam Dump System. g

Q 3g,g _ l l One M ASD line for each of the our steam generators is l provided. Each M MD line consists of one M E and an l associated manuainisolation tAeek valve. 1 l

The Me ASD3 are provided with upstream tacek manuaunsofation valves Eovorov;1ae?. posit 1yetsnutonacapaDim1ry;isnoumganaso !

l deyatopuseatHTeIEiWe'YEfiditonactm1titV"mvaenancesacciFiues" to I pccmit thcir bcinji tcsted ct powcr. cnd to providc cn al tcrnctc

! ;;ar.s of isoletici.. The Me ASDN are equipped with pneumatic controllers to permit control of the cooldown rate.

The ADVs arc usually Asussare provided with a pressurized gas supply of botticd nitrogen that, on a loss of pressure in the normal instrument air supply, automatically supplies nitrogen to

operate the Me Adus.auriEEriltrogenTaccumlITEtirrasupp.11e5 the @

l Mt ASUW5d Uni!TECKfTiar7"fsEdira~tBP!E6htrMoa'lVi31FrYsteTil e

generat3F.. The nitrogen EccUmillatof5 supply is sized to provide the sufficient pressurized gas to operate the Me g for the time required for Reactor Coolant System cooldown to RHR entry C"diti b @ Q3.7.G-i A description of the We ASDi is found in Reference 1. Thc ADVs

arc OPERACLE with caly a DC pcwcr sourcc availabic. In addition.

] hand hccis arc picvidcd for iccal manual opcratica.

4 i (continued) l HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 23 5/15/97 i

ABh gar .

p 30'p\ B 3.7.4 BASES (continued) /

LCO Three & @D lines are required to be OPERABLE. One M QQ

! is required from each of bree steam generators to ensure M that at least one W g line is available to conduct a unit cooldown following an SGTR, in which one steam generator become h/

unavailable, accompanied by a single, active failure of arr second b. n" M E line on an unaffected steam generator. The Mock RTiU3'J:

j 4 3,7'G -l if3532tM valves must be OPERABLE to isolate a failed open M

! ggline. A closed Meek manaamuRIR3 tiff valve does not render it or its M M line inoperable, if becausensuTtinunent4 operator action time to open the Meek phUiDE3DMIF# valve is supported I in the accident analysis M6Mh7. RWirMrdentenassa.mtnM '

NtEEEPh51LTMEoMUeJ/L5UsEeQ'U tesEIMEi51t3NMTeVeXSteamEt0 MeIEtmo3DueneEEIonderKto2DerJ.o'liiiEbeU:EaTeIVErenrRgwncmnT Failure to meet the LC0 can result in the inability to rama pre s s> > w=_PtV6BTiRhexnea cto rmcool;antasystliiiiEKndEhBGUltM lljgiiilIDUtlagt 121 ceci thc unit to PJlR catry corditions felicaing n~

an cycnt in ,,hich the corir.;cr is uncvailabic for usc with,thc Stcc; S pass Systc; An M E is considered OPERABLE when it is capable of providing controlled . relief of the main steam flow and capable of fully opening and closing on demand.

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1RirisTUer.ed%DRERABLBE5UhRfM61hourasupblFF57 theta 51H1 mum teaulfEUEo rg.mi tTsitlonprgar:.dtsu;o rax21 xm kere4r APPLICASILITY In H0 DES 1, 2. and 3, and in tiOD: 4, whcn a stcs: gcncr;tcr is bcing rclicd upon for hcat rcacici, the ABb ASDE1'tHbs are required to be OPERABLE.

Tfi!HODE7;Ul"the ? pre s s 0iTTddYtEhiBEMEtIIF'6Eiiiii t at'15nswa re s u t!StHEt gd5b~ibui tH6ffa75GTRie v ent'2%qQihiliDESD30pe rfs t'i orD5sgoW l

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. EgiH Fe d Et5ibeTOPERABLE4fi7MODEC43."

(continued) l l

MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 25 5/15/97 l

ABVs E B 3.7.4

,.)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMEfffS To perform a controlled cooldown of the RCS the ABVe M must be able to be opened etther remotely or loc;11y and throttled through their full range. This SR ensures that the ABVs F5Ds are tested through a full control cycle esvuestmMUTiVhemnseTR1N IFEYtgtnogramp. ct lccat on;c pcr fu;l cycic.

Therco nc htio n s2tnatlTbe ftave m:r#Ar nexo p_e r.a bm mrygomnegSD3Es R1tliEfh~elma naastsoJRa onsva nveIopenxa na rnomnia mstTiMRlT6E Dpenatjnggpr, essa enanc5tempetaIurgspfE7ASDsaneIdEYtsnec5Tcli ThitYsTElimT):g1DnessureFct3rolittVo JTJtbl!WilyegplugmArMtlis Filvetinneau tr.ealttWmoreEtcrnetopen:po srti on a;tnela@8ro nemu s'o fititrananst'fite amrJilnespnes sUte s:nor,5thTSEs uRVeyf6hTd teattirement'EtiiEb~eXttve r,1stheZo pena m63WrEH t d1F01Tro fEtifETASDE lEEihottidHbETp7e0Wedstanom m a a rreb ro pen aIa ngst~empe nat o nesa nd ones suremwhic nRsE1 nifheWuppe rapo r,tio nIo11MODET3EREEDlE.

Pcrforman:c of incrvic; tcsting orJse of an ADV @ during a i unit cooldown may satisfy this requirement. Operating experience

~j has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the [10] c,onth requinedanser#;lcesestT5g P_nogr,am Frequency. The Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

Thumurseuilenceskeoutnements'itn7o WedibugfdtEthlititallroTs E6t r2ErdtMh ndT5du'r~3t f o nal nvH00Es3XpMo r2t o the 5.fmirdng!!TreTSR:rt

~

ifh rs5a ni owsgaTme M7]EofCe3ttngiunt'0"-H00EVIiEtoOeft abTitTi conditqonstcons15tentTiithYhose3undM951RT1 acceptancertrTteraon g6HHTYtedF(RE'fMSH sR 3.7.a.2 'My,\[1 Q 3 /lit -l The function of the bbek manualtfsolitibli valve is to isolate a failed open DrkleatiHg ABV @ . Cycling the t?teek manual T561Et_1on valve both closed and open demonstrates its capability to perform this function. Performance of inservice testing or use of the bbek ih15uilKffo'1Et1Hh' valve during unit cooldown may satisfy this requirement. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed et the tinTac~; !dHfdWith"trie7n_ser.vfeWestiHWProqr3 [10] cranih

)

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 27 5/15/97

- . ~ . - - . . . . - .

- - ~ _ _ . _ . _ - .

AFW System B 3.7.5 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System BASES BACKGROUND The AFW System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the loss of normal feedwater supply. The AFW pumps nor: malt 9 take suction through scparst; and indcpcadcat- aIcommon suction linet from the condensate storage tank (CST) (LCO 3.7.6)t2dnou.td trLesp;oecomesunavatfael.e-coo:InnewaretSTsavanacJesrcomrtNs 9

~

7 Eksentf51Esenv1ce;Witerst-swursistemsat:acnfmotirt dEiVERAERYiTunip- i 1T50 ppt. redMomIoneXESR5NiMDi5t'eli8ECt1DIDiEttfli1Rel17AER M pTipI!5NEWiRURSffoliEN ~

ai2iE e.

and paap to the steam generator secondary side via separate and to independent connections to the main feedwater (HFW) piping (y outside containment. The steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the main steam safety valves (HSSVs) (LCO 3.7.1) or atmospheric i w a 1

dump YtFaliirdunii, valves (LC0 3.7.4). If the main condenser is C available, steam may be released via the steem concenserastEllii Y Dumotva'1ves bge:s valycs and concensatE recir t o the CST.

iWh Q 3/l.6 -l The AFW System consi.ts of g motor driven AFW pumps and one 13 s steam turbine driven pump configured into three trains. Each ,

motor driven pump provides gi of AfW fnesteeawaterj flow capacity teoutrecuoceremova.lKoIEGecaVZneatWrosEtDesteactor; assumeannitheraccicentaanaJ:vsesa , ;nd thc T!iBturbine driven

{

pump provides 200 of the requircd capacity to thc steem p scacratcrs ortarmotorIccivenxpump3i cs assuacd in thc ;;;idcnt analysis. The pumps are equipped with indc;;cadcnt recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. Each d*

h motor driven AFW pump is wered from an independent Class 1E s gfD A has the capability to be r:aligncd fr:; thc control r;ca lo_ cal;iy; N power supply and feecs steam generators, although each pump g

gl.b aligned to feed other steam generators. The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives steam from two main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves HiidawatiiEfrTafr?55nd3HtTESLsupp_i,y, lanes. Each of the steam feed lines will supply 100% of the requirements of the turbine driven AFW pump. IHf6dditionneach 6f2thd?ESw- supply 2ilfries .11 I wsuppjyriucGf2t!TeYfe#IiEddeht'sT6f the~tGrbine~defVsn'AFW[pMp]

(continued)

MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7-29 5/15/97

AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES BACKGROUND The AFW System is capable of supplying feedwater to the steam (continued) generators during normal unit startup, shutdown, and hot standby conditions.

The turbit.e driven AFW pump supplies a common header capable of feeding all steam generators with nonnamnopen DC powc cd gZ ,

l oper-ated control valves cctuatcd to thc approprictc stcc @hi*j

~

j gcncretor by the Encinccccd Safcty Fcaturc Actuation Sy:tcm !

fESFAE+.fifie motor driven pumps supply flow to the steam kgl igenerators through a normally open motor operated valve that ;

automatically throttles flow to prevent pump runout conditions (under all steam generator pressure conditions.) One pump at full fiWis sutticient to remove decay neat and cool the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions. Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive power sources for the AFW System is met.

The AFW System is designed to supply sufficient water to the i

steam generator (s) to remove decay heat with steam generator pressure at the lloEstDr.essur,e, setpoint of the MSSVs t0UsE3!

Bccumu rata 5ii. Subsequently, the AFW System supplies sufficient 3

water to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions, with steam released through the ADVT ASDY.

\f l Q 3.7,Gi The ii6 tor;tardven AFW pumps Sy;tcm ;;tuatc; FtatiS automatically on steam generator water level low low @ any steam generator on trit pro rgbot'h tmai ntfee'DwEt'e rspump suuponIaTtIIIt]AnxoIgAMS'AUS$fi E5tTIEtionefyTihMEOCAEsequencerRandtt11e=sh'Utdowrmsequencer;0 . by th; SFA lL:0 0.0.2). Thc systc; cisc cctuatc; cn icas af cf f3itc pcacr. ThMIIFElfieTdEi.v en'iAEW 30umpKISKautomattenEl{

5t~a rtedDiFite amtgene na tlif3C a te rai evej sw ow slow girGanygwoIstei5 s

felieFator.sTJN301F579NB02RunderpolfEiT63!!L'EndIupongattiiste onTof T

NLSAC safcty injcctica, and trip _of cil "In' pumps, The AFW Systerr is discussed in the FSAR, Section p9"9 (Ref.1).

APPLICABLE The AFW System mitigates the consequences of any event with loss SAFETY ANALYSES of normal feedwater.

The design basis of the AFV System is to supply water to the steam generator to remove decay heat and other residual heat by delivering at least the minimum required flow rate to the steam

)

(continued) 5/15/97 MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 30

l AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES

-LCO tots 16eNd"0BERABEEpishnYthbR ssoolatedEma mEsteam mon tyaTla I (continued). Wa tmap2Vaw.esaa rie:fEiiTdIo rrs ecu reamnghe3rssa tenu a_r;ds2po.sLt3Fn3 EacnznIt riosenra ccuma j ato rst a nKesupo'Janssonem uAEPEcdiit'rbd1RVERE BTdronerte amigeDe na to rza t mo sobe r~iDJt e a mBRI5pTTalvew nezta nKs l liiuTtilbeImaa ntameaRJtuarpnessanemsafkamen moyensunevawasennoun i gupp.nynonzthent uAliPJfa oWEdiit r.oJaya nve_szananth1Rpcussor65

~-

QPJJMB12wm pe2ffv~d!bou rms uqp_1yMs!Etneym1 ni muminequrteamo'M EiWitatnxoTsaritLt'WiiEBh cxoutWSB03xorzwwwelme Ec LCO is 2,sdifict by a htc indiccting thet onc A*J tre-in-whtet, includcs c actor- drivcn pump, is rcquircd to bc KuhoTitg Enezawasy.sremata nzbezus ea nn nue0DEEMtoman.vexaecaydne a t=wHE ECOXdorsanornneaultentheyAbwasystemEoJ0E OPERABLE in H00E 4 suceRtDeNKdKE5VstemESERVaRGibleELorEaeTalEh'E5tamenvat. Mit is bccou;; of thc rcduccd hcot removal icquircacat: and shet-pericd of tiac in 1i00: 4 during which thc APJ is rcquir d and th:

insufficicnt stca; availabic in liOO 4 to pcwcr th; turbinc drivcn AJ pump.

4 l

-) APPLICABILITY In H0 DES 1, 2, and 3, the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE in the event that it is called upon to function when the HFW is lost. In addition, the AFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the steam generator secondary inventory, lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In H0DE 4 EiidE5 the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steam generators DLrtfL1sinotWs'quireassancer.th'siRHKpystemrts By.atlable%1iiTthTsTH00E.

In H0DE 5-e 6, the steam generators are not normally used for heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONS U lhfl[ O 3'1' b - l If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the following reasons:

i f

(continued)

MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 33 5/15/97

AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.4 (continued)

~

REQUIREME.ViS g c rating and the autostart functicr. is n;t rcquired. The 18 month Frequency is based on tre med to perform this bfQi Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance

$3SJr-l were performed with the reactor at power. g Q 3.?.G-/

This SR is modified by EIN5t~d. TfisTN5t ndicates that the SR be deferred until suitable test conditions are established. This deferral is required because there is insufficient steam pressure to perform the test. [Thc] "cte [2] :tetcs thct thc SR is re rc. quired in liOOC 4. [In liOOC 4.-the rcquircd pump i; circedy cpcrating and the aut: start function i; nct requircd.] [In tiOOC 4. the hcot rcmoval requircacnt; would bc icss providing acic tiac for opcretor action to acnually stort thc requircd APJ pumpd Q 3.'?. G l This SR verlfies that the AFW is properly aligned by verifying the ficw paths from the CST to each steam generator prior to entering H0DE 2 after :aore than 30 days in H00E 5 or 6.

OPERABILITY of AFW flow paths must be verified before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of the AFM System during a subsequent shutdown. The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering judgement and other administrative controls that ensure that flow paths remain OPERABLE. To further ensure AFW System alignment. flow path OPERABILITY is verified following extended outages to determine no misalignment of valves has occurred. This SR cnsures that the flow path from the CST to the steam generators is properly aligned. (2is S*1 i; nct required by thos; units th:t ;c AIJ for acrmcl startup and :hutdown.)

REFERENCES 1. FSAR. Section IE4 9EAHifTffryTeedwatersystem7

2. ASME. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Section XI.

E F5ARZ56ctTo,n 9'37136mpressedTAfrISVstem!

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 40 5/15/97

CST B 3.7.6

.)

BASES APPLICABLE Sthe rap nyT e a'15ch a r a ctiEfit3t'F.quJA55 ftlc oa 1EetTfR5Vre c e raf h'Mtt h's SAFETY ANALYSES d

' esmnzorAthTTAEWFsYit'emIcanr.DerroundEMfGARElDf4*93 (continued)

The CST satisfies Criterien 3 fiWdB of th: NRC NRC Policy Stctcacnt EDICER?5DW6F6)T2-)IiUiD:.

LCO To satisfy accidcat analysis assumptions, the CST must contain sufficient cooling water to remove decay heat for 06DERt15UP3 following a reactor trip from 102% RTP, and then to cool down the RCS to RHR entry conditicas, assuming a coincident loss of offsite power and the most adverse single failure. In doirrg this, it must rctcinnufficient watcr to casurc adcquatc nct pcsitivc suctica hcoc for th; AIJ pumps during cocido,in, as ,,cil es account for any losscs from th; stcam drivcn AP' pump tcrbinc.

cr bcforc isoisting AFJ tc ; brckcn linc.-

The teautrea CST 4evet contanteawater.svomme rcquircd sh6['.

cq.nvelcat to a usabic volum of 2 (281J00 gal _lons which is Q 3l),G -l q.)

based on holding th: unit in l00: 0 for i hours. folicwcd by a cooldown to RHP entry conditions bumngentat90natmacKoutfevents et "~/ hour This basis is established in Reference El 4-end cfIds thc volumc rcquired by th: accidcat enalysis.

The OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank 4evet containedewaterzvo.lume at or above the minimum required MJume3 1c,;l -

APPLICABILITY In HODES 1, 2. and 3. and in 100: 4. ,,hcn stcar gcncretor is bcing rclicd upon for hcct rca,svol. the CST is required to be OPERABLE. -

In H00ES'M74 or 5. the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the CST 4 eve + E5ntaihedWitTrN51Eid is not within limits, the OPERABILITY of the backup y supply should be verified by E

administrative means within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter. OPERABILITY of the backup fccdscter M supply must (continued)

MAPX-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 44 5/15/97

_ -_ _ . __m _ _ __- . _ _ ._ -_ _ _ .,

CCW System .

B 3.7.7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 1

B 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System BASES l BACKGROUND The CCW System provides a heat sink for the removal of process !

and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, the CCW System also provides this function for various nonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCW

! System serves as a barrier to the release of racioactive i byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the

! psentTM Service Water System, and thus to the environment.

A tw icet M CCW System is arranged as two independent, full capacity cooling loops, and has isolatable nonsafety related components. Each safety related train includes E e full p~ capacity pQ surge tank, heat exchanger, piping, valves, and g instrumentation. Each safety related train is powered from a y separate bus. An-epen Fe'5tEl e surge tank in the systcm picvidc

_./ g g _.[ pump trip pictc:tivc eacnsjoop functions to ensure that sufficient net positive suction head is available bndEM a ccommodate5vo.i umetWiMha nges gaueRto5t rie rma sr,a n s3 entsio r.

Reakage. The 0,,5 pump in each train is automatically started on receipt of a safety injection signal, and all nonessential components are isolated.

Additional information on the design and operation of the system, along with a list of the components served, is presented in the FSAR, Section R G'2 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the CCW System is the removal of decay heat from the l reactor via the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This may be during a normal or post accident cooldown and shutdown. {

I i

APPLICABLE The design basis of the CCW System is for one CCW train to remove SAFETY ANALYSES the pest gi,tifromg.?mponentriimoo~rta5titor m TtiliitingMM consequercesFoTsa loss of coolant accident (LOCA) 5FMnurifiNtEE6

)TMs~ break'E(MSCBT" hcet load fica th; contcir::nt sump during the eccirculction pha:c. with c M maximum CCW temperature of p~ost E0CA7is' 1311F (Ref. 2) . Thc Cacrgcncy Corc Cccling Systc: (CCCS)

LOCA and ccnteiracnt CIC?.ADILI"i LOCA cach ocdcl thc Icximum end

) minimum pcrforacn:c of the CCW Systc , rc pcctivcly. Thc ncrmet W

l (continued)

W&UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 47 5/15/97

1 I

SWS E 3 B 3.7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l

B 3.7.8 EsTEHtT87 Service Water KESW)i SysterfSWSt l

BASES BACKGROUND The SW9 HSwisysIedi provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during :

a Design Basis. Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, and a normal shutdown, the SWS ngsyAg also provides this function for various safety related and nonsafety j related components bndItecetvesYc5oTHEtWT6M652thenonlTGt'V

~ l he'.l at'same r.virce5Wa ter5bys ti!Hi. The safety related function is covered by this LCO. i The SW9 edwysysreHi consists of two separate,100% capacity, safety related, cooling water trains. Each train consists of two ametracleaningEyctramermpteinoextanNDne 100t capacity pumpt, cnc compcacnt cccling watcr (CCW) hcat cxchangcr, piping, 3 valving, M instrumentation, and twc cyclenc scparators.- The 4

pumps and valves are remote and manually aligned, except in the unlikely event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The pumps eNncd tc thc critical locps are automatically started upon receipt of a safety injection signal, ilowmuttTonupnessutetto'Etg a ux11tinmysreedwa te r,2p,u,LmpsNo rMo s s 4075:0 U.fitesowers.ugupon.

neceiptWiffoneyorMhesessTenliTEM and all pie 78Utomafd23irM O 'g )

irctua_ted essential valves are aligned to their post accident positions asarequirec. The SW9 ESW595YU5i also provides p6Q Qackupyply to the Auxiliary Feecwater System) emergency ~

Additional information about the design and operation of the SWS EdwAsystem, along with a list of the components served, is presented in the FSAR, Section 9M152 (Ref.1). The principal safety related function of the SWE ES'n"I5?fte5 is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the CCW System !! Tid;;removaligol E6Ht~a i nme nt"hR i o a d s avMYt he!co nta tnme ntE65HFE'.

APPLICASLE The design basis of the SWS ESWTsyslteri is for one SWS ESW train.

SAFETY ANALYSES in conjunction with the CCW System and a 100t capacity containment cooling system, to remove 8ccTdEiitWeREF8tEd7and core decay heat following a design basis LOCA as discussed in the FSAR. Section 6] (Ref. 2). This prevents the containment sump (continued)

MAPJ( UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.7-52 5/15/97

6WS E B 3.7.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE 2L_1,7.8.2. (continued)

REQUIREMENTS toww.wouctle_nnressurewsnam1gn DrrJerenuosynessars The 5& EbdWysG is a r.orssrt opersti-ag EKd.necmency: :ysta that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal testing. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under dministrative controls. The IB month Frequency is based on b 55- 57 %

n tp rfo th s SurveiT aiic un rt -c W is t.at y CA 3.7-#4 riry) a uni out ge dt ent' 1 f r an np1 nn tra s nt

_f heurv 'lla ce _ re_ rf _ _ _ yit the ea ra po7 r Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the g month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. S

$ 6S N P pvN

[ow AF SR 3.7.8.3 CA 3S004 0 g e. ,

This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the M t:5wgsysIem '

pumps on an' actual or simulated actuation signal. Bil!@E iFctUlitWn?.s1gna-is:ancludenumroww.wauctionwPsessutetsanastoss dgR5Wi!E The SWE ESW5 system is a r,er;elly egret' g M.

emee.gency system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal I testi during normal _ operation. The E month Frequency is based ,

gg%

g5 o

_ p@fgtm/tifiWSurveillancef under tne conditions ,

tha app y during a unit o andQ potential for an .u pe<fnq unplanned transient if th jdlr eillance Iwere performed with the CA 3.9- 0o 4 CA 3.7-004 reactor at power. Operat1n experience 1has shown that these 3 /1.6 -l components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the IB month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. ,

.1w s (.A 3.7-24 REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section wmtssentlaispery1cewiteraystem;

2. FSAR, Section bxcLcritainmedtaystems:

3. FSAR, Section 574U"NsTdQ112 Heat"REiioTdl:EWtW MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 57 5/15/97

l 1

CA 3.7-004 INSERT 58-57a engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating j experience.

l l

i l

1 l

1

UHS .

B 3.7.9

)

BASES ADPLICABLE m3-epeM4ng limits crc bascd on,.'onsenot4ve-+eet-trensfc.~

SAFETY ANALYSES analyscs for thc worst casc LOCA. Rcfcccccc 1 providc: the (continued) & tail: cf th: casumption; uscd in the analysis, which ircludc wcrat cxpcctcd actccccicgical conditions, conscrvativc unccrtaintics when calculating dcc;y hcat, and worst casc singic activc failurc (c.g., singic failurc cf a manmedc structurc).

Thc U l is dcsigacd in accordancc with Rcgulatory Ouidc 1.27 (Rcf. 2), which rcquircs a 30 day supply of cccling watcr in the UHS-l u neiutims?,s3edKt'5Td TIUMtuttelma x1 mumine amadsnimear n M5irdaTdTPJTain tYPSAMC5 ectio np52.F. 5DhM eso to v.1U1nguaE0EWaIe d t empenatu teni es s n ha nto rmequ e st,pgp5hFsertnsma s s umecstliitTtM DefRinibia sma c c.1dsiitmoccu tszatit uesta mes:rn at'Etammorrm a vRre 15ereonoitRIETIR5b6fidttT6fisW5i2towermpenIotmanceID T eyaw--.nP%U85 ponantemperat'0rsemeach'sasundeniEEhesezconcItaonsususm5is Themn1mmcmmnegameusevemsstezczireerwiromsttfeN554tomromtM QRdge$smacceseetJmes11esssfh'57324Eaeteneerssyneea6dBbEbU5%iUe Q lit 3DEday2suppjNKoJScoo1DDgEancNmaKeupDiateQRDosIEUUAsunderi l j paxamumzevaporatson7cona41onzTonct'hisuperaoc minemotwoond Rete rsvoinmernema e 1 ni fiMTtt'EP,430168YsYsW4ega cteziceTM Us ea blMJ o n fo TAthisAvol umensr;.Lz'f4Ka c r;e3Teet53wrt1 cnXts3tlis volumezo.tsEt'HiWib5 verhermim mumm e ve isneec 6metBW53 fit'83hDM RPSharord.tbe25WmumpsArzneXnema am ngtvolumegpcoya nestaImang,1n tMtzisggteaterXtliE6725%f6TithEE5tTIElWEtetsvoj DmTPEEThBILYSETiY BnaziyzedE67lll tliEZdes3DnlibTsTjIEDOAZinIaccoridEficeWitli1NRC Regula t"6ifyEGUrd 6W~27K(R ETPE2'M The VHS satisfies Criterion 3 of th; !!RC !;RC Policy Statcmcat 10ICFRrbuy.sem cE'M.

LCO The UHS is required to be OPERABLE and is considered OPEPXLE if it contains a sufficient volume of water at or below the maximum temperature that would allow the SWSS [Sg5t'EB to operate for at j least 30 days following the design basis LOCA without the loss of I

net positive suction head (NPSH). and without exceeding the maximum._oj.gqqn temperature of the equipment served by the 545 EEI sTstrnii &js To meet this condition, the UHS temperature

g should not exceed @0lF and the level should not fall below W25 fe~et?ff5m3h's"t5tt35iT6f.sthWURSMB31T25MtW.anXseaEleve# during g 3,7,G-l normal unit operation.

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 60 5/15/97

l

UHS l

i s B 3.7.9 I

BASES LC0 FiWirda M5nRtFotDHSicoo_la ngYtowe rpt r1a1 n s weremsroe rgtry:tuga ra (continued) beaumedRt'oTdmTDTtMthGYh~eTtE571tTHiirdXfEftWe'ESWIs7stTmW PAopetaDIEEUHSE661TnigtowerRe1EtTECa]EcomssuppMRf[rllfffBTRiet3 l D510HSrcii511ingit'oNi2!t~rliMin6KrheWWe10HShf5Eii5t

! D roperatuatFffaTURSYsT5DIliEHtermsm i nooer.aommuniessmi tu j LormatenmDNc73EthEFe~tW6EfMEEb'fittiemmoons i

l APPLICABILIT( In H0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4 the UHS is required to support the OPERABILITY of the cquipacnt ;crviccd by th; U!!S ownsysteili and l required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

i in "00: S or C, th; OPEPA"ILITI rcquircmcats of th: UilS crc dctccmincd- by thc syctcm2 it suppcrts.

l ACTIONS M (%Ni Q 3,7 Cr -l l If one cr accc cooling towere LtT#iFi havc cac fan inoperable (i.c. , up tc cac fan pcr ccoling towcr :nopcrcbic), action must be tuken to restere the inoperable cooling tower tr1ain 4nfe to OPERABLE status within 7 dc;; E22 hour;s, The Hey 72Eho_un Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of an accident occurring during the Heye E23houts that one cooling tower h tr,ajn is inoperable (in cnc cr more I ccoling tcwcrs), the number of available systems, and the time l required to reasonably complete the Required Action.

B.1 and B.2

~

flf the cooling tower traj,n & cannot be restored to OPERABLE i

status within the associated Completion Time, ori if the UHS is l inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, the unit must be placed in a HODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least H0DE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in H00E 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

l l The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

HARK-UP 0F NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.7 61 5/15/97 l

_ - _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ __ ._ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

i l

UHS .

B 3.7.9 BASES (continued) __ _

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ( 3.7.9.1 W' Q 3.7 G -I This SR verifies that ade7uate long term (30 day) cooling can be maintained. The specified level also ensures that sufficient NPSH is available to operate the SWS ESWE!PEGiii pumps. The f24} hour Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES.

This SR verifies that the UHS water level is a 53I25KeitTrr7.oj tliaItTolT5 hit 5fMeIDRaormuN25 ft liie~ERFE3E@TeJ.

l SR 5

3.7 0.2 kg)kr o sa.G -l This SR verifies that the SWS E is available to cool the GGW

@! System to at least its maximum design temperature with the maximum accident or normal design heat loads for 30 days following a Design Basis Accident. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is based on operating experience related to trending of the parameter variations during the applicable MODES. This SR verifies that the average water temperature of the UHS is a egg. )

SR 3.7.9.3 % gC)/ Q 3.7.C-l Operating each cooling tower fan 5fittiotTiYtDemawncmoWr.speeos for 2 g3, minutes ensures that all fans are OPERABLE and that all l associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures l that fan or motor failure, or cx:c;siec vibration, can be

! detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency is based on operating experience the known reliability of the fan units, the redundancy available, and the low prcbability of significant degradation of the UKS cooling tower fans occurring between surveillances.

Sn ?' 1 Thi 5'1 ccrific thet cc:h cccling to-cr fen stcrt; and operetc5 cn an cctuel cr simulatcd cctuction sigaci. Thc [10] month Ircqucacy is ccasistcnt with thc typicci rcfucling cycic.

Opcreting cxpcrica:c hc; shasa thet thcsc :ccpcncnts c;ucily peas j (continued) l l HARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 62 5/15/97 l

l t _, _

l C C TCS C_RA_CS .

B 3.7.11

) B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS g i 4

B 'CREATCS'r 3.7.11 Control ICRAGST Room Emcrgcacy Air [6n7dit' ion 1ng Tcmpcreturc Ccatrol System g,$

p a sa.c-I BASES BACKGROUND The CREATCO CRACS provides temperature control fod the control room following isciaticn of th; satrci rocs. o The CREATCS C.JA.CS consists of two independen and redundant trains that provide cooling and hcating o - irculated control room air. Each train consists of gp_r_eL12tgasecticontFn~ed i

fef'rnge tati ontsystem s usj ng gessenfili iss er#;rcewaterzaszaghest sTii@%2t eorgfiIgT1Mf3'nPl! hecti.ng coils, cscling coils.

instrumentation, and controls to provide for control room temperature control. The CREATCS CRACS is a subsystem rdEtie GREVMucestri1_D_e_avanFccDis/s103 providing air temperature control

! for the control room.

, The CREATCS CRACS is an emergency system, pertM which may also

]* operate [ during normal unit opert.tions. A single train will provide the required temperature contro'l to maintain the control room betwcca [70 'I{ } and [C::"I{ '} MF. The CREATCS CRACS operation in maintaining the control room temperature is discussed in the FSAR. Section 99TT (Ref.1).

m APPLICABLE The design basis of the CREATCS @EA is to maintain the control SAFETY ANALYSES room temperature for 30 days of continuous occupancy. # .Q)}i 5

Q 3.'1.G ~l The CREATCS CRACS components are arranged in redundant. safety related trains. During norm 5ltor emergency operation the CPIATCS CRACS maintains the temperature bctwc:n [70]'. und [003'I Ers'F. A single active failure of a component of the CTIATCS CRACS. with a loss of offsite power does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function. Redundant detectors and controls are provided for control room temperature control. The CRI.ATCO CRACS is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The CIIATCS CRACS is capable of

! removing sensible and latent heat loads from the control room.

which include consideration of equipment hea loads and personnel occupancy requirements, to ensure equipment OPERABILITf.

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7-73 5/15/97

--l l

l

[JL!d.pgencynxnausunysIe3 FBACS s B 3.7.13 l

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ,\

B 3.7.13 ruci Duilding Air Cicanup Syst: 2 (ICACSF gmergeacymnaustedystem (EES) @*

I BASE.S BACKGROUND s nenme rtaeocytitxMBEtabystemmser.vesToot3BtT6TRDTl@WRbum amp b ncythenceJ 3bTillHma w r.o_Di owing massa terymt03em ungnrgna Ji nt:o.m a te tynela t edr ampe r.smsoj a t'ElEthemauxnin rysu11di rfd1!!87Fd theatme ccenc yaexna u s tays temrexnau s t s".Iti5t e drilibyrco n ta mliialW mauuenormicaRWelfRHlIECGSERTdp1 The FBACS tmem T gf; ERh'aTritt!SyftlBiW13olcan filter airborne radioactive particulates ,

from the area of the fuel pool fellowing a fuel handling !

accident. cr icss cf ccciant accidcat (LCCA). 2; TCACS in ecnjunctien-mirether-nerec-Hy-eperati.Wem. also providc; !

envircc catal centrol cf tcmpcroturc and humidity in th fuci l poci arca. '

The FBACS p,me_rgencyatxnaustES7ftem me i consists of two independent and redundant trains. Each train consists of a heater, a prefilter cr dcmistcr. a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)

T-filter ba6E. an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity (principally iodines), and a fan. Ductwork. I valvcs or dampers, and instrumentation also form part of the system cs wcil as-dcmistcrs functicning to r:ducc thc rciativc ;

i umidity of th; airstream. A second bank of HEPA filters follows the adsorber section to collect carbon fines. and prcvidc backup in ca;c the main :::PA filtcr bank fails. 7c dcwnstrc:a ll EPA filtcr is not creditcd in thc analysis but scrvcs to cclicct !

charccal fincs, and tc back up thc upstrces !!:PA filtcr should it dcycicp a ic;k. Ec systcm initiatcs filtcccd vcatilatica of thc fuci handling building fcilcwing rcccipt -cf a high radiation ehw.+- _

Iheitme r ge ncystxnEftiS?it em rtso n tsta nd5EEfp raa rrautM5tTcEt3TJ 76]DWihgrr.ece T ptToTai:fUslE$tTfDi ngae ntT9%tEDXi s5TitT57iSJiYn3I TEBVISTEaraa zsa fftyMiEEtTddWigna mSI5hnitTitif onnofltTe STSWid eWffdpe ca tT6FF? tike s;p rec edenceio ve rla nyJo thlRCti5'dET5T, 0.ye' rst4Nr.%".

2 IhlthuISISWi606MhM@itMil1~s78135edWoTeihatTst*thd l aWTTi af7AbifiTdfrig%h'e71 nYt rUhie7itr'5hWss5cTEt'e'dWith EctIIstT6Ti75'fath~e75ISym5de7ffiTriEia1Y6h71s7ddr~d5Y6dTn7EC033 3Y25 ESFAS?IRYtrD5isiititic~nm Thc FDACS u a standbj systcm, parts of which-tcy also bc eperetcd during crmal plank cperet-tent- Upon receipt of the

)

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 77 5/15/97

-- - . . _. . .- . .- -- = - . - .

r

[Ete_r,gencyrt.xnaHEt2:Sy5fEg FBAC-&- -

B 3.7.13

/

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS of the equipment and the two train redundancy available. ' hMR

[

EaTibelisitHf.iEd WithtthEIEESRTnnheMIST6i2F3VISET4 ne:0pId0iiiNi

%Eftiinat SR 3.7.13.2 M

This SR verifies that the required FBAGG tmerigencymnaust'5STYtM l ff.ltTd testing is performed in accordance with the MEiit'!3TtTdu ERter~5TEYtT5#PtogramRVFTP7. The Emergency 2txnT[FstETitM filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 -

(Ref. G Z). The E includhs testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (gencr:1 u;; and fclic.iin; spccific cpcrations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in det' ail in the M.

SR 3.7 pbMi G 3.7. G - l W

This SR verifies that each FBAGS Emengencyst.XhRstES91tM train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal [.

irhes esa ctua t1 on esi gna l sti nc-l uceralsa fstyst na ecta o ngsigna l, ka ppRcabTeW57HODEE18E2?ES ra na m3E5d ?Sp- ente 0el2R5546a s eous R a d i o a'dtivJtyg@531EEplilfsbTFfd[FrA n_gano vementToTm nna diTtEd TUET!"dFri5theff0ElfbuiTdiEH),Y The [p month Frequency is consistent with t'hE@ifilnoperatiHgYcyc:lera0peratanagexperJencernasanown thTt7the5 eTc5mponent575siTalb4 p a s st.thMSunve ntita ncewien' pE rTo rmedKit'TtWeEBT55Mthnteque ncyei nene To reEXth'E2F,ne_que ncyils acceptable 3fromva*rel';il6iliit'VZ5tT5dplo iitT; Rcfcccn;; C.

DDifiEg geme rge_qc,ylopie rdtTd55EtliEEmergen cymt1TOYtTS5TtWTN E01oma tic a 11M5t'5 r;trin $el thTr)lithT5SI 510 ratt$V.ISEUi DeupideWiid ffiH RthEEfhTtTaYing3sig5ElMEIhlthTeS1Sneup sheTraTsgonetatE Ri_th'Td a mpe r_sfa'1Td6EdItIDExh a ust"M5iiiTthe/ Aux 1 rl a rdtBDHiIi ng Ia nd freVEhtIDiiTJi t EFEd MElk a gemu rilth67B VIS@ neu_p32WhTchTs.

5 Niti_itE'd'idnT515pentV5ElEPo51KG 65eoT5'FRidi33 ctWitFAsM,1 gh j

S snamtWe7fshsT6pefitEWithT.th~eTdsmper.staJTdHEdItoTeFhliist"ifr6Tn e

theTFUET8HiTdihg i;tbVr e v e ntTuWf.iltYrsd Pl e ak'5 ge e7CNoTm31TExhTUs t 8'iiTWoiiGth'eTFOel CBHil d f5_gTdW55htiliObil51;yemonTfofr,e_g]bJJId TEt'i 66 d6te?t5cs%g05e~TdEte~dtornoutBUt GTiTl?E0tomatifa'llM3TisnTthi i

l (continued)

MARreUP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7-82 5/15/97

1 l

l l

l Spent Fuel Assectly Storage -

B 3.7.17

)

B 3.7 PLNfT SYSTEMS l B 3.7.17 S pent Fuel Assembly Storage g J J.h o3,7 C-l l BA3ES 1

l BACKGROUND In the Maximum Density Rack (HDR) [(Rcf;.1 and 2)] design, the spent fuel stcragc pool is divided into two separate and distinct regions which, for the purpose of criticality considerations, are l considered as separate pools MBUff):. Ksglon m . with ,

{+36i m)D)mumROM0g storage positions, is designed to l accommodate new fuel with a maximun enrichment of E4-65i M wt!

U 235 FiltPfi63urnableracsormenssoraupcomezustIEU35Britti anteccalTabsorbent, or spcnt fuel rc;cidics; cf the discharge fuel burnup. Reg.1onR2, with fe6M} E storage positions, is designed to accommodate fuel of varicus DDE2X5ENtTEUEE's initial enrichments which have accumulated minimum burnups within the acceptable domain according to Figure 3.7.171, in the accompanying LCO, Fuel assemblies not meeting the criteria of Figure RYP'I72 shall be stored in accordance with n

paragraph 4.3.1.1 in Section 4.3, Fuel Storage, The water in the spent fuel stcragc pool normally contains soluble boron, which results in large subcriticality margins under actual operating conditions. However, the NRC guidelines, based upon the accident condition in which all soluble poison is assumed to have been lost, specify that the limiting k,,f of 0.95 l be evaluated in the absence of soluble boron. Hence, the design of both regions is based on the use of unborated water, which j maintains each region in a subcritical condition during normal l operation with the regions fully loaded. The double contingency )

principle discussed in ANSI N 16.11975 and the April 1978 NRC letter (Ref. S 2) allows credit for soluble boron under other abnormal or accident conditions. since only a single accident need be considered at one time. For example, the most severe accident scenario is associated with the movement of fuel from REWi'6KE"EtBEgM. and accidental misloading of a fuel l

assembly in Ee,g]on;2 This cculd potenticily incrce:c the l criticclity cf [Rcgica 2]. To mitigate these postulated criticality related accidents. 20_00gppagorisoIIibTe' baron is norma 1R dissolved in the pool water. Safe operation of the MDR with no movement of assemblies may therefore be achieved by controlling the location of each assembly in accordance with the accompanying LCO. Pricr tc movcnnt cf en eseeely, it is

. nccc;scry tc pcrfcr-- CR 3.7.10.h-

}

(continued)

HARK.UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 89 5/15/97

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1, LCO Statement ITS 3.7.1, LCO Statement DOC 01-01-A CTS 3.7.1.1 LCO requires the MSSVs operable per Table 3.7-2. The STS 3.7.1 requires the MSSVs Operable as specified in Teh'e 3.7.1-1 and Table 3.71-2. The ITS 3.7.1 states the MSSVs are Operable but deletes the phrase "as specified in Table 3.7.1-1 and l Table 3.7.1-2".

l Comment: DOC 01-01-A states this is consistent with the NUREG-1431. This is not the case. Revise the submittal to retain the STS format which is an administrative reformatting change of the CTS requirement.

FLOG RESPONSE: I DOC 1-01-A was used to revise the CTS LCO based on NUREG-1431 as modified by TSTF-235. See Comment Number O 3.7.'-4 concerning TSTF-235.

To address the administrative reformatting discussion in the comment, the FLOG discussed in the transmittal letter and the " Methodology For Mark-Up of Current TS"in the back of Enclosure 2, the CTS has been marked up to reflect the substance of NUREG-1431, Revision 1. In general, only technical changes have been identified.

However, some non-technical changes have also been included when the changes cannot easily be determined to be non-technical by a reviewer, or if an explanation is required to demonstrate that the change is non-technical. DOC 1-13-A was created and added to the top of the page for each CTS Section 3.7 Specification. DOC 1-13-A states:

"All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technica: Specifications, NUREG-1431. During the development certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted. l As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process, no technical changes (either actual or interpretational) to the TS were made unless they were identified and justified. This justification is used in those instances where, for improved clarity, the CTS was ;

reformatted to conform to the ITS."

~

ATTACHED PAGES: -

Enc!. 2 7-1, 7-4, 7-6, 7-7, 7- 9, 7.-9a, 7-9 b, 7- 11, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-17, 7-16a Encl. 3A 3 Encl. 38 2

~

dl ]

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

,~ 3/4.7.1 TURBINECYCLJ I A Q '3.9,I-l SAFETY VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam o g. ot. A generator shall be OPERABLE witn s lif t settings as spe;ified ia 72h .7 ;.-

' i APPLICA8ILITY: M00ES 1, 2, and 3.

'A "E on- 01-L51, MSS @

ACTION: M (.cm b h E O tIS * +. Loo

,r. With four reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in ,

1 or more main steam line Code safety valves

[3.'7.q l- Y coeration ands'<ith inoceracle.3 operation in M00ES 1, 2, and 3 may proceed proviced, that og,gqas.3 i

rwithin status4;rnours, either th: :-cr theMcutr:n hng: inoperaole ~M valve "igh is-i; restored 5 toci-t to OPERABLE i: ::u::t k-","',$g g

o* d moreg rg acr Tale :.--1: otherwise,SHlfiDCWN de in at least s0T STANDBY within within tM f:i i ct. "

ne curs, I

g}cyc j next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months anc in "O

t. h pr:<i:i:= ;c :;u!":as;n :.:.1 :r: = t :;;;icu a. la c -

ol-of-A J o s- e n-t.5 5 Q 3.7.l- 5 ,,

C. . Lsed b,r'JW SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS o 34.> -8 i

4. 7 .1.1 Me :ddi tic..1 a c';ui r;;;n* '. Other th;'; th::: r; uir:d by o t- c i - A

} : ped ti m ica 2.:. . n , a c.

'o s HssV 'ine p t,le. a A Mrc posh ak 9 powar .buf : a s n.l d .

o'- 9-us 3 Q '34,1- 4 1.s- 3 Q.. 00'd % or ene$ O inopub\e. 4 Hodsu k % valw F CDeWow+ (.HT l 3ero or ngoJia d oJL pear few1 redace.

1HERHAL POWER 4:o 6. [ 5 6 '71 ##]3 /o N *' b # 3 N

l CALLAWAY - UNIT T' V~ 4 7 ~

C t h "B R W *s%

$3v wa on -

N m_ swiou;ed w ow& is k66,% H M GR T

CTS 3.7.1.1 footnotes and inserts Insert A

- or cdu; T'.im..d Power +^ ' ' c Sr. r eq"'I en t_he A fr:H" u! ., cab!c- CN 01-04-LS3

- A RTI' #cified in Table 3.7-1 3 fc 'he n"-b of OPERpLE 'ISSW and hthe Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced 4 4ees g thr. c: ;q=1 *e +h A fr:! .= .ille's/2b!e '"; RT' :pec!Sd4n Table 3.7-1

'c- t nm .br of OPEPJ3LE '!SSW within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; gu Insert B NEW ggg 3 N,

c. With one or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs 01-06-M OPERABLE, be in at least "OT STi'?DI3'cwithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in "OT S"UCC"C ' within ic fc!!c& B ours.

'A MODE 4 Insert C 4.7.1.1@ Verify each required MSSV lift setpoint per Table 3.7-2 in 01-07-A accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing, lift setting shall be within +/- 1%.

Footnotes 4 A

@ Only required to be performed in MODES I and 2 01-05-M' 4 d I~6 I c i-o# -Es- 3

Q <e)uu d in MODE 1. 0 3,7,/ -S 1

1 1

PLANT SYSTEMS l AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM d ~

Q 3.'L l-l l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION k ns .

3. 7.1. 2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwaters;r;; b oM l ar.d anc ' ted #1:s p2-':- shall be OPERABLE aith.

Tnc ...v ta - d .o v e n w . '. . s .) Tcedoste. su...;; , ce;h capLic c i sc ...g ol- ol- LG wered from separate emergency busses, and

b. One stea.. rbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of beinc "

powered from 'h steam supply system loops, and l

~

c. Associated flowpaths i aach motor-driven auxliiary feedwater pumo consisting of suction . m the Condensate Storage Tank capable of automatically transie, ing to an OPERABLE Essential Service Water Supply and-discharge t

o steam generators, and

d. Associated flowpaths for the turbine-driven a -

iary feedwater pump consisting of suction from the Condensate Sto / Tank capable of automatically transferring to two separate :o BLE Essential Service Water supplies and discharging to four ste.

nerat: r:.

APPLICABILITY- MODES 1, 2, and 3. c. nu.-s op A ca- w A

->[ ACTION:

b 4.Tt C * .5 c. %d 3 um ex-os- m

a. With one auxiliary feedwater!;;;; inoperable3 restore the reouired ca - cH.C-auxiliary f eedwater'r,,w.;.s to OPEP.AELE status within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months sfor ce

""5 ~

in a- ieas- HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN 6 , .

within the following f.hnu" % 9-01 O !

37,5-1

b. ": ? .:n) ;;.rt : f P.: :::::::: - - w;;9 f: 2 :: ---dr'/ r **,.' '

a:; y '::du;t: pu ; i n:p: at':% P.: :: :ociat:d ;; ; P

y >. : p.y. g . _, u_ '. .. __ .> s#-~..- .

. A. . .~. ,. ...m. _., . .......__ .

' ; ; . ': . '. h : .

c. With one of the Essential Service Water flowpaths to the turbine-oriven auxiliarv feedwater cump inoperabie', restore the receirecj supoly flowcath's to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months /.or De in a- "- i*

ieast HOT STANCBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN wit.hin the following 4 hr e _ ep w-a 6 10 J :-

q 3. , -L

.u .x. _ - . . . . . . . ....>....:...>.,.....i-_-.3-

v. m. ._

[

f~^i:~_^ ;U~; #-'. : -2:10, : *. 0 " ' h0 F :: d :~ rib d ' 3- ~ C ' -:,,

. ". :

u r t i ',0 d < C r : _ .- ' . '., r) ~ ;; h+a'r e "~ ;u~-; :52 b d ^:I 2 ' I

,_. r....g'.

n o-

-w--,.

C t-- 19 -LG j *[]~ ,. ' ." _' .._ } { c: : ' E:~ ':: L:::-

B :: :. .nd :. ::r; ryr: ::::.: ': :: *. c ^ : e r ' :;-

I ..

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3p 7-4 Amencment No.55 i

REVISlay y _

' '^ 5' PLANT SYSTEMS s

- CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK O l -- B - A Q 3.7. I - I

' Ulfb,db'd.

% A MW F N

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

~

(4.t+S l

3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with a contained water volume of at least 281,000 gallons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,'2, and 3.

l

~- "

4 3,g,(,-Q ACTION:

O With the CST inoperable, either:

a. Restore the CST to.0PERABLE status r be in at least HOT STANDBY 43,1,6-4 ithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and inrHOT SHUTD.0WN sithin the following ~

A

, A f ours, or WT o -04 'T

b. 0;;;,n ,tr:.t:1the OPERABILITY of the . Essential Service Water 37.I-6, System as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps /and 3 -

ge4 Sw3 gh g restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least

p. '7. o.f 5 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUT 00WN within the mems HOT STANO =

followin hours.

>K /

3 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS ')

4. 7.1. 3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months J by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps. _1. , un - _

-. 7 .1. 3 . 2 M E SW Sy * -- t h:'. ' b; de. .e,as t. ete d 0. E AS LE t l ea s t ::: p r.r o'5-03.-'M 12 5:;r: b;- :- ' ';' ' ;; t' t tt 1. Ip i., . ; ' - p e r ! * ' a ukeaev ? th: EF q 3,ef, g 4 Syp *= te the <iipply ::ur:: <a- the zu.iite x j <ee @ e+e 7_ 7:_

l 1

I -

I 1

4" CALLAWAY - IINIT 1 3/4 7-6 i

. . - _ - . _ . - . . _ . . - . _ - - .. . .-.- . - . -.... _ . _ . - . . - _ . = - . . - . - - . - . . - . . . . . ~ . -

- \

9 REVjSt oy.

I A PLANT SYSTEMS.

Q ~$,71-l

SPECIFICAtlIViJY l -

LIMIT!i!G CONDITION' FOR OPERATI0t! _,

l 3.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall- be less than or equal to 0.1 microcurie / gram 00SE EQUIVALENT I-131.

AP'PLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,' 3, and 4.-

s ACTI_ON:

With the specific activity of the Secondary Coolant Sy[ tem greater than 0.1 ~

l microcurie / gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, be in at least. HOT STAND 8Y within l:

G hours and in CCLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

4 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS j

jeN0y*k '

ou-on- M

! 4.7.1.4 he specific activity of the Secondary coolant System -:h:1' be-det - ' n:d to be 'ithi- t.t: 'imit b; perfe m:r. : ef 'th: :::p1'ng and On:1y:i:

x-s3 g .w e c. per pr:gr : :f ~;bic * '1, b 6 c. to Sc,/p gese cou.watteT 5 \ da-f r. . 1 1

i i.

f 4

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-7 4 y y e., +

4 e - , - . - - . vi- - - e,--,4 - s.-.-

ISjoy PLANT SYSTEMS

~

HAIN' STEAM L!NE ISOLATION VALVES ol A l I

', G 3,1.l-1 o

LIM!T!NG COND*T!ON Foo 0.ERAi!0N - . . .

50 c 5-c4- A l 3.7.1.5 E-eehhain steam line isolation valve (MSLIV) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICAEILITY: . MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACT ION: ~

s MODE 1:

With one MSLIV inoperable but open,' POWER OPERATION may continue

_ p ovided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within

_.gy hours; otherwise be in eiOT :TA:00Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ead-+n 05-05 -N,

CT: :JJT00WN - u .. ^bc fci C r; 5 P

. o% g h 3,g,g l MODES 2 and 3: g fo o" 6 [M* % bo=6 ** 0'ed <\*h os-os-m

.V (.w e W 7 %s With one MSLIV inoperabl ,

sucsecuent operatien in MODE 2 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve is mi-* *M closecs O the rsi s e ,

be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUT 00WN within G 3,7.2-I the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

oc e. e. ew % b - M ~ w, u .ge % A note :/.c $ y ' 9/ l- o -% -

4:

s' C ..ge ' ic w' so a<e c.w ;4L g, w aa P' < e ea aa La ' vo 3 wt ' im L , aW

<' b ' Go we. o.er ,.

'bG _d Quea% L ~~ -

a s, ~

SURVEILLANC~ RE0VIREMTNTS 4.7.!.5 Each MSLIV shall be demonstrated OPERAS! E by verifying full closure within 5 secones when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. Tne provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not apolicaole for entry into NCE 3.

mW A .ie.s b k ge\cbenges1 6 en u OS-cW (ged) VeeCy e.a.J o c.ba \ c><

% .\a.L.d ce b< b s p \ o.A \ cost o ,e ger

\ B ~Mt. N ycomweg be,b e.k% 4 0.4 W M 4[ic.olole O Q wb mobE. L 1

1 b~ c 'r'L.- ^5 W - c 5- c3-t S i b N b epet.h C Jb C'vy u. e,'\eae d l g CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-9

i PLANT SYSTEg jlf_A

~

MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

% o7-On- A j 3.7.1.5 Etreh(main t eedwater isolation valve (MFIV1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: HODES 1, 2, and 3.

'~*'

ACTION: (.5cearA Codik Cnk f w anoced D eack *\* D cv n.<e "00:5 1 cad 2. With one FIVs inoperable but cpen, operation may c6ntinue ' %.iS2 , 3 provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERASLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months otherDise_bp in HOT 9TANDBY within the next o7-tut 54 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,o Q'Mc * 'd de4 "N h des =a me ter 7 4= t s)cn-u-w 4

MCT: .

'li:'. enc ""IV iacperebic, cb;cquent operctier Mcdc 2 ny 7 - A proceed provide' the isc'2t 4nn ""^ it ~2intain^d c'c'cd.

Ctherwisc,bein_HOTSHUTDOWNwiththenext6hou@

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.7.1.6 Each MFIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure The provisions

)within5secondswhentestedpursuanttoSpecification4.0.5.of specificatio ,

f .

l l

pd Ve k tad- 4W Aks b N W\=b psyhre. ,

l on an se.b \ o<- A h L J i c_4 \e u k % oG 08~ M pc \b As. A g<=ncat. es boCb ca h cb C

4. 0 4 Q"- d oph=Me h-c.~h w4o mohE 3 . l i

l l

.y">

w Amendment No. 16 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-9a

e 4

t_

( UG1'I p., r.ni

.. - e. v. 3i. - - e._

4 STEAM GENERATOR ATHOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES c 1-.13 - A Q 3.9.I-l .

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

\- cu o3-6 3.7.1.7 At leas: threesteamgeneratoratmospnericsteamdumph,'ys ":: (A50's) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICA5ILITY_: Modes 1, I and'3.

m. i . O Ni . .

b=s cv eMSA5

'*8~^

a$. With one cf the recuired A505 incperable.Lc :: ::. . : :: :: .. - 0"' #'

.: :;;::: . . : .::: 1:'.c::, within 7' days res:cre :ne ASO :: "

~ *~0 e# ~

OPERABLE status, or be in HOT STANDSY wi:nin 6 hcurs and in # 0 3"~

HOT SHUTCOWN wi:nin ne folicwing # " "-s.

\;*.s c'~ *3 ~ '*

b. With more than ene of the recuired ASDdinoperable C: ::

cc. cn.Ls4

..,s,.,,; . , w1.hi n

.....;..w.

. Z., hours i res:cre at least two of :ne recuired A505' to OPERABLE status O

or be in HOT STANDBY wi nin the nex- 6 neurs and in HOT SHUT 00WN:.soms35 wi-hin .ne f olicwingJ,peurs. uns i

...s. . . . . . ,

< .- ec.ci.LS ::

...... ... . .... ....y., ... .. ..... . . .

_m u. . ,. .. e .-

e.,

. , . . . . . .. 2. 1. g, i

--....v ..a :.

. un- :..:. :. .... .. . . . =-......,~.:,,

.. .. ., e. u. . .. ..

The previsiens of Specifica: ion 3.0.4 are no acplicable. C L- cS- K

$+

~

SURV . N. . '..A NC :. ' x. e n U 't ". ..M.~ . . .N i 3 4 7.1.7 No acci icnal recuirements 0:ner than ncse receirec ty . . . .

ine crevisions of s,pect:1ca:1on ,.0. , are nc:

spec 1:1ca:1on ,.v,.:. '

applicacie for en ry into Mcce 3. .

pew) Ye<.Qy ese e \ & w oe of etcL. Asb mee\NkbvA A in c.cc a am e., : t A(. E r s e m. .i =.x: .

.s 3 t' cop 3/4 7-9b Amendmen: Nc . E , 5 9 CALLAWAY - UNIT l

/

, PLANT SYSTEMS

.3/4. 7. 3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM O I-I3 - A Q 3,9 l-I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

'.7.3 s At least two independent. component cooling water loops shall be OPERASLE.

APDLICA8ILITY: H00E5 1, 2, 3, and 4

~

ACTION: -4 N W'd=ALD 06-CA~

s .

Vith only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, resto e at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOW within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4 7.3 At least two cocponent cooling water loops shall be demonstrated o 3'9.0-15 OP ERASLE: 09-08-A) a.

e . At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, orp-o4-A j, power-operated, or autc=atic)eervicing saf ety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured a-in oosition is i_n u.uu-, o g-o i-tfr

- . - - . . - . _ -.n.-...u.,

. . . u.1 o_r ec. .c o s 1.,.1 o n .J . o_ m ..:_ = . ~_,_,,

t ,o .. . ,

iE:7 :f it :urg: :: * ? cue? :nd ev 'astrumer127ier ch ; ru'te w*m it': i r r ':ti r n e ' the-r.c a-aucl e - r afe ty e12* ed p r c':- c' he .

y:ta ;n:11 b perf ,cd : 1:::t onc per 21 d y:;

y[g 3,9,'J.y l 2

b. At least once per 18 months du 3 ; : h u t d eu . , by verifying that: o g-o 3-LG

. m c B-oS- A l

1) Each automatic valveb+ red G< icing n fety ;1 t d ;;u.pr nt w g-cs-A isc iet'a; .hc n;n nutic r :af ny r:1:1:d pertier O' th: : :: q 08-o9-6r actuates to its correct position er : 5:f e t; nj:ction anc er :

i=u!:::d--Hign -' u nd Leu Surg: Tank L:vci 1: 0 t-emet uign n andog-cr. -11.

2)k Each OPERABLE Cc=cenent Cooling Vater System pump starts auto- os-to- A l matically,cn . hf:t,. ~ .j n ion c.nc .::: f 'Nec tcn s igac i o g-a re,s.

urwae

d. ^2 1:::t en:: ;;=. '.3 ce n th s cu ri ng thu'Ar . by 00-f0 % : CWH E '. c S-ot-tri C.". : 3 R ' : 0 N o f t+e--wg : .ank 1:v 1 a nd - " ' a :t u!:e n ta t i e n ~~ i:4 pr ~ic: :u. centi: ;;;1 n i on o f the nor nud ea r :s f:*y r:' ned p -*.' en e ' r e ry: w. ,

+- u at:: ::c 15-=: nth ' c; :nvey be _:: <ed ':r y:4e. : previced t w wm ' ' ' :ac e i: per' se: ;ri:r te :: t a r- ' 'icui ng a 'i :t :fu !ing w ta9e er June 1, 19sE, _-ni n:ver :=ur: 'i ~ t. 'h p es':{cn: :f e r m rese: ' r:. perfe sance of tri: s urv+

;nc e

GP:C i 'i -a t i on " . C .

CALLAVAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-11 Amenc ent No. 8

'1 !

PLANT SYSTEMS ,

l 3/4.7.a ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 0 l A Q 3e'),l-l 1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.7.4 At least two independent essential service water (ESW) loops shall be l OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1, 2, 3, and 4 )

i ACTICH: C N M S' D ,

09.co- A f With cnly one ESW loop OPERABLE 7 resters et least'two ESW loops to OPERABLE !

status within 72 hcurs or be in at least HOT STANDEY' within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the folloWing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS G '3. 7. 8-I E 4.7.4 At least two ESW loops shall be ownst-ated OPERABLE: 0?*O6 A Qn L % pC 0 8-o'1h L a .g At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valvel(manual, .. ,

power-cperatad, or automatic) servicing safe *y-related equipment l

that is not locked, sealed, or other aise secured in position, is in _ - -

its cerre,- eesition /In &ccitica, c .1;;. t :nct per :1 d:y:, an c t/_ y4 I

. u . i r ,.

m .m.. . -.

..u.m.u mo , ,

n-e-.-

m .w... ogg.. ..-. _,

e, .-m.- o.,,.__._._...3 e . .. __,.,..__

cm. . . . . . . . . . q .5.'/,6-l) l i

=ent:tien fer automatic itchtien cf the-ESW te the air c- re:::re g S.g-f,5J '

e d ' b e p : M Od - e f; Cre e nent'ye) C h ~?.~I~ N ,

, b. At least once per 18 months duH ac :hutdcen, by verifying that: 4 - '., '. C. -

L@3.] c8..o5- A

1) Each automa*ic valves erncing ::.f tty- : lated equip ert er o _o g -LG

. ++clating the n;n nuclear ::ftty ci:~.cd pertion c' th: :y: tem a .3.7. B-12 -

actuates to its c:rrect position cc . L::: of-P;-tr- cr -Saf ety-Inje:^icn tc t ignel-end- on a isubte: High Ci'f:r:ntic.i -

5 #

M u urc 1::t cigr.:!; a -

w 4. /-F A 2)k Each ESV System pump starts aute=atically[:n : Sa '; t-, :.j;ni:n, ot to I

. , . _ _ _ _ . . - . _ __s ___ , _ _ _ 2 t _ -__.

eg.cs. A.

_..ca.

be - s, w ._. _. m_ _

.-.u s n. - f.y - . ~ -- ~ w . r - m s . S. m .

c. ** i:::t :n:c pcr 12--ecnth: d u ri 1-sW d =n , by perf: ming : CAMP. ci- d/f CALI',1'-~2i-

n. , ,a,, . . . : . . . ,. s,

f tee-w , di . . f f:rential

u. --.: p r ::ure-m0t

~-,-,e. , . =cntation f er Out:c:ti og{0

.., _.s.._

G 3. 'h B-I J time 3;eci ;ct f :n n fmutn y cy be u:ived f r Cycle I p~ '4 vided *N c6-lo- A l su rve4-1-a ac e a p : r f c - c d p r i e r to-eesa r : ':lleu'ng In: :- :fu n; cutage :- he 1, '_9 8 5 , -n i cne v e r c ccur: '" ret. 7.: p ro+M+e es-+'--

Speci " caticr '.0.? are- set < tm p e rf-:-a nc e c ' t'-i r t umi ' ! ~r e.

/

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 Amenc nent Nc. 8

FEB-24-1998 15:01 l

, .PI ANT SYSTEMS __

3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM o l A i

Q 3. '?.1 -1 LTHTTING CONDT'T ION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent essential service water (ESW) loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4 ACTION: $ (f.. InnW aMcAd) o 1-4 cL-A With only one ESW loop OPERABLE. restore at least two ESW loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or' be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHlITDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS

~ ~g-a 3.7.9- 5 4.7.4 At least twc ESi! loops shall be demonstrat::d OPERABLE:

rn Ha f/mp+4 08 -o - A a.* At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valveV(manual. #1'07-A power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked sealed, or otherwise secured in position. is in __

1ts correc.t

-n o upositio,n.

um er 7; y

.u von. iu

-. w. c-.rm

v. y .wnm In ddi, tion. yj t 100 m. t One:-e c

s.g , , u ,, mg ,, ,, ~.

- _ , , o ,. m fMaq

.. w aeui.o e i un i vi cu evuia v n. 4av ww6vu v. cuc n .. ou ao ;-

- compre;;crs shell bc performed; 9-obl- V

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that: l rue,- r af 3_

1) Each autcmatic valvebr"+ icing safcty-related esvismes vr--

9010 ting th; n nucle:r : fety rcht;d sciticn-cf the syste O39'og_tg actuates to its correct position on : L :: cf-Ic-cr vi '.ic ic v A '8- A Injection tett :1;nc.1 :.nd en simu h ted High 01'ferenti:1

-Prc: ur; test sign an dMm/

2 '-

Each ESW System pump starts automatica11y en : Ofety Injc ticf.[yj,$'

D

-L;35-;f Pcwcr t :t sign:1, :nd durir.g sh tdcnn ca e Lcw Suc.ica

_- / AP 9 --t

,M,._

caau c wr'9n go.,o , .

-^- %.,

u , ,.

.w,w-

--_ , n __me_ t..

__.,,,,-a.s,, , our. -.

-- i awwww wi gwi A i.4 4..w 3 6 4 6.4 g gwe ivr r i y w ~.e

h. s/"J1616 i.Ltd.l DeM t .Vil.-- -,-

Vi

--thc diffcr:ntici prc;:ure ir.;truments:1cn fer cut;metic i:clatico of F-4/-LG.

'h; :SW t; the sic : mpresscrs. g 3,9,gT)

Q09 0,9-LG~)

l Rhe specified ;S mcath frc:;uency asy be weived f;r Cycic I prcvid:d the O f-/4 -A l

acillance is pcrformcd pricr to re ::rt foticwing th: fir:t refuelin:

--eut:ge c" June 1. 1000, whichever oc:gr; first. he provision; af--

Spe:ifis+ tion 4.0.2 are reset fr m performance of thi: civeillance.-

t CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 Amendment No. 8.121

^

CTS 3.7.4 Footnotes and Inserts ACTION INSERT l

@ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.4.6, 09-02-A "R CS Loops - Mode 4", for Residual Heat Removal loops made inoperable by ESW.

@ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.1, 09-02-A "AC Sources Operating", for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ESW.

s ?

l 4.7.4.a Insert l l

Note: Isolation of flow to individual components does not render the 09-07-A ESW System inoperable.

l 4.7.4.b.1) Insert I I in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position 08-05-A 4.7.4b.1) and b.2) Insert J 69-o G-TRI on an actual or simulated actuation signal 03-00-TRP W \

q 3a.e-S l

l I

1 i

l l

I~I3 ~ A PLANT SYSTEMS _ O 3. '7. l- 1 i 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK t

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink (UHS) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum water level at 'or above 13.25 feet (El 831.25 feet MSL) fren: the bottom of the UHS,

b. An average water temperature of less than or equal to 90*F, and s .

13-M- LCr

c. Tw U!C :: ling t wcr treinc (2 celk per. tee 4*-}. .

C APPLICABILITY : M00E3 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the UHS inoperable as a result of level or temperature, be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLO SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , s

b. With one UHS cooling tower train inoperable, restore both trains g to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y within.the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.7.5.1 The UHS shall be detennined CPEFASLE at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the average water temperature and water level to be within their 1imits.

4.7.5.2 The UHS cooling tower trains shall be demonstrated CPERABLE at least G - L-*

once per 31 days by verifying that each cooling tower f an acerates for at 1:::: :n:: ;;r ;; r.:n:ns leas 15 minutes in both the slow and f ast modeg :.:

y:,; : .t a =:

br::kag: er d:gr:d :'Or of :9: _.

) . i : U...

. l: .~,_

'. ; impe::i a; c c. ; .cc 4 -.. m _

. . ,m, ,- ~, - , i u n .< - ' .u n-v tG-

. ....- ....,u. e.m._.s.- m..c m m.e_ - -r--

. ..m m_...

"4 m ' y

. pe:: .; :5

'J45 -i pr:p 'c r :n; :

-~ bnornc ! dc;r:d::i co wh i'r -isr-:

10 d :: b : :kag . : f ::. O',1 p um; s u c t i ce .

-s

).

3/4 7-13 Amendment No. 25 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 e , , ,

- s se eae =* * , ese

t

/,r3 i- _

\/

f

\

{

(\ M W. i l ~( M K.!

\, i PLANTSY5?ry '

)

) 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOH EMERCENCY VENTlLATION SYSTEM oH3-A tIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Q3.9.l-l 6m 1

1 1

l

3. 7. 6 Two inuependent Cori.r,ol Room Emergency Ventila t.on Sys te=5 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

All H30ES.[ hyuemeA J hr b. led R.A u:ses.M2eg

.o33 ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4: .

s

With one Control Room Emergency Ventilation Syste+ inoperable. restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status 'witnin 7 days or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLO SHUT 00W within the following 10-10-LS U 30 haurs. O A km agy h ukf wbe c*S brus b'ateah ,D *54 M b ** woteem\.\e. cM rno.p.m.

L.m Lo 3 b.-bcy'A N00E5 5 and 6: h , .<<,

\ .C we. 4AJ Lt c.ss kke.s g

a. Q 3, *7.10 - Y Vith one Control Room Emergency Ventilation System inoperable, g ,g restore initiate andthe maintain inoperable systemof operation tothe OPERABLE remaining status OPERASLE within Control 7 days or MehAk 43n,;3.tj '

Roomm.ns Emer.ge ncy Ve t i l a ti stem i p a.io-g) este 4 %spe eaese ~ we k le he recirculation r.odef ec M t a.sse.Mes %e L,h\y. 10 t.5 G c.

Vith both Control Room Emergency' ventilation Systems inoperable e v 'b t .": ?t..SLi'~;rfr~ci ' :: E :rgen ; V e r F '.

5U '"E i:- Sy nc.7 ' * - %S #

..u,,.

.y.. _.._-__3_,.:.,.,,

.... . . _ _ . ,u u. m. . _e , --._ -,-o.3- - - _< %_

.; ; rid

, g gg g.cy cg> E L E : . gge _; =c J eu 7,,.s uspend all ope rat ions involving CORE ALTERAi!0NS cr acs;..<c rcact' ty chcr:r- i ,;\, s 3 ww.an W m - 3 L.

a.a %.kat.\y

.<e s. .e eC W5.N g %

b< ensscotecable t,wbol 6 .id-/3 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS L.\ * * W ** Cow bo4*'fi g o.,o.g,5 3%

.o. .

3 S. ^-

M 4.7.6 'Each Control Room Emergency Yentilation System shall be denonstrated OPERABLE:

M 4 "PerC c cep<ca c.c.sys G\br de% N scc.< educa. I.ral., di ' # rP. go.os A

a. A'. Ices'. wn;i pcr 12 h;w. s ty .iri'f i ng th e the cordt:1-roca, ai ter;;r0'.ur- ; le;; tea,or i g u; I t :- -M9 ,,,,,g, g y ryg 7

b. At leas t once per 31 days er :

ET.'~~EEE 'EI~ EAE!E by i'itiatirg, so.n .ts u-

'r:: the ::ntr:1 ::m, '!:= t'rcu;n the HEP' icr: and cherc;e1 g g.w ac;crber; cf tet" t h ; c ' t r a t i : n c r.d P r c : : u - ', : M ' O.- Sy ncr: nc by verifying that the Pressuri:ation System operates for at least 10 continuous us pu L< hours 3wiis th eus, the he a te rs ope ra tingya4 4b. Fr @G. fttLe g o . p. B f

_ . r ;- ... :..: . . ..__ . - . . _ _ ,:

.a.- .~, r=:. u ~~ - - . .., e ,o-.a A

~y.v...., .

.is. . . - ..; ..,. .. r r . .w .. .

1

/

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-14 Mendment No. 8

CTS %.7.lNSERTS INSERT'A' With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable due to 10-20-LS39 an inoperable Control Room baundary while in MODE 1,2,3 or 4, restore the inopernic Cont ol Roon Soundar" rn CPC.PABI C c .tus '<ithin 21 he' irs or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

INSERT 'B' With two Control Rocm Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable,due to 10-20-LS39 an inoperable Control Room boundary while inMODE 5 or 6 or during '

movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies, restore the inoperable Control Rooni boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and suspend movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies.

i i

i

m- r L s=s ~.L. s ne~G fy-p.9 gera >e m as u >a ma 8 Ga.og4

, sv=s ~ a e m 6 13 ptANT SYSTEMS ewna&%

1 Ca t ass <-.wts m 4 Lg t L. u,$. REVISl0N

$a u<..u M

- '"2 v 7

3/4.7.7 EMERGENCY EXHAUST bYb i t.&

01 A Q 3.9.-l-I *

, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7 Two independent Emergency Exhaust Systems shall be dPERASLE.

APPLICA8ILITY: M00E5 1, 2, 3, and 4

( /

ACTION:

With one Emergency Exhaust System inoperable, restore the inoperabl'e Emergency Exhaust System to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOCWN within the following

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

T hsteer 'L' s ;-

i ;-c .-M

, a 3.*7.13.2~I

-Lsa:.:r < d g-c6- 6)

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.7.7 Each Emergency Exhaust System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At' least once per 31 days on ; :T*,C"I~E: 7:5~ Ell:I by '-it::: g, 11-c 5- t.5 W

a. t o - o b - t G-

'- 9 ::-t :' -:cm, 'i:q tn cugh th: 9E?' 'i' c s :nc cr,c ;;d

' ad::-t:-: Ed verify % that the system operates for at least 1G continuous hours with the heaters operating; a

b. At least once per 18 months, or (1) after any structural maintenance to-c e- A on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorcer housings, or- (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1) Verifying that the Emergency Exhaust System satisfies tha to-08-A in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% and uses *.he test procedure guicance in Regulatory Positions C.S.a C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2, Marcn 1975. anc the system flow rate i s 9000 c f m + 10% ;

Wed) By ger b . g A npped CES O b kd] A a.a.. - d ec e. t o - c E- A w+L. A v?TP . .

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-17 3,' l

CTS %.7.7 NSERTS INSERT 'L' With two Emergency Exhaust Systern trains inoperable in MODES '1,2,3, or 4, 12-02-M for reasons other than an inoperable auxiliary building boundary, be in at least HOT STANDBY witMn the next 6 beur: and in COLD SITUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

INSERT 'M' With two Emergency Exhaust System trains inoperable due to an inoperable q ~3,7,13. 2 - 1 Auxiliary Building pressure boundary restore the inoperable Auxiliary Building. 10!20-LS39 pressure boundary to OPERABLE status within?4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least' HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the .

following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . '

N e

l l

1

tc qW Lt.O tt-ot_g CRERCS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS C A Aq 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency AiryTempercture Cer. trol System (CRESCS) c1 A Q 3.71-)

LC0 3.7.11 Two CPMCS triins shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, .{5, and 6,i During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies,

[ Curing C0i!E ALTEPaTICMS]. '

s .

ACTIONS _

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION A.1 Restore CREKICS train 30 days ' \' WO i A. One CRE3ICS train inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

~

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months / I B. Required Action and B.1 Se in MODE 3.

associated Completion k Time of Condition A AND not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months G 3.9. IO-I'1 l C..I Place OPERABLE Immediately C. Required Action and associated Completion CRERCS train in Time of Condition A operationy not met fin MODE 5 or 6, ord during OR -

movement of irradiated -

1mmediately fuel assemolies [, or C.2.1 Suscend CORE dur .c C0fiE ,

ALTERATIONS. ,

? LT'17 ION S1.

AND I Immediately C 12? Suspend move: 1ent of irradiated ft el assemblies.

m. --

AND (continued)

C.l. 2 4 3W0*'7 fenhendef 603 powered by %

w emG3w(-3 3/47- L a- power sotutty Rev 1, 04/07/95 WOG STS 2.7 25 v

i CHANGE I NUMBER N_21C DESCRIPTION mode where the specification is no longer applicable, which in this case would be H0DE 4. The CTS would require the plant to enter TS 3.0.3 because operation with less than two HSSVs OPERABLE per SG is an undefined cor.dition and thus not permitted. Therefore, the new ACTION ^

eliminates the one hour allowed for action via TS 3.0.3.

This requirement is more restrictive with the loss of the one hour for actions required by TS 3.0.3.

01 07 A The CTS SR is revised to specifically reference the In service Testing (IST) Program developed per TS 4.0.5 and contained in the Administrative section of the ITS.

The surveillance directly references Table 3.7 2 for lift points and incorporates the requirement that the MSSV as left liftpoints to be within 4/- 1 percent of the nominal setpoint.

01 08 -

NOT USED.

g .7 ggr) Dc 3,7-001 01-09 -

-Net oppTicable.to calTawa,y. See conwrsion compartseP- l IaMe-f Emlu:m e 3C) .

01 10 LG The note on Table 3.7-2 stating that the set pressures of l the MSSVs shall correspond to the ambient conditions of I the valve at normal operating temperatures is moved to the Bases of ITS SR 3.7.1.1. This change is acceptable because it removes details from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basic limiting condition for l operation. j 01 11 LG The MSSV 4eus-orifice size is moved from Table 3.7-2 to a D(c E n licensee controlled document. This is design information that is not required in the ITS for operating or OPERABILITY concerns. -

C _RT 3A- O 3 .'l I - k i N require that the plant be p 01 12 r The proposed ch @ange would LS- @ in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months instead of COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . This is acceptable because it would place the plant in a condition outside the MODE of APPLICABILITY of the 1 en _

c _ A-3e d 3, >

02-01 LG The descriptive material related to the definition of an auxiliary feedwater (AFW) train, is deleted from the LCO and moved to the Bases. This change is acceptable because it removes details from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basic limiting condition for operation.

DESCRIPTION GF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 3 5/15/97

Q 3.7.1-1 INSERT 3A - 3 o Ol- 13 A All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording is'in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. During the development certain wording preferences or English language conventions were adopted. As a result, the Technical Specifications (TS) should be more readily readable, and therefore understandable, by plant operators and other users. During the reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process, no i technical charges (either actual or :nterpretational) to tha TS viero made unless th':y ware identified and justified. This justification is used in those instances where, for improved clarity, the CTS was reforrnatted to conform to the ITS.

l l

l

t.

