Text

Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.3,3.4,3.5,3.6,3.7,3.8 & 4.0, Converting to ITS
	ML20205L090
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	04/07/1999
From:	; UNION ELECTRIC CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20205L081	List: ML20205L090; ULNRC-04007, Submits follow-up Items Related to Proposed Conversion to ITSs Sections 3.3,3.4,3.6 & 3.7.Encl Includes mark-ups of ITS Sections 3.5,3.6 & 3.8.Suppl to Ltr Will Be Provided at Later Date;
References
	NUDOCS 9904140135
	Download: ML20205L090 (150)
	v • d • e

_ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

PM Instrumentation B 3.3.3

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BASES L

ACTIONS L1 (continued) event requiring PM instrument operation and the availability.of-alternate means to obtain the required information.

MlementatMofga31alterJat@etho@3f i nn torJes11siteetted g y m ,;

Kiot3#1u!aMiste mne r s a g l = M iser t Continuous operation wi t h k red s noperable in ]

' Function is not acceptable becaDse tne alternate indications may /,

not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applieo to the PM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of' a // nopera M PM Function channel of the Function limits the risk that the.

w 11 be in a degraded condition should'an accident dN' occur. Condi on C is modified by a Note that excludes hydrogen monMer ana _ , channels.

El i

dondition D applies when two hydrogen mon %er analyzeg channels are inoperable. Required Action D.1 requires restoring one hydrogen monMer analyset channel to OPERABLE status within 72_ hours. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Cn=nletion Time -- is reasonable based on the ng y -

Ka L y t os c tr ion or al f ov i o H far em ed ci c- A1 .

n ikelyg ,,g y jg eymf that a L6CA (which would cause core damage) would occur during this time.

L.1 Condition E applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition .C or D are not met. Required Action E.1 requires entering the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.31 for the channel iurwiiately. The applicable L Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of-Condition C or D, and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition E is entered for that channel and provides for transfer ,

L to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

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9904140135 990407

. ' .W PDR ADOCK 05000483 PDR a (continued)

P MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES 'B 3.3 170 5/15/97 J

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1 PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 cmi Pc ,1,

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i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS test verifies that the channel responds to measure parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. This SR is modified by a Note that excludes neutron detectors. " - - ' " " ' - - - " " ' - -

r.;;t.;r. d;tecter; i' ;g;ificd ir, th; ";;;; -f ' 00 3.3.1. !

"";;;ter Trip , .

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~6de F 1 treguency is based on operating experience and

$l7y _ consiste y with the typical industry refueling cycle. Dur_ing performancefofdthelCHANNEL"!CALI_BRATIONF,g t _he M insegt 6 7' ~z.y RadiationILeyelHHigh,RangeXmonitors;tyergication;of.J1he;15E23 e

u gni -s lav'and' alarm function tis M ujredjf cg. 7, ,7_gfg f TNTERT ~TA T.*T.3.D N I ~D C- 2,7.-ed.f.

1 REFERENCES . 'Jr.it 3F;ific decurar.t (c.s. . "r ";suletery Cuid: 1.^7 SE", letter'. ESAR_IMpendi IS".". dM 2; NRCTLetteMCallawayTlanti,1UnitMfEmergencylRespgnse Capab111tyEConformanceitojegulato$Juide51E97J Revisiong.*EB;ggYoungblooditgiDIEZ chnellEds@

Aprib30p9851 33 UENRCf30233ated]{ar20399E i;. Callaway10LIAmendmentJg2103Jdat. .Oct_ober*20Z19952 5;E- Regulatory Guide 1.97, dete- ReyE EDecemberg980; 6;3- NUREG 0737. Supplement 1. "THI Ac ion Items."

7; FSARjSection~7A'.'3;37 M

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in We C#gyggj, M W A7 roAl of /,,y 97T-eoto, S. RAA SecNon /P. 2. / _ g y,g.g

9. NWAEG-dP2p Co llow [ER See hn D2 ~Gnr i MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 h . 1 [3" YN#*'" ygj

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f re-< ~ INSERT SR 3.3.3.2

c. ,

Whenever an RTD is replaced in Functions 2 or 3, the next required CHANNEL CALIBRATION ~/2 ~47-4 of the RTDs is accomplished by an inplace cross calibration that compares the other sensing elements with the recently installed sensing element. Whenever a core exit thermocouple is replaced in Functiog4 he next required CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the core exit g 7,'3 A /

thermocouples is acco ilished by an inplace cross calibration that compares the other sensing elements with the rece ly installed sensing element.

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l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.3-32 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Improved TS [] Table 3.3.6-1 is changed to be consistent with current TS [3.3.2 Functonal Unit 3.c and current TS 3.9.9). Subfunctions [b-d] of containment radiation are stricken since only the gaseous [] channels provide the actuation function

[and the bracketed setpoint is changed to reflect plant-specific requirements). [The Actuation Logic was split to reflect the SSPS, with only MODE 1-4 Applicability, and BOP-ESFAS portions and associated SR requirements in the current TS.]