No3 or-a4-*LS3 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - C RENT TS 3/4.7 38-00/ Page 2 of 15 TECH SPEC CilANGE APPLICABILITY DIABLO CANYON COMANCllE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION l

01-09 This DCPP specific change revises the maximum power range YES:.LAR 97 06 NO: refer to NO: refer to N0; refer to neutron high flux trip setpoints required for one or more sutaitted 01-04-LS3. 01-04-L53. 01-04 LS3.

LS-31 inoperable HSSVs in accordance with the recomendations of . justifying.reylsed.

Westinghouse NSAL 94 001, dated January 20. 1994, and high flux trip set-specific analysis and calculations performed to confirm the points-for--

conclusions of the Westinghouse NSAL. Inoperable-HSSVss _

YES YES 01 10 The note on Table 3.7-2 stating that the set pressures YES YES LG shall correspond to the ambient conditions of the valve at normal operating temperatures is moved to the Bases of IIS SR 3.7.1.1.

YES: moved to FSAR. YES: mved to FSAR. YES: moved to llSAR. YES: moved to FSAR.

01 11 The itSSV Lw+ orifice size is moved to a licensee LG controlled document. 'DC -A R-z?M 01-12 Tb -[>ose p chan< wou re e tt pla:i e N0; part of CTS. NO: part of CTS. YES YES i 110 lJ i thin 2 ho s in ead COLD 11U1 g g y.7p g m w -- )

YES YES YES 02-01 The descriptive raterial, definition of an AFV train, in YES LG the LCO is mved to the Bases. ,

02-02 The ACTION specifies the requirements for A0T should one of YES N0; part of CTS. YES YES LS-S the steam supplies to the IDAFM pump become inoperable.

YES YES YES 02-03 ACTIONS are modified to require restoration of the systems YES H to meet the LCO within 10 days of discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

NO NO N0 02-04 In this DCPP specific revision. the APPLICABILITY and YES M ACTIONS are revised to include MODE 4 when the SGs are relied upon for heat removal.

i YES YES 02-05 The addition of the note for three inoperable AFW trains YES YES A assures that TS 3.0.3 will not be entered and that no other action statement for other inoperable components will be applied that might force the unit into an unsafe condition.

& 3.'} I~ l CURRENT IS 5/15/97 CONVERSION C0t! PARIS 0N TABLE

O 3.7.1-1 INSERT 3B-2a 01-13 All reformatting, renumbering, and editorial wording is in accordance YES YES YES YES A with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431.

L

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-4 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1 Action a ITS 3.7.1 Action A.1 and A.2 end Table 3.7.1-1 DOC 01-04-LS3 JFD 3.7-01 This change is tayond the scope of a conversion bewuse of the industry travelcrs referenced in this DOC (WOG-83, Rev 0 and Rev.1) that have not been approved by the NRC.

Comment: Withdraw the change or adopt the STS.

FLOG RESPONSE:

WOG-83 has been approved by the TSTF and is designated as TSTF-235. This traveler has been submitted to the NRC and ir under review. The proposed wording in TSTF-235 was modified from WOG-83 and these modifications have been incorporated into the ITS.

Comanche Peak, Wo:f Creek, and Callaway, co.uinue te pursue tne changes proposed by -

this traveler. Diablo Canyon will no longer pursue this change due to issuance of LAs 125/123 (dated May 28,1998) which revised CTS 3/4.7.1.1, Table 3.7-1, " Maximum Allowable Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint With inoperable Steam Line Safety Valves" and the associated Bases. See licensee-initiated number DC 3.7-008 for more details.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Encl. 2 7-1, 7-2 Encl. 3A 1, 2 l Encl. 4 18 !

Encl. 5A Traveler Status page, 3.7-1, 3.7-3 '

Encl. 5B B 3.7-2, B 3.7-3, B 3.7-4, B 3.7-5, B 3.7-6 Encl. 6A 1, 3 Encl. 6B 1, 2 l

ON y 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

, 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCL" l A Q '3,'7, l- l SAFETY VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATICH

3. 7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE wi:n i f ;a;;ing; 23 ;;gif;;; ia 73;;e 0.7 2. c i- on- A APPLICABILITY: MCOES 1, 2, and 3.

MSS DI' OI-OL ACTION:

M bd.b t. I S "O ' *E

%o

.r. With four reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in

[33. q j-Y oceration antp tith or mere main steam line Code safety valves cera e,g peration in MS 1, 2, and 3 may pmceed pmked, t.5at

) 01-04-lg.3 -

rwithin status4rhours, either

n: ':wcr the4:utr:n

~:ng: inoperable-' unvalve"i gnis~-i; restored Ic t; 1-to CPERABLE::;;;:W7.$g)3 1: e .

morg ;;r Tcle 2.7 '_; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within ne CM gg l gjepti j next6hcursancinf: SHUTDChN within the ':ii:u'-- { cuts.

'h pr:;<i:i n: ;f 'pe:ifi ::ica 2.O.1 r: n;; .;;lica:1e. 'A re- ;; ^

2.

Ol-05-A b o t-os-d5

~ _/ '

93.7I-5 m_ %

C. . ns4 B _ scw 0)

SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS Q sn.)-B

4. 7.1.1 s: :eesti =:: :;ui =:-:: ::n:- :n:n 13;;; ,;;<7c -

ci. g. a

\ ;p w ri;2ti:n a. :. 5. cm A c.

j er onn., o r m or-e. s6 3entrales wd

! one. H65V 'mopua,We, W & MTd, pos h ak 9 poum J2,r.wf f, a sn.s d ei- y _ t.c,_ 3 0 sn. t - 4 og_04-Lb ,

s I

d'5 W A 0" 4.. 008 etu., or rneeSke gw% F A<, ('oef&c. MSSY(HTM tent inoprde. M Mocierder 5eco or t\qdin cd alf pows.c funh cedttcoU ]y /c N *, & 4

' THERMAL POWER f:o s [ 5fo 3 71 .

6 O

ls 4 )

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 ~V4 7 7^

D- yo R' "E' ' ul' g g sw inoFue

%W &- 8" & Ha*-

Aed.Je eof s M %

i

- . _. ~ . - . .- - - . - - . . - _

CTS 3.7.1.1 footnotes and inserts Insert A

- or ndux T.iemJ Power e != $= c eq" I to the 3 f,vi-"- u!c cd!z CN 01-04-LS3

m RTI' 2gdEcd in Table 3.7-12 f= 6e n"~ber of OPEPMLE w MSSV and -

(e hthe Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced W p S= c:;qud te te MW.u~. ille"d!c 'K RTP :p=iE:d in Table 3.7-1 fr *h- c~iin of OPEPMLE MSSS within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; gu I

Insert B NEW H@E3 ,

s ? l

c. With one or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs . 01-06-M l OPERABLE, be in at least;;OT STi'QBbvithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MOT SIICEO"T within Sc fc"c+ B ours. 1 la \

HoDE 4 Insert C l 4.7.1.1@ Verify each required MSSV lift setpoint per Table 3.7-2 in 01-07-A accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following l testing, lift setting shall be within t/- 1%.

Footnotes A

@ Only required to be performed in MODES I and 2 01-05 W 4 3fl I ~6

% < twr-ed in MobE i o i-o4 -LS- 3 0 3.?./ -4 1

REviS 10N 1

TABLE 3.7-1 MAMMcP ' L'.0Wf.E LE "CHER $"!:E '!EU ?CM LUX ti:0" ""

CPC:. ~ '.':TH ISOFERAaLE 57EAl' :NE IA?:TY / A L / :' :"" "" """ ' " "'"

G.twe. * "P.wcr

- orts.at,t.t m u n m m w s.y v. ins n. me.s.m MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE ot.M.L5 3 MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE NEUTRON ? LUX HIGH SETPOINT O 3' 'I'Y SAFETY VALVES ON ANY M GGFr-5F RATE: Tn E R.+A c r uw:.R '

OPERATING STEAM GENERATOR __

( % RTP)

C

. e EL 6 U r 4 o i.c4-LS 3 * "

L

3 Q 3lll- Y a aa.

.a- 2

\

co\y onc sh e gencM h4~3 th t% m wm

o. ) Q\A one M55 V o^ ~1(Ua 9.Ti . Q 1A one. MSW t w c.g e cA\e, ggg gje % EM iS m,<c M. o ne. skam geweca.be N t%3wm GNw al.ic.

on 7, ;--? W 3L o

. cp 5.7-E D ,.

f l

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/

./

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2

DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.7 This enclosure ccatains a brief description /juetificatun for each marked-up change to the current Technical Specifications (CTS). The changes are identified by change numbers contained in Enclosure 2 (Mark up of the CTS). In aedition. the referenced No Significant Hazards Considerations (NSHCs) are contained in Enclosure 4. Only technical changes are discussed; administrative changes (i.e.. format, presentation, and editorial chang:s) made to conform to MURIG-1431 Revision 1 are not discussed except to' clarify the changes. For Enclosures 3A. 38. 4. 6A. and 6B. text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not comon to all the Joint Licensing Subcomittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plante may have plant specific information in that location.

CHANGE NtMBER NLC DESCRIPTION 01 01 A A reference to Table 3.7-2 is deleted from the limiting condition of operation (LCO) and moved to the surveillance requirement (SR) (refer to change 01 07 A). This change is consistent with NUREG-1431.

01 02- LS 1 A note is added to allow separate entry for each main steam safety valve (HSSV). The current specification requires that all MSSVs discovered to be inoperable be returned to OPERABLE within the initial four hours provided for the first inoperable MSSV. For example. if a second inoperable MSSV wore discovered three hours into the action statement of the first inoperable MSSV both MSSVs would have to be returned to OPERABLE within the following one nour or the plant power level would have to I

be reduced to that specified in Table 3.71. The addition of the note allowing separate entry for each inoperable MSSV provides the full four hours for each inoperable MSSV. This is acceptable based upon the assumptions used to analyze the unit with inoperable MSSVs (highest flow l HSSV fails to open and the other three MSSVs with similar lift points on the other SGs also fail). l 01 03 -

Not Applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

01-04 LS-3 The CTS allow continued operation with inoperabie MSSVs if the power range neutron high flux trips are reduced.

MURE G . W31 %dA L a.- = 0. Rev.-0 =d draft aca 1.-

! o* re,v i sed provided revised ACTIONS to require that: 1) the reactor

! b 3 progesed power be reduced to compensate for the loss of pressure

! g 23 5, relief capacity to a maximum allowable power determined in accordance with Westinghouse NSAL 94 001 and NRC l

Q 3.'7.l- g Inf rm tion Notice 94-60: 2) the power range neutron flux l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 1 5/15/97 l

l

CHANGE

\ NUMBER !!jiliC DESCRIPTION high trip setpoint be reduced for inoperable MSSVs if a positive moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) exists at the allowed percent rated thermal power in MODE 1: and

3) the power range neutron flux high trip setooints be reduced to account for a control rod withdrawal at partial power with more than one MSSV inoperable.(}Jn addition.

M the completion time for resetting the high flux trips is '~

g revised from 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and the ACTION is revised b

oD to'specifically require an appropriate power reduction 2 3 o within four hours. This is a relaxation since the CTS y 3 g $)5'{b require the high neutron flux trip setpoint to be reduced as required within four hours for inocerable MSSVs

-O -t 4

Q

'\

o, P {C c3 P

recardless of the HTC valuejPending approval of drafy' 9 >

g

~1 P $ of WOG 83, the cnanges proposed in the travejer T .h s= q _f !

have . .an modified to retain the current TS reywfement to s f 3 9. reset the range .itron flux high tripetpoints

" 3~ based on the numoe f MSSVs inoperabie t a maximum 9 3Ib allowable power determi ~ in accordan th calculations f m 0

1 =

or analysis to account for W /ingh se NSAL 94-001 and NRC Information Notice 94 60. h ver. the completion Q'5.T'g '

LI O E l time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months proposed by -83 been retained and }

, {yhU 3 <, ,

p pf (( ,

is justified based on the w probabilit occurring during this " e and the need to p vide f an event s sufficient time to set the channels in an oro ly manner

-) t., aithout inducine transient due to human error.

315( 3 <- o[ Retention of e CTS requirement for resetting the re tar trip set ints is acceptable because this requirement is

h i,.,

~-

nore snservative than the ACTIONS specified bv eitner the b [e S or WCG 83, as revised]

01 05 XA The exception to TS 3.0.4 is no longer needed due to the note associated with the revised surveillance. The exception was allowed to TS 3.0.4 due to the fact that the applicable M00ES must be entered in creer to perform the Q 3.9.1- 5 recuired surveillance (if the MSSVs are tested in place) and to allow Mooe changes to be made if the applicable acticn was met. In the CTS. MODE 1. 2.. or 3 could be c"1t e r_ed . In_NUREG 1431. the surveillance is modifleo by a g e -c J t.t n ?cte that specifies that tne survelliance

eed only oe current prior to reacning MODE 2. Tne surveillance note still allows MCOE changes into tne MODE of APPLICABILITY of the LCO. ' .e. MOCE 3 for testing ourposes. 01 06 M The new ACTION adds an explicit recu1rement to be in MODE 3 in 6 hours and MODE 4 in 12 hours a f any steam

 -)                                               generator (SG) loop has less nan two MSSVs coerable.

NUREG 1431 recuires that tne plant only be piacec in c DESCRIPTION CF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 2 5/15/97

l Q 3.7.1-4 INSERT 3A-2 Based on Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter', NSAL 94-001, for plants licensed to operate at partial power levels with a positive MTC, changes are made to require a reduction in the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint in addition to a reduction in reactor power when the MTC is positive. This is necessary to limit the primary side heat generation that may occur during a RCS heatup event. With a positive MTC a heatup of the coolant will result in a power incr3ase which requires additional steam relieving capacity. Changes are made to require a reduction in the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint in addition to a reduction in the reactor power when there is more than one inoperable MSSV on any single l steam generator. .For a reactivity insertion accident such as an uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal from a partial power level the reactor power will increase during the transient until a reactor trip occurs on Overtemperature [ Delta T] or Power Range Neutron Flux-High. With more than one inoperable MSSV on any steam generator the combined steam flow capacity of the inoperable MSSVs and the turbine may be insufficient in some cases to prevent l overpressurization of the Main Steam System prior to reaching the reactor trip setpoint. The , Action for reducing the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trio setpoint is modified by a j footnote to indicate that reducing the setpoint is only required in MODE 1. In MODES 2 and 3 the reactor protectior, system tips in CTS 3.3.1 provides sufficient protection.

                                                                                                .                            l l

I O i I

-. - - - .                 -- . . - .          . - - . - - -- ~                   _ _ - . --                           - . - .        -             .

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 3 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i The CTS allow continued operation with incperable MSSVs if the powcr range neutron I flux high reactor trip setpoints are reduced. The amount of reduction in the trip L setpoint is dependent on the total number of inoperable HSSVs per SG and is intended # to compensate for the lost relief capacity (heat removal capability and thusb the4'b overpressure protection) should a transient requiring their operation occur. proposed specification, the CTS requirement to reduce the power range high neutron Q33.l-9 ' flux reactor trip setpoint is retained; however, the time to complete resetting the ; trip setpoints would be changed from four to 72 hours. The C'S require that, if the MSSV cannct be restored to an CPERABLE status within four hours, that the power range high neutron flux reactor trip setpoints must be reset in the same 4 hour period. NUREG 1431 requires that the reactor power be reduced in four hours if the MSSV cannot be returned to an OPERABLE status; however, NUREG 1431 would not require resetting the power range neutron flux high setpoints. ( The Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) has proposed changes to NUREG-1431 it = ':r b ( ' UCC ^^ m cci . ;;d Mm;h dr.J . .b . _; that: 1) propose that the completion time Tsi'F-for resetting the power range neutron flux hign trip setpoint to compensate for a ' positive HTC or a control rod withdrawal event at partial reactor power to be , 72 hours, 2) specifies that the power level reductions be per the Westinghouse ' k 3[/. l *-Y, , Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL 94 01 and. 3) deletes the Maximum Allowable l t RTP for 5 MSSVs OPERABLE.Jowe er, pe ing pr va of dra Rev. 1 o -

av ler ha been medir . *o r tain Q curr to the 5 i

[tye nan es , opo ec 1e In wer en tra ux h h tri etpoin bae q . nt o r se - maxi ~ allo ao wer de erm a na orda ce Q 30 l'I, p u- c. SVs inop ab *o hicompletion ic ations or anat sis o account m Westi ghouse_ SAL 94 0013 The ailcwed Time to reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoints is reasonable based on cperating experience to accomplish the required ACTIONS in an orderly manner. The power levels specified per NSAL 94 001 are based on a conservative algorithm developed by Westinghouse to bound the required relief capacity. 0 34,l-@ TETF-235 The above changes. are consistent with NUREG-1451 as revised by1c3:et and NSAL 94 001. The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards :cnsiderations (NSHCs). This determination has been performed in accordance with criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

                         "Tne Ccantssion may make a final cetemination. pursuant to tne procedures in paragraph 50.91. that a prooosed amencment to an coerating license for a facility 11 censed under caragrapn 50.21(b) or paragraon 50 22 or a testing If coeraticn of cne facility involves no significant hazarcs consideration.

fact it ty In accorcance w1tn the prcoosed amencment woula not. 5/15/97 18 h0 SIGNIFICAh7 MAZARDS CONSIDERATION

1 i Q 3.7.1-4 I INSERT 4-18 Based on Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter, NSAL 94-001, for plants licensed to operate' at partial power levels with a positive MTC, changes are made to require a reduction in the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint in addition to a reduction in reactor power when the MTC is positive. This is necessary to limit the primary side heat generation that may occur during a RCS hectup event. With a positive d.TC a heatup of the coo!aat w!Il resu!'. in a power increase which requires additional steam relieving capacity. Changes are made to require a reduction in the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint in addition to a reduction in the reactor power when there is more than one inoperable MSSV on any single steam generator. For a reactivity insertion accident such as an uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal from a partial power level the reactor power will increase during the transient until a reactor trip occurs on Overtemperature [ Delta-T] or Power Rang a Neutron Flux-High. With more than one inoperable MSSV on any steam generator the combined steam flow capacity of the inoperable MSSVs and the turbine may be insufficient in some cases to prevent overpressurization of the Main Steam System prior to reaching the reactor trip setpoint. The Action for reducing the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint is modified by a , fcetncte to indicatc that raducing the setpoint is on!y required in MODE 1. In MODES 2 and 3 the reactor protection system trips in CTS 3.3.1 provides sufficient protection. l _.e_.

Indt.stry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.7 . TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF 36, Rev. 2 Incorporated 3.7 42,-.Only applicable to - DCPP TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific rezlalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. TSTF 70, Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable -Net-NRC approved'c Of

                                                                                             -trr/e'cr cut off date TA '~7*##   l TSTF 100                    Incorporated        3.7 05 and 3.7 19         NRC approved.

TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. Wn6r83 Partially 3.7 01 Retained CTS (Formerly Incorpcrated requirements for WO8 GIT resetting trip setpoints q since requirements are

                           ~
                                  -                                                              more conservative than 9'31l-4                                                                      the traveler.

CC'- Incorporated 3.7 34 Not incorporated by DCPP as current licensing 9 3 7'd'I 737p g l basis. e 3.9. g _ , TSTF 139. Incorporated Not Applicable - jygc ogmej, W. 7-Oer Rev. 1 Bases change 'I 4 (CEOG 51) T5TF 140. M Incorporated Not Applicable TR 3.'7-cc4 Rev. X. O p eo,,,,,rw d~p .e Se (CEOG 52) 4 4 ncu W u m I. J e er.bim. fgrEWee ee agrz Incorporated 3.7 57 a 2.7.*o -it a 3.9. is. 9-g M Incorporated 3.7 56 0 3.?, 2 - 3 Q 3.'7, 2-3 TF1F-pS9 {E~% s 5A- TR 31 - @ l TR 3 'l-001 I'In%A TR 3.'7-coa. gg_hB77-001 1 5/15/97 MARK-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) l l t

s INSERT S A-TR 3.7-001 , TRAVELER // STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-173, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable- Bases Change NRC approved. 5 .__ -___________-__m-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ __J

INSERT SA-TR 3.7-002 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFFRENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-174, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable- Dases Change NRC approved t t t 6

i I HSSys 3.7.1 i l 3.7 PLAhT SYSTEMS . 3.7.1 'Hain Steam Safety Valves (HSSVs) !- LCO 3.7.1 The EiTs HSSVs per;steaugenetatcr; shall be OPERMLE e; ;;c:ibe--m 3.7 01 __a u,m.m m , _. ._ ...

                                                  .   . m... . m_

m.mu.. i APPLICABILITY: HODES 1. 2. and 3. ACTIONS Separate Conditig entry is owed r each HSSV. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME)

k.1 Reduce y nitevumeuwts 4 hours . 3J.01' 6 ,0ne 'S 7or: ' more

                                   ;;cr21:.rc;; ired B to less than or equal to the l  ,                   56 gejets. *g       ~~

eppli; sic paumsmowante RTP li:t:d spetamie3 in Q.,M~N D

           -/.        4 tee or n d<e. 'fiSSYS
  ",n                 wopo ble .                                       Table 3.7.11 Ionstaeanamoen 6710REEKHEEglSSg!ll.

OR sa ..o%- Nere - Hade1 l 0% e mort 5,o u , --- r e <a . la . l wcenouns -.3;7 0E g WM A.hs Lo @ M RedQ5l5RDEBENEMIRET@ M55V ineP"M & B 'e' ' Sir W G O sis \ l sWO TelfDBlEE!!5EEEN!Wn'JC l W . W T C. p M m ecuwonesmammam potw b ') aarcwmm, etsspew.alecPatn Earrf.=wmweneinc= Der. HMORESIEETMSSTd!! C C X. Required Action and X.1BeinH00E3, 6 hours associated Completion ) Time not met. ANQ / 03 k2 Be in HODE 4. 12 hours C s One or more steam generators with h B

. - c _ ;; y L h + mms inocue<. / ---

T

/_

3.7 1 5/15/97 HARX.UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

l [ i 1 1 ggg g y Q 3.7.1-4 j CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ~' A. ' - One or more s' team - NOTE- ---

                                             . generators with one    With one MSSV inoperable on only                                3.7  '

MSSV inoperable and one steam generator, the Q 3.7.1-4 the Moderator Maximum Allowable poweris Temperature Coefficient 71% RTP. With one MSSV (MTC) zero or negative inoperable on more than one - at all power levels, steam generator the Maximum ; Allowable power is 56% RTP, A.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours 3.7 01 POWER to s (56, 3.7-12 71}% RTP. Q 3.7.1-4 i I c

!- MSSVs 3.7.I' M f k y'mW Table 3.7.1-1 (page.1 of 1) OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus 3,7_gj

                              ^pplicabgower ir Per:crt of RAT:D TU R,tiAL PC',':R O

' bg 1 :MIMUM NUMBER OFYMSSVs PER STEAM GENERATOR MAyrauM A LLOWASLE FPL-:: A;'_: POWER Q 3.7. ; #

                     ,1 QUIR : OP:RACLE                                                  (% RTP)

: ,00 -

N * ."1-123 4 X* 54 C'7D q 3n.i-g 3 y* 29 2 X* 2 2- B-Ps (a) W:t& m HssV inopale. m4 msb lj 7/ '/o RTP. W1gwra u

                   & gx; - olfowdle g .iu l                      om HSSV 'nop<dle. on enore h                                                      sW fa#                 }WM 6(, */. R'TF k mAslmv.tn a$lotodle,                                           IS l

i i i f WOG STS 3.7-3 Rev 1, 04/07/95

MSSVs l B 3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE The KafEtW6ELWhemonsMMMY@Yh'E transient response for I SAFETY ANALYSES turbine trip oMtiiEttlilIFoWeil without a direct reactor l (continued) trip presents no hazard to the integrity of the RCS or the Main i Steam System. unextucnynqErmana i.ysTsms:JecIorreafa ssera nt; e negra mig 9K4M@ 4GhMus6hEv.tvW Mr wi@v . -ss J-i.s# 'eXM@ x-#ilm cr&heub53wshk eMW4% i: Qlee@v @s tits :. & t. @@ 91se# n 'uTt WAo.tien'~ queef <,qpes t exqpa@ @tsitsgG ggingqueggh .o - l

                        . .M .Sighe4--4t(6ufi'4td4h . GhetBW-M. lins . A e.w 4, m e m m w r w . m e e s e a r w e m m frN~EE25iBEMIDB211ilioEtl11MELE115piMHS5y3tiDernra111

..vu swwM wmau:!. pangs Macywrg m E F4+F-- If a ;;;ini;;; rcectivity fccdeck is anu ed, the reactor is tripped on high picnuriccr pecssurc. In this casc, the picssuriccr 3;fety valv;s opca, and RC pressurc rc;; ins bcicw 110t of th; dc;ign valuc. 2; 1i:0"3 eisc cpen to limit the acccadery sta; prenurc. yng,a j,33,,7, Q _3,7, ; ,, ,j If acxi;u; rcactivity fccdback is anu;cd, thc rcactor is tripped on c.citeycreturc ;.T. Oc deperture fica nucleete bciling retic bercescs throughout the tic ;sicat, and nc.cr disps bcic., its initial valuc. I'renuricer rclicf valics and liS:V er: ntiv;tcd and picvcat ovcipicnurication in the primary and scandary systcas. The MSSVs are assumed to have two active and one passive failure modes. The active failure modes are spurious opening, and failure to reclose once opened. The passive failure i mode is failure to open upon demand.

The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of thc NRC Policy Statc; cat lunu;FIDUT40mlonosf>] LCD The accident analysis requires ftw tDarmve MSSVs per steam generator tEORERABG to provide overpressure protection for design basis transients occurring at 102% RTP. An lis:V will bc cr.sidcr;d ino--bic if it fails to opcn on dc;;nd. The LCO recuires that NHSSVs per.YsteamZgeneratW be OPERABLE in compliance wi ference 2-g cycn though this i: not a < 3 ccquiracat of th: D A malysi:. This is bccoux cperetien riith I or - la: than the full numbcr of ti::Vs requira limitation: a elicwabic ~1:En"AL PC'ZR (tc acct A:": Codc rcquirc:at ). Thac - Q 316 g a %. M A - 3 (continued) MARK-UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.7 2 5/15/97

Q 3.7.1-4 INSERT B 3.7-2 in some circumstances it is necessary to limit the primaiy side heat generation that can be l achieved during an AOO by reducing the setpoint of the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor I trip function. For example, if more than one MSSV on a single steam generator is inoperable, an l uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal at power event occurring from a partial power level may i result in an increase in reactor power that exceeds the combined steam flow capacity of the turbine and the remaining OPERABLE MSSVs. Thus, for multiple inoperable MSSVs on the same steam generator it is necessary to prevent this power increase by lowering the Power Range Neutron Flux-High setpoint to an appropriate value. When the Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) is positive, the reactor power may increase above the initial value during an RCS heatup event (e.g., turbine trip). Thus, for any number of inoperable MSSVs it is necessary to reduce the trip setpoint if a positive MTC may exist at partial power conditions l l l

M55Vs B 3.7.1 BASES LC0 limitatica: ;r; xcording t: Tobic :.7.: 1 in thc ccxmpanMeg-(continued) LC:, and Rcquir:d Actica A.:. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open uponraemana within the setpoint tolerances g- relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced. The OPERABILITY of the HSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Dc ll*.t a:::l,7;;, c:=di,7; :: Tabic :.7. : l,i .4c ac::.ya,77l,7; LC:, arra2pcnd t; articnt anditions of thc valv; c,t ac;inei-cpcrating t.mpcretur; and pr.nure. This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCPB omarrt SM!iEESTMdWEfit'ED12MI APPLICABILITY In MCO: : ;bcvc 40 RU, the numbcr af MOSV: pc. :tx; ;=c:t:r c quir;d t; bc CITa:L: mu;t b; a;xrding t; Tabic :.7.1 ; in the i ecsapcnying LCC. Scio., 4: RT in MODES 1, 2, and 3, cc.1; two l M MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE M slmttuseconcauvas vsremspressure. ; 1 In MODES 4 end 5 Egg there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs, 'h :tn; gcac.at;r: ;r: n;t norm:11y u:cd for hat i r.acvel in MCC:: : ad , xd -thu; ar. net bc ;vcgra:urind, thccc i; n; r quir;acat fcr thc M::V t; bc CITJ2'.~ ir, thae ue - -

                     , ~ ~ .

ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV. 30 A/5XdW 4. evaewemb$un6t' cay TFr50dessa snappmyedgi5a T 55UWwcheJA0_WQW ing"#a ctionS3D2sbclo rITCCCCefit9 tt@aW1De9fl EdodtRo- -I_hesefBOdonS3lceOuineW1%WM1ngattirMADERW5WGnd ter.esamfiiatow owemaiustheTeowesmangeweutcona.m uen gn seg6trmrmmesfiirwrzarcr61t@ci:Deensassw#dW#' tiTo N

                                   \               b                   \

(continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 3 5/15/97

 .- -        . ...     .         _ _ . - -      . - . . .           _ . . . . _ . -  . ~ - - . _ . - . - . . - . . . . - . - . -

Q 3.7.1-4 INSERT 8 3.7-4 6.J. In the case of only a single inoperable MSSV on one or more steam generators when the Moderator Temperature Coefficient is not positive a reactor power reduction alone is sufficient to

limit primary side heat generation such that overpressurization of the secondary side is pmcluded for any RCS heatup event. Furthermore, for this case there is sufficient total steam flow capacity provided by the turbine and remaining insertion, such as in the event of an uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal at power, Therefore, Required Action A.1 requires an appropriate reduction in reactor power within 4 hours. Required Action A.1 is only applicable when the Moderator Temperature Coefficient is negative at all power levels.

The maximum THERMAL POWER corresponding to the heat removal capacity of the remaining OPERABLE MSSVs is determined via a conservative heat balance calculation as described in the attachment to Reference 6, with an appropriate allowance for calorimetric power uncertainty. l i

HSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 anas e (continued) compj.uuwumvi mez a secto nzcur.neumtsr.nez ratteruacca onunasmeen irsWgneT2amhouracc;;oiet30st:1medassor.oposedstnweesm<evycue With one or more MSSVs inoperable, rcducc pcwcr Ett'6TapitrfMLUE g so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets Reference 2 requirements for thc applicabic 2 a"AL PC'mIR. Lt- G 3.76 d - wthi 3W3 $ COME281185peration with less than all SVs OPERABLE for each steam generator is permissible if TH .AL POWER is propcrticnally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished b; krestrict> LinTHERMAL POWER L,, q 3,q, p tmyravem1regtromiUXstmuunr rEU&pumrmv.cotoan su that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that steam generator. For cx=pic, if cac "S:" is inoperabic in enc stc = scacrator, thc rclicf capacity cf thct stc= scacretor is rcduccd by approxiaatcly 20!. Tc -ffsct this reduction in rclicf cepecity, cacc;y tran-fcr tc, that tc= scacrator must tc siailarly rcduccd by at icast 20%. ~l ti ; i; accceplishcd by reducing ~1L".n"AL ItWER by ;t la-t 20! which carscrvativcly limits the cacrgy transfcr to all stc= scacratcrs tc eppicxinctcly 00! cf total cepccity. ansistcat with the rclicf cepecity cf asc{,cretor, KKgn a.--- As2nw+ a _@ nVs 68 &r sagg ADE 4 ~ -

                                                                                            'na- - r
                                                                                                                   ~-~-~@-
                                                                                                                    #-                 i_N__VJ l

ars rr =____4;ac y -1.i.n nn.-_.. m yu - . - :n -- -

                                                                                                                                     -L-.... sq h

l a.ox-. -13 yy.u m. wu un --- m. - 4Gilg--r r-n-num;5 tagarmamepsmarcamerssenssinsertragrovsamtre 4 3.7. M sMaITIeZ$Y/orumcorTAAD0DGIRumusu.neEUS:iMOJ2 GP. 8 AB - "sd n m

                                     /          l     .

I neH ULDwegEcmp.retJonJLhem2Yte45UttapastDA SecMnfoDerat7ng

                                                                                                          .     .r                         I expgr21 enceEtoia geomo I;1.statnemequirfG=AC:Dicnr4Fnvamor.cetry/

mannerMtH5Ut%ha ut er71Tngrun1.t Jsystep

                                  -6 Fcr an steem-gerratr at e-epecifi_d preteere-ttc 'rxtierre
                          .,:e          ..-..:       in        .a     ...u      u e e, , :. s.      - :- > ..              ,,. ..

I bi ibe WMpub i wJ \s3W/ .a i wwb6 8 6 6 .J W r &J ww wbi sI418 3bu M4 iVI IVMJ.

                            . , ,        A B

(contirued) MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 4 5/15/97

Q 3.7.1-4 INSERT SB-4a B.1 and B.2 in the case of multiple inoperable MSSVs on one or more steam generators, with a reactor power reduction alone there may be insufficient total steam flow capacity provided by the turbine and remaining OPERABLE MSSVs to preclude overpressurization in the event of an increased reactor power due to reactivity insertion, such as in the event of an uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal at power. Furthermore, for a single inoperable MSSV on one or more steam generators when the Moderator Temperature Coefficient is positive at any power level the reactor power may increase as a result of an RCS heatup event such that flow capacity of the remaining OPERABLE MSSVs is insufficient. Therefore, in addition to Required Action B.1, which specifies an appropriate reduction in reactor power within 4 hours, Required Action B.2 specifies that the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint be reduced within 72 hours. The maximum THERMAL POWER corresponding to the heat removal capacity of the remaining OPERABLE MSSVs is dstermined via a conservative heat balance calculation as described in the attachment to Reference 6, with an appropriate allowance for Nuclear Instrumentation System trip channel uncertainties. Required Action B.2 is modified by a Note, indicating that the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint reduction is only required in MODE 1. In MODES 2 and 3 the reactor protection system trips specified in LCO 3.3.1, " Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," prov. n sufficient protection. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable based on operating experience to accomplish the Required Actions in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

MSSVs . B 3.7.1 G 3.1l- h BASES O C C ACTIONS g1and12 (continued) required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the HSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program c(% a . The AS"I Sedc. Scction XI (Rcf. 4;, ccquirc; that sofcty and rclicf velsc tcsts bc pcrfcracd in esc,rd;nce with A"SI/AS " I ^" 1-007 (Rcf. S; . Acc;rding t; Refercacc S, thc following tests are rcquired.

                           ;. Visu;l s ainction,

b. Sc;t tightr- s deter;inction,

c. Sctpcint pressurc detersinetica (!ift actting),

d. Co,.plionsc ith carcr's c;t tightac s criterie, ;nd

c. Vcrific;tica c,f the M1;ncing dreicc intcgrity on blanccd vehe'r.-

Oc OSI,= Sterird rcquires that -11 i;1ics k tested cicry CA 3.?-co5 S yars end ; aini;u; cf 20t of the i;1;= k tcsted c. cry 24 ;;nths. The ASlE Code specifies the activities and

     +D    ,4                                        to satisfy the requirements. Table frequencies necess 3.7.12 allows att F etpoint tolerance f_or OPERABILITY,            "

uc citr. th; v;1vc"-Mat _ Q_. It;duri? the Survci . r-psb ell i f oi_Ijf ffessusc skat D C A 3 9-00 CA 3. -6d5 This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in M00E 3 prior to performing the SR. The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be I correctedsmTeneces5ary3 to ambient conditions of the valve at t j operating temperature and pressure. l {' (continued) B 3.7-6 5/15/97 HARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES

JUSTIFICATION OF DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1431 CHAPTER 3.7 i l This enclosure contains a brief discussion / justification for each marked up technical change to NUREG-1431. Revisicn 1, to make them plant specific or to incorporate generic changes resulting from the Industry /NRC generic change process. The change numbers are referenced directly from the NUREG-1431 mark ups. For enclosures 3A. 38, 4.- 6A. and 68. text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the irformation is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcommittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific information in that location. CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION g 4 3,7,f tf c Enwr fo A - k - 3.7 01 ction A.1 is revised. [new acticn A.2 is acced, anc Table 3.7.1 1 is ised consistent with traveler WOG 83. Rev. O to account for e fact tha a reduction in power level is not directly proportiona to the edu ion in main steam safety valves (MSSV) relieving c ability and] plants hich may operate for some part of a fuel cycle ith a positive moderato temperature coefficient (KTC). Per Westi ouse Nuclear Safety Adv ory Letter. NSAL 94 001, if the MTC positive at the required red ed power level, the reactor cool t system (RCS) heat up following a tu ine trip event could result n a core power increase and additional h t transfer to the seco ary system which may not be attenuated without er pressurizing t main steam system. To preclude this conditi , the power r ge neutron flux high trip set point is required to be set to ower level consistent with the number of inoperable safet val s within 72 hours. [] These changes are consistent with Westingh e Owners Group (WOG) Traveler WOG 83 and , NSAL 94 001. A recent revision to W -83 (Rev. 1) as been proposed requiring that t the power range neutr flux trip high etpoints be reduced when at a reduced reactor pow level to account fo a control rod withdrawal event at reduced eactor power. The identi ' cation of this issue has identified a no conservatism in NUREG 1431. nsequently the requirement i the CTS to reduce the power range eutron flux trip hign setpoints y ch inoperable MSSVs [ ] is retained. . wever, the 72 hour Completicif Time proposed in the traveler is incorpora d into the ITS. Thecha/gesareacceptablebecausetheretentionofthe equirement to reduod the power range flux trip hign setpoint is more cc ervative t' NUREG 1431 or WOG 83 and the extended Completion Time r ognizes le low probability of an event occurring during the 72 hours lowed

::ct *"e *m n setnoints.

3.7 02 The CTS Applicability of Modes 1. 2 and 3 is being retained in ITS 3.7.2. MSIVs. and ITS 3.7.3. [MFIVs]. The ITS Applicability is j "except when all MSIVs are closed and de activated" (wnen in Modes 2 l JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 1 5/15/97 l 1

1 1 Q 3.7.1-4 INSERT 6A-1a The Actions are revised consistent with TSTF-235 to account for the fact that a reduction in power levels is not directly proportional to the reduction in main steam safety valve (MSSV) relieving capability and plants which may operate for some part of a fuel cycle with a positive r Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC). Based on Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory ) Letter, NSAL 94-001, for plants licensed to operate at partial power levels with a positive MTC, changes are made to require a reduction in the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip

setpoint in addition to a reduction in reactor power when the MTC is positive. This is necessary to limit the primary side heat generation that may occur during a RCS heatup event. With a t

positive MTC a heatup of the coolant will result in a power increase which requires additional steam relieving capaci+y. Changes are made to require a reduction in the Power Range Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint in addition to a reduction in the reactor power when there is more than one inoperable MSSV on any single steam generator. For a reactivity insertion accident such as an uncontrolled RCCA bank withdrawal from a partial power level the resctor power will increase during the transient until a reactor trip occurs on Overtemperature (Delta T] or Power Range Neutron Flux-High. With more than one inoperable MSSV on any steam generator the combined steam flow capacity of the inoperable MSSVs and the - ine may be insufficient in some cases to prevent everpressurization of the Main Steam Symm prior to reaching the reactor trip setpoint. I 1 l l l I I I J

CHANGE h)MBtd JUSTIFICATION 3.7 07 Revised Conditions A and D to be consistent with current licensing basis. The ITS as written would have allowed the OPERABLE emergency exhaust system (EES) train to remaii1 in standby during movement of irradiated fuel. 3.7 08

SR 3.7.5.1 is revised to add a note consistent with the CTSs and the piant specific design. The verification of flow control valve position is deferred until conditions are appropriate. 3.7 09 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.7 10 Not applicabl'e to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.7 11 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.7 12 mm , -, -m , . _ , , _ . im oppiiuovic w v o . , om,.,m.

                                                         +msem
                                                               ,.i.

emo _. .a. muvving o, 5

                                                                                      . .'_mm
                                                                                             -Ib       k3I   i (Enuiusure 6Bt-3.7 13       Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table

, . , , (Enclosure 68). QM. 3.7 14 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 681. l 3.7 15 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.7 16 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.7 17 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table j (Enclosure 68). 3.7 18 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 1 3.7 19 REQUIRED ACTION B.1 is revised to state that restoration of "all but one" [ASD] line is required, which will effectively exit REQUIRED ACTION B.1 and re enter REQUIRED ACTION A.I. This is consistent with the BASES of NUREG 1431. The specific change proposed by Industry Traveler TSTF 100 is to add the "all but one" phrase to REQUIRED ACTION B.1 for plants that only require three of the four [ASD] lir.es to be OPERABLE. uk:A D 3.7 20 This change implements a requirement that is in CTS for Callaway A new Condition is added to address the inoperability of one of the Essential Service Water (ESW) supplies to the turbine driven AFW pump. JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 3 5/15/97

 - _ . . . .. _- - -                 - . - .           . _   .    - . - . . . . = . - . - -     . . - -    . . . -    . . . . . . . .

Q 3.7.1-4 1 ! INSERT 6A-1b i For Callaway, two setpoints are given in Table 3.7.1-1 for the case of 4 OPERABLE MSSVs per l steam generator. A Note is added to Table 3.7.1-1 and to the Required Action A.1 to address the plant specific requirement. Addition of the Note does not change technical requirernents, but provides clarification. The two setpoints are based on current licensing and analyses bases. l The safety analyses are based on Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter, NSAL 94-001. For further information refer to DOC 01-04 LS-3. 1 l t l l J 5

                   -                    .                                                                        _ -                                             ~.                            .-

t g -1~ l Dw'p

        ^ 3.q \ A                                                                                                                                                                                                      Page 1 of 7 W                                 CONVERSION C0tlPARIS0N TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES iROH NUREG-1431. SECIION 3.7

1

i APPLICABILITY kTECilSPECCll/NGE i DIABLO CANYON COMANCllE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY Nth!BER DESCRIPTIONk

\,

and able YES YES YES- j 3.7-01 As ion s.1 i re i ed [new AC}i0tl A.2) 3 /. > ts r vised] n for opera on wt NO - tYldn,m s ;

                                                                                                                                                     '                                                                                 l a

nope abl SVs ani resetti .31Qaer range neu - ('.TS flux high rip e ints wi i inoperad > iSSVs. ie 3 .Q C letir Ilme tr t t e power ra ge ne t flux high

tr ' > set .oints is extend . 4q 72 hou s. [The t b Ns i i re >ised based ondlSAL 94 001 a'511a elete the reference [ t fiv DPERABil/tiSSVs} - , YES YES ; 3.7 02 The CIS Applicability of flodes 1. 2 and 3 is being NO: DCPP is NO: CPSES is adopting 115. adopting ITS. ! retained in 115 3.7.2 IISIVs and 115 3.7.3. [liFIVs]. s YES: per LA 77/76 N0 ff0 f10 , 3.7 03 SR 3.7.3.1 is divided into two surveillances since both [ the stroke time and the frequency requirements are dif ferent at DCPP for the feedwater regulation /b> pass valves and the feetNater isolation valve. i YES YES YES [ 3.7 04 Requirements involving reliance on the SG heat removal NO: DCPP is system for heat removal in ilDDE 4 would be deleted. adopting 115. .. t REQUIRED ACTIOil 11.1 and new C.1 are. revised to state that YES YES NO: refer to il0; refer to > 1 3.7-05 3.7-19. 3.7 19. l restoration of "all but one" and "all but two" [ASD] lines is required which will ef fectively exit the respective ' REQUIRED AC110N. YES YES NO: not part of fl0: not part of \ 3.7 06 The C0ilDITION and RE00lRED ACT10fl for two or more ' CIS. CTS inoperable [ ADV] lines is limited to two [ADV) lines and , the CottPLETION TillE is revised from 24 to 72 hours per the ! current licensing basis. A new CONDITION C is added. 5 Revised Conditions A and C to be consistent with CTS. The NO: not part of NO: not part of YES YES 3.7 07 CTS. CTS. IIS as written would have allowed the OPERABLE EES train to remain in standby during movement of irradiated fuel. i YES- YES YES $ 3.7 08 SR 3.7.5.1 is revised to add a note consistent with' the NO: ABl valves have CIS and the plant specific design. The verification of a correct position. [ i j. flow control valve position is deferred until conditions , ar e appropriate. f 5/15/97 f CONVfRSION COllPARISON TABtE - NUREG-1431 : ! L

                                                           -         .          .    . - ~      .. .. _ . . -

Q 3.7.1 4 INSERT 68-2a The Actions are revised consistent with TSTF-235 to account for the fact that a reduction in , power level is not directly proportional to the reduction in main steam safety valve (MSSV)

relieving espability and plants which may operate for some part of a fuel cycle with a positive ! Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC). I 1 l l l I 1

{w.5k I[&hh CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROH NUREG-1431. SECTION 3.7 Page 2 of 7 TECH SPEC CilANGE APPLICABILITY NUttBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 3.7 09 New Conditions F. G. and H and the surveillance ' YES NO NO NO requirement associated with the FWST AfW punp supply are relocated from the CTS on AFW supply and included in the i DCPP ATW specification for completeness. 3.7 10 The specification description, the LCO. the action YES NO NO NO requirements and the surveillance are revised to incorporate the DCPP plant specific requirement for operable AFV supply sources via the CST and the FWST per the current licensing basis. 3.7-11 The REQUIRED ACTIONS for CPSES feedwater isolation and NO YES NO NO associated bypass valves inoperable are revised consistent i with the current licensing basis for a COMPLETION T!HE of 4 hours and to credit the MFRVs (feedwater control valves (FCVs)) and associated bypass valves for a cocpletion time of 72 hours. A new SR is added for the FCVs and associated bypass valves. 3.7-12 WGG-M-+evned Ndit.te : * :nd T:b!: 3 7 1 ta 2een"nt fan plante that credit-the Pcwcr Psang: "!gh u e ytrno riisa-trip NO gp -YES- A/C) NO M)- K8 l fee 64cn Ocn lilG-i+ positive (Sec.2.7 01 ;bcvc) Thc g_ ggggg7 gg_ 4

wor-dieg-ef-the-trevelcr he5 tcca redified fer CPSCS te 3.7, /- 4 ' accomt-for phnt ;pc:!fis-4!f ferencen 3.7-13 Note 1. under REQUIRED ACTION A.1 is deleted. The DCPP YES NO NO N') emergency diesel generators have self contained cooling systems that do not rely upon an external source of cooling water. . 3.7-14 The note for SR 3.7.8.1 is deleted since the DCPP ASW YES NO NO N0 system supplies only the CCW heat exchanger and no other individual components. i 3.7-15 SR 3.7.8.1 is revised to include a DCPP specific YES NO NO N0 ! requirement to verify the availability of power and air so that the valves can be placed in their correct positions as described in the bases. CONVERSION C0ttPARISOf1 TABLE - NUREG-1431 5/15/97

Q 3.7.1-4 INSERT 68-2b TSTF-235 is incorporated to credit the Power Range High Neutron Flux trip function when MTC is positive (see 3.7-01 above). The traveler has been modified for Callaway by adding a Note to account for plant specific differences. 1 i l l 1 l l l

ADDfilONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-5 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST:' CTS 3.7.1.1 Action b ITS 3.0.4 and ITS SR 3.7.1.1 DOC 01-05-M CTS 3.7.1.1 Action b states that "The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable." A note in ITS SR 3.7.1.1 states the SR is only required in Modes 1 and 2. Comment: This change is in accordance with the STS and it is acceptable. However, the DOC is incorrectlyjustified as a "more restrictive change. ITS 3.0.4 has been revised to permit the placement of Notes, as in this case, that permit entry into Modes of operation where the LCO Operability can be established. This is an administrative change that reformats the CTS requirements for the purpose of clarification by explicitly-stating the reason for Specification 3.0.4 not being applicable. Revise the submittal to provide an "A" DOC. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 01-05-M has been revised to be DOC 01-05-A. The justification of the change has been revited to indicate that the ITS Note is equivalent to the CTS 3.0.4 exception. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-1 Encl. 3A 2 Encl. 38 1 1 i l y - -

N 2 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l

3/4.7.1 TUR9tNE CYCLE l A l SAFETY VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATICH 3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each stea:n c i- ot- A generator shall be OPERABLE *Mn s li f t sanings ca spe.ified f a Te;i. 0.7 2. APPLICABILITY: H00E5 1. 2, and 3. uc MSS @ OL- ol-W. ( is ano ACTION: h, tank bbb &o l

                          ,a*.      With   'am'  reactor coolant iceps and associated steam generators in

[3,'7. j If coera: ,ar. a th or more main steam line Code safety valves q i_noce. .'s e goperation in MCOES 1, 2, and 3 may proceed proviced, that I ogq ,tg.3 (within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to CPERASLE:tu::c" og. g g g3 t status er the ':wcr hng: 4:utr:n H un H gh ~-i; I t::0i9t i: eg_t3 eM of yno r<, gg

                                    -pa r~; tic 2.~ .; otherwise, be in at least HCT STANDBY within the glcuej                   next 6 hours and in g             SHUTOCWH within *2: f:11:0 g " curs.

t. h; pr visica: :f 'peci fi:nica 2. 0.1 cr . act ;;;;i i cabl e. I2 + 2 ^ (

Ol-6-A { a t-os-65 l

          /                                                                                                             ~

3* o t- e t.- m c, . h se d b NEW LS-40] l SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS Q SN.)-8 o s- o,- A

4. 7.1.1 s 2eet tiem : :tui :::nt: :th:r inca th::: :wir:: ty Specifi;s".i:a 4.0.5. T nsec( C.

er one, or more s6 ptmdors usa os H55V mopudle. W L MTe, peshe, at g potuu AmE : a sn.l d ei- y _ t.g. 3 0 '3.1 l L4 g J ,,g q LS .3 I a.. con % o. mere s6 ged*s ed

MSSY )

inopAle. M Moduk % vh* F Co&'mt (HTt. Suo or THERHAL qdin POWER at toeJ!L G. 56 p[ouAu '71 ##]3 feaL reduc,4 RTP un%

3 kuu

       *'                                                                 3/4 7-1 n     w    g  a     t1ssv

_g H ; w &Ib % CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 yuut ss 'll % Ms.SV inopudt on mou y a , 3% Meou>w jpu, b 6. N6%- is sc% R

CTS 3.7.1.1 footnotes and inserts l Insert A l - or aduce Tacuumi Power r !::: i= c: eq"-1 m the A fr%r "le'adb CN 01-04-LS3

   -A RTI' y ccified inTable 3.7-1     3 fe 6: nu+ cf OPERpLE MSSV and htM hthe Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced *4eee                             i p   hr c: ;q=1 c 9 A f'+u . Al!c"d!: ", RTP :pecic::d in Table 3.7-1 fc:ic nw 1;r of OPEROLE MSS'.'; within 72 hours;                  gu                         :

l Insert B NEW HoDE ~5 s 7

c. With one or more steam generators with less han two MSSVs 01-06-M OPERABLE, be in at least I OT STA'.CI3'rwithin the next 6 hours and in MOT S:FCO",%within the felle >"n;If ours.

Mo0E 4 Insert C 4.7.1.1@ Verify each required MSSV lift setpoint per Table 3.7-2 in 01-07-A accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing, lift setting shall be within +/- 1%. 1 Footnotes A i

      @     Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2                    01-05-X 4 3Il I ~6
     #              te tw0 in            MObG $.                             01-04 -LS- 3 o 3a.1-4

CHANGE

               \          NUMBER                        NSEC              DESCRIDTION high trip setpoint be reduced for inoperable HSSVs if a positive moderator temperature coefficient (HTC) exists at the allowed percent rated thermal power in H00E 1: and

3) the power range neutron flux high trip setpoints be reduced to account for a control rod withdrawal at partial l powerwithmorethanoneMSSVinoperable.(hnaddition.

F~1 ) the completion time for resetting the high flux trips is ! revised from 4 hours to 72 hours and the ACTION is revised I O ~~ .k to specifically require an appropriate power reduction 23

                $                                                         within four hours. This is a relaxation since the CTS

( o 3 g_$ )o f g 3 y require the high neutron flux trip setpoint to be reduced as required within four hours for incoerable MSSVs S

                                                                                                                                                                  -t 4

l p^ F Mg o E~~ y O recardless of the HTC valuejPending approval of craft 9 >

                                                'l P %                        .1 of WOG 83, th'e cnanges proposed in the trave Tg 5=                              i have e an modified to retain the current TS rec' . ement to                           ;        l l                                       { p a .f'    $     9.             ' reset the             range neutron flux high trip etpoints L               based on the numbe           f HSSVs inoperable t a maximum o

y 3*f allowable power determi in accordan with calculations or analysis to account for W fingh se NSAL 94 001 and

                                                          %m :-           NRC Information Notice 94 60. h ver, the completion                                  QMd'g   '

9Io E time of 72 hours proposed by -83 been retained and }

         '                             {yhUp p'                           is justified based on the            w probabili:    f an event
                                        $ 4 12 g                         ; occurring during this ".e and the need to p vide sufficient time to r set the channels in an orc ly manner i[$0f 1 ~$ 3 <. o                   f aithout inducin Retention   of      e transient due to human error.

CTS requirement for resetting the re tor (, j trip set ints is acceptable because this requirement is D R [5' nore onservative than the ACTIONS scecified by either the c SorWOG83.asrevised] d XA The exception to TS 3.0.4 is no longer needed due to the note associated with the revised surveillance. The exception was allowed to TS 3.0.4 due to the fact tnat the applicable MODES must be entered in order to perform the Q 3 M. i-5 required surveillance (if the HSSVs are tested in place) and to allow Hoce changes to be made if the applicable action was met. In the CTS. MODE 1. 2 or 3 could be antered. In NUREG-1431. the surveillance is modified by a Mc . c.n r hote tnat specifies that the surveillance

need only be current prior n, reacning MODE 2. The surveillance note still allows HCCE changes into the MCCE of APPLICABIL:TY of the LCO.1.e. . MCCE 3 for test ng purposes. 31 06 M The new ACTION aeds an exolicit recuirement to ce in M00E 3 in 6 hours and MODE a in 12 hours if any steam generator (SG) 1000 nas less than two MSSVs coerabie. NUREG 1431 recuires that the plant only be placec in a DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 2 5/15/97

f'h 4 tJ )

               .:,1 l-                                                                                         0                                                       .

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7- Page 1 of 15 TECH SPEC CHANGE AFPLICABILITY DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION YES YES - YES 01-01 Reference to Table 3.7-2 is deleted from the LCO and YES A relocated to the SR (refer to 01 07 A). YES YES 01-02 A note is added to allow separate condition entry for each YES YES LS-1 MSSV which allows the full four hours for each inoperable MSSV. YES NO NO-01 03 This CPSES specific revision relaxes the as-found MSSV 11ft NO: LA 108/107 LS-2 tolerances from +/- It to +/- 31. issued 10/1/95 to relax setpoint (refer also to 01-13-LS20). YES YES YES 01-04 Revised ACTIONS for inoperable MSSVs: 1) specifically YES LS-3 requires a power reduction within four hours and

2) requires the reactor power neutron flux high trip set point to be reduced within 72 hours.

The ACTION of the CTS which allowed an exception to YES YES YES YES 01-05

   -H- A    15 3.0.4 is deleted due to the note associated with revised SR 4.7.1.1 which allows a HDDE change into H00E 3. one of 233.1 - S    the MODES of APPLICABILITY of the Lt0.

YES YES YES 01 06 The new ACTION adds an explicit requirement to be in H0DE 3 YES H in 6 hours and H0DE 4 in 12 hours if any SG loop has less than two MSSVs operable. This is one hour less than allowed by Lr0 3.0.3. YES YES 01-07 The CTS SR is revised to specifically reference the IST YES YES A Program. The surveillance directly references Table 3.7-2 for lift points and incorporates the footnote from the table requiring the HSSV as left liftpoints to be within '

            +/ It of the nominal setpoint.

N/A N/A N/A N/A 01-08 NOT USED. 5/15/97 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEE F ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.1-7 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1 Actions i' ITS 3.7.1 Action B DOC 01-06-M ITS Action B adds a new condition for when "one or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE", then MODE 4 is entered to exit LCO Applicability. CTS 3.7.1.1 Actions would require the more severe LCO 3.0.3 shutdown for this degraded condition. Comment: This change is not "more restrictive". In this degraded condition, the hss of one hour is immaterial since the one hour is insufficient time to return all the MSSVs to 1 Operable. The one hour period is the normal allocation of time to plan for an orderly plant j shutdown. It is less restrictive to place the unit in Mode 4 ratherinan in Mode 5. The "more" and the "less" restrictive features of this change are acting as opposites. Therefore, this change should include all this discussion and then be revised as an administrative reformatting of the CTS Table 3.7-1 requirements. FLOG RESPONSE: The applicability for this specification is Modes 1,2, and 3. In the CTS, LCO 3.0.3 shutdown only requires that the licensee " .. place the unit in a MODE, in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in.. " Mode 3 in next 6 hours, Mode 4 in the following 6 hours and Mode 5 in the subsequent 24 hours. Thus, for this specification, LCO 3.0.3 is satisfied upon entry into Mode 4. LCO 3.0.3 allows 1 hour to prepare for an orderly shutdown but the new Condition B does not; therefore the change is more restrictive. ATTACHED PAGES: None 1

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.1-8 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.1 Action a ITS 3.7.1 Action B DOC 01-12-A CTS 3.7.1.1 Action a requires the MSSVs to be restored to Operable status within 4 hours or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoints are reduced. If those

actions are not completed, then the unit is placed in Mode 5 within 36 hours. ITS 3.7.1 l Action B only requires placing the unit in Mode 4 within 12 hours where the LCO is not applicable.

Comment: The CTS requirement to place the unit in Mode 5 is explicit and must be l carried out if the MSSVs are not retumed Operable during the shutdown activities. The ITS change is less restrictive because the unit can remain indefinitely in Mode 4 for repairs rather than going into Mode 5. Revise the submittal to justify this DOC 01-12-A l change as "less restrictive." l FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 01-12-A has been changed to DOC 01-12-LS-40. DOC 01-12-LS-40 states: l " Consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1, the proposed change would require that the plant l be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours instead of in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours as required by CTS. In both the ITS and the CTS, the LCO is applicable only in MODES 1,2, and 3. Thus, the CTS requirements specify achieving a shutdown condition, MODE 5, that is more stringent than required to exit the MODE of Applicability i ! of the LCO. The change would permit achieving and maintaining MODE 4 rather than cooling down to MODE 5. This is acceptable since, once the plant has achieved MODE 4, it would be outside the Mode of Applicability for this Specification. Also, in ! MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs. Therefore, there ! l is no need to continue to MODE 5. Therefore, the proposed change is acceptable." l ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-1 Encl. 3A 3 Encl. 3B 2 Encl. 4 2, LS-40 l l d l l l I l

ON y 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTENs

~~

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE l-t 6- A

                                                                          '.'                                                                                      l SAFETY VALVES l

1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABL' J-' " ;ettings :: spe.ified ia Te;ie 0.7 5 o t- et- A l I

APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1, 2, and 3. l 01- 01-W. ACTION: taak Nb b'*f M ade t.wod b mk mSSd With four reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in [q 3,'7. l-Y 2: coeration ands.rith or more main steam line Code safety valves inocerable,goperation in M00ES 1, 2, and 3 may proceed previoed, that y. I og,34,g.3 3 q rwithin status4 hours, eitherkng;

r tnc ':acr the inoperacle tutten ~::: valve "ighis ~-i; restored to OPERABLEmty:d"ey.$)3 5 :::imt i:

                                         ;;r ~;bic 2.7 '_; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the I

l CM of morc rg ours. SHUTOCWN wi thi n * ' ' ' ' - ' -- I gleuv$ j next6hoursandinf:

t. h pr vi:i n: :f :;;;ifi::tica 2.0.i cr; act ;;;;i::b .. d + :: ^ - J Ol-Oli-A lc\-o A S D *7d'I a i- o t.- m C. nseA., @ tocw j

5-40) - SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS Q3dJ-8 os- o,- A

4. 7.1.1 9: deft s :: :quir = nt: :tter tn:n :n :: ,;;ime tj

ed 'i: ::i sa 4. :. 5. Imsed c.

l cr Ont, o f" m orf Sb jtntaldr$ WN

                        ,  one. H55V'ino                  W &, MT(,                                                                                               '

p os h at g % le.poum AutE : o sm d , oI- $4 -15 '3 1 O 'VI,1- 4 g[_gQ.LS

Mb U$* 0% N S n.. LO$ c>v, or (ncYs Slew f%LM l inoperde. e4 ModuM b FM P Suo or twyhin ak oJL p[cor femLs> < eda Le'5%

                                           -TMERHAL POWER to n I
           %d g g g @ m flSSV w O *$Nl J $
                  ~

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-1 4 Ho,y,iw pet w % '1l % T P. M yS *n N93V inopuA.blt on "10f6 skam g e b +l" N(, % ,

                                                                                                               -M__ om te eo w is G G

CTS 3.7.1.1 footnotes and inserts

Insert A 1 ot :cd= Th-uud Power e !x: S= _: eq",1 en the 3 f,+"- ' " c" cab 4 CN 01-04-LS3

 ;; RT:' ycc!Eed inTable 3.7-1     3 k: We n6Mr of OPEP-ptE FiSSV: and 4adece the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced 4+4eer e= c: :qu! M + o!&= \!!cedb . RTP :p::M;d in Table 3.7-1 2: t. nea; ef OPFRf2LE 3 !SSV: within 72 hours;                         pu Insert B NEw                                            H@E3      '

s. 01-06-M l

c. With one or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE, be in at least?IOT ST/J within the next 6 hours and in "OT SI"CC"T within 1: fe!!c 1 4-if ours.

HoDE + Insert C 01-07-A 4.7.1.1@ Verify each required MSSV lift setpoint per Table 3.7-2 in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing, lift setting shall be within t/- 1%. Footnotes A Only required to be performed in MODES I and 2 01-05 M 4 3A I~6 01- 04 -LS- 3

   # Q <s tard in M o b E t.                                                          03,7,1-4

_ _ ._ .m . . _ _ . _ _ _..__ ___. _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ( CHANGE NUMBER ESH.C DESCRIPTION mode where the specification is no longer applicable, which in this case would be MODE 4. The CTS would require the plant to enter TS 3.0.3 because operation with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE per SG is an undefined condition and thus not permitted. Therefore, the new ACTION eliminates the one hour allowed for action via TS 3.0.3. This requirement is more restrictive with the loss of the one hour for actions required by TS 3.0.3. 01 07 A The CTS SR is revised to specifically reference the In service Testing (IST) Program developed per TS 4.0.5 and contained in the Administrative section of the ITS. The surveillance directly references Table 3.7-2 for lift points and incorporates the requirement that the MSSV as left liftpoints to be within +/ 1 percent of the nominal setpoint. 01 08 - NOT USED. mot O$ED 01 09 -

                                    -Net app 1Tcabie to CaFF3%). See C,uversion LompnefP-Iab1 m i m re 30)r 01 10         LG               The note on Table 3.7 2 stating that the set pressures of the MSSVs shall correspond to the ambient conditions of the valve at normal operating temperatures is moved to the Bases of ITS SR 3.7.1.1. This change is acceptable because it removes details from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basic limiting condition for operation.

01 11 LG The MSSV tous-orifice size is moved from Table 3.7 2 to a D0 Au- C-licensee controlled document. This is design information that is not required in the ITS for operating or OPERABILITY concerns. --

                                       <                        MRT 3 A- 36               G 3 7 I-$

01 12 r The proposed change would require that the plant be placed LS- @ in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours instead of COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours. This is acceptable because it would place the plant in a condition outside the MODE of APPLICABILITY of thg 1en - T 3A-3 O 3,M The< descripti@ve material related to the definition of an 02 01 LG auxiliary feedwater (AFW) train, is deleted from the LCO and moved to the Bases. This change is acceptable because it removes details from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basic limiting condition for operation. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 3 5/15/97

Q 3.7.18 INSERT 3A-3b 01-12-LS-40 Consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1, the proposed change would require that the plant be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours instead of in COLD . SHUTDOWN within 36 hours as required by CTS. In both the ITS and the CTS, the LCO is applicable only in MODES 1,2, and 3. Thus, the CTS requirements specify achieving a shutdown condition, MODE 5, that is more stringent than required to exit the MODE of Applicability of the LCO. The change would permit achieving and maintaining MODE 4 rather than cooling down to MODE 5. This is acceptable since, once the plant has achieved MODE 4, it would be outside the Mode of Applicability for this Specification. Also, in MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs. Therefore, there is no need to continue to MODE 5. Therefore, the proposed change is acceptable. I 1 i

                                                                                                                     .. s                   s

( N ()$ fu G < la k Ol- 0 4 - LU'3 )

f.- - , pc. -f d.7-UD/ Page 2 of IS C0tNERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CU RENT TS 3/4.7 TECll SPEC CilANGE APPLICABILITY DIABLO CANYON COMANCllE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION l 01-09 This DCPP specific change revises the maximum power range YESi-L>R 97 06 NO: refer to f10: refer to NO: refer to sulaitted. 01-04-LS3. 01-04 LS3. 01 04-LS3. LS 31 neutron high flux trip setpoints required for one or more inoperable HSSVs in accordance with the recomendations of justifying.reYlled. Westinghouse NSAL 94 001. dated January 20. 1994. and high-flux trip set. specific analysis and calculations performed to confirm the -point s - for-conclusions of the Westinghouse NSAL. inoperable HSSVss YES YES 01 10 The note on Table 3.7-2 stating that the set pressures YES YES LG shall correspond to the ambient conditions of the valve at normal operating temperatures is moved to the Bases of IIS SR 3.7.1.1. YES: moved to FSAR. YES: moved to FSAR. YES: moved to USAR. YES: mved to FSAR. 01-11 The HSSV4+=+ orifice size is noved to a licensee LG controlled document. gC -A U(, gg pr) set changb w re re tt plant c N0; part of CIS. NO: part of CTS. YES YES 01-12 1 th 6 ou M YES YES YES C2-01 The descriptive material, definition of an AfW train, in YES tG the LCO is moved to the Bases. 02-02 The ACTION specifies the requirements for A0T should one of YES No: part of CIS. YES YES LS 5 the steam supplies to the TDAFM punp become inoperable. YES YES YES 02 03 ACTIONS are modified to require restoration of the systems YES M to meet the LC0 within 10 days of discovery of failure to meet the LCO. N0 NO N0 0?-04 In this DCPP specific revision, the APPLICABILITY and YES ft ACTIONS are revised to include HOCE 4 when the SGs are relied upon for heat removal, YES YES f 02-05 The addition of the note for three inoperable AFM trains YES YES A assures that TS 3.0.3 will not be entered and that no other action statement for other inoperable components will be applied that might force the unit into an unsafe condition.

 ~                                                 c          & 3.0 W $
      -- . .m r v n. . cni.o so r co t Tsot r                ritopfMT TS                                                                                                  5/15/97

Q 3.7.1-8 INSERT 3B-2b TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY . NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMMANCHE ' WOLF CREEK- CALLAWAY PEAK i 01-12 The proposed change would require that the plant be NO; part of CTS. NO; part of CTS YES. YES~ ' LS-40 placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours instead ofin !* COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours. i i i P i r t L

                                                          .__   ,.       7     ,  _ . ,,  .        .  .                            . , . . .

1 1 l I NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) . j CONTENTS l (continued) IV. Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations "LS" (continued) i LS 28............. .... ..... . .... ... . ...... . .... . . .. .. 46 LS 29........ ....... .. ... .... . ........ ... .. . ...... . 48 1.5-30.. . ..... ... . . ... .. .. . . ......... . .... ...Not used i LS 31.................... ...... ... ......... . ..............Not used ) l LS-32....... . .... ......... ........... ...... . ........ ... .51 l l LS 33. .. .................. ... ...... ........... .... .............. 53 l LS 34..... ............ ... ......................... ....... . 6 ! LS.35.... . ............. ... . ... ........... . .. . . St .bJ . 'as.?M-Y I LS 36... . ... ....... .... .. .. .. . ..... . . .. .. .Not use () 3.?,5-2 LS 37......................... ........ ...... ..............Not used Q 3 7 6'f LS 38......... ................................ . ...... ....... 62 l LS 39.. . .......... ...._. .. ........ .... .. ...... . .. . ... 64 LS- o FI w+-_A D- Q 3.9.1-u} __ -_ 8 4 l V. Recurring No Significant Hazards Considerations "TR" ! TR 1. .. .................. . ........ ........ . . . ...... . .... .66 1 i i h NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 2 5/15/97 1

Q 5.7.1-8

' INSERT 4-a IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-40 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The proposed change would require that the plant be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within
-12 hours in accordance with ITS 3.7.1 instead of in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours as required by CTS. In both the ITS and the CTS,' the LCO is applicable only in MODES 1,2, and 3.

Thus, the CTS requirements specify achieving a shutdown condition, MODE 5, that is more stringent than required to exit the MODE of Applicability of the LCO. . This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

          "The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the p' rocedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facilityin accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1. Involve a significant incmase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

3. Involve a significant mduction in a margin of safety."

The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase.in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change involves plant shutdown conditions to be achieved when Action Statements required by the Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Technical Specification cannot be performed as required. The change would permit achieving and maintaining MODE 4 rather than cooling down to MODE 5. Once the plant has achieved MODE 4, it would be outside the Mode of Applicability for this Specification. In MODES 4, and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs. Therefore, there is no need to continue to MODE 5, and it could be argued that considering the activities required and thermal transient involved with a plant cooldown, the probability of an accident or transient occurring would be reduced by remaining in MODE 4. Therefore, the proposed change would involve no significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated, In addition, accident analyses that credit the MSSVs are assumed to occur during plant operational MODES above MODE 4; and no credible transients could occur requiring

_ _ . ~ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ . ~ _ . _ . _ . . . _ operation of the MSSVs in MODES 4,5, or 6. Therefore, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents would not be affected by the proposed change. Therefore, the proposed change would not result in a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.: 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? '

The proposed change involves only the MODE required to be achieved and the time of l achieving the specified MODE in response to inoperable MSSVs. The change does not j involve any physical alteration of the plant systems of change the methods of operating plant systems. The proposed change would not introduce new accidents or failure

modes and existing accident analyses would remain valid.

l Therefore, this proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind j of accident. i

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

l The proposed change wou!d require placing the plant in MODE 4 within 12 hours rather t than MODE 5 within 36 hours. MODE 4 is outside the Mode of Applicability of the MSSV l Technical Specification, and no additional safety benefit accrues from continuing to / l MODE 5. The safety analyses that define MSSV OPERABILITY are initiated at plant ! operation. Therefore, the proposed change would not alter any accident analysis

                          -assumptions, initial conditions, or results. Consequently, the change would have no impact on the margins defined in accident analysis.

Therefore, this proposed change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of ( safety. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above safety evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS-40" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified, i+ i l l

, - . - - . . . - - - . . . - . . . - . - - . ~ - - - . _ . - . . - . . - . - - - . _ . . - - - l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.2-1 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.5, All Actions ' iTS 3.7.2, Action A, C, D, and E DOC 05-03-LS-12 l l JFD 3.7-34 l i l There changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the industry travelers referenced in this DOC (WOG-64 and TSTF 30) have not been approved by the NRC. Comment: Withdraw the changes or adopt the STS. 4 FLOG RESPONSE: I i 1 I WOG-64 has been approved by the TSTF and is designated TSTF-281. This traveler has ; been submitted to the NRC and the industry status reports indicate that the reviewer recommends rejection of this traveler. Therefore, the FLOG has decided to withdraw the changes proposed by the traveler and adopt the 8 hour Completion Time as identified in L N'JREG-1431. ATTACHED PAGES: I Encl. 2 7-9 Encl. 3A 7 Encl.38 5

Encl. 4 30,31 j Encl. SA Traveler Status page, 3.7-5, 3.7-6 Encl 58 B 3.7-11, B 3.7-12 Encl. 6A 5 Encl. 68 5 l

l I l a

IS lay l PLANT SYSTEMS

MAIN' STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES of A l Q 3.1. l - l LIMITlHG CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION kc 3.7.1.5 E-eehhain steam line isolation valve (MSLIV) shall be OPERABLE. o 5 A APPLICABILITY: .MCOES 1, 2, and 3. ACTION: , s ? 1 MODE 1: . With one MSLIV inoperable but open, ' POWER OPERATION may continue rovided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERA 8LE status within gy hours; otherwise be in NOT STArcSY within the next 6 hours erre-4e, S'03' ^ il0T :MUT00W" r . ;...n - thc f;"cW; 5 b m o bei Q g 3, g, g . l MODES 2 and 3: .p $ 6'" 8

o6 **A "edeE '\h os-05-m With one MSLIV inoperable, subsequent operation in M00 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve is m M *'ned closec, Otherwise, be in HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUT 00WN within the following 6 hours. _

Q 3,7.2~/ 4 oc ~ e. e% > 1a s - w sa .ee m b ebe * .c $ f

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SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREM NTS l 1 1

4. 7, l. 5 !.ach MSLIV shall be cemonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure I within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Soecification 4.0.5. The provisions l of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable "ar entry into MODE 3.

05 - CS- M

                @Gd Ned y eat \~ m W wk.ies b k sso\a. ben 9esg6 on an ub\ o< w.\mka acbe km S p \ ab \co d oo,e per
                               \ B eMb b                     o                   Sec-[tc.Atm.00.4ow t                       1 N h LOY &p^ mws '\ n& V 0%E". %

N b e R a<c.h L&b. , C by h c.1\oced etcL *S\V- 0 5- 63-L5 l' CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 /-9 l l

CHANGE NUMBER NSEC DESCRIPTION 05 02 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison _ Table (Enclosure ' fQ 59,2-1 8 05 03 LS 12 The Completic Time for closing one inoperable MSIV is extended to ACTIONS are ; hours included for either oneandVse in arate _ aoIe Required gr ,J W or more Vs inoperable in Modes 2 or 3. The Completion Time of G33,Q-1(8 ~ ours is considered appropriate for two reasons. First, there is a low probability of a SGTR event during this time period. Even if a SGTR occurred, the steam and condensate systems would likely be available to aid in the removal of any fission products released through the open MSIV. And second, because the Main Steam System is a closed system for events occurring inside containment. The closed system is subjected to Type A testing, is seismic Category I piping, is missile protected, and typically has pressurized flow through it during normal operation such that loss of integrity would be expected to be observed through leakage detection systems and during walkdowns of the system.jThi is c nsiste t wi the 72/hourfrestof tion 71me for conta'nment sola on v veg 9 3 7. oli cloged sy ems. /This c _nge i_ con stent J th OGy64 g g Inwt 3 A a7a o2 3 05 04 A The LCO is changed from the OPERABILITY of each MSIV to the OPERABILITY of four MSIVs. 05 05 M A new requirement for a 7 day periodic verification of the closure [ ] of inoperable isolation valves is added to be consistent with NUREG 1431. 05 06 - NOT USED. 05 07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 05 08 M This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs and [ main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs)] to distinguish between the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuaticn if one oc ' rs to satisfy the SRs. This change is consistent with a. Tnis proposeo change is q 3, , g 3 acceptable because it results in more stringent iS requirements that are both approoriate and consistent with NUREG-1431. < W p _.f a 3.9. 2 - 11 06-01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 7 5/15/97 D .-- . - -

Q 3.7.2-1 INSERT 3A-7a The proposed change revises the MODE 1 action to place the plant in MODE 3 and subsequently MODE 4 to require entry into MODE 2 since the ACTIONS for MODE 2 or 3 operation would then be applicable. The Action for operation in MODE 2 or 3 is revised to allow one or more MSIV to be inoperable. This change is acceptable because the MSIV is closed and performing its safety function and that, if other MSIVs become inoperable, their closure will allow them to perform their 1 safety function. The addition of the note allowing separate entry for each inoperable MSIV ! provides the full completion time / allowed outage time for each inoperable MSSV. This is acceptable because the action is to close the MSIV and the low probability of an accident requiring closure of the MSIVs in MODES 2 and 3 while in the 8 hour action. l l

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 Page 5.of.15 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 04 01 Isotopic analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 concentration YES YES YES YES H is to be performed on a 31 day frequency. The conditional performance requirerents in the CTS are deleted. 04-02 The SR of Table 4.71 to determine gross radioactivity is YE5 YES YES iES LS 8 deleted. 05 01 The MODE of APPLICABILITY for HSIVs is revised to clarify YES NO: maintaining YES NO: maintaining LS 9 that in HDDES 2 and 3 with all HSIVs closed [ ], the safety CTS.' CTS. function of the of the HSIVs is met. 05 02 This DCPP specific change revises the A0T/conpletion time YES NO NO N3 LS 11 for an inoperable HSIV from four hours to eight hours in H0DE I and in HDDES 2 and 3. This change also deletes the H0DE 1 requirement to place the plant in H0DE 3, and then H0DE 4 due to an inoperable HSIV and only requires entry into H00E 2 since the ACTIONS for H0DE 2 or 3 operation would then be applicable. Operation in t0 DES 2 and 3 is revised to allow more than one HSIV to be inoperable and by a note to allow a separate condition entry for each inoperable HSIV. 05-03 The completion time for closing one inoperable HSIV is NO: refer to 21 NO - ROf8bj YES YES LS-12 extendedto)ChoursandseparaterequiredACTIONsare 05 02-LSil. irl CTS 3, included for either one Ebn uin-nar= #1er @ more b HSIVs inoperable in H00ES 2 or 3. 05 04 The LCO is changed from the OPFPABILITY of each HSIV to the YES NO: already in CTS. YES YES A OPERABILITY of four HSIVs. 05-05 A new requirement for a 7 day periodic verification of the YES N0: already in CTS. YES YES H closure [ ] of inoperable isolation valves is added. 05-06 NOT USED. N/A N/A N/A N/A 05-07 A footnote is added to the SR (in lieu of the current YES YES NO: part of CTS. NO: part of CTS. LS-23 exception to 15 4.0.4) to indicate that demonstration of isolation valve operability is only required to be performed for entry into (and continued operation in) H0 DES 1 and 2. C0iNERSION COMPARISON TAlli E - CURRENT TS 5/15/97

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT MAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 12 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The current Technical Specifications (CTS) Actions require that with one main steam isolation valve (MSIV) inoperable and open in MODE 1, OPERABILITY be restored within [4] hours. Also, the CTS Actions require that, with one MSIV inoperable in MODES 2 and 3. subsequent operation in H00E 2 or MODE 3 may proceed provided the MSIV is closed and maintained closed. Failure to meet these conditions would require placing the plant in at least HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following six hours. The changes to the CTS to be evaluated are:

1) The A0T for a single MSIV

inoperable would.be extended from r0 hours tn J r_ hours in H00E 1. pe fi -

                                                                                /aN hollk 2tadlM (Vay61(rW/62Ncro6             s   o-      se      is$U
                                                                  &7             According to the BASES of NUREG 1431, the A0T of 8 hours is justified because of the low probability 30           of an accident occurring during this time period that would require McIV closure and because the MSIVs are isolation valves in a closed system (the SG and connected systems) that provide a passive barrier for containment isolation.                                                                                     ;

Extending the A0T from _ hours Pldd4tWrteflet& te@emaDQthe probability of an accident requiring MSIV closure occurring during a g hour

   @N'g,,1     period would remain very low. The MSIVs close to mitigate postulated' design                 6 basis main steam and main feedwater line breaks and SG tube rupture events.

l These are Condition IV events (" Limiting Faults") and have an expected frequency of less than one occurrence in a hundred years.

        ,-l       t n     to e                  A      f h           sy-        f m to 7             sfThe MSIVs are in a system that is effectively an extension of containment, The SG systems inside containment are designed to l

similar ASME standards and have system design pressures many times greater than the containment design pressure. Thus, the SG and connected systems provide an effective barrier " "- M =' " -e While the

   @ y,- l     SG and connected systems would not provide a barrier for a postulated SGTR, in this case with an inoperable MSIV, the release of any fission products would be via the main steam and condensate systems and through the main condenser.
;              These systems have long piping runs and a water-rich environment that would provide scrubbing of radiciodine and other fission products from the release.

2 In addition, the revised A0T would provide a more reasonable time to diagnose problems associated with an inoperable MSIV and mobilize corrective actions, obtain administrative clearances, complete the maintenance, restore the valve to an OPERABLE condition, and, where appropriate, perform a post maintenance NO SIGNIFICANT MAZARDS CONSIDERATION 30 5/15/97

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 12 (continued) s verification. The additional time reduces the probability of unnecessary unit transients and. unit shutdowns, thus improving unit safety and increasing unit availability. The proposed changes to increase the MSIV A0Ts are consistent with the recomendations from NUREG 1024. " Technical Specifications - Enhancing the Safety Impact." NUREG 1024 states in part: 1 Allowable outage times that are too short will subject the unit to unnecessary trips, transients and fatigue cycling. Outage times that are too short also l may result in less thorough repair and Dost repair testing befors equipment is

                    . returned to service.                                g                         m,,,ySQ,^;pepq7dl,Q

2) The MODE 2 and 3 requirements for a single MSIV inoperable would be revised to ,

extend the time to cicse the valve t hours. No A0T was enumerated _in CTS: q the imnlication_was that the valve would be closed imediately.fTQ AOIN 3 *y ' (s ci di NUR r 1431 s6 s. Industr vel r WUG- propo t ' 1 vis th1 to 7 ho The usti - tion or thi o s c is i i I sa as p ovi abov for SIV inope e in OE 1 a.. e i pr a 'l ty o an t re iring ' cl ure he ef ective'barrie l l tp ovid e SG yss insid contai ent g

3) Upon failure to meet the requirements for MODE 1. the plant would be required l

i to shutdown to MODE 2 within 6 hours rather than MODE 3 within 6 hours and

MODE 4 within 12 hours. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431. The CTS requirement to take the unit to HOT SHUTDOWN if the valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status is overly restrictive. Once the transition to MODE 2 occurs. the ACTIONS of MODE 2 should apply: the CTS allow continued operation in MODES 2 and 3 with one MSIV inoperable and closed. The safety function of the MSIVs is to close when required. Therefore, a closed MSIV is performing its safety function even if it is not OPERABLE. However, an MSIV cannot be closed with the unit operating in MODE 1 without initiating a unit shutdown. To provide the option to close the MSIV. the unit must be in at least MODE 2. Therefore, the proposed change would eliminate an overly restrictive shutdown requirement and apply a more logical sequence to MSIV OPERABILITY requirements as a unit shutdown progresses. i ew ct' Sta meny' uld ea d to 11 w con it

of cr . a' V o erao in r00E 2 nd t dd a ote o.llow rat reit L_n , ar como etion time. ,for _ cn i _oerkeMS .The proposed A0i to be e g h applied to this condition is 8 hours. These proposed changes are in accordance with NUREG-1431. Justification for the changes is based on the Required Action to close and maintain closed the inoperable MSIVs. NUREG-1431 recognizes that, if the-MSIV is closed, it is performing its safety function and that, if other MSIVs become inoperable, their closure will allow them to perform their safety function. The addition of the note allowing separate

! entry for each inoperable MSIV provides the full completion time / allowed l outage time for each inoperable MSSV. This is acceptable based upon the fact NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 31 5/15/97

            .                       -   ~.                  -       _.                            . .

Irductry Travelers Applicable to Section 3 7 . TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS i TSTF 36, Rev. 2 Incorporated 3.7-42.! 0nly applicable to DCPP TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Hot Applicable Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence ! for fuel handling accident. TSTF 70. Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable -Not- NRC approved -

                                                                   --trr!ehr cut Off'a: cfdne, TS-I N#f           <

TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7-05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved, WC& 83 Partially 3.7 01 Retained CTS (Formerly Incorporated requirements for WO6417 resetting trip setpoints

                                                                       ' " " S" "***"t' '                     '

m~5 more conservative than I93*. 1 I-4 the traveler, l 4094+- Incorporated 3.7 34 Not incorporated by DCPP as current licensing 9 31'd'I g p.,,,, y l basis. j o 3.?. s - I TSTF 139. Incorporated Not Applicable - ggc ,7f,,,/, T& 7. 7-oer f Rev. 1 Bases change l (CEOG 51) TSTF 140 M Incorporated Not Applicable TR 3.7-Cc4 Rev. X O Inco,,,a cL ,, f sm r1, w th;m witoMe er,bic.n. (CE0G-52) fgh-WOG8fr,ggrf Incorporated 3.7 57 Q ~3 7.2 -l h G 3.7.13. 0-2 3 WGG 35 Incorporated 3.7 56 Q 3.7, 2-3

        '7F1 ? - j$4        0 3.?. 2 - 3 I

p_ rg s,1- oo l 7 TR 31-C0 l u s .%i j Tx 3.7-C01 1 5/15/97 MARX-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

S

d. e T v N o r p

E p M a M C O R C N e g n a h C s e s a 1 3 E e . l C ba 1 N c 0 E lp i 0- R p 7 E A 3 F F t R I o D N T-A S T R E _ S N I d t e S ar U o T pr A o _ T cn _ S I O v.

        #    e R R

_ E 3 , L 7 E 1 V F - A T R S T T

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      #   I INSERT S A-TR 3.7-002 TRAVELERII                              STATUS                                                                                  DIFFERENCE //                                          COMMENTS TSTF-174, Rev. O                        Incorporated                                                                            Not Applicable - Bases Change                          NRC approved.

L [

l l MSIVs . 3.7.2 I

         -3.7    PLANT SYSTEMS i

l 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) l l LCO 3.7.2 hout HSIVs shall be OPERABLE. _B. APPLICABILITY: H00Eg1.2EBTdE liOOC: 2 and : caccpt whca all ",SI'! cic cic;cd nd : 3.7 02f d: ;ctivatcd. I ACTIONS t =

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME g G3/7.2-f A. One HSIV inoperable in A.1 Restore MSIV to OPERABLE Mhours M H00E 1. status, c a.s 4

i B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hottrs associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. l G 3nl2~l 6 - ~ , , l g8 C. "0E C.1 Close MSIV. % hours >J77)Gib Scp;r;;c Ccadition catry j .. O

40) ic ;11cacd for ;;ch Hs+y-.

6!ia l j C.2 Verify MSIV is closed. Once per 7 days B- ' l l One er-mere HSIVe inoperable in MODE 2 or 3. (continued) l ! l l i l MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7-5 5/15/97

t l MSIVs l 3.7.2 l ACTIONS (continued) REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION l _ -- . __.. v - ~ , l

                      ~
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                                                                                                                 -~+            1
      '.D 6 hours                fJ)Qgt-0_           Required Action andBe [(W_                  in H00E 3.
                                                                          .1                                    "

associated Completion Time of 8.D. (,ondition C M Be in HODE 4. 12 hours not met. BM.2

                                             ,    D v

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE NOTE SR 3.7.2.1 - - - - Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2. In accordance B PS

           #                  Verif                time of each MSIV is s 5 ISO                                                                                       with the                 3,7 56 seconds cn en ;;tc; cc ;imul; tad ;;tsetica Insenzice                  B PS signal.                                                        Ts3ttng?F.tc9c,ay Q 3q' ,9 S (continued) 5/15/97 HARK-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7 6

r MSI": . B 3.7.2 BASES LCO 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 4) limits or the NRC staff approved licensing (continued) basis. APPLICABILITY The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in M00Eg 1. and in MOOCS 2 and 3g cxccpt when closcd and dc activatcd when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed. they are aircady performing the safety function. In MODE 455ED1'E. normally .r. cat of the M2"s arc cicsc+.-end the steam generator energy is low. Onecerotes In M00C : cr C. the stc;; scacreters do act contain such cacrgy kceu;; their teapcrature-is bcicw the bci".ing point of watcr. therefere- the MSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES. ACTIONS M 8 Q 3.U-l With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1. action st be taken to restore OPERABLE status within d hours. 3Some repairs to the HSIV can be made with the unit hot. The)( hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the HSIVs. b The g hour Completion Time is greater than that normally allowed for containment isolation valves because the MSIVs are valves Q 3'9 b j that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valvcs differ fic; othcr contain, x at isolatica valves in that the mom ..r - IliI21lLtFiiBETTeTRWibTeTd(TMEtjEE!WlEME Et3bunymorgheTelosedrsVst"emW'Fscli provides an additional paTsive means for containment isolation. IL1 If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within g $ hours. the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in Q'3.9.2-l MODE 2 within 6 hours and Condition C would be entered. The Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. (continued) MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7-11 5/15/97 i

l MSIVs . I B 3.7.2 l gepwo SMbod I 1 I BASES Q 3'9'9'! l ACTIONS (continued) C.19 eM C.2 pm Q. h l Condition G g is modified by a Note indicating thatshwnerstYdYd mrernys7arestnoperaDtemntModemor=s separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV. Since the HSIVs are required to be OPERABLE -in H00ES 2 and 3, the l l inoperable HSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the HSIVs are already in the position

 -                      required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.                      ,

The hour Completion Time f23ctnrrmfK#tMShlEGA is consistent I with that allowed in Conditica A ff7rMME51bTvamopeW>m ' (t2iormer.egnyv.mnopesaTsgjefmotjfir.esDEIMygo

                        . __...m--.tanss%un.ea-m=, -//

m _ For inoperable HSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable HSIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be l closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative centrols, to ensure that these valves are in the , closed position. l p+3 Q 3.7 9 - I yik { u we :Abm<& If the HSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a HODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in HODE 3 within 6 hours, and in H0DE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from H00E 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. l l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that MSIV closure time is s Q seconds ef-en cctuel cr simletcd xtuctica sigaci Tr~o~Td"eRh78ttTratorsttialn (continued) MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 12 5/15/97 i

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION 3.7 32 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.7 33 The requirement to verify a make-up flow rate during the tests demonstrating the capability to maintain control room differential pressure above atmospheric pressure would be deleted. The current licensing basis of the plant is to be able to maintain a positive pressure in the control rocm with respect to the outside atmosphere. mbt USED accordance witn traveler WOG 64, the completion time ror closing one 3.7-34 in erable MSIV is extended to 72 hours; and separate required action

                                                                                             } 9gg are i luded for either one MSIV inoperable or two or more MSIVs inoperab e in Modes 2 and 3. The Completion Time of 72 hours is considere     ppropriate according to the Bases of NUREG-1431, b ause of
             }theicwprob ility of an accident occurring during this ti          period that would req e MSIV closure and because the MSIVs ar solation valves in a close system (the SG and connected system that provide a passive barrier for ntainment isolation. Extendiry the A0T to 72 hours would not alt the argument that the pr trability of an accident requiring MSIV c sure occurring duri a 72 hour period would remain very low. The MSIVs 'ose to mitigat postulated design basis main steam and main feedwater        e breaks   d SGTR events. These are Condition IV events (" Limiting Fa ts") nd have an expected frequency of less than once in a hundred years Also the MSIVs are in a system iat is an xtension of containment.

The SG systems inside contai . nt are design to similar ASME standards and have system . sign pressures man times greater than the containment design presr e. Thus, the SG and c ected systems provide an effective crier similar to that evalua d in TSTF 30. In addition, the evised A0T would provide a more reason le time to diagnose prob 1. s associated with an inoperable MSIV and mo 'lize corrective tions, obtain administrative clearances. complet the maintena .e, restore the valve to an operable condition, and, w , re appro iate. perform a post maintenance verification. The additiv al ti _ reduces the probability of unnecessary unit transients and unit utdowns, thus imoroving unit safety and increasing unit availability.j 3.7-35 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.7-36 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.7-37 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.7-38 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 5 5/15/97

f% hl {; 'J t CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROH NUREG-1431, SECTION 3.7 Page 5 of 7 lECil SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCl!E PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY t f The requirement to verify a make-up flow rate during the VES: per CTS. NO: retained CTS YES YES 3.7-33 tests demonstrating the capability to maintain control requirement. ' room differential pressure above atmospheric pressure would be deleted. 3.7-34 ' i attor d it w it. mTi c r "isp. it- c. Ton 1 iiG; miupiim C ;reia & E&-- W G3,74- [

              'o       o       ne i   >  able F        is ext                                                            to .        .                                   m.                               ....m.

MA g g n . ' arat utred ons are uded . either one g : IV in frahle i HnnFc ev4_1 g ; SR 3.7.10.3 is revised to reflect DCPP specific. plant YES NO NO NO 3.7-35 configuration and CTS required testing. ; NO YES NO N0 3.7 36 REQUIRED ACTIONS 0 and E are revised for CPSES for two t trains inoperable where at least 100% of the required heat removal capacity is available. NO YES NO NO 3.7-37 Hodifies LC0 3.7.2 CONDITION A and adds new CONDITION B ? and C to be consistent with the CPSES CTS. 3.7-38 This proposed change deletes reference to a specific NO: see CN 3.7-49. YES NO: see CN 3.7-49. NO: see CN 3.7-49. } flowrate for conducting the negative pressure test per the CPSES C15. SR 3.7.12.6 is added to verify the shutdown of the non-ESF NO YES NO NO 3.7 39 [ fans to prevent bypass of the ESF Filtration units (CPSES , specific). N/A N/A N/A N/A [ 3.7-40 NOT USED. 3.7-41 The Main Feedwater Regulating and associa'ted Bypass Valves NO: CTS includes NO: refer to YES YES are deleted from the 115 per current licensing basis. MFRVs. 3.7-11. i Add DCPP specific note that states that 3.0.3 is not YES NO NO NO I 3.7-42 l applicable to the fuel handling building ventilation r i system during fuel movement since fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. YES NO NO N0 3.7-43 ACTION A of ITS 3.7.13 is revised and Action C. E and F.1 of ITS 3.7.13 are not used per the DCPP CTS. CONVERSION C0t1 PARIS 0N TABLE - NUREG-1431 5/15/97

 -. ., . . . _                    _           __     _     . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . . - _ . . . _ _ . _ _ _ - _ .          . ~ . _ . _.

l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.2-2 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA i REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.5 , ITS SR's 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.2 l DOC 05-xx-LSx l CTS 4.7.1.5 states the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into Mode 3. ITS SR's 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.2 state they are _"Only required to be performed in l Modes 1 and 2". l Comment: Provide the technical basis for this change. A similar JLS change was only l l explained for DCPP and CPSES under change number 05-07-LS23. l FLOG RESPONSE: No DOC is applicable to this item because there is no change involved. The Notes on ITS 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.2 are technically equivalent to the statement in CTS 4.7.1.5 that the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3. As discussed in Example 1.4-4 in Section 1.0 of the ITS, this type of Note allows entry into MODE 3 for the purpose of performing the surveillance. Employing DOC 05-07-LS for this case is not l apphcable because l

1. The CTS surveillance requirements for the Main Steam isolation Valves at l

Callaway and WCGS already contain the note that Specification 4.0.4 is not applicable for entry into MODE 3, and

2. The Callaway and WCGS licensing bases do not include the provision that a 24-hour limit is imposed to complete a surveillance when changing MODES under a 4.0.4 exception. Refer to the Bases for CTS 4.0.3 and the submittals associated with Generic Letter 89-07 (ULNRC-2457, dated 8/8/91 for Callaway and NA 92-0139, dated 12/22/92, for WCGS). Therefore, incorporating the ITS Note in lieu of the statement that Specification 4.0.4 is not applicable would not be a less restrictive change.

Based on a review of the DOCS applicable to this issue, an addition has been made to DOC 05-08-M which describes the addition of a new surveillance requirement for the Main Steam isolation Valves. The following has been added to reflect the information in JFD 3.7-56:

                         "Although this is a new surveillance requirement, it may be performed in conjunction with existing surveillance requirements. Therefore, the statement allowing testing to be performed in MODE 3 is also needed for this new surveillance requirement."

ATTACHED PAGES:

Encl. 3A 7 l

i J

i CHANGE i NUMBER N2iG DESCRIPTION 05-02 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison _ Table (Enclosure . [g 3,9, g-q , 6 05 03 LS-12 The Completic Time for closing one inoperable MSIV is l extended to hours and seoarate Required ACTIONS are j l included for either oneMV7EigTUabIe gr3 flor more Vs inoperable in Modes 2 or 3. The Completion Time of G 3,7,2-l S X ours is considered appropriate for two reasons. l rirst, there is a low probability of a SGTR event during this time period. Even if a SGTR occurred, the steam and l condensate systems wculd likely be available to aid in the removal of any fission products released through the open MSIV. And second, because the Main Steam System is a closed system for events occurring inside containment. Tiie closed system is subjected to Type A testing, is seismic Category I piping, is missile protected, and typically has pressurized flow through it during normal operation such that loss of integrity would be expected to l be observed through leakage _ detection syst_ ems and during walkdowns of the system.jThis is consistent with tne q 72 hour restoration time for containment isolation valves (3 7 Ni on closed hange i_s consistent with WOG-64.

                                                                                  -g.ht_ 3 A '7C                                         ,

05 04 A The LC0'is changed from the OPERABILITY of each MSIV to l ! the OPERABILITY of four MSIVs. 05 05 M A new requirement for a 7 day periodic verification of the l closure [ ] of inoperable isolation valves is added to be consistent with NUREG 1431. , I 05 06 - NOT USED. 05-07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1 This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs and [ main i 05 08 H l feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs)] to distinguish between l the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these l ( isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an , actual actuation if one ocrurs to satisfy the SRs. This j TSL g,, change is consistent withG$GM This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS q 3, , g _3 requirements that are both acoropriate and consistent with NUREG-1431. < %p o 3.9.2- 17 r 8 06 01 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). l l l 7 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS l l l

l Q 3.7.2-2, Q 3.7.3-4 INSERT 3A-76 l 05-08-M - Although this is a new surveillance requirement, it may be performed in conjunction with existing surveillance requirements. Therefore, the statement allowing testing to be performed in MODE 3 is also needed for this new surveillance requirement. l l l l l I l 4

1 1

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.2-3 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.5 ITS SR 3.7.2.1 and SR 3.7.2.2 DOC 05-08-M JFD 3.7-56 These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the industry traveler referenced in this DOC (WOG-98) has not been approved by the NRC. Comment: Withdraw the changes or adopt the STS.

                                                                                                                'l FLOG RESPONSE:

WOG-98 has been approved by the TSTF and is designated as TSTF-289. The l August 18,1998, industry status reports indicates this traveler has been approved by the NRC. The proposed wording in TSTF-289 was modified from WOG-98 and these modifications have been incorporated into the ITS. The FLOG continues to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler. l ATTACHED PAGES: 1 i Encl.3A 7 Encl. SA Traveler Status page,3.7-6 Encl. 58 8 3.7-13 En:1. 6A 7 a i 1 l 4 i 1-s

CHANGE RQiEEB EEC DESCRIPTION 05 02 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison _ Table (Enclosure . [G 5.7,2-l 8 1 05 03 LS-12 The CompleticpTime for closing one inoperable HSIV is extended to A hours and secarate Required ACTIONS are ; included for either oneNbIe gfjnf/ or more Vs inoperable in Modes 2 or 3.' The Completion Time of Q 3,7,2-l 8 X ours is considered appropriate for two reasons. rirst, there is a low probability of a SGTR event during this time period. Even if a SGTR occurred, the steam and condensate systems would likely be available to aid in the ' re'noval of any fission products released through the open HSIV. And second, because the Main Steam System is a closed system for events occurring inside containment. The closed system is subjected to Type A testing, is seismic Category I piping, is missile protected, and typically has pressurized flow tnrough it during normal operation such that loss of integrity would be expected to be observed through leakage detection systems and during gowns w

o_f _the system.jThis 1s cotisistenY with tne q 72 hour restoration time for containment isolation valves f, 37 bb on closed systems. This change i_s consistent with WOG 64..

^'

g gin %k[3 A m- 7a , 3 05 04 A The LC0 is changed from tne OPERABILITI of each MSIV to the OPERABILITY of four MSIVs. 05 05 M A new requirement for a 7 day periodic verification of the closure [ ] of inoperable isolation valves is added to be consistent with NUREG 1431. 05 06 - NOT USED. 05 07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 05-08 M This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs and [ main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs)] to distinguish between the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation if one ocm rs to satisfy the SRs. This

                     ,TSW,,h                       change is consistent withQbG e       This proposed change is acceptable because it results in more stringent TS q 3, , g _3                      requirements that are both accrooriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. 4       %b3 A ---               G 3 9 9 ~ 1l 06 01                                       Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

7 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

fndust.y Trav21ers Applicabic to Sectior 3.7 TRAVR ER # STATUS DIFFERENCE E COMMENTS TSTF 36, Rev. 2 Incorporated 3.7 42...Only applicable to DCPP TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific

reanalysis to establish

                                                                                           -                                   decay time dependence for fuel handling accident.

TSTF 70, Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable -Not NRC approved'4: Of

                                                                                                                             -traveler cut off date 75-ZW#f TSTF 100                            Incorporated     3.7 05 and 3.7 19                               NRC approved.

TSTF 101- Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. WGCrres Partially 3.7-01 Retained CTS 1-(Fermerly Incorporated requirements for resetting trip setpoints {

                           .W08:3IT
                                             -                                                                                   since requirements are
             )

75 ~ e D more conservative than 93.1l-4 the traveler. C 't Incorporated 3.7 34 Not incorporated by DCPP : as current licensing 93 1d'I 73g y[ - basis. q 3.9 m , TSTF 139. Incorporated Not Applicable - gjgc ,gn y,j. T/-7. 7-Ser Rev. 1 Bases change 'I (CE0G 51) TSTF-140. M Incorporated Not Applicable T2 3.7-cc4 Rev. X. O w,,,a a, ,e sm 84, w ncuoadu wd:ulde er,'L rim. (CEOG 52)

                   'f'{ffWO64fragr/                              Incorporated                   3.7 57                           Q 3 7,10 -lh G 3,9.13, .1-2, WouG5                              Incorporated                   3.7 56 O 3.?, 2 - 3                                                                             Q 3.7, 2-3
                    '7F1 F -[Si I               CG~Jn  sx
                      ,~

os1-at W J 4 3'l-" I \ ' Ik M-00?.- TR 3.'7-Cc1 i 1 5/15/97 MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

INSERT SA-TR 3.7-001 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS Incorporated Not Applicable- Bases Change NRC approved. TSTF-173, Rev. O _..__.__._-.__..______.__.___.___..___--___u________ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _

INSERT S A-TR 3.7-002 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-174, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable- Bases Change NRC approved.

PS!Vs 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REC'JIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

     =:; .

N DS r.I b mum = u_s D?I . se _ V?.1 ours 22 N Ay, sepagategeonaanuememm n -fb 3,] g-/ i s sowe 51stl == / ;m .vrmtvecrosed! Once er 7 d s

        - u                                 .

WoXot@nG. 4 A ncpetatmemittiu MP N .m

                  /                       #"

{Q3.G2--l.,~N .I_

  'D                                    {
                                                .1       Be in MODE 3.          6 hours 9_           Required Action and [

associated W ' /'" Completion Time of Mia Condition C M 12 hours not met. BE.2 Be in MODE 4.

                                        >   )

O SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEKTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE

                                                   - - NOTE SR 3.7.2.1                    - - -

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

      #                                                                             In accordance           B PS __

l50 Verif time of each MSIV is s 5 seconds. en7 a. xtual ;r cimul:tcd xtu;tica with the 3.7-56 etgneh insetztca B PS Q 3 q' ,9 S Tssting2Fragr.,am (continued) 3.7 6 5/15/97 MARK-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 (continued) REQUIREHENTS wnentested@Gi3UHMt"Kd!theunserva ce=tt est EP.rogtam. The HSIV

             ,       ,            Mtime is assumed in the accident and containment analyses.
             ) s o fa.h,%          This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The HSIVs should not k 3*7'                 be tested at power, since even a part stroke exercise increases the risk of a valve closure when the unit i_s generating pcwer. C A .5,7-608 A E .o            Se ic X (              ,r     re n    u ng per                    in
                                                           '                  2 0 1/r 2 The Frequency is in accordance with the J.r. semi,1:cesestif55
                                   ,W2           w. m      ~o     .  ,,~ [10] xath Ircqucacy for valv:

closucc tix is based on th; rciucling cycic. Opcrsting c.<pcricacc h;s shcan that thcsc cac.pcacats usually pass the Surycillanc: whcn pcrferxd et the [10] xath Ircqucacy. Thercfccc, thc Ir;;ucncy is ac;cptabic fica, a rcliability tandpcint. This test is conducted in HODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and pressure. ;s discusscd in ricfcccnc- : : cxr:ising rcqu; r;. , cat s . This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in H00E 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until H00E 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated, 5R*5TT'7'~l IntssdKcyer.tTJ essna rgea cn7Md tv&Tsrca p aD _reto rJcto sucero nya n actuaJEDFEWufatedBcIRaUonEsignMmm ne:imanu? musticJDse hTDasw37.cnL9111th~dICoTittorMoomiotov.10esian;accepratuemactHEtTdii RTana L-zusdnTsnurve.t1:1ancesTsXnormamyspenfotmeaguponneturniHC l - l theiun t.tstozo pe rationirom owa ngaage,r.ue1Tacicut;agemnicon]uncf306 iTffhT5x=swmr nNowevetEft-ITs;acceptanten'orpectorurtEi3 iMEf>Tra ncaE1 ndTViMaTi ym nesfrTaTeTc3TcT4MSIVXtFst'i ng t.Ts eyery. w$ i mcnthT*!iTiis'IB~hi61ith7E rAcuencnf o rste stmgEHma sedM thefinet oe hingEy_c]:em i nTsweguency_etsaa cceptDT65fi:TimTa FETTib MtWsta ndpo1 nt""*Tiii's*SR'Frs%Tdit edMFfa?N5telthdt EI I ow s75trEi 5toTalid F6TffhtT6dKifi"H0DEss;p r.a o cstorpe rfc7i:iiii4Etlie , SRNff"ETTdWsTd6TEV"6f"testFnMTuht fT? H00E53T"tEdtt3 bTf sH 3 (continued) i MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 13 5/15/97

 .   -..-...- - - -~~.-                                       .-.-- - -.         -.-        -- -         -     ~ ,.

i CHANGE-NUMBER JUSTIFICATION the design of the Emergency Exhaust System. This is acceptable because it reflects the plant specific design of the system which has different j modes of operation for mitigating radiological releases in the l auxiliary building following a LOCA and the fuel building following a FHA. 3.7 45 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table l (Enclosure 68). l 3.7 46 Revised to delete " irradiated fuel assemblies seated in" the storage l racks since the accident analysis assumes that a fuel assembly is lying l_ on top of the fuel storage racks. This change is made to conform to l the BASES and APPLICABILITY for NUREG 1431. The top of the fuel rack , is approximately 1 foot above the top of the seated fuel assembly. l l 3.7 47 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.7-48 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68), gpy 3.7 49' The requirement to verify ahflow rate during the tests demonstrating the capability to maintain [ auxiliary and fuel] building differential pressure below atmospheric pressure would be deleted. The l current licensing basis of the plant is to be able to maintain a negative pressure [in the fuel building] with respect to the outside 1 atmosphere. l 3.7 50 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table ;

l. (Enclosure 68). d l j

3'g 00 l 3.7 51 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table % l (Enclosure 6B). ' 3.7 52 Net ri (JM cyphc.the b M' O

                                   %deswe. LEO 3.7 53         Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

3.7-54 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). _ 3.7 56 This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs and [MFIVs] to distinguish between the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these isolation

valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation. if one

! occurs, to satisfy the surveillance requirements. These changes are consistent wit!LSM.% [Although SRs 3.7.2.2 and 3.7.3.2 are new SRs. [ Tg ,283 they may be performed in conjunction with SRs 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.3.1. ! l ] Therefore. the note allowing testing to be performed in MODE 3 is also ' Q A needed for these new SRs. Refer to 3.7 25 for a related change.] l JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 7 5/15/97 ;

. - . __ ____ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . = _ - - . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.3-3 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.6[7] ITS SR 3.7.3.1 and SR 3.7.3.2 DOC 05-08-M JFD 3.7-56 These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the industry traveler referenced in this DOC (WOG-98) has not been approved by the NRC. Comment: Withdraw the changes or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number 3.7.2-3. ATTACHED PAGES: See attached pages for response to Comment Number 3.7.2-3.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.3-4 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.6[7] ITS SRs 3.7.3.1 and 3.7.3.2 DOC 07-aa-LSa JFD 3.7-25 ( CTS 4.7.1.6[7] states the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into l Mode 3. ITS SRs 3.7.3.1 and 3.7.3.2 state they are "Only required to be performed in Modes 1 and 2". Comment: Explain the technical basis for this change in a DOC. This is the complementary CTS change to match the ITS JFD 3.7-25 already provided. FLOG RESPONSE: No DOC is applicable to this item because there is no change involved. The Notes on j ITS 3.7.3.1 and 3.7.3.2 are technically equivalent to the statement in CTS 4.7.1.6 for l Callaway and 4.7.1.7 for WCGS that the provisions of Speci5 cation 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3. As discussed in Example 1.4-4 in Section 1.0 of the ITS, this type of Note allows entry into MODE 3 for the purpose of performing the surveillance. Employing a less restrictive DOC for this case is not applicable because l

1. The CTS surveillance requirements for the ' Main Steam isolation Valves at Callaway and WCGS already contain the note that Specification 4.0.4 is not applicable for entry into MODE 3, and l 2. The Callaway and WCGS licensing bases do not include the provision that a l- 24 hour limit is imposed to complete a surveillance when changing MODES under l a 4.0.4 exception. Refer to the Bases for CTS 4.0.3 and the submittals associated with Generic Letter 89-07 (ULNRC-2457, dated 8/8/91 for Callaway and NA 92-0139, dated 12,22/92, for WCGS). Therefore, incorporating the iTS Note in lieu of the statement that Specification 4.0.4 is not applicable would not be a less restrictive change.

Based on a review of the DOCS applicable to this issue, an additien has been made to DOC 05-08-M which describes the addition of a new surveillance requirement for the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves. The following has been added to reflect the information in JFD 3.7-56: l "Although this is a new surveillance requirement, it may be performed in conjunction with existing surveillance requirements. Therefore, the statement allowing testing to be performed in MODE 3 is also needed for this new surveillance requirement." ATTACHED PAGES: l See attached pages in response to Comment Number Q 3.7.2-2. 1 i I l t i

l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.4-4 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.6[7] Actions a and b l ITS 3.7.4 Required Action C.2, Completion Tirne l DOC 02-20-LS35 JFD 3.7-04 l If one or more ADVs is not restored, CTS 3.7.1.6[7] Actions requires Mode 3 entry in 6 hours and entry into Mode 4 in an additional 6 hours. ITS 3.7.4 permits an additional 12 hours for entry to Mode 4. Comment: This total 18 hour Completion Time, for entry into Mode 4, is for when the Applicability of the LCO has been extended to cover the extra time spent in Mode 4, while the steam generator is relied upon for heat removal per the STS. Callaway and WCGS have eiected to not adopt the revised STS Applicability, so the current licensing basis of 12 hours total time must be retained. JFD 3.7-04 does not discuss the technical basis for receiving the extra 6 hours of Completion Time. The DOC referenced is not applicable. Revise the submittal to retain the current licensing basis or adopt the STS Applicability text. FLOG RESPONSE: l In view of the basis for the 18 hour Completion Time provided by NRR, the additional time l allowed for operation within MODE 4 is not applicable to Callaway and Wolf Creek. l Therefore, changes have been incorporated to retain the current licensing basis of . 12 hours to achieve MODE 4. l ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-9b Encl. 3A 5, 6 Encl. 38 4 Encl. 4 2, LS-35 NA Encl. 5A 3.7-11 Encl. 5B B 3.7-26 l l

l ! l 1 ! m l l PLANI SYSTEMS l l l STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP VALVES 01-l3 - A Q 3.9.I-I 1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 i oL.- o3- ^ l 3.7.1.7 At least three steam generator atmospheric steam dumph'um c h e: (ASD's) i , shall be OPERABLE. I ( APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2 and'3.

ACTION:

                                                               \;m                                cx,- en -tSA5 a    With one of the required ASD             . noperable.due to ::u;:: cthcr        as-n cc ou-e3-m
                                - ...            ;;;a:;c, within 7~ days restore the ASD fo          #               5 OPERABLE stetus, or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in "*'

HOT SHUTDOWN within the following '

s. '0 ' " ~

                                                                          %e.s

t. With more than one of the recuired ASD%(inoperable 4ec :: "#

usci Other-ther cx :::i'/c :::t 10 %:ge, within 24 hours *'

restore at least two of the required ASDY to OPERABLE status ' O ' or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 houkand in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following g ours. um 2-S o-'55 C

                                                   .m
                                                   =_

. 'li t' ;r.:. r mc r; c f th: ;;;i ;d 7.50': ',cper:ble bc::;;c :f e< cert 10 rest 10 ks;e, c'c:t th: 2:50ciat0d bl0:' v :. l '/ ( ; } .

i ec- oT-t.515 4 rd et ~c the A50 :: 00E?fS'.E sta tu: t 20 dr.y:, :- t: l lj SEY 't- 5 hour: nd '- 907 SHUT 00'" it "'- th: e:m;,';E %

                    '- 907 :

1

          $    The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable,                   o t- o8- K 1

i SURVE!LLANCE REOUIREMENTS

4.7.1.7 No addit. anal requirements other than those recuired by l Specification 4.0.5. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not ; l applicable for entry into Mode 3. !. 0* # gew) Vec,C oy ne- m\ek e.gt of eack Asb me.%a,\ ho kb v.h in ceceJane, att & h e w e. %: h3 Pro p m l CALLAWAY - UN!T 1 3/4 7-9b Amendment No. W, 59

l i

i CHANGE l NUMBER HSBC DESCRIPTION l l changes and results in consistent presentation of pump testing throughout the'TS. 02 09 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). 02 10 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 02 11 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). l 02 12 TR-1 The respective valve and pump SRs are revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs. to satisfy ] j the SRs. The identification of the initiating signal is ; moved to the Bases. 02 13 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02 14 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02 15 LG The pump performance testing is revised to move the acceptance criteria to the Bases. This is acceptable because it removes details from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basic SR in TS. 02 16 A ACTION a. is clarified to note that ACTION [c and g] conditions are not included. This is not a technical change. 02 17 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison , Table (Enclosure 3B). 02-18 M The surveillance is revised to be consistent with NUREG 1431 which requires verification of flow from the CST to each SG. This is more restrictive than current TS which require flowjqrif_ication to only two SGs. g 39.$-Y e he LCO D ers 02 19 LG ACTIONS b a

AfN trains versus pumps. The ITS Bases will de train requirements and which RF0l!IREQ_ACUCHg -Q3.9.44 3A-k) [3$ ej f Th tiefr, fail / ret meet 02 20 lS 35 neACfl0Nre (puirempntsjo ,l ut he p ntdefnwo d be eviseg fromchiev/ng HpT '

DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 5 5/15/97

Q 3.7.4-4 Q 3.7.5-2 l O 3.7.6-4 j INSERT 3A-Sa Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). l l I i l

I I

CHANGE l DESCRIPTION

   '_       NUMBER        MiH_C

[?, t)- o cure to chte ing .OT TAND HUT 00 wifin w1 in e l foi ow1 i Q 3.?,54 t ext ho s dH SH WN wi in e fo owi g i Q'5,?,Li 12 oure. T is i re onab c nsi ring he xil' ry l f,.edwa.er ste. ca ilit'es cul be 1 mit an is i co ing d wn at rate uo a id al' e es fcons'tenwi to lan sys ms. This hagefsasscia d w' h e < stif' cati n o differ n s of _3.7 4. / I 02-21 LG The requirement to perform the 18 month surveillance J "during shutdown" would be moved to the Bases. 03-01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). 03 02 LS 22 The requirement to verify the operability of the essential-service water system by verifying the system is in ; operation when acting as the AFW supply is deleted. In : addition, the Action is revised to require that the operability of the backup system be verified "by administrative means." These changes are acceptable because the ESW system is designed to automatically start and supply water to the AFW system when required. Therefore, the system does not need to be operating to 1 perform this function. 1 03 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison J Table (Enclosure 38), 04 01 H The revision requires isotopic analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131 concentration to be performed on a 31 day frequency. The conditional performance requirements in the current surveillance (i .e. , based on 10 percent of the allowable limit for radionuclides contained in Table 4.71) are deleted. This results in a more restrictive requirement for the isotopic analysis. 04 02 LS 8 The SR of Table 4.71 to determine Gross Radioactivity is deleted. The change is acceptable because radiciodines ' and the resulting thyroid dose are limiting; not noble gases and whole body dose. The primary to secondary leakage limits and dose equivalent I 131 limits ensure the dose analyses in the [ Final Safety Analysis Report] remain l valid. 05 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 6 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS l

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 Page 4 of 15 TECil SPEC CilANGE APPLICABILITY DIABLO CANYON C0HANCilE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION 02 16 ACTION a. is clarified to note that ACTION [c and g] N0; CTS does not YES YES YES i A conditions are not included. contain an Action for TDAFW pump supplies. ; YES NO NO ! 02-17 The CPSES specific note with respect to Unit 2 Train A is NO A deleted since 2RF02 is couplete. 02-18 The surveillance is revised to be consistent with NO: flow path NO: SR not in CTS. YES YES ; verified at each : M NUREG-1431 which requires verification of flow from the CST to each SG. startup. NO NO YES 02-19 The Callaway specific ACTIONS b and d are deleted since the NO LG LCO now refers to AFW trains versus pumos. _ 02 20 The time from failure to meet the ACTION requirements to N0; refer to CN Y[S JET MO- JFr MO - LS-35 shut the plant down would be revised from achieving fl0T 02-10 LS21. Q S.'7 il- 9 f}f d pu Q ; STANDBY within the next 6 hours and 110T SituTDOWN within the Q 3.1. 5-- 2 CTS ms U ' following 6 hours to achieving 110T STANDBY within the next -q yg, g_gj 6 hours and 610T SiluTDOWN within the following 12 hours. NO NO YES 02 21 The Callaway specific requirement to perform the 18 month NO LG surveillance "during shutdown" would be moved to the Bases. P NO NO N0 03-01 The DCPP specific description of the AFV supply pathway and YES - LG the required surveillances are moved to the AFW ITS and : Bases. l NO: the service N0; refer to YES YES 03 02 The requirement to verify the operability of the ESW system LS-22 when acting as backup to the CST for AFV supply by water system is not 03-03-LG. verifying the system is in operation is deleted. The a credited AfW surveillance will now require that the operability of the supply backup. l backup system be verified "by administrative means" 03-03 The CPSES specific description of how to verify the NO: the service YES N0; refer to NO: refer to water system is not 03-02 LS22. 03 02-LS22. LG operability of the service water system when acting as backup to the CST for AfW supply is moved to the Bases. a credited AFW The surveillance will now require that the operability of supply backup. t the backup system be verified "by administrative means." . i f 5/15/97 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS

                                                                                         . - - - -    .m_. _ _ _ _ , _ . _ _ _ _

N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) CONTENTS (continued) Specif4c No Significant Hazards Considerations "LS" (continued) IV.

                                                                                          ............................... 46 t

LS 28.................................. LS 29.......................................

                                                                                              ........................... 48 30................ ............................................Not l                                                                                                                                 used

! LS LS 31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No t LS 32..... ....................... .................................... 51 LS 33...........................................

                                                                                                     ......... ............. 53
                                                                                                                                - 56       --

LS 34................. ......... ...... LS 35.........................................................

                                                                                          ..........................St.M F 2 QQ 3.1,5             1 M~Y 2

LS 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........Not . . . . . . . . .used

                                                                                                                                   . . . . .4'374-[

LS 37.............................. - LS 38........... ........ ............................................. 62 LS 39....... .......................................................... 64

                                                        -4 J ]-- Q 3,7./- g LS- 0 Recurring No Significant Hazards Considere: ions                                 "TR" V.

TR 1..... ............................................................. 66 1 L r a G s f u 5/15/97 2 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

DELETE O 3.9. 4- 4 I O 3. 7. s- 2. G 3. 9. a - 4 - IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS l NSHC LS 35 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR l TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i Consistent wit NUREG 1431, Rev.1, the required completion time to shut th plant down would be re ised from achieving HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours a d HOT SHUTDOWN within t following 6 hours to achieving HOT STANDBY within th next 6 hours and HOT SH N within the following 12 hours. An additional hours would be allowed to achieve OT SHtTTDOWN for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) ystem, the Condensate Storage Tan and the [ atmospheric steam dump] lines if ey were inoperable. Once HOT S OWN was achieved, the plant would be i a H00E where the residual heat removal (RH system would be OPERABLE in additio to the OPERABLE AFW train (s) and the support s tems used to perform the cooldown o HOT SHUTDOWN conditions. Since the inop able AFW train (s) and the sup rt systems may affect the normal cooldown rate, the TS allows an additional six urs to achieve MODE 4. The added time provides additio al margin to perform an o derly transfer from the SG method of heat removal to the RH system to regain the at removal function without challenging unit systems. The AFW system and the support syst are designe to cool the plant to MODE 4 entry conditions at which time the RHR ystem may e placed in service. The RHR system, which is required to be OPERABL is ca ble of adequate heat removal. Although AFW and the support systems may u d for additional cooldown below 350*F, AFW and the support systems operabil in H00E 4 is not an assumption of any safety analysis and is not consistent with h current licensing basis. The MODE APPLICABILITY for AFW and the support sys ems the current TS is H0 DES 1, 2. and 3. In general, the AFW system and e suppo t systems would be available to remove heat during a normal startup o shutdown a thus would be capable of providing the heat removal function ven if not tec ically OPERABLE. This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has en determined that it involves no significant hazard consideration. This det ination has been performed in accordance with he criteria set forth in 10 50.92(c) as quoted below:

                     "The Comission ay make a final determination. pursuan to the procedures in 50.91. that a oposed amencment to an operating 11 cense or a facility licensed und 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significan hazards consideration. if operation of the faci 'ty in accordance with the roposed amendment would not:

l 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or conseq nces of an accident previously evaluated; or l Create the poss1D111ty of a new or different kind of accident frcahany l accident prev 1ously evaluated; or N NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 59 5/15/97

D LETE Q s ,7, 5- 2. IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS O ' '

NSHC LS 35 (continued)

3. volve a significant reduction in a margin af safety. "

The following eva ation is provided for the three categories of the signific nt hazards consideratio standards:

1. Does the c nge involve a significant increase in the prob ility or consequences f an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change does not alter the plant configuration r operation or the functionofanysafetyhstem. Consequently, the change es not increase the probability of an acciden as defined in accident analy s. The proposed change permits a longer ti to cooldown to RHR entry onditions; however, this would not affect the co equences of any postu ted accidents and is appropriate due to the need t avoid any transien while cooling down with a potentially degraded AFW and su rt systems. Therefore, the proposed change wo d have no ignificant effect on the probability or consequences of any revioue y analyzed accidents.

c. 2. Does the change create the poss ity of a new or different kind of accident from any accident prev ~ sly evaluated?

The proposed change does not requi e phys cal alteration to any plant system or change the method by which an safety r lated system performs its function. As discussed above, the change oes allow a ditional time to complete the transfer from the SG as the thod for heat emoval to the RHR system, but i does not alter the basic odology. Therefore, the proposed hange would not create he possibility of a new or different kind of acc ent.

3. Does this c nge involve a significant reduct'on in a margin of safety?

The proposed c nge does not alter the basic regulator requirements or change any accident nalysis assumptions, initial conditions o results. l Therefore the proposed change would have no significant a erse effect on margins f safety. I NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associ ed with NSHC LS 35" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisf; the no

si ificant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c); and according ,a
n- significant hazards consideration finding is justified.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 60 5/15/97 i

Af h ASDY . 3.7.4 OA pe.g. . 3.7 7:- PLANT SYSTEMS PS. 3.7.4 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves 99%) IXSDTX

   ..g t .                                                                                                                                                              v: aPS u-          LCO 3.7.4                anree M @ lines shall be OPERABLE.                                                                                                   1B
        ..                                                                                                                                                                 ;3.7 4-APPLICABILITY:                        H00ES 1, 2, and 3 rg M00: 4 whca ;t;:.r. gcacratcr                        i; iclicd upca for hcat is.cval.-
                                                                                                               ~'                  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
                                                                                                                                                 ~
     'r-- M ONS' ~.. q ='2 == ='.'_ =='.'.'- ';-     . - . -
                                                                                 . . . ' # # *~'~; " _. YYI' ^

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION

                                                               . g =.;. .     .. ...._.. _.. .. _ ..                      . ._ : .         . . } ._ , ,
     ..-..w...          ..                  .      .:=       .

1 A.1 . f NOTE - - : - [_. '

      .1-.

w w- - A. . One. required M+-@G

17LCO 3.0.~4 i s not ~--- ~ ~ ~~ R:.PS ~ line 1'n65riat31e~ applicable. 2- '- Restore required 'M @ 7 days Y PS- _. .d ' line to OPERABLE status. 24 hours :3.7 19: B. Two or more required M B.1 Restore Itinout one ps

                               @ lines inoperable.

requirea M @ line to OPERABLE status. 6 hours C. Required Action and C.1 Be in H00E 3. associated Completion

                                                                                                                                                       'a ?.7.+ - +1 Time not met,                                   eE2 n/2 urs                             B C.2 Be in H00E 4. without-                                                                        3.7-4
                                                                                      . r-;lico;;.upac : teem. .__.                          __. _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . _

p;ncretar for hc:t rc ,cych-5/15/97 3.7 11 HARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

me g . B 3.7.4 fb BASES - In H00E 5 or 6, an SGTR is not a credible event. _ . APPLICABILITY cl LE:.'f (continued) ye.

       ";,5&rACTIUNS                                                    M
           ' ~~                             '- '                        With one required M E line inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion
           ~                   ~          ~

Time allows for the redundant capability afforded by the remaining OPERABLE W E lines, a nonsafety grade backup in the

                                                                                                                                                                                              )
  ..         Z ".r-;.a ;;.                              ..   ---

Conaenser; Steam M Bypest System, and HSSVs. Required

  --.m,,                      .T;._       ,.t    . f,% ,                Action A.1- is modified by a Note indicating that LC0 3.0.4 does     ~                ~

4 i. n.1 not apply.

     - .a              .
                                                                                                                                                                                            ~
     %_=l=.~:..-S-...-.-~_.......-..,.                                                 . .
                                                                                            ~
                                                                   ^
        ~ L..                                                    .. U
                                                                                                                                     .=
                                                                                                                  . . : .:..L
   '*'2Cl f.^ *%42 ~= With
                                                              .          : =p==;=1   ~     *     -       ..

two or more M Li@t!W3R!EiD lines inoperable, action must

          .. ._.                                                         be taken to restore all but one M tiEER!RG linet to OPERABLE status. Since the t4eek 6 valve can be
                                                                     . . closed to isolate an M E, some repairs may be possibl e with
              -i             .

the unit at power. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable to .

     \.                                                                  repair inoperable W g lines, based on the availability of the concensen Steam DM Bypeet System and HSSVs and the low probability of an event occurring during this period that would require the M E lines.                               -

C.1 and C.2

If the M reauir.eanSD line[.sE cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be ; placed in a H00E in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least H00E 3 within 6 hours, and in H00E 4 .;ithcut r; liar.x gca :tx gcacrat;r for hat rca,cval, withi ' urs. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on perating experience, to reach the required

     -                    --                     --           --          unit conditions-fro -full power conditions in an onderly. manner                                          _ - .

and without challending unit systems.

                                                                                                   /2 Q 11A - 4,\

(continued) 5/15/97 HARK.UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 26

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-3 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.2 Action c ITS 3.7.5 Action B l DOC 02-03-M l JFD 3.7-20 l l CTS 3.7.1.2 Action c has been modified to extend the Completion Times for one ! inoperable ESW flowpath to the TDAFW pump for "up to 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the requirements of the LCO." ITS 3.7.5 Action B contains this new requirement. Commeat: The STS Completion Time requirements are in brackets which means the l

requirements must be justified to determine if they are applicable or not. Callaway should explain in detail how the CTS or ITS permit " multiple overlapping Action entries such that the AOT is exceeded," as is discussed in the DOC. Provide explicit operational examples for this LCO. In addition, explain which Action of the LCO relates directly to the respective Actions A, B and C of the Example 1.3-3. Explicitly state how and why the new Completion Time extensions are developed and why they are appropriate. Also, provide additional explanations of how it was determined that this is more restrictive.

FLOG RESPONSE: The steam driven turbine AFW pump (TDAFP) receives steam from two main steam lines

       ' upstream of the main steam isolation valves and water from either the condensate storage tank or redundant ESW supply lines. Each steam feed line will supply 100% of the requirements of the TDAFP, and each of the ESW supply lines will supply 100% of the requirements of the TDAFP. ESW is the backup, safety-related water supply for AFW supply to the steam generators. Each ESW train can provide flow to the TDAFP through normally closed valves.

The TDAFP is required to be OPERABLE with redundant steam supply lines from each of two main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves and shall be capable of automatically transferring the suction from the condensate storage tank to two redundant ESW supply line and supplying AFW to any of the steam generators. The inoperability of a single supply line from an ESW train to the TDAFP does not render the TDAFP inoperable. With one ESW train inoperable, the associated motor-driven train is considered inoperable and one TDAFP supply line is considered inoperable. However, the TDAFP is OPERABLE based on the remaining OPERABLE ESW supply line and associated motor-driven train. Under CTS action requirements for an inoperable AFW train, for reasons other than an inoperable steam or ESW supply line to the TDAFP, credit is taken for the redundant steam supply lines and redundant ESW lines to the TDAFP. However, this creates the possibility of entering the ACTIONS in one Condition followed by a second entry into an unrelated Condition, followed by alternate entry and exit from these Conditions without ever restoring full compliance with the LCO or requiring a unit shutdown. Therefore, consistent with the guidance in Attachment 4, IT613, " Completion Time", an additional l Completion Time has been added for both the Condition for an inoperable AFW train and new Conditions for an inoperable steam supply line or ESW supply line which limits l operation with the LCO not met to a total of 10 days. The new Completion Time requires that the equipment affected be restored within "10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO." This includes meeting all the requirements of the LCO, including OPERABILITY of the steam supply line and ESW line redundancy . In this case, without the separate Completion Time, it would be possible to

attemate between Conditions A, t3, and C in such a manner that operation could continue indefinitely without ever restoring systems to meet the LCO. The new Completion Time sets a limit en the maximum time allowed for operation, in any combination of Conditions, during any continuous failure to meet the LCO. This results in an additional restriction on plant operation. Attachment 4, ITS 1.3 " Completion Time", Example 1.3-3, applies to the situation of one l Function X train and one Function Y train ir operable, and Condition A and Condition B are concurrently applicable. This situation is not directly applicable to ITS 3.7.5 Actions, which cover the possibility of several fonctiom with concurrent Conditions (i.e., en inoperable AFW train for reasons other than an inoperable steam or ESW supply line to the TDAFP.; an inoperable ESW supply line; and an inoperable steam supply line). ' However, the following case illustrates the purpose of the 10 day portion of the Completion Time: At time zero one steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump is discovered to be inoperable (1st inoperability), and Condition A is entered. This steam supply must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days and 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO. At this point,7 days is the more restrictive Completion Time i for Required Action A.1 which must be met. Next at day 6 the turbine driven AFW pump ' is declared inoperable due to failure of the trip / throttle valve mechanicallinkage (2nd l inoperabilily), and Condition C is enterad for one AFW train inoperable for reasons other than Conditions A or B. The turbine driven AFW train must be restored to OPERABLE i status within 72 hours and 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO. The l 72 hours is the more restrictive Completion Time for Required Action C.1 which must be l met by day 9. In addition, the steam supply must still be restored by day 7 in accordance with Required Action A.1. Then at day 6 and 12 hours the steam supply is restored to OPERABLE status, and Condition A is exited. At this point Required Action C.1 is still applicable, and must be met by day 9. Next at day 8 one ESW supply to the turbine driven AFW pump is discovered to be inoperable (3rd inoperability), and Condition B is entered. This ESW supply must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours and 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO. At this point,10 days from discovery < of failure to meet the LCO is the more restrictive Completion Time for Required Action 8.1 which must be met by day 10 rather than day 11 as permitted by the 72 hour l Completion Time. In addition, the turbine driven AFW train must still be restored by day 9 in accordance with Required Action C.1. l The Completion Time extensions are based on current licensing bases and are consistent : with NUREG-1431 Completion Times for other AFW/ESW train Conditions. With one of two ESW supply lines to the TDAFP inoperable, action to restore the inoperable ESW line to OPERABLE must be completed in 72 hours. The 72 hours is reasonable and based on the fact that the redundant OPERABLE ESW line can supply 100% of the TDAFP requirements; the availability of the preferred nonsafety grade condensate storage tank; the availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; the low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable ESW supply line to the TDAFP; and a 72 hour Completion Time allowed for one train of ESW inoperable. DOC 02-03-M has been revised to include: "By imposing a 10 day limit for time allowed in the Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO, a situation resulting from multiple Conditions which may be entered concurrently is prevented." ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 3A 4 _- - - . - _= .-_ - _

 ~_--.- -                ~- - -.- -.- - .- - ---~ - - _-_- _.--- _

CHANGE NUMBER .N_SEC DESCRIPTION 02 02 LS 5 The ACTION specifies the require-ents for allowed outage time (A0T) should one df the steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump become inoperable. A previous interpretation required that the TDAFW pump be declared inoperable and the ACTION statement for one inoperable emp be enNred. This revision is a relaxation of the CTS requirements. ! 02 03 H The ACTIONS are modified to require restoration of the j systems to meet the LCO within 10 days of discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This new requirement is intended l to prevent multiple overlapping ACTION entries such that the intended A0T is exceeded &This proposed change is 10 SAN 3 k' b acceptable because it results in more stringent TS g 3,9, g M requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. 02 04 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02 05- A Although previously implied, the addition of the footnote for three inoperable AFW trains assures that TS 3.0.3 will not be entered and that no other ACTION statement for other inoperable components will be applied that might force the unit into an unsafe condition.

               -02 06            LG                       The change would move the details regarding the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) motor operated discharge valves and essential service water (ESW) supply valve descriptions to the BASES. These details include the requirement to verify that the motor driven AFW pump discharge valves limit flow to 320 gpm and identification of specific valve numbers in the suction lines to the pumps. This is acceptable because these details are not required to be in TS to support the imediate operational safety of the plant.

02 07 XA The surveillance to verify valve alignments is revised to include automatic valves. This proposed change is O'5.16-6 acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both aporopriate and consistent with NUREG 1431. p 5,25-L 02 08 LS-6 The surveillance interval for the AFW pump performance is changed from once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS (STB) to "in accordance with the IST Program. This proposed change will eliminate any potential ambiguity l associated with AR4 pump testing as a result of ASME I 4 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS l

 . - . . . . - . . . . . . -       . ~ _ . . - - . _ . . . . .. - . ._.- . . . . . . - . - . .. . . . - . . . . .. - - _ . . . . . . _ - . -

Q 3.7.5-3 INSERT 3A-4a By imposing a 10 day limit for time allowed in the Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO, a situation resulting from multiple Conditions which may be entered concurrently is prevented. l t i I i I l I h I l l~ i

          ---                          ,        ._,r   . _ , - , , _                    e                     - . _. .,- .

- -~.. .. - - - . . . - . . - - . - - - - . - . . - . - . . . . . - . - . . . - . ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.4 5 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.6[7] ITS SR 3.7.4.1 JFD 3.7-28 CTS 4.7.1.0[7] states the surveillance is in accordance with Specification 4.0.5. ITS SR 3.7.4.1 requires one complete cycle of the ASD (ARV] in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The STS requires a frequency of"18 months"instead of "per the IST Program." This change is beyond the scope of a conversion. Comment: Withdraw the change or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS reference " pursuant to Specification 4.0.5" refers to the Inservice Testing Program. The Inservice Testing Program specifies the testing requirements and the testing frequency for pumps and valves included in the Inservice Testing Program. There is no specification corresponding to CTS 4.0.5 in the STS. The Inservice Testing Program is now controlled under ITS 5.5.8. Thus adopting the Inservice Testing Program frequency in the ITS is equivalent to the CTS Specification 4.0.5 frequency. ATTACHED PAGES: None l 1 l

                                                                                  --T-

ADDILONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.4-6 APPLICABILITY: CP,CA 1

     '     REQUEST:      CTS 4.7.1.7                                                                              !

ITS SR 3.7.4.2 { DOC 06-04-M JFD 3.7-28 CTS 4.7.1.7 states the surveillance is in accordance with Specification 4.0.5. ITS SR 3.7.4.2 adds a new SR requirement to verify one complete cycle of the ASD(ARV) manualisolation valve in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The STS requires a frequency of 18 months instead of per the IST Program. Comment: Withdraw the change or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: Callaway and Comanche Peak have included the ASD (ARV) manual isolation valves in their respective Inservice Test Programs. By including the valves in the Inservice Test Program and requiring a new surveil!ance in the Specification, the requirements are more stringent than before. The STS requires a frequency of 18 months for the new surveillance, however this is provided in brackets. Under TS conversion procedures, bracketed material may be ' replaced with adequate justification. The ASD (ARV) manualisolation valves provide a support function for the ASD (APV) valves. Because it is acceptable for the surveillance frequency for the ASD (ARV) valves to be provided in accordance with the Inservice Test Program, then it is also acceptable for the ASD (ARV) manual isolation valves. ATTACHED PAGES: None l l l l l l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.4-7 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA I REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.6[7], [ Item a). Bases ITS 3.7,4, LCO discussion DOC 06-06-LG For CPSES, the CTS 4.7.1.7, item a surveillance on the air accumulator tank pressure is not retained in the ITS but it is moved to a licensee controlled document. For Callaway and WCGS, there is no CTS requirement but the Bases LCO discussion states the Operability requirements for the nitrogen accumulator tank pressure. Comment: For DCPP. this equivalent CTS surveillance is retained in the ITS. For all otbEt, it is required to explain why this similar surveillance is not being retained or added to the ITS. Revise the submittal to add this new SR performed every 24 hours to ITS 3.7.4. { FLOG RESPONSE: NUREG 1431 evolved over many years ofindustry and NRC review and comment. Part of the process included the removal from the TS, descriptive details and in some cases whole specifications and surveillances that were not required to be in the TS As a result, TS requirements on many of the support systems for equipment required to be in the TS were moved out of the TS. The accumulators are such a support system for the relief valves. The designs and safety functions of the relief valve accumulator tank for the FLOG plants are typical of that found in the industry. The accumulator provides a backup means for operation of the valves in the event of a loss of instrument air. The CPSES requirement to perform a 24 hour surveillance on the accumulator tank pressure, while important, does not meet the criteria in 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii) for information required to be in the TS. Neither is there a similar requirement in NUREG-1431. As result CPSES included a discussion of the basis of the accumulator pressure in the Bases and moved the requirement for performing the surveillance to the TRM. Callaway and WCGS, which do not have this surveillance requirement in the CTS, likewise did not include it in the ITS. While not required to do so, Diablo Canyon's Operations department chose to carry their CTS requirement into the ITS. l ATTACHED PAGES: None l r s l l l l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.5-2 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.2 Action (a, c, e, new g); (a, b, new d] iTS 3.7.5 Required Action (C.2)(D.2], and Completion Times DOC 02-20-LS35 JFD 3.7-04 If CTS 3.7.1.2 Actions are not met, then it is required to enter Mode 3 in 6 hours and enter Mode 4 in an additional 6 hours. ITS 3.7.4 permits an additional 12 hours for entry to Mode 4 if the Required Action and associated Completion Times are not met or two AFW trains are inoperable. Comment: Issue #1 - The STS permits e total 18 hour Completion Time for entry into Mode 4, when the Applicability of the LCO has been extended to cover the extra time spent in Mode 4, while the steam generator is relied upon for heat removal. Callaway ! and WCGS have elected not to adopt the revised STS Applicability, so the current licensing basis of 12 hours total time must be retained, it is presumed that the RCSIRHR transition temperature is above or at the Mode 4 350 F temperature limits. JFD 3.7-04 does not discuss the technical basis for receiving the extra 6 hours of Completion Time. Provide a new DOC because the DOC 02-20-LS35 referenced is not applicable and not specific enough for this CTS change. Issue #2 - JFD 3.7-04 does not specifically explain the deletion of the STS 3.7.5 LCO Note. Revise this JFD or provide a new DOC to adopt the STS text. Issue #3 - JFD 3.7-04 does not specifically explain the deletion of STS Action E. Revise this JFD or provide a new DOC to adopt the STS text. Issue #4 - JFD 3.7-04 does not specifically explain the deletion of the note to STS SR 3.7.5.3 and the l STS SR 3.7.5.4, Note #2. Revise this JFD or provide a new DOC to adopt the STS text. Revise the submittal for these four related issues. FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1: In view of the basis for the 18 hour Completion Time provided by NRR, the additional time allowed for operation within MODE 4 is not applicable to Callaway and Wolf Creek. Therefore, changes have been incorporated to retain the current licensing basis of 12 hours to achieve MODE 4. { Issue #2: JFD 3.7-04 has been revised to specifically identify that deletion of the LCO 3.7.5 Note is consistent with the current licensing basis. The current licensing basis does not rely on the steam generator and supporting systems for heat removal in MODE 4. Issue #3: JFD 3.7-04 has been revised to specifically identify that deletion of STS Required Action E is consistent with the current licensing basis. The current licensing basis does not rely on the steam generator and supporting systems for heat removalin MODE 4.

la u3 #4: JFD 3.7-04 has been revised to specifically identify that deletion of the Note to SR 3.7.5.3 and Note 2 to SR 3.7.5.4 is consistent with the current licensing basis. The current licensing basis does not rely on the steam generator and supporting systems for heat removal in MODE 4. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-4, 7-4 a Encl. 3A 5, 6 Encl. 3B 4 Encl. 4 2, LS-35 NA Encl. 5A 3.7-14 Encl. 58 8 3.7-36 . Encl. 6A 2 l

1 si arm u1 v- m

             .w            3.I_..

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM U-O~

                                            .                                                                      Q 3 SI-l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION W as

3. 7.1. 2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwaterspum;; CF ol-6 and at:::4 3 ed #1:s ;;th: shall be OPERABLE aith.

T s .m -c o v e n -

                                                                                           . l . c.r f eccee ;.ec pu ..r ,                      each ;5p; Lie ui se .4- okON
                                   +wered from separate emergency busses, and

b. One stea,. rbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of beinc~

powered from u 'h steam supply system loops, and l

c. Associated flowpaths ; aacn motor-driven auxiliary feecwater pumo consisting of suction m the Condensate Storage Tank cacable of automatically transre. 'ng to an OPERABLE Essential Service Water Supply and discharge t *wo steam generators, and

d. Associated flowpaths for the turbine-driven a '

iary feedwater pump consisting of suction from the Condensate Sto a Tank capable of automatically transferring to two separate :o"BLE Essential Service Water supplies and discharging to four ste c

r.e :t:r:.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. htN r e o(' TOk%on$ 0o A ) 4,Ct L C 4 C. hd ACTION: ' b ox-os- "

a. With one auxiliary feedwater!;. ; inoperable3f restore the recuired c7. - e t- tG "M ~

auxiliary feedwater,w to OPERAELE status within 72 hourvor ce in at within the following fihe"*ugleast HOT STANDSY within the next 6

y. ,.: u

                                                ~ . , ~ , . . .. .
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6 .~~.

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                                                                                                                                           -- -      . - . _~ a -: . ,_-,

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b- d:: r:d i n ;;r:bl; = d '.:T::"" :., :., 0- ' -

.i: iid e

                               ;;;.i~.nl .

c. With one of the Essential Service Water flowpaths to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumo incoerable', restore the recuireds sucoly flowcaths to OPERASLE status within 72 hoursAcr ce in a: C3- #

least HOT STANDBY within the next 5 hours and in HOT SHUIDOWN within the following 4 p h

g. : a

...a

. 75.I w.

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q (7 5- L f--ds : t e ru- ; ' :;-: ::: , :: .ta 2: de:: " bed :- a ". - :N . ,

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l , _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _.._m_ .., _., _. __. . .__ ~ . ,., . c., m- ty.

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                                                                                           <_,..-w
                                                                                                                                 ~

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 S/a 7- A:nenement No.55

. . _ . . . . _ _ . _. _ _ . . . . _ . ._.....__....___.m.___ _-._____ ._._ _..___ - . . . . _ . 1 I Q 3.7.5-2 CTS 3.7.1.2 Footnotes and inserts INSERT E and within 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO 02-03-M i INSERT F 1

g. With one steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump inoperable, 02-02-LS5 restore steam supply to OPERABLE status within 7 days and 10 days O_2 _03-M from discovery of failure to meet the LCO, or be i MCDE 3 within the C](ig j E- L l next 6 hours and in MODE 4 within the following ours. Q 3.7.5-2 l

Footnote b < t LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO required actions requiring MODE changes 02-05-A are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. l. l

l AlfrILMRY FEEDVATER SYSTN

     ,          LIMITING C(WDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION: Continued W ^S                                        c2-ot- W

! is. Vith two auxiliary feedwater -punsbinoperable, be in at least HOT STN:DB'i within G hours and ja HCT SWTDC'.? within the followin hours.

                                                                                                                          '     o       1,       W A                                                        bus                             6' f..                                                                                                 o:-o5- A Vith three auxiliary feedwater.pues6noperable, israediately                                ox-os-te-initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary                                    py,7,g feedwater pump to OPEPJJLE status as sowi as possible.                                           -                  -

j

g. N - % h s. A i: ~ 7

                                                                                                                              *' 2~

o 2. , .

   -Z~~ l@FJ11AFg REDUIREMEh75  ~
                                                                                                                             "jV^                Y kn 4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater[penp. shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:                                       c 2 -o'- *

2. At least once per 31 days bY* '

(pw m.,a e-.c oed l a-. 4 a ,

                                                                                                       .A~Q             os-o1 6 2-%.            --

1) Yerifying that eachiner-:utcratic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

 )                                2)     Yerifying th.at each automatic valve, other than Al-HY-30, 31, 32, and 33, in the flow path is in the fully open position                                                  -

whenever the Auxiliary Feedwater System is placed in automatic l cor+ or nr when above 10% RATED THERML POVER. l

                                  % ==.caa.oe, wtA D s                 cc   res    ?.D                                        c: 'ca-tu

b. AL icas vowc m R ap v. . . Miw6cdC TESI EASIS by.

l I) Yerifykbh:t each s>otor-driven pump +p: ad kwge picss re--;f greater than cr caual tc 1535 p:ig on mcircul: tion , g.33.s 4L Lvelepa L s f6 whcn t;;ted-pur;uant i; Spccification '.0.5; and j bad of 2) Yerifyingh the steam turbine-driven pumpde" 1cp: a- ; I dirch2 p--prerrure of gre:ter than r cqu:1 to 1625-psig at-a sase

                                        -frew cf gre:ter th:n- er equ:1 to 12We (required to be cc:.pleted within 24 hours after attaining ;t900 psig in all                           i steam generators - the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into M3DE 3).
                                                          ,,            t ,

5(c'",. Q' "

                                                     ,),
                                                           .o y \oc    *st   po %;

i-oc gur t b & cr.p <c a doe lete d kacl m*e l CALLARY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-t a Amendment No. M ,108

4 l l CTS 3.7.1.2 Footnotes and Inserts

                                                                              ~
          '~

INSERT E andwi hin t 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO 02-03-M INSERT F

g. With one steam supply to the turbine. driven AFW pump inoperable, 02-02-LS5 restor st:am supply to OPERABLE status within 7 days and 10 days 02- -M from discovery of failure to meet the LCO, or be in MODE 3 within ~

the h0;%S3g 2o - / ~

              - -   next
    .m.--.._.....___.n_      6 hours      and      in   MODE       4      within        the
                                                                ._ _ _ _ .. . . ..._.. _ . foll.owin.

g C urs. ._. - q g,y, g.2 Footnote _

ac. . .

LCO 3.0.3 and all other,LCO required actions requiring MODE changes .,02-05-A

    2                  are suspeiided until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

s - i

                                       =.             .                              _e e
                                                                                                                     **MW8              6 M        4NWS eepe       g              a6 W    4

1 1 ! CHANGE NUMBER HE DESCRIPTION changes and results. in consistent presentation of pump testing throughout the'TS.

02 09 -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). 02 10 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). : 02 11 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison

iable (Enclosure 38).

02 12 TR 1 The respective valve and pump _SRs are revised to allow l credit for an actual actuation, if one cccurs, to satisfy the SRs. The ic'2ntification of the initiating signal is < moved to the Bases. 02-13 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). 02 14 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). 02 15 LG The pump performance testing is revised to move the acceptance criteria to the Bases. This is acceptable l because it removes details from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining ~the basic SR in TS. 02'16 A ACTION a. is clarified to note that ACTION [c and g] l conditions are not included. This is not a technical j change. l 02 17 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02 18 H The surveillance is revised to be consistent with NUREG 1431 which requires verification of flow from the l i CST to each SG. This is more restrictive than current TS l wnich require flowgification to only two SGs. J 3,'7. $- Y t _ Insat 3 A - 5b 3 02 19 LG ACTIONS b and d are celetMce the LIOMrs to AFW trains versus pumps. The ITS Bases will define train requirements and which RFOUTRFn_ . r I ara jQ3 ')4-Y [f$_g / Ii

A - So_) ~

02-20 LS 35 Th tiefr. fail / ret meet + e ACp0N reguirempnts yo ut he p ntdc/nwo d be evisey from /chiev/ng HpfT DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 5 5/15/97

l l Q 3.7.4-4 Q 3.7.5-2 Q 3.7.6-4 l INSERT 3A-5a Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1 i l l l 4 l l l l

l i I j CHANGE NUMBER BLTC DESCRIPTION _ - -- n , p 3,7 4-[ ST BY thi t ne 6 urs in l g y g, g_g -t fol owi 6 our< to chiev/nd_ ing .0T 4TAND T/HUTD0' d wi wi in e ext ho s dH SH DOWN wi in e fo owi g i

                . 7. 6 S      12 our . T.is i re onab                 nsi ring he jJXil' ry f edwa er st cap ilities cul be 1'mited an is con:4 ten. wi", co .ing d w at           rate .o a id . al er es to lan sys .ms. -This hagefsasscia dwdh                      e
                                                                                    /

stif ~ cati n o differ n sof3.7d4.

/ ~

l 02 21 LG The requirement to perform the 18 month surveillance "during shutdown" would be moved to the Bases. 03 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 03 02 LS-22 The requirement to verify the operability of the essential service water system by verifying the system is in operation when acting as the AFW supply is deleted. In addition, the Action is revised to require that the operability of the backup system be verified "by administrative means." These changes are acceptable because the ESW system is designed to automatically start and supply water to the AFW system when required. Therefore, the system does not need to be operating to perform this function. 03 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38) . 04-01 M The revision requires isotopic analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131 concentration to be performed on a 31 day frequency. The conditional performance requirements in the current surveillance (i.e., based on 10 percent of the allowable limit for radionuclides contained in Table 4.71) are deleted. This results in a more restrictive requirement for the isotopic analysis. 04 02 LS 8 The SR of Table 4.71 to determine Gross Radioactivity is deleted. The change is acceptable because radiciodines and the resulting thyroid dose are limiting: not noble gases and whole body dose. The primary to secondary leakage limits and dose equivalent I 131 limits ensure the dose analyses in the [ Final Safety Analysis Report) remain i

valid.

05 01 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 6 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

4 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4./ Page 4 of 15 ; I TECH SPEC Cl!ANGE ' APPLICABILITY

;-        NUMBER         DESCRIPTION                                                                                                                             DIABLO CANYON       C0HANCHE PEAX                                                     WOLF CREEK                                                 CALLAWAY 02-16          ACTION a. is cla.-ified to note that ACTION [c and g)                                                                                   NO: CTS does not    YES                                                               YES                                                          YES A              conditions are not included.                                                                                                            contain an Action for TDAfW pump                                                                                                                                                                                          i supplies.