Comment: {DC} New CTS Action 37 is proposed. It is not clear how the new Action 37 relates to the functions (including Action 18 that it modifies), that deletion of the requirement to close purge valves has been justified or how the new Action 37 relates to the ITS markup.

{WC} The proposed setpoint shown as footnote (c) to ITS T 3.3.6-1 is not an acceptable limit. Revise Function 2.a (T3.3.6-1) applicability to include footnote (a).

{CW) The proposed setpoint shown as footnote (c) to ITS T 3.3.6-1 represents a change to the CTS which is neither identified nor evaluated. Revise T3.3-6 to include particulate radiation monitors to be consistent with CTS. See 01-43A.

{WC, CW) Explain the design justification for not including Table 3.3.6-1 Note "a" in the applicability for actuation logic and relays. Specified logic must support radiation isolation function in the table. If the logic supports Phase A Isolation (T3.3.6-1, FS) then it should not be listed in this table. A single listing of the logic in ESFAS Table 3.3.2-1 is acceptable.

{WC, CW} Add new SR for BOP ESFAS actuation logic test with note that continuity check may be excluded.

{WC} Adopt ISTS for Required Action A.1 and Condition B trains / channels. l FLOG RESPONSE (original):

The first comment was accepted for DCPP at the 9/15/98 meeting; however, Table 3.3.6-1 has been corrected to include the single REQUIRED CHANNEL for MODE 6 and (a) applicabilities, and to delete the original inserted note (b). l 1

in response to the second comment, Wolf Creek has revised ITS Table 3.3.6-1 Trip i I

Setpoint footnote for the Containment Purge Isolation Function to include trip setpoint value from the CTS ### footnote. The details in the CTS footnote on the methodology for changing the setroint has been moved to the ITS SR Bases.

In response to the third comment, Callaway personnel explained during meetings with NRC staff on September 16,1998 that, unlike other FLOG utilities, the containment

gaseous and particulate radiation monitors covered by CTS LCO 3.3.3.1 as listed in CTS Table 3.3-6 serve only an RCS leakage detection function. These monitors have no .

containment purge isolation function. The containment purge exhaust gaseous radiation monitors covered by ITS Table 3.3.6-1 are not covered in the Callaway CTS. Operability and surveillance requirements for these monitors are covered in FSAR Section 16.11.2.4 and Tables 16.11-5 and 16.11-6. The setpoint for these monitors is established by FSAR Table 11.5-3, as noted in Enclosure 1 (sort by ITS page 23 of 27). The wording of footnote (c) will be retained. Comment Number Q 1-43-A was resolved at the September meetings.

The fourth comment was resolved during meetings with NRC staff on September 16, 1998, as reflected in Reference 6. After further review of the fourth comment with plant personnel, ITS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table 3.3.7-1 are revised to reflect the BOP-ESFAS actuation logic and associated SR requirements in CTS Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2. The Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (Solid State Protection System)

Functions (2) are not required to be duplicated in ITS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table 3.3.7-1 since this function is redundant to the ESFAS Containment Phase "A" Isolation Function.

The Surveillance Requirements (SR 3.3.6.3 and SR 3.3.7.4 for performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST; SR 3.3.6.5 and SR 3.3.7.5 for performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST) associated with Function 2 in ITS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table 3.3.7-1 are deleted.

JFD 3.3-39 has been revised to reflect this justification. DOC 2-57-A was initiated to reflect changes in CTS Table 3.3-3 to delete Functional Units 3.c.2) and 9.b since these functions are redundant to Functional Units 3.c.4) and 9.d.

In response to the fifth comment, footnote (b) to ITS Table 3.3.6-1 dea . Q the ACTUATION LOGIC TEST has been added to SR 3.3.6.2 based on the c, ,3es to ITS Table 3.3.6-1 to reflect only the BOP-ESFAS actuation logic and associated SRs.

Corresponding Bases changes have been made.

In response to the sixth comment, WCGS has revised ITS 3.3.6 Required Actiorm.1 to reflect NUREG-1431. ITS 3.3.6 Condition B was revised in response to Comment Number Q 3.3-30.

FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): As a supplemental response to the fourth comment, the Callaway and Wolf Creek ITS 3.3.6 and 3.3.7 Reference lists are revised to delete the references to SLNRC 84-0038, consistent with the previous changes to delete SR 3.3.6.5 and SR 3.3.7.5.