02 17 The CPSES specific note with respect to linit 2 Train A is NO YES NO NO. - A deleted since 2Rf02 is complete. [ 02-18 lhe surveillance is revised to be consistent with NO: flow path NO: SR not in CTS. YES YES M NUREG-1431 which requires verification of flow from the CST verified at each to each SG, startup. I i t 02 19 The Callaway specific ACTIONS b and d are deleted since the- NO NO No YES

,         LG            LCO now refers to AW trains versus pumps.

i 02-20 The time from failure to meet the ACTION requirements to NO: refer to CN YES YEY #0- Jf4r AIO - LS-35 shut the plant down would be revised from achieving HOT 02 10 LS21. Q S."7 'I-9 l}fd fm, Mu j ' STANDBY within the next 6 hours and il0T SilllTDOWN within the g3,7,g_g g3 following 6 hours to achieving'110T STANDBY within the next C7g i 6 hours and HOT SituTDOWN within the following 12 hours. --q 3,9, g ! r 02-21 The Callaway specific requirement to perform the 18 month NO NO NO YES i LG surveillance during shutdown" would be moved to the Bases. i l i 03-01 The DCPP specific description of the AfW supply pathway and YES NO NO NO I LG the required surveillances are moved to the A m ITS and l Bases. 03 02 The requirement to verify the operability of the ESW system NO: the service N0: refer to YES YES l LS-22 when acting as backup to the CSI for AfW supply by water system is not 03-03 LG. [ verifying the system is in operation is deleted. The a credited AfW ! surveillance will now require that the operability of the supply backup. ! backup system be verified ~by administrative means" [ I 03 03 The CPSES specific description of how to verify the NO: the service YES- N0;. refer to NO: refer to [ LG operability of the service water system when acting as water system is not 03 02-LS22. 03-02 LS22. I backup to the CST for AfW supply is moved to the Bases. a credited AFM i The surveillance will now require that the operability of supply backup. the backup system be verified ~by administrative means." f i CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97

( l l \ l l NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) I CONTENTS (continued) 1 ( IV. Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations "LS" (continued) LS 28......... . .. .......... ...... ...... ...... ... .... ........ 46 LS 29. ........ ... ... .......... .. ..... . .. . . . .... ... 48 LS.33.. . . .. . Net used l LS 31........... ......... ............ . ..................... .Not used j LS32...............................................................51 LS 33. ............ . ....... ............. .......... .... ........... 53 56 - LS 34.............. ... ................ ........... . . . . . . . . . . . LS.35... ................. ............ ........... .. . . . .y . u+s .(W Q3.'?.4-9 LS 36.. ... ................... ........ . .. ........ .........Not use Q 3.7.5 0 l l LS 37.. .......... .......... ........ .................. . ......Not used 4 3 7 6'Y l ! LS 38... ......... ........ ........... . .... .... . ..... .... ...... 62 ! LS 39........... .. ..... ....................... . ...... 64 LS- D # Ih -t 4 C 3.7.f- g I

                                              -   k ]                                                                                   i V.      Re:urring No Significant Hazards Considerations                      "TR" TR 1... ...................          ............ ................ ............ 66 l

l l i 1 2 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

DELETE O g.q q- 4 . Q 3. '7. 5 - Q. IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICART HAZARDS CONSIDERA N5 NSHC LS 35 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Consistent wit NUREG 1431. Rev.1. the required completion time to shut th plant down would be re ised frc.", achieving HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours a d HOT SHUTDOWN within t following 6 hours to achieving HOT STANDBY within th next 6 hours and HOT SH WN within the following 12 hours. An additional hours would be allowed to achieve HOT SHUTDOWN for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) ystem, the Condensate Storage Tan and the [ atmospheric steam dump] lines if ey were inoperable. Once HOT S OWN was achieved, the plant would be i a H00E where the residual heat removal (RH system would be OPERABLE in additio to the OPERABLE AFW train (s) and the support s' tems used to perform the cooldewn o HOT SHUTDOWN conditions. Since the inop rable AFW train (s) and the sup rt systems may affect the normai cooldown rate, tt.e TS allows an additicnol six ours to achieve MODE 4. The added t6e prcvides additio al margin to perf*m an o derly transfer from the SG method of heat removal to the RH system to regain ;.a at removal function without challenging unit systems. The AFW system and the support syste are designe to cool the plant to MODE 4 ) entry conditions at which time the RHR ystem may/ 6 e placed in service. The RHR ' system, which is required to be OPERABL is ca 6ble of adequate heat removal. ! Although AFW and the support systems may u d for additional cooldown below 350*F, AFW and the support systems operabil in H0DE 4 is not an assumption of any safety analysis and is not consistent with h current licensing basis. The MODE APPLICABILITY for AFW and the support sys ems the current TS is HODES 1, 2, l and 3. In general, the AFW system and e suppo t systems would be available to remove heat during a normal startup or shutdown a thus would be capable of l providing the heat removal function ven if not tec ically OPERABLE. l l This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has en determined that it

!                     involves no significant hazard consideration. This det mination has been performed in accordance with he criteria set forth in 10 ~R 50.92(c) as quoted below:

t 1 1-

                              "The Comission ay make a final determination, pursuans to the procedures in                                            '

50.91. that a oposed amendment to an operating license or a facility , licensed und 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no ! signi fican nazaros consideration, If operation of the faci 'ty in accordance W1th the roposed amencment would not: l

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or conseq nces of an j accident previously evaluated; or i

j a. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident fronny accident previously evaluated; or N } NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 59 5/15/97

              ,                                    ,,-e,,                          ,          -             , - , .        .         -n-    -      +

,~ .. . . -.. .-.- - . _ . . . - - - . - . . _.. . . . - ._ _ - , - . ! g 3.1. 4 --4 h LETE q 3,7. 5 2. i IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS O

j l ! NSHC LS-35 (continued) I (

3. volve a significant reduction 1n a marg 1n of safety. "

l The following eva ation is provided for the three categories of the signific nt hazards consideratio standards: l

1. Does the nge involve a significant increase in the prob ility or consequences f an accident previously evaluated?

l The proposed change do s not alter the plant configuration r operation or the function of any safety stem. Consequently, the change ces not increase the probability of an acciden as defined in acc; dent analy s. The proposed l change permits a longer ting to cooldown to RHR entry onditions: however, this would not affect the consequences of any postu ted accidents and is appropriate due to the need t avoid any transien while cooling down with a potentially degraded AFV and su ort systems. Therefore, the proposed change wo d have no ignificant effect on the probability or consequences of any reviou y analyzed accidents. m 2. Does the change create the poss ity of a new or different kind of accident from any accident prev' sly evaluated? ; The proposea change does not requi e phys cal alteration to any plant system or change the method by which an safety r lated system performs its function. As discussed above, the change ces allow a ditional time to complete the ! transfer from the SG as the thod for heat emoval to the RHR system, but does not alter the basic odology. Therefore, the proposed hange would not create he possibility of a new or different kind of ace' ent.

3. Does this c nge involve a significant reduct'on in a margin of safety?

The proposed c nge does not altei the basic regulator requirements or change any accident nalysis assumptions, initial conditions o results. Therefore the proposed change would have no significant a erse effect on margins f safety. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION l Based the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associ ed with N5HC LS 35" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satis (f' the si ificant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c): and according ,a n significant hazards consideration finding is justified. 1 i

I NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 60 5/15/97

DEL.ETE & 3'1' Y ~ 4 l . ) Q 3,7.5-2 IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS d 3, 7, 4 -Y NSHC LS-35 l (continued). ENVIRONMENT EVALUATION

                   'The proposed change has be                                        lu d and it has been determined that the change.

does not involve (i) a signifi, cati .

c consideration, (ii) a significant change l in the types or significan .'ncrease in tne amo of any effluent that may be-released offsite. or d'

                                                                        ) a significant increase in 1                 vidual or cumulative occupational radi on exposure. Accordingly, the proposed                                                        meets the eligibilit                          erion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR .-                                9).
                   ' Theref                   ., pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment of the pro                                     d c          ge is not required.

I f ' . Os** J

i i l l l

       +   *:=

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 61 5/15/97 l t w - " , _ . . . - 4-i,. - .n., . ,

I APW Systm . 3.7.5 . l l

  .-9 l
  .. .r.e l :    FF ACTIONS (continued)

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION H BC. One AFM train inoperable B C.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hours 3.7 4. in %0; 1, ar ;. fo_F, OPERABLE status. ED. .::B - ! l reasons?.ornengtE5 C5iidifion ZAlorJM i IDFda7 M E , .:83 l

                                                                                                                                            !!E'6bvecrM                   13.7;20~'       i
                                                                                                                    ~

Taluur.egr.o apeer

                                                                                                          ~
                                                                                                        -' ~;                               t7ibTt C0 l

60. Required Action and G D.1 Be in H0DE 3. 6 hours r3.7-20

l l 2 associated Completion - ' AB;PS 9 l

        ;;_.;.             Time for Condition AM                                    RE '                .
    .g . .x'e -            br.,EC .not met.                     -   ' ,- --           7:                         --

urs s ",B GSM s Qg BeqtFJHODE M 3 < DE h /2 W [Q 3.7 5 - N6?Ahw.ttnams nnoperHbT6 in =0; 1. 2, r3.7 .. g

                                                                                                                                        -                                         ~B:      I GEs ahree .AFW trains                                           DEE NOTE       -
                                                                                                                                                                                           \

LCO 3.0.3 anc all other ;3.74

                       - inoperable in "OC: 1. 2
                           %                                                                       LCO Required Actions                                                            B requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

Initiate action to . Immediately l I restore one AFW train - - l l - - --

                                                                                                   -to OPERABLE status----                                                                 l M dictcly                      3.7 4

[. Rcqui. cd A."J trcin C.1 ~.T.iticic cctica tc rcctcrc nen . e , -

                                                .      : _u--             . .
                                                                                            ,-.._.:_u IW

3iibp

                               - _ _ibe

_ _e s. 6,_ eb i44 en. .i e ~. ng n i. . d 61 i . .i VI 6 sic L's . t W 3.7 14 5/15/97 MARX UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

AFW Syster. . B 3.7.5 n% dh;7

s. , BASES ACTIONS EJJ (continued)

        -                                             The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allcwed in
      -                                                this specitled Condition afcer di.5cs'.ary of icilur e tc .aet th:

LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which lii1T%1pjg Conditions A and 0 are entered concurrently. The A@. connector between 72 hours and 10 days dictates that both 4 Comoletion Times apply simultaneously, '~~~ ~ and the more restrictive

                                                                               ~ ~ ~ ~ ' " ' " ~

tMd L

5. .. : .. .

   .' ,h   . . -. .__. . . . . . x.j.                         *         '
                                  . . . . _ . _. ,. J1.1 and G 0.2~
                                                                                           " " ~ ~ ~
   " . ,                               '; 5 - - When Required Action A.1 pr2trnTor#.J. Cannot be ComDleted within
   ""                           " m L*?. ~         'the required Completion Time, or if two AFW trains are inoperable Gw.                 .
                               ._5;en s b r.r - in 1i00: 1. O. cr 3. the unit must be placed in a H0DE in which
                               -+ e- . --e              the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be ec-r.
                                    ~

laced in at least H0DE 3 within 6 hours, and in H0DE 4 within MN allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating

 '  -                                                   experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full pcwer conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

In li00: 4 with tsc AIJ train; inspcratic, spcratica i;-clicwcd to cantingc bc .;u;c Only c-nc act:r driv;n pump A%' train i; ic;;irci in ;;;;rden;c ith thc ikt; that ,:dific; thc LOO. ilthcu;h act icquircd. thc unit acy c;ntinuc te ccci dcwn and initict; IJ:, 9 E.1 If all Qt_eg AFW trains are inoperable in tiOC: 1. 2. ;r 2. the unit is in a seriously degraded condition yith no safety related l means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for

                                                   . __ conducting..a cooldown.wi.th nonsafety te.1ated .equipmerit.                     In such _     __

a condition, the unit should not be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be started i ir:rnediately to restore one AFW train to GPERABLE status, i (continued) [ B 3.7 36 5/15/97 HAPX-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES l l

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION and 3 for the HSIVs) and "except when closed and de activated" (in 1

         ,44 ne;w                                          Hode 1. 2. and 3 for the [HFIVs]).

y t e . .: .

l CTS 3.7.1.5 permits continued plant operation with one HSIV inoperable in Modes 2 and 3 provided the inoperable HSIV is maintained closed. CTS 3.7.1.6 permits continued plant operation in Mode 3 with one [HFIV]

" inoperable provided the inoperable [HFIV) is maintained closed. The Ils allow multiple vaives co be inoperable prMded the/ Ort ined tai verified closed every 7 days. For either the ITS or CTS there is no
- -- specified time limitation for continued plant operation provided the *
'~ 4' . required actions continue to be satisfied. Both the ITS and the CTS
- ' recognize that when a MSIV or [HFIV] is in the closed position, it is performing its safety related function. There is no benefit with regard to either safe plant operation or a postulated single failure in ,
- the accident analysis in de energizing the valves in or9r to exit the
- LCO in accordance with the ITS Applicability. The Required Actions would continue to assure that the inoperable valves were closed and i verified closed. While the ITS may provide additional flexibility for opcrations under certain circumstances, use of the CTS Applicability
~
" - would remove some uncertainty 'regarding the relationship between the
- 4 l .
.."7 - ~
~ Applicability and Required Actions for these LCOs. Therefore, using the CTS Applicability statement in the ITS for HSIVs and [HFIVs] is acceptable and would represent an improvement in the mechanics of ap' plying the LCOs, 3.7 03 Not. applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table l (Enclosure 68). ;

3.7 04 Requirements involving reliance on the SG heat remvai system for heat l

            *        -                       -           removal in MODE 4 would be deleted consistent with current licensing basis. The SG heat removal system is designed to cool the plant to 7

l HODE 4 entry conditions at which time the RHR system may be placed in service. The RHR system, which is required to be OPERABLE. is capable of adequate heat removal. Although the SG heat removal system may be used for additional cooldown below 350*F. the SG heat removal system

                                                        . operability in H0DE 4 is not an assumption of any safety analysis and l                                                          is not consistent with the current licensing basis. The MODE applicability for the SG heat removal system in the CTS is HODES 1. 2.

and 3. The SG heat removal system would be used.to remoye heat during , l a normal startup or shutdown and thus would be capable of providing the l _ ._..._.. . _._. . heat.. removal functio 11_during the transition to. and from RHR in MODE 4 even if not required to be OPERABLE by this TS. Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Compari Q37 3.7 05 (Enclosure 68). a 3.7 06 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). f i 2 5/15/97 JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS

Q 3.7.5-2 INSERT 6A-2a 3.7-04 Based on this justification, LCO 3.7.5 NOTE, Condition E of ITS 3.7.5, the Note to 1 SR 3.7.5.3, and Note 2 to SR 3.7.5.4 are not within the current licensing basis and have been deleted.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATICN COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-4 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.2 Action b and c, (*) footr ote ITS 3.7.5 Action B DOC 02-19-LG l JFD 3.7-20 i CTS 3.7.1.2 has an (*) footnote which states "One train of Essential Service Water l inoperable will result in entering Action statements b and c, concurrently." This CTS Operability requirement was moved to the Bases LCO discussion. I Comment: Issue #1 - For Callaway, the movement of this Operability requirement to the l Bases is not discussed in this DOC. Revise this DOC to include specificjustification for ! this CTS change. Issue #2 - For WCGS, this same Operability requirement is stated in , the last two sentences of the second paragraph of the Bases LCO discussion. Therefore, it appears that WCGS should have the same ITS Action B as Callaway. Provide a new DOC with appropriate technical justification for this new action. j FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1: DOC 02-19-LG (Callaway-specific) has been revised to read:

       " ACTIONS b and d and the footnote to ACTION c are deleted since the LCO now refers to AFW trains versus pumps. These requirements serve to define the flow paths necessary to maintain an OPERABLE system. The ITS Bases will define AFW train requirements and which Required Actions are applicable."

In addition, ITS Bases 3.7.5 Background is modified to incorporate a reference to the condensate storage tank as well as the ESW system as sources of water for the steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. ITS Bases 3.7.5 Action B.1 is modified to eliminate the possibility of one inoperable ESW train resulting in concurrently entering Condition B, for an inoperable ESW supply line to the turbine driven AFW pump, and Condition C, for an inoperable MDAFP train. Bases 3.7.5 Action B.1 is further modified to clarify that the inoperability of an ESW supply line to the TDAFP, as specified in Condition B, does not impact the motor driven AFW trains. Issue #2: WCGS had requested to add a similar Required Action as a plant-specific license amendment (WCGS letter ET 97-0075, dated 9/2/97). However, WCGS was informed by the NRC staff that this would require generic treatment as a TSTF. Therefore, the CTS ACTIONS remain different between Callaway and WCGS. While the ACTIONS for Callaway provide more detailed guidance regarding system flow paths, those for WCGS are more closely aligned with the ISTS approach wherein the OPERABILITY requirements are retained in ITS while details, such as flow paths that define an

OPERABLE system, are located in the Bases. In this case, Callaway elected to retain one of the flow path requirements from CTS in the ITS Required Actions. However,
WCGS maintains the CTS approach of retaining detailed flow path requirements in the Bases. As WCGS is maintaining current licensing basis, there is no need to incorporate a new Required Action. Therefore, the proposed ITS Required Actions differ between Callaway and WCGS even though the Bases are the same. The Bases are modified to provide additional clarification.

h t l i l ATTACHED PAGES: 1 Encl.3A 5 l Encl. 58 8 3.7-29, B 3.7-34, B 3.7-35 l l l l l l t l I l l l 4 t l i I I

r i

)                       CHANGE l                       NUMBER          HE                    DESCRIPTION changes and results in consistent presentation of pump                       ,

testing throughout the'TS. : 02 09 - Not applicable to Cailaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

                      ' 02 10            -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 1 02 11 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02 12 TR 1 The respective valve and pump SRs are revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy 4 the SRs. The identification of the initiating signal is l moved to the Bases. 02 13 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 4

,                       02-14            -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02 15 LG The pump performance testing is revised to move the acceptance criteria to 'the Bases. This is acceptable because it removes details from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basic SR in TS. 02;16 A ACTION a. is clarified to note that ACTION [c and g) l conditions are not included. Thl: is not a technical change. ~ 02 17 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 02 18 H The surveillance is revised to be consistent with NUREG 1431 which requires verification of flow from the CST to each SG. This is more restrictive than current TS which require flow arification to only two SGs. g 3,7 $ lf Inwt 3 A- 5b 3

02 19 LG ACTIONS b and d are de eted since tne LT,0lw efers to AFW trains versus pumps. The ITS Bases will define y

train requirements and yhich RF0llLRER A I 6 ara ' Q 3,7 4- N 1 A --

fif-l 02 20 LS 35 Th tiefr. fail / ret meet e ACp0N re;(uirempntsjo _l~ ut he p ntdc/nwo d be eviseg from /chiev/ng Hjdl

                                                                                                         ~ _ -
                      - DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS                          5                                5/15/97
                                                                                           .- -._ _          _ ~ _ __

            . . .         -    -      ..    .. .        ..            _    .       ~ . - ..           . - . ..

i O 3.7.5-4 l INSERT 3A-5b 1 02-19-LG ACTIONS b and d and the footnote to ACTION c are deleted since the LCO 'now !

                  . refers to AFW trains versus pumps. These requirements serve to define the flow             i paths necessary to maintain an OPERABLE system. The ITS Bases will define                   j

AFW train requirements and which Required Actions are applicable.

J l ) 1 l l i l' I i l i l l I I I I l l l . -. ..

l AFW System I B 3.7.5 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B B 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System BASES i L BACKGROUND The AFW System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the loss of normal feedwater supply. The AFW pumps norma.idy. take suction through scperatc and indcpcndcnt bTcciiiiii5fi suction linet from the condensate storage tank (CST) (LCO 3.7.6)udnou.ui tne rumxpeccmesona vau an i emwnazwarettTsqvanacreyrranttFs 9 EssectIagsenv1TceiwateFKu.dwigsyst-eacnsmotordar.tv_enfAEW5 pump i nwrfrrinTtrma imrPMMEMMMFIENTMWEr!TMrnN mfd and pu.p to the steam generator secondary side via separate and M independent connections to the main feedwater (HFW) piping Cr outside. containment. The steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the main steam safety valves (HSSVs) (LCO 3.7.1) or atmospheric w q dump steamrddidij valves (LCO 3.7.4). If the main condenser is : - available. steam may be released via the steem C5irdenserdSreR Y DUmpAvalves bgc;; valycs and concensafE recir ' +o the CST. S tMR The AFW System consists of E motor driven AFW pumps and one 43,'76-l )

                                                                                                     .3f steam turbine driven pump configured into three trains. Each motor driven pump provides Et of AFW tnesteedwafEii flow ccpacity tecnirecutocatemova.iziorgoecavznearistromernesteactor:

EK5DiHEd8TrEtheraccidEhtunnarlsess . and ths TMurbine driven k pump provides 200t of the rcasiccd capacity tc thc stcca p scacratcra 5maimotorracivenToum53 a; c;;umcd in thc accident L analysi s . The pumps are equipped with indcpcndcat recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. Each d'- l h motor driven AFW pump is powered from an independent Class 1E s OD power supply and feedshsteam generators. although each pump j A has the capability to be r:aligncd frc- thc c;ntici rccs locality; g gl.b aligne_d to feed other steam generators. The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives steam from two main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves Hiidiwater5fi*FaWFedundant*ESWJ.suco,[y l Tiii'ei. Each of the steam feed lines will supply 100% of the

requirements of the turbine driven AFW pump. Ififiddit3cn';[~ap l of th'd?ESwtsu2 ply;;t.fhes -w1i17supp.lyguu: WfEtTeYe7g fneme_nt'sT6f.

tH6'tdrb~ine~dr1ven 'AFWTph (continued) MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 29 5/15/97 l

I i AFW System . B 3.7.5 l BASES ACTIONS A l (continued) l

a. The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pumo: (

b. The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and

c. The low probability of an event occtirring that requires the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO. l The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the l

  ,,gM;,                             LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which                   i 7

WN.ije Conditions A and C are entered concurrently. The Bill connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met. v w+n: iW w.an siws.E we.w+ x=e+ % .te sw + .

                  $ 3.9.64            BWMEDE!5EDiUE23@UMC5inRemonwidiliiE4fErr;eTsTsDL_Jased bhnTheEH]iommneasonst g     anexecuncantsuPuget-rssentna me ra.iterw atermuo pw.aane
                               /              HiEtiEEur.Dnedraen25fMFHThT: '
   /     .

a (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 34 5/15/97

AiW System . B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS NMIT H un:mvANDaanymmm.ne5Dr.e.TzuuccanonsaTMyanace 1

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.g3,                                     itet>% w +fB9hr.)ir +t@ ..i+rMk 9 trysg.g.i,. ,.w. vat m. wy                                          .
"~'!                                      es .i.gu.r;. er.1,9.wi.h wy ..tht.wgag.hn u mirewir3k die Q4) . . iaW lt!l3bst .e (egt,yt.         L    ggt $.j ,(Mil.l. @ #Md>sl8N@b i@ '.".JM
                                            . tet.. r- MW"+s + 2 4tiMCa d&iuERuss- df.a /ACfsiFGisul M.                                                                                                      M
                                          ... carr.im.mst.v .is4.Taen5mmmw+wa-BQ.1 With inoperable one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) "- in M00: 1, 2. or 3 action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This Condition includes the loss of two steam supply lines 541it3ESWE@M5Eges to the turbine driven AFW pump. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B C.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet

,                                          this LCO.
%:/

(continued) MARK-UP 0F NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.7 35 5/15/97

1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.5-6 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.2, Action a[b].1 and 2 ITS SR 3.7.5.1 DOC 2-07-M JFD 3.7-08 CTS 4.7.1.2, Action a[b].1 verifics each non-automatic valve and Action a[b].2 verifies each automatic valve is in its correct position. ITS SR 3.7.5.1 collectively verifies each manual, power-operated and automatic valve is in its correct position with a new note excepting certain valves. ! Comment: Issue #1 - Contrary to DOC 02-07-M, these CTS requirements have always I , apolied to automatic valves. Therefore, this is not a more restrictive change but an l adnd7istrative reformatting change to combine separate surveillances into one ITS SR. Provide a DOC with the appropriate justification for this CTS administrative change. ; issue //2 - The Note to this ITS is taken from the CTS but it is superfluous because the CTS and ITS requirements both are to verify each valve is in its correct position, i regardless if the unit is in Mode 1,2, or 3. If the unit is still in Mode 2 or 3, the AFW flow I control is in its correct position if it is closed, in Mode 1, the valve should be open. These are procedural details of how and when this SR is performed. This ITS Note should be deleted and these details moved to and explained in depth in the SR Bases. For WCGS only, the CTS markup does not explain the conversion basis for 4.7.1.2.1 b.2.

      ~ Provide a DOC with the appropriate justification for this CTS change. Revise the submittal for these two issues.

FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1: DOC 2-07-M has been revised to DOC 2-07-A. The ITS surveillance results from the I combination of two CTS surveillances. Combining the two CTS surveillances into one 1 CTS surveillance does not impact technical content, but involves a reformatting i administrative change. Enclosures 3A and 3B have been revised to show the DOC 2-07-A. DOC 2-07-A incorporates the following:

       "Two CTS surveillance requirements, CTS 4.7.1.2, Action a[b].1 and 2, are combined into one ITS SR 3.7.5.1 surveillance requirement. Combining the two surveillances does not impact the technical content. The proposed change is acceptable because it involves an administrative change that reformats surveillance requirements without changing technical content."

l l Issue #2: l The ITS Note to SR 3.7.5.1 is appropriately located and should not be removed to the Bases. The Note is supported by current licensing basis and provides clarification for operability of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps with the discharge valves throttled to I maintain steam generatorlevels during plant heatup or cooldown. The AFW system is a dual use system. Under current licensing basis, the AFW trains are considered l OPERABLE during alignment and operation for steam generator level control, when the AFW flow control valves are not in the full open position and when the unit thermal power is less than or equal to 10% RTP The correct position for these valves for accident i conditions is the full open position. By retaining the Note for clarification, current flexibility remains and unnecessary Action entry is prevented. Maintaining the CTS SR as an ITS SR Note is consistent with proposed traveler TSTF-245.

  . _.       _ . .     .~.-             ..   . . . _ . - - . . . . _ . . - . - . - . - . .       - . . .

Tha commInt indicating that ths WCGS CTS markup does not explain the conysrsion l basis for 4.7.1.2.1b.2) is not clear. As noted above, CTS SRs 4.7.1.2.1b.1) and b.2) are combined into one ITS surveillance requirement, SR 3.7.5.1. There were no changes made to CTS SR 4.7.1.2b.1) and DOC 2 07-A explains the combining of the CTS SRs. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 3A 4 l Encl. 38 3 l l l l r. 4 i

CHANGE NUMBER NSEC DESCRIPTION 02-02 LS 5 The ACTION specifies th,e requirements for allowed outage time (A0T) should one of the steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump become inoperable. A previous interpretation required that the TDAFW pump be declared inoperable and the ACTION statement for one inoperable pump be entered. This revision is a relaxation of the CTS requirements. 02 03 H The ACTIONS are modified to require restoration of the systems to meet the LC0 within 10 days of discovery of l failure to meet the LCO. This new requirement is intended to prevent multiple overlapping ACTION entries such that Ingd 3 A ~ b the intended A0T is exceeded &This proposed change is g 3,q g M acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with ; NUREG 1431. 02 04 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). l 02-05 A Although previously implied, the addition of the footnote l for three inoperable AFW trains assures that TS 3.0.3 will l I not be entered and that no other ACTION statement for other inoperable components will be applied that might i force the unit into an unsafe condition. l 02 06 LG The change would move the details regarding the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) motor operated discharge valves and essential service water (ESW) supply valve descriptions to the BASES. These details include the requirement to verify that the motor driven AFW pump discharge valves limit flow to 320 gpm and identification of specific valve numbers in the suction lines to the pumps. This is acceptable because these details are not required to be in TS to support the immediate operational safety of the plant. 02-07 XA The surveillance to verify valve alignments is revised to include automatic valves. This proposed change is Q 3% 5' b acceptable because it results in more stringent TS requirements that are both appropriate and consistent with NUREG-1431. 3A Q 3.25-6 02 08 LS-6 The surveillance interval for the AFW pump performance is changed from once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS (STB) to "in accordance with the IST Program.' This

proposed change will eliminate any potential ambiguity associated with AFW pump testing as a result of ASME 4 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

_, , . _ .__. _.___ . . . - . ~ _ . . . . . . . _ . _ _ _ . - _ . _ _ _ . . _

                                                                                                      .        . _ _    . . .~. _ . _ .

1 O 3.7.5-6 i

                   ' INSERT 3A-4h                                                                                                       I 1

l l Two CTS surveillance requirements, CTS 4.7.1.2, Action a[b).1 and 2, are combined into one ITS l_ ' SR 3.7.5.1 surveillance requirement. Com!.'ning the two surveillances does not impact the ' technical conterit. The proposed change is acceptable because it involves a alministrative change that reformats surveillance requirements without changing technical content. t I i l l i i f I i ?

i CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 Page 3 of 15 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION , NO: descriptive NO:-descriptive YES YES-02-06 The change would move details regarding AFW motor operated LG discharge valves and ESW supply valve descriptions to the material not part material not part Bases. of CTS. of CTS. 02-07 Themrtf tration-of- valve -au gnments-is-revised-to-include VEs. M O YES' YES YES. O 378-b .

              -M-     A  -automatiewalvek                              Inse<1 36-3m YES                                       YES          YES 02-08     The surveillance interval for the AFW pump performance is                                                                                                                YES LS-6      changed from 92 days on a STB to in accordance with the IST                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ,

Program. NO NO NO 02 09 This DCPP specific surveillance is revised to combine the YES A water and steam flow paths. YES: also refer to NO: refer to NO: refer to NO: refer to r 02 10 The time to achieve HOT SHilTDOWN if actions are not 02-20 LS35. 02-04-M. 02-20 LS35. 02-20-LS35. ' LS-21 completed is changed from 6 to 12 hours. This time is reasonable to reach the required conditions under the circumstances since the SG heat removal system. is the system performing the cooldown to MODE 4. . NO NO NO 02-11 In this DCPP specific revision. the testing requirements YES A for pumps and valves are separated into two SRs. t YES YES YES i YES 02-12 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation TR-1 and moves signal specifics to 'the Bases. NO NO NO 02 13 In this DCPP specific revision. the verification that the YES A fire water storage tank is capable of realignment as an AFW - . water source is moved to the AFW ITS. YES YES NO: part of CTS. ! 02-14 The note for testing of the steam TDAFW punp is revised to YES H explicitly define when testing must be performed. YES t NO: acceptance YES YES 02-15 The pump performance testing is revised to move the LG acceptance criteria to the Bases. criteria not specified in CTS. y f r t 5/15/97- ! CONVERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CURRENT TS

, ___ _.._-_ ... . .. .. .. _ ._ __. .. . . - . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ . - _. ._ _ _ - . _ _ _ . . . . _ . . , Q 3.7.5-6 INSERT 38-3a Two CTS surveillance requirements, CTS 4.7.1.2, Action a[b].1 and 2, are combined into > one ITS SR 3.7.5.1 surveillance requirement. i 7 9 h 1 I 1 I ( t { -- 1 5 4 'I .

         . . . __.            _   _ ~ .       -_.          .--                              . _. -    ,

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-7 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.2 Bases ITS 3.7.5, LCO discussion DOC 06-06-LG For Callaway and WCGS, there is no CTS requirement but the Bases ITS 3.7.5 LCO discussion states the Operability requirements for the TDAFW pump control valve and , the ARV [ASD]'s nitrogen accumulator tank pressure. For CPSES, CTS 4.7.1.7 item a, is l a surveillance on the accumulator tank air pressure for the ARVs. l Comment: This comment is related to item #8 of ITS 3.7.4. There is no CTS DOC or ITS JFD provided to explain these Operability requirements listed in the Bases for i ITS 3.7.5. An explanation is required to explain why there is no surveillance for the , TDAFW pump control valve or ARV [ASD] nitrogen accumulator tank pressure. Revise l the submittal to add this new SR performed every 24 hours to either ITS 3.7.4 or ' ITS 3.7.5, as is similarly done at DCPP. FLOG RESPONSE: See response to Comment Number Q 3.7.5-7. The same discussion provided for the ARVs/ASDs accumulators applies to the TDAFW pump control valve accumulators. ATTACHED PAGES: None i l 8

 -_             .         --         . - _ -        ---          -   -       -         . . . - - . ~ . - - . - - _ -

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.5-9 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA I REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.2.1.c(1) ITS SR 3.7.5.3 , DOC 02-xx-LSx l CTS 4.7.1.2.1 item c[1] verifies all automatic valves actuate to their correct (full open} position. ITS SR 3.7.5.3 verifies only those valves "that are not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position . . l Comment: This CTS change was made to the ITS markup but there was no DOC provided to justify this less restrictive technical CTS change for verifying a' reduced I number of valves. Provide the missing DOC and revise the submittal. I FLOG RESPONSE: CTS 4.7.1.2.1 item c[1] was revised to verify only those valves "that are not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position" %tuate to their correct position on receipt of an actuation test signal. DOC 08-05-A was added to address this change which we believe to be administrative rather than less restrictive. The NRC accepted a similar change at Vogtle as an administrative change, as discussed in Section 3.1.3.7 item (13) of the Vogtle SER. I DOC 08-05-A (as revised in response to Comment 3.7.7-2) states: "The clarification allows automatic valves, which are in their secured position under administrative controls, to be exempted from the surveillance. These automatic valves are secured in their accident position and are not required to actuate to perform their sa'ety function. Proper positioning of valves is administratively controlled by equipment out of service programs and locked valve programs. These programs ensure valves are maintained in their ' proper position by requiring independent verification of safety-related or other important equipment, documentation of the position of locked equipment in a surveillance program, and periodic reviews of equipment normally required to be locked. Exempting automatic valves that are secured in their required position is perceived as the intent of the CTS wording, and therefore, the addition of the phrase more accurately reflects this intent and is considered to be administrative." ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-5 Encl. 3A 11

1 7 l tW ts nd io c u J, u"\ed PLANT SYST MS o<. h we scu<ed u tesh t StJRVEittANCE RE00TREMENTS (Continued) < dQ 3.7,E- 9 /

                            .                                                             C+ 08- 0 5- A

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by: ca-at-iG-l euk r Verifyingk4at automatic valve:" ALM 30, 31, 32, Ind-33-4n-the o l - o'- 'G 1)

ESW=cupply to-the--aux 4 Mar-y--feedwater-pumps actuate to the4r (, h coned te!' operAposition uper mceipt ef-an-Aux + Mary-Feedwater Pusp i V sure ub\ o< s A\ ta I

                        =acw Suction w 4 Prc.:y.a-kow-test-s49nal, on om 0  2 - n - C,

2) Verifying that each' motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump l starts as-de:igned-autwatically upon receipt of an- Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation-te:t s4 9 nah-and on ** ubt a 9-\*kA c a,_ a-,u achh svo \

3) Verifying that caeh auxiliary feedwater 7ctor-operated discharge-valve li=jt: the-f4c to cach : team genenter-free: ca ou-w i thc 20tcr dr4ven-pump tc-1c::- than-or ;equa4-to-340-9pa.

d. At least once per 18 months by verifyin[g at the steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump startsa designed autc=:tically upon-receipt cf an Agy41j;py {ggdyg4gy_pctygtjg3 Tggt gjg3;}

(required to be completed within 24 hours after attaining 2900 psig in all steam generators - the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3).

     '4.7.1.2.2    An auxiliary feedwater flow path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE                              '

i following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 30 days prior to entering MODE 2 by verifying. normal. flow out 1c :t twa-steam-generators-from cac auxiliary ** j feedwater pump'. co A L aems A S g

                                 %     ,o   <uw sbsm geners.44-

__ c1 0-T t.1 on aw acbl er S t ~bkd u h h si p \

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-5 Amendment No. r/3,108

l CHANGE NUMBER NSHC DESCRIPTION I 3A- k O 3'I' '9 08 05 A CThe surveillance is modified to clarify that valves that i 9 are locked, sealed or 6therwise secured in their correct position are not required to be tested. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431. Rev.1. and provides clarification only. l < (in)_3A 11 bly > $ 3.7.7 08 06 TR 1 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation. if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of ; the signal is moved to the Bases. 08 07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison j Table (Enclosure 38). 08 08 A The surveillances are revised to clarify that only verification of the correct position of valves in the flow path is required. 08 09 bkfy'i,desd'/ n - Q 3.7.% 3 1 08 10 A The Callaway specific note applicable to cycle i surveillance requirements is no longer needed. 09 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). I-09 02 A A note is added to ACTION that explicitly references the LCOs which must be entered if equipment becomes inoperable ; due to loss of [ essential] service water. The ACTIONS of : the referenced LCOs require more imediate action than the [ essential] service water ACTIONS. 09 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09 04 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09-05 TR 1 The surveillance requirements are revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the surveillance requirements. The identification of the initiating signal is moved to the Bases. 09 06 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). 1 09 07 A A note is added to the [ESW] surveillance that clarifies system operability requirements. Isolation of [ESW] flow ! to individual components does not render the system l DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 11 5/15/97

Q 3.7.5-9 . INSERT 3A-11a , The clarification allows automatic valves, which 'are in their secured position under i administrative controls, to be exempted from the surveillance. These automatic valves ' are secured in their accident position and are not required to actuate to perform their ) 4 safety function. Proper positioning of valves is administratively controlled by equipment i out of service programs and locked valve programs. These programs ensure valves are maintained in their proper position by requiring independent verification of safety-related or other important equipment, documentation of the position of locked equipment in a surveillance program, and periodic reviews of equipment normally required to be locked. Exempting automatic valves that are secured in their required position is perceived as the intent of the CTS wording, and therefore, the addition of the phrase more accurately reflects this intent and is considered to be administrative. 1 l

l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.6-2 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.3 Action a ITS 3.7.6 Action A DOC 03-yy-LSy CTS 3.7.1.3 Action a explicitly requires the CST restored Operable in 4 hours or verify an Operable ESW (SSWS) as a backup water supply in 7 days. These Actions and Completion Times have been reversed in the ITS 3.7.6 Actions. Comment: ITS 3.7.6 is acceptable as proposed; however, the CTS Actions have been extensively reformatted and changed without the CTS markup indicating and providing a technicaljustification for these CTS changed requirements. CPSES has provided no CTS markup of this Action to indicate changes and WCGS is the nearest to identifying I changes but is without an explanation. Provide a revised DOC, JFD, or CTS markup with the appropriate explanations and justifications. FLOG RESPONSE: Except for the extension in completion time (DOC 2-20-LS) the unmodified CTS 3.7.1.3 ACTIONS a and b are technically equivalent to ITS Conditions A and B (as modified by JFD 3.7-04). Based on the FLOG methodology, which does not require that technically I equivalent statements be revised solely for the purpose of conforming the CTS to the ITS i format, CPSES chose not to modify the CTS. WCGS and Callaway elected to reformat j the CTS to more closely approximate the ITS format but failed to identify that those i changes were purely administrative. Based on the response to Comment Number Q 3.7.1-1, DOC 01-13-A was added to each specification to address the fact that changes would not be made such as reformatting, renumbering, and editorial rewording to conform the CTS to the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1431. This DOC also is used for those cases where some non-technical changes were made to conform the CTS to the ITS. ATTACHED PAGES: j None

l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.6-4 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.1.3 Action a and b ITS 3.7,6 Required Action B.2 l DOC 02-20-LS35 JFD 3.7-04 i If CTS 3.7.1.3 Actions are not met, then it is required to enter Mode 3 in 6 hours and enter Mode 4 in an additional 6 hours. ITS 3.7.6 permits an additional 12 hours for entry to Mode 4 if the Required Action and associated Completion Times are not met. Comment: The STS permits a total 18 hour Completion Time, for entry into Mode 4, when the Applicability of the LCO has been extended to cover the extra time spent in Mode 4, while the steam generator is relied upon for heat removal. Callaway and WCGS have elected not to adopt the revised STS Applicability, so the current licensing basis of 12 hours total time must be retained. it is presumed that the RCSIRHR transition temperature is above or at the Mode 4 350 F temperature limits. JFD 3.7-04 does not ' discuss the technical basis for receiving the extra 6 hours of Completion Time. Provide a new DOC because the DOC 02-20-LS35 referenced is not applicable and not specific l ertough for this CTS change. Revise this JFD or provide new DOCS to adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: In view of the basis for the 18 hour Completion Time provided by NRR, the additional time allowed for operation within MODE 4 is not applicable to Callaway and Wolf Creek. l Therefore, changes have been incorporated to retain the current licensing basis of 12 hours to achieve MODE 4. ATTACHED PAGES: 1 Encl. 2 7-6 5, 6 l Encl. 3A l Encl. 38 4 I Encl. 4 2, LS-35 NA I l Encl. 5A 3.7-17 Encl. 5B B 3.7-45 l l L l l l l

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    -~                                                                                         .

REVIStan , _ j 'j PLANT SYSTEMS

o1-B-A Wtb, 4 beds CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK Q 3,7. l - I 4A 4 hou.rG Mw F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i .. 3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with a contained water volume of at least 281,000 gallons. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,'2, and 3. 43,gf.( ACTION: N' With the CST inoperable, either: - 4 3,1, G- 4

a. Restore the CST to.0PERABLE status e be in at least HOT STANOBY thin the next 6 hours and in> HOT SHUTD.0WN within the following $ W O Y

                                       ,eg / .ours, or W)         o "CUN

b. 04.;;;tr:t: 1the OPERABILITY of the Essential Service Water 3. 7. le - 6, System as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps /and 3 9, - 4.

qq q restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least hugg p.o./.sg me 3 HOT STAND within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUT 00VN within the -- followin hours.

#st

_.-.'s ) SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS l l

4. 7.1. 3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours l by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits when the tank is '

the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps. 1 _u u - - ). - d,...;,,;;, etad 0."5".".0L!at lee;t :n : Mr o 3-o A- '5 A EN Systr th:1' t;

' '; ' ; t':t t' _ r ^, _ _ __ . _ e :; -s* ' ^- "-at"t r the EF '-

                             * , ' 1. 2 . 2 'h:

q y,7, (,-(, L2 5: r: i; _ syc e- i< the w % .:: r;; <c ue 1. ~ r i t e j e e e+e 7 - . _ i 4 CALLAWAY - IlNII 1 3/4 7-6 1"' . e y . , - . . - - . , ~

CHANGE NUMBER LTC DESCRIPTION l l changes and results in consistent presentation of pump testing throughout the'TS. 02 09 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). l 02 10 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparisor. L ! Table (Enclosure 38). 02 11 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02 12 TR 1 The respective valve and pump SRs are revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of the initiating signal is moved to the Bases. 02 13 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 02 14 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02 15 LG The pump performance testing is revised to move the acceptance criteria to the Bases. This is acceptable because it removes deta11s from the TS that are not required to protect the health and safety of the public while retaining the basic SR in TS. 02;16 A ACTION a. is clarified to note that ACTION [c and g] conditions are not included. This is not a technical change. 02 17 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 02-18 H The surveillance is revised to be consistent with NUREG 1431 which requires verification of flow from the CST to each SG. This is more restrictive than current TS which require flowjtrification to only two SGs. A 3,7.$ lf G Q Insut 3 A- 5b 3 ACTIONS b and d are dE eteM ce the LIO now efers to 02 19 LG AFW trains versus pumps. The ITS Bases will define train requirements and which DFOUTRF0_ Q a Q3,'l Q- N a Ha W Th. ti e fr 3 A ) [fk-/ ~ 02 20 LS 35 fail /re t meet e.ACp0Nreyuirempntsyo ut he p ntdefnwo d be evise7 from -/chiev/ng HpT 5 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

l Q 3.7.4-4 l Q 3.7.5-2

O 3.7.6-4 l

l INSERT 3A-Sa Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). l l i I l

I 1

l l l I l l

ma as s. ~. J_ a.ma.e d-- -4 A44. AC-w-..3hM J.1L-++ --' - a*-m.- 4 4-a W AAda ---J E-+-mmJ r [ CHANGE : [ DESCRIPTION NUMBER NSiq - l ne 6 urs nd T HUTD0 wi in p 3,7, M STA BY foi owi thi t 6 our to chie ing OT aTAND wi in e i t 9g ho s dH 'N wi in e fo owi g ext SH nsi ring he il' ry h 3, ?. 6 % 12 our . T is i re onab is l f edwa er st ca ilit"es cul be 1'mit an l cons' ten wi co ing d n at rate oa id al'ere /s to lan sys+ s. This ha ge 's ass cia d w' h e i i l ' stif' cati n o differ n so 3.7 4. i l The requirement to perform the 18 month surveillance f 02 21 LG l "during shutdown ~ would be moved to the Bases. 03 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 03-02 LS 22 The requirement to verify the operability of the essential service water system by verifying the system is in operation when acting as the AFW supply is deleted. In addition, the Action is revised to require that the operability of the backup system be verified "by administrative means." These changes are acceptable because the ESW system is designed to automatically start and supply water to the AFW system when required. Therefore, the system does not need to be operating to perform this function. 03 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). The revision requires isotopic analysis for DOSE 04 01 M EQUIVALENT I-131 concentration to be performed on a 31 day frequency. The conditional performance requirements in : the current surveillance (i.e. , based on 10 percent of the allowable limit for radionuclides contained in Table 4.71) are deleted. This results in a more restrictive requirement for the isotopic analysis. LS-8 The SR of Table 4.7-1 to determine Gross Radioactivity is 04 02 deleted. The change is acceptable because radiciodines and the resulting thyroid dose are limiting; not noble gases and whole body dose. The primary to secondary leakage limits and dose equivalent I 131 limits ensure the dose analyses in the [ Final Safety Analysis Report] remain I valid. 05 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 3B). t 6 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 Page 4 of 15 i TECil SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY i NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK ACTION a. is clarifted to note that ACTION [c and g] N0: CTS does not YES YES YES 02-16 A conditions are not included. contain an Action for TDAPJ pump supplies. NO NO 02-17 The CPSES specific note with respect to Unit 2 Train A is NO YES A deleted since 2RF02 is complete. 02-18 The surveillance is revised to be consistent with N0: flow path NO: SR not in CTS. YES YES l H NUREG 1431 which requires verification of flow from the CST ver.fted at each to each SG. startup. NO NO YES 02-19 The Callaway specific ACTIONS b and d are deleted since the NO LG LCG now refers to AFW trains versus pumps. _ 02 20 The time from failure to meet the ACTION requirements to NO: refer to CN Y$ JET MO , yf/f blO - LS-35 shut the plant down would be revised from achieving Il0T 02-10-LS21. Q E9.81-4 #f d Hu STANDBY within the next 6 hours and 110T SIUTDOWN within the Q 3.7. E-- 2 CTS cys ; following 6 hours to achieving 110T STANDBY within the next -g yg, g _q 6 hours and liOT SHUIDOWN within the following 12 hours. y NO NO YES 02-21 The Callaway specific requirement to perform the 18 month NO surveillance "during shutdoun" would te moved to the Bases. [ LG ! YES NO NO NO [ 03-01 The DCPP specific description of the AfM supply pathway and i LG the required surveillances are moved to the AfW ITS and Bases. 03-02 The requirement to verify the operability of the ESW system NO: the service NO: refer to YES YES ! LS-22 when acting as backup to the CST for AFW supply by water system is not 03-03-LG. ! verifying the system is in operation is deleted. The a credited AFW surveillance will now require that the operability of the supply backup. ' backup system be verified "by administrative means" 4 03-03 The CPSES specific description of how to verify the NO: the service YES NO: refer to NO: refer to ' water system is not 03-02-LS22. 03-02-LS22. , LG operability of the service water system when acting as , backup to the CST for AFM supply is moved to the Bases. a credited AFW The surveillance will now require that the operability of supply backup. the backup system be verified ~by administrative means." ; i f CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/I5/97 '

N0 SIGNIFICNfr HAIARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) CONTENTS (continued) IV. Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations "LS" (continued) LS 28... ... . . . .. ... . .. ... .. . . . . . .. .. . . 46 l LS 29. ...... ...... .. ....... ... ..... ... . . . . .... .. .48 ! LS 30. .. ....... . .. .. .. . ...... ....... ..... ..... . . .Not used l LS 31... .... . ... .... .... . ... . . . .. .. ....... . . ..Not used LS 32... ............. ........ .... . ..... ...... ... .. . ... 51 LS-33............ . .... .... ....... . .... ........ .. . . .. ... 53 6 - l LS 34.................. LS.35.................. .... ... ...

                                                                     ........ .. .. .......... . . (".ut.M .
                                                                                                  . .. .                                 Q s.M-Y    I
                                                                                                                       .Not useg         Q 3.'7.5-9 LS 36.....     ....... .......               .. .. ... ............ ......... .

LS 37... .... ......... . . .. ..... . ...... ...... ....Not used Q 3 7 6'Y l LS 38..... ....... ............. ...... ... . . .... ... ....... ..... 62 l i LS 39. ........... ............... ..... .... .... .... .. ........ 64 LS- D -.h.].- Q 3 ,'J.J - g V. Recurring No Significant Hazards Considerations "TR" TR 1.... ..... ................... ...... . .... . .... ...... ..... 66 1 l l l l l l l l l l 2 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION l

DELETE O 3,q q_4 \ Q 3. '7. 6 - D. l A 3.'7.6 - 4 ! j IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 5 f NSHC LS 35 l 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Consistent wit NUREG 1431. Rev.1, the required completion time to shut th plant down would be re ised from achieving HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours a d HOT SHUTDOWN within t following 6 hours to achieving HOT STANDBY within th next 6 hours and HOT SH WN within the following 12 hours. An additional hours would be allowed to achieve OT SHUTDOWN for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) ystem, the i Condensate Storage Tan and the [ atmospheric steam dump] lines if ey were ! inoperable. Once HOT S OWN was achieved, the plant would be i a MODE where the residual heat removal (RH system would be OPERABLE in additio to the OPERABLE AFW train (s) and the support s tems used to perform the cooldown o HOT SHUTDOWN conditions. Since the inop able AFW train (s) and the sup rt systems may affect the normal cooldown rate, the TS allows an additional six urs to achieve MODE 4. The added time provides additio al margin to perform an o derly transfer from the SG . method of heat removal to the RH system to regain the at removal function without l challenging unit systems. i The AFW system and the support syst are designe to cool the plant to H00E 4 entry conditions at which time the RHR ystem may e placed in service. The RHR system, which is required to be OPERABL is ca ble of adequate heat removal. . l Although AFW and the support systems may u d for additional cooldown below 350*F, AFW and the support systems operabil in MODE 4 is not an assumption of any safety analysis and is not consistent with h current licensing basis. The MODE APPLICABILI1Y for AFW and the support sy ems the current TS is MODES 1, 2, and 3. In general, the AFW system and e suppo t systems would be available to remove heat during a normal startup o shutdown a thus would be capable of providing the heat removal function ven if not tec ically OPERABLE. This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has en determined that it involves no significant hazard consideration. This det ination has been performed in accordance with he criteria set forth in 10 R 50.92(c) as quoted below:

             "The Cormtission ray make a final determination, pursuan to the procedures in

50. 91. tha t a , oposed amendment to an operating license or a facility licensed und 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significan* hazards consideration if operation of the faci' ty in accordance with tne roposed amendment would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or conseq nces of an accident previously evaluated; or

c. Create the poss1bility of a new or different kind af accident frcsNny accident previously evaluated; or NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 59 5/15/97

DELGTE q .g 7,. 5- 2. IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS Q 3, ,6-4 J NSHC LS 35 (continued)

3. volve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. "

The following eva ation is provided for the three categories of the signific nt hazards consideratic standards:

1. Does the c nge involve a significant increase in the prob ility or consequences f an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change do s not alter the plant configuration r operation or the function of any safety stem. Consequently, the change es not increase the l probability of an acciden as defined in accident analy s. The proposed l change permits a longer ti to cooldown to RHR entry onditions; however, this would not affect the co equences of any postu ted accidents and is appropriate due to the need t avoid any transien while cooling down with a potentially degraded AFW and su rt systems. ! Therefore, the proposed change wo d have no ignificant effect on the probability or consequences of any reviou y analyzed accidents.

 , . - ,                2.      Does the change create the poss         ity of a new or different kind of accident from any accident prev'       sly evaluated?

The proposed change does not requi e phys cal alteration to any plant system or change the method by which an safety r lated system performs its function. l As discussed above, the change oes allow a ditional time to complete the . l transfer from the SG as the thod for heat emoval to the RHR system, but l does not alter the basic dology. Therefore, the proposed hange would not create he possibility of a new or different kind of acci ent. ! 3. Does this c nge involve a significant reduct'on in a margin of safety? l The proposed c nge does not alter the basic regulator requirements or change ! any accident nalysis assumptions, initial conditions o results. l Therefore the proposed change would have no significant a erse effect on margins f safety. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associ ed with NSHC LS 35" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisf the no si ificant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c): and according ,a n significant hazards consideration finding is justified. I NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 60 5/15/97

bgggTE & 3 1. ~4l

                                                                                               - t G 3,7. s - 2 IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS                 d 3, 7, (, -Y i                                                         NSHC LS 35 I

(continued). ENVIRONMENT EVALUATION The proposed change has b lu d and it has been determined that the change does not involve (1) a signifi onsideration. (ii) a significant change ! in the types or significan .ncrease in the amo of any effluent that may be released offsite, or ) a significant increase in 1 idual or cumulative l occupational radi on exposure. Accordingly, the propose meets the l eligibilit erion-for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR . - 9). Theref . pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment of the pro c ge is not required. l i ! 1 I l l l

   ,n ~ I.-a
   \

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 61 5/15/97 L_- ._. _ _ _

CST 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) LCO 3.7.6 The CST 4evet c~ontRneaswateravolume shall be 12810_0U gal -PS B PS 3.7 4 APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1. 2. and h b liOOC 4 when st;;; scacrator is relicd apen fcr hcat rcausal. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CST 4evet cfligElEl A.1 Verify by administrative 4 hours :. PS , FatEMVoM not within means OPERABILITY of backup limit. water supply. M Once per 12 hours E thereafter A.2 Restore CST 4evet contamea 7 days PS-Wilt 1HlERTUHF( to within limit. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in HODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. E B.2 Be in H00E 4. . without ,Jg urs B r;lience on st;;; gencratcr ,12 3.7 4 fcr hcot rescial. Q 3 M~ N 3.7 17 5/15/97 MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

CST B 3.7.6 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) include verification that the flow paths from the backup water supply towasystemI to the AFW pumps are OPERABLE, and that the backup supply has the required volume of water available (qq 611EFRTI53 The CST must be restored to OPERoBLE status within 7 days, bccous; the backup supply cy bc perforain; this function in addition to its neraal functicas. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating j(, experience, to verify the OPERABILITY of the backup g wee- _6 supply %The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on an OPERABLE backup water supply being available, and the low 3 probability of an event occurring during this time period

          #             requiring the CST, 8.1 and B.2 If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a M00E in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in H00E 4-
                           'thout rclienc; on th; ;t;;; scacretor for hc;t rar,~ vel, within 19, 3 hours. .The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on Q 3,q _ perating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without                 )

1 challenging unit systems, SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.6.1 REQUIREMEhTS This SR verifies that the CST contains the required volume of cooling water. (The requircd CC v;1uac ::y bc singic valuc cr e function ;f RC conditions.' The 12 hour Frequency is based on operating experience and the need for operator awareness of unit evolutions that may affect the CST inventory between checks. Also, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to abnormal deviations in the CST c5Mtaneazwatra V51U5]e hvel-(continued) MARX-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 45 5/15/97

l l TR 3.7-002 INSERT 58-45a Additionally, verifying the backup water supply every 12 hours is adequate to ensure the backup water supply continues to be available. l L

l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.6-6 APPLICABILITY: CA I l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.1.3.1 and 4.7.1.3.2 l j ITS 3.7.6 Required Action A.1 and A.2 ' DOC 03-02-LS22 l CTS 4.7.1.3.1 and 4.7.1.3.2 each contain details for when and how to verify the l Operability of the CST level and the backup ESW. Comment: The CTS markup of 4.7.1.3.2 does not show the text is deleted as the DOC states. Revise the CTS markup. Also, the DOC does not match the CTS markup l because the verification by " administrative means"is added to the Reauired Action A.1 ! and not the surveillance as the CTS markup shows. Revise the CTS markup and DOC to correctly explain and justify this CTS change. FLOG RESPONSE: The Callaway CTS markup has been corrected so that the DOC 3-02-LS22 states the justification for the CTS change. ATTACHED PAGES: ) Encl. 2 7-6 I l l l i l

  ~                                                       ~

REVIStan 3

                                                                                                                         ~
 " '[          PLANT SYSTEMS l

o I- t3 - A , Wfb, d bod,

    -          CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK Q 3,7 1 -I                                                                 l ME      Mo f 4 hotuG I

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

                                                                                                               &h                   )

3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with a contained water volume of at least 281,000 gallons. APPLICABILITY _: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTION:

~-~

3,.7f ( 8 O ~ With the CST inoperable, either:

a. Restore the CST to.0PERABLE status or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y g 3,1, g- y

                                 ' thin the next 6 hours anc in HOT SHUTD.0WN within the following d M Y O U e
                            >$:# hours , or o - CMM R := tr:::1the OPERABILITY of the Essential Service Water (ESW)

b. 3,7. 6 - 4, gg4 g System as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pump and 3 9. -

restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least

            %         h                        within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the           p o-/         sg mems               HOT STAND                                                                               ' = _

followin hours. M: - N SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS }

4. 7.1. 3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps. ,

                                                                                         ,  _1 _
                                                                                                    ._u_n.-

4, 3 r-1. 3 . 2 '": E5W Sytte- ch:P k der.sc.5t. ded 0"Ef S'.Eet least ;r. : ; ^. - oVCa. '5 E 12 h:ur: t; 9 '; ' ; iM t t' - ET Ij. b '_ ' ; -2*'aa *e a tt - the ET2-

                                                        <a- the au i'ia y '- @ a e* pu pt.

q 3,1, g_4 Sy t + == (< the uic h neur:: i l l CALLAWAY - LINIT 1 3/4 7-6 t-

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.7-1 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA , REQUEST: CTS 4.7.3.a and c l Licensee Controlled Documents ! DOC 08-01-LG l CTS 4.7.3.a and c require an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the surge tank level and flow instrumentation, respectively, , l which have not been retained in ITS 3.7.7 but are proposed to be relocated to Licensee ' Controlled Documents. l Comment: There is no technical basis provided to justify the relocation of these CTS l requirements. The general"LG" NSHC is inadequate. Revise the submittal to provide l this information. ' i FLOG RESPONSE:

                         . Technical Specification requirements should consist of those that are of immediate operational concem. Instrumentation requirements of immediate operational concem are those that initiate mitigating functions to prevent exceeding acceptance limits during         ;

Design Basis Accidents or are used by the operators in a post-accident monitoring and i control function. DOC 08-01-LG has been revised to provide additionaljustification for moving these requirements to a licensee controlled document. The revised DOC reads as follows:

                          "The requirements to perform Analog Channel Operational Tests (ACOTs) and Channel              ,

Calibrations on surge tank level and flow instrumentation which provides automatic l l isolation of the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system would be moved to an LCD that is maintained in accordance with 2pplicable regulatory requirements. The isolated portions of the system are post-accident sampling system cooling, nuclear sampling system cooling, and Radwaste Building loads. The safety function of the level and flow instrumentation is to isolate non-safety-related-portions of the system to l terminate system leakage during a DBA (LOCA or secondary line break). The instrumentation can also isolate non-safety-related piping following a postulated earthquake which could cause failures in the non-safety portion of the system. The instrumentation also provides high and low level alarms and indication; however, it is not i used for post-accident monitoring. The urge tank level and flow instrumentation need not be in Technical Specifications for the following reasons: (1) For the DBAs, a Safety injection Signal (SIS) independently closes the valves to isolate the non-safety-related , portions of the system; and (2) the surveillance requirements that will remain in ITS include an 18 month verification of the proper automatic actuation of the valves that i isolate the non-safety-related portion of the system on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Therefore, the requirements for ACOT and channel calibration testing of the surge tank level and flow instrumentation are not of immediate operational concern and they may be moved to a licensee controlled document." ATTACHED PAGES: 1

Encl. 3A 10

l I l I CHANGE ILBC DESCRIPTION NUMBER k;h OPERABLE status. This . change is considered less restrictive because it provides alternate methods of complying with Technical Specification ACTIONS. l

         ~.                    07-13             -                     NOT USED.

i

    . . . ~ .

1 ,' ..07 14 - NOT USED. l

      .1 ~3' ,w ._ , .

PiF07-15

    ~'l'4; . ,
                                                  -                    NOT USED.

l i mv , - 07 16 LS 34 CTS are revised to add a note.to allow separate condition F- entry for each inoperable [ main feedwater isolation valve (HFIV)]. The CTSs as written permit a single valve to be , dFNr 1.- c_

i

~~~

inoperable but would require entry into 3.0.3 if more than ane valve were operable. This change is acceptable in l view of the low probability of an event requiring feedwater isolation while a [HFIV) is inoperable and

l considering the availability of other design features to I MS Z- provide backup for the feedwater isolation function.

07 17 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison 3 Q 3.7.7-I \

           .                    08 01               LG                      , requir            t uo ppffchn XnfogChiffpi Oper i na
                                                                          ,sts e     (A          ) and Channel Calibratiorfs would             movedfo controJYed docur>/nts to/intain pensisten Jicens NURE     431 fomat. Thdisacceptablebecauseit s an >
                                                                                            ' loc ting (detail not re ue to 08 02               A A note is added to the ACTION that references a potential interaction with ITS 3.4.6 dealing with operability of the '

RHR system in H00E 4. The note requires that the ( applicable TS be entered for the RHR train made incperable i by the inoperable [ component cooling water (CCW)] system. The ACTIONS of the referenced TS (RCS Loops MODE 4) require more immediate action than are required by the [CCW] ACTIONS. 08-03 LG The requirement to perform the 18 month surveillance l

                                                                    . . . during shutdown" to -avoid plant transients is moved to the Bases, 08 04                A                   A note is added to the [CCW] surveillance that clarifies j                                                                           that the system is not made inoperable by the isolation of individual components. This change is in accordance with NUREG-1431. Rev.1. and provides clarification only.

i 5/15/97 10 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

                   .     .    . .      -         _ . . . _ .       .     - -     - =     _ . -        -

Q 3.7.7-1 INSERT 3A-10a 08-01-LG The requirements to perform Analog Channel Operational Tests (ACOTs) and Channel Calibrations on surge tank level and flow instrumentation which provioes automatic isolation of the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system would l be moved to an LCD that is maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory l requirements. The isolated portions of the system are post-accident sampling l system cooling, nuclear sampling system cooling, and Radwaste Building loads. l The safety function of the level and flow instrumentation is to isolate non-safety-related portions of the system to terminate system leakage during a DBA (LOCA or secondary line break). The instrumentation can also isolate non-safety-related , piping following a postulated earthquake which could cause failures in the non-l safety portion of the system. The instrumentation also provides high and low level l alarms and indication; however, it is not used for post-accident monitoring. The l surge tank level and flow instrumentation need not be in Technical Specifications ; I for the following reasons: (1) For the DBAs, a Safety injection Signal (SIS) l l independently closes the valves to isolate the non-safety-related portions of the ) system; (2) In the case of a seismic event, the plant operating staff would l anticipate the possibility of leaks and ruptures of non-safety related piping l systems and would identify and isolate any leaks in the CCW system and initiate safety-related makeup flow from the seismically qualified ESW system; and (3) the . surveillance requirements that will remain in ITS include an 18 month verification l of the proper automatic actuation of the valves that isolate the non-safety-related ! portion of the system on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Therefore, the requirements for ACOT and channel calibration testing of the surge tank level and flow instrumentation are not of immediate operational concern and they may be moved to a licensee controlled document. l I 1 1 { d 9 l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.7-2 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.3.[1].b l ITS SR 3/7.7.2 l DOC 08-05-A l l CTS 4.7.3.(1].b requires that each automatic valve is verified to actuate to its correct position. Corresponding ITS SR 3.7.7.2 limits this verification by excepting those valves that are " locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position." Comment: This CTS change is acceptable; however, this results in fewer valves that need this verification which is a "less restrictive" change. In addition, for CPSES, the (*") footnote in the CTS markup has omitted the beginning phrase "in the flow path." Revise the submittal to provide the appropriate justification for the proposed change. FLOG RESPONSE: The FLOG believes that the proposed change is an administrative change. The NRC accepted a similar change at Vogtle as an administrative change, as discussed in Section 3.1.3.7 item (13) of the Vogtle SER. l l DOC 08-05-A is revised to include: "The clarification allows automatic valves, which are l in their secured position under administrative controls, to be exempted from the i surveillance. These automatic valves are secured in their accident position and are not required to actuate to perform their safety function. Proper positioning of valves is administratively controlled by equipment out of service programs and locked valve programs. These programs ensure valves are maintained in their proper position by requiring independent verification of safety-related or other important equipment, documentation of the position of locked equipment in a surveillance program, and periodic reviews of equipment normally required to be locked. Exempting automatic valves that are secured in their required position is perceived as the intent of the CTS wording, and therefore, the addition of the phrass more accurately reflects this intent and is considered to be administrative." In response to the CPSES specific comment, CPSES has included a revised CTS page to add the words "in the flow path" to the ("*) footnote. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 3A 11 l l l 4

l l CHANGE NUMBER _NjihC DESCRIPTION 7 g ,q Q 3.'7.6-9 l 08 05 A (The surveillance is modified to clarify that valves that i 9 are locked, sealed or 6therwise secured in their correct position are not required to be tested. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1, and provides clarification only. _

                                                                                                              >$37.7-1       l
                                  <                                          (IM_     3A - 11b The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, 08 06          TR 1 if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of the signal is moved to the Bases.

08 07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 08 08 A The surveillances are revised to clarify that only verification of the correct position of valves in the flow path is required. 08 09 bl(f/tpfeg/ Inwt 3 A - lle. Q 3.7.7- 3 08 10 A The Callaway specific note applicable to cycle 1 surveillance requirements is no longer needed. 09 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09 02 A A note is added to ACTION that explicitly references the LCOs which must be entered if equipment becomes inoperable due to locs of [ essential] service water. The ACTIONS of the referenced LCOs require more immediate action than the [ essential] service water ACTIONS. 09 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09 04 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09 05 TR 1 The surveillance requirements are revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the surveillance requirements. The identification of the initiating signal is moved to the Bases. 09 06 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). l-I ! 09-07 A A note is added to the [ESW] surveillance that clarifies system operability requirements. Isolation of [ESW] flow to individual components does not render the system 11 5/15/97 , DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

Q 3.7.7-2 i INSERT 3A-11 b The clarification allows automatic valves, which are in their secured position under administrative controls, to be exempted from the surveillance. These automatic valves are secured in their accident position and are not required to actuate to perform their safety function. Proper positioning of valves is administratively controlled by equipment out of service programs and locked valve programs. These programs ensure valves are maintained in their proper position by requiring independent verification of safety-related or other important equipment, documentation of the position of locked equipment in a surveillance program, and periodic reviews of equipment normally required to be locked. Exempting automatic valves that are secured in their required position is perceived as the intent of the CTS wording, and therefore, the addition of the phrase more accurately reflects this intent and is considered to be administrative. i l 1 l 1

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.7-3 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.3.b.1 Bases for ITS SR 3.7.7.2 ' DOC 08-xx-LG CTS 4.7.3.b.1 requires each automatic valve defined as " servicing safety-related i equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety related portion of the system" to be verified to actuate to its correct position. The CTS implies this text is deleted; whereas, the definition for which of these valves are verified, is actually moved to the Bases for ! ITS 3.7.7.2. Comment: It is acceptable to move these details of the surveillance to the Bases. There is no DOC provided for this CTS change. Provide the appropriate technicaljustification l for this CTS change, l FLOG RESPONSE: A new DOC 08-09-LG has been prepared to address moving these details to the ITS l Bases. This DOC has been applied to portions of CTS 4.7.3.b.1.) The new DOC reads: l " Consistent with the requirements of NUREG-1431, Rev.1, descriptive details defining the specific valves that are the focus of periodic surveillance (i.e., those valves servicing

                - safety-related equipment orisolating the non nuclear safety-related portion of the system) have been moved to the Bases for the applicable ITS SR. This is an example of -                                          i maintaining the basic requirements for valve surveillance in the ITS while locating the                                I detailed description of the valves in question in the ITS Bases."

ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-11 Encl. 3A 11 i Encl. 3B 9 a l l r 1 i

l i [

       ,      PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.3 COMPCNENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM                                                                 01-l3 - A Q 3.'), I-I                                                                           l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.7.3 At'least two independent, component c:oling water loops shall be j OPERA 3LE. f

APPLICABILITY: H00E5 1, 2, 3, and 4 . 0 6' O A' ^ ' ACTION: 4 N '-s u + a.*A b . I s With only one ccmcenent cooling water loop OPERA 3LE, restore at least two loops to CPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANOSY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTOOWN witnin the following 30 hours. 1 1 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS O 3' ' 4J.3 At least two c econent coeling water loeps shall be demonstrated os.08-b OPERASLE: G. n %. Dec ed' cryo 4- A

a. s t.. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, a

ty j pcwer-operated, or aut matic) ervicing safety-related equipment

hat is not ICcked, sealed, or otnervise secured in Oositien is

                                                                                                                              ..,....mmu..-             .

in

                                                                                                                                                                             .c . ,. ;.

og.ot-uG-

                                                                                                                                                            .. n e. . . -

e ... o rrec.. 1, r e s t ..1 o n_._f .a .

                              ;EI Of :: :urg: ::r" .ev: :nd :t 4 strumentat :n nic-
                                                                                  '         '                                                     4
                                                                                                                                                                        ---"'te y_._,._<- __.s,. . _< . . . - .. _ . . , , , , , , , - . ,,e.,._.,-.3._,.a_-~___4,. .< . e 1

y::: :n; '

;;r': o:: :: 1 ::.: :nc; ;;r Il d:y:: g g,7-M j 1

o s-o ?,-L4 l 2 h. At least once per 18 months du 3 ; t u t d e'e. , by verifying that: e S-o5- A

Q G. es cS-b

1. ) .

a.h a t. . ..,ma. . i c v a l vwe(~. . -. . : : .,.< =

                                                                                                                             < . ~, -    = .. . a. w:...
                                                                                                                                                                               . :::q 08-69-LI' c' th: :

15 cia ^i.; ..ne x,. i.cir.:r ::.f:ty :::;00 ; rti:r actuates to its correct position :- : O ' e t; !,f:::'er anc er : l 54mula d HQ h rieu :nc Leu f urge 'an' L;;;' 1 m.,ad. - :y:'g-s uand es-ec S d s tarts aute- es-to- A j 2)k Each OPERA 8LE C:meenent Cooling Water .-._ System pum.. . ..u- .:-- .

                                                                                               . . , ,, . .:..  . . - ..    - ~
                                                                                                                                      -~    e-      -  -s.                e...~' C6-s -7 '

2 a.1 a 1. y,,i m_ _.

                                                  .                          -s..   .. .

s :w<t + z by-pee'rer-img : 5 ' NML c 6-cM.G-a

c. !! 10:00 Onc: ; - 13 Onth, cu-i ng N%dc t- ,

                       '        C/ LIBE!CH o' the 'eq: tank : vel and 7 tru entati-+n i' :P '

9.^"i:0 Odom;ti: :::I:.i0n 0f tat 70 "-'Wc I-ear--644 ^ ty r :: d 0 04-+fi c' t'e :Y:;ta.. ~ O c A

                 -+4e-se::: : :d - 13 weh < : ; _ n cy                                   0,.       5: uct e:d ' r 'yci: : provi:^d +-                                  '#

f0euig.tnc :~ :#a ? w re:4 nce ': pe ' -,cc ;ri r 1: :: .,a rt

                                                                                                                                 'he prev # f n C' out.:g er _'une 1, 1985, M cv:- Oceur: ~t.
                  -50ef i f i ::t i r 1. C . 2 c re rese ^ ' :: p c r f --anet O' 17i~ Mm : ' ' ' ' n C M                                                                                               l j

i A;en den ~ 50- 3 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-11 i l

 - - - _ .            .             _          _     _  .       -       . . - .      . - - - - _ - _ . _ - - -               = _ . .

CHANGE NUMBER N2iG DESCRIPTION 7 g ., g Q 3.'7.6-9

           .08 05         A (The surveillance is modified to clarify that valves that 9 are locked, sealed or dtherwise secured in their correct positior. are not required to be tested. This change is in accordatee with NUREG 1431. Rev.1. and provides l

clarification only. _ l

                                                                                                                      >$3.7.7-2 l

TR 1

                                        <                          (3M         _3A-lib The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation,                                 ,

08 06 if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of the signal is moved to the Bases. 08 07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 08 08 A The surveillances are revised to clarify that only verification of the correct position of valves in the flow l path is required. _

~'

08 09 b6'de*I/ 08 10 A The Callaway specific note applicable to cycle 1 surveillance requirements is no longer needed. 09 01 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09 02 A A note is added to ACTION that explicitly references the ' LCOs which must be entered if equipment becomes inoperable due to loss of [ essential] service water. The ACTIONS of the referenced LCOs require more imediate action than the [ essential] service water ACTIONS. 09 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09 04 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09 05 TR 1 The surveillance requirements are revised to allow credit for an actual actuation if one occurs, to satisfy the surveillance requirements. The identification of the initiating signal is moved to the Bases. 09 06 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 09 07 A A note is added to the [ESW) surveillance that clarifies system operability requirements. Isolation of [ESW] flow to individual components does not render the system l 11 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

i 1 Q 3.7.7-3 INSERT 3A-11C 08-09-LG Consistent with the requirements of NUREG-14341, Rev.1, drsenptive details defining the specific valves that are the focus of periodic surveillance (i.e., those valves servicing safety related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system) have been moved to the Bases for the applicable ITS SR. This is an exhmple of maintaining the basic requirements for valve surveillance in the ITS while locating the detailed description of the valves in question in the ITS Bases. l l l l l 1 i l l l

                                                    ,- ,                  .             ,.           v

                                                                                                   %            ,,sg          :     , ,

h[3.,y, g ki " ki i. I:(-ll ,

lI al- N {*S - y> ,

                                                                                                        ,..:        1.,                 -!

l . Page 9 of 15 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TSa 3/4.7

                                                                                                                     >        r s

APPLICABILITY p' t. a ; TECli SPEC CilANGE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY DIABLO CANYON ' COMANCHE PEAK NUMBER DESCRIPTION : YES YES , YES YES ; , 08 04 A note is added that clarifles [CCW system] operability. A YES YES YES YES 08-05 Surveillance is modt fled to exclude valves that are locked. A sealed or otherwise secured in their correct position. YES YES YES YES . 08 06 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation . t TR 1 and moves signal specifics to the Bases. NO

NO YES NO l f A new surveillance specific to DCPP is added that requires 08 07 ]

H verifying that each CCW puup starts automatically on an actual or simulated signal actuation at least once per i. 18 months. YES YES F YES YES 08 08 Surveillance is modified to only be applicable to flow path

                                                                                                                                                     - , , , n A              valves.                                                      -                                        m - en -                      .NIA-Y2C nww                                                                    Mih -_ t40 i

4SE. W 38 A fQ 3.7.7-3 g n , 080f &~ i NO YES NO N0 [ 08-10 The Callaway spectfic note applicable to cycle 1 A surveillance requirements is no longer needed. NO NO NO I YES 09 01 A DCPP existing survetllance is revised that requires j H verifying that a motive source is available that would . allow the required valves to be repositioned.' YES j

                                                                                                                                           >            YES NO: ASW only                YES                                                                   ;

09 02 A note is added that requires entry into applicable LCOs if supplies only CCW [ A an inoperable [ESW] system makes the af fected equipment heat exchangers. i i f inoperable. H0 N0 YES~ NO i ! 09-03 The DCPP specific surveillance is reworded and the l A requirement to verify the position of automatic valves is ,. j. deleted since the ASW system has no automatic valves. N0 NO NO ; YES A new surveillance spectfic to DCPP is added that requires l 09 04

M verifying that each ASW pur:p starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal at least once per I i

18 months. I

.l:

4 ' , S/15/97 ! r <...or rie r osi crain Af,g rr)H T Ant r f'llPRI~NT TS i t

T Q 3.7.7-3 , i INSERT 38-9a I TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY !

>            NUMBER   DESCRIPTION                                                                                                                                                                                                      DIABLO CANYON                                                      COMMANCHE        WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY PEAK

, 08-09 Descriptive details defining the specific valves that are the No - Details not in No - Details not Yes Yes LG focus of periodic surveillance have been moved to the CTS in CTS l Bases for the applicable ITS SR.

F

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           .1 L

.l t i t j f i i t i _ __ _ , _ . _ _ _ . - . __._.._ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ____________________._________._,________.___-.._._____m._ . _ _ ,

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.8-11 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7,4.a and c l Licensee Controlled Documents j DOC 08-01-LG CTS 4.7.4.a and c require an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST and a CHANNEL CAllBRATION on the ESW differential pressure instrumentation, respectively, which have not been retained in ITS 3.7.8 but are proposed to be relocated to Licensee , Controlled Documents. 1 Comment: There is no technical basis provided to justify the relocation of these CTS requirements. The generic "LG" NSHC is inadequate. The identity of the Licensee Controlled Documents is not reported. Revise the submittal to provide this information. , FLOG RESPONSE: Technical Specification requirements should consist of those that are of immediate operational concern. Instrumentation requirements of immediate operational concem are those that initiate mitigating functions to prevent exceeding acceptance limits during Design Basis Accidents or are used by the operators in a post-accident monitoring and control function. New DOC 09-09-LG has been prepared to provide additionaljustification for moving these ESW requirements to a licensee controlled document (LCD). The revised DOC reads as follows:

           "The requirements to perform an Analog Channel Operational Test (ACOT) and a Channel Calibration would be moved to a licensee-controlled document (LCD) that is j           maintained in accoidance with applicable regulatory requirements. The ESW instrumentation in question isolates flow to the non-safety-related air compressors in the event of a leak following a design basis accident (DBA) or an earthquake. This function is not of immediate operational concem due to the magnitude of the leak involved.

Normally the ESW flow rate to the air compressor is approximately (60] gpm. The rnagnitude of an associated leak when compare to the overall flow rate of an ESW train (approximately (17,000] gpm) would not be large enough to affect the safety function of the ESW system even if the instrumentation failed to function. This conclusion is confirmed by the ESW single active failure analysis of FSAR/USAR Table 9.2 5 which shows that continued used of the affected ESW train would result in minimalloss of water. In addition, the surveillance requirements that will remain in ITS include an 18 month verification of the operation of the valves that isolate non-safety related portions of the system on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Therefore, the requirements for i ACOT and channel calibration testing of the instrumentation that isolates flow to the air compressors are not of immediate operational concern, and they may be moved to a licensee controlled document." , ATTACHED PAGES: l l l Encl. 2 7-12 l Encl. 3A 12 Encl. 3B 10

       ,-.            ,  mm-.,                                  m -
                                                                    --. ,      ,.        -    - ~ .

i i l

ptANT SYSTEus j

3 /4, 7. .t ESSENTIAL SERVICE Wt.TER SYS~EM O l-LIMITING CONDITIC'N OR OPERATICH l 3.7.4 At least two independent essential service uter (ESW) loops shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: pagE3 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: ON' . na ea H 0 e e-us t n hour or and in COLD SHUTOCWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTS p 3.1.8 IE 0g,0g~A 4.7.4 At least two EI4 loops shall ' *Q9m-n<*-sted % % ug CPERAELE: c(-o~t-n_ a.g At least once per 21 days by verifying that each valvel(manual, power-eperated, or aut:matic) servicing safety-related equipment

 '#                               that is not locked, sealed, or etnerwise secured in position, _is in cd t/d i ts core re si-inc /In ecci " i ca , n '.a,                     c
                                                                                                        . c:
                                                                                                          , . .t..
                                                                                                                . :nce   . . s,
                                                                                                                     . . ...      -c . srm.  - .T... : y:
                                                                                                                                                       . . ., .e-

h 3,9, ))

                                     ,.,.,-..c.m,...m.-
                                                                    ~,.. ,.-. .. . .- .
                                                                                    ..                     .                   r-the air :----e++oas
                                                                                                                                                                         .o .L4 eefnation fer tute nic i : Mt4:n f the-Erd i

nd ' b: pt-*:- :d; C.ee ne W aye) C & ,?_7,,CC +

At least once per 13 sonths d?n : hut 4 ewe, by verifying that: e rt 4

b. og.os- A

                           .-                                              nwe t.D                              'ated OuiOctnt --                                  o -og-LG           ,

1) Each autceatic valve,,5em-icing Ocf:t; '

vscining t.nc aca a;.c;ccr :cf:ty r;inc$pertien f":-cr of .h: :y::

a .3,3, g.;g

                                                                                                                                              ;r Scf;ty' actuates to its correct position c r ; Lc;:                                                                                             .
                                           !ajc;-ica tett--efgaci cad on ; timu44ed-High Ci#f:r:ntial                                                                               ~

Pressu~: ::t ef;ns'-;ga-

                                                                           " M ai N                               --

Ic f c t) . -lc : pen , og.toi

A 2)k Eaca ES'W System pump starts automatically},en ~

                                                                                                                             -;-e- ;ea;          : o.;nei. og-es-W Lc " .c .i a r n ar e ( A. ' ;;s.;;5 '; :nc .n: af by per#0-ning : W.W.                                CI- /t//

c. At 7:0: t -'a-n c e ;>c - ' 3-Mf4%-oue+fMJ-+huteown ,dn t ucentation f:r Out: cati C.' LIS" A~IO" : f tn ti'Mrsnti c.1 prc::um

[gg l

                                    +scl nien O' S E!d t: _. i - r -- m "

5 . ~

G '3.'7 $-1/ ce,-to - A l e_ m p e : . .., . m. , , _ _~.._ , . m *-~...Py bc wa4v@r--QcWmde' ~ --eu e : 4 ,g-l surve w, C. ;,.n

                                                     -e p m.~,a-eesu H,go W            ,, ..

m + - m e a :,. ,',... catags=g**w, 4

y- ' . **.p.c;,wr__ occurs-- r , -. -

gg%;.,cr . - a 4 are---resew, om-v, e n, . ,-, , , . ,5 m msinanca.

                                                                                  ~~              -- --

l ., ;eencrent No. 3 3 / 4 . .,< -- C.ALLAWAY - UNIT 1

FEB-24-1998 15:01 PLAVfSYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM o I A Q 3,'7.1 -1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two ir. dependent essential service water (ESW) lecps shall be OPERABLE. APPLICA8ILITY: MCOES 1. 2. 3, and 4. 01-sa-A ACTICN: @ (fa 2n.ra,-+ a%elad) With cnly one ESW locp OPERABLE. restore at least two ESW loops to CPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANCBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the folicwing 30 hcurs. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREFENTS Q 3,9.945

4.7.4 At least two ESW iceps shall be demcnstrated OPERABLE:in m f/mpdh 08- A)

            *                                                                                                                                 #1~d7'A

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valveV(manual.

pcwer operated, or automatic) serv 1cing safety-related equipment that is not lccked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in __7 __ i,ts c- 31 day:. 3rr 7/.p. 7M ue ,correc.t -n m- .oc. - nsition. c 4 -.. ~-:n ;dditi0n,.-:t 1^;;t o , , , once 3 a ,~,.- y..-..n ,-- , w o --e - y 3, . g3..w 4 , 4, - ,. , m. ,.. .

                                                                                                                        . . , .. m en yg             -
                                                                                            . o.o v.       oG   .n
                                   .eu    to     c w o  ivi   auv     mo..e me i
                 -c:Igis;;cr2 ; hell te pcrf r cd;                                                                                               - ~93-L})

At least once per 18 months by verifying that: l b. r een+ r of s

1) Each automatic valveher" icing :;f;ty-rcl:t;d ;;gipmen,. cr 3 9,og.y,

                              -i:01; ting th0 "On nucicar : f:ty r:le,t;d ;crtica Of the 5,5                                             2 tem G33 0-3 actuates t0 its correct pcsition-On : L::: cf I;wcr si L cV nje::10n tett !';nal .P:n On ; simulcted uigh 01Orenti;l
                                       ..+..u.
                                     .an         -

and g g4_, 2'df Each ESW System pump startsnd 0 S;f:ty :njecti^#. - ' '

';rir.g :had;wn-ca automatically 0r : - L;n 26;i;n

                              -' ;;s- f ?0,w;.r,
                                                     ,-      t0;t 'ign: 1.-
                              -"r i c a a d e c (tv n yLuipa e ,
                                                                                                                          -. - i-vro         _e 9a      a t.           L.   - - s p , r.,. 4 - ,. . - ni on e.              h 4hkl Nh
           ,.         4+    1      ,.

r e ,. - .-

s.fy 4 I h. 5 '%a y iVI .Ig gl V4 eN 5I5 hw Ib s si.d V. 3%b pQ. eJI

                                                                                &J J in:trum ntaticn f r :st:actic i:claticn Offqd-o/hLG.

i. 1

                  -th; diffc.;ntial pcc :ur:                                                                                                            -

3 9,B-J[

                    -t49e ~L             ; the 5;r c:m;'r:ss:"s.

C 09-09-_Lf) the O f'/4 -A iThe 2;ect' icd '0 mcath fr ucr.cy caj te ,,5i.ed-f;r Cycic ! pr; vide

     ;;rni' lance is pcrfccmed prior to restart folhing the fir;t refuel".;                                                     Of cuta;e        cr junc 1.,1^00, whichEver n__ m < u ,. u , 4 . n -_. ___ .                           <_           _ ;c:ur;
                                                                                 < , , fir. ,:. .~Th0

_ _< previ

w. I 1 icn:

J .....o-,6s. awk tGl l 1 gi

     =i p G w 4 i i w w . i vii      ..6        Wi G i666k ii was            p bs t vi mLilbe VI i

3/4 7-12 Amendment No. 8.121 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1

CTS 3.7.4 Footnotes and Inserts l ACTION INSERT

   @ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3 A.6,       09-02-A "RCS Loops - Mode 4", for Residual Heat Removal loops made         .

inoperable by ESW.

   @ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.1,       09-02-A "AC Sources Operating", for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ESW.

s ? 4.7.4.a Insert .

Note: Isolation of flow to individual components does not render the 09-07-A

              - ESW System inoperable.

4.7.4.b.1) Insert I in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position 08-05-A 4.7.4b.1) and b.2) Insert J 69-o 6-TRI on an actual or simulated actuation signal vv mm- ou Q '5.9. 6- 16 5 l

CHANGE NUMBER H2[G DESCRIPTLQM S1, 8 l l inoperable. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431 G j pul 3A' o 3.7. g-12. l and provides

                                   '             cljrMg[ation_only.

V_QLJ 3A-Id 10 01 - Not applicable tti Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). Q3.?,Jg f/ 10 02 H The APPLICABILITY and applicable ACTIONS are revised to incorporate "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies" in addition to all MODES (i.e.. MODES 16).M 1 10 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l Table (Enclosure 38). 10 04 A A new ACTION statement is added by NUREG 1431 to require i entering TS 3.0.3 immediately if two trains of the CR ventilation system are inoperable in H00ES 1, 2. 3, or 4. The CTS requires entry '.nto TS 3.0.3, since the condition of two trains inope 61e is undefined: therefore, the ; revision has been <.0assified as administrative. 10 05 LS 18 A new option is added to the ACTION by NUREG 1431 that allows the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of l irradiated fue'i versus placing the CR ventilation system l in the recirculation mode. 10 06 LG The details and description of NuDcd Idu rd ~ the monthly SRs for train operability are moved to e Bases. This is an example of removing details that are not required to be in TS and is consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1. Q5,7.10-7 10 07 LG The surveilTincen thatMiries CMa~ture once per~ hours is moved to a licepsee congdocument. 10 08 A The description of the ventilation filter specific testing requirements and the required surveillances are moved to the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) as defined in the Administrative Controls of the ITS. No technical changes to requirements or test specifics except as noted in separate change numbers are made. A new SR is added l that requires [ Control Room Emergency Ventilation and ( Emergency Exhaust] system filter testing in accordance with the VFTP. The requirements of this specification l are: 1) moved to Section 5.5.11 of the ITS, or 2) deleted since they are duplicated in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52. Revision 2, [ ANSI N510 1975, or ASTM D 3803 1989]. 12 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS l 1

O 3.7.8-11 l INSERT 3A-12M 09 09-LG The requirements to perform an Analog Channel Operational Test (ACOT) and a Channel Calibration would be moved to a licensee-controlled document (LCD) that l is maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements. The ESW l instrumentation in question isolates flow to the non-safety-related air compressors , in the event of a leak following a design basis accident (DBA) or an earthquake. I This function is not of immediate operational concern due to the magnitude of the leak involved. Normally the ESW flow rate to the air compressor is approximately J [60] gpm. The magnitude of an associated leak when compared to the overall flow rate of an ESW train (approximately [17,000] gpm) would not be large enough to affect the safety function of the ESW system even if the instrumentation failed to function. This conclusion is confirmed by the ESW single active failure analysis ! of FSAR/USAR Table 9.2 5 which shows that continued use of the affected ESW ' train would result in minimal loss of water. In addition, the surveillance i requirements that will remain in ITS include an 18 month verification of the I operation of the valves that isolate non-safety related portions of the system on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Therefore, the requirements for ACOT and channel calibration testing of the instrumentation that isolates flow to the air compressors are not of immediate operational concern, and they may be moved to a licensee controlled document. l l

09- 0 6 - LG ^ Insert-36 l&~ Q %"7. B ~/ 2 Q .% ']. 8 - II Page 10 of 15 Oq _Oq-1.G Insu+ 38-!O C0fWERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY. TECH SPEC CHANGE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY DIABLO CANYON CCHANCHE PEAK NUMBER DESCRIPTION YES YES N0; refer to YES 09-05 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation 09-04 H; this TR-1 and moves signal specifics to the Bases. requirement did not previously exist. NO NG YES; also refer to NO 09-06 A new surveillance specific to DCPP is added that requires change 09 01-H. H verifying that each valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position is capable of being placed in the correct position in accordance with the IST Program. YES YES N0; ASW only YES 09 07 A note is added to the [ESW) surveillance that clarifies supplies CCW heat A system operability requirements. Isolacion of [ESW] flow exchangers. to individual components does not render the system inoper able. NO NO YES NO 10-01 The DCPP specific text description. definition of a LG ventilation train, is deleted from the LCO and moved to the Bases. YES YES N0; part of CTS. YES 10-02 The APPLICABILITY and ACTIONS are revised to include M 'during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.' N0; refer to N0; refer to The SR for the control room ventilation system is revised N0. Plant YES 10 22 H. 10-03 configuration 10-22-H. LS-7 to require the filtration units without electric heaters to includes heaters. be tested for only 15 minutes instead of 10 hours. YES YES YES YES 10 04 An ACTION statement is added to require entering 3.0.3 if A two trains of the control room (CR) ventilation filter system are inoperable in H00ES 1. 2. 3. or 4. YES YES N0; part of CTS. YES 10 05 A new option is added to the ACTIONS by NtREG-1431 that LS-18 allows the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel versus placing the ventilation system in the recirculation mode. 6 3.9.JD - 8 YES

                                                         '~'iidr;                                    .he                                            YES N0; not in CIS.      YES 10-06      The details and description of LG monthly SRs for train operability are moved to the Bases.

5/15/97 CllRRENI 15 CONVfR510tl ColtPARISOfl l ABI E

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ' Q 3.7.8-11 INSERT 38-196 -/Ob TECH SPEC CHANGE                                                                                                           APPLICABILITY -

NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY ' PEAK 09-09 The requirements to perform an Analog Channel NO - not in CTS. NO - not in CTS. YES; moved to YES: moved LG Operational Test (ACOT) and a Channel Calibration would the USAR. to the FSAR. be moved to a licensee-controlled document (LCD). 1 1

i l I

I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-12 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA l l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.4.b.1 Bases for ITS SR 3.7.8.2 i DOC 09-aa-LG CTS 4.7.4.b.1 requires each automatic valve defined as " servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety related portion of the system"is verified to actuate to its correct position. The CTS implies this text is deleted; whereas, the definition for which of these valves are verified is actually moved to the Bases for ITS 3.7.8.2. Comment: It is acceptable to move these details of the surveillance to the Bases. , However, there is no DOC provided for this CTS change. Provide the appropriate { technical justification for this CTS change. ; I FLOG RESPONSE: A new DOC 09-08-LG has been prepared to address moving these details to the ITS Bases. This DOC has been applied to portions of CTS 4.7.4.b.1.) The new DOC reads:

       " Consistent with the requirements of NUREG-1431, Rev.1, descriptive details defining the specific valves that are the focus of periodic surveillance (i.e., those valves servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system) have been moved to the Bases for the applicable ITS SR. This is an example of                    i maintaining the basic requirements for valve surveillances in the ITS while locating the         l detailed description of the valves in question in the ITS Bases."

ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-12 Encl. 3A 12 Encl. 38 10 g r-

PLANT SYSTEuS 1 r 3/4.7.A ESSENT!AL SERVICE VATER SY5 EM oI-l'5-A Q 3Al-l LIMITING CONDITICH FCR OPERATION - l 1 3.7,4 At least two independent essential service water (E5W) locps shall be OPERABLE. . APPLICABILITY: M00E5 1, 2, 3, and 4 b 09-c:.- A , ACTION: C lb A O

l Vith only' ene Erd loco GPERABLE7 restere at least'two ESW Iceps te OPERASLE ,

status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDEY witnin the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDCWH within the following 30 hcurs. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREENTS q 3.1.8 15 gg,g,A 4.7.4 At least two EFd locps shall ha 9mm*-Qed CPERABLE: Go A N %s c f-O'T- n_ At least once per 31 days by ver1fying that eacn valvel(manual, a.h pcwer-cperated, er agtematic) servicing saf ety-related equip =ent

 #                          that is net lecked, sealed, er etnerwise secured                                                                          in cositien, is in c8%\/h
                                                                                                                                     ;nce ;cr I; : y:, -n its cer- c-                esitim                /In       scef       .     :a,    n     ',,:..:t
                                                                                                                     ..ss........,.....,,.,......:...,._                                                   3,3 .)J m m .rw. -.n.m AE. -.,-.m...u, u.,               u                                . m.
                                                                                            ...-,.a.  .
                                                                                                                                            -h^ ai a :-- re:::-:
                                                                                                                                                                                                           .o .16 sent:tien            for     autorn'c                    10:ini      .^     ef   *h:      ET       '   10                                                                           -
                            ..u.- w. .,._e,.-.,_s.,f_

(:s e. n en t'n e ')0 d; '*, C A-2'"I N

                                ~.      ..

LC

b. At least once per 13 months i.".- :huMe=re, by verifying that: og.os. h

                       .-                                                                    :w k)                                                                                                    o o g -l,.G

1) Each autet:atic valvessenicin- : f-ty :1 0ted :quierent-s*

i::ining incn nu;1:7 ::.f .ty r i n:d p:rtic . Of th: :y::f:ty - g* .3, 7 g.12 actua*es te its correct position en ; '.c u.: w, 3f"r-cr :r

                                                                                                                                                . . .- a. s s. . . . . : . .
                                                                                 ,,.o
                                                                                             ..u.a o      . .:

c% - c 5-TL,., w ... o- .u. s, ,, a__._ . _ . ~ . . _ . . ,a, - - w . _. g ya os-to-l A 2)k Each ESW Systen pucc starts . - _. aut:caticallyicn _< _ : R ft ..u . . :. . . m > .,cs.c5 ~.. ty ' nf .._ T. :

                                                                     .__-_..,-,.....:.-m
                                                         , _ -                                                         u-
                                        ..             ..eu              .ua.c             r cAI- M//

c. 't ':::t :nc: pe r .3 -oMM curi g cht ena-........:..,

                                                                                                                                 , by p: ': ....          in;; ;s. "HN"EL      . . .,,. -.

_..,.:s _- ,m. ..a . a. . . ,. u s:,u. - ..

                                                                                        -...; . ~ c. ., . , .

m.. . ~. - - .. oWI.mG. M:t.r o, . ..

                                        . . : . . . < u. , .
                                                                       ,,,,d..    -
                                                                                        .._,a.

_ ~_~_ - - . ~ Q~3.'")6-I) c6-to- A e M eeci ::: 12 sen*a 'n:;; nrj ::y 5: u:ie:d 'Oll:=i for "yci:g :in: ? ~>

                                                                                                                                              '#        i ded--

'u:I'r M- -

survei' law: i s pe rf --,cd :-i cr :.c- r::::r 7: ? hen ; ' l cutage c 't e 1, insgM,e+er-occw: -t. l Spec 4f? cati r

C.* .

we mset 'rt- per':~arca e ' r i r E U'-'ei ' ' ar e . t

     /                                                                                                                                                     A~ enc. ment Mc. $

CALLAWAy - UNIT 1 ;/4 7 12 w,. g,,,,,,,,p a e a M m -4m

FE3-24-1998 15:01 PLANT SYSTERS l 3/4.7 4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 01 A fQ 3.7.1-1 i LTHTTING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.7.4 At least two independent essential service water (ESW) lecps shall be ! OPERABLE. I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4. l ACTION: $(f,Inf,,-tame 4,/) 41-02-A With only one ESW loop OPERASLE. restore at least two ESW loops to CPERABLE status within 72 hours or' be in at least HOT STANCBY within the next 6 hcurs and in COLD SHUE0WN within the folicwing 30 hours. 1 SURVEILLANCE REGUIREMENTS i I G =3.7.9_15 ' 4.7.4 At least two ESW locos shall be demonstrated OPERAELE: r., & Simp +A 08 -De-_A) a.* At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve v(manual. #1'07'A J pcwer-cperated. or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment I that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position. is in _ _ _ _ l its corre.c.t m uposition..

                                                -. -n--          .~c Ir. dditi n. :t MO t On;2 - r 21                             day: 3r 5/ ZI//     # M m g,J,.y- i ;.g,,u.
                     , o o   -- .

7 g .w w. .nmy w . m . Yu~ -.e. ; s m. o m,, .,,~

                                                                             >.         .i
                                                                                                                              . ._ _ _              3,q, ,, j m . m .      .cu co u p o ,.v,i av.vya                 .w i w i a . mu v.        .ow ..n       . .   .m     en
                  -ccmgre;;cr; :nei; :c ;^r,ccmed: -                                                                                               9

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that: l

                                                                     .ruee :2~                                                                oy s-

1) Each autcmatic valvehcr"+ icing : f_ty-rchted c uipmes cc- k3 9,og_g

                              -B hting-tn non nucic:r :0fety-rcht:d ;cc-icn-;f the 5,,;;em 03'28-3 actuates to its correct position on : L:::-of :mer ci Sa4 ci.,

nj :ticn test ";r.21 :nd on cimuhted High Di'forenti:1 mw .. .

                                                      ~r      . u. w..y r an rg d MW-/

2' 0

                               .Each ES,W System pump star,ts automatically n : Rfety ~
                                                                                                                  - _ _ . , -              injc:tiou
                                                                                                                                                       # #~'#[-m I'.___

v. .n_

                                              ._ / &

e,m p- t

                                                             .--._-.m.,.,....
                                                                      \

owm .~. . . % ai.- - nu vu e sa a-..m.

                               ~ aaaa. c wrn e vas.

n t k :t Once cr 10 ;nths by ;;rfor-ing : C'J.AlCEL CALIBRA-':C" cf -l-th ff:renpi$1;re::ur: in: r. ment:tica f:r :u::cetic i cktica of@-o/ hG; .

                   --th; g,W I; :ne C r := pressors.
                             ..                                                                                                               f q 3.9,g-Ji C0969-Lp)
- #The 2;ccified '_^ mcnth fres M y may be me n ed f;r Cycic : prcvidcd the                                                                    O f-/4 -A wr;;i'hnte ": parfcrmcd ;r;or to restart f0'cning thc fir:t refuel- .;

cutage or June 1.1000, nhichever cc ur: 'irst. ,'The provicicn: Of c _ _ _ m. , . I w_4i i

    . pn U b i 3 iww

s. , ,__Wi L _____ ,__ ., a _- , _ _ um ..._._ m ._-,

i.6g. 6 i .ui p4G 4 iwi .n,. s a w s wI .i t 6 a .WI VUl 6 6 gi saw . CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 Amendment No. e.121

I CTS 3.7.4 Footnotes and Inserts ACTION INSERT

                      @ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.4.6,          09-02-A "RCS Loops - Mode 4", for Residual Heat Removal loops made inoperable by ESW.
                      @ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.1,           09-02-A "AC Sources Operating", for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ESW.

s ? l 4.7.4.a Insert ~ .

Note: Isolation of tiow to individual components does not render the 09-07-A ESW System inoperable.

4.7.4.b.1) Insert I l 08-05-A l in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position - 4.7.4b.1) and b.2) Insert J 69-o 6-TRI on an actual or simulated actuation signal 00-00-Tl f Q 3.'7.8- 16

CHANGE NUMBER [LSE DESCRIPTION S'q. 8 U inoperable. This change. is in accordance with NUREG-1431 G Nj

 ,Imul 3 A               and provides cl                 a on1            o 3,9, g,ja j
                                                       ~

10 01 - Not applicable t H al1away. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). Q 3.7.jg- 4 10 02 M The APPLICABILITY and applicable ACTIONS are revised to incorporate "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies

in addition to all MODES (i.e.. MODES 16).M 10 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

10 04 A A new ACTION statement is added by NUREG 1431 to require entering TS 3.0.3 imediately if two trains of the CR ventilation system are inoperable in MODES 1. 2. 3. or 4. l The CTS requires entry into TS 3.0.3. since the condition of two trains inoperable is undefined: therefore, the revision has been classified as administrative. 1

10 05 LS 18 A new option is added to the ACTION by NUREG 1431 that allows the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel versus placing the CR ventilation system in the recirculation mode. The details and description of CDcd UkuJ# 0 10 06 LG - the monthly SRs for train operability are moved toTne Bases. This is an example of removing details that are not required to be in TS and is consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1. L 3 A --12. b 03710~7

~-

10 07 LG u The surve11Td7Fcithat verities C temperaturIonceper hours is moved to a licensee congdocument. 10 08 A The description of the ventilation filter specific testing requirements and the required surveillances are moved to the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) as defined in the Administrative Controls of the ITS. No technical changes to requirements or test specifics except as noted in separate change numbers are made. A new SR is added that requires [ Control Room Emergency Ventilation and Emergency Exhaust] system filter testing in accordance with the VFTP. The requirements of this specification are: 1) moved to Section 5.5.11 of the ITS. or 2) deleted since they are duplicated in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52. Revision 2 [ ANSI N510-1975, or ASTM 0 3803-1989]. 12 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

                     .. -.           . _ - . _ -     . ~ ~ . . . -        . . - - . . _ .      -.   . - -

Q 3.7.812 INSERT 3A-12C 09-08-LG Consistent with the requirements of NUREG-1431, Rev.1, descriptive details defining the specific val.es that are the focus of periodic surveillance (i.e., those valves servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system) have been moved to the Bases for the applicable ITS SR. This is an. example of maintaining the basic requirements for valve surveillance in the iTS while locating the detailed description of the valves in question in the iTS Bases. l I

In w ui- 38 I ~ 0 3'"I* S ~ I 2 09-o s - LG A q 3.'7. 8 -11 g Page 10 of 15 098G , DMP CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY. TECH SPEC CilANGE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY DIABLO CANYON COMANCllE PEAK NUMBER DESCRIPTION YES YES NO: refer to YES 09 05 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation 09 04 H; this TR-1 and moves signal specifics to the Bases. requirement did not previously exist. NO NO YES; also refer to NO ! 09 06 A new surveillance specific to DCPP is added that requires change 09 01-H. H verifying that each valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position is capable of being placed in the correct position in accordance with the IST Program. YES YES YES N0; ASW only 09-07 A note is added to the [ESW) surveillance that clarifies supplies CCW heat A system operability requirements. Isolation of [ESW) flow exchangers. to individual components does not render the system inoperable. NO NO NO YES 10 01 The DCPP specific text description definition of a LG ventilation train. is deleted from the LCO and moved to the Bases. YES , N0; part of CTS. YES

                                                                                        .YES 10 02                The APPLICABILITY and ACTIONS are revised to include                                                                                                                              l H
                         "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies."                                                                          N0; refer to                                           .

N0; refer to No. Plant YES ; The SR for the control room ventilation system is revised 10 22 H. 10-22 H. 10 03 configuration ! LS-7 to require the filtration units without electric heaters to includes heaters. be tested for only 15 minutes instead of 10 hours. YES YES ' YES YES An ACTION statement is added to require entering 3.0.3 if 10 04 A two trains of the control room (CR) ventilation filter ! system are inoperable in H0 DES 1. 2. 3. or 4. YES : N0; part of CTS. YES f YES 10-05 A new option is added to the ACTIONS by NUREG-1431 that j allows the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of LS-18 ; irradiated fuel versus placing the ventilation system in _A 3.'),10- 8 the recirculation mode. YES N0; not in CTS. YES 10-06 The details and description of E g i i Ni he YES t f LG monthly SRs for train operability are moved to the Bases, , 1 7 5/15/97 , C0fNFRSION COMPARISON TABIE - CllRRENT IS

Q 3.7.8-12 ~ INSERT 38-10a TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY PEAK + 09-08 Descriptive details defining the specific valves that are the NO; not in CTS. NO; not in CTS. YES; moved to YES; moved ,. LG focus of periodic surveillance have been moved to the the Bases. to the Bases. Bases for the applicable ITS SR. i 1 t

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-14 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7,4.b.1 ITS SR 3.7.8.2 DOC 08-05-A CTS 4.7.4.b.1 requires that each automatic valve is verified to actuate to its correct position. Corresponding ITS SR 3.7.8.2 limits this verification by excepting those valves that are " locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position." Comment: This CTS change is acceptable; however, this results in fewer valves that need this verification which is a "less restrictive" change. Revise the submittal to provide the appropriate justification for the proposed change. FLOG RESPONSE: See the response to Comment Number Q 3.7.7-2. ATTACHED PAGES: See attached pages in response to Comment Number Q 3.7.7-2. l l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-15 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.4.a and b ITS SR 3.7.8.1 and SR 3.7.8.2 DOC 08-08-A CTS 4.7.4.a and b have been modified to further define the position verification as pertaining to each valve "in the flow path" which is correspondingly located in ITS SR 3.7.8.1 and SR 3.7.8.2. Comment: This CTS change d not identified with a DOC in the CTS markup. This , I change is acceptable if the DOC used to justify this change is 08-08-A. Revise the CTS markup. FLOG RESPONSE: For Callaway, the CTS markup has been revised to apply DOC 08-08-A to the change , dealing with valves "in the flow path"in surveillance requirement 4.7.4.a. In addition, this DOC has been applied to the use of "in the flow path" in surveillance requirement 4.7.3.a. For WCGS, the CTS markup has been revised to change DOC 08-04-A to DOC 08-08-A for surveillance requirement 4.7.4.a. l l ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-11, 7-12 1 "Y

    .-.m

1

          ,     PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM                                                     01-l3 - A Q 3.9, l-l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 At least two independent.cocoonent cooling water loops shall be OP ERAS LE.

AP P!.ICABI L ITY: H00E5 1, 2, 3, and 4 j l N 4"+ AL,g 8-ca- A ACTION: -*

l Vith only one c: ::enent cooling water loop OPERIELE, restore at least two loops to OPERAELE status within 72 hours or De in at least HOT STANOSY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following 30 hours. ,

1 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.7.3 At least two cecoonent cooling water loops shall be cemonstrated og.08-A)

OP ERABLE: s a t. QN. P.oc ra+' o$-o4- A

a. . At least once per 31 days by verifying t. hat each valve (manual, j_.

power-operated, or aut:matic) ervicing saf ety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otnemise securec in cosition is in -- e g.o m.G 1 ,. ,., r ec. .., -o s 1 .1 o n .J .

                                                                                               .,. _ _ ,..m..

m ~~ .. o. . u u - .- . ,n e.. ,...u.,

 -                                 iE: Of t::: :urg:                    :n" ':v:' :nd                cu      i nct     urent:t c- si:N -:",'. .te i
                                                                                                                 --se. e. . ~, - .1. , . s. . -..:...              m. .

as - . 4 .. . 4..$,.:......,

                                                                          .e . . , .
                                                                                      -.--.,m,3..,-.

j:::. n: 5: perf: me :: :::: :n:: p r 21 d:y:-; y[gg,q,7 LJ 2

5. At least once per 18 months du ' ; ttutdeun, by- verifying *. hat: o s.-o 3-LG-r ,A s o S-o5- A Each automatic valve :t-eicing ::f.ty :I.ted ^;ui;r n: :- CB CS-Ps ,.,.

1) Sci sti ng --;.u no m:: ur ::f::y- r:':::: pertier :< :': .j::eq os 69-F actua*es to its correct position er : 52'::y 19f:::f n no-se-a i ulated-Hign rice :nd Lee Surg Y -4.: v :1 10:1 f ; n :'- and cpo. a.L C::%at. a 2)k Each OPERASLE Comconent C: cling Water System pump starts -- auto- et ter.A l a , l yg _ . su.. ..;< . . . .: ..:.. m n. ..<_n-s.- .-.sa- a.-mi 3 a.,1 i4 ..y .iwm sss s6 - r C&% ;9.i w hw<t. 44 d

c. *i M :t once ;;r 12 cen:9: cu #,g :Nv w=n, 53 per :-ing

                                    .                                                                                                              : :N "NE-L oE-ow.G 01.'. I S E "I ^ N : f t h: :u g: tank i:v:1 and                                cr ' :tru ntaticr -hi:n
                                                                                                                                                                     .i:n p ~re i c: c u .eeat.i: i::1 ti:n c' :n                                 no.--nuc'::r ::.f:rj :':: d p c' t% rysum                                                                                                     .

o c A Ocset:;:d13-::%h f w caey-m:y : ::ved 'or ye' I prev :ed tM -

wrv e 4ance : per'c- 4: ;rier :: ::: art## feit: ing .n " :: :'. !;

                                                                                                                    'he pr:V 0ien :I#

M9: er lun 1, 1E8E, ni:Frve :Cu" N t.

                                                                                                                                               ' Onc e'-

[ 59eG M 3tien 2.0.2 5 d E5c ^. f - ^ r p e*hM : I9i :ure. 2/4 7-11 Amenc en: .a . . o-CALLAWAY - UNIT 1

' - / Ox 7., 1 %., !

                                                                                                                                                     ,), /
                                                                                                                                          \
                                                                                                                                             's,.s/

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.A ESSENTI AL SERVICE W!.TER SYSTEM

                                                                                   'Ol-l*3-A Q 3,9,l-1 L!MITING CONDITION ~0R OPERATION                                                                       .

3.7.4 At least two independent essential service water (E5W) locps shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABIL!TY: H00E5 1, 2, 3, and 4. C3-c:- A ACTION: C L % M OM A D ., With only' one E5W icap OPERASLE7 restore at least'two ESV leops to OPERASLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANCEY' within tne next 5 hours and in COLD SHUTDOW within the f ollowing 30 acurs. 1 1 1 1 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREENTS q3.7.8 LEI At least two ESV loops shall be dames *.,:3Qd CPERASLE: 0 8 06_- A

4. 7. 4 G % % ah c i-o'l- n_

4 a.t Atleastonceper31daysbyverifyingthateachvalvel(manual, ., pcwer-cperated, or autc=atic) servicing saf ety-related equipment - that is not locked, sealed, er otherwise secured in cosition. is in c 1/y/r its ceram eesit ec /!a scci.e.1:a, n ;;;n d

ace s,cr n dcys,, :n 3,9 .H

                                                               ..-- ,m.., ..,.,.m.. o.,,,,._.__._..,.4. . , . . - , ._,, _3 ,,, . . . _

n.m . ,- .. n m. .o. . .....m.... y .. ..

                                                                                                                                                      , g ,,g
                                           ..n.

o

                                                    <._ ....         ... m 3 ,. u -, . u ggg .                33 35.                                                      '

n f i: p: ' d:: /; C ~n nen t" > C h-2.~1*CCA' At least once per 13 months du 'na__:huth, by verifying that: e t t LC. -- '

b. og,.os. A

               *             .-                                                 wA.7 )  .

M.og-LG

1) Eact autceatic valveasincingacf: r : lated ::uipment er nciating inc nea ngclear fety reined- per*.icn Of th: :y:t= g .3,3, g.12

                                                                                                       ' :::-O f" .c r e r ~;f: y

ac*wates to its correct position ca _ lajenica ten :ignal :n6-ca a :ime'ene&H'gh 01'f: tet4a4 #~ *

                                              ? m.:u : i n t sig-1'r;ta                                                                                          A
                                                                                **' A Icf: ci I.l:.-l:n, estoi 2)k Eacn E5V Sys*em pump star *s aut:matically[en                                     : .e a . . : Fel . ca..os-W ic ~ c.i:n Tre:5.c e ; AT' ' ,.ws ' .ac .:n f^w
                                      't ':::t once per 13-wth: curing shut man, by perf: ing : 3'.W 9. ci-                                                        fl 4s

c. -

                                                                                                    ' 90 .ru.sentction f:r :::=ni ggU
                                      ~"L:3"aTEN :f th i'ftr:ntial pr ::ur:

is:1=1:n :! in: E:n 1: :: 4 ~ r ~ -= s ' ~ . ~ Q'3.'16-)) bewa+ved 'cr Cyci: I p evided x ~b ef*:e-sp:; ; c. 2 :: nth f r;. :j ::3 m :lanse-40 p t -f -r,c d ri r to-r: a r: 'Ol l er i 7 9-G: 'i- n fue'# ?

                                                                                       -:. 7: peevi:ica: :f cu* ge c- _'c e 1,1999, -r.icoever :::ur:                               t' *-fr s==>eiince.

Speci'i cati:n ' . 0. are ~;et ' :- perf:-a e l f ;cencment Nc. ^ CALLAWAY - UNIT' 1 3/4 7 12

       'WS W                                                                                           ---

FE3-24-1998 15:01 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM o f .13 - A

                                                                                                      . Q 3. '? .1 -l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.7.4 At least two independent essential service Water (ESW) Iceps shall be l OPERABLE. 1 APPLICASILITY: MODES 1. 2, 3. and 4. ACTION: @ (fa, xn.ra, + anchool) 61.-sa-A With cnly one ESW loop CPERABLE. restore at least two ESW loops to CPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANCBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHllT00WN within the follcwing 30 hcurs. l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS G 3.7.9-15 i 4.7.4 At least two ESW locps shall be demcnstrated OPERABLE: 08 A) in k Slowp+h At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve v(manual. #1'#7'A i a.* power-cperated or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment l J that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position. is in 1tsu corr.ect mmm positio.n,.

                                                   -.    -n~           -~n E     :dditkn,.-:t
                                                                                         -           ,,         .w R:s,t o ,- .-. ,

onc; 4c _r 31 day:. c3r fgj/g,gi _,,.m, _

                     , o.m.w-- .. .o. m m.
                                                              ..-.. un.                   . .. _    __, _ ~     ..

m _m m..

                                                                                                                                              . ..       r.   .. . . .
                                                                                                                                                              .~_2

_ _ 0 3.q,6- 1 w..e ..n e . . . ei.

                 -.%_ _ .s..
                                  .i.e m.a.u.         u oo am_eu. m,o.
                                                           -           ___         ___s. e iwa.oov.                                                                                             -og- L fJ
                     .....rica v a                   ooi.         s ,.s.,        . . . . ~ .

At least once per 18 months by verifying that: l

b. py c ruer-+ cc

1) Each a c 9,og_g I a_.,,.utomatic <.,,,

.mu

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                                                                                                                                   ...    ,.w . . n o w.;;uipmes

_ _ __ : _ - .. ~..,u ay m.s. er._ G 3.7. e-3 actuates to .io,.,g,

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                                                                                                                   .us 4...een,:

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0 * * ~~A 2' Each ES,Wm_.- System cumo star,ts

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       .h U4   i 4.e . a w I I    ".d.

3/4712 klendment No. 8.121 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1

i I i CTS 3.7.4 Footnotes and Inserts ACTION INSERT

    @ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.4.6,       09-02-A "RCS Loops - Mode 4", for Residual Heat Removal loops made inoperable by ESW.                                                                  l l
    @ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.1,       09-02-A
               AC Sources Operating", for emergency diesel generator made                        ,

inoperable by ESW. s ? 4.7.4.a Insert

Note: Isolation of flow to individual components does not render the 09-07-A ESW System inoperable.

4.7.4.b.1) Insert I in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position 08-05-A 4.7.4b.1) and b.2) Insert J 69-o 6-TRI on an actual or simulated actuation signal 03-00;f@' Q 3.'7. 8 ~ Ib i

i I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.8-16 APPLICABILITY: CA l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.4.b.1 and 2 ITS SRs 3.7.8.2 and 3.7.8.3 DOC 08-06-TR1 CTS 4.7.4.b.1 and 2 have been modified by moving the specific actuation test signal to the BASES and requiring in ITS SRs 3.7.8.2 and 3.7.8.3 either a " simulated or actual test I signal" to actuate the ESW valves and pumps. Comment: This change is acceptable, if the DOC used to justify this change is re-identified as 09-05-TR1 for consistency within the CTS markup for this LCO. Revise the CTS markup. FLOG RESPONSE: For consistency the Callaway CTS markup has been revised to show DOC 9-05-YR1 as the justification for the referenced changes. The markups are attached. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-12 l i l l

                                                                    -. _. -               =~.                .            . -                  .- -                                                 ._ _                   . - -

4 m\

                                                                                                                                                                                                                \
                                                                                                                                                                                                 .-       m .,i

(.~6Q_f,W; 1- . -_ x%~- PLANT SYSTEuS 3/4.7.A ESSENTI AL SERVICE W.TER SYS"'E.M

                                                                                                            ' O l A Q 3,7.l-1 LIMITING CONDITICN OR OPERATION                                                                                                               .

3.7.4 At least two independent essential service water (ESW) loeps shall be OPEMBLE. APDLICABILITY: MCCES 1, 2, 3, and 4 eq-c:- A ACTION: C N Wad 6' h D _ With only' one ESW loop CPEMBLE? restore at least'two E5W iceps to OPEMSLE s*atus within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANCBf within tne next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTUOWN within the folloWing 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREWiNTS q '3.1.8-l5 080g-A 4.7.4 At least two ESV loops shall he c-dawr<trated n wCPEMBLE: c a'-o7-n_ a.4 At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valvel(manual, .. power-eperat.ed, or automatic) servicing safety-related equip =ent - j that is not locked, sealed, or etnerwise secured in position is in c

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                                                         ,.a..._.a..,. .f                                                                                C.re a new'.fuye) c A ~?.-1-CC4-                                        [

At least once per 18 scnths d?. - " + " , by verifying that: er ' :' - . !

b. cE-os-A l

                             .-                                                                   C+*ct V                                                                                            o -o g -l.G

1) Each automa*ic valvess m icing :.ftty '

d tui; :nt -

i;cicting tac n;. auricar ::.f;;y :IMed p:rti: 0 0' *h: :y:ta a .3, g g.g actuates to its ccrrec* position cc :. ';;: Of"r-crN ;r Rf;ty* ati c.I , Injs.-.ica Oc; . ;4;nal :.ad On c. :inul .0:d High Ci#f ~ rhesse: ::t sign:1-;ga-

                                                                                                      .n ,,ck. f -
    .                                                                                                              /                                                                                     ott, io-l A 2}k Each ESV System                                      pumo starts autenatically}.cn              __.             ._

k f:0) :-f;; , : .

.ca

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                                     ** '     :::t :n : ; r 'S wit: curiq :het2 , by ;;r':-aing ; OWNE                                                                                                      c/l- /h

c. C:ti og{G-C L*3TL'T~2M ;f thc tiffer--ti'.1 p n: u 0-4n -= ente.tica f r nut:

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G'3.').6-1J C6 A ita .;p.:1.;c: ': c:a n ' ea cnrj may-t: ::ived ' r Cyc1: : p ~w44ed

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see4 those f : per v o med Orier .c

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                                                                                                                                                                /cencment Mc. 3 3/4 7 '2
      '/

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 h

FE3-24-1998 15'01 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVTCE WATER SYSTEM o 1 13- A Q 3,?.1-l t IMITING CCN0! TION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent essential service water (ESW) iceps shall be OPERABLE. APPLICASILITY: NCES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTTON: @ (fa, xntar.+ a% clod) 09-01-A With only one ESW iccp OPERABLE. restore at least two ESW iccos to CPERABLE status within 72 hours er be in at least HOT STANCBY W1 thin the next 6 hcurs . and in COLD SHUTDCWN within the fclicwing 30 hours. 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Q 3 ?.9-15 4.7.4 At least two ESW iceps shall be dc icnstrated OPERABLE: -- in +1,a fImp+h 08 - D8- A') a.* At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valveV(manual. #1'07'A power-cperated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equip:r.ent that is not locked. sealed, or otherwise secured in position. is in 1ts corr ~ectu posit,n -. -ion. . .-vIr, Odditi n. :t 10 st crca - r 31 day: er f/g//g} n --

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b. At least once per 18 mcnths by verifying that: l

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Each a t u omatic valveh,er"_+icir,;

                                                      %,          .__ .._ _.                  .. .                   __        ..;            :;fet,y-relat:d

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actuates

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Us Cerrect position ci, c L ^.", Of ';Wer ;i .ic,ici.f

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s . . ,. . m m ...aiu wi CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 Amendment No, e.121

    . - - .- . . _ .          --    .-~.-.          -.-.         _--       -- . - -..-..-. -                                      .. . .-.        . . . -

CTS 3.7.4 Footnotes and Inserts i ACTION INSERT

                 '@ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.4.6,                                    09-02-A "RCS Loops - Mode 4", for Residual Heat Removal loops made inoperable by ESW.
                  @ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.1,                                    09-02-A "AC Sources Operating", for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ESW.

s ? 4.7.4.a Insert .

Note: Isolation of flow to individual components does not render the 09-07-A

                             ' ESW System inoperable.

4.7.4.b.1) Insert I in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position 08-05-A 4.7.4b.1) and b.2) Insert J - - 69-o6-TRI i on an actual or simulated actuation signal vv ve . a ; Q 3.3.6-16 J 1

                                                                                             - . - - _     _ - - , , . . . -           , ., . - -         y- -

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.8-17 APPLICABILITY: CA ! l REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.4 Actions Bases ITS 3.7.8, LCO discussion DOC 09-bb-LSb CTS 3/4.7.4 Actions have been extensively modified by new Bases ITS 3.7.8 LCO discussion which establish three new conditions for ESW Operability. Comment: Callaway should explain the technical basis for inclusion of these new items into the Bases LCO discussion. Under paragraph c, items 3.A and 3.B appear to be acceptable clarifications of text to further define ESW system component Operability. However, further information is required for the staff to make this determination. in addition, if item c is valid, it contains Required Actions that should be put into the Actions portion of the LCO rather than buried in the Bases. FLOG RESPONSE: ITS Bases 3.7.8 LCO includes a discussion of criteria for the OPERABILITY of the ESW system. A requirement for the pump room supply fan to be operable is added. The discussion is intended to provide clarifications to define and guide the operator in determining ESW system component Operability. The criteria given provide general I guidance at the component level for determining system operability. The general I guidelines for the operators are property mentioned in the LCO Bases. However, the Bases have been modified to limit the level of detailed information provided, when this information is appropriately incorporated into plant procedures. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 3B B 3.7-53, B 3.7-54, B 3.7-55

l

l SWS E . B 3.7.8 BASES APPLICABLE fluid from increasing in temperature during the recirculation SAFETY ANALYSES phase following a LOCA and provides for a gradual reduction in (continued) the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the Reactor I Coolant System by the ECCS pumps. The SWE E5IMBTEE is designed I to perform its function with a single failure of any active component, assuming the loss of offsite power. The SWS M. in conjunction with the CCW System, also cools the unit from residual heat removal (RHR), as discussed in the FSAR. Section m . . (Ref. 3) entry conditions to MODE 5 during rersal end post accident operations + +c.s .: 4www m..s .n . c ..sw #.E -hM'm. The time required for this evolution is a function of the number .of r a R CCW M l M.M. O - and RHR System trains that are operating. One SWS 7 ~x train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in H0 DES 5 and 6. This assumes a maximum SWS 3 temperature of E*F occurring sinultaneously with maximum heat loads on the system. The SWS w <-. satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC NRC Policy st;t;;.;at a a : . , u .-. .s w ...o. LCO Two SWS Rc c.

trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming that the worst case single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

An SWS M train is considered OPERABLE during H00ES 1. 2.

3. and 4 when:

a. The pump is CPERABLE: ane- G 3,7. 6- l'I

b. The associated piping, valves, hc;t cxchanger, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the O 3'7' 7 safety related function are OPERABLEy 3 Q s . . .' .. _. d -

_. .. ,, A. . ' . Mb __.T. g Q 3,7,$-f v x ' d '-. ' '. -- .. :. - . Q /% 8 i , s , \ \ .

y.._ _ . mnou,_.. ._ m ewr-w muihetrn,m,a'- .errdeM,His,t55fE,?It6teiWoWM

                                             ,        ,                                ,   , ,         ,    ~

m... . .

4. - -1VSSRT 8 3.q-53 y % ppt;%tn$ Q 3,78-/9 HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 53 5/15/97

I i Q 3.7.8-17 INSERT B 3.7-53

c. The pump room supply fan is OPERABLE.

The prelube storage tanks, TEF01 A and TEF01B, are not required for OPERABILITY of the ESW pumps. The ESW pumps will start and run satisfactorily with dry bearings in an emergency should prelube water supply from the prelube storage tank not be present. Once the pump starts, lube water will be supplied by the pump. l 1 i I l l l 1

MM B 3.7.8 i BASES i l LC0 (continued) 3'3- I T aa i'- Cm c# i -

                                                                                                                    . l : -

r. - ; ' :F u --

o' -- m';:. o- an ;; i ;-T r . ; . ',

                                                                                                                                                                             ..-]  c.:

p, ., ., .
9 c.s-n i mas /

f N /

                                                       )                                                                                                                                        1 E

t i i l I a , M I l l k y,~ l E t

                                                                                                                       - n                                                main t
                                                                                                                        .,aw.; , :g? i-
                                                                                                                                                  .n g                   y_ . __ _ _ . _ . _ _ .       -

p_ . _ ,. _ . _ . .. __. .a_e_mr_. . ;ss copr.- _ ratyear-r~ 'N_'macaEucos

                                                                                                                                     -                        ~                     \J (continued)

MARX UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 54 5/15/97

MM B 3.7.8 BASES V w LCO g 3,g, 8-)rf (V tv - - = u m . . +-- o-a-m ~ q (continued) , m- noy. _ _ nq

                                                , }W1*ff?         ,

APPLICABILITY In H00ES 1, 2, 3, and 4 the M Eilmp!q is a rciselly cpcrating M system that is required to support the CPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the M ESMU!il and required to be OPE" ELE in these MCOES. In "CCC: : and 5 the :C#IL.T' ccquir;; cat; ;f the :'W: ;r: datcc;incd by the ;ystem; it support;. ACTIONS L1 If one M M train is irioperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE M M train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE M W 4Ac l train could result in loss of M M function. Required Action A.1.is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1,

                        'AC Sources    Operating,' should be entered if an inoperable M M train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator.

The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and H00E 4," should be Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops entered if an inoperable M ESEEpiil train results in an inoperable decey res*%A heat removal train. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for tnese components. The 72 hour Con:pletion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPEMBLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period. 8.1 and B.2 If the M liSWEiED!!i train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a M00E in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status, (continued)_ 5/15/97 MARX UP GF NUREG-1431 BASES 8 3.7-55

i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l I ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.9-6 APPLICABILITY: CA l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.5.2 l Licensee Controlled Documents DCC 13-06-LG CTS 4.7.5.2 contains visualinspection requirements of the coc!ing tower that have not been retained in ITS 3.7.9 but have been relocated to Licensee Controlled Documents. Comment: There is no technical basis provided to justify the relocation of these CTS requirements. The generic "LG" NSHC is inadequate. The identity of the Licensee Controlled Documents is not reported. Revise the submittal to provide this information. FLOG RESPONSE: Identification of the licensee controlled document containing this requirement is provided in Enclosure 38 of the conversion application. Visualinspection requirements of the cooling tower have been relocated to the FSAR. This is an example of relocating detailed information and a specific requirement, while retaining the fundamental requirements in the Technical Specifications. CTS 4.7.5.2 requires demenstrating that the UHS cooling tower trains are operable. This fundamental requirement is retained in ITS 3.7.9. The specific requirement to visually inspect and verify no abnormal breakage or degradation of the fill materials is detailed information which has not been retained in ITS 3.7.9, but relocated. DCC 13-06-LG is appropriate justification for the relocation because the visualinspection requirement is descriptive in nature; a specific requirement regarding the UHS cooling tower trains; and because the requirement is relocated to the FSAR. ATTACHED PAGES: None i

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.9-7 APPLICABILITY: CA
REQUEST: CTS 4.7.5.3 i Licensee Controlled Documents DOC 13-07-LG CTS 4.7.5.3 contains visual inspection requirements of the UHS riprap which might lead to blockage of the ESW pump suction that have not been retained in ITS 3.7.9 but have been relocated to Licensee Controlled Documents. ;

Comment: There is no technical basis provided to justify the relocation of these CTS i requirements. The generic "LG" NSHC is inadequate. The identity of the Licensee I Controlled Documents is not reported. Revise the submittal to provide this information. FLOG RESPONSE: Identification of the licensee controlled document containing this requirement is provided in Enclosure 3B of the conversion application. Visualinspection requirements of the UHS riprap have been relocated to the FSAR. This is an example of relocating details, while retaining the fundamental requirements in the Technical Specifications. CTS 4.7.5.3 requires demonstrating the UHS operable. This fundamental requirement is retained in ITS 3.7.9. The specific requirement to visually inspect the UHS riprap for any abnormal degradation which might lead to blockage of the ESW pump suction is detailed information which has not been retained in ITS 3.7.9, but relocated. DOC 13-07-LG is appropriate justification for this relocation because the visual inspection requirement is descriptive in nature; it is a specific requirement regarding the UHS; and because the requirement is relocated to the FSAR. ATTACHED PAGES: None l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.9-8 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.5 STS SR 3.7.9.4 DOC 13 yy-LSy - STS SR 3.7.9.4 requires each cooling tower to be verified to start on an actual or simulated signal. The CTS does not contain a similar requirement. Comment: There is no JFD provided to explain why this SR is not adopted in the ITS 3.7.9. Provide an explanation to justify this deviation from the STS or adopt the STS text. FLOG RESPONSE: The ITS SR 3.7.9.4 was not adopted, because the surveillance requirement is not in CTS. l As discussed in the FSAR, the cooling tower fan start signal is dependent on ESW return ' temperature in combination with ESW pump operation of five minutes or more and does not start on an ESFAS signal. The UHS cooling tower fans start in slow speed when the ESW discharge temperature increases to 104 F and then shift to fast speed at 114 F, if the corresponding ESW pump has been running for at least 5 minutes. Under current plant practice the UHS cooling tower train is declared inoperable when the corresponding ; temperature loop is out-of-sentice. The temperature loops are tested under the l Preventative Maintenance Program. Although the UHS cooling tower " temperature control circuitry"is required for ) OPERABILITY, it is not part of the primary success path which functions or actuates to i mitigate a DBA or transient as stated in Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36. UHS temperature I control is not an immediate function required following a DBA, since the UHS temperature l must be maintained below the technical specification limit. Should a DBA occur, with a I' subsequent increase in UHS temperature and failure of the temperature controls, alarms and indications of equipment status are provided in the control room to alert operators of a problem with the UHS temperature control. There is ample time for the operators to manually align the equipment. Criterion 3 attributes for the UHS are met as follows: 30-day post-LOCA UHS requirements are satisfied by meeting SR 3.7.9.1 and 3.7.9.2 for level and temperature, and cooling tower fan operability is demonstrated by SR 3.7.9.3. ATTACHED PAGES: None l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.10-4 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.5.1 [3.7.6], Action a and b for Modes 5 and 6 ITS 3.7.10 Actions C and D DOC 10-xx-M CTS 3.7.5.1 [3.7.6], Action a and b for Modes 5 and 6 have been modified by ITS 3.7.10 I Actions A, B, and C by the addition of an "immediate" Completion Time for both Actions and the addition of suspending the " movement of irradiated fuel assemblies"in Action b. Comment: These two CTS more restrictive changes were not identified in the CTS

            . markup and no DOCS were provided to justify these changes. Provide the appropriate DOCS for these changes.                                                                                             l FLOG RESPONSE:                                                                                                                !

DOC 10-02-M justified the addition of "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies" to the Applicability, and the revisions to the applicable ACTIONS. CTS 3.7.5.1, Actions a and b have been revised to reference this DOC. Also DOC 10-02-M has been revised to include the following: "During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the [CREVS] must be OPERABLE to cope with the release of a fuel handling accident." DOC 10-27-M has been added: "If the inoperable [CREVS] train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be taken to immediately place the OPERABLE [CREVS] train in the [ recirculation) mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure would be readily detected." CTS 3.7.5.1, Actions a and b have been revised to reference this DOC. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-14 Encl. 3A 12,14 Encl. 3B 13 i l

x sm

i 1N1198 *t %) 3. i s x ptAxi SYSTEMS I 3/4 7.6 CONTROL ROCH EMERCENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM o }-13. A Q 3,9. l-l (IMITlHG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6 Two independent Control Recm Emer;ency Ventilation Systeas shAll be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: Al1 H00ES.7b e g % u eA .9 'ec & M L.y asse Q ACTION: 4 D-

          >COES 1, 2, 3 and 4:                                                                               ..

s With one Control Recm Emergency Ventilation Systemlincoerable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hours and in COLO SHUT 00W within the following to - 20'LS M 30 hours M4L b, cAnvs brac gen'Je.,C.c moos e4 e -d om w.,em At % %a.g {g p'p= . ' ma u k. yt.u be \e.o 3.o 3 i m..es,-4A .C weU C4 e.ss We.g i

                                                                                                                                                                    ,,,cg,4 MODES 5 and 6: w                                                                                                                                                 ,

With one Centrol Roem Emergency Ventilation System incperable, 03'

a. [ ~9 restore the inoperable system to OPERASLE status within 7 days or 'mm.e.4% o3ff,,o.tj initiate and maintain operation of the remaining CPERABLE Control -

                                                                                                                                                               -g g ,7,so -19]

Rocm Emergency Ventilatien st psuem in *B Ce recirculation r.cdef oc w5 tem 10- g - g t a.

em htw 4 s ecewi w e M u '.e3 \ use.Mes w e L,.kiy, D. With both Centrol Recm Emergencv' Ventilation Systems incoerables :- Nb"

                                                                                                                                                                         -+'s s s in:        -

m : rim a: E=e genco:ne- _-, m ,er,.-.,rfm , -m s .

                                 .. . m, s_

u, ..:-....:.-..~-.u., -

                                                                  - ---                           ir-.--ru ,

_. ,y; v_. . _ _ gg pc-s:s: :j: r- - 4 :1 :r g e:_-_=_=:- 'cu-,, suspend alI cperaticns io'ab , 5 g invol vi ng CORE ALTERATIONS ; ;cii'. ' . ; ;;.;*. ' ty :na ;-' " 0 ^ -/3 icMc 'a' , 7 w,c ce% ed.e aa

~ ~

D

                                                                          %4ah  .c swhaa
                                                                            '5 "*-

m.g w ' d[.ten SURVEILLANCE REOUIRENENTS % be'/$ I m 10 . -/4 4.7.6 Each Control Roem Emergency Ventilation System shall be der.cnstrated OPERABLE: (Ned PM cepced c.2.uvs Osbr deit] (* uc.vda.w:a. a d k NPT . to c84

a. A ^. l e e ; ^. G n: c p e r 12 5c . ; h i r' 'y ' 7; tha t- tu - ;; ^.t r:I ^3ee g . g . g c,.

O - t 7p: ;; r- :'

' t h e . o r c v e '. 1: I f * ~-; p y r/p g

b. At least once per 31 days er 5~ ' C ~ E 9 E0 ~ E :~ E AE *. 5 by ' t i a t i ,; . se.q- ts u.

fr: tnc ::ntr:1 ::r, '!: thr:u;r th; HE.','icr' :nd char:;ci . u c, O d',0 rb c -' f 5 0 t ' the " 't ticr and 'r Curl:'t?Or 5 7', t c ?. ; cae-

                              'oy veri fying that the Pressurization System operates for at least 10 continuou,s hours with th e h e a t e r s o p e r a t i n gf aad A MMea. b\br                                               go.p B
                                   -ib cecce.L v 2: \5 was                   ta s .
                                                                                                             ';    u'-    :      u~~T?        T .- :                     10 4  -'
                       ,..a..v...,
                                                . . , . ~ . 1 -,... . .

i 1 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-la A.:e nc.me n t No . 69

l l L I CTS %.7JNSERTS l INSERT'A' With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable due to 10-20-LS39 an inoperable Control Room boundary while in MODE 1,2,3 or 4, restore the inoperable Control Room boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in atleast HOT STANDI vithin the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 ha j l INSERT 'B' l With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable,due ta 10-20-LS39 an inoperable Control Room boundary while inMODE 5 or 6 or during ' l movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, restore the inoperable Control Rooni l i l l boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 nours or immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and suspend movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies. I l

CHANGE NUMBER .N.SEC DESCRIPTION G S'9. 8 -l l j inoperable. This change is in accordance with NUREG-1431 Insul '3 A' and provides c1 rific tion _ only.w o 3.7 6-12 l In yd %A --IEc.) 10 01 - Not applicable t5 Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). Q 3.7.jp-# 10 02 M The APPLICABILITY and applicable ACTIONS are revised to incorporate "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies" in addition to all MODES (i.e.. MODES 1-6).M 10 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 04 A A new ACTION statement is added by NUREG 1431 to require entering TS 3.0.3 imediately if two trains of the CR ventilation system are inoperable in MODES 1, 2. 3. or 4. The CTS requires entry into TS 3.0.3, since the condition of two trains inoperable is undefined: therefore. the revision has been classified as administrative. 10 05 LS 18 A new option is added to the ACTION by NUREG 1431 that allows the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel versus placing the CR ventilation system in the recirculation mode. O ' 10 06 LG The details and description of 6cM6^d NIDJh rd the monthly SRs for train operability are moved to the Bases. This is an example of removing details that are not required to be in TS and is consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1.

                                                                          .Tn d 'M -12.(      Q3.710-7 The surveil ance that veFifies C temperatureonceper}

10 07 LG hours is moved to a licensee congdocument.f 10 08 A The description of the ventilation filter specific testing requirements and the required surveillances are moved to the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) as defined in the Administrative Controls of the ITS. No technical changes to requirements or test specifics except as noted in separate change numbers are made. A new SR is added that requires (Control Room Emergency Ventilation and Emergency Exhaust] system filter testing in accordance with the VFTP. The requirements of this specification are: 1) moved to Section 5.5.11 of the ITS, or 2) deleted since they are duplicated in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52. Revision 2. [ ANSI N510-1975. or ASTM D 3803 1989]. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 12 5/15/97

l Q 3.7.10-4 ! INSERT 3A-12a l During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the [CREVS] must be OPERABLE to cope with the release of a fuel handling accident. l 1 l i

 . - . .              .       . __       .      --         -.--. .             .._.      -.    =      . _ - - .

1 1 L CHANGE j NUMBER N.21C DESCRIPTION 1 10 18 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison 1 Table (Enclosure 38). 1 10 19 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ! Table (Enclosure 38). 10 20 LS 39 This change establishes appropriate Required Actions and , Completion Times for ventilation system pressure envelope ; degradation. The proposed change would allow 24 hours to restore the capability to maintain the proper pressure by allowing for routine repairs before requiring the unit to perform an orderly shutdown. This change recognizes that the ventilation trains associated with the pressure envelope would still be OPERABLE and providing the appropriate flows even if the required pressure limit _, _ cannot be met. These changes are as proposed bgg 4W/75TF-287 j 10 21 LS 38 The action to immediately suspend positive reactivity Q 3.7l3 7 changes when both trains of CR ventilation are incperable in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is deleted consistent with NUREG 1431. This change is acceptable because the imediate suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel provides adequate protection from a release of radioactivity. Baron dilution events leading to criticality are not postulated as these events are prevented from occurring. 10 22 H A requirement to operate the filtration system fans for at least 15 minutes would be added consistent with NUREG 1431. These fans. which do not have associated , heaters, do not have a specified run time in CTS: adding this requirement is more restrictive. The proposed change is acceptable because it provides a minimum run time to l assure fan OPERABILITY without imposing significant wear and attendant degradation on the fan. I 10 23 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 24 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison C y Table (Enclosure 38).(JnwN ~ G 3.7.10 -Y ----> 11 01 M A new specification for CR heat removal is added per ! NUREG 1431. CR temperature control is required to ensure gy 3 A-Wo, the ability of the CR equipment to function following a OBA. j Q 3,7.10 ' a 8 l yy 3 A 4 c. Q 3.110- 13 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 14 5/15/97

l l Q 3.7.10-4 INSERT 3A-14h i

l. 10-27 M If the inoperable [CREVS] train cannot be restored to OPERABLE - '

status within the required Completion Time, action must be taken to immediately place the OPERABLE (CREVS] train in the (recirculation] mode. This action ensures that the remaining train 1 is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will l occur, and that any active failure would be readily detected. 1 l i l I I l l 1 I i t