Based on comments from the NRC reviewer, Required Action C.1 in LCO 3.3.2 and Required Action B.1 in LCO 3.3.6 of the Callaway ITS are being revised to: " Place and maintain containment purge supply and exhaust valves closed." ITS Table 3.3.7-1 is also revised to only reflect credited isolation actuation functions. In addition, Required Action Q.1 (P.1 as a result of Comment Number O 3.3-04)in LCO 3.3.2 of the ITS is being revised to: " Declare associated auxiliary feedwater pump (s) inoperable." The latter change is addressed for WCGS under Comment Number Q 2-37.

As discussed with the NRC reviewer on February 17,1999 and March 4,1999, Wolf Creek is maintaining the CTS requirement to only have one required radiation monitoring channel. ITS 3.3.2 Condition C, ITS 3.3.6 Conditions, and ITS Table 3.3.7-1 and associated Bases are revised to adopt the CTS Actions for containment purge isolation.

__ . .. ____o

l The ITS 3.4.15 Bases are revised to direct the operator to LCO 3.3.6 for the loss of a required containment himosphere adioactivity monitor.

FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): As discussed with the NRC reviewer on March 10, 1999, ITS 3.3.2 Required Action C.1 and ITS 3.3.6 Requi/ed Action B.1 are being revised to state: " Place and maintali, containment purge supply and exhaust valves in closed position." This is consistent with ITS 3.3.6 Required Action C.1.

In addition, DOC 2-45-LG has been rev: sed to delete references to SR 3.3.6.5 and SR 3.3.7.5 since they were previously deleted.

! ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, page 3/4 3-20 and INSERT 3/4 3-20E Enclosure 3A, page 24 Enclosure 3B, page 19 Enclosure SA, pages 3.3-26 and 3.3-60 Enclosure 58, pages t 3.3-127 and INSERT B 3.3-127, and B 3.3-195 Enclosure 6A, pages 5 and INSERT 6A-5 I

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) :

L TABLE NOTATION

'2-22-4 i

,m # TripfunctionmaybeblockedinthisMODEbelowtheP-11(Pressurizergg,g_gg j

.y ,

Pressure Interlock) Setpoint. j

1. Trip functier cutcr; tic;115 bled:d :bov: " 11 :nd [ y be blocked below M P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked. $2.743

1. 1. Trip function may be blocked just before shutdown of the last operating main feedwater pump and restored just after the first main feedwater pump is put into service (following its startup trip test). _l i

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

One in Separation Croup 1 :nd cn *a Separatier orcup A 7_jgg

~ Octu;tica lo-ic- 1 The dc-energiz5rtion oftonc ndcr; c oftr;in th: cf 30F ::FAAnncis iaoper;bie.

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--ecteeti:n S t a t ==n* 91 : lay; epp lie ; both runction;l Units 6.c nd C.g in thi: :::e.

e provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable in Modes 5 and g 1

- $- - < -9 Only t e chutdown wten of one requercer i: requir:d to bc Of RABL l ,%

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Mcd:: 5 :nd 5 whi G ceciespcods tc the CICIADL: Emergency Dic:cl * .

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++ Operability is only required for associated OPERABLE bus in Modes 5 2-//-A and 6. - - -

+++ Each MSFIS channel (train) requires a minimum of two programmable logicchs/NH controllers to_be OPERAB_1.E _

m (a) Feedwater 1sblation only. bO.3

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ACTION STATEMENTS

-#M l i ith the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the " mur /-o+.LG ACTION tegurre 14 ChannElsyCI

/ "ACL: rehuirc; cot, be in at least HOT STANDBY within/-+y A 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN 'ithin the following 30 hour3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months s: p_2y 4

~

Wf however, one channel may be b assed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for

_ 3/M-N surveillance testing " ' "hm. rovided the /~U'lS i other channel is OPERABLE. 4 ##9 a-a g% '"~A om %A/~ ~[le che/.-*

rm, n.e-Xu wN Ib py-g l With the number of OPERABLE Anguru Mu-bcr cf-Channels, operation may" proceed until performance of channels one less than the Total the next required ANALOG CHANNEL ,iRATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in v . tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION 16 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Jct;l-- /-f7-A

egu,rel t ;bc, vi-Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypass condition-;nd the i E .imum Ch:nn;is OPEPISLE requir =cnt is act. One additional /-0+-4G l

/--U-l_r channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillarce

-- rww f-/r-A1 g yy,}- testing' gegr - - d s/+ 3-no> ;gy p&,% 4 ,,.y With less ~~ than nnthsmMinimum

_ . ~ -Channels

)tIERABLE ~ I ACTION 17 -

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INSERT 3/4 3-20E g g,3-72 rh With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Required Channels for Functional Unit 3.a.2), immediately ~ Myysrtygwpecy:pdf32jVJ2f place ad minbrn -Ha c&rma,J-purge ,, 17

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CHANGE

..-., NUMER NSE DESCRIPTION 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months A0T has expired. Since this change does not affect the application of this ACTION Statement, it is considered to be administrative