Page 13 of 15 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY TECil SPEC CHANGE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY : DIABLO CANYON- COMANCHE PEAK NUMBER DESCRIPTION NO: part of CTS. NO: part of CTS. YES YES 10-24 The 30*C temperature specified for laboratory testing of A filter carbon samples is added. [This temperature is specified by ASTM D 3803-1989 but is explicitly stated la NUREG-1431]. YES NO: part of CTS. YES NO: Not part of 11-01 A new specification for CR heat removal is added to ensura [ CTS. , H that the CR equipment functions following a DBA. YES YES i _, N0; Not part of NO: part of CTS. i 11-02 Extends the A0T for an inoperable CR AJC unti from 7 to CTS. > LS-28 30 days. YES .- YES YES NO: CTS does not ! The frequency of the surveillance for verification of the require the ', { 12-01 ESF filtration train capability to maintain a negative LS-29 surveillance. pressure relative to atmospheric pressure is revised from 18 months to 18 months on a STB. YES NO: addressed by NO: addressed by YES 12 02 A new ACTION is added to cover the condition when both ITS LCO 3.0.3. ITS LCO 3.0.3. M emergency exhaust system trains are inoperable in H0 DES 1.

2. 3. or 4. N/A N/A N/A N/A L 12 03 NOT tlSED. YES I

YES YES YES l 12 04 The surveillance requirement is revised to allow credit for ! TR 1 an actual actuation and moves signal specifics to the Bases. YES l NO: STB not part of YES NO: refer to 3/4.9 [ t 12-05 Deletes the STB for the 31 day testing. CTS. SRs. j LS-32 NO: not in CTS. YES NO: not in CTS. p YES 12 06 The details and description of the SR for train operability LG are moved to the Bases. NO N0 f NO YES ! 12-07 A new CPSES specific surveillance is added to verify that H non-safety related fans stop upon initiation of an actual cr simulated signal. 13% q 3.9. /O- /8 Inw4 38 hy % 13 lo Q E ?. lb - 4 i 10 - G 3 B - 13 c- Q 4 i InM 5/15/97 l 1 CONVfRSI0tl COMPARISON TABLE - CilRRENT TS .

Q 3.7.10-4 INSERT 3B-1d TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY PEAK - 10 Provides action to immediately place the operable YES NO YES YES- , M [CREVS] train in the [ recirculation] mode if inoperable [CREVS] cannot be restored to operable status within the required completion time. r i 1 l

1 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATiON COVER SHEET i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.10-7 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.5.1.a (4.7.6.a] ITS, Licensee Controlled Documents DOC 10-07-LG CTS 4.7.5.1.a (4.7.6.a] require the control room temperature verified less than 120*F once per 12 hours. This has not been retained in ITS 3.7.8 but is proposed to be relocated to Licensee Controlled Documents. Comment: There is no technical basis provided to justify the relocation of these CTS requirements. The generic "LG" NSHC is inadequate. The identity of the licensee controlled documents is not reported. Also, for DCPP. the CTS markup incorrectly identifie.s this change as an "R" CTS change. Revise the submittal to provide these corrections, information and justifications. FLOG RESPONSE: The CRVS for Diablo Canyon and CREVS for Wolf Creek and Callaway provides airborne radiological protection for the control room operators, as demonstrated by the control room accident dose analyses for the most limiting design basis loss of coolant accident fission product release, presented in the FSAR. The requirement to verify CR temperature once per 12 hours is not necessary to demonstrate operability of the CRVS or CREVS to perform this function. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control rooni will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Thus, DOC 10-07-LG has been revised to include the following additional justification:

       "The NRC has previously approved moving this type of detailed information or specific requirements to a licensee controlled document that is maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements. This temperature is not an initial condition or controlled parameter for any licensing-based accident scenarios. Also, its inclusion in the ITS is not necessary to adequately protect the health and safety of the public. The basic requirements for maintaining OPERABILITY are still retained in the technical specifications."

Enclosure 38, " Conversion Comparison Table - Current TS 3/4.7," identifies the location of the relocated requirement. Any changes to the relocated requirement will be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. For Diablo Canyon, the CTS markup has been revised to refer to DOC 10-07-LG vs. DOC 10-07-R for CTS SR 4.7.5.1.a. ATTACHED PAGES: ! Encl. 2 7-14 Encl. 3A 12 i f

C'N CN I N/ \ ij \ f@ nB i@ 34 1 s . PLANT SYSTEMS i 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILAi!ON SYSTEM O }.l3. A Q Ul.l-l (lMITlHG CONDITION FOR OPERATICH 3.7.6 Two independent Control Reem Emergency Ventilation Systems shill be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: All H00ES./,'b q = c-eA .9 M hd C.A m es,a.be,3 ACTION: 4 M' N DES 1, 2, 3 and 4: . s Vith one Centrol Reem Emergency ventilation Sys tee 'incperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERASLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT to . :,o-i.5 53 STANOBY within the next 6 hours and in COLO SHUTDCW within the following cy, gg 'd m p30h.%. hours cA b ces 2nu s eteWe,,R ese & b am w.;e%v., e,A,a e g.

Le Lo 3 ..m.A NOES 5 and 6:u -.n,.-e_\ .C we h U Lt e.ss Ahe,s ,,p,g Q 3,'7.10 d With one Control Recm Emergency ventilation System inoperable, a.

restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE sta .us within 7 days er Me. bah10-2 o3,.7,,7 o.y M initiate anc maintain Operation of the remaining OPERA 3LE Control p ,7,so - 3 9] Roem Emergency Ventilatiqn 5,ystem i the reci rcul ation r.oce/ oc M - I ~5 ~WS c.we. A 5 wa w.&ro -e<e-4 4 6 su &.aa) Lt use-Wes s =e a .Ady.

0. With both C:ntrol Reem Emergency' Ventilation Svstems inecerable, :- N '"

                                                                                                                                                   ' o - i- d ^, ., '
                            -:.- t : T i-/:, f in*.r:, , :: ;.: rgency /cr . '. n : c r :,ync:, --;; ?re:

19 C? 2 w-*~2-'51' # M'-- to,5,Sgg o < er" to bc er'...cul n'en -ece be _;:u .v, suspend all cperations i;;-e e: :y : c - *;El.._ : g ry z: g I 'M",J involving CORE ALTERATICHS ; ;;;i.' s ;c :: ty chc---- icuart ' C ,,,- 7 C - et ~/3 a4

                                                       -.% %.C b\yA. eCwbev.6.La su                               b.cfus.owob so .ge n b \e. @       ' ^l        go. ,o.us 3%

U """#'h ee bMVi SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS - - o , q. S n.

                                                                                                                                                              -M 4.7.6       Each Control Recm Emergency Ventilation System shall be denenstrated CPERA8LE:

dw.cs. ed 4. 'sM-r?. to o8- A W TA cep<ca c.c.sys % b'eq (* m

4. A. ', e n c r.; c p e r '.: nce. 2 t, .c ri G i ng the. tr; contr:' r;= s o . ., . t.c e i - i ; ; ; ; *. ; . '::: ther er c;uc. t: 3 'M ' ; q y s7,p 7

b. At least once per 31 days er ; ',**C'EREO ; E ~ 3AEIE by '-f t :t i .;, so.q-\ S t!

k : .- th ::9t ' ::c, ' ' ; -- t' ; gF the 4E

t -' ' n :

                                                                                                                  .   - :-htr :: : i             g , g. uc, O c; 0 rb c -- ;' bet" th        'I't     tier end- P r0s tu~i ' Micr Ept0% n d-by  verifying that the Pressuri:ation System operates for at least 10 continuoup hours with the heaters operatingf aad A h\ Mea.b\'d                                                  go.p B
                            % pww 3 is e ks.
                                                                                         ~-~:        u~-     :    u-     -- =-                       l no-A A
               . , . ~ .... u
                                                                      ..;         . . .. -      . -  - -            ~- - - - --

4

    /                                                                                             Mencment No. 69 CAL.LAWAY - UNIT 1                                      3/4 7-14

l \ l t 1 CTS %.7.lNSERTS l INSERT ' A' With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable due to 10-20-LS39 an inoperable Control Room boundary while in MODE 1,2,3 or 4, restore the inoperable Contrcl Room boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be l l in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. INSERT 'B' With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable due to 10-20-LS39 an inoperable Control Room boundary while in' MODE 5 or 6 or during ' movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, restore the inoperable Control Rooni boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and suspend movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies. l I

l CHANGE NUMBER N2iG DESCRIPTION S'q. 8 H inoperable. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431 G j i

   ,Insu4 3 A- @              and provides clAtion on1vw o 3,9,g-12. l
                                              'J n sa E 3A --ILc.]

10 01 - Not applicable t5 Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). Q 3.'7.jt)- # 10 02 M The APPLICABILITY and applicable ACTIONS are revised to incorporate "during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies" in addition to all MODES (i .e. . MODES 16).M 10 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 04 A A new ACTION statement is added by NUREG-1431 to require entering TS 3.0.3 immediately if two trains of the CR ventilation system are inoperable in MODES 1. 2. 3. or 4. The CTS requires entry into TS 3.0.3 since the condition of two trains inoperable is undefined; therefore, the revision has been classified as administrative. 10 05 LS 18 A new option is added to the ACTION by NUREG 1431 that allows the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel versus placing the CR ventilation system in the recirculation mode. 10 06 LG The details and description of N;.d:d NNI0tj O-the monthly SRs for train operability are moved to the Bases. This is an example of removing details that are not required to be in TS and is consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1. Q 3.7.10-7 In d M -10.h 10 07 LG The surveil ance that vehfies temperature once per . l hours is moved to a lgcongdocument. 10 08 A The description of the ventilation filter specific testing requirements and the required surveillances are moved to the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) as defined in the Administrative Controls of the ITS. No technical changes to requirements or test specifics except as nc'ed in separate change numbers are made. A new SR is added that requires [ Control Room Emergency Ventilation and Emergency Exhaust] system filter testing in accordance with the VFTP. The requirements of this specification are: 1) moved to Section 5.5.11 of the ITS. or 2) deleted since they are duplicated in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52. Revision 2. [ ANSI N510 1975, or ASTM D 3803 1989]. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 12 5/15/97

Q 3.7.10-7 INSERT 3A-12h The NRC has previously approved moving this type of detailed information or specific requirements to a licensee controlled document that is maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements. This temperature is not an initial condition or ; controlled parameter for any licensing-based accident scenarios. Also, its inclusion in the l ITS is not necessary to adequately protect the health and safety of the public. The basic requirements for maintaining OPERABILITY are still retained in the technical specifications. 1 1 1 i l i l i l l . . .. -. . - -

 -   .             .-_ _ .   - - _ - - _       _. - . =          . =. -       . - - - -                .__

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-8 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CA l REQUEST: CTS 4.7.5.1.b.1 and 3 (4.7.6.b] iTS SR 3.7.10.1 DOC 10-06-LG CTS 4.7.5.1.b.1 and 3 (4.7.6.b] verify at least once per 31 days that each CRVS (CREVS] train operates and each component operates for its specified length of time. ITS SR 3.7.10.1 requires these similar verifications but in less detail. Comment: Issue #1 (for DCPP and WCGS only)- The DOC states that the specific details which comprise the CTS 4.7.5.1.b.1 and 3 (4.7.6.b) requirements are no longer retained in the SR but are moved to the Bases. A review of the ITS SR 3.7.10.1 Bases ! discussion shows these details are not there. Revise the Bases accordingly per the ! DOC. Issue #2 - The CTS markup of CTS 4.7.5.1.b.1 (4.7.6.b] shows it has Dot been ' modified to require that "each train" respectively operates for the specified length of time. The CTS markup still states the " system" operates rather than each " train" which is l inconsistent with ITS SR 3.7.10.1. Revise this DOC or provide new DOCS for these changes. Issue #3 - What are the respective " modes of operation" for these operational tests in ITS SR 3.7.10.17 For Callaway and WCGS, it is assumed to be the CRVS mode. For DCPP. it is assumed to be the pressurization mode of operation since the booster and pressurization supply fans are operating. Provide a detailed explanation and include it in the Bases. Issue #4 (For DCPP and WCGS)- The CTS markup of the Action a for

Modes 5 and 6 has DOC 10-06-LG identified but it cannot be determined which CTS change this DOC is to justify.

FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1 - The words from CTS, governed by DOC 10-06-LG, have been incorporated into ITS SR 3.7.10.1 for WCGS and DCPP. Issue #2 - Based on the format and use of the word " system"in CTS, especially in the current LCO and the initial sentence of the Surveillance Requirements, there is no technical difference between the CTS and ITS with respect to the OPERABILITY or surveillance requirements for this system. Furthermore, adopting the iTS would result in no differences from current procedures and practices with regard to testing each train of the system to demonstrate the capability to perform its safety function. As discussed in the response to Comment Number 3.7.1-1, a generic DOC was initiated and applied to each LCO to address format changes between the CTS and ITS. Issue #3 - For Callaway and Wolf Creek, there is no specified mode of operation for the monthly test of the fans and filter drying evolution. As noted in the Bases for SR 3.7.10.1, the test is a check that the fans in each train function properly; and this occasion is used to operate filter train heaters to dry out the charcoal beds. The test of system startup in the emergency mode is performed under the test specified in ITS SR 3.7.10.3. For Diablo Canyon, the test is performed in the pressurization mode of operation by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber using either redundant set of booster and pressurization supply fans. The Bases for SR 3.7.10.1 have been revised to reflect this method of testing. Issue #4 - The CTS markup for WCGS and DCPP has been modified to remove the DOC 10-06-LG from the ACTION statements. Also, DOC 10-06-LG itself has been modified to remove reference to " required ACTIONS." Use of this DOC against the

chang:s to ths Action Statsm:nts is a vestiga of a former uss of this changs that is no l longer applicable. ! \ \ ATTACHED PAGES: ' i Encl. 3A 12 ! Encl. 38 10 l l 1 l l

l CHANGE l NUMBER tGiG DESCRIPTION S'9,8 U inoperable. This change is in accordance with NUREG 1431 G Insu4 3A- dj and provides cigalion_ only. o 3.7 g-12 l l ME}_A -!Q c. , 10 01 - Not applicable t5 Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l I Table (Enclosure 38). Q 3.9.je-. f/ 10 02 M The APPLICABILITY and applicable ACTIONS are revised to incorporate "during movement of irradiated fuel l assemblies" in addition to all MODES (i.e., MODES 16).M l 10 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). ; 10 04 A A new ACTION statement is added by NUREG 1431 to require entering TS 3.0.3 immediately if two trains of the CR ventilation system are inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3. or 4. i The CTS requires entry into TS 3.0.3, since the condition l of two trains inoperable is undefined: therefore, the l revision has been classified as administrative. I 10 05 LS 18 A new option is added to the ACTION by NUREG 1431 that allows the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel versus placing the CR ventilation system in the recirculation mode. , O ' 10 06 LG The details and description of NdedNIdu and - the monthly SRs f~ train operability are moved to he Bases. This is an example of removing details that are not required to be in TS and is consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. 1. jg, b Q 3,7.10-7

p 10 07 LG The s'urveilTsiice thatlerifies CR temperaturIonce per hours is moved to a licensee con,trolle,d r ddocument. 10 08 A The description of the ventilation filter specific testing requirements and the required surveillances are moved to the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) as defined in the Administrative Controls of the ITS. No technical changes to requirements or test specifics except as noted in separate change numbers are made. A new SR is added that requires [ Control Room Emergency Ventilation and Emergency Exhaust] system filter testing in accordance with the VFTP. The requirements of this specification are: 1) moved to Section 5.5.11 of the ITS. or 2) deleted since they are duplicated in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52. Revision 2, [ ANSI N5101975. or ASTM 0 3803 1989]. 12 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

g90g L5 1*n ( ~0 ** O CONVE C ARIS0N TABLE - CURRENT ~15 3/4.7 Page 10 of 15 ~ TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY . NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 09-05 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation NO: refer to YES YES YES , TR-1 and moves signal specifics to the Bases. 09-04-M: this requirement did not previously exist. 09-06 A new surveillance specific to DCPP is added that requires YES: also refer to NO NO NO M verifying that each valve in the flow path that is not changt 09-01-M. locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position is capable ; of being placed in the correct position in accordance with the IST Program. 09 07 A note is added to the [ESWJ surveillance that clarifies NO: ASW only YES YES YES A system operability requirements. Isolation of [ESW) flow supplies CCW heat to individual components does not render the system exchangers. inoperable. 7 The DCPP specific text description, definition of a YES NO NO NO 10 01 LG ventilation train, is deleted from the LCO and moved to the , Bases. 10 02 The APPLICABILITY and ACTIONS are revised to include YES NO: part of CTS. YES YES H "during movement of irradiated fuel assenblies." 10 03 The SR for the control room ventilation system is revised NO. Plant YES NO: refer to NO: refer to LS-7 to require the filtration units without electric heaters to configuration 10-22-H. 10-22-M. be tested for only 15 minutes instead of 10 hours. Includes heateri.

10 04 An ACTION statement is added to require entering 3.0.3 if YES YES YES YES

~ A two trains of the control room (CR) ventilation filter , system are inoperable in H0 DES 1. 2. 3. or 4. ! 10-05 A new option is added to the ACTIONS by NUREG-1431 that YES NO: part of CTS. YES YES LS-18 allows the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel versus placing the ventilation system in the recirculation mode. .__J 3.9.10-8 10-06 The details and description of N [ 4 . M L..; _ he YES NO: not in CTS. YES YES LG monthly SRs for train operability are moved to the Bases. i CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97 I

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-9 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.5.1.c.3; (4.7.6.c.1 and 3]; (4.7.7.1.b.2 & 3] I ITS SR 3.7.10.4 DOC 10-17-A l DOC (10-15-LG) l DOC (10-24 A] JFD 3.7-33 CTS 4.7.5.1.c.3 (4.7.6.c.1 and 3] [4.7.7.1.b.3] verifies a system flow rate (s) of 2100 (Lor DCPP, 2000/2200/750 for WCGS. and 2000/500 for Callaway cfm i 10% at least once per 18 months. This CTS requirement is not retained in ITS 3.7.10.4.

Comment: Issue #1 - ITS SR 3.7.10.4 should state the required flow rate for each train l because for the HEPA filter to be effective, the train flow must be within the specified flow l rate range of i10% and still meet the room pressurization requirement. Issue #2 - For DCPP, ITS SR 3.7.10.3 has a JFD 3.7-33 that is referenced; however, it is not understood what purpose this JFD has to do with this SR. For all, explain why the makeup flow requirement was not adopted in more detail and/or revise this JFD accordingly.

FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1: The ventilation flow requirements of CTS 4.7.5.1.c.3 (4.7.6.c.1 and 3) (4.7.7.1.b.3) were moved to ITS 5.5.11a and b. See the response to NRC comment Q 5.5-8 for a complete explanation of where the specific CTS ventilation system requirements were moved. ITS SR 3.7.10.4 corresponds to CPSES CTS 4.7.7.1.i (DCPP 4.7.5.1.e.3, WCGS and Callaway 4.7.6e.3). While the CPSES surveillance included a specific maximum makeup flowrate as part of the surveillance, the other licensees did not. The purpose of this surveillance is to verify the positive pressure of the control room with limited intake of outside air. Thus the testing should limit the makeup flowrate. For CPSES the maximum makeup flowrate is in the CTS and thus is included in the ITS. For the others, the makeup flowrate is not in the CTS and is controlled by the testing procedures. [1g_u_q_#_2: ATTACHED PAGES: None

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-13 APPLICABILITY: CA l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.6, Action a for Modes 5 and 6 ITS 3.7.10 Action D and Bases for Background DOC 10-05-LS18 i If one CREVS train is inoperable for 7 days, CTS 3.7.5.1, Action a for Modes 5 and 6 i requires an option which is to place the Operable train in operation in the " recirculation" i mode. ITS 3.7.10 Required Action C.1 retains this CTS requirement and adds another option per Required Actions C.2.1 and C.2.2 which is to " suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies." ! Comment: This DOC is also used in the CTS markup for Action b of Modes 5 and 6 which is not correct even though the change is similar. Refer to the above Comment 3.7.10.-4 for the correct designation of this change. Revise this CTS markup. FLOG RESPONSE: The CTS markup for Action b of Modes 5 and 6 has been revised to reflect a new DOC. DOC 10-31-M has been added and states: "With both CREVSs inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable control room boundary, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are immediately suspended. l The action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release l

              ' of radioactivity that might enter the control room. Without precluding the movement of             l fuel to a safe position, requiring the combined actions of suspending CORE                         l ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies to place the unit in a                      '

condition to minimize accident risk is more restrictive." ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-14 Encl. 3A 14 Encl. 38 13 I l I

t f~\ ,f

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l i PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4 7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM ol A 433.l-l

                                                                                                                         @~)'h t%

(!MITlHG CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6 Two incependent Control Reem Emergency Ventilation Systems shall be OP!RAELE. APPLICABILITY: All MCOES./,hg oeme.A of he AQ C \ %g ACTION: 4 U* M00E5 1, 2, 3 and 4: .. s With one Control Room Emergency ventilation SysteCine erable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLO SHUTOCW within the following to- to-L539 gg

          =       30.h.A
                    .a hourfb.      A b C88*5 h \**tW=@ *50^5 M d'^ * % eN ie, ceW e 'ca-*%

f twbe i.e o Lo 3 t g.eg.A NDES 5 and 6:wn e.n,-,.A .C wcs b k.J C.4 e s s .k h e.s ;g,g,g C 3.'7.10 - d

a. With one Control Roem Emergency Ventilation System inoperable, 10-ff M s restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or Meh*k O'5M.lo-4 initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control p , r,so-;g]

Roomsuas ese. Emergency 4 s seed Ventila movet a~ticn r.cde/ oc- M to- 5 -L.5 G s su.k System

44 .r d use ~ in the Wesreci i-erculation Miy.

b. With both Control Reem Emergencv 'Ventil_ation Systems inecerable -er-- Nb"

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                               -;c.e e: ty : G E'~l3 g : g e p 4_- : u- N",'."f0spendallcperations                                                                        ,o involving CORE ALTERATIONS :                       ;c'i".~ .: r e c; *.              ty chc-- '                                  I ~ ~J
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U ***"'" *Ca* u.tec.ue. ba**d'% e SURVE1LLANCE REOUIREMENTS - - f o '_1__7_ -

                                                                                  .                                                                                    ~5 3.
                                                                                                                                                                       . .pt 4.7.6         Each Control Room Emergency Ventilation System shall be cenonstrated CPERAELE:

(% 'Peh ceped c.cavs Ebe Meg tw ca.wdswce. ed. d. w rP. to-os t\

a. A:. M ; cace pe r ': n o ;, .erifyi ; ina. th: ::ntr:' r:::

_ s o . ,, . t,3 e!- t :; '.t r: ;

- then ; c:;uel t; SI'2; p 7,1,p.7

b. At least once per 31 days er : STA:C E *: E 0 T E ~' 3 A! ! ! by ' ' * ? :. t i ; . so.a.us a 4+:: tn: ::rt :' :: , :u t'r:ugr it: HEU ' ' ' t : -- and chore:el , g. uc, ad: Ort ; :f 00th th; " ' tratior and "re:Curi:215 0n I;; tem a nd-b y verifying that the Pressuri:ation System operates for at least 10,continuou the heaters operatingt *4 & W Ga.0 4 g o . p- 0^

m osen.L p.ehours 2: \s with w As,

                                                                        .. .           _ _ _ __.         . a : . - :         u' 'a* -- ~~_    r .__ '               io-* 6 '\
                                           .-,.-; . . .. 2 , ,. . ; -
                                                                                                 " - " --- -                              ~ ' ' ~ ~

l -w , . . ....2 - . - . - l 3 l / i CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-14 /c.endment No. 69

l l l CTS %.7.!NSERTS INSERT ' A' With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable due to 10-20-LS39 an inoperable Control Room boundary while in MODE 1,2,3 or 4, restore the inoperable Control Room boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l INSERT 'B'

With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable,due to 10-20-LS39 an inoperable Control Room boundary while in%IODE 5 or 6 or during ' I movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, restore the inoperable Control Rooni I boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and suspend movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies. j l l l

CHANGE NUMBER BMG DESCRIPTION 10 18 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison ) Table (Enclosure 38). 10 19 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 20 LS 39 This change establishes appropriate Required Actions and Completion Times for ventilation system pressure envelope degradation. The proposed change would allow 24 hours to restore the capability to maintain the proper pressure by allowing for routine repairs before requiring the unit to l perform an orderly shutdown. This change recognizes that i the ventilation trains associated with the pressure envelope would still be OPERABLE and providing the appropriate flows even if the required pressure limit _ _

                                                                                                             ,5 cannot be met. These changes are as proposed bgW/TSTF-267. )
                                                                                                & D I.l3, 7     l 10 21         LS 38      The action to immediately suspend positive reactivity
                                  -changes when both trains of CR ventilation are inoperable in NOES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is deleted consistent with NUREG 1431. This change is acceptable because the imediate suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel provides adequate protection from a release of radioactivity.                        !

i Bomn dilution events leading to criticality are not postulated as these events are prevented from occurring. 10 22 M A requirement to operate the filtration system fans for at least 15 minutes would be added consistent with NUREG 1431. These fans, which do not have associated heaters, do not have a specified run time in CTS: adding this requirement is more restrictive. The proposed change is acceptable because it provides a minimum run time to assure fan OPERABILITY without imposing significant wear and attendant degradation on the fan. 10 23 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 24 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison

=~

r Table 5 4 (Enclosure 38).(InuA 3 A-t4k Q M-Y A new specification for CR heat removal'is added per l 11 01 M NUREG 1431. CR temperature control is required to ensure the ability of the CR equipment to function following a h t 3A-Wo.- DBA. Q 3,9.10 ' S pg 3 A 4 c. Q 3.?J0 G 14 5/15/97 OESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS l . . -

 . -. -     . , -     = -     . . _   _ - . - . - - . _ - - . - - . - - . - . _ . - . . . -     - - . . _ , _ . . . - - . . -

Q 3.7.10-13 INSERT 3A-14C ' With both CRVSs inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable control room boundary, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are immediately suspended. The action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might enter the control room. Without precluding the movement of fuel to a safe position, requiring the combined actions of suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies to place the unit in a condition to minimize accident risk is more restrictive. l l

          +                       .                                                       _

Page 13 of 15 CONVERSION COWARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY TECH SPEC CHANGE COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY DIABLO CANYON NUMBER DESCRIPTION YES NO: part of CTS. NO: part of CTS. YES 10-24 The 30*C temperature specified for laboratory testing of A' filter carbon sanples is added. [This temperature is specified by ASTM D 3803-1989. but is explicitly stated in NUREG-1431]. YES NO: Not part of NO: part of CTS. YES 11-01 A new specification for CR heat removal is added to ensure CTS. H that the CR equipment functions following a DBA. NO: part of CTS. YES YES

Extends the A0T for an inoperable CR A/C unit from 7 to NO: Not part of 11-02 CTS. LS-28 30 days. YES YES NO: CTS does not YES 12-01 The frequency of the surveillance for verification of the { ESF filtration train capability to maintain a negative require the LS-29 surveillance. pressure relative to atmospheric pressure is revised from 18 months to 18 months on a STB. NO: addressed by YES YES NO: addressed by k 12 02 A new ACTION is added to cover the condition when both ITS LCD 3.0.3. emergency exhaust system trains are inoperable in MODES 1 ITS LCO 3.0.3. H

2. 3. or 4.

N/A N/A N/A N/A 12-03 NOT USED. YES YES YES YES 12-04 The surveillance requirement is revised to allow credit for TR-1 an actual actuation and moves signal specifics to the Bases. NO: refer to 3/4.9 YES NO: STB not part of YES 12-05 Deletes the STB for the 31 day testing. SRs. CTS. LS-32 YES NO: not in CTS. NO: not in CTS. YES 12 06 The details and description of the SR for train operability LG are moved to the Bases. NO NO NO YES 12 07 A new CPSES specific surveillance is added to verify that M non safety related fans stop upon initiation of an actual or simulated signal. In d 36 -13% 9 3.9.10 - /8 Lg 315_ T3 b Q 3.9.10- 4 uwas pc. o 2 vo- a 5/15/97 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS

i 4 1

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         - Q 3.7.10-13i    i INSERT 3B-13(,                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .f

[ TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY ; NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIAbmO CANYON COMMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY ! PEAK' 10-31 Another requirement is added to ITS 3.7.10 Action D to NO NO NO YES M " suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and suspend movement > of irradiated fuel assemblies" as an alternative to placing i an OPERABLE CRVS train in the recirculation mode when j the other train is int 9erable. l t i i-l r i f

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-14 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CP, CA REQUt:.dT: CTS 3.7.6 Actico b, Modes 1,2,3 & 4; j Action c, Modes 5 & 6 ' l ITS 3.7.10 Action B, C, D, E, and F DOC 10-20-LS39 JFD 3.7-57 These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the ;ndustry traveler , referenced in this DOC (WOG-86) has not been approved by the NRC. l l In addition, for CPSES, the Action D condition statement appears to be contradictory because with two inoperable trains, it is not clear how any pressurization occurs. Comment: Withdraw the changes or adopt the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: WOG-86 has been approved by the TSTF and is designated as TSTF-287. This traveler has been submitted to the NRC and is under review. The proposed wording in TSTF 287 was modified from WOG-86, and these modifications have been incorporated into the ITS. This result in changes only to the Bases for the Required Actions for ITS 3.7.10. The FLOG continues to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler, This TSTF is not applicable to DCPP, but is applicable to CPSES. For CPSES, Condition D refers to two CREFS trains inoperable due to inoperable CR boundary. The CR boundary inoperability is usually the result of boundary degradation such that either CREFS trains running the system is unable to maintain a pressurization of > .125 inches water gauge at 800 cfm. Action D merely requires repair of the i degraded pressure boundary. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. SA Traveler Status page Encl. 5B B 3.7-69, B 3.7-70 Also, see attached pages for response to Comment Number 3.7.13.2-2. i l l \ 1 1

i . Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.7 . STA11JS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TRAVFLER # i TSW 36, Rev. 2 Incorporated 3.7 42...Only applicable to DLPP J Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific l l TSTF 51 reanalysis to establish decay time dependence i for fuel handling ! accident. I Not Incorporated Not Applicable - fiet-NRC approved,4 cf TSTF 70. Rev. 1

                                                                                                    . . .. .-. s. .s. o. u... . 'Tk-?.~7-co r
                                                                                            +. .. .e.

Incorporated 3.7 05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. TSTF 101 Partially 3.7 01 Retained CTS W0e43 Incorporated requirements for (Formerly resetting trip setpoints WO8:3IT since requirements are

                          ~*                                                                  more conservative than 9 '3 '1- l- 4                                                              the traveler.

i Incorporated 3.7 34 Not incorporated by DCPP MMMIA- as current licensing 9 31'd-I l 73g yl basis. G 34. 2 - 1 TSTF 139. Incorporated Hot Applicable - jyg g ,'y n yg,/, -q-7.-7-Ogr

Bases change Rev. 1 i (CEOG 51) Not Applicable TR 3.7-cc4 TSTF 140 $ Incorporated B-Rev. T. O hyrw A ncuoid d~e nm*Aen: er,% ion-(CEDG 52) f$1f-WEXi oG pg7 Incorporated 3.7 57 4 b.'7. ic -J h 0 3.7. /3. , 0-2 m Incorporated 3.7 56 Q 3,7. 2-3

                'TF17 - pS'i          O 3M, 2- 3 1

( y m.,- o i ra 3.9-00 ; I' 'f424 TR 3.'7-Cod. i- ,. gg -ft b/7-00.1. I I 5/15/97 1 l MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) i

i INSEltt' SA-TR 3.7-001 , DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TRAVELER # STATUS Not Applicable-Bases Change NRC approved. TSTF-173, Rev. O Incorporated 1

m INSERT 5A-TR 3.7-002 STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TRAVELER # NRC approved. TSTF-174, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable-Bases Change b

 .. .__ _       m  __ _       _.___._                   _ _ _ _ _ _ . .              .___ .         _ _ _ _ . _ _      . . _ _ . . _ .

l CICT CRE75 l B 3.7.10 BASES l ACTIONS' M.1 and M.2 (continued) l 1 east MCOE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The i ailowed Ccmpieticn Times are rt:asonacie, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit ccnditions from full pcwer i conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. ' i 1,1),i.1 Q 3.1,10 - M Cast M 3.2.1. and 97 2 2 l Ifnm00mE5*Md during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. l if the incperable CTIT: CEEV5 train cannot be restored to ' l OPERABLE status within the required Cerapleticri Time, action must ! be taken to immediately place the OPERAELE CTET: CREVS train in I the c;c. ;cna $25 mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPEPAELE. that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure would be readily detected. gg gg Q 3 '7, lo -/ 7 An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to imediately suscend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that l ! might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position. l l l Ec;uir:d Actica :.: .: Icdificd L .';t: indic; ting t; ;l;;; the N ! ;y;t;I 'n thc t;xic g;; pr;;;;;ica red: :.ut;mc. tic trar.;fcr t: t;xic ;;.; pr;t;nicn red; .: i ncpc.-il;. . i c 1 and M.2 rn7h>Ut-masoc during movement of irradiated fuel assembi

                                         , h two C"II: CREVS trains inoperable foraneasonsectnen::na:(-M                               N,
                                                                              ~

q 3,qjo_.l4 .iugan:Incoetab Le';contrai rrocrHXbcuadarmlT!e5-LondffaiC'IDW M a nm nc oera cTFbcunc a ryeno t9 resto rea EiliItWeTComp i.ebcne19 me l'Elbred.IDywondItWri25, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of I radioactivity that mignt enter the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This cces not ! preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position. (continued) MARK UP GF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 69 5/15/97 i l

GREM GREV5 l B 3.7.10 1 BASES 1 l ACTIONS eel _ o 3T/,10- lY (continued) ( If both GREM CM trahV e inoperable in MODE 1. 2, 3. or 4 70 --- _+Muir.eu .narz :_- r_- ninscET.abrIEicoudvimundh@ NS5 the GREFG GB@@ may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered imediately. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.1 REQUIREMENTS Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not tee severe. testing each train I once every month .c a-- r-E riL & s di e : -i2. . . m wFi.gii a . _. p::-). . o nl . Te . . a.F.W.71 - [.g.H .g30 ... . . .iy ini r

                           @h4/* JIl PlWtFAb+ WEnE5 provides an adequate check                                                                          l of this system.                                                                                                              '

Monthly heater operations dry out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal from humidity in the ambient air. Sy;t;n ith heater;

                           =g . . w eys.y . .: wa. 96 must be operated for i 10 continuous -hours with the heaters cr.cisi;;d w-:-                                                    ..

y ri.. v. (:g..j.<. r . ;3. .g g gj. n;- r.yg m.; n > ..-- e . . , , .qg .m. . 1.i .. - . , . .p s ;; . <.1 ai c, . y . . , , , ., . &

                                            . . g e d Q . . : , . .C                         R. 4. . : ' i. a. i e i .

e f f.N p a ,gr. ) .t p .J .e, en- , q sg. ,, Sy;tcu without hc;tci; need only be operated for a 15 minutes to i demonstrate the function of the system. The 31 day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and the two train l redundancy availability. SR 3.7.10.2 l This SR verifies that the required GREM 930@ testing is l performed in accordance with the VefitFKTE!TIEfttTI'MH5M4 1 M. l l l The GREM CREVS filter tests arc in ac;srder.cc with UEEZfiEENEt l ptocedDF.55BTidar**tn Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The M .

includes testing the performar.ce of the HEPA filter. charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical (continued)

{ i MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 70 5/15/97

a ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.10-15 APPLICABILITY: WC, C 2 l REQUEST: CTS 3.7.6, Action a for Modes 5 and 6 l ITS 3.7.10 Action D and Bases for Background DOC 10-zz-LSz If one CREVS train is inoperable for 7 days, CTS 3.7.5.1, Action a for Modes 5 and 6 requires the Operable trains to be in operation in the recirculation mode. ITS 3.7.10 Required Action D.1 retains this CTS requirement but modifies the mode of operation to the CREVS mode of operation. Comment: ITS 3.7.10 Action D has adopted the STS text; however, this CTS change is not identified on the CTS markup and is not justified with a DOC and technical justification. Provide the appropriate DOC for this CTS change. 1 FLOG RESPONSE: Based on current operating practice at WCGS, it has been determined that adopting the wording of ITS 3.7.10, Required Action D.1 represents a technical change from CTS 3.7.6, ACTION a for MODES 5 and 6. This is because the terms " recirculation mode," represents a system lineup that is different from the "CRVIS mode." In the CRVIS mode the Control Room ventilation system is in a recirculation lineup and the Pressurization System is operating. In the " recirculation mode," the Pressurization System is not operating. Therefore, for WCGS, operating the CREVS in the CRVIS mode is more restrictive with respect to system lineup and function than the " recirculation I mode," and a new DOC 10-25-M has been prepared for this change. For Callaway, adopting the wording of ITS 3.7.10, Required Action D.1, does not represent a technical change from CTS 3.7.6, ACTION a, for MODES 5 and 6. This is because the terms " recirculation mode" and "CRVIS mode" represent the same system lineup. Therefore, for Callaway, no CTS markup and attendant DOC are required. ATTACHED PAGES: None i i l l I l

_. _ _. _ .___- _. __ _. _ . _ ~_ -_ . ._ . _ _ . 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET i ADDITIONAL * 'ORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-16 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.6.b iTS SR 3.7.10.1 DOC 10-12-LS32 CTS 4.7.6.b verifies at least once per 31 days on a Staggered Test Basis that each CREVS train operates and each component operates for its specified length of time. ITS SR 3.7.10.1 requires these similar verifications every 31 days but not on a Staggered Test Basis. Comment: This ITS proposed change is acceptable; however there is no technical justification provided in this DOC. Also, this DOC refers to the contents of the NSHC that contains a justification only for Vogtle which is not applicable. Provide a technical justification that is applicable to Callaway and WCGS. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 10-12-LS-32 has been revised to provide a technical justification for the proposed ; change. The emphasis on the NRC evaluation of Staggered Test Basis reported on the ' Vogtle docket has been reduced. However, those conclusions are generic and are applicable to the proposed change for Callaway and WCGS, also. The revised DOC now reads:

               "This change deletes the required STB for the 31 day test. Since the CREVS is a two train system, the STB requirement forces a test of one or the other train every 15 days.

Each individual train will still be tested on a 31 day frequency. These trains have been designed to be redundant and independent of each other. Assuming a constant failure rate over time and no common mode failure potential, the testing frequency is the most significant parameter in assuring that latent failures are detected. Therefore, since the testing frequency would not be altered by this proposed change, the availability of the CREVS trains will not be adversely affected; and the proposed change is acceptable." ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 3A 13 Encl. 4 51 I

DESCRIPTION O ' WiC No N G } -dsed ~- delete the ACT7'N for a PERABLE ntilatic 10 09 L 27 fT s chan N ain no being pable~ of eing su lied from an l

                                . rge y power source.                   er the finition . OPEUB in

! NURE 1431. e ventil ion systjsn would b conside OPE" LE w' . either NORMALfr EMERGENp power peurce. l 10 10 TR 1 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuaticn. if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of ; the initiating signal is moved to the Bases. l 10 11 LS 19 The frequency of the surveillance requiring verification I of the CR ventilation system capability to maintain a , positive pressure is relaxed to 18 months on a STB. ! consistent with NUREG 1431. The r.ew frequency requires one of the two trains to be tested every 18 months instead of both trains every 18 months. The most likely cause of a failure to achieve the required pressure is a failure of i I the ventilation pressure boundary. Thus. when one train successfully demonstrates the ability to maintain the pressure. in all likelihood the other train will also. This results in less testing of the CR ventilation system than is required by th _g 3, 7, jo. jg i 10 12 LS 32 is han del es he req' red forte 31%ytes. oth trai s wi st' 1 be sted o a 31 ay fr uenc'. Thi ch ge i acc table ased a the aluat on of the e ect enes of tes ing pro ided n NSH LS-327 10 13 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 14 A The statement that LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable is deleted based upon the new ITS definition of LCO 3.0.4 wnich does not apply in MODES 5 and 6. 10-15 LG The ventilation system flow rates would be moved to licensee controlled documents. These flow rates are ' established in conjunction with flow balancing of the ventilation systems. 10 16 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 17 A The SR to measure ventilation system flow rate is not ' identified as a separate SR in the ITS because it Ts verified during the other in-place filter tests (see l ' ITS 5.5.11). 13 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

 .- . . - . - . - .~.                  . - . - - . . - -                    _ - - - . . . - - - .        .       .      . - . -           - - - _ . -

l Q 3.7.10-16 INSERT 3A-13b l 10-12 LS-32 This change deletes the required STB for the 31 day test. Since l the CREVS is a two train system, the STB requirement forces a I test of one or the other train every 15 days. Each individual trcin l will still be tested on a 31 day frequency. These trains have been designed to be redundant and independent of each other. Assuming a constant failure rate over time and no common mode failure potential, the testing frequency is the most significant parameter in assuring that latent failures are detected. Therefore, since the testing frequency would not be altered by this proposed change, the availability of the CREVS trains will not be adversely affected; and the proposed change is acceptable. i

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATICNS , NSHC LS 32 b 10 CFR S0.92 EVALUATION gg.7 4., g g TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REGUIREHENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL$SPECIFICATIONS Q 7. 7. - M* 2 -I c c e ec,u rement to t,est m 1ti-trai m

ge w,oul e .

                      . .e,rp                                                                  ng the testir;g frequency fo individual component /ystems en a STB                                        wh' e maintain)d in the NRCVs Safety Evalvation                   r        Repo As discusse rainsogtle's Plant         / component,s/unchangedS                                        Convers'tn, "the iptent                      of a requdement A numb 9r of to      crease          e reliab ity of the,, component or yjstem being tested.

has negligi s) dies has demonstetedthatsjaggeredtest ic studies hav,tWe e_shown thatjin impact most on compone teliabil ' y. Thes analytical and determini / $has'negli' e impact or

                                                                                                                                              ~
   ..: .u.            cases vaggered esting (a) 's operationalg difficult, l
       . . .                                                                    s not as safety significan as initially, ught, ompenent reli ility (c stress on cymponents such as, diesel genep6 tors potentJa (dJ introduces additiona                                         frates and component l

wearcut.,r(e) resu ts n more) ausing iyreased compdient failure,dancy for tes),mg purpo freque j l . ,. likel /reductionsji'n system red,und of human, error many ofby t increasing the num

 . ~fai-The         ore, chanpe's of this                            type are acceptable / - improved TS have been or,rltted from t According                Based,on             l es ing requ              nts in th                                                                            le nega       e               i he NRC Sa           y Evaluation, removal of STB,/esting woul, have negli
                        ,mo ct , a,         potential pgsitive impact, 90 plant safety.     ,

t-This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that This determination has been involves no significant hazards consideration. performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR S0.92(c) a l below:

            *                       "The Ccamission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedu 50.91, that a proposed amencment to an operating license for a facility                                                           j licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involve significant hazards consideration.

l with the prooosed amendment would not: increase in the procability or consequences of an l

1. Involve a significant l accident previously evaluated: or 2.

Create cne possibility of a new or different kind of accident frca any . . . - . - .

                                            -accident previously-evaluated; or 3.

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. " The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significan hazards consideraticn standards: 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? 5/15/97 51 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

Q 3.7.10-16, O 3.7.13.2-3 INSERT 4-51a The proposed change would eliminate the requirement to test multi-train / multi-component systems on a STB while maintaining the testing frequency for individual trains / components unchanged. Individual trains of safety-related systems have been designed to be redundant and independent of each other. Assuming a constant failure rate over time and no common mode failure potential, the testing frequency is the most significant parameter in assuring that latent failures are detected. Therefore, since the testing frequency would not be altered by this proposed change, the availability of individual trains and, therefore, system availability will not be adversely affected. Furthermore, the NRC has evaluated the potentialimpact of eliminating STB testing on a generic basis in its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) supporting TS Conversion for Plant Vogtle. The SER noted that a number of studies have concluded that STB testing has negligible impact on system reliability; and, in most cases, staggered testing is not as safety-significant as originally believed. These conclusions have been used to eliminate from NUREG-1431, Rev.1, many of the staggered testing requirements contained in earlier Standard Technical Specifications. l I 1 i 4 1 3--- - .. _ , , . . . . . . , . . . _ - _

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-17 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.6 Action b, Modes 5 and 6 ITS 3.7.10 Action E DOC 10-09-LS27 CTS 3.7.6 Action b, Modes 5 and 6 suspends operations when there are two inoperable trains of CREVS or the remaining Operable train in operation is not capable of being powered by an emergency power source. This latter requirement is not retained in ITS 3.7.10 Action E. Comment: The DOC contradicts itself by permitting " normal" electrical power to operate the required train. The train in operation must have a safety-related power source per the ITS Operability definition which is not changed from the CTS. The guidance of the STS only shows this CTS requirement may be redundant to the train Operability definitions which are moved to the Bases. Also, for consistency, evaluate this Comment jointly with Comment 3.7.10-3 for DCPP. Revise this DOC and report on the results of the evaluation. FLOG RESPONSE:

This response has been reviewed jointly with Comment Number Q 3.7.10-3, which is applicable only to DCPP. Refer to Comment Number Q 3.7.10-3 for the DCPP specific information. Based on this review, a determination was made to maintain CTS 3.7.6.1 ACTION b. (in part), which pertains to ensuring the OPERABLE CREVS train is capable of being powered by an emergency power source. ITS 3.7.10, Required Action D.1 has been modified to incorporate the action to verify that the OPERABLE CREVS train is capable of being powered by an emergency power source. Additionally, it was: determined that this same Required Action applies to ITS 3.7.11, " Control Room Air Conditioning System" for Wolf Creek and Callaway. New JFD 3.7-62 was initiated for i adopting the CTS requirement which states: l; " CTS [3.7.6], Action b, for MODES S and 6, require verification that the ventilation system placed in operation be capable of being powered by an emergency power source. ITS !
LCO [3.7.10 and 3.7.11], Required Actions, are revised to incorporate this requirement."

ATTACHED PAGES: I ! Encl. 2 7-14, 7-16a s Encl. 3A 13 4 Encl. 3B 11 1 Encl. 4 1 (LS-27 not used) l Encl. 5A 3.7-26, 3.7-28 Encl. 5B B 3.7-69, B 3.7-75 Encl. 6A 8 Encl. 6B 7

(N "s \

                                                                                                                          /                     \

(iD%yi@r@) ptANT SYSTEMS i 3/a 7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENT'LATION SYSTEM }. LIMIT 1HG CCH0!TICH FOR OPERATION 3.7.6 Two independent Control Recm Emergency ventilation Systetas shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: All H00ES.[hpe,.,eA of ;<c d,.1.d L\ useMu %, ACTION: 4 M-MCOES 1, 2, 3 and 4: .. s With one Control Recm Emergency Ventilation System.'incperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLO SHUT 00W within the following to - to-L539

      =         30 heurs . UML b C"S bci4 *Me<We ,C*' <hs A e b om Wgeca.bie. NWt ce bvauY',s gg              am. hay *W t.c.o 1 o 3                                                                                                                      m . m.

MCOES 5 and 6: w m.<e,.-4.h. .C we bW Q cs%khe.s ,g Vith one Control Recm .:.mergency ventilation System incpe.rable, o sn.w-4

a. 1047M restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or 6cvA'O o3n,lo.y initiate and maintain Operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control p a,so-pg Room Emergency Ventilation System in the recirculation nede/ ocM - t o- 5.LMS cwe at. s a s,.s.ee,e -e- t a su.aad y A use-Wes. %e LAh.

b. Wi th both Centrol Reem Emergency 'Ventil_ation Svstems inecerables -,w- 5Eb'"

s o- 9.L.S ,3

                           ...,..,.n..==.=,.=..=.m....=.. . . .- ..--.           = .....; ~. ... < . . ;                                      -..,.?.

m .....3..; .. - ..v. :-'vy.5% ..= , . s.- 2 .W - c' ba' 4-

~ ~' i E L E : n c r : n c o e ur ; u -:)$'s'p'e';nd a l l c p e r a t i *o 9 n s313 te b; '- 19 -e:!-:T :ti er -:d: by C.*' 2. --t

                           ;;.e ed t;                         -

e- - g 'n ' ,"<~e s. involving CORE ALTERATIONS :r ;c:it: . c;;;' 'ty :n r ~

                                                                                                                                                                               ~/3
                                                         $4                  s
                                                              %4t %6\t;su%a.64.         6
                                                                                      <.ek                        Se cent.=% ob b                                         .t
                                                         *.,re           .C                                       % so.tecA\e, u b\                             go.,o.ss 5%

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS D **# *' Ce 6d'%

                                                                                                                      ~_.                          -

c. 3 S.

                                                                                                                                                                        . -jv]

4.7.6 ~ Each Control Roem Emergency ventilation System shall be cenenstrated CPERA8LE: to'*8'A M4 PA ceped c.cavs G\W Aey a aceduca el A W[.

4. A. l e s '. ;nc e pe r ': L r s b . c r ' 'j ' r.; '.n o t th^ C;ntr;; 7005 to - o1 - L G.

t::;-: ;;; : ; ' ::: ther :r cavel i: S'*~; Q 7.7,p - 7 At least once per 31 days en : :Tf.::E~E: ~E ~ EAE' S by init::t? ;, so.e, . us t b. f r:.- th; ::rtr:1 :::, '1: t- u;n th: HE 't- , , . uc,

                                                                                                                     ; and cncr::e; ad::rbc-s of Octh th: ~ 'trati r nd $re::u-i:2 tier Sy:::-: a n d-by    verifying that the Pressuri:atian System operates for at least 10 continucus hours witn tne heaters operatingta-A 4 hb Libe                                                                   go.-c, B    -

e o.erm ..- 3 s s ,+ ,u s .

                                                                                         - -s.-';---      u'      :     u -" -~ -~~
                                                                                                                                    ?. T .-                    to S '
             .c.

i

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7 - 1.: Mendment No. 69

CTS %.7.!NSERTS l 1 INSERT ' A' With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable due to 10-20-LS39 l an inoperable Control Room boundary while in MODE 1,2,3 or 4, restore the inoperable Control Room boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. INSERT 'B' With two Control Room Emergency Ventilation System trains inoperable,due te 10-20-LS39 l l an inoperable Control Room boundary while inMODE 5 or 6 or during ' I movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, restore the inoperable Control Rooni boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and suspend movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies. l I 1 l

r (t-ot_ m, ! dS M LC.O CRERCS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS g L atk q Cor. trol System (CREA3CS) 01 A 1 3.7.11 Control Room Emer;2My Air). Temper:tur Q 3n.l-I l l i i LCO 3.7.11 Two CREATCS trains shall be OPERABLE. l MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, .[5, and 6,7 ; APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, ; [ Curing CC"I ALTEPdTICN!1 < s ACTIONS i COMPLETION TIME REQUIRED ACTION CONDITION 30 days

                                                                                                  ' \" k A.1         RestoreCRNCStrain A. One.CREAICS train                          to OPERABLE status.
          .i noperable.

6 hours /~ B.1 Be in MODE 3. k B. Required Action and associated Completion AND Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, 36 hours B.2 Be in MODE 5. ! 3, or 4 a s.tl. so-s'i l Immediately C. Required Action and C.I.l Place OPERABLE associated Completion CPZAICS train in l operation)( Time of Condition A not met fin MODE 5 i or 6, ort during OR. - movement of irradiated :- Immediately C.2.1 Suspend CORE fuel assemblies -b--er ALTERATIONS.

L-during C0f1E ' l ALTEPATICMS}. l SS l Immediately C.2.f 2} Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

                                                       ,6BDQ                                (continued) 0 ' 0*'7 C A. 2               C&e f                                    %

fu$1003 Powered as em63%C 3 b4 3/4 l'ik power soux4,y Rev 1, 04/07/95

.7 25 WOG STS

CHANGE

                                                                     &?(lsej       d       ,   OM NUMBER            tgEC                DESCRIPTION 10 09             L 27     fT s chan                        delete the ACT N for an PERABLE ' ntilatio ain no being pable'of eing sur lied from an rge y power source.         er the finition                 OPERAB    in
                                  /NURE 1431.                    'e ventil ion syst . would b considepe'd OPE             LE w'   either    NCRMAL r EMERGENp power yource.

10 10 TR 1 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation. if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of the initiating signal is moved to the Bases. 10 11 LS 19 The frequency of the surveillance requiring verification of the CR ventilation system capability to maintain a positive pressure is relaxed to 18 months on a STB. consistent with NUREG 1431. The new frequency requires one of the two trains to be tested every 18 months instead of both trains every 18 months. The most likely cause of a failure to achieve the required pressure is a failure of the ventilation pressure boundary. Thus when one train successfully demonstrates the ability to maintain the l pressure, in all likelihood the other train will also. This results in less testing of the CR ventilation system l than is required by th _ gg,jo jg s han del es he req red for t e 31 ' y te e. 10 12 LS 32 ot trai s wi' st i be ested o a 31 ay fr uenc . l Th ch ge i acepptable ased a the aluat on of the e ec of $TB tes ing pro ided 'n NSH LS 3 10 13 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 14 A The statement that LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable is deleted based upon the new ITS definition of LCO 3.0.4 which does not apply in HOCES 5 and 6. l 10 15 LG The ventilation system flow rates would be moved to l licensee controlled documents. These flow rates are established in conjunction with flow balancing of the ventilation systems. 10 16 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). i l 10-17 A The SR to measure ventilation system flow rate is not ' identified as a separate SR in the ITS because it is verified during the other in-place filter tests (see ITS 5.5.11). 13 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

Page 11 of 15 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY TECH SPEC CHANGE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY DIABLO CANYON COMANCliE PEAK NUMBER DESCRIPTION YES: moved to t!SAR. YES: moved to FSAR. YES: move to ECGS. NO: not in CTS. 10-07 The surveillance that verifles CR temperature once per LG 12 hours is moved to a Itcensee-controlled d - nt. YES YES YES YES 10-08 The description of the ventilation filter specific testing requirements are moved to the VFTP, as in t . A Administrative Controls of the ITS, or as p gr}ovel BITS s X btT _ s. A SR is p5 Rs . added that requires [ Control Room Emergency Ventilation and Q Ebg Emergency Exhaust System] filter testing in accordance with the VFTP.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     #ES i                                                                                                                                                                                                      "A .;t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ;             '; CTS.                                                                                YES Q3 fljo.f                h a fion or                 OP N ntila ton rai not                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       7 fo I LS ?

10 0 c pa eo bei su d om a ese nc c a I G. NA NA NA L A i ed. - w~gg n YES YES YES YES 10-10 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation TR-1 and moves signal specifics to the Bases. YES YES YES YES 10-11 Frequency of the surveillance requiring verification of the LS-19 control room ventilation system capability to maintain a positive pressure in the CR is relaxed to 18 months on a STB. YES YES NO: CTS N0: not in CTS. Deletes the STB for the 31 day testing. 10-12 surveillance is not LS-32 STB. NO N0 YES NO 10-13 The DCPP specific footnotes indicating the control room LG ventilation system is comon to both units and that the system may be considered OPERABLE with no chlorine monitors if no bulk chlorine gas is stored within the SITE BOUNDRY. are moved to the Bases. YES NO: TS 3.0.4 YES NO: TS 3.0.4 10-14 lhe statement that LCO 3.0.41s not applicable is deleted exemption is not in exemption is not in A based upon the new ITS definition of LCO 3.0.4 which does CTS. CTS. not apply in H0 DES 5 and 6. 5/15/97 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS

ENCLOSURE-4 o ge

    .w. .r .

4.M" .'S NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSfDERATIONS (NSHC)

COMTENTS

                     ~                                                                                                                                                                       3 Organization............................................................
   ~ '.. . . .. . I .

II. .. Description of NSHC Evaluations . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 III. Generic No Significant Hazards Considerations i l 1

                                          " A"    Admi ni strati ve Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 W.T ... =. - R" - Rel ocated Technical .Speci fication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8                                                                               ,
                                           "LG"    Less Restrictive (Moving Infonnation Out of the Techni cal Speci fi cations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 i
                                           "M" ' More Rest i cti ve Requi rements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 w.,.,.

g.g

IV. Specific No S, .ficant Hazards Considerations "LS" 15 LS.1................................................................... (T LS 2..............................................................Not ..used 18 LS 3................................................................ 21 LS 4................................................................... 23 LS 5................................................................... 26 LS.6................................................................... i LS 7..............................................................Not used 28

LS 8...................................................................

used ' LS 9..............................................................Not used LS 10..............................................................Not

                                                                                                                                                                  .....,Not used LS 11.......... ...................................... ....

LS 12..................... ....... ......... ........ .................. 30 LS 13......... .......... ........................................Not used i LS 14...... ....... ..... .......................................Not used LS 15............. .. ............. ..................... .... ..Not used i LS 16................... .......... ...... .......................Not used

                                                                                                                                                                . ...       .Not used LS 17........       ....... ....... .. .......... . .... ......
                                                                                                                                                                                            .34
                                 .-..LS 18.....                                ..          ... ...... .......................                                                              _   _.
                                                                                                . ......... . ... .... -. . ...... .....                                               36 LS 19. ........ ..... .                    .
                                                                                                                                                                            .Not used LS 20..... ... . ...                .. ..... . ..                    . .......... . ..........

LS 21.... ...... . .. .. .. .... . . ....... .. . . ........Not used

                                                                                                                                                      ..         . .. ...                   . 38 LS 22...   . ..               ........ ... .......                                 ... ...
                                                                                                                                                                          ..Not used LS.23.... .       .. ..           .            .      ..          .     .       . . .... ... .
                                                                                                                                                                              .Not used LS 24....  ... . .                  . .. . .                  ..           .. .           .. .
                                                                                                                                                                        . .                . 41 LS-25. ..    ...           ....... .                     . . .. ... . ..                        .

Not used LS.26.... . .. . .

                                                                                                   ..            ...           ... .        .....              . ././. / 7              ..,444 LS 27......     ......              ....
                                                                                                                                                                                           @.7./0- /7 i

1 5/15/97 ! NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

Q 3,?.10-1g IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 27 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The condition of OPERABLE ventilation train not being capable f being supplied from an emergency er source and the required action is delet . The REQUIRED ACTION if an OPERABL train of ventilation is lost during fue movement is to start the remaining OPERABLE rain for both the current Technical pecification and NUREG-1431. This assure, that the safety function is bei g fulfilled and that any ventiietion failures woul readily apparent to the o rators. Should the ventilation system fail und these conditions, fuel vement would be stopped and thus the possibility of an ac idental fuel drop woul be impossible. This is the same ACTION that would be requ ed if both ventila on trains suddenly became inoperable. Therefore, the requ ement to have o capability to transfer the ventilation system to an emergene er source s unnecessary. The no significant hazards considerat ons (N Cs) involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusin on e three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

              'The Comission may make a final de rmination, pursuant to the procedures in i             paragraph 50.91. that a propose amen nent to an operating license for a facility licensed under paragr ph 50.2 b) or paragraph 50.22 or a testing facility involves no signiff nt hazard consideration. if operation of the fac11ity in accordance with the proposed mndment would not:

1. Involve a signific nt increase in the robabi11ty or consequences of an accident previous y evaluated; or

2. Create the pas ibility of a new or differ nt kind of accident fran any ,

accident pre ously evaluated; or

3. Involve a ignificant reduction in a margin ! safety. "

The following evalu ion is provided for the NSHC. Doe the change involve a significant increase in t probability or 1. co equences of an accident previously evaluated? The pr posed change does not alter the unit configuration or o eration or the i func ion of any safety system. Consequently. the change does n t increase the i pr ability of an accident as defined in the FSAR Update. Delet'ng the an necessary condition that is not censistent with other actions o specification does not effect the analyzed accident. its probabili y or its consequences. 44 5/15/97 f NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

Q 3,1,10 -17 IV. SPECIFIC N0 SIGN'.FICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS 1 NSHC LS 27 (continued) Theref e, the proposed change does not involve a significan increase in the probabil y or consequences of an accident previously eval ted. l

2. Does t e change create the possibility of a new r different kind of acciden from any accident previously evaluat ?

e The proposed chang does not require physical a eration to any unit system or change the method by hich any safety related ystem performs its function. l Therefore, the proposed ange does not c ate the possibility of a new or different kind of acciden from any acc ent previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involv a si ificant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change does not al the basic regulatory requirements or change any ac;ident analysis assumpt ns, initial conditions or results. Consequently, the proposed ange d s not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. NO SIGNIFI HAZARDS CONSID TION DETERMINATION i Therefore, it is conclude that, based on the abo safety evaluation, the activities associated w h this change satisfy the HC standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, an aHC finding is justified. , l ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION ined that the change The proposed c ange has been evaluated and it has been det does not inv ve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (i a significant change in the typ or significant increase in the amounts of any ef ent that may be released ffsite. or (iii) a significant increase in individual cumulative occupat'onal radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change ets the eligi 11ty criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 1.22(c)(9). Ther fore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment o the proposed c nge is not required.

          /                                                                                                         <

45 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

i WW . 3.7.10 j ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME f _ l

                                                .l.1      @ 3,9.lo-I7

60. (continued) EQ4 Place OPERABLE GRE M Immediately PS-CREV5 train in CRVIS

                                                   ; ciscacy mode.

\ . AND

                                                  >                     fmg.                        '

p.1,2 2 % v w N OPeRABtf ddk casvS 4rA b G 3 7 /O-17 WO d '^ D~20' Si5tiaid51 CUE Im N teV G N 3m 9 f*

souta, m Q3,,lo-l7 E B 1

692.g Suspend movement of Immediately l irradiated fuel assemblies, r IluliR Mit M -3.7-57 g RiggiliggggggM CI N%ume a IERf.EIONS"! l aWititdgrosh]RERt TJi@II2iiEEMBE M ueternamusmus!ss dLTMmmiMuittitas gg s m:estE:gRn+ Ilielsmitl132 FJFdfatFd570iB T M assemDu rs? N w sq E PS Two GREM CREVS trains inoperable itG00155 B-61567701 during movement

B of irradiated fuel assemblies fotteasons! 3.7 57 otli'e d.tliagjo ditibnWB- B PS or during COPI AL " ,ATIONS.

(continued) l l l 3.7 26 5/15/97 MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

i r. C.GCS EKeT+3 l 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 trol Rqom Car;cncy Air C57FditTorung Tc i:cratur: Contrc4 System <ps 43QQ

l (CREATCS.) i CA 3.1-ED 3 LC0 3.7.11 Two CftEATC4 CRACS trains shall be OPERABLE. ps APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3, 4, doand!6I B Ouring movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. - ! Curing CCII ALZ?AT:0NC- g.ps 1 ACTIONS CONDITEN REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. .One CPLATCS CRKCS train A.1 Restore CICATCC CRAUS train 30 days :Ps inoperable. to OPERABLE status. 1 I l B. Required Action and B.1 Be in H00E 3. 6 hours l associated Completion l Time of Condition A not M2 i met in H00E 1, 2, 3 - or 4. B.2 Be in H00E 5. 36 hours G 3.'7./o-/'7 C. Required Action and C.h Place OPERABLE CICATCC Immediately B l associated Completion CRXCS train in PS. Time of Condition A not operation. met i'.nJH00tztwor.cowod 7 4 during movement of 08 irradiated fuel assemblies, cr iring C"2H u quspend7 CORE B CCII AL ZIaTICNC. ALTERATIONS-e,gl B PS C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately B ! irradiated fuel assemblies. aNW _ _ C. l' 6# flABLE ceACS % is 2~ hg gM ;,y 'E mru4.'u d.f 3N. M 6TW Pom' 'Av"" ' MARX UP OF WCG STS REV 1 [0 DREG 1431)'3.7 2ti G 3,'7.10 17 5/15/97 f

                                                                                                                                                               . --=

 .    -                         -               -       . _ . .   .     . - . . --     .-      - - - . = . - _-

l i l ER .: CRE75 i B 3.7.10 i 1 l BASES l l ACTIONS B0.1 and M.2 (continued) _j least MCCE 3 within 6 hours, and in MCOE 5 within 36 hours. The ! ailowed Completien Times are reasonaole i;ased on operating experience, to reach the required unit ccnditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. h.1, D, $ 1 Q 3.% 10- W l 1 can d 30.2.1. and CD 2 2 ITENCOEFYr"5M during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if the inoperable GRiE9 CEEVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within tha required Cerapletion Time, action must be taken to immediately place the OPERABLE GRE:9 CRE75 train in the c;;r;cncy M mode. This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure would be readily detected. gggt gg-6( Q 3.% Md An a'lternative to Required Action C.1 is to imediately suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the i unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude j the movement of fuel to a safe position. Requir:d Actica : * .; scdi' icd by m "ct; 'ndic; ting t; ;k;; thc ey;;;; in thc t;xic se; pr;;;;tica ;cdc :.u;;matic tr:nd : tc t;xic ;u; pr;;;;tica ;;dc .; incpc. ;bic. M 1 and AC 2 I'nht:=cI6M during movement of irradiated fuel assemold N ', , .

                            ,jl two C r : CREVS trains inoperable forsteasonsgoInen=nart:M 4 3,qjo_pj. iierananocera5Dscontroigroomnbouccarm@resConditaanaundil V.Na nm nocera cTEEbcunca ryenctnesto rec .a nat7iETComatem en eia me XTibred7DywondTtiDii"g accion must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might enter the control room. This places the unit in a conditicn that minimizes accident risk. This dces not i

preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position. l i ' (centinued) M.GK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 69 5/15/97

Q 3.7.10-17 INSERT 58-69a . Action D.1.2 requires the CREVS train placed in' operation be capable of being powered by an emergency power source. This action assures OPERABILITY of the CREVS train in the unlikely event of a Fuel Handling Accident or Decay Tank rupture while shutdown concurrent with a loss of offsite power. l 1 1 I [ 1

B 3.7.11 BASES ACTIONS IL1 and B.2 (continued) In MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, if the inoperable GREATE& M train cannot be restored to OPERABE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in M000 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit . G 3,7,/O -/ 7 C.2.1. and C.2.2

                        ,o-    -"    n - during movement of irradiated fuel, if the                   j inoperable GREATG& M train cannot be restored to OPERABE                         l status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABE GREAfGG M train must be placed in operation immediately. This action                     ,

ensures that the remaining train is OPERABE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur a that_ active _ failures will be readily detected. .r#3ERT 55-g Q 3,7,lD-17 An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position D.1 and 0.2 REEDEiE!!dEERR during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, with two GREATGE CRACS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safety position. (continued) B 3.7 75 5/15/97 MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES

  .       . . .     ..._ .__ _ .            . . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ .                      ..__.. . _ _. .._ _ . . _ . . _. _ _ .. . _ .m.                              . . . . _ . . _ _ . _ __

Q 3.7.10-17 INSERT 58-75a Action C.1.2 requires the CRACS train placed in operation be capable of being powered by an emergency power source. This action assures OPERABILITY of the CRACS train in the unlikely event of a Fuel Handling Accident or Decay Tank rupture while shutdown concurrent with a loss of o# site power. 4 m I-T e e,- , - . - _ , . -_ . , . . - . .v.. ,. . . ,_ ,. - , ..,, - - ___ . . _ , . , , , . _ _ , , . - , . . ,

                                                          . _~ .--

, _ > . . _ . . _ . . . .._ _ _ _ .. _ _ __ m-_ _ . _ . - _ _ . . _ . , . _ . . _ _ _ . . . _ _ . . . . . . _ _ ll l= CHANGE NUMER JUST1FfCATf0N . 3.7 57 This change establishes appropriate Required' Actions and Completion

                           - Times for ventilation system press e boundary enveloce degradation.

These changes are consistent with -{TSTf-#SQ Q 3,7,/3,2-52, ! 3 ? 3,7-69 l 3.'?-60 : I r ! 3. 7 bl

                                   -     .. -   ~             -,

fL~~ ZNSER r 6 A - sa ) o 3.1.10-17 i I r JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 6 5/15/97

                 - on a   m.-.        .s              +.         e   r           .

e ,m- -

1 Q 3.7.10-17 i INSERT 6A-8a l i CTS (3.7.6], Action b, for MODES 5 and 6, require verification that the ventilation system placed in operation be capable of being powered by an emergency power source. ITS LCO [3.7.10 and 3.7.11], Required Actions, are revised to incorporate this requirement. i I i l l l i r t l

D h - CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE FOR DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG-1431. SECTION 3.7 Page 7 of 7 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 3.7-54 The LCO. REQUIRED ACTIONS and Surveillances are revised YES: per LA NO NO N0 per the DCPP specific CTS to incorporate Region 2 fuel 116/114. storage requirements. 3.7-55 The NUREG-1431 specification is not used since an YES NO NO NO ! equivalent safety grade system does not exist. Therefore, the deletion is per the current licensing basis. 3.7-56 This change creates c new SR for the MSIVs and [WIVs] to YES YES YES YES , distinguish between the IST and the automatic actuation t testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation. If one occurs. to - satisfy the surveillance requirements. [Although SRs , 3.7.2.2 and 3.7.3.2 are new SRs. they may be performed in conjunction with SRs 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.3.1. Therefore, the i note alluwing testing to be pe-fo 1ned in H0DE 3 is also needed for these new SRs.] c 3.7-57 This change establishes appropriate REQUIRED ACTIONS and

YES YES -

Conpletion Times for ventilation system pressure envelope -YES-re /,,.w, /\/d[/ CrJ'. b CM u_-dd3 degradation. !

   .TN36ET                                     C          k 3, '7. / O -/7

_ t f i - h l f CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - NUREG-1431 5/15/97

Q 3.7.10-17 INSERT 6B-7a TECH SPEC CHANGE l APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY PEAK 3.7-58 3.7-59 3.7-60 3.7-61 3.7-62 CTS [3.7.6], Action b, for MODES 5 and 6, require Yes No - not in CTS Yes Yes verification that the ventilation system placed in operation be capable of being powered by an emergency power Q 3 710-17 source. ITS LCO [3.7.10 and 3.7.11), Required Actions, are revised to incorporate this requirement.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDn IONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.10-18 APPLICABILITY: DC, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.5.1.e.2 and 3; [4.7.6.e.2 and 3] ITS SRs 3.7.10.3 and 3.7.10.4 DOC 10-aa-LSa CTS 4.7.5.1.e. and 2 requires the CRVS (CREVS] system to be actuated and pressurization tested once per 18 months. The ITS SRs 3.7.10.3 and 4 requires that each " train" rather than the " system" be tested. Comment: Issue #1 - The CTS markup does not match the ITS requirements. A new DOC or a revised DOC must be provided with the revised CTS markup to explain this change in the CTS requirements. Issue #2 (for Callaway and WCGS)- CTS 4.7.6.e.2 contains details of how this test is performed which have not been retained in the ITS. It is recommended that these details be moved to the ITS SR 3.7.10.3. Issue #3 (for Callaway and WCGS)- In 4.7.6.e.2 and 3, does the automatic mode of operation switch-over occur to " recirculation or CRVIS" modes of operation as presented in ITS SR 3.7.10.37 Both ITS SR 3.7.10.3 and ITS SR 3.7.10.4 should be performed in the CRIVS mode of operation. Correct or revise the ITS and CTS markups for consistency. FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1: With respect to these specifications, there is no difference between " system" and " train." The difference between the CTS and ITS wording is strictly a format issue. As discussed in the response to Comment Number 3.7.1-1, a generic DOC was initiated and applied to each LCO to address format changes between the CTS and ITS. Issue #2 (for Callaway and WCGS): When the CREVS is initiated by the signals identified in the Bases for SR 3.7.10.3, it automatically assumes the CRVIS lineup. The CRVIS lineup includes operating the filtration system train and the pressurization system train. By design the CREVS system components actuate to the proper lineup without intervention by the operating staff. The details of how the system alignment is achieved have been incorporated into the Background Bases for ITS 3.7.10. Refer to the second through fifth paragraphs of that , section of the Bases. Apparently, the version of the Standard Technical Specifications in effect when the plants were licensed considered the recirculation mode to be synonymous with the emergency, i.e., CRVIS, mode of operation. However, the CTS surveillance also specifies that flow be directed through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. The only mode of operation of CREVS that directs flow through both the filtration system and the pressurization system filters and adsorbers is the CRVIS mode. The CTS 4.7.6.e.2) details conceming how the testing is performed will be moved to the ITS SR 3.7.10.3 Bases. DOC 10-26-LG has been initiated to address moving these details to the ITS Bases. In the past, the CREVS at WCGS was used to isolate the control room from a postulated chlorine leak on site. In the lineup used to prevent chlorine ingress, the pressurization system fans were not operating; however, the lineup allowed recirculation of control room air through the filtration system filters and adsorbers. This lineup was referred to as the

                     " recirculation" lineup. The previous use of the tenn " recirculation"in reference to a chlorine release is the basis for the differences in the response to Comment Number Q 3.7.10-15 for Callaway and WCGS.

Issue #J (far CIlliway and WCGS): When the CREVS is initiated by the signals identified in the Bases for SR 3.7.10.3, it automatically assumes the CRVIS lineup. Therefore, SR 3.7.10.3 is performed in the CRVIS lineup. In addition, SR 3.7.10.4 is perform' ed in the CRVIS lineup. These : requirements are identical to the testing performed under CTS surveillance requirements 4.7.6.e.2 and 3. There is no need to revise the ITS and CTS markups, because the proposed ITS requirements are no different than the CTS requirements. ATTACHED PAGES:

              ' Encl. 2           7-16                                                                     ;

Encl. 3A 14 Encl. 38 13 Encl. 58 8 3.7-71 4 1 1 4 i

PLANT SYSTEMS gg achd o4" %%de.bb t o t o-TC 1 0 ChbM g SURVEILLANCE RE0UTREMENTS (Continued) Verifying that on trol 5 0: "crt l:ticr b012 tion er Figh i 2) Ca:ccus P,;dic cti ity test signal, the system automatically ! Ah y ritche: 'nt: ; ie irculati;r 50dC Of cp;rcti0r "ith #10w jo.24- q 34,10- 66 thr;;;h the ll EPA filt;r; :.d charcc:,1.d: rbe- b;nk; 1 - "# Verify % that the system maintains the control room at a g, 3) 7 positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch Water o cce r_t!> res, s @ S Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system l operation; and 4) Verifying that the Pressurization System filter adsorber unit ' ~*^ heaters dissipate 15 2 kW in the Pre;;surization System when I tested in accordance with ANSI N51D-1975. f. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by to-CE-A l I verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing criteria of less than 1% i.n accordance with ANSI H510-1975 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the I system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm -+200 200 f r the Filtration System and 500 cfm + 500 f r the Pressurization System filter adsorber unit; and - 50 ! g. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber to-06'A bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon l refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 0 ! 2000 cfm + for the Filtration System and 500 cfm for the ' Pressurization System filter adsorber unit. l l l U Amendment No. c,105 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-16

l CHANGE NUMBER NS1!.C DESCRIPTION 10 18 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). l l 10-19 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison i Table (Enclosure 38). 10 20 LS 39 This change establishes appropriate Required Actions and Completion Times for ventilation system pressure envelope degradation. The proposed change would allow 24 hours to restore the capability to maintain the proper pressure by allowing for routine repairs before requiring the unit to perform an orderly shutdown. This change recognizes that the ventilation trains associated with the pressure envelcpe would still be OPERABLE and providing the appropriate flows even if the required pressure limit _ cannot be met. These changes are as proposed bgW/TSTF .287 ) 10 21 LS 38 The action to imediately suspend positive reactivity G 3 3.l1 7 changes when both trains of CR ventilatico are inoperable in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is deleted consistent with NUREG 1431. This change is acceptable because the imediate suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel provides adequate protection from a release of radioactivity. Baron dilution events leading to criticality are not postulated as these events are prevented from occurring. 10 22 H A requirement to operate the filtration system fans for at least 15 minutes would be added consistent with NUREG 1431. These fans, which do not have associated heaters, do not have a specified run time in CTS: adding this requirement is more restrictive. The proposed change is acceptable because it provide: a minimum run time to sssure fan OPERABILITY without imposing significant wear i and attendant degradation on the fan. 10 23 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 24 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison [- g Table (Enclosure 38). {J Q G 3.7J o -> 11 01 M A new specification for CR heat removal is added per NUREG 1431. CR temperature control is required to ensure the ability of the CR equipment to function following a LM 3 A- A DBA. l Q 3.9.IO,,t8 l 9Q 3 A -N c. Q 3.7.10- G DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 14 5/15/97

Q 3.7.1018 INSERT 3A-14a CTS 4.7.6.e.2) verifies on per 18 months that on a Control Room ventilation isolation or l High Gaseous Radioactivity test signal, the system automatically switches into a ; recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber 1 banks. The details of the methods for performing this surveillance are moved to the ITS SR 3.7.10.3 Bases. The requirements of ITS LCO 3.7.10 and associated surveillances l are adequate for erisuring the CREVS are Operable. These details are not necessary to i be in the TS to ensure the CREVS can perform its intended safety function. Moving j these details maintains consistency with NUREG-1431. Any change to these details will ' be made in accordance with the Bases Control Program described in ITS Section 5.5.13. l

l. !

t l i l l' l l l a

Page 13 of 15 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.7 APPLICABILITY TEOl SPEC OlANGE CALLAWAY C0HANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK DIABLO CANYON NUMBER DESCRIPTION N0; part of CTS. NO: part of CTS. YES YES 10 24 The 30*C tenperature specified for laboratory testing of A filter carbon samples is added. [This temperature is specified by ASTH D 3803-1989 but is explicitly stated in NUREG-1431]. YES N0; part of CTS. YES N0; Not part of 11-01 A new specification for CR heat removal is added to ensure CTS. H that the CR equipment functions following a DBA. YES NO: part of CTS. YES

N0; Not part of 11-02 Extends the A0T for an inoperable CR A/C unit from 7 to CTS. LS 28 30 days. YES YES N0; CTS does not YES The fregency of the surveillance for verification of the require the j 12-01 ESF *.stration train capability to maintain a negative LS 29 surveillance. p essure relative to atnespheric pressure is revised from 18 months to 18 months on a STB. YES N0; addressed by YES

N0; addressed by A new ACTION is added to cover the condition when 115 bothLCO 3.0.3. ITS LC0 3.0.3.

k 12-02 H emergency exhaust system trains are inoperable in HDDES 1.

2. 3. or 4. N/A N/A l N/A N/A NOT USED. YES 12-03 YES YES YES The surveillance requirement is revised to allow credit for 12-04 an actual actuation and moves signal specifics to the TR-1 Bases. N0; refer to 3/4.9 YES N0; S18 not part of YES SRs.

12-05 Deletes the SIB for the 31 day testing. CTS. N0; not in CIS. N0; not in CTS. LS-32 YES YES The details and description of the SR for train operability 12 06 are moved to the Bases. NO NO tG YES NO A new CPSES specific surveillance is added to verify that 12 07 non-safety related f ans stop upon initiation of an actual M or simulated sige.al. 3,f3 13 % q 3.9. /O- /8 I%4 hy 3 B _ 13 b Q 3.9.16- 4 Q 3.9. t o - 13 5/15/97 Inad 3 B - 13 c-r0HVFRSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS .-

l Q 3.7.10-18 INSERT 3B-13a TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER l DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY PEAK 10-26 The details of the methods for performing CTS No - not in CTS No - Not in CTS Yes Yes LG SR 4.7.6.e 2) are moved to the ITS SR 3.7.10.3 Bases.

C-RE;6 CREVS' B 3.7.10 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.2 (continued) RE0C'MENTS properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VETR. Q 3,9, I O -Ig SR 3.7.10.3. qlb This SR verifies that each GREM CRES train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. IneerctuatTottiis1gna] t,7 _____m. . A -w.-- _..m- ig_. 4.ratT0lTEo- - -iuumela InWh .v. sag. w a.s m gs & w man .n F.m W p :@ . ,

                                                                           . .+ s. .

w . s. i -- m ; s:::;.Iv,v v .r.t.ch . t !

                                                                                                   " I'; # CIF            012 CA 3,7-00 3          $ $ '., y *

4" M
W ;if

                                   -. .e SR 3.7.10.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of the potentially contaminated air.

The control. room positive pressure, with respect to pctcatielly cent;;inctcd ;djacent ;rces tilEEIM5lRIEEElitiHilEM is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the GREM staw . During the M c;ciscacy mode of operation, the GREM CE is designed to pressurize the control room z E125 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to tfilElHi!!I5ME aglilRWilLWi!! edeeecat arc;; in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The GREM C_ REVS is designed to maintain this positive The l pressure with one train at c ;dcup ncw c:tc of 0000] cf;. Frequency of 3 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG 0800 (Ref. 4). REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6Y4*lDMit3b7HtWS7 stems"

2. FSAR, Chapter bAm.et.ontrb1ERbbWKa'dibrogfc'aT!

CbnsEquences"CRTcQT&tf5YrTM5de~Tgj l (continued) B 3.7 71 5/15/97 MARX-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES

1 CA 3.7-003

       ' INSERT 5B-71a This Surveillance Requirement also verifies that a control room ventilation isolation signal (CRVIS) will be received by the LOCA sequencer to enable an automatic start of the Diesel Generatorloads that are associated with a CRVIS. Verification that these loads will start and operate at the appropriate step in the LOCA sequencer and that other auto-start signals for these loads will be inhibited until the LOCA sequencer is reset is accomplished under Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.12, i

l l

 .-. .... . - .. .-- - - --          . . . . . - . ~ ,     - . . . . ~ _ . ~ . - . - -         . . . .,,. .. _ . .-.. _.- . . . - . . . - - . . . - . - - . .

1 l-Q 3.7.10-18

                     - INSERT 58-71b The CREVS train automatically switches on an actual or simulated CRVIS signalinto a CRViS mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

l i l l l l I I l l l l i i l l l l L n-.yr, .---7,, -

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.10-19 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA l REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.6; (CTS 3/4.7.7] ITS 3.7.10 Action D.1 (C.1] l JFD 3.7-bb JFD B-PS STS 3.7.10 has a note to Required Action C.1 which states " Place in toxic gas protection mode if automatic transfer to toxic gas protection mode is inoperable." ITS 3.7.10 has not adopted this STS requirement. Comment: There is no JFD for not retaining this STS requirement. The categorization of "B-PS" does not provide the detailed explanation to enable a reviewer to reach the same determination. Provide a detailed JFD for not adopting the STS text or provide an altemate note. FLOG RESPONSE: The categorization of "B-PS" per the FLOG mark-up methodology means " Bracketed - Plant Specific." The ITS Required Action C.1 Note is bracketed in the STS and per the STS conversion methodology would not be required to be adopted unless a comparable requirement already existed in the CTS. Callaway, CPSES and WCGS do not have such a requirement in their CTS. ATTACHED PAGES: None I I

ADDITIONAL !NFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.13.21 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.7 and 3/4.9.13 ITS 3.7.13, Applicability, Actions, SRs and Bases DOC (3.7) 12-08-M DOC (3.7)12-09-A CTS 3/4.7.7 defines various EES surveillance requirements for the fuel building when in fact these requirements should apply also to the auxiliary building. ITS 3.7.13 has corrected these CTS errors by adding Notes to the Applicability, clarifying the Actions and adding a new SR. Comment: This is an " administrative" change and not a "more restrictive" change to adapt the current licensing basis to reflect the original design. It is noted these tests have been performed but not under the guidance of the CTS. Therefore, this formalizes what i has been current practice. For Callawav. revise DOC 12-08-M for an administrative change and revise the CTS markup where it is identified for the Applicability Note and the new SR per Insert K. Delete the use of this DOC for Insert M where it clearly does not apply. DOC 12-09-A as presented contradicts ITS SR 3.7.13.4; so delete this DOC as redundant to DOC 12-08-A. Also, CTS 4.7.7.d.2 for ITS SR 3.7.13.4 and CTS 3.9.13.d.3 for ITS 3.7.13.5 must correctly identify the Auxiliary and Fuel Building in the CTS to the l respective SIS and FBVIS mode of operation to match the proposed ITS SR l requirements. For WCGS, activate this DOC 12-08-A as an administrative change and then use it to identify the addition of the Applicability Note which is not identified in the l CTS markup. Also, CTS 4.7.7.b.1 for ITS SR 3.7.13.4 and CTS 3.9.13.g.2 for ITS 3.~i.13.5 are not identified in the CTS which need to have the respective SIS and i FBVIS mode of operation identified to match the proposed ITS SR requirements. FLOG RESPONSE: When the EES is initiated by a Safety injection Signal, it automatically aligns itself in the . SIS mode of operation. When the EES is initiated by a Spent Fuel Pool Gaseous l Radioactivity High signal, it aligns itself in the FBVIS mode of operction. Callaway: DOC 12-08-M has been changed to DOC 12-08-A. The CTS markup has been revised to:

Change DOC 12-08-M to 12-08-A for the new Applicability Note. The Applicability Note has been revised to match the wording of the Applicability Note for WCGS ITS 3.7.13.

Delete DOC 12-08-M from insert M.

       .        Replace DOC 12-09-A with 12-08-A on 4.7.7.d.2. DOC 12-09-A is deleted.
       .        Revise the markup of 4.7.7.d.2 to make this surveillance applicable to the Auxiliary Building and change FBVIS to SIS. Insert K has been deleted.

WCGS: Since the system is aligned to its proper mode of operation by either the SIS or FBVIS, there is no need to mark CTS surveillance requirements 4.7.7.b.1 and 3.9.13.g.2 to identify the respective mode of operation. Also, in the W GS CTS, LCO 3.7.7, which is applicable in MODES 1 through 4, addresses EES OPERABILITY in the SIS mode of operation; and LCO 3.9.13, which is applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the spent fuel pool, addresses EES OPERABILITY in the FBVIS mode of operation. Therefore, for WCGS, there is no need to activate DOC 12-08-A to cover addition of the Applicability

_ . . _ _ . . . . . . . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . . . . . _ . . . . ~ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ . _ . i_ _ . t 1. Note to CTS, The Applicability Note simply summarizes the existing CTS requirement for l the two modes of operation of the EES. t (. . ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-17 (Insert M),7-18 (Insert K) . Encl. 3A 15,16 ! Encl. 3B 14 i r . l 1 l 1 j i I l i.

syrn- e 5 5 m A. g qec M y-)f-p , jp.gfg ~ ctptred n mobC5IASawA%, I F6V:5 nak. g eqe cab t$ ' ' ' ' 2'/ PLANT SYSTEMS teAE$ cm ass ~% -e4 d 6g in=LM REV[ 10N y, u,3 2

3/4.7.7 EMERGENCY EXHAU51 suit. 01 A Q 3,9.1-l

7 LIMITING CONOLTION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7 Two independant Emergency Exhaust Systems shall be dPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MCOES 1, 2, 3, and 4 ( / ACTION: With one Emergency Exhaust System inoperable, restore the inoperacle Emergency , Exhaust System to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANOSY I within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following* 30 hours. l Ne r '\' s \ 1.c:.- m 4 3.'7./3.2-1 g

              % seer < m '

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7 Each Emergency Exhaust System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

                                                                                       '-it';t'mg,      n-o5'5 E

a. At' least once per 31 days ;n : :T C E C TE'~ 3'l:: b;- to - c4-W

                           '- - r e :: : c ' :c , "':u e rough th: 9E?' 'i' tcrs :nd :ncr::cy

nd verify % that the system operates for at least 4c :-t e-:

10 continuous hou,-s with the heaters operating; 4 At least once per 18 months, or (1) af ter any structural maintenance (o.o 6- A , b, l on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorcer housings, or (2) following i painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation tone communicating with the system by: 1 to-C8-A

1) Verifying that the Emergency Exhaust System satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1% and uses the test procedure quicance .

in Regulatory Positions C.S.a, C.S.c, and C.S.d of Regulatory ! Guide 1.52 Revision 2, March 1973, and the system flow rate is 9000 cfm 10%;

                                                                                    'm uc..< dance.         t o - ca- A e E.5 L i w b to.4 By           e< fo<    .,g +L cep a d wi        4L. vYTP .                    .

3/4 7-17 CALLAWAY - UNii 1 I

i l CTS %.7.7 NSERTS INSERT 'L' l With two Emergency Exhaust Syste:n trains inoperable in MODES 1,2,3, or 4, 12-02-M for reasons other than an inoperabic auxiliary building boundary, be in at least ) l HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l INSERT 'M' With two Emergency Exhaust System trains inoperable due to an inoperable 4 3 A I3*2 Auxiliary Building pressure boundary restore the inoperable Auxiliary Building- 10 20-LS39 pressure boundary to OPERABLE status within?4 hours or be in at least1IOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the . following 30 hours. 6 l l

FPR @ '97 12:16PM E. CWY E.%1NEER!rf, PLANT

                                                                                                                                                        )A N                     PLANT SYSTEMS SURVETLLANCE REQUIREWENTS (Continued)                                                                             _ _ _ _ -

2) Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory m. og. A analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide .

1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, asets the laboratory testing

         .; ..                                  criteria of ASTM D-3803-1989 when tested at 30*C and 70%
     -m                                 .       relative humidity, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than T

2%, and G:.:.

    -E ~

3) Verifying a system flow rate of 9000 cfm 10%'during system io.n.A -

      .$k                                       operation      when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

g _. .

                                                ~- -

c. - After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying 10-ce A sie. within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a t-

                                    ' ~ repres'entative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March.1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of ASTM D-3803-1989 when tested
                                         'at 30*C and 70% relative humidity, for a methyl . iodide penetration of less than 2%;

d. At least once per 18 months by: ,

Verifying that the p'ressure drop across the combined HEPA t o-CS- A 1) filters and charcoal adsorber banks of less than 5.4 inches A Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 9000 cfm g 105, c. g,7,y, g' I Verifying that the system maintains e

                                                                                                             %   But ding at a L2 A

2) *~

negative pressure of greater than or equa .ok rch Water ** Gauge relative to the outside atmosphere system 'l operation,-

w.4sese, ,ctr ws u . h .C A .

3) Verifying that the system starts onWty hjectin tut sa-o4 M signal, and - se6\ .c omw &

4) Verifying that the heaters dissipate 3713 kW when tested in p accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by m.og.A verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 9000'cfm 310%; and

                                                                                                     ~~
                        - - f.            After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber so oS-A bank by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing criteria of less than 1%

in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 9000 cfm 10%. p3 Ldh A M ,Q3.7.h.2_d CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 Amendment No.118

'-~

l 1 CTSI.7.7 Idsert M - ew 2-08-M/

                        . ew)V ifying t t each Strai can m tainan ative pr ute in t Auxilia uildin f atle 0.25 i hes wper gauge ith resp .t to atrno heric pr sure in the St mode /opers ~ n.             /                                                -                       I
                                                   /                                                                       Q 7. 7. /7. 2 - / [

r~.

c. ::a hT4=.~ r -

vgr.9_ . . a x, . . zwp: c.. . -

 . ,9.-; .                                                                                                       .
. x- gn. .                        .         .            .

s- . .

. =in : .. - ..

    .a..                    . . .                                                                '

r 4 1 1 1 1 l 4 em yw'

w. w.em

                                                                                                      -e. ,   +m   em ,

e m.= M .h -e maan. mwe w

l l CHANGE DESCRIPTION

MBE N.SB.C .

This change extends the,A0T for an inoperable CR air l 1* 02 LS 28 l conditioning (A/C) unit from 7 days to 30 days. Even though this is a new TS, the OPERABILITY of the CR A/C units was previously controlled by the CR ventilation i specification which allowed a 7 day A0T. l LS 29 The frequency of the surveillance requiring verification 12 01 l of the [ Emergency Ey.haust System] capability to maintain a negative pressure relative to atmospheric pressure is revised to 18 months on a STB. The new frequency requires one of the 2 trains to be tested every 18 months instead of both trains every 18 months. The most likely cause of a failure to achieve the required negative pressure is a l failure of the ventilation pressure boundary. Thus when one train successfully demonstrates the ability to maintain the negative pressure, in all likelihood the other train will also. This results in less testing of the ventilation system than is required by the CTS. A This change implements ACTION B. of NUREG 14313.7.13. 12 02 M new ACTION is added to cover the condition when both Emergency Exhaust System trains are inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. The Required Action from NUREG 1431 is more l restrictive than entering LCO 3.0.3. 1 12 03 - NOT USED. The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, 12 04 TR 1 if one occurs, to satisfy the 3Rs. The identification of th? specific signals that initiate the change in state of the equipment is moved to the Bases. - l5h () 3,7,13 2-3 LS 32 Th's cha ge d etes he aggeedte/tbasi (STB forjthe 12 05 Y co istetwitKtheN EG- 31 gMange 3 day esti to ~ i _thedeft_ tion Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison 12 06 - Table (Enclosure 38). Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison 12 07 - Table (Enci sure 38). - to; W c u e d h si e M 12-08 #A / new surveillance is being added to test the capability ( of the EES to maintain a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge relative to atmospheric pressure [

                                 ]L_gg,g,g-]

while in the SIS lineup. In addition, a note is being added to the Applicability to clarify when both EES

 .                                                            functions are required OPERABLE. In the CTS. the SIS mode 5/15/97 15 f                           DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS
                                                -w-w

CHANGE DESCRIPTION li M ER tL91C of operation for the EES.was not addressed. The CTS

               - -                                                                   surveillance requirements in 3/4.7.7 and 3/4.9.13 only had surveillance tests addressing the FBVIS mode of operation.

Thus, this function was being tested via the preventative maintenance program. However, the SIS mode of operation ; for the EES is part of the design basis of the plant in

                   '                                                                 Hode 14 and appropriately belongs in the scope of the

{Q 17,IS.2- / (

       .y. r . .
       ' $fF 12-09                                         M                  epfsti            survei ance is r vised to pect ei the that this/

VIS re re es is form [d wh 5:-7K ne3ativ Wneu . R er c nge 08- for relAedpevisipn/ .

       -jf~                                     -     .              .
          >--.-:-......                                                                                                               See Conversion Comparison Not applicable to-Callaway.
       " .c (12 10 -      '
                                                                                   ' Table (Enclosure 38).
                                                                                ~ Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison
                                                    ^

13 01 - l 8 Table (Enclosure 38). , e.3"r "- The descriptive material related to the definition of an 13 02 LG OPERABLE UHS is moved to the Bases. 13 03 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 13 04 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 13 05 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison

             -                                                                           Table (Enclosure 38).

Hoves the 18 month visual inspection of the UHS cooling 13 06 LG tower fill material to a licensee controlled document. Moves the 31 day UHS riprap inspection to a licensee-13 07 LG controlled document. 13 08 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Ericlosure 38). . . . 13-09 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison 14 01 - Table (Enclosure 38). Not applicable to fallaway. See Conversion Comparison 15 01 - Table (Enclosure 38). 5/15/97 16 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

m- i

                                                                                                                                                  ;h                  a e . Tu, .;                  ,          l .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         . al3,N .              .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                .* ,g
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ' 'Qp]}
                                                                                                *:5-            '

lH , '; t p;.pt?eh g' r.( , y-[Slp "if . j ~U s, Page 14 of 15 CONVERSI0tl COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT i'. TS 3/4.7 i4 :

                                                                                                                                                    .                   APPLICABILITY TECil SPEC CilANGE WOLF CREEK                                                                              CAllAWAY
                                             '                                          DIABLO CANYON                                                   COMANCllE PEAK llUMBER        DESCRIPTION                                                                                                                                             .                                         .

(Q3.7.13.2-Ij NO NO YES , N01 12 08 A new Callaway specific surveillance is added to verify the - capability f the emergency exhaust system (EES) to l qX A maintain a negathe pressure. A note is also added to the Applicability of the EES TS to clarify when both EES functions are required to be OPERABLE. yv y-- @ f4

                                 -v       3       v v y - {'nsed a specify            JiO N /g                                                      JNr A/p              ,.                     fl0'AffA 12-09       , Th%aljakay specific surveillince,4s r                                                                                                                        ,                                                                                                                        1711.2-1]
                 , tfie vjntilAtton yst.mIlinydppiti         est equ for

W __D --

w

                . RepdEe . thek.cgat)1Te prj_                                                                                                            NO                                           NO                                                                                     N0 YES                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,

The DCPP specift JTS ABVS LCO is extended to the supply 12 10 H fans. ^ N0 NO 1 YES NO . The DCPP spect fic note stating that the (AtS ts comon to 13 01 i LG both units is moved to the Bases. : NO YES NO NO i The Callaway specific descriptive material is mved to the 13-02 Bases. NO l LG YES: relocated to NO NO The CPSES specific LCO for sediment depth and the the IPJi. ! 13 03 surveillances for SSI Dam inspections and sediment depth R are relocated to a Itcensee-controlled document. NO YES: moved to the N0 NO t USAR. This Wolf Creek specific change moves the description of ! 13-04 the required dam height and the requirement for.the related LG i surveillance to a licensee controlled document. YES 1 NO N0 No The CPSES spectfic ACTION associated with the restoration 13-05 of SSI level is revised to. allow seven days for completion LS-30 of the required action. NO YES: mved to the NO NO FSAR. ThisCalla.<ayspecificchangemovesthe18monthvisual 13 06

LG inspection of the cooling tower fill material to a licensee controlled document. NO YES: moved to the NO NO FSAR.

This Callaway specific change moves the 31 day LAIS riprap 13 07 LG inspection to a licensee-controlled document. NO NO YES NO This DCPP spectitc change extends the LCO APPLICABILITY to , 13 08 H tODE 4 and revises ACTIONS accordingly. ,

                                                                                                                                                                                         'I~                                                                                                                5/15/97 mm,rne mo conomvots unt r                 rtinRENT TS

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

                             -. . - . . _ - . - _ .      --        - ..     .        - . . ~ -. _ - -

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.13.2-2 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.7.7 Action, insert M (New c); CTS' 3.9.13 (new c) ITS 3.7.13 Action B, C, D, d, and (F] DOC (3.7) 10-20-LS39 DOC (3.9) 12-12-LS26 l JFD 3.7-57 ! These changes are beyond the scope of a conversion because the industry traveler . referenced in this DOC (WOG-86) has not been approved by the NRC. l Comment: Withdraw the changes or adopt the STS. l l FLOG RESPONSE: l l WOG-86 has been approved by the TSTF and is designated as TSTF-287. This traveler has been submitted to the NRC and is under review. The proposed wording in TSTF-287 l was modified from WOG 86, and these modifications have been incorporated into the ' ITS. This resulted in changes only to the Bases for the Required Actions for the Emergency Exhaust System, ITS 3.7.13. The FLOG continues to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler. In addition, due to the change in traveler status, WOG-86 has been replaced witn TSTF-287 in DOC (3.7) 10-20-LS39, DOC (3.9) 12-12-LS-26 (for WCGS only), NSHC (3.7) LS-39, NSHC (3.9) LS-26 (for WCGS only), and JFD 3.7-57. Also see the response to Comment Number O 3.7.10-14. l l ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 3A (3.7) 14 Encl. 4 (3.7) 64 , Encl. 5A Traveler Status page Encl. 6A 8 l I

l CHANGE l NUMBER t@C DESCRIPTION 10 18 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). ~ 10 19 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 20 LS 39 This change establishes appropriate Required Actions and Completion Times for ventilation system pressure envelope degradation. The proposed change would allow 24 hours to restore the capability to maintain the proper pressure by allowing for routine repairs before requiring the unit to perform an orderly shutdown. This change recognizes that the ventilation trains associated with the pressure envelope would still be OPERABLE and providing the i appropriate flows even if the required pressure limit _ ! cannot be met. These changes are as proposed b WW/ TSTF-28'7, i 10 21 LS 38 The action to immediately suspend positive reactivity i ! changes when both trains of CR ventilati.on are inoperable i in H00ES 5 and 6 and during movement of irradiatM fuel l assemblies is deleted consistent with NUREG 1431. This I change is acceptable because the imediate suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel provides l ! adequate protection from a release of radioactivity. Boron dilution events leading to criticality are not i postulated as these events are prevented from occurring. 10 22 H A requirement to operate the filtration system fans for at least 15 minutes would be added consistent with l NUREG 1431. These fans, which do not have associated ' heaters, do not have a specified run time in CTS: adding i this requirement is more restrictive. The proposed change is acceptable because it provides a minimum run time to assure fan OPERABILITY without imposing significant wear l and attendant degradation on the fan. l 10 23 - Not applicable to Cal.laway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 10 24 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison

==

l 4, (Enclosure 38).Q%i _ 3 A_-lQ G M lo4 Table l 11 01 M A new specification for CR heat removal is added per NUREG 1431. CR temperature control it required to ensure

  ' h 3A- 4 the ability of the CR equipment to function following a DBA.

Q 3,7.10 , i S yg 3 A 4 c. Q 3 .7.10- l'3 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 14 5/15/97

l IV. SFECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS l g 4 NSHC LS 39 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION

         .-           -                                                      .              FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMEKf5 WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
      .; g This change provides specific required ACTIONS for failed surveillances designed to detect ventilation system pressure envelope degradation. These surveillances l

require a positive or negative pressure limit be satisfied in the area with the associated required ventilation train operating. While other surveillances in the l _c. same specification test the. operability of the ventilation train, these surveillances ensure the pressure envelope leak tightness is adequate to meet the l r:3. design.. assumptions. . However.;there.are no corresponding Conditions, UnderRequired the CTS,

       .gr, Actions, or Completion Times _ associated with these surveillances.

TS 3.0.3 must be entered [and in the case' of the fuel building with the pressure limits not met, TS 3.0.3 would not be an appropriate ACTION]. The proposed change i would allow 24 hours to restore the capability to maintain the proper pressure by

allowing for routine repairs before requiring the unit to perform an orderly

     -id[. shutdown. These' changes have been 'modeled after the Shieldrovi                                      Building   specification s consistency      wit h
         ~
                     ~ (ISTS 3.6.19) for a dual or ice condenser containme NUREG 1431. This change is consistent with                                     67 75 7F - 2 F 7.     {Q 1,7, /y,2,.2,

_This proposed TS. change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it ( involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been , j performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

                                     "The Cortmission may make a final. determination. pursuant to the procedures in 50.91.. that a proposed amendnent to an operating license for a facility
           -                         Ilcensed under 50.2Hb) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no
            ~ ~-                    -Significant hazards consideration, if operation of the faci 1ity in accordance with the proposed amendrnent would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident fran any accident previously evaluated: or . .

                             .--3.- Invol-ve-a-significant reduction. in a margin of Safe.ty.."

I The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or l consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

5 64 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICAKT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

,._ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ . ~_ _ _.._ _. _. _ _. . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ __--._ _._

     -                                                  8ndustry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.7                                                       .

TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE _i COMMENTS TSTF 36, Rev. 2 Incorporated 3.7 42. 0nly applicable to - ! DCPP l TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. TSTF 70. Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable -e t NRC approved, : Of l -trr! 'Or cut Off d:te. T-7 W## TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7 05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. l Partially 3.7 01 Retained CTS

) -

W004S (Formerly Incorporated requirements for

                                   .WOS-717                                                                        resetting trip setpoints since requirements are e                                                                       more conservative than 93'1I-4                                                                           the traveler.

W944.- Incorporated 3.7 34 Not incorporated by DCPP as current licensing 9 3'1*d'I gg yja 3.9. m , basis. TSTF 139, Incorporated Not Applicable - Bases change

                                                                                                                     ,ygc ,#ny,j,          7%-7. 7-oer Rev. 1 (CE0G 51)

TSTF 140, $ Incorporated Not Applicable TR J 7.cc4 Rev.;I. O w,prW d~e ese (CEOG 52) & ncumin ml:uMe er,%im. 1'6I-W004(r.qg7 Incorporated 3.7 57 Q b.7.30 -lY[G N,?.13.1-4

                                      -WetP96                   Incorporated                          3.7 56 Q 3.'7, 2-3
                            'T6T F -$94                0 3.?. 2 - 3 Wp rgw-col        3,1 %

TR 3 'l-00 l

 !                             Inso4                         E 3.'7' Cod.

g _ g 3,1-001 l. L 1 5/'.5/97 MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) l.

INSF" 5 A-TR 3.7-001 , TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMME.4TS TSTF-173, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable - Cases Change NRC approved.

4 INSERT SA-TR 3.7-002 TRAVELER // STATUS DIFFERENCE // COMMENTS TSTF-174, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable-Ilases Change NRC approved.

CHANGE nut! BEE JUSTIFICATION 3.7 57 This change. establishes appropriate Required Actions and Completion Times for ventilation system press e boundary enveloce_ degradation. These changes are consistent with -g TSTf-J Q 3,?, /J. 2-2., 3,'?-58 3,7-69 I 3.']-bO-

3. '7 bl

                                         -          - ~_     '

l LL ZNSERT 4 A - 8D o 3. 7. to-t'7 i i 1 4 4 JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 8 5/15/97 l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.13.2-3 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.7.a and CTS 4.9.13.a ITS SR 3.7.13.1 DOC (3.7) 12-05-LS32 DOC (3.7) 10-06-LG DOC (3.9) 12-07-LS25 CTS 4.7.7.a and CTS 4.9.13.a verify at least once per 31 days on a Staggered Test Basis that each EES train operates and each heater / component operates for its specified length of time. ITS SR 3.7.13.1 requires these similar verifications every 31 days but not on a Staggered Test Basis. Comment: Isr;ue #1 - This ITS proposed change is acceptable; however there is no technicaljustification provided in these DOCS. Also, this DOC refers to the contents of the NSHC that contains a justification only for Vogtle which is not applicable. What is the technicaljustification that is derived directly from the operating history of the plants in this submittal? Revise the DOCS and the CTS markup. Issue #2 - For WCGS, the details of how to perform the test of 4.9.13.a should be identified and then moved to the Bases of ITS SR 3.7.13.1 under DOC 10-06-LG, as is done in Callaway for 4.7.7.a. For Callaway, these CTS 4.9.13.a details are moved but the CTS markup does not show this as occurring under DOC 10-06-LG. Provide a revised DOC and CTS markup. FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1: DOC (3.7) 12-05-LS-32 (for Callaway) and DOC (3.9) 12-07-LS-25 have been revised to provide a technicaljustification for the proposed change. DOC (3.7) 12-05-LS-32 is not ; applicable to WCGS since CTS SR 4.7.7a. refers to the surveillances in CTS 4.9.13. The emphasis on the NRC evaluation of Staggered Test Basis reported on the Vogtle docket has been reduced. However, those conclusions are generic and are applicable to the proposed change for Callaway and WCGS, also. The revised DOC now reads:

     "This change deletes the required STB for the 31 day test. Since the EES is a two train system, the STB requirement forces a test of one or the other train every 15 days. Each individual train will still De tested on a 31 day frequency. These trains have been designed to be redun.' ant and independent of each other. Assuming a constant failure rate over time and no common mode failure potential, the testing frequency is the most significant parameter in assuring that latent failures are detected. Therefore, since the testing frequency would not be altered by this proposed change, the availability of the EES trains will not be adversely affected; and the proposed change is acceptable."

Ls. sue #2: WCGS: The details to be moved from 4.913.a have been struck through, and these details have been incorporated into the ITS 3.7.13.1 Bases. This change is covered by new DOC (3.9) 12-14-LG similar to DOC (3.7) 10-06-LG. Callaway: The details to be moved from 4.9.13.a have basen struck through. This change is covered by new DOC (3.9) 12-14-LG similar to DOC (3.7) 10-06-LG.

ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.13 CTS 3/4.7 - ITS 3.7 Encl. 3A 15 Encl. 4 51 Att. No.15 CTS 3/4.9 Encl. 2 9-17 Encl. 3A 9 Encl. 38 7 Encl. 4 58 l l l l i i I

CHANGE NUMBER tL91C DESCRIPTION 11 02 LS ;28 This change extends the A0T for an inoperable CR air conditioning (A/C) unit from 7 days to 30 days. Even though this is a new TS, the OPERABILITY of the CR A/C units was previously controlled by the CR ventilation specification which allowed a 7 day A0T. 12 01 LS-29 The frequency of the surveillance requiring verification of the [ Emergency Exhaust System] capability to maintain a negative pressure relative to atmospheric pressure is revised to 18 months on a STB. The new frequency requires one of the 2 trains to be tested every 18 months instead of both trains every 18 months. The most likely cause of a failure to achieve the required negative pressure is a failure of the ventilation pressure boundary. Thus when one train successfully demonstrates the ability to maintain the negative pressure, in all likelihood the other train will also. This results in less testing of the ventilation system than is required by the CTS. 12 02 M This change implements ACTION B. of NUREG 14313/7.13. A new ACTION is added to cover the condition when both Emergency Exhaust System trains are inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

nequired Action from NUREG 1431 is more restrictive than entering LCO 3.0.3.

12 03 - NOT USED. 12 04 TR 1 The SR is revised to allow credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the SRs. The identification of the specific signals that initiate the change in state of the equipment is moved to the Bases. 43,7J3,7_3 12 05 LS 32 Th's cha ge d etes he agge ed teylt basi (STB /forjhet Y 3 day esti to co iste t witK the _ EG~ 1(31

                                                                               -       9 Man.e
                              ' the defi tion 12 06          -

Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 12 07 - Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison cuidhusinY6sslah XA 12 08 X new surveillance is being added to test the capability of the EES to maintain a negative pressure of at least 0.25 inches water gauge relative to atmospheric p. essure _ 4 g j3,g-] while in the SIS lineup. In addition, a note is being added to the Applicability to clarify when both EES functions are required OPERABLE. In the CTS. the SIS mode DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 15 5/15/97

Q 3.7.13.2-3 INSERT 3A-15a This change deletes the required STB for the 31 day test. Since the EES is a two train system, the STB requirement forces a test of one or the other train every 15 days. Each individual train will still be tested on a 31 day frequency. These trains have been designed to be redundant and independent of each other, Assuming a constant failure rate over time and no common mode failure potential, the testing frequency is the most significant parameter in assuring that latent failures are detected. Therefore, since the testing frequency would not be altered by this proposed change, the availability of the . EES trains wi!! not be adversely affected; and the proposed change is acceptable. k i d 1

            .-..-                         -- . . - . . - - . . - . . . . . . -                           _ ~ . . . . . - . - - . . - - - .                                 -- -

l IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CCNSICERATICNS O NSHC LS 32 [e.e.4 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION

       ~ . .

g FCR )

TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE l RECUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPEC?ICATICNS j Q 77.d.2-I e i. m. me ecp rement dTM l ej propose changeyoul c ponent ystems a STB wh4 e maintalnjng the test 1ryg frequency for individual) rains /ccmponent unchanged As discussed in the NRCVs Safety Eval l I Plant,Vo'gtle'sf T'S Converstn, "the ipt$nt of aggered req,u(rement testir i' A numcer of for sj to y'ncreaseffle reliab ity of the,,ccmponent or , system being tested. l l syddies ha e demonstt ted that s,;aggered testi,og has negligi,t/e impact en co / l These/ analytical, rand deterministic studies ha.ve shown that,i'n most L .j _p. teliabil'.y.

b5 has negligWie' impact or

  "~ ~ y cases                          waggered                   *e, sting (a) is operationalfrf difficult,                                                                          j

! 'n empenentreli ility, (c) s not as saf,ety significant/as initially, thought, ; (dT introduces addition stress on epmponents such as' diesel genepaters potent,ta 1, ' aasing ir reased ccagdient failurefrates and ccm ent wearcut.7(e) results Jn more) g purposes.yand (f) increases the l l . . , frequen reductions /n system redundancy for tes r of secarate test evolutlens. ! 2:M': likel 1 Ther,e,thood of human error by increasing the nu

Based on l

        .-s.,                                                                                                                                                                          l l                            *he NRC Saf              y Evaluation,/ removalf of STB lesting woulf/have                                       /

negligdle

                                                                                                                                                             /                  negatiMI i      .. ,

me ct, a potential positive impact, on plant safety. ! V This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it l involves no significant hazards censideration. This determination has been l i performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as cuoted I belcw:

             *                          *The Ccamission may make a final determination. pursuant to the procedures in                                                                  l 50.91. that a prcccsed amencment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 cr fcr a test:ng facility involves no significant hazards ccasideracion. if cperation cf the facility in acccrdance wiin the prcpcsed amencment wculd not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the prccaD1Iity cr ccnsequences of an accident prev 1cusly evaluated: cr i

frcr; any l

2. Create cne posslaihty of a new or d1?ferenc kind af accicen:

                                                   - accident prev 1cusly -evaIuaCad: cr I

1 ^ 3. Involve a significant reduction in a mar;1n of safety." s The folicwing evaluation is provided fcr the tnree categcries of tne significant fi hazards consideration standards: 1 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in tne precacility or f consecuences of an accident trev1cusly evaluated? S/1997 51 ! NO SIGNIF!CN(T HAIAPDS CONSIDERATION

, .- .. - . - . . _ = - ~. -. --. .~. - - . - -. -.- . . ..- l Q 3.7.10-16, O 3.7.13.2-3 INSERT 4-51a The proposed change would eliminate the requirement to test multi-train / multi-component systems on a STB while maintaining the testing frequency for individual trains /compenents unchanged. Individual trains of safety-related systems have been designed to be redundant and independent of each other. Assuming a constant failure rate over time and no common mode failure potential, the testing frequency is the most significant parameter in assuring that latent failures are detected. Therefore, since the testing frequency would not be altered by this proposed change, the availability of individual trains and, therefore, system availability will not be adversely affected. Furthermore, the NRC has evaluated the potentialimpact of eliminating STB testing on a generic basis in its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) supporting TS Conversion for Plant Vogtle. The SER noted that a number of studies have concluded that STB tesung has negligible impact on system reliability; and, in most cases, staggared testing is not as safety-significant as originally believed. These conclusions have been used to eliminate from NUREG-1431, Rev.1, many of the staggered testing requ;rements contained in earlier Standard l Technical Specifications. I

l

                                                 =c,-    ---- - .wr                                          . . - -

REVistoN 1 C s e,Q:"f x#, - REFUELING OPERATIONS ' l 3/4.9.13 EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM

'O.

[. LIMITJNC COND! TION FOR OPERATION 9.:g;:- ix-3.9.13 Jwo independent Emergency Exhaust Systems shall be OPERAS i-lpE:.bc.

':: .k; : -                                                             Wh;n: r-irradiated fuel -i4 in the fuelL'M*              :tr-2ce ;cE APPLICABILITY:                                                                                                                 }},. 0 \ -L5 "O{'                                                                               w e,9 vno n d of T                                 ACTION:                         .
                                                               \:na\g g t witnin
 ]- g                                                                                                                                           **e ""a'       - 52.-02.-LGW c"*
   . _ .                                                     With one Emergency Exhaust System                    i         inoperable, fuel "t"                          movemen?^
                                                 . a.

the fuel +tcr:g: r :.: rr cr?-? c?e"?t ca Exhaust zir- ;: r:wmay proceed provided the CPERABLE Emergencyi S/ stem is in operation and discharging through at least one tr of HEPA filters and enarcoal adsorbers. uspen b 14q a 1 operations j g.OE-l.G With no Emergency Exhaust System OPERABLE,:re:: :r :r:n> b.

involving movement of fuel.within the ters;:fuel ster:g:r::s-until at least one

                                                              =:r:t!:n Emergency        at W    d: :::r Exha,             th: 'r!is. restored to CPERASLE status.

t System 2.O.? :nd 2.O.' r: n:t' : W i::b 4 r 12.-03 A

                                                               *he- y cv : :' r: :f Sp :i'ic:tfen:

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

                \                                                                                                                                       ted 4.9.13 The above required Emercency Exnaust Systems shall be demonsl CPERASLE:                                                                                            i ny.1 a q n f       l2 0-]_ L3        /

At least. once per 31 day.s er thro-"'~MG- crane ~I:~ SMter I - anc/checoab 0 or 4 :. teast ( 'f, - lf - Lr

a. /

rase n contrai rocm, fidwtna; .ne system operates

                                                                    'cstdeergandvert yi,3 10 continue hours with the heaters operating' ;                                      {Q 3.7.i3.2- 3]

l maintenance lZ-04-A b. At least once per 18 months, or (1) af ter any structura(2) following en the HEFA filter or enarcoal adscreer housings, ilation :one or i I painting. fire, or chemical release in any vent ! communicating with the system by: isfies the t nce 1 - g' ,'A'

1) Verifying that the E=ergency Exhaust quicanceSystem sa Regulatory criteria of less than 1% and uses tne test pr:cecure in Regulatory Positions C.S.a, C.5.c, and C.E.d flow rate of is Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Maren 1978, anc the system 90C0 cfm : IC" ;

3/4 9 '7

                           '-                       CALLAWAY - UNIT i

   - _ _ _            _ _ _ . -         _.        _             ._ _                     __           _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .                _-    ~      - - _ _ _

l l CHANGE NUMBER fL2fC DESCRIPTION m (($S 12 06 A This requirement would demonstrate the operability of each

     'C#                                                             train of the [ Emergency Exhaust System] (including maintaining negative pressure in the building). This is consistent with current practice. This change does not d                                                      result in a change to technical requirements and is
                                 -                                   consistent             ' C 3A-%

TacCW Q ev. 1. (~$17.lf2~A ( 12 07 LS 25 h pr se chan e wo ve ~ tR TES If l f om e 3 day R. is r resen s no angeinthef

                            '                                        fr      enc of t tin since he CT defi tion of STA ERE TEKT            S wo dh e req ired t stin                   ach f the wo                       ,

mer ncy haus Syst ] trai s ev y 31 ays an the

l [new$Srire ach tr in to 4t_e3 ed ev ry 31 ays.-

     ~; fli- . .:9 file ;_f. 't.":
           ..z 12 08                 LS 16       .
                                                               ~ The proposed change would allow the 18 month testing of the [ Emergency Exhaust System's] ability to maintain the
     #.+.,.___._._...                                      <..n       required pressure differential between the building and the outside atmosphere to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST eMCM, ..                      .-                     .;...- BASIS.

12 09 LG Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

12-10 LS;9 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 12 11 A The SR to measure [ Emergency Exhaust System] flow rate is not identified as a separate SR in the ITS because it is j t verified during the other in place filter tests (see ITS 5.5.11 a. and b.). This change does not result in a

                                                     -                 change to technical requirements.                                      g 12 12                 LS 26                Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison L                                       3               l_Q 3. 7. t.7. 2 - 3 (

hto 2[fthes nt u s oc tion,s dedgnpion fromRegion!to gion 2. /This/r' _

c. nge E91d1__Rev.

                                                                       ~                     _ . _                        [g g,t7- 3 A - 'M'd
                                                                                                                                            % 57.I7_.1-Il-14 02                     A                Changes the Applicability from "W7ieneveFTR a iated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool" to "Whenever anv i

fuel assembly is in Region 2 of the scent fuel poo[Iliy auct a re ytringent i frequ2remeryr wnly is ap np op);/a'te corisi nt with NUREG-1 . Rev. 1 14 03 LS 12 This change would delete the action requirements to suspend all other movement of fuel assemolies and crane 9 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

f l lI t l i 0 3.7.13.2 3 }l INSERT 3A 9a 4 This change deletes the required STB for the 31 day test. Since the EES 1s 12 07-LS 25 g f a two train system, the STB requirement forces a test of one or the other

         .E      '

train every 15 days. Each individual train will still be tested on a 31 day lli i frequency. These trains have been designed to be redundant and independent , of each other. Assuming a constant failure rate over time and no common k mode failure potential, the testing frequency is the most significant r_'** 'i."' - Therefore, since parameter in assuring that latent failures are detected. 15$$E?.J:.. . ~ the testing frequency would not be altered by this proposed change the

  -pr["                                             availability of the EES trains will not be adversely affected: and the Eai'Ef.'.
 --m          gry . :..j::- -                       proposed change is acceptable.

g: m- q.. r . . ; i - U~~ - .

  .s._
  - m.:

w:.o . . . + -

   .q 1               ~2e     -

i51" . .: qh._

       . :,. ; u.

mus g.e*.9'-

hMa '.es

s .Er . .. e9 8 g 4 l

                                                                                                                                         .m e-a-
                                                                                                   -     8
                                                                                               *MM m aiseumm-e WW
                                                                       -  e   e p y,gp ,

l

t ti I ; l L 1 0 3.7.13.2 3 INSERT 3A 9b 1 l 12 14 LG The details and description of the monthly SRs for train operability are ,

             -                                moved to the Bases. This is an example of rer.oving details that are not        !l required to be in TS and is consistent with MJREG 1431, Rev 1.                    1 l
                        *             '*A   .

e w qrue W W

                     .      g    og s e   ag.

i i i l I l l L

                                                                                                                             ~
                                                                                                                           ~

1 ~ ~ l - -+- - -~ ---- --~ - - l

           .-. .- . . - , .            .      _     . . -...~--      --

J'

                                                                                                                                                                                     /Mh
      - e v^                         !
                                       -4q7.7.n.2-yl g.

Mc g.: . .-f:r J .j.. , y 2-

                                                                                                                                                                  "\                    Page 7 of 8 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.9 42-43          %trst                 @ f.:r -7]

L -11

                                                                                                                               -                 APPLICABILITY TECil SPEC t

CllANGE WOLF CREEK CAltliWAY

                                      !                                                                   DIABLO CNiYON          lCOMANCilEPEAK NUMBER      DESCRIPTION Ye>                Yes Yes                     No - CPSES does not 12 11 lhe SR to measure [ Emergency Exhaust System] flow rate is                                                             have this A

not identified as a separate SR in the 115 because it is specification in verified during the ottier in-place filter tests (see ITS CIS 3/4.9. S_S.ll a. and b.). ! No - maintaining No - CPSES does not Yes Yes 12 12 1 hts change establishek appropriate ACIl0HS and Completion have this CTS. 15-26 Turcs for fuel Building pressure envelope degradation. specification in dd7.7,/7,/ CTS 3/4.9. 7 fM 36 Ho - not in CIS Ho - CPSES does not 'fes Yes O is placir; spent uel as eriiblR Q e) in;oRegi i2of[hesppotfuel ool an thangin stor e have this specification in Regio ( @pMi catio desi aa Qong from lle/Jion 1 CTS 3/4.9. Yes Yes No - already in CTS No - CPSES does not 1 02 Changes the Applicability from 'Whenever irradiated fuel have this assenblies are in the spent fuel pool" to ~Whenever any specification in ,Q fuel assembly 1.s in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool.- CIS 3/4.9. (G 17.17./-/ l Yes No - f.PSES does not Yes Yes 14 03 This change would delete the action requirements to w: pend have this 0 12 all other nwement of fuel assemblies and trane operations, specification in i CTS 3/4.9. Yes Yes Yes Mo CPSES does not 14 04 Deletes the action st ement requir ement to verify spent 1:4ve this LS 13 fuel pool baron concentration every 8 hours while action is 'pecification in being taken to relocatd noncomplying spent fuel assemblies j CIS 3/4.9. from Region 2 to Region 1. ,

                                                                                                                                     %. - CPSES does not       Yes - to USAR     Yes - to FSAR lhe requirement to keep records of the burnup analysis for les - to the Bases 14 05                                                                                                             '

hae- this LG all asseablies in Region 2 would be moved to a licensee specitiration in conti alled dacunent. CTS 3/4.9. No - CPSES does not No - not in CTS No - not in CIS Yes 14 06 The LCO for Region 2 is modified by referencing ITS 4.3.1.1 have this A of the Design Section. The information referenced in the specification in 115 is basically identical to the information contained in CIS 3/4.9 the esign section of the CIS S.6. ' FUEL STORAGE.' ther ef or e tWre are no technical changes. _ N I O!P,411,lhu FOMNil1 dlN I All! I filitRf ul lS --

t 4 - Q 3.7.13.2-3 e ! INSERT 38-7a APPLICABILITY TECH SPEC CHANGE DIABLO CANYON COMMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY i NUMBER DESCRIPTION PEAK No - Not in CTS No - Not in CTS Yes Yes 12-14 The details and description of the monthly SRs for train LG operability are moved to the Bases. l-i i 4 i

f i

I i l , 4 , n o wwrse ws-= y a+ a.m

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION NSHC LS 25 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION henD

      &               IMS6tf 4O                                                         FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL                                                IQ 7.711.

1 SPECIFICATIONS 2. - 3 eme o i ST BASIS hile ma' taining th testingfr[queny componen sys6em on a ST "ERED As dis ussed in th NRC's Safety L r,. 1.,l;b for in vidual unchanged l l , .; val ionReprtforj rains /cyponentPlant Vp le's TS fnversio , "the interyt of a req I ta iVto increase thenstrated r iabilityhat ofstagger the compp'nent or s stem being [e d testing s negligib ,

       .~                                                       f
                                                                                                                                                                            )

t sted. erednumberte' sting /f studies Te have d ,se anal ical and de erministic s ud mpact compo hat injn,nent staggere reliadility. testing a) is opera onally dif icult, (b) as shown negl gible i act on ost cas/ponent r liabilit . (c) is not as safety y gnificant m componentf such as di sel in' ially ught, ) introduces additi nal stress nt ly causi increas component ailure ratyd and compo generator potent system redundancy for testing wearout (e)'re ts in mor frequen reductions he number ,

            -      purpo    s, and i)l increa es the lik ihood of hyman error b[ increasing Ther fore, chanj;es of this ype are acc table.

of s, parate st evolu ns. testingrpquirements' the CTS h e been o tted cpordingl many of e stagger l Based o the NRC Safety Evalua on, remova of SfAGGE D l temthepnprovedT ould have egligible egative imp ct, and pot tial pos ive TEST BASIS testin mpact/on plant /afety. This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined th This determination has been involves no significant hazards consideration. l l performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) a below:

                             "The Cwmission may make a final determination. pursuant to the proce 50.91. that a proposed amenament to an operating license for a facility 1icensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing faci 1ity involves no significant hazards consideration would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the prcbability or consequences of accident previously evaluated; or 2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident frmt an -- -

          ~ ~ ~         ~                 accident previously evaluated:-or

3. Involve a signif1 cant reduction in a margin of safety.

The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significa hazards consideration standards: j 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluate 5/15/97 58 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

i O 3.7.13.2-3 1 INSERT 4-58a , The proposed change would eliminate the requirement to test multi-train / multi-component systems on a STB while maintaining the testing frequency for individual trains / components , unchanged. Individual trains of safety-related systems have been designed to be redurdant and independent of each other. Assuming a constant failure rate over time and no common mode failure potential, the testing frequency is the most significant parameter in assuring that latent failures are detected. Therefore, since the testing frequency would not be altered by this proposed change, the availability of individual trains and, therefore, system availability will not be , adversely affected. Furthermore the NRC has evaluated the potentialimpact of eliminating STB l l testing on a generic basis in its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) supporting TS Conversion for Plant Vogtle. The SER noted that a number of studies have concluded that STB testing has negligible impact on system reliability; and, in most cases, staggered testing is not as safety-significant as originally believed. These conclusions have been used to eliminate from NUREG-1431, Rev.1, many of the staggered testing requirements contained in earlier Standard , Technical Specifications. l

_ _ _ .. ._ . - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . m . . _ . _ _ _ __ _ _ ._ _ - _ _. _ __ _ . _ . _ . __ _ ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.13.2-4 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.7.b.3; CTS 4.9.13.b.3; INSERT K for Callaway ITS SR 3.7.13.4 and SR 3.7.13.5 DOC (3.7) 10-17-A DOC (3.9) 12-11-A JFD 3.7-49 CTS 4.7.7.b.3 and CTS 4.9.13.b.3 verify a system flow rate (s) of (6000/9000] cfm i 10% at least once per 18 months. This CTS requirement is not retained in ITS SR 3.7.13.4 or SR 3.7.13.5. l Comment: ITS SRs 3.7.13.4 and 3.7.13.5 should state the required flow rate for each train for the HEPA filters to be effective and to preserve the integrity of the HEPA filter at the specified flow rate range of i 10%. JFD 3.7-49 states that the " makeup flow rate requirement"is deleted when there is none stated in the CTS or ITS. There are numerous CTS train flow rate requirements which must, be met via the ITS SRs 3.7.13.4 and 5 to achieve the required building negative pressure. Adopt the STS SR requirement , or explain in more detail why this is not required. Provide a new or revised CTS DOC, a l revised CTS markup and a new or revised JFD, as appropriate for these CTS changes. ; FLOG RESPONSE: l JFD 3.7-49 has been revised to delete the word " makeup." However, there is no need to include the flow rates in the surveillance requirements for Section 3.7 because the required flow rates for filter train testing, with appropriate tolerances from CTS, are incorporated into the Ventilation Filter Testing Program in ITS Section 5.5.11. Therefore, I other than the above mentioned change to JFD 3.7-49, no changes to DOCS or markups I are necessary. ; l ATTACHED PAGES: l Encl. 6A 7 Encl. 6B 6 I 1

l I l C-ANGE WMR JUSTIFICATION l the design of the Emergency Exhaust System. This is acceptable because l it reflects the plant specific design of the system which has different I modes of operation for mitigating radiological releases in the auxiliary building following a LOCA and the fuel building following a FHA. 2L7-45 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 2 7-46 Revised to delete " irradiated fuel assemblies seated in" the storage racks since the accident analysis assumes that a fuel assembly is lying on top of the fuel storage racks. This change is made to conform to the BASES and APPLICABILITY for NURLG 1431. The top of the fuel rack is approximately 1 foot above the top of the seated fuel assembly. 2 .7-47 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 2 7-48 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). py 2 .7-49 The requirement to verify a flow rate during the tests demonstrating the capability to maintain [ auxiliary and fuel) building differential pressure below atmospheric pressure would be deleted. The current licensing basis of the plant is to be able to maintain a i negative pressure [in the fuel building) with respect to the outside ) atmosphere. 2 .7 50 Not applicable to Callaway, See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). , 2.7 51 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table p6 ", # I 4 (Enclosure 68). 2.7-52 -ht xd tJck gelicthe b

b#

                          %deswe. led 2 7 53             Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68).                          -

2 7-54 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comprison Table (Enclosure 68).

2. -56 This change creates a new SR for the MSIVs and [HFIVs] to distir.guish between the IST and the automatic actuation testing of these isolation valves. The surveillance allows credit for an actual actuation, if one occurs, to satisfy the surveillance requirements. These changes are (y,%

consistent witdMMal [Although SRs 3.7.2.2 and 3.7.3.2 are new SRs. they may be parformed in conjunction with SRs 3.7.2.1 and 3.'7.3.1.

    -                      Therefore, the note allowing testing to be performed in MODE 3 is also S           D       needed for these new SRs. Refer to 3.7 25 for a related change.)

T' TIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 7 5/15/97

m _ -__ ._ _ . . - __ . . ..

                                                                       -'i
                                                                             'h  j l                 !                    C           t 't.                te        e       i se-  .,'            n r                        "t                                                               d

ji ,j . U ! ,j 2, S J P l t

                                                                                                                                                                                                              ,h fj                   l[ h + );[                   h                l 4

ahl+~.u~m

                                                                                      ...a                . . . -.-. _ a u w              -

a :. f w.. + .a. . - 1 - APPL.itAull.llY - t ILCll 'il'LC tilAllGt , DIABLO CANYON COMANCilE PEAK WOLF CREEK CAllAWAY NUMBER DESCRIPTION . This change would revise ITS 3.7.13 to add a note to the NO: fuel building '- NO: CTS does not YES YES 3.7 44 applicability and change the conditions, required ACTIONS ventilation not require this - and SRs to conform to the design of the Esergency Exhaust required for post ,' specification.' LOCA leakage. . System. > YES , NO . NO 3.7-45' ITS 3.7.15 1s revised to be CPSES specific to address the N0 t

i~

two spent fuel pools and the in containment storage racks. NO: ITS is YES NO: ITS is YES 3.7-46 Revised to delete " irradiated fuel asseoblies seated in" since accident analysis assumes fuel asseably lying on top consistent with .'i consistent with CTS.

                                                                                                                                                             .         CTS.

of the fuel storage ' racks. This change adds 15'3.7.19 a safety chilled water system NO YES ' '; N0 i NO 3.7 47 . which is in the CPSES CTS. YES - NO N0 This change adds TS 3.7.20. aa llPS INAC system which is in HQ 3.7-48 the CPSES CTS. ! J Q 3,7,fy,2-4_/ YES YES The requirenent to verify -pp flow rate during the YES NO: see CH 3.7-38. 3.7-49 tests denonstrating the capa y to maintain [ auxiliary and fuel] building differential pressure below atmospheric pressure would be deleted. The current licensing basis of the plant is to be able to maintain a negative pressure [in the fuel building) with respect to the cutside atmosphere. . YES NO NO NO 3.7-50 The CTS DCPP specific ADY surveillance that verifles the back-up air bottle pressure once per 24 hours is retained. YES NO i 4- NO NO 3.7-51 A new spent fuel pool stor' age specification is created for Il Region 1 fuel storage due to unique storage requirements .. at DCPP. N/A N/A ,- N/A N/A 3.7-52 NOT USED. NO NO N0 YES . 3.7-53 ITS 3.7.16 for DCPP is revised to be consistent with the current licensing basis and CTS. ;

                                                                                                                        "                                                                                    c /' c '07 rruntrncinis rotipAPIRnN T Ani r              HtlRFfi-1431

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.13.2-5 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: CTS 4.7.7.b.1 & 2; d.2 & 3 and CTS 4.9.13.d.2 & 3 ITS SR 3.7.13.3, SR 3.7.13.4 and ITS SR 3.7.13.5 DOC (3.9) 12-06-A i CTS 4.7.7.b.1 & 2, d.2 & 3 and CTS 4.9.13.d.2 & 3 require at least once per 18 months that the EES " System"is actuated and that the " required building" negative pressure is achieved. ITS SR 3.7.13.3, SR 3.7.13.4 and ITS SR 3.7.13.5 require the same except each " train" is verified rather than the " system". Comment: The CTS changes should be the changing of " system" to " train", identifJng the " correct" building and specifying the mode of operation which produces the required negative pressure. These CTS changes are not identified in most of the CTS locations. l The proposed ITS SRs appear to be acceptable; however, all the changes to CTS l requirements must be identified. Revise the CTS markups. l 5: LOG RESPONSE: 1 With respect to these specifications, there is no difference between " system" and " train". The difference between the CTS and ITS wording is strictly a format issue. As discussed ; in the response to Comment Number Q 3.7.1-1, a generic DOC was initiated and applied to each LCO to address format changes between the CTS and ITS. l The mark-up of CTS 4.7.7.b.1 and 4.7.7.b.2 should not be revised to indicate the correct l building or to specify the mode of operation, because the flow is through the same filter and adsorbers regardless of the modt of operation (SIS or FBVIS). The response to Comment Number Q 3.7.13.2-1 describes that the mark-up to CTS 4.7.7.d.2 was revised to be consistent with ITS SR 3.7.13.4 as requested. See the attached pages to Comment Number Q 3.7.13.2-1. The mark up of CTS 4.9.13.d.2 and 4.9.13.d.3 is covered by DOC 12-06-A in Attachment No.15, CTS 3/4.9. In this case, there is no technical difference between the editorial use of " system" or "each train" or "one train". Again this wording preference is non-technical, an issue of format, and within the discussion of the response to Comment Number O 3.7.1-1. ATTACHED PAGES: None

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.13.2-7 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.9.13.d.2 [g.2] ITS SR 3.7.13.3 DOC (3.9)12 ww-LSw For Callaway, CTS 4.9.13.d.2; and for WCGS CTS 4.9.13.g.2; each respectively require at least once per 18 months that the EES " System" is actuated on an actual or simulated test signal. lTS SR 3.7.13.3 requires the same except this SR does not contain the surveillance details which are moved to the Bases. Comment: The ITS SR 3.7.13.5 i.s acceptable; however, the CTS markup does not identify this movement of the CTS requirements to the ITS Bases for SR 3.7.13.3. A new DOC in Chapter 3.9 similar to DOC (3.7)10-6-LG in Chapter 3.7 could be used in this case to identify this "less restrictive" technical change. Revise the CTS markup and provide new DOCS as appropriate. FLOG RESPONSE: When the EES is initiated by a Safety injection Signal, it automatically aligns itself in the SIS mode of operation. When the EES is initiated by a Spent Fuel Pool Gaseous Radioactivity High signal, it aligns itself in the FBVIS mode of operation. Surveillance details for the FBVIS actuation function,4.9.13.d.2 (Callaway) and 4.9.13.g.1 (WCGS), have been moved to the Bases using DOC (3.9) 12-05 TR-1. This DOC identifies the specific actuation signal that initiates the system in the FBVIS mode. The details regarding compor,ent functions to align the filter train to the Fuel Building and isolate the Auxiliary Building are considered to be included in DOC (3.9) 12-06-A. This change is considered administrative and not LG (less restrictive) because the system alignment for the FBVIS is fixed; there is no choice among different alignments once the system operating mode is selected. Therefore, the system alignment details from the surveillance requirement are fixed by the system design, and the proposed change is not technical in nature. ATTACHED PAGES: None

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.13.2-8 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.7 ITS 3.7.13 Action A and D JFD 3.7-07 ITS 3.7.13 Actions A and D both cover one EES train inoperable. Action A is for , Modes 1,2,3, and 4 and Action D is "During the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies". Comment: The original STS text appears to be the same as these ITS Conditions are now modified with this JFD. The ITS appears to be acceptable; however, the concern about the EES remaining in standby is not apparent. Explain in more depth the technical problem and the need for this deviation from the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: CTS 3.9.13 ACTIONS do not allow 7 days to restore an inoperable EES train to OPERABLE status before starting the OPERABLE EES train. Upon determining that one train is inoperable, sel handling may proceed provided the redundant train is placed in operation. ITS 3.7.13 Required Actions would permit the 7-day period with one train inoperable. Therefore, as discussed in JFD 3.7-07, the OPERABLE train could have remained idle during the 7-day Allowed Outage Time while movi1g irradiated fuel in the Fuel Building. ATTACHED PAGES: None

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.13.2-9 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3/4.7.7 STS SR 3.7.13.5 DOC (3.7) or (3.9) 12-yy-LSy

 'q                JFD (3.7)-qq STS SR 3.7.13.5 requires verification that each EES filter bypass damper can be closed.

The CTS does not contain a similar requirement. Comment: There is no JFD provided to explain why this SR is not adopted in ITS 3.7.13. Provide an explanation to justify not adopting the STS. FLOG RESPONSE: The EES filter trains have no bypass dampers at Callaway and WCGS. Therefore, this bracketed information in ITS was struck-through. ATTACHED PAGES: None l l

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.13.2-10 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.13 Action a and b ITS 3.7.13 Actions A and B I DOC (3.9) 12-02-LG

in CTS 3.9.13 Actions a and b, with one FHBVS train inoperable, fuel movement and

  ;         " crane operation with loads over the spent fuel pool" can proceed within limitations; and, f         with two FHBVS trains inoperable, fuel movement and " crane operation with loads over 1

l [' the spent fuel pool" are suspended. Comment: The DOC states the phrase " crane operations with loads over the spent fuel pool"is removed from the ITS but there is no location for where this CTS requirement is to be found. Revise this DOC to provide this additional discussion. FLOG RESPONSE: l In the FLOG TS Conversion submittals, Enclosure 3B has been used to designate the specific Licensee Controlled Document to which moved / relocated information will be moved. For DOC (3.9) 12-02-LG, the information will be moved to the FSAR/USAR for each applicable plant. l ATTACHED PAGES: ! None l i

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.15-1 APPLICABILITY: DC, CP, WC, CA : l REQUEST: CTS 3.9.10[11), Applicability l ITS 3.7.15 Applicability and Licensee Controlled Documents DOC (3.9) 11-01-LG CTS 3.9.10[11] is Applicable whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the (spent) fuel

  . .y       pool. ITS 3.7.15 is Applicable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the (spent] fuel pool.

Comment: The CTS change appears to be acceptable as proposed in the ITS 3.7.15 markup; however, there is no explanation pertaining to what is actually relocated to the Licensee Controlled Documents. This appears to be a "LS" category change rather than an "LG" change. Revise the DOC, or provide a new DOC and revise the CTS markup, as necessary, for the appropriate change category and technical justification required for this CTS change. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC 11-01-LG was revised during the Section 3.9 review in response to Comment Number Q 3.9-21. ATTACHED PAGES: None j l l l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.15-2 APPLICAE'lLITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.11 Action b ITS 3.7.15 Note to Required Action A.1 DOC (3.9) 14-10-A CTS 3.9.11 Action b states "The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable". ITS 3.7.15 has a Note to Required Action A.1 which states that only "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable." Comment: The DOC for this CTS change provides inadequate technicaljustification to explain why this administrative change is acceptable. Provide a revise DOC that contains this technical discussion. FLOG RESPONSE: A Reviewer's Note in STS LCO 3.0.4 states: "LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. Before this version of LCO 3.0.4 can be implemented on a plant specific basis, the licensee must review the existing technical specifications to determine where specific restrictions on MODE changes or Required Actions should be included in individual LCOs to justify this change; such an evaluation should be summarized in a matrix of all existing LCOs to facilitate NRC staff review of a conversion to the STS." Based on this Reviewer's Note, a matrix of this evaluation was placed in the NSHC LS-1 in Enclosure 4 of the Section 3.0 package (Attachment No. 6). The matrix shows that no LCO 3.0.4 note is needed because the Required Action is to exit the Applicability by suspending fuel movement for LCO 3.7.15 and by moving the noncomplying fuel for LCO 3.7.17. DOC 14-10-A is revised to state:

             "The statement that 3.0.4 is not applicable is deleted. LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. LCO 3.0.4 is deleted because the Required Action is to exit the Applicability by suspending fuel movement. Transitions into MODES or other specified conditions of Applicability involving movement of fuel or initiating CORE ALTERATIONS were considered as not requiring a LCO 3.0.4 note if the immediate action was to suspend these activities. This change is considered an administrative change based on the changes to ITS LCO 3.0.4 and does not affect an operatino limit or how the plant is operated."

ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.15 CTS 3/4.9 - ITS 3.9 Encl.3A 10

CHANGE NUMBER HSHC DESCRIPTION

 +n
 ";itj                                                             operations. This change is consistent with NUREG 1431,
 %K-                   -          , ,-

Rev. 1. 1

              ... 14 04                 LS-13                   Deletes the action statement requirement to verify spent
         ..                                                        fuel pool boron concentration every 8 hours while action
     '?                                                            is being taken to relocate noncomplying spent fuel J '" '                                                        assemblies from Region 2 to Region 1. This change is                                         I consistent with NUREG 1431. Rev.1.
                                                                        .ThisGY Yh -10j),.
                                                                             ~

[Q '3.7. I7. t-+ (

       --'~~ 14 05                        LG                             q0 reme D to                      so        e u         an      1 1 ass      lie in Re on 2              uld       relo ted t a l cens      co rolled doc             t. T s cha e is            nsis nt 1: e. ~.
                            .O_ ,[.'.. ... .. . . .     . . . .

ith UREG 431, v. 1. nd mo es re ireme s tha do fr nel the 14 06 A Not applicable to CDisfay. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B).

   .32.. ._',14

07 pg .

(A hA -_ /0/) 4 3.7. /7. /-d

                                                                                                                       @ 3'7'IM ~

14 08 / t.G. u dr 'DlfMM

     .               14 09                  -

Not used. ,y , , g_ z ~1.1- 3 ) 14 10 A staf .an+ that .0.4 's no appli abie [ dele /ed. T 's change 's co siste t wit NURE 1431,/ R ev.1/. Th's han ' doe not esul in a hange o tech ic 1 e ir ts. 15 01 R Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 10 5/15/97

Q 3.7.15-2, Q 3.7.17.'i-3 INSERT 3A-10a The statement that 3.0.4 is not applicable is deleted. LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. LCO 3.0.4 is deleted because the Required Actions is to exit the Applicability by suspending fuel movement. Transitions into MODES or other specified conditions of Applicability involving movement of fuel or initiating CORE ALTERATIONS were considered as not requiring a LCO 3.0.4 note if the immediate action was to suspend these activities. This change is considered an administrative change based on the changes to ITS LCO 3.0.4 and does not affect an operating limit or how the plant is operated. 9 4 1

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION No: Q 3.7.16-3 APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.12. Action b (for Callaway and WCGS) STS 3.7.16 JFD 3.7-dd I STS 3.7.16, Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration, was not adopted. I Comment: There is no detailed explanation for why this STS LCO was not adopted. Also, see Comment 3.7.17.1.-2 of ITS 3.7.17. FLOG RESPONSE: ITS 3.7.16 is a bracketed specification in the STS and per the STS conversion , methodology would not be required to be adopted unless it already existed in the CTS (as I was the case for DCPP). Callaway, CPSES and WCGS do not have this specification in - their CTS. For CPSES, the NRC SER for the high density rack License Amendment (LA 46/32) ; concluded that normal plant procedures were sufficient to assure boron concentration in the spent fuel pool. ' 1 Callaway and WCGS are further evaluating STS 3.7.16, Fuel Storage Pool Boron ! Concentration and CTS 3.9.12, Action b, in conjunction with the CTS license amendment request for reracking of the Spent Fuel Pool. An additional response to Comment Number Q 3.7.16-3 and Q 3.7.17.1-2 will be provided by November 6,1998. ATTACHED PAGES: ! None l i

i t ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.17.1-1 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.12, Applicability ITS 3.7.17, Applicability DOC (3.9) 14-02-M CTS 3.9.12, Applicability states "Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool" and ITS 3.7.17, Applicat5iy states "Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool". Comment: The change in the CTS Applicability provides an additional limitation which restricts the LCO to only apply if "any fuel assembly is in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool". Previously, the LCO applied to both Regions 1 and 2. The "more restrictive" determination is not justified with the technical explanation provided. Regardless, since fuel assemblies are already in storage, this is a technical administrative change to standardize requirements for the verifications of fuel composition and burnup history, currently performed, prior to loading into Region 2 of the spent fuel pool. Revise the DOC, or provide a new DOC and revise the CTS markup, as necessary, for the appropriate change category and technicaljustification required for this CTS change. FLOG RESPONSE: DOC (3.9) 14-02-M has been changed DOC (3.9) 14-02-A. The revised DOC reads:

        " Changes the Applicability from 'Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool' to 'Whenever any fuel assembly is in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool.' This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1. On balance, the change is considered to be administrative because (1) both the CTS LCO and the ITS LCO require the same actions upon storing spent fuelin Region 2 of the spent fuel pool and (2) the proposed change to the Applicability would not impose any new requirements beyond those currently being performed."

ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.15 CTS 3/4.9 - ITS 3.9 Encl. 3A 9 Encl. 3B 7

M GE HUMBER HSHC DESCRIPTIO8

 $m1.n12 06                                         A,                                This requirement would demonstrate the operability of each O -                                                                               train of the [ Emergency Exhaust System] (including m .a. .                                                                           maintaining negative pressure in the building). This is cf-@                                                                               consistent with current practice. This change does not 3Gji.N .-                                                                           result in a change to technical requirements and is S$2.r.)                  --

consistent ith NHREr, ev. 1. y f,' g - Isett-' 3 A -%,, [4 5.7./J.2 - 3l

g. 12 07 LS 25 h p. s chan e wo ve - tR TE I

  .w _-.e     ..~t,..                 .

f om e 3 -day . is r resen s no ange in the fr enc of t tin since he CT defi 'tio of STA

m. . . T S wo dh e req ired t sting each f the wo . . , , ,,

                                     .                                                     r ncy          aus Syst ] trai s ev y 31 ays an the pduG:y.d. ; ,y.-                               -?        .       ..c..:H new                S re ire ach tr in to e te _ed_ev_ry 31 ays.                                                     .
      .w ;                        ..         s 3

12-08 LS 16 . The proposed change would allow the 18-month testing of

                                                                  -                   the [ Emergency Exhaust System's] ability to maintain the
  . . . -        ....t..             . .                               -

required pressure differential between the building and . a4 - .the outside atmosphere to be performed on.a STAGGERED TEST

     .- . .- --r           . r .w                -s,:       ..2... .,.g.^

BASIS. # * ' " - " - 12 09 LG Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversi6n Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 12 10 LS 9 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). 12 11 A The SR to measure [ Emergency Exhaust System] flow rate is not identified as a separate SR in the ITS because it is verified during the other in place filter tests (see ITS 5.5.11 a. and b.). This change does not result in a change to technical requirements. g g,j 12 12 LS 26 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison

                                                                                                                                                                 *b"""f 3A-%

fl 14 01 . LG-T l' il 1 7 O 3. 7, n. 2 - 3 l 6 w f. Q,cT el assembiies

                                                                                       ~ to egi n 2 ftes nt uel                                    cl nd changi [g st6f rag oc tio       de ign ion fr                     Re 'on;          to[egion2.jThi
 ---                       -.           . . . _ . . _                                cpnge      5, c, n,s,i    ent_it _NUR                     -14 1_ Rev. 1M~ Q 7.7.17. l-l]

[ DJf&t.T 3A-% 14 02 yA Changes the Applicability from "Wninever 1rraciated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool" to "Whenever any fuel assembi is in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool. ic requjr.. wh1 is ap np_opr / ate,and cp s ydi.tngfafataforeptringenti NUJtEG 1_ . R. 1 14 03 LS 12 This change would delete the action requirements to suspend all other movement of fuel assemblies and crane DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 9 5/15/97

i. i l Q 3.7.17.1-1 INSERT 3A-9c This change is consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1. On balance, the change is considered to be administrative because (1) both the CTS LCO and the ITS LCO require the same actions upon storing spent fuelin Region 2 of the spent fuel pool and (2) the proposed change to the l . Applicability would not impose any new requirements beyond those currently being performed. t l , w-l l \ 1 1 l I l l I i

I 2 -l+ 2dsiAT 3 Wic 9 3.7. s1. 2- 3 l ;

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    . h.

s2-t3 - E tt r t-23 , ^-~ ~ -> [qES-7[ CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE ' CURRENT TS 3/4.9 E # '. 7:!f,N N! .* P Page 7 of 8

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  . Rctynjh g:      4                                    . p:. 3                                                               ,...

t TECil SPEC CHANGE - 4 46 1-APPLICABILITY?: S';..;- . NUllBER DESCRIPTION = DIABLO CANYON ' COMANCHE PEAK : WOLF CREEK. CALLAWAY

                                                                                                                                                                                        #3                                                        .                                                            ,

12 11 The SR to measure ((merhency Exhaust System] flow rate is Yes Ho CPSES does not Yes Yes ,,.,, A not identified as a sep'arate SR in the 115 because it is have this , .

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ?                                          ;

verified during the other in place filter tests (see 115 ,

                                                                                                                                                                                        . specification in                                                                                                     J
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ~

S.5.11 a. and b.). I CTS 3/4.9. r 12-12 This change establishesiappropriate ACTIONS and Conpletion Yes No - CPSES does not Yes No - maintaining 15 26 TimesforfuelBuilding}pressureenvelopedegradation. have this ': CTS.

                                                                                                                                                                                         . specification in -                                                                                                                                              f
                  -rJr FAJ- 'JIS P1.F -4 O 7.7.17. / -O                                                                                                                                   CTS 3/4,9,                                               : ,

40( , ele

             , 45 the es ri ions placir spent uel 'as niblie                                                                                         No - not in CTS                      Ho - CPSES does not                                                  Yes                      Yes At       in Regi i 2 of he sp t fuel . I an changi                                              stor e                                                                                  have this                                                 i L(r        catio     esi ia ion from R ion 1                 Regio                                                                                                                     specification in CTS 3/4.9.                                                j' t

1 02 Changes the Applicabili}y from *%enever irradiated fuel No - already in CTS No - CPSES does'not Yes Yes f(A assemblies are in the spent fuel pool

to 'Whenever any fuel assembiv is in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool.'

have this !- specification lir ! i G '3.7.17./-/ ; , CTS 3/4.9. [ t I 14 03 This change would delete the action requirements to suspend Yes No - CPSES does not Yes Yes l LS 12 all other trovement of fuel assemblies and crane operations. have this . !

                                      ,                                                                                                                                                   specification in
                                      ,                                                                                                                                                   CTS 3/4.9.                                                                                                                                                        -

14 04 Deletes the action statement requirement to verify spent Yes No - CPSES does not Yes Yes LS-13 fuel pool boron concent have this i beingtakentorelocate(ationevery8hourswhileactionis noncomplying spent fuel assemblies specification in,; from Region 2 to Region 1. - CTS 3/4.9. I i 14-05 The requirement to keep records of the burnup analysis for Yes - to the Bases No - CPSES does'not Yes - to LISAR Yes to FSAR LG all assenblies in Region 2 would be moved to a licensee have this

                                       '                                                                                                                                                                                              : {3 controlled document.                                                                                                                                                           specific 91on in i                                                                                                                                                  CTS 3/4.5 14 06     The LCO for Region 2 is modified by referencing ITS 4.3.1.1                                                                                Yes                                 No - CPSES does not                                                 ilo - not in CTS A         of the Design Section. The'information referenced in the                                                                                                                                                                                                                    No - not in CTS have this ITS is basically identical to the information contained in                                                                                                                    specification in the design section of the CIS 5.6.               TtKL S10 RAGE.'                                                                                                              CTS 3/4.9 therefore there are no technical changes.                                                                                                                                                                                                 ,

b C0!!VfR510ll CollPARIS0ll TAlli.E ' CllRRfilT TS " ' - - ' - ' t

                 ..      ._.               _    - - - __.._         _ . . _ _ . - . _ - _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . . . _ . . - _ _ _ . . _ _ = _ - - . _ - . _ - . _ _ . . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ -               _ _ _ - _ . _ _ . - _ - . _ - _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ _ . _ _                        -__.___-_-._.e_-____-_-_.                           . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEE'i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.17.1 2 ' APPLICABILITY: CP, WC, CA , REQUEST: CTS 3.9.12, Action a ITS 3.7.17 DOC (3.9) 14-04-LS13 With the fuel assembly storage requirements not met, CTS 3.9.12 Action a requires the

         " boron concentration of the spent fuel pool to be verified 2 2000 ppm at least once per 8 hours". This CTS action is not retained in ITS 3.7.17.

Comment: The DOC states this action is consistent with the STS which is incorrect. , The STS has an LCO for spent fuel pool boron concentration requirements which has not I been adopted. The STS 3.7.16 serves the same purpose as this CTS Action a requirement which is to ensure the double contingency principle is maintain for the fuel storage requirements. These requirements are clearly stated in the STS Bases for both STS 3.7.16 and ITS 3.7.17 which are dependent upon one another.' This CTS l requirement shall be retained by adopting the STS 3.7.16. (For CPSES, recently l approved LAR 94-22, TXX-94325 provides a current licensing basis for spent fuel storage and spent fuel boron concentration. However, CPSES should still adopt STS 3.7.16.) Revise the DOC, or provide a new DOC and revise the CTS markup, as necessary, for the appropriate change category and technical justification required to retain this CTS l requirement. (Also, see Comment 3.7.16.-3 of ITS 3.7.16) FLOG RESPONSE: For CPSES, Callaway, and WCGS, see response to Comment 3.7.16-3. ATTACHED PAGES: None

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.17.1-3 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 3.9.12 Action b ITS 3.7.17 Note to Required Action A.1 DOC (3.9) 14-10-A CTS 3.9.12 Action b states "The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable". ITS 3.7.17 has a Note to Required Action A.1 which states that only "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable." Comment: The DOC for this CTS change provides inadequate technicaljustification to explain why this administrative change is acceptable. Provide a revised DOC that contains this technical discussion. FLOG RESPONSE: A Reviewer's Note in STS LCO 3.0.4 states: "LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. Before this version of LCO 3.0.4 can be implemented on a plant-specific basis, the licensee must review the existing technical specifications to determine where specific restrictions on MODE changes or Required Actions should be included in individual LCOs to justify this change; such an evaluation should be summarized in a matrix of all existing LCOs to facilitate NRC staff review of a conversion to the STS." Based on this Reviewer's Note, a matrix of this evaluation was placed in the NSHC LS-1 in Enclosure 4 of the Section 3.0 package (Attachment No. 6). The matrix shows that no LCO 3.0.4 note is needed because the Required Action is to exit the Applicability by suspending fuel movement for LCO 3.7.15 and by moving the noncomplying fuel for LCO 3.7.17. DOC 14-10-A is revised to state:

      "The statement that 3.0.4 is not applicable is deleted. LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are part of a shutdown of the unit shall not be prevented. In addition, LCO 3.0.4 has been revised so that it is only applicable for entry into a MODE or other specified conditions in the Aprilicability in MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The MODE change restrictions in LCO 3.0.4 were previously applicable in all MODES. LCO 3.0.4 is deleted oecause the Required Action is to exit the Applicability by suspending fuel movement. Transitions into MODES or other specified conditions of Applicability involving movement of fuel orinitiating CORE ALTERATIONS were considered as not requiring a LCO 3.0.4 note if the immediate action was to suspend these activities. This change is considered an administrative change based on the changes to ITS LCO 3.0.4 and does not affect an operating limit or how the plant is operated."

ATTACHED PAGES: See attached pages in response to Comment Number Q 3.7.15-2.

_ _ _ __ .- _ _ _ _ ~ _.___ -__ __._ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.17.1-4 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA REQUEST: CTS 4.9.12 ITS 3.7.17 or Licensee Controlled Documents DOC (3.9) 14-05-LG CTS 4.9.12 requires specific verification steps to be completed prior to placing a fuel assembly in Region 2 and a record kept for the time period in storage. ITS SR 3.7.17 does not retain these requirements. Comment: Issue #1 - These CTS requirements are relocated to Licensee Controlled Documents that are not identified. Generic DOC "LG"is inadequate because there is no technicaljustification provided for the removal of these CTS requirements. Issue #2 - The first sentence of CTS 4.9.12 should be addressed in this DOC. Provide a description of how this sentence is treated in the conversion of CTS requirements. Revise the DOC or provide a new DOC and a revised CTS markup which is appropriate for this CTS change. FLOG RESPONSE: Issue #1: In the FLOG TS Conversion submittals, Enclosure 3B has been used to designate the specific Licensee Controlled Document to which moved / relocated information will be moved. For DOC (3.9) 14-05-LG, the information will be moved to the Callaway FSAR and the WCGS USAR. In addition, DOC 14-05-LG has been enhanced to provide additionaljustification for this change. Issue #2: To address this issue, a new DOC 14-08-LG was prepared to move to a licensee controlled document the requirement to independently verify the burnup. This requirement will be located in the Bases for SR 3.7.17.1. ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.15 CTS 3/4.9 and ITS 3.9 Encl. 2 3/4 9-15 Encl.3A 10 Encl. 3B 8 Att. No.13 CTS 3/4.7 and ITS 3.7 Encl. SB B 3.7-91 I 4

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    , ~ - - - . ,

( mm\ ..

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              \
                                                                                                                                                                 *                                                               \

j O

                                     ~                                                                                                                                                                      N8 joy                        y RLFULLlHG OPERATIONS us:- "'                                 3/4.9.17 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE---

l l

w. 1 M/ LIMIT!HG CONDITION FOR OPERATION

     . ::. r2 ~.s-u +.s:.
  .s. - rREl-l"1. -3.9.12 Spent fuel assemblies stored in Region 2 shall be subject to the 4   .gW^m                                                                                                                                                                                                                            I.G 3.7.17.l- T l
  '.?@               ; .. . ..f ollowing conditions:
        .s.                                 .
        . . =:= ww .s . . . The combination of initial enrichraent and cumulative exposure shall                     .

g AL9 .c..s. .,. 4.: . 2 be within the acceptable domain of Figure 3.9-1, and 9 '1' be ?! ?ced 4a<-e, 0.egica 2, aer th:19 ,y-,m

         -. v             .              .            E.          M: : pert 'u:! 2 s.                              : -h'!::
                                                                                                                          ,. w . . ,, s a- ,u.4-                    o4ee                     s . 4 m,,

4 ,, o o,,, 4 ,, -

1 -- ---, + 4 ;. -- -- -- r::::- ;.n . . . , , -- - ,. v

                                                                                                                           -----c-

r: ' pr;;res;. N-01 M

                                                                                     -~e.:gier                          2, rh'!: r:ft:!'n; ;;:rsti:r:
  . . .  ~ '
                                           .    .._2;           ,--::!n; .

r g y,7,fy,g b l

        .g r .. . ;.;; .APPLICABILITY:         _..,.,.                                                                                     ,
                                                                                                                                                           !:-h7 4:         ""e-in the spe'nt fuel Whenever 4rradf:t d f r ?                                                                                                                                      l -07.-H PUCI.
     ..                                                                       Zd                                                                                                           I *m.2-a,. ACTION:                              sM1b                                , , . . .              -~-
  "w.:&%A#dy.y.r;a.&4 f e.y . . . m With the requiremerits of the above specificat on not sa:nd cren; aper;tigas-i                    tisfied, N-O,o-$ .     !
      -           --          - . ~ . . .
                                                       ... , urp:rd :!' ether'r th: ft:1;;::rt           :t:rs;:      f fOr    t:1:::::::blic:

Ord .:; th: n r :::plyir.; f;;7-l 4-r!th !::d: L'n t i ' th::: re aci r;r.:nt: ;f th; ;;,gve f,;',

                                                                  -::::d!':: t:                        ":gi;r             1.::ti:#i:d,             ber;n 00^ter.tr: tier ;f the spe,i; spec 4'4c:*4 ea ::

ue 4'4ed ta be gre ! - t*.ra er equ 1 te -2000 pp- :t

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            - q_g.g i   ~,j                                                            _ pee 1 ch:11 h-

2. s j .

                                                                      < ... --,.                -e                  w ..,           _g
                                                        *                                     [.no_E d U- self@9                              f                  fi.d+.keposI.)w not applicable.                                                 g,jg A       (

n 2.0.'

                     , p.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3,0.3 is f

1 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS { Q 7.7,17.l- + Q ' Re ion 2 shall be ly.-C[-ffy 4.9.12 The burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored i veys.pe g p'r ascertained by analysis of* its burnup history a _ ja1 _ . _ . ' 5: K:pt to storage in Reg'on 2. ,

? :t:? re :-d "' re " cr2.yr' '- e.:g'cr ef th: :;, ::

pr-t 'e:' 2:: mb'y -:.:!-:

                                               "     Li           ,    -! n **:t              t*

d LSo

. -. ~ - ' ~ -- - . . _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . . _, _ _ - . . . . _,

i i 3/4 9-15 CALLAWAY - UN}T 1

CHANGE NUMBER EJC DESCRIPTION

  .e,.
  .h.d. .- .--., p. .,,,.- ,        .

operations. This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev. 1.

           '.': 14 04                                 LS 13                       Deletes the action statement requirement to verify spent
    ;. . 4 2. . "
       .                                                                          fuel pool boron concentration every 8 hours while action
    'i[~'

m' is being taken to relocate noncomplying spent fuel assemblies from Region 2 to Region 1. This change is l consistent wi_th _NUREG 1431. Rev. 1. ~ FQ '3 717 I-+ l

             '                                                       '                       . T als N I $ h_- t O h D-
        - - - - 14 J05 ""* LG                                                                                  nt To h             5o                 e u                     an      1
                                .. . , ,.... .. ... .                     .          1 ass lie in,Re on 2                         uld b relo ted t a
         ' .f. '         . ,. 4 1 cens              co rolled doc            t. T s chapge is nsistent
     ..... , ~ .
                           . f: .. .-

ith UREG- 431 v. 1. nd mo es r lireme s tha do the

                                       . .                                                                                                ~
                                                                                       .                                  .f7 .nc 14 06                          A                           Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison J.                              ,

Table (Enclosure 3B). ;

  -          f.G.14071,,_s.                                                                                             hAMj                         ,  Q 3.7. / 7. /-d 14 08                          /t.G.                                 uped/ WE M                                                @7*2/7'"

14 09 . Not used. ,.7 /rNO37Ml-3) 14 10 A in sta emen that .0.4 's no a'pplI/able dele /ed. T is ange s co siste t wit NURE 1431 ev. V. Th's han e doe not esul in a hange o te ic1/ e iren nts. 15 01 R Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 3B). ' DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 10 5/15/97

l Q 3.7.17.1-4 INSERT 3A-10b 14-05-LG The requirement to keep records of the bumup analysis, for all assemblies in Region 2 would be moved to a licensee controlled document. This change, which would move details regarding record keeping from the Technical Specifications

          %                  while retaining the bumup criteria requirements, is consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1. The requirement for retention of records related to activities affecting                          l quality is contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVil, and other sections                        l of 10 CFR 50 that are applicable to the plant (i.e.,50.71, etc.). Post-completion review of records does not directly assure operation of the facility in a safe manner, as the activities described in the documents have already been performed. By retaining these requirements in plant procedures and licensee controlled documents, any changes in these record retention requirements will be adequately controlled under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 an the applicable regulations.

l

Q 3.7.17.1-4 INSERT 3A-10c 14-08-LG The requirement to independently verify the burnup analysis of each spent fuel assembly prior to storage of the assembly in Region 2 would be moved to a licensee controlled document. This change, which would move details regarding performance of analyses from the Technical Specifications while retaining the requirement to ascertain the burnup history, is consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1. The requirement to verify engineering calculations is contained in 4 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 111, and in the Quality Assurance Program. By retaining this requirement in a licensee controlled document, any changes to the requirements will be adequately controlled in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 ano the applicable regulations. 1 1 l ) 4 4 4

                                                                                                 ~
                                                                                              --                   r. *                ' ,I k
                                                                                                       .l2                                                    .Y f .
                                                 ;                 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS          3/4 9: 2~ " } ! cif - -;P i
                                                                                                                                                    .                        Page 8 of 8
                                                                                                                                     ,                g. y,% . ,      ,

TECil SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY - flui!BER DESCRIPTI0tl , DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 14 07 )d V T5 A 8 Q ~3 717 I-S~ l NA NA NA ' NA 14 0

                        )bd/y6/ %*J5ELY" 30- Eh                 Q 3. 7.17.1 - 4 ' l    NA                         NA                          IIA ~                  NA 14 09             Not used.                .                                     NA                         NA             -

IIA NA 14 10 The statement that 3.0.4 is not applicable would be Yes No - CPSES does not Yes , Yes A removed. , have this ;

                                                 !                                                                specification in
                                                 !                                                                CTS 3/4.9      i:                         '

The requirement to enpty the spent fuel exclusion zone area

15-01 Yes - See Ho - CPSES does not 110 not in CIS No - not in CTS R prior to any spent fuel shipping cask handling operations Attachment 21. page have this i is relocated to Licensee controlled documents. 27. specification .in CTS 3/4.9 ' r -- ~r ! I

                                                  !                                                                            i:
                                                  !                                                                               l-!

i-1

s :

l I I C0!!VI RSIOll C0l! PARIS 0ll TABLE - CURRDIT TS 5/15/97 r__ _ . _ _

Q 3.7.17.1 ! INSERT 3B-8b TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY - : NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMMANCHE WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY -i CANYON PEAK :

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          -i 14-08        The requirement to independently verify the bumup                                                                                                                              No - CPSES does                                      Yes - to Bases                               Yes - to Bases -              .

LG analysis of each spent fuel assembly prior to storage of the not have this t assembly in Region 2 would be moved to a licensee specification in .; controlled document. CTS 3/4.9 t h 5 ., L 5 i t i

i i h [ t r i t f

l Spent Fuel Assembly Storage - B 3.7.17

 .n:?TeM.

Mfr BASES ACTIONS M (continued) . If unable to move irradiated fuel assemblies while in H0DE 5 5h.I' y,$$ . Vr or 6. LCO 3.0.3 would not be applicable. If unable to move irradiated fuel assemblies while in H00E 1, 2, 3, or 4, the

    -39.

Mr / .

                                                . action is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability py-                                           to move fuel assemblies is not sufficient reasen to require a F                                             reactor shutdown.

a:

      .- e .

A,y," l

               ' SURVEILLANCE .._.
                .                                SR 3.7.17.1               . _
      "~
                 ' REQUIREMENTS                                                                                                                                  '

l This SR verifies by administrative means that the initial

7. enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with

      ~ " ~ '

Figure Ipir$ETE in the accompanying LCO. For fuel assemblies in ,

      $ 6'             -

o the unacceptable range of Figure 3.7.171, performance of this SR l

   "" [ ~ ~' ' ,                              ' will ensure compliance with Specification 4.3.1.1.
   . y 4 REFERENCES                               1.        Cella.;;y TSAR, Apperdix 0.1A. 7,c ";xis Ocasity neck                                                )

TM-' ' (."00) Ocsign Conccpt." l 1

2. Ocscriptien and Evalcetion for Propescd Changcs to recility Operating Liccascs CPR :: ;rd DPR 40 (Zion Ic.;cr Station). f g t:::aKmpenc1Xw::1Ampe1waetetor.aoamcanamagi B g. Double contingency principle of ANSI N16.11975, as specified in the April 14, 1978 NRC letter (Section 1.2) I and implied in the proposed revision to Regulatory Guide 1.13 (Section 1.4, Appendix A).

4. IS'R. Ocction C5.7.42 i

                                                                                                                        .Q.J 5A                 L                                       }'

[ *

I

                                                                                           '       mm          ~.                  '
                                                                                                       /                             Q 3 .1.17. ) - 4 B 3.7 91                                         5/15/97 MARX UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES

 . _ _ _ _     ._ _      _      __     _ . .       _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ ~                       _. .

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: Q 3.7.17.15 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA

REQUEST: CTS 3.9.12.a ITS 3.7.17 and SR 3.7.17.1

           ,                  DOC (3.9) 14-aa A CTS 3.9.12.a states the combination of initial enrichment and cumulative exposure shall be in accordance with Figure 3.9-1 which is similarly converted into the format of l                    - ITS 3.7.17.

3 Comment: The LCO statement of ITS 3.7.17 also provides for storage in accordance l with Specification 4.3.1.1 and ITS SR 3.7.17.1 also verifies these requirements prior to placement in Region 2. There is no DOC provided to explain why these new STS l requirements are appropriate changes to the CTS requirements. Provide this detailed explanation to adopt the STS text. FLOG RESPONSE: ITS 3.7.17 LCO and SR 3.7.17.1 appear to provide an alternative method of complying with the Spent Fuel Assembly Storage requirements by referring to ITS 4.3.1.1. However, CTS 4.9.12 establishes criteria for storing fuel assemblies in Region 2. It is silent regarding storage of fuel assemblies that do not meet the criteria. For other fuel, the CTS requirements of Specification 5.6.1.1 would apply. ITS 3.7.17, by including a reference to ITS 4.3.1.1, makes specific what the CTS already require. The reference to ITS 4.3.1.1 imposes no new requirements. As noted in the Bases for ITS 3.7.17, fuel assemblies not meeting the criteria for storage in Region 2 shall be stored in accordance with the criteria of paragraph 4.3.1.1 in Section 4.3, Fuel Storage. To clarify this, a new DOC 14-07-A , has been prepared; it reads as follows: '

                     "lTS 3.7.17 and SR 3.7.17.1 make reference to the " Design Features" of ITS Section 4.3.1.1. This direct reference to the fuel storage criticality features is not contained in CTS. However, requirements contained in the CTS Design Features section for fuel storage criticality continue to apply to fuel assemblies that do not meet the Region 2 storage requirements. Therefore, the direct reference to the Design Features Section imposes no new technical requirements; and this is an administrative change."

ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.15 CTS 3/4.9 - ITS 3.9 Encl. 2 9-15 Encl. 3A 10 Encl. 38 9,8 i

                                                                                                                                                                                       .                                 p.

[ iggg\ -- ss bbYl8)Qg y RLFULLING OPERATIONS a SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE _ . 3L4.9.17

              .m
             'f:,',( ,                      LlHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Y.mi      x......,.
     =. :. :,: ..;
                           ., , .. =

Spent fuel assemblies stored in Region 2 shall be subject to the G 7. J 7. I - 5' l

         ' Ff.',. . ._ . [3.9.12 kh5h h ~ . . - d.".9.The                                              .". ."combination of initial enrichment and cumulative exposureM*shall
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          -0 7 -A
                                                       ~

Wh"[I""'" a.

       - - ~ -                                                          be within the acceptable domain of Figure 3.9-1, and

.Jcf .' '. - -

                                                                                                                                                                        'a D.eg 4 c a 2, aer :h:1' ny a ..                          _

h !' be ? ?! cod r.- ~ : . . , . .

b. M: :::nt 'u:1 :::r k'ft: 4- t

                                                                                                                                                                            <-e,.     %_ ._ 4 m. ,,,

4. e. ._ ,. 4. m_ ... _ , m_

                                                                                                                         !: .r:fu:)# g :;ir:t!:r: ~~ ~ -~-- - l 0 3.7.17.l- 4 -[q,gl g s_ . -,
                                                                                                                                                    , 4 ,. . . ._ 4 m_ n                                       ,
    -r.       , p-         .                                                                                             ,..,,e,.__
                                                                         . _ . _ ._ ,_ . , , . _ 1 m_ ,. ._ ._ 4 m_ .- s_ ._

cr; 'r progrc;;.

            . e,.
               . . _.,                                                _-being : ".:gfer 2,
    .               .        ,' '            " ' - ' ~

A

                                                                                                                                                                          '"* in the spent fuel APPLICABILITY:

Whenever 4rr:disted fuel 2:!

                                                                                                                                                         -h'4-:                                                    -

l 92.ki pool. J s5 M'1

hig 2. .

ACTION: a.

                                                                        ' With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied,:nd :renc                                                                                    $0P6   apc. c .

su:p:nd 21' eth:r

                                                                                                         #-   th: fu:1  re't:::nt:t:r:g:   :f fu:7 cr::: and        :::::bli::

er: th: -Or-:::plyin; f;:1

m th 10:d: L' n . i ' th:: -ecquir:::nt: f the :ba.c '

rb!!:: t: " gf:r 1.::ti:f f edr-tcr:n ::n :ntreti:n f the spcc.i f % , q.g.g

pec #4 cat ce u--ie4ed -- be gre2re- ta_- - equal tr 000 ;p - :t 4 i :

j _ peel chesi s e

                                                                                                                                     +
                                                                                                                       ~ron-so.-pi p g b d -b_ ku,ios I )m not applicable.

s J:: - er pt- ? he u- . mov we ' H A

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3-:nc 2.0

                                                                                                                                                                                                      .is SURVEILLANCE REOUIRsHENTS (Q 7.7.17. l                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  I4 -Cf-/_G 4.0.12 The burnup of each spent f uel assembly stored 10Agion                                                                                       v efi . pe 2 shall   pr be e
                                                   .bciertained by analysis of its burnup nistory                                                                  g"Mc                               ' :: -:p: 't-                  --

r;?::: : r-d O' rec 92-/:': : .

to .turage s in Region 2. 2 mb'y em2i n: : e:gfer - cf :h; :p;r

                                                                           ;m t e        a **:t tw: :; nt 'u:'                                                                                                                      19 LG
                                                    ','"    ,t'--
                                                                ...~.

i I i 3/4 9 '.5 CALLAWAY - UNIT t I. 4 4

  .~. _. _ ._.                           _ . _ _ _ . _ _                   _ _ _ ._                  _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _                                . . _ . _ . - _ . . . _ _ _

CHANGE i NUMBER ILSBC DESCRIPTION 4

fi,

                             . . . -+; . . .

operations. This change is consistent with NUREG 1431 gey, 1,

                      . . . .          14 04~~                   LS 13             . Deletes the action statement requirement to verify spent                                                l
                  ..'i.,...v                 .

fuel pool boron concentration every 8 hours while action

                  . /:X.h '7         .      _.'                                        is being taken to relocate noncomplying spent fuel                                                      l

} G35P~ assemblies from Region 2 to Region 1. This change is i 3./

                  ??$=i                                                                consistent                    with-ISQ        NUREG 1431.               Rev.1 5 '3.'7.I7.
                                                                                             .TdsGW5                                                  [
                                   "14 05' '

7 - so e u an [6Eh ' LG

                                                                                                  ~~remen70%                                                                         1

! WM7 . .. 1 ass ._l i e in Re .on 2 uld relo ted t a, . . 4::g . _. _. a .. ..

                                                                       .-':-.-         T cens e cc rolled doc                                 t. T s cha e is nsis nt g .. ., ,.,_ .. ..--.

ith REG. 431 v. 1. nd mo es r ireme s tha do the- 2- -- l f r 'ncl

14 06 A Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38).

[h q 3,7, f 7, j g j .. 14 07. y f 14 08 / LCr ue d/ d5F.g/t- h 7 7./7 14 09 - Not used. ,7, f f, y 14 10 A r sta ement/that .0.4 s no ap'pl' a'ble fdeleed. 4 2 T is ange 's co siste [t wit NURE 1431. ev. Th~s j han e doe not esul in a hange o te ical _ I e ir ts, l 15 01 R Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). 6 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 10 5/15/97

I u i CONVERSION COMPARIS0N TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.9 Page 7 of 8 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY l 12-11 The SR to measure [ Emergency Exhaust System] flow rate is Yes No - CPSES does not Yes Yes A not identified as a separate SR in the ITS because it is have this verified during the other in-place filter tests (see ITS specification in 5.5.11 a. and b.). 3/4.9. 12-12 This change establishes appropriate ACTIONS and Completion OffEJ Meet No Yes

 '.5 26                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      No -mainI ainIng Times for Fuel Building pressure envelope degradation;at--

Wol f cr=" Caratingitatf orr-- No-c r"m.tnla.*ninh- nel' k'** T IdI -

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    '"                       c75,

[p ((' b gj;ggg { 14-01 Deletes the restrictions on placing spent fuel assed11es No - not in CTS No - CPSES does not Yes Yes LS 11 into Region 2 of the spent fuel pool and changing storage have this locations designations from Region 1 to Region 2. specification in CTS 3/4.9. 14 02 Changcs u.e Applicability from "Whenever irradiated fuel No - already in CTS No - CPSES does not Yes Yes M assemblies are in the spent fuel pool" to "Whenever any have this ' fuel asse21y is in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool." specification in CTS 3/4.9.

14-03 This change would delete the action requirements to suspend Yes No - CPSES does not Yes Yes LS-12 all other movement of fuel asse211es and crane operations. have this r specification in CTS 3/4.9. 14-04 Deletes the action statement requirement to verify spent Yes No - CPSES does not Yes Yes LS-13 fuel pool boron concentration every 8 hours while action is have this being taken to relocate nonconplying spent fuel assedlies { specification in from Region 2 to Region 1. CTS 3/4.9. 14-05 The requirement to keep records of the burnup analysis for Yes - to the Bases No - CPSES does not Yes - to USAR Yes - to FSAR LG all asse@ lies in Region 2 would be moved to a licensee have this controlled document. Specification in CTS 3/4.9. 14 05 The LCO or R ion is afie er ncing 11 4.3.1. Yb A ('of the eslg Sec on. in ormation eferenc in the Y h et s doe no - K Tn pp - p in/ TJ ISi basi ally denti al t the inf mation c tained n i ci cati [ (the e the ae c icich e. _

               ""                  ^ - "

C7 3.9.17. 9-2) Q 3.9.I'2 2-3 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 5/15/97

CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.9 Page 8 of 8 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY

-~~

1407[kudf INIEAT 35-Ob )--Q 3,7./7, /-5 m Na a m 1408hh EkT, Q '3.7, / 7, / -[ NA M NA NA 14 09 Not used. NA NA NA NA 14 10 The statement that 3.0.4 is not apolicable would be Yes No CPSES does not Yes A removed. Yes have this specification in CTS 3/4.9 15-01 The requirement to enpty the spent fuel exclusion zone area Yes - See No - CPSES does not No - not in CTS R prior to any spent fuel shipping cask handling operations No - not in Cf5 Attachment 21, page have this is relocated to Licensee controlled documents. 27. specification in CTS 3/4.9 CONUERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS l l 5/15/97

                          .                                                                                                                                                                                    +

INSERT 38-8a 0 3.7.17.1-4 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON CONMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 14 08 The requirement to independently verify the No - CPSES does Yes - to Bases Yes - to Bases LG burnup analysis of each spent fuel assembly not have this prior to storage of the assembly in Region 2 specification in

would be moved to a licensee controlled CTS 3/ 4.9 document. INSERT 3B-8b 0 3.7.17.1-5 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANTON :COMMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK : CALLAWAY I4-07 The ITS reference to the fuel storage No - ITS 3.7.17 No - CPSES does Yes 'I Yes A criticality design features in Section 4.3.1.1 does not refer not have this imposes no new technical requirements beyond to Section specification in CTS. 4.3.1.1 CTS 3/ 4.9 INSERT 30-8c 0 3.7.17.2-2, 0 3.7.17.3-2 TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO CANYON COMMANCHE PEAK WOLF CREEK CALLAWAY 14-06 The requirement in DCPP CTS 4.9.14.1 and CTS Yes No No No A 4.9.14.3 to determine the cumulative burnup of each fuel assembly by analysis of its burnup history prior to storage in Regions I or 2 is included in ITS SR 3.7.17.1 and SR 3.7.17.2. which require verification that a fuel assembly meets the LCO requirements prior to moving a fuel assembly into Region 1 or 2. i

_ ~. __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7.17.1-6 APPLICABILITY: WC, CA l REQUEST: CTS 3.9.12.b l ITS 3.7.17 or Licensee Controlled Documents? DOC (3.9) 14-01-LS11 CTS 3.9.12.b places specific prevention to refrain from re-designating the storage locations of fuel assemblies while refueling operations are in progress. ITS SR 3.7.17 does not retain these requirements. l l Comment: There is no technicaljustification provided in the DOC for this less restrictive l CTS change. These CTS requirements are relocated to a location not identified. The I NSHC states that "any changes of storage locations from Region 1 to Region 2 are controlled by plant procedures" which is unacceptable; and which directly contradicts the deleted CTS requirement. Provide detailed explanations for these CTS changes, state if the CTS requirement is retained anywhere and revise the DOC and CTS markup, as appropriate for these CTS changes. FLOG RESPONSE: The DOC for this proposed change has been changed to an "LG" revision; and NSHC LS-11 has been deleted. The detailed requirements from CTS 3.9.12.b will be moved to l the USAR for WCGS and to the FSAR for Callaway. DOC 14-01-LG will read: I l

         " Moves details regarding operation of the spent fuel handling system from the Specification for spent fuel assembly storage. The restrictions on changing the designation of storage locations from Region 1 to Region 2 during refueling operations           ;

would be moved to a Licensee Controlled Document. This change is consistent with ' NUREG-1431, Rev.1, and is acceptable because it moves details of system operation from the Technical Specifications while retaining the overall limitations contained in ITS Figure 3.7.17-1 or in ITS 4.3.1.1." ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.15 CTS 3/4.9 - ITS 3.9 Encl. 2 9-15 Encl. 3A 9 Encl. 3B 7 Encl. 4 1,36,37

                                                                                                                                                                                                       ~~,
                                                                                                                                                                                                     / __.

g pgm- >g\I ~

                                                                                    - - -                                                                                                            r kj
                               ~

RbYI8)Oy J RLFULLING OPERATIONS wy 3/4.9.12 SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY STORACE . le

    ,e m,                  ,

LIMITlHG CONDITION FOR OPERATION

  ..'*4......

S d- .. e .- m: 4.W .,. . v:/ ,- - ' 3.9.12 Spent fuel assemblies stored in Region I. ,;.11 be subject to the {G 3,7.

 .Wlhi; h:.4 ..c . following                               conditions:

fii'*W.f-S-tw The combinat, ion of initial enrichment and cumulative exposure h ll sa N U 'A

 ~ ~ . . . ~

e.--e a.... sw. be within the acceptable domain of Figure 3.9-1, and W;-tW,. .; _ , . . 2:: h'ie: W !' be ? 3ced 4a Deg#ca ?, iaac- -h:!'- _* -- k j wi.nm_.+... .., .~ ' b. 9: p:-t 'u:' f '~~ h tea, e-.4 j aa,ed ia de:4,-P aa h _

                                             -         .. e a,e.1cc?t            e- be t

3, m: 1: c f.

n; :p - : -; 27;a- .--. l c 9,7.j7,). f i_ p g ,

. 5._9 'J.. . ,, .,,, .---- -- .~ _. __3 ; t ; t- e_g: - - - E 2: e-bl#e *-e-in the spent fuel APPLICABILITY:

~,.

Whenever h-:df ated 'er' N.92.h puol. L.I b%6.22. . ACTION: sM'.1 h i 4.w %, . . .:.

                                               - a.  ......With        the    requirements                  of         the        above         specification
                                                                                                                                                 !i   :      :nd          ;ren        not
                                                                                                                                                                                        ;pe.      a;igr,red, M-03-3 satisf
                                                                                                  ;:::nt :f ft:1 :::::b
                                                            -- urpe-d 21' eth:r uit' i::d: ' - t! . : 'u:1 :t:r:;: cre : nd                                    -:/: th:.:nt:ner-::.                     ;1;. 'ng f t:?--
                                  '-~                '

re;uir S th; c.w.c 2:::2!!:: t: h ;';r :2ti:#':d, 1. Unti'b:r:3 th:::

00-c-eMret t :n o f-W ;pi, t f u', - jg gq.g MMat i c he -: a wer!'d ** - er e;"21 te 2000 ;p- ::

  , _3,                                         -              pec' ch?                            ed ta bc ;r:2 --
                                                                                                         + __
                                                                        --c: re- 9-heu-'                                                              i 8

mow

m a.eL ffst_M 4. kr.S l)re- not applicable.

            ,                                                  1::

M-}O A I

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 2.0 ' - !

                                                                                                                                                                                     .is SURVEllt.ANCE REOUIREMENTS

[Q 7.7. / 7. l- + l4 -Of-L(,y The burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored io , Region ve.r1 2 shallyec be pr , , 4.9.32 '- n otrtained by analysis of its burnup history

: :- T 5:7 ::

to !.turage- in Region 2.

                                                                                           * :: ;ict: r:ce-c c' rec' rs                                          a:gier : ef :t: : pert
                                          "       L:         ,;-!:q         t &            p:-       'u:' 2:::-b'; ~                                                                                          H-OS-Lf pe

. .~ --.. .. t 3/4 9*16 CAL.L AWAY - UNII L

\ CHANGE NUMBER F_511C QESCRIPTION

 .w This requirement would demonstrate the operability of each I$)

W 12 06 A train of the [ Emergency Exhaust System] (including maintaining negative pressure in the building). This is consistent with current practice. This change does not J lj._ . y- result in a change to technical requirements and is 1?p - . - . consistent ith3Hpm- ev. 1. g _ Idf6tT- 3 A -%.f rA 7.7./J.2 - 3 12 07. LS 25 h pr 's chan e wo ve - TE 8/ I f om e 3 day R. is r resen s no ange in the

              '              ~~

fr enc of t tin since he CT defi 'tio of STA l - r E.-.' B IS wo d 'h e req ired t sting each f the wo l . - . . r ncy E aus Syst ] trai s eve,ry 31 ays a the Ma . . _ . . . . . . new 5r ire pach tr in to t_eged__ev_ry~31 ays.

   ~
            ~~'12 08                            LS 16                   The proposed change would allow the 18 month testing of f                                                                        the [ Emergency Exhaust System's] ability to maintain the
    '*                                                                  required pressure differential between the building and

! -iz' the outside atmosphere to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST irk..o ~z- . . BASIS. 12-09 LG Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison l l Table (Enciosure 38). 12 10 LS-9 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 38). . 12 11 A The SR to measure [ Emergency Exhaust System] flow rate is

   '                                                                     not identified as a separate SR in the ITS because it is verified during the other in place filter tests (see ITS 5.5.11 a. and b.). This change does not result in a change to technical requirements.                                                    ggg 12 12                      LS 26                    Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison 14-01
                                              ~h_      j2 Lg                         m .

y c 1 3 l 9 3. 7. n. 2 -3 [

ny-T :. 2 ftes nt uel ol nd ang1 gion 2.gstora/g to egi f oc tio de ign ion frp Re 'on'- to ifhis c nge .s consi ent ittf NUR , _14 1_ Rev. 1s Q Ugl-[]- - c.a m- y - w - 14-02 Jr A Changes the Applicability from ~ nenever irraciated fuel assemblies are in the spent fuel pool to "Whenever anv fuel assembi is in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool. .i aodt afore i ptringent regtur wht n is l ap ny _opr/a'tegnd _cofipJtd wjd1NUJG1 d . .R 1 ( 14 03 LS-12 This change would delete the action requirements to suspend all other movement of fuel assemblies and crane 9 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS

   . . _ . .. - , - -           ~     . _ - .     . . _ .    .   .           ..-            . .              -- --.

l

Q 3.7.17.1-6 , 1 INSERT 3A-9d 1 14-01-LG Moves details regarding operation of the spent fuel handling system from the ! Specification for spent fuel assembly storags. The restrictions on changing the 1 designation of storage locations from Region 1 to Region 2 during refueling i- operations would be moved to a Licensee Controlled Document. This change is l consistent with NUREG-1431, Rev.1, and is acceptable because it moves details ' of system operation from the Technical Specifications while retainisig the overall limitations contained in ITS Figure 3.7.17-1 or in ITS 4.3.1.1. l l l i

12 -/f- iMr 367D lQ 7.7. n. 2-Il h, . h te, ij- 1,u c: y j .; [.j m

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           .            p.         w . ][fk      r,. M K. m ,,,.,                e fl$

[h 12-13 T4ar [q .5.:r-7[

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ; o + .a 'l
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      . e.gne."? "; m L4 CONVERSION COMPARISON TABLE - CURRENT TS 3/4.9                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Page 7 of 8 a                                                         -k TECil SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY                               F NUMBER     DESCRIPTION                     l                                                                                             DIABLO CANYON                                                                                                 C0HANCHE PEAK'                    WOLF CREEK                                    CALLAWAY 12 11      The SR to measure [ Emergency Exhaust System] flow rate is                                                                  Yes                                                                                                            No CPSES does not                  Yes                                          Yes A          not identified as a separate SR in the ITS because it is                                                                                                                                                                                    have this verified during the othe'r in place filter tests (see ITS                                                                                                                                                        .                          specification in 5.5.11 a. and b.).                                                                                                                                                                                                                         CTS 3/4.9.

12 12 This change establishes-appropriate ACTIONS and Completion Yes No CPSES does not Yes No - maintaining ' 15 26 Tirres for fuel Building pressure envelope degradation.

have this CTS.

rJr ' M 7.7.17. / -O 75N 14 0 ele) 'ons i placi - spent uel as r5blIe No - not in CTS Ho - CPSES does not Yes Yes p got in 4 Regi i 2 of he sp dt fuel .Ia changi stor~ e have this LG catiop esi a ion from Rg ion 1 Regio , specification in CTS 3/4.9. 1 02 Changes the Applicability from 'Whenever irradiated fuel No - already in CTS Ho - CPSES does not les

               ,f(A              855'"" " '5  i" the spent ruei pool to 'Vhenever any                                                                                                                                                                                     have this Yes fuel assembiv is_ in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool."                                                                                                                                                                                      specification in

[G '3.7.17./-/ CTS 3/4.9. 14 03 lhis change would deleth the action requirements to suspend Yes No - CPSES does not Yes (5 12 Yes all other novenent of fuel assemblies and crane operations. have this

                                                                 ;                                                                                                                                                                                                           specification in CTS 3/4.9.                                         '

14 04 Deletes the action statcment requirement to verify spent Yes No - CPSES does not Yes LS-13 fuel pool boron concentration every 8 hours while action is Yes have this being taken to relocate noncomplying spent fuel assemblies specification in from Region 2 to Region 1. - CTS 3/4.9. 14 05 1he requirement to keepIreccrds of the burnup analysis for Yes - to the Bases No - CPSES does not Yes - to ll5AA Yes - to FSAR LG all assenblics in Region 2 wuuld be moved to a licensee have this ! controlled document. specification in CTS 3/4.9. 14 06 The LCO for Region 2 is modified by referencing 115 4.3.1.1 Yes A cf the Design Section. The information referenced in the No - CPSES does not tio not in CTS Ho not in CTS have this 115 is basically identical to the information contained in specification in the design section of the CTS 5.6. ' FUEL STORAGE. CTS 3/4.9 j therefore there are no technical changes. l . Cf)llVI RSIOll O)ltPARISOll T Allt f GlHRi lli IS

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ,       ,. . . L7: '^'

1 Q 3.7.17.1-6 INSERT 3B-7b [

t i TECH SPEC CHANGE APPLICABILITY t NUMBER DESCRIPTION DIABLO COMMAi4CHE WOLF CREEK ' CALLAWAY ' CANYON PEAK ! , 14 Moves' details regarding operation of the spent fuel No - not in No - CPSES does Yes - to USAR Yes - to FSAR t LG handling system from the Specification for spent fuel CTS not have this , assembly storage. specification in ' ! CTS 3/4.9 a i l i I

i i _ _ _ .- . _ _ _ - . - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . - - . . - . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - __.__________.____.________-_.._____._____._._._m_______ _

1 l 1 ENCLOSURE 4

        !~    ~

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) CONTENTS 1

                ... .                                                                                                                                                                                          I
          .r.PW.
           ,w. : e i

fe:cfr .

             ..             I.       , Org ani z ati on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4
                        ' II.             Description of NSHC Evaluations.............................................

III. Generic No Significant Hazards Consideration Determinations .

                          .              ."A". Admi ni strati ve Cha nges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 "R"      Rel ocated Techni cal Speci fications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 "LG" - Less Restrictive (Movi ng Information Out of the Techni cal Speci fications) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

_.3. . m . . . . .

                                          "H" - More Restri cti ve Requi rements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 IV.           Specific No Significant Hazards Consideration Determinations                                                                  "LS" 15                l LS 1.......................................................................                                                                                         '

LS 2.......................................................... ............ 18

                                                                                                                                                                            ........... 20 LS.3...................................................... ..

LS 4....................................................... .............. 23

                                                                                                                                                                      ..............        25                l LS.5........................................................

LS.6........................................................ .............. 27 l 29 LS 7.......................................................................

                                                                                                  .................................. ..... . .... 31 LS.8.......................

LS 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N ot a ppl i c a bl e l' LS 10..........................................................

                                                                                                                                                                                            , 4fg 3,,q, _ g [

w

                                                                                                                                                                                   ...d LS.    .........................................................

38 j LS.12...................................................................... LS 13................................ ..................................... 40 ' LS 14......................... ............................................ 42 l

                                         ,,LS 15.................                      .............................. -. .................. 44 LS 16...................                        .............. ........... .......... ............ 46                                     .Not used
           --                ' -- -        L S 17 . . . c. . . . . . . . . ..,......... . ... ................ ...                                                     .....
                                                                                                                               . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not appl i cabl e LS 18...        ...... .. ............. ......

LS 19........... ....... ........ ....... ......... ..........Not applicable LS 20.................................... .................. ......... .... 48

                                                                                                                                                  ...        ... ............               .51 LS-21......... ........ .......... ...... .. .....
                                                                                           .. .............. ........... . ...                                          .... ........ 54 LS 22.........                 .... ...

l LS.23..... ..... ... .. . ..... ............ . . , . . . . . . . . . . . No t a ppl i c abl e

                                                                                                                                                      .. .......... . ..... 56 LS 24........ ........... .......... ... ... ... . .
                                                                                                                           ..... . .. ...                           .    ...      .. ...... 58 LS 25....... ......... ...... .......

1 . 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

. - __ -. -- . - _ . _ - - - - - - . - - = -___ _ -_. - - 1 IV. u

                                                      ' ECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS m                                                                        NSHC LS 11                                             g 1                    '..                                         10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION
 @%      'a- M _-
          .                                                                  FOR                                                        ,
        .[                                       TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE                                         NI7 /I/~d f 1M                                         REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS p f p':' . .: -                         .

nL'L4f d % s y u. MUSWonsistent with NUREG 1431. Rev. I the proposed changes would dele e the jnIEKrestrictions on placing spent fuel assemblies into Region 2 of t spent fuel pool iTLa6d' cha'nging storage locations designations from Region 1 to Re ion 2 while

 @hefueling operations are in progress.

k.g 4-~ ~ " . {f~ ]This proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it w Z 1nvolves no_significant hazards consideration. This det ination has been

              .                                                                                                            ~
      +           performed in accordancs with the criteria set forth in                                   CFR 50.92(c)as quoted below:
                        . "The Cannission may make a final determinat'on. pursuant to the procedures in
      .f. .                50.91, that a proposed amendnent to an op ating license for a facility mwn." licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for                                              testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if                         eration of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendnent wuld no

1. Involve a significant incre se in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalu ed: or

2. Create the possibility f a new or different kind of accident fran any accident previously aluated; or l

3. Involve a signific nt reduction in a margin of safety."

The following evaluation is ovided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration stan rds:

1. Does the c nge involve a significant increase in the probability.or consequen es of an accident previously evaluated?

The ITS has SR 3.7.17.1 which requires that the spent fuel be verified As acceptable long as the[or placing verification in Region is performed the probability2 prior of toan placing inadvertent the fuel in Region -- critical'ty in the' fuel pool would not be 'significantly' increased regardless of whe the fuel is placed in Region 2. Likewise. any changes of storage locaty'ons from Region 1 to Region 2 are controlled by plant procedure: ther/ fore.theprobabilityofinadvertentcriticalityresultingfromregion changes would not be significantly increased. The proposed changes involve nditions that are intended to prevent a criticality eccident. thus they c[ould have no effect on the consequences of a criticality accident should occur. Therefore. the proposed change would not result in a significant 36 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

_ . __ _ .m.. . . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ _ M IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS

            .g                                                                                         NSHC LS 11 (continued) r                      E,.-
                  .&                       increase in the probability or consequences of a previous 1 evaluated WJ -                          accident.

D.R':.I or different kind of l

             .W26. a                      ,2.          .Does the change create the possibility of a accident from any accident previously eval ted?

3,F-f

. L 2.(?-lu , .... i d.Thie' proposed changes involve restrictions in' nded to prevent criticality

                -der. .. ;.c accidents. There are no other new or diff ent accidents that could result
                  ?             -2
                                          .from removal 'of the TS requirement. Th efore, this proposed change would not
                  ;f y -- create the possibility of a new or di erent kind of accident.

5F+h:u. . - . .

                                                . ~
                          ~~~~ ~ 3..       . Doesthis change ' involve 'a ignificant reduction in a margin of safety?                                            ,

Removal of the restrictions spent fuel placement and storage location

.- - designation would result i a change in plant operations. However, the ITS will retain provisions meet' the enrichment and exposure requirements and to y

i n fd --

perform a verificatio of these parameters prior to placing spent fuel in

              - - - - -               - Region 2. Therefor , the proposed changes do not involve any reduction in a
                    .                      margin of safety
                ~
             ,. .                                                  N SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the a ve evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS 11" esulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significan hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c): and accordingly, a no signi cant hazards consideration finding is justified.                                                                                                     !

4 "Y * ' " " $ ** *e a . w ee .... .. w

                                                                                                                                    ,e 4

1 d 1 37 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.7 R DOCS APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: CTS Section 3.7 LCOs normally relocated in accordance with the Split Report: 1 For all plants: 1: 14-01-R CTS 3/4.7.2, SG Pressurt " Temperature Limits 15-01-R CTS 3!4.7.6, Flood Protect.cn 16-01-R CTS 3/4.7.9, Snubbers 17-01-R CTS 3/4.7.10, Area Temperature Monitoring 19-01-R CTS 3/4.7.13, Main Feedwater Pressure / Temperature Limits The above CTS LCOs are proposed to be relocated to Licensee Controlled Documents. Comment: For CPSES - There is no technical justification provided for the relocation of these CTS LCOs. Revise the DOCS to provide the missing technicaljustification. For the others - Where are the normal CTS LCOs which are apparently not part of the respective current licensing basis for these plants? If these CTS LCOs c'.:ll exist, provide the same technical justifications as required for CPSES. FLOG RESPONSE: For CPSES, DOCS 14-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.2, SG Pressure / Temperature Limits, 15-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.6, Flood Protection, 16-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.9, Snubbers, 17-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.10, Area Temperature Monitoring, and 19-01-R - CTS 3/4.7.13, Main Feedwater Pressure / Temperature Limits, have been revised to provide additionaljustification for the changes. Also screening sheets have been provided to verify that the relocated specification does not meet any of the 4 criteria in 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii) goveming components, systems and structures that must be included in the TS. The location of the relocated specifications is provided in Enclosure 38. For the other plants, the equivalent specifications (where applicable) were moved out of the CTS into Licensee Controlled Documents in previous license amendments. ATTACHED PAGES: None l l t

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR 3.7-001 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: TSTF-173, Rev. O was approved by the NRC. TSTF-173 revises ITS 3.7.18 Bases, Background, to delete the statement regarding 1-131 equilibrium. There are no changes involved to any CTS mark-ups, DOCS, of JFDs. ATTACHED PAGES:

  .           Encl. 5A         Traveler Status Sheet Encl. 5B         B 3.7-92 t

2ndustry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.7 . TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF 36. Rev. 2 Incorporated 3.7 42.. 0nly applicable to

DCPP TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident.

TSTF 70. Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable -Net-NRC approved,:: cf

                                                                                  -traveler cut eff date,-T-7 ~7-d#f TSTF-100         Incorporated         3.7 05 and 3.7 19      NRC approved.

TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. WO843 Partially 3.7 01 Retained CTS (Formerly Incorporated requirements for

                      .WO8G7'                                                      resetting trip setpoints
                                                                                   ' " "*9" **"**

d5 more conservative than 937l-4 the traveler. M044- Incorporated 3.7 34 Not incorporated by DCPP as current licensing 9 31*d'I 7p p.,,, y l basis. e 3.9. m _ , TSTF 139. Rev. 1 Incorporated Not Applicable - Bases change g ,//fj ,j, -rg_y, 7-cgr (CEOG 51) TSTF 140, M Incorporated Not Applicabit TR 3.7-ct4 Rev. X. O wd bBe (CEOG 52) w,7,gvwn.w.dfe Awv mi er,he. fg1fWO8v86,gg7 Incorporated 3.7 57 Q h.'7. kD -l % G N.9 13. .?-2, E .iB Incorporated 3.7 56

                '761 ? - %9         0 3.9. 2 - 3                                                         Q 3 7. 2-3 h                         m3.9-xl UL m.1 4 j;%.,.cc)              ra 3.7-ce MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)           1                                         5/15/97

t INSERT S A-TR 3.7-001 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-173, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable- Bases Change NRC approved. k

INSERT S A-TR 3.7-002 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS ' TSTF-174, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable - Bases Change NRC approved. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _-__-a _ - .-_ '- - - . _ . _ _ _ _ __ - _ _ __ _.

_ -. - _. . . - _ ~ - _ _ - . . . _ _ - _ .- -. - -. J j Secondary Specific Activity . i B 3.7.18 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity BASES BACKGROUND Activity in the secondary coolant results from steam generator tube outleakage from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Under steady state conditions, the activity is primarily iodines with I relatively short half lives and, thus, indicates current ' conditions. During transients I 131 spikes have been observed as well as increased releases of some noble gases. Other fission i product isotopes, as well as activated corrosion products in I lesser amounts, may also be found in the secondary coolant. l A limit on secondary coolant specific activity during power i operation minimizes releases to the environment because of normal I operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and accidents. l This limit is lower than the activity value that might be

     ,.                        expected from a 1 gpm tube leak (LCO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational
     +:9                       LEAKAGE") of primary coolant at the limit of 1.0 pCi/gm                   .

(LCO 3.4.16. "RCS Specific Activity"). The steam line failure is assumed to result in the release of the noble gas and iodine activity contained in the steam generator inventory, the feedwater. and the reactor coolant LEAXAGE. Most of the iodine isotopes have short half lives. (i.e., < 20 hours). MT.J. dth TR 3 7-ool M1' "f: Of 0.01 ty;. ;--- =9:ter fr+0r th:n it iceys. but-P =t r::d 9"Cdh-4"= h= " a d_ M n i c ed :- WEs Mth the spccified e;ti'iity limit, the rcsuitent : hour thyrcid i;; t;.; p;r;;n et th; ;niusion ecce bountry (EC) w;uld b;

                               ;b;ut 0.00 cc; if th; acin st;;; sof;ty ;;1;;s (",05"s; ; pen f;r 2 heur; f;iledng a trip fre; full p;;;r.

Operating a unit at the allowable e. joe 4,:,Nm ,w 4, R3EDIE li;its ;;uld result .e wi4 n.m ,W .r.u i+ +n-e 2 hour 6g exposure r +nrc. of fo a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 (Ref.1) limits--ee-the limits estblished es tFe "'l staff appreicd li; casing basis. APPLICABLE The accident analysis of the main steam line break (HSLB), as SAFETY ANALYSES discussed in the FSAR. Chapter FMH (Ref. 2) assumes the M initial secondary coolant specific activity to have a radioactive v (continued) HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 92 5/15/97

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR 3.7-002 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Incorporate TSTF '174, Rev. O to revise ITS 3.7.6 Bases for Actions A.1 and A.2 to add a discussion of the Completion Time of"Once per 12 hours thereafter" for verifying by adrainistrative means the operability of backup water supply. The August 18,1998 industry TSTF status reports indicates the status of TSTF-174, Rev. O as NRC approved. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 5A Traveler Status Sheet Encl. SB B 3.7-45

i - Industry Travelers Applicable to Ssction 3.7 . TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMENTS TSTF 36 Rev. 2 Incorporated 3.7 42 . 0nly applicable to - DCPP TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Appitcable Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. TSTF 70, Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable !

                                                                                     -iM-NRC approved,as-ef- 5
                                                                                     -tr:Mer : t ef' dt:. 7 -7 ~N#f
                                                                                                               ~

TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7 05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. l TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7-29 NRC approved. WO64S Partially 3.7 01 Retained CTS (Formerly Incorporated requirements for l

             }              WOB:3TT                                                    resetting trip setpoints since requirements are more conservative than 931l-4                                                          the traveler, 42664                 Incorporated          3.7 34         Not incorporated by DCPP as current licensing        9 31'd'I gg.,,, y ;                                                         basis.

e 3 9. m _ , TSTF 139 Incorporated Not Applicable - Bases change ggc ,'gnyj,

767.7-oer Rev. 1 (CEOG 51) TSTF 140, M Incorporated Not Applicable TR 3.7-tc4 ! Rev. X. O incorprM c.L 4 ot Sw (CE0G 52) A ;e rdu.ndu o<mI:tJe er. bien. ff1f-WO84(r pgr/ Incorporated 3.7 57 4 b. l.10 -l h G N.'/.13. 0-4

                            -WOG-96                Incorporated          3.7 56 0 33, 2- 3                                                    Q 3 7. 2-3 7F1 F -fbi q

(h,_m.14 u sa-x I b .1-00'). TR 3.'7-Co 2 c MARX UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 1 5/15/97

INSERT 5 A-TR 3.7-00I , TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-173, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable-Bases Change NRC approved. O

..'* ^ d S e T o v N r p E p M a

   -                M  C O R C N e

g n a h C s e s a B

                    /
                    /      -

E l e C ba 2 N c 0 E pi l 0 R p

7. . E A 3 F F to R I T- D N A

S T R E S N I d t e S a r U o T pr A o T cn S I

O

                    /     v.
                    !     e R R E   4 L   7 E  1 V F-A T R S T T

                           - = . .                    .                 -             .   ._

CST . B 3.7.6 BASES l ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) include verification that the flow paths from the backup water supply IESHEBBMill to the AFW pumps are OPERABLE, and that the l backup supply has the required volume of water available LUjg m . The CST must be restored to i OPERABLE status within 7 days, becaux the backup ;upply ny bc , pcifereing this furation in edditien to its nor el furetions. l The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience to verify the OPERABILITY of the backup gg wetee 6 ,q6, - supply %The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on an l 3, OPERABLE backup water supply being available, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period requiring the CST. B.1 and B.2 If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a H00E in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least H00E 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4-

                                     "thout reli;xe en th; ;tcu scriretor f;,r heet rcarec1. within J2            hours. .The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on Q 3,9, _          perating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the CST contains the required volume of cooling water. Oc required CZ volux ;;y bc ;ingic v;1ac or ; furetion of RCS conditic,n;.) The 12 hour Frequency is based on operating experience and the need for operator awareness of unit evolutions that may affect the CST inventory between checks. Also, the 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to abnormal deviations in the CST tiiTfsfn~edNitej LToTDiiG 4 eve +- 1 (continued) l HARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 45 5/15/97 l

i ! l I TR 3.7-002 ' l l INSERT 5B45a Additionally, verifying the backup water supply every 12 hours is adequate to ensure the ; backup water supply continues to be available. l~ 1 i I l l l 1 l

       -    .-              -.   . . . - - . . -    . -   . ~ .     - -    .         .. - - .  . .

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: TR 3.7-005 APPLICABILITY: CA, CP, DC, WC REQUEST: Revise Traveler Status page to reflect NRC approval and latest revision number of the following travelers:

                - TSTF-139 Revision 1 - NRC Approved
                - TSTF-70, Revision 1 - NRC Approved
                - WOG 86 became TSTF-287 There are no changes involved to any CTS mark-ups, ITS mark-ups, DOCS, or JFDs.

ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 5A Traveler Status Sheet l l l l l

Industry Travelers Applicable to Section 3.7 . TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COHHENTS l TSTF 36 Rev. 2 Incorporated 3.7 42.. 0nly applicable to - DCPP TSTF 51 Not Incorporated Not Applicable Requires plant specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident. TSTF 70, Rev. 1 Not Incorporated Not Applicable -Not-NRC approved,c cf

                                                                     -traveler =t cff date. TS-7 ~N##

TSTF 100 Incorporated 3.7 05 and 3.7 19 NRC approved. TSTF 101 Incorporated 3.7 29 NRC approved. 3.7 01 Retained CTS

    )           W0043 (Formerly Partially Incorporated                          requirements for
               .W98:317                                                resetting trip setpoints
                    ~yt-                                               since requirements are M                                               more conservative than 9 '3 9 l - 4                                              the traveler.

I N Incorporated 3.7 34 Not incorporated by .)CPP as current licensing 9 31*d'I gp yl basis. q 3.?. 2 - 1 TSTF 139 Rev. 1 Incorporated Not Applicable - Bases change g ,//ff d, 7g-y, 7-oor 4 (CE0G 51) TSTF 140, $ Incorporated Not Applicable TR 3.7.cq Rev. X O yn c,,,,a ,L,,,,, f, sm (CE0G 52) A rhm g,.g[, e,l4f;m. f(ffWOG4fr-gg7 Incorporated 3.7 57 Q b. l.10 -l'f) G N.'1.13. 7-4

                -WJ3-98           Incorporated           3.7 56 761 ? -j$$          Q 3.9. 2 - 3                                                Q 3 'l, 2-3 W-k%$ rR'51-001             TR 3.'l-00 l 3.g-()01   TR 3.']-CO2, MARX UP OF WOG STS REY 1 (NUREG 1431)        1                                      5/15/97

INSERT S A-TR 3.7-001 TRAVELERil STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-173, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable-Bases Change NRC approved. e 9 er

                                                                                                                                                            .: : 15.        ..-. , .

5 INSERT SA-TR 3.7-002 TRAVELER // STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS TSTF-174, Rev. O Incorporated Not Applicable-Bases Change NRC approved. L_ __-__ .______.__ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ __ __.____--_m

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: C A 3.7-ED APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Various changes that do not impact the technical content of the submittal or other FLOG members. Changes are noted with CA 3.7-ED in the margin and noted below:

1) CTS 2.0, Table 2.2-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints: Added missing percent symbol in several places.

2) CTS 3/4.7.1, Turbine Cycle, Safety Valves: the footnote to Table 3.7-1, inoperable Main Steam Safety Valves versus Allowable Power and Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint in Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, is modified in two places by replacing "% RTP" with " power".

3) ITS LCO 3.7.1, Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs): the footnote to Table 3.7.1-1, OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus Maximum Allowable Power, is modified in two places by replacing "% RTP" with " power".

4) ITS LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System: Action "B" (the designation letter B) should not be highlighted.

5) ITS LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System, SR 3.7.5.4: The "s" in " NOTES" should be struck through.

6) ITS LCO 3.7.6, Condensate Storage Tank, APPLICABILITY: a redlined period should be placed at end.

7) ITS LCO 3.7.8, Essential Service Water, Action A: Under A.1 Notes, item 1, the ,

period at end should not be struck out, but redlined. '

8) ITS LCO 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink, Action 8: under " Completion Time" the "s" after 36 hours should not be highlighted. !

1

9) ITS LCO 3.7.11, Control Room Air Conditioning System: Title line should have (CRACS) highlighted.

10) ITS LCO 3.7.13, Emergency Exhaust System, SR 3.7.13.3: "SR 3.7.13.3" should l be highlighted. l

11) ITS LCO 3.7.17, Spent Fuel Assembly Storage: Title should be highlighted.

12) ITS LCO 3.7.17, Spent Fuel Assembly Storage: " Figure 3.7.17-1" should be l highlighted.

ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No. 5 CTS 2.0 - ITS 2.0 Encl, 2 2-4 Att. No.13 CTS 3/4.7 - ITS 3.7 Encl. 2 7-2 Encl. 5A 3.7-3,3.7-13,3.7-16,3.7-17,3.7-21, 3.7-23,3.7-28, 3.7-32,3.7-34,3.7-35

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                                                                                                                                                                                       .._;:.;---.C.C^-

CALLGAY UNIT 1 ~~ A--

REVis,0g I TABLE 3.7-1 . I

                       "" :"U" ? LLevr2LE 'O'4R o'M:E MEU n0M " Lux 'iIC:: ::TPO:C UITH                      N
                                                                                                               /

INGFERABL; 57;Ati LIN 5ATITY "AL'!:S 00?.1MO FOUP, LOOP OPERtJ 0N ocu AbLE Moin N% W h vs\ws W. Mo Timn 0tL % k P.wcf MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE ot.o4-LS $ MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT SAFETY VALVES ON ANY - #[3 CENT OF RATED TnEht evWC E ', O 3' ' OPERATING STEAM GENERATOR ( % RTP) - C g

                                                                          -et-      E L. 6 U .

4 ol.04-LS 3 G " L # 3 G 3.1.1- 4 2 44 a.a.

                       .r s                   ?

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W ... , J o Call.AWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2 t.l

MSSVs 3.7.1

    .        b        d HiMW                         Table 3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus L ^;plicebicjPower ir Per:c;;t of RAT:0 Tu:Ra;st row P,- 3 7-0/ O gg -M! NIM"M NUMBER OFYMSSVs PER STEAM GENERATOR MAyIMUM A LLOlA/ABLE APPLICACL; POWER q3.1)_#

               -REQUIRE OP:RACLE                               (f. RTP)
                       -+-                                     : inn 4                                    g 5 /- ('7l            q' g, _ ff 3

x-se 29 2 X4s .21 g_ps (a) du wr,4 m HssV impale. m 4 uw. s,6 p'd ,

              @ . % ; - affou> d le g iu 7/ % RTP. M ora HSSV inop<-R on enore                    h - sW ynxwk L.munum dt.acals & Is f08             5'6 */. RTF WOG STS                                  3.7-3                         Rev 1, 04/07/95

AFW Systt:m .

3.7.5 I 4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS . I 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System 1 1

LCO 3.7.5 M AFW trains shall be OPERABLE. -B;

Only cre A"' train which ireludes a s.eter driven pa;r.p. is r; quired 3.7 4.:. l l, to b; 0"C"J"L in = 4. i a APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, and 3-! c/3;7 4-M00C 4 whcn st;;;;; gac eter is relicd upon for heat rc;evel. 7 ACTIONS -] l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E One steam supply to A.1 Restore steam supply to 7 days ,

B-.

turbine driven AFW pump OPERABLE status. j inoperable. M 10 days from

;                                                                                     discovery of failure to meet
!                                                                                     the LCO l
                                                                                                              ~

. Ofil!EESWEEEtglEItD HE RE5YdtMEE55EEttXEE5 Z22D50RN 3~.7 j tlRthlieBffiLTAinTAFRERhii5 DPF4HEEB32iMR 1 ,, N#N M No avauays;;rnTm Q)h);Jh atwewist a 5.9-cD uwntww tiiiiECO (continued) HARX UP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7 13 5/15/97

                       .- .      .                      . . _ =     . -.        .         .  . . -         _ _ - .

L' AFW System

gS 3.7.5

  ;                                                                        6 qf9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE [ FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.4 - - Not required to \ rmed for the ?-B turbine driven AFW pump until 24?hourJ

                                                                                                                   -B-PS after 2 200' psig in the steam generator.

2. "et opplicabic ir. "00: 4 whcr. stcc.r. 3.7 4 gcc,creter is relicd upor. for hcat rca.evel. l Verify each AFW pump starts automatically on an [1 months 1Bn actual or simulated actuation signal.

l SR-wwn-6 Verify proper alignment of the required AFW Prior to .:B s l i flow paths by verifying flow from the entering HODE 2 l g condensate storage tank to each steam whenever unit i generator. } has been in H00E 5 or 6 for

                                                                                   > 30 days l

l HARK-UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7 16 5/15/97

1 l CST . 3.7.6 1 3.7 PLART SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) o LC0 3.7.6 The CST 4evel Enta1neoEwater;ivolume shall be 2 281300' gal -PS l l : B PS C A 3,1-E D APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, and h Igl A 3.7 4 "00C 4 when st;;; sci,cretcr is rclicd upcn for heat reaval. l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. CST 4evel Go rw - A.1 Verify by administrative 4 hours PS ' i MfeEvolume not within means OPERABILITY of backup limit, water supply. M ; 1 Once per 12 hours l M thereafter l l A.2 Restore CST M c5Htained 7 days PS-Etei570Jume to within limit. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in H0DE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. M B.2 Be in H00E 4. . withcut .JJ ours B-rclienc; cn st;;; scacretcr la 3.7 4 fcr hcet icevel. G3WN 1 l l HARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7-17 5/15/97 i I

                                                                                                               @ SW9                    -

3.7.8 I 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Ess'irit~.ialj Service Water System N ESW)! , PS - LCO 3.7.8 Two SWS E trains shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1. 2. 3. and 4. 1 ACTIONS i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l A. One SW9 @ train A.1 NOTES - - inoperable. e:OPSW

1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required

                                                   '               Actions of LCO 3.8.1                      Y oh i                                                                    *AC Sources-Operating." for                 y l     .

emergency diesel < generator made / inoperable by SWS CA 3' PS - i l 2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6 "RCS Loops - H0DE 4." for residual heat l renoval loops made inoperable by SWS- ESW5 PS I Restore SWE QW train to 72 hours PS j OPERABLE status. l l ! (continued) MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG.1431) 3.7 21 5/15/97 i 1

UHS . l 3.7.9 l l 1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (VHS) LCO 3.7.9 The UHS shall be OPERABLE. l APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1, 2, 3, and 4. 1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Or,; er .7,or; ;;elir,; A.1 "a;ter; coelir,; teW;r 7-deys B-PS-te.ars with er.; ;;;lir,; ferds) te 0"E"X L status, t;;;r for,ir,egrebl;. EM MM 42Elollrg NW l B. Required Action and B.1 Be in H00E 3. 6 hours associated Completion i j, Time of Condition A not ANQ met, gM go *) B.2 Be in H0DE 5. ' dg 36 hou ( O g,l gg l UHS inoperable E -B; IBEi6tiEElt!!ERtMB 05iiattit!!am. l l

 ;i .

i MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7 23 5/15/97 1

y ,-ne ne 3.7.11 l l 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 tr R C ciscacy Air Toditioning Tugratur; Centrol System . Ps c CR 3/)-ED 3 LCO 3.7.11 Two GREATG M trains shall be OPERABLE. i; ps - APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1. 2. 3. 4. % JE! s c B- 4 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Ouring 00^" *1""' TIC'S B.PS m ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I l l A. One GREATG M train A.1 Restore GREATE M train 30 days :PSr inoperable. to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not M met in H0DE 1. 2. 3 - or 4. B.2 Be in H0DE 5. 36 hours 3.?./o-17 C. Required Action and C. Place OPERABLE CRC'TCS Immediately B associated Completion M train in . pS . Time of Condition A not operation. met inTH00EEZ6@iNtif, e i during movement of DB irradiated fuel assemblies. er during C;25 N B

          " ^ ^ " ' ' " " ' ~ "'

sma: anum l M B PS C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately B irradiated fuel assemblies.

              .                       NW-                              _

agIf . . % -(con - d) k3 T mmLAla 5~.9 -4 { cm emum pow Jawra. - HARX UP OF WOG STS REV 1 INDRE(l1431)Ms Q 3 /1./ O l'7 5/15/97 l

E5EPoencytMalTitT3St1!B1FBAGS- . 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT', diURVEILLANCE FRE0VENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Operate each E FBAGS train for 31 days PS 5EIDE5hthnuousWo0F.sT9fthYheTRBT6ff B PS gpeTJitlM. SR 3.7.13.2 Perform required M FBAGS filter testing in In accordance . PS accordance with the Vehtf3Jt"0H!Eif1Rr2F63 tim with the E B gj[p]irJaltvt:1d. SR 3.7.13.3 Verify each EES FBAGS train actuates on an IB months ' PS . actual or simulated actuation signal. Be c4hpl

A 3,7 ED SR 3.7.13.4 Verify one E FBAGS train can maintain a IB months on a -PS:

pfgTLtiVii pressure r E OR inches water gauge STAGGERED TEST .B PS with respect to atmospheric pressure T67th~e BASIS .p3 NQMfirFJtidfTdDig during the post accidcat SI_S 3:7 49'- mode of operation et a ficw rotc ; [20.000) efs. SR 3.7.13.5 Verify one M train can maintain a gpt3Te: g months on a 3.7 44 pressure It$0725 inches water gauge with respect STAGGERED TEST to atmospheric pressure Mthemnae.irnuvidT51 BASIS during the FBVIS mode of operation. B PS-3.7-49 SR 0.7.13.5 "crify c;ch CACS filtcr bgess dr. .pcr can bc [10] acntha B PS cicacd. MARK UP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7 32 5/15/97

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage . 3.7.17 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS {3 .17 Spent Fuel Assembly S Ej[ U 3 7-N LCO 3.7.17 The combination of initial enrichment and burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in Real5M72 shall be within the Acceptable Btenop cB PS: 05iiiFIN of Figure 3.7.171 or in accordance with Specification : iB PSr - 4.3.1.1. APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in R,fil5iH2 of the spent

                                                                                                                      ,                                             eB PS:

fuel storesc pool. gps-ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 NOTE -

                 '                              LC0 not met.                             LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Initiate action to move Immediately the noncomplying fuel assembly from @5H32. B SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILt.ANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.17.1 Verify by administrative means the initial Prior to storing enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is the fuel in accordance with Figure 3.7.171 or assembly in Specification 4.3.1.1. RegiZn12 o B MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7 34 5/15/97

4 Spant Fual Asssmbly Storags 3.7.17 - MiJ Ml ht FIGURE .7_.17 -- 1 )

AGE 10F 1)- CA 3'7'O FUEL ASSEMBLY BURNUP LIMITS - REGION 2 t 45000- - - - - 40000- :- - - - -

ABOVE THE CURVE IS ACCEPTABLE : : :

                        ^ 35000- :             ' ' ' ' - l ' ' ' ' ' I-                                  ' ' ' ' '*
                                                                                                                                              -            ':-                         v'         - - '

3 , - OF'A/V-5 FUEL: : 2 . N * - o

3: . . . . .

2 ' v 30000- - - w g . D - M l ca . . . g . x,25000-u

                                        ~ ' '                       **
                                                                                                       -     ' * ~                            '-

Laj . . . . .

r . . . 5 a ggggg. . .~

                                                                     ,..               ~                       .                        .z.          .        ~               .         .         ~~

2 3 ST.ANDARD FUEL o J . . cn 1 w 15g00

                                                . .                       .      . ~                         ~.               .       .                                ~~~                       ~~          .

W . M . . 8C . LaJ . 3 - w 10000- - - - - i- - - i BELOW THE CURVE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE 5000- - - - - - - - - - - 0- - - - - 4 t ( i i l ' i i 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 FUEL ASSEMBLY INITIAL ENRICHMENT, W/0 U-235 MARK--UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG-1431) 3.7-35 5/15/97

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.7-003 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ITS Bases 3.7.10.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT is modified to clarify that the control room ventilation isolation signal (CRVIS) input to the load shedder emergency load sequencer (LSELS) must be tested to veri'y that the Control Room Air Conditioner fan will actuate through the LOCA sequencer. The , clarification further states that testing of the inhibit circuits for the Control Room ' and Class 1E air conditions is required by Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.12. l ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. SB B 3.7-71

           --.     -                      .                 -          -             -      ..  .~   .

l EREFG CREVS' - B 3.7.10 + . BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.10.2 (continued) . REQUIREMEKTS l properties of the activated charcoal. Specific test Frequencies l and additional information are discussed in detail in the VR. Q 3.9,IO -jg SR 3.7.10.3

qlb This SR verifies that each GREM CRENS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. RiiggtTtrintrrgrfgijalj l mv.-g ,. mr._ .c...--mu- Mrah or:mriie a5F=" Hantammry.V4The Frequency of g months is NeUtgittT)3tijE Intuf -

                      ~ Lyoten - ;r--1-a                -- ;-- -wrane__-u.        -..-. ait g6- h               """"""*"""'m8"""memoamweenreamanurswpyene t                                                                  TE CA 3.7-003                                               3-# ifi'd I"' 9"IU "7 C" 'l2 1

1 SR 3.7.10.4 This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure, and the assumed inleakage rates of the potentially contaminated air. The control- room positive pressure, with respect to p;tcatielly cx,te;;;inetcd adjeccat ereen KhW6]EiEBRIKtmo_spDete,. is periodically tested to verify proper functioning of the GREM CREDfS. During the CRY _H c.xiscacy mode of operation, the GREM CILEYS is designed to pressurize the control room :t UlI25 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to tiii!NYs3He ilitlii2% HIRE eddeccat arca in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The GREM @@ is designed to maintain this positive pressure with one train et e .ekcup fica retc of ?000] cfai. The Frequency of g months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG 0800 (Ref. 4). REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section E4NI!fftRII3Iwoyst"edic

2. FSAR, Chapter 15 Arm,ontrd1RR55m7RYdf5Toijiicjg C6risequEiicu~s "C81t0Tatf5HTH6 dew (continued)

MARX UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 71 5/15/97

I I CA 3.7 003 I

        . INSERT 5B-71a i

This Surveillance Requirement also verifies that a control room ventilation isolation signal ; (CRVIS) will be received by the LOCA sequencer to enable an automatic start of the Diesel ! Generator loads that are associated with a CRVIS. -Verification that these loads will start and i operate at the appropriate step in the LOCA sequencer and that other auto-start signals for these 1 7 loads will be inhibited until the LOCA sequencer is reset is accomplished under Surveillance l Requirement SR 3.8.1.12. I

Q 3.7.10-18

      . INSERT 58-71b The CREVS rrain automatically switches on an .:ctual or simulated CRVIS signal into a     <

CRVIS mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

I:

P Y l_ _

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3,7-004 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ITS Bases 3.7.8.2 and 3.7.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS are modified to delete the requirement for testing during shutdown. The change incorporates l information from a CTS Specification 3/4.7.4, Essential Service Water System, l l change made subsequent to the conversion application. The amendment request ' for this change was submitted to the NRC via ULNRC-3626, dated August 8, l 1997. The NRC letter dated February 24,1998 issued Amendment 121 to the l Callaway Operating License and indicated staff review and acceptability of the l revision to the CTS Specification. , ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 2 7-12, Amendment No.121 Encl. SB B 3.7-57 , II I l l 1 i i I l

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 ESSENTI AL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 0 l- l'3 - A Q 3,7,l-1 LIMITING CONDITICH FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent essential service water (ESW) loops shall be OPERABLE. APPLICA8ILITY: H00E5 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: CNwedMAD oge ,. A With only' one ESW loop OPERAELE7 restore at least'two E5W leeps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY' within the next 6 hours and in COLO 5HUTDCWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS q 3.7. 8 16

4. '7. 4 At least two ESW loops shall be 9e' ated CPERABLE: 08'Ob-b Q, % M @ o(-o l-K a.4 Atleastonceper31daysbyverifyingthateachvalvel(manual, ..

power-cperated, or aut =atic) servicing safety-related equipment

that is net locked, sealed, er otherwise secured in position, is in - -

its cerrect resitice._ / n accin an, a . ica: . :nce p:r n dcy:, :h c 4 t/t./r n.m.m m. , , , e.m. .no o . ,ou -,,.,..,.u.,

                                          .                 .. -          m   ...._,,.m.._.
                                                                                                .a.,,._._._._.<.,...._,,..__:..._

cm.. . , . . . 3.9, -Il oestatien f:r automatic i::1:tien cf the ES'd it th: 11- : ~ r:::er: 34 shPbep 'c-:d /;.- Cre e. nedt't e) O A ~?.~7-CC

b. At least once per 13 scnths ".-- *'a, by verifying that: et%

                      .-                                                      Lwd '1)                                                          o8.o5- A Each automatic valve,,,tersicing ::f:trr:l:ted : quip:ent :r                                               o -og-LG 1) i:clating the n;n nutice,r ::'cty rel:ted pertien of th: :y:::: a .3, ;,3 12 actuates to its correct position cn ; L::: f-Scr er 5 f ty' lajs:.ica tes .--s+;n:1 and en c. :icule.ted High 01'ftr:ntie4                                               * ~ 5 ~*

m..,. _,._ ..,.-._ , o. . , 3. ., a 2)h Each ESV System pump starts automatically [en : Safct, :-lt .;ns-w , 05-10-l A La. Lc;ica Tress re (An' pws; :nc L:s. ef Twe. ten os.oss :. e- 4t-4+a:t One pcr 13 enth; curi~; chutde'en, by performing : "H/M9. cg. M GAL 2IaTIO" :f-thc di f f:r:nti:1 prc::u- # nct =ent:tica for se:::::: g g N' is:1:tien :f r.e-ETd v S :i ~ r --ss-m. ' Q'3.*76-)) 0~^ C n. seeH i ct 2 zn .n - f re;utn y .aywa4*ec fer "ycle ! ;~ vids4 ::.a. WPve4444nG: i: perfo- ,cd pri0r .c restart 'Ollering in: '# r : c:ft:I# 79-cutage c* Ju e 1,1985, -nichever :: cur: " rct. ".: provw+ ens--s4-. Speci'icat'cn ' 12 are m:et 're perf:~-r ce c' Sie su~efilance.

3/4 7-12 k:encment Nc. S CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 W Me

FES-24-1998 15:01 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4 7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM c 1 A

                                                                         ; Q 3.'?.l-l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent essential service Water (ESW) loops shall be OPERAELE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4 ACTION: @ (f,. xn.ca,+ a+helad) 01-s a-A With only one ESW loop OPERABLE. restore at least two ESW locas to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within t1e next 6 hours and in COLD SHlITDOWN within the follcwing 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS G 3.'1.9-\ 4.7.4 At least two ESW loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: in H a Sim p d h 08'7 )5 D8 A a.* At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valveV(manual. #'/'#7'A power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed. or otherwise secured in position. is in _ -- 1t,s,, c,.orr,e.c.t..pos,iti.on, n, n . .ru o u -r

               .g u von.. ,9 wq m       ,
                                                  .m . m. In ;d.di,t.i0r.,
                                                              , c e. . , , u. m 3       :t 1:::t-cnc;J.y_r
                                                                                  .m.,   ,-,~.,                , . , _ , , . , , .31 days er (ff.}. ]/

g.. g,9,g_,- m.. u.nen t.4 L. wo i w au Lume 6. n o v w iv u v . v67.s un .g w us au

             -ccmpresscr; hell bc ;crformcd,                                                                                                 9 9

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that: l reee r Eachautomaticvalveher"+dcing:;f;ty-rclated;;gipmem,cr-97 s-

1) 3 9,og.g tc!: ting th n:n nucl;;r ;;fety relat d pcitica of the system 03'7*8-actuates to its correct position on :. L;;;-cf Powcr ci Saici,r

                         !nj:cti n test ti;nal                  n. On         .4mtdated High 01'f renti:1
                       -Prc;:ur t:,tcign:Fand
                                                         .zG,s_ ;r                                                                          09-or-m-/

2 Each ESW System pump starts automatically0c Safety :nja: tic 8.h~j,%. '

                      -L,;;;-cf '0,wcr.

_ .. __ .n to:t _ 1;n:1, :nd during shotdenn ca 5 cw Suc;ica - m mw c mn rumpu .

                                                        .aL_    L..   ...,pn,,,4,,,,       e , A . i. , f    e..-    * = a . *= T o . t  E A+
                                ...en .1o                                              . '. n m a'-t vnuw w .un v.
        .                       g ,,                                                                                                                   -

i, _m . ,6 ..~omaa w re. ..,m,

                 ~                          rm    _e thc diffcrcntial prc::ur: in:trumentati:n for :st;metic i;cl: tion Ofb- 4 /--L G
              -the ETn to the sir : mpress?!.

fM. [09-09-LG

  #~he specified 10 mcach frc:;uency may be wened for Cyclc I prcvided ch:                                                                   Of-/4-A sur'/:1' lance 1: pcrformed pricr to restart fc'icning the first rcfuePr.S cat:;e cr Jun 1.1000. whichever cc;ur; first. 'The provi;icn; cf Spccific tica 4.0.2 cre is:ct fic perform.nce cf thi; ;giveill5ccc.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-12 Amendment No. 8.121

CTS 3.7.4 Footnotes and Inserts ACTION INSERT-

                 - @ Note:. Enter appli' cable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.4.6,                    09-02-A "RCS Loops - Mode 4", for Residual Heat Removal loops made                       .

inoperable by ESW.

                   @ Note: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.1,                       09-02-A "AC Sources Operating", for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ESW.

s ? 4.7.4.a Insert .

Note: Isolation of flow to individual components does not render the 09-07-A ESW System inoperable.

4.7.4.b.1) Insert I in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position 08-05-A 4.7.4b.1) and b.2) Insert J - - 69- o 6-TR I on an actual or simulated actuation signal 00-00-TRt-Q 3.3.6-16 II ' 8.

MM . . . B 3,7.8 BASES SURVEILI.ANCE SR 3.7.8.2 (continued) REQUIREMENTS ; DSCREllBIR1"B!!EE15BWD2m The M lgil[EH!lpti is a rerr.elly egretir.;; Bt2EtB5lIliMkT2R system that cannot be fu'lly actuated as part of normal testing. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under inistratiye controls. The 3 month Freque gneisbasedonj, 6-51 rfo th s 5 vei rt co t1 ohs t y dA i.?-WY ni out ge 1 f r an 1n tra nt rv lla e _ re_ rf __ _ t the a r_ a _ r Operating experience has shown that t'hese components usuaT1y pass the Surveillance when performed at the E month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. 5

                                                                                                                                          % 65                  P 3M" 5R 3.7.8.3                                           CA 3M4 0                                             g4 l                                                  This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the M r%i pumps on an actual or simulated actuation signal.                                                   ie t!!3NME The M ESILB~yEle is a rer ;.11y egretir.;; EIElllRR teethBR!f system that cannot be fully actuated as part of normal                                                        f testi     during normal operation. The E month Frequency is based g%.

6-5 pergreitmesurve111ance4under ttu con tha apply during a unit andQ potential for an .w ' CA 3,9-00 4 unplanned transient if t _ eillance Iwere performed with the reactor at power. Operati experience l has shown that these CA 3 7-004 3S.6 -1 components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the _ g month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint. s CA 3 7-W4 REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section I

2. FSAR, Section E1!"Co~ittifflitl BEE!lBRM

3. FSAR, Section 6MNtes@

l l MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 57 5/15/97

  .- .-. - . - . ~ _ - .           .     -   .   . - . . . . - . . . . . - . . - . . . - - . . . . - - . . _ . . . ..- - . .            -. . . ..

l CA 3.7-004 i

INSERT SB-57a l l \

4 engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. i E 3 l-l l-l 1 l l i I l l l 1 i l i l l l t l

4 - Q 3.7.10-18 INSERT SB-57b The CREVS train automatically switches on an actual or simulated CRVIS signalinto a CRVIS mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.7-005 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ITS 3.7.1, Table 3.7.1-2, Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings, and Bases : SR 3.7.1.1, are modified for MSSV set pressure tolerances. The change I incorporates information from CTS Specification 3/4.7.1, Turbine Cycle and CTS Specification 2.2, Table 2.2-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Trip l Setpoints, changes made subsequent to the conversion application. The amendment request for these change was submitted to the NRC via

                           - ULNRC-3627, dated August 8,1997. The NRC letter dated October 2,1998, issued Amendment 128 to the Callaway Operating License and indicated staff review and acceptability of the revision to the CTS Specification.

1 ATTACHED PAGES: 1 i Att. 5 CTS 2.0 - ITS 2.0 ! Encl. 2 2-4

i i Att.13 CTS 3/4.7 - ITS 3.7 Encl. 2 7-3 Encl. 5A 3.7-4 Encl. 58 B 3.7-6 l

TABIE 2.2-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSlEH INSTRllMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS 9 r 5EN50R

                                                              -lGTAt                                                   -ERROR                                                                                                                                   #~#2 ~ ' g E>

FUNCTIONAL UNIT ---Att0WATEi. (iin -b- -fft}~ -TR44LsrTon!ur. ALLOWABIE val.UE 2- 0 3- A

      ,<             1. Manual Reactor Trip                 &A--                              4-A-                           M-A-                                      A-              N.A c-ii               2. Power Range Neutron Flux
      -4

a. liigh Setpoint M Sfr - 4100% cf itfP" s112.3% of RTP*

b. Low Setpoint 3- 56- 4-- s25! cf RTF s28.3por RTP*

Power Range. Neutron Flux. +- 6- - r4% of RTF- s6.3Jof RTP* with r Y* 3. liigh Positive Rate with a tiac a time constant

                                                                                                                                                                           -esisteiit 22 -   22 seconds                                                           cA 31-N s ecnds-

4. Deleted S. Intermediate Range. - 17.0 41- + - 325% of RTP s35.3 of RTP*

Neutron Flux N

1. 6. Source Range. Neutron Flux -17.0 -10.01- s105 cps 's1.6 x 10' cps .

7. Overtemperature AT -ft-A- N-A-- -N-A'. Scc Ncici See Note t- I A-M-@

8. Overpower AT -N-#- -ft-A- -th8r- Sea Nete 3= See Note 4. a-OS-LG R 9. Pressurtzer Pressure-Low -S --2-21 0- 21305 png =1874 psig 1

10. Pressurizer Pressure-liigh -3.125- M 3-0-- s23SS psig 52393 psig n -

643*"I'O#l P 11. Pressurizer Water Level-liigh 4 3_ --2-4 .24-. -02% of- 593.8% of instrument

        ..O                                                          hCA3/1-00d                                                                                              Mstruent spm    span 1 m M.            12. Reactor Coolant Flow-low           5-                             4                           4-6

4 90 uf levir 288.8% of loop 3 4;ini.;u:r minimum measured

        ,  n   7 3                                                                                                                                                            92suret! "~?'-  flow **

nP t) ; ., i

      ' U )f
        ;    . t

RTP = RAll D TilfRMAl. POLER lg ** Minimum Measured I' low = 95.660 gpm

           -     i

TABLE 3 7-2 cA 5.7-005 , STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING

t TRIFICESIZE l Loco 1 loco 2 loco 3 Leco a V055 V065 .V075 V045 1185 ps19 16. sq. in. oHl-LG V056 V066 V076 V046 1197 psig 16.0 . in.

V057 V067 V077 V047 1210 psi 9 16.0 sq. in. V058 V068 V078 V048- 1222 ps19 16.0 sq. i . , V059 V069 V079 V049 1234 psig 16.0 sq. in. , h i- 10 -LCr m

     -     - r m . ~ ,. .,--,....._    . ,,,, . .~...; .- - =>- - -      2___   a r$,5 l2 .5/ 3 % f,4,i " $hE3i2Q @ ~iiG 2 IE [ $.$((,], y Y a~ hounc       -

6etting tolerance is -3/-1% of the nominal ~ setpoint. Tne as-left lift setting tolerance is li of the ncminal setpoint. I Ch 3,7-60 5 l 1 c4 3,%005 CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-3 Amendment No.128 L

I HSSVs . 3.7.1 Table 3.7.12 (page 1 of 1) Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings LIFT ING 8-i VALVE NUMBER (p;ig 2 n; (Pst3 + 5l-I"l0 l

                                                                                                                                           ^-                              l STEAM GENERATOR CA ~3.%o5
                 #1                           #2                   M                   fj!                                                                                 !

i 350055 AsV0065 AsV0025 Annons ms i B PS. M W. AlEEiB 4HIIEEE E l l MJ M M M & l 1 ABBW58 M M M M ABV0059 ABVOO69 Jude ABV00E[ M l I l MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.7 4 5/15/97

   ._.                              ~_ _            _ ._       _              _ _ _ __ __                     _       ._ __

MSSVs B 3.7.1 o3.1.1if BASES M ACTIONS g1and .2 (continued) required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREHERTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program M . "e AS"I Cedc. Ocction )(I (Ref. 4), requircs that s;fcty end rclicf velic tests be pcrforacd in ec;;rdence with #CI/AS,"C = 11007 (Rcf. 5). According t; Refcccace 5, the following tests arc requircd.

                            ;.           'li;uel u sin; tion,                                                                           ;

b. Sc;t tightre;s dctcrainetion,

c. Sctp; int pressure dctermination Clift ;ctting).

d. Ca,plic. rec with ancr's sat tightress criteri;, end

                             *           '!crification of the hiercing dcVicc integrity on bele. recd iL'. R i.
                *ggg         Ihc NiCI/AS"E Stenderd rCquircs th;I ell ,';lvcs UC tCstcd cycry 5 ycc.rs. c.nd ; aini;r.ua ;f 20t ;f the v;1va k tcsted cycry
                   ,f 24 r;nths. The ASME Code specifies the activities and
             +3/             frecuencies necess                  to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7.12 allows a[t, X etpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY.

newcycr. tre V;1vcTMi@dt_ Q_ ICdurir? tre Su_ryci ysacc] ge,N olloW [GE__dIi [ f(45.Sutt gQ

                              , . =:r. . . _ .
                                                         .-..m......  . . .   . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ ._..._. e CA 3,'7-00 6            FAfiL*694 tGd?FMJG ebM195h*F-CA 3. -00Cw This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be correctedMIEtranecessary3 to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.

(continued) MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 6 5/15/97 \

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVdR SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.7-008 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Because the MSIVs are not exempt from the ASME Code, the Bases discussion of SR 3.7.2.1 is revised to delete the statement that the MSIVs are not tested at power because they are exempt. This is consistent with the Callaway IST Program. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. 5B B 3.7-13 l 1 l 1 l l I l l

MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS _ _m. ._... .. . .u.; n._ ,,,m..___..-. The MSIV

          .                     WrT~"- time is assumed in the accident and containment analyses.

1so[a.bh This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit

                 ,,3 to operation following a refueling outage. The MSIVs should not                                                                    i

k 3* 7' be tested at power. since even a part stroke exercise increases ;

j ; the risk of a valve closure when the unit is generating power. c4 3,7.ggg sa tstefat r t ar e t rom {

                                                    .S            io X (Ryf.5.r--           ir        nt du ng per io in                         '

3 1 r2 4 The Frequency is in accordance with the Wm p@ t- 'a.- er [10] w aths. Ra [10] enth Trcqu;xy fer v;17; cissur; ti.e is tend en tre r;facling cy;1;. Ogr;tir-cagri;re; he; ;hea. th;t trax ;; .peaants ;;211y p;; tra i Surveillera; wter, grfe.ad et the [10] enth Treqs.aj.

rar;fere, tre Trcqurai is e;;;pt;bi; fr,a. ; r;li;tility j

standgint. This test is conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and pressure. ;s dixu;xd in ",;f;rcre; 5 car;ising r;@ir;nats. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3. to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated. M A o.p .v M 4 & i F.R r m.i.d.M a.i. ,5t - 4 I,q, u . o . u npt.a r.1,. N . . p . : .. !. . . .u y.3 i, n~ : f.' . s .N.e,,. p'; . [,j . r-;. .. g . 3 a gap.,q.p. 5.f

ti l

                                        .,            ' hi'@ :l M 0 Qt'*' J P.V t *1 .14
                                                      .                                        5  01. . 9 M h.

4* - 1Dl .; m-fdm .. ./

                                     . ., 6 , p .. . . . y.,, . r "
                                                               .        r.g> (.y 3 i .3 6,;.3. J .. ,ig . i a n ,. - . i . s. n , u y.;, n           g.

slREktBMGSittklHTdQ4TDlBili2]IMMilukticEDmfR25% GRitMBBut2M24NSiaDRIltIEEfMIDWEIDIEBHl3BE!mr3trentm cientifEttEtstsidaMtttemtesttm*ardittiisisttEarmtattr6t ELWesXtitttralMMid*#pt@ttillitWD10DEtllBERtt3MRCrormfrHIB;tiiB SEET1MralToits?5Pdelaref7tlIttimtontfinivue.:r.aucerstabTtsit (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 13 5/15/97 i

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.7-009 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: The Bases discussion for SR 3.7.3.1 is revised to delete a statement about

                    . quarterly stroke requirements for the valves during operation in MODES 1 and 2.

This statement is not consistent with the Callaway IST Program. ATTACHED PAGES: Encl. SB B 3.7-21

NFIVs .,~ ..... u.. m ,,,....w. .,7r. ....w a B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS E R.1 and E G.2 (continued) If the MFIV(s) end "i"'.'(;) ed the axeisted b3 pen velv;(;; cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or closed, er inleted within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, h_e unit _must bejlaced in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, a n

                                              ~ ~ ~4 within 1Y murgThe allowed Completion Times are N3g0M                     g i

rTasonable, conditionsbased on powar operating experience, to reach the requiredg g,pfjp O 37 9 unit from full and without challenging unit systems. conditions in an orderly manner Q 37,6-/ SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1

 . REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each MFIV,~ " ", .ad us;;;ted b>p;n v;1;;; is s 7 I seconds
                                       ; islet;d sta;tien ;igal                        . - -     -,^ei~   .                   .L.      - ..      w'*
                                                                                                                 .       The MFIV emH4FRV closure ti                 assumed in the accident and containment analyses. Thi urveillance is normally performed upon returning gh Q A                    the it to operati n following a refueling outage. These valves
                                           .euld at       .,s tested at power since even a part strokNe

( g '50' g c se incre risk of a valve closure with the unit @ ra ing power i Y co is nt w t 3 3f'/009 g{f ks., ka 2 - C A 3.7-009 The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the - :i.v E

                                                               . er [10] sath;. Oe [13) susth Tre,;.cx., for velv; cienr; i; b;xd ca th; .;f. cling cycl;. Ogretia;
                                       ;;,grica;; ha ;he.r thet trax ca,pxat; us;11y gn the
                                       .r.i ww i a s .i rww wissai ywa a w, susw.      .w    birw LawJ vuswi s bi a . .-                         .
                                                  - x , , . 3f y.m m. u uw , ; . . .. . s . : - g
                                                   .                                                                                     6, -

e, J : t~ a -

3 b} je &Qu WL-i'.1@ M 91 a U.Ja! UJc . / L W7('. s sim ' .a 7.w rX.M.rucq.c .c).A t.5 ?w.; @ay.w.

D -l h is i<d! ?,r 8,8. M : . h {aj = iah.je..dg h p] M a8 t'. = O W N 5: b i- { P f *>- MREEl!ERlR3tBElntTJMIES5ttt21DtlEt5lEIldl111feb52XlRi83.12t'

                                       .N'RMM32DMtuG (continued) i MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES                                       B 3.7 21                                                                      5/15/97                I l

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ML20154Q119

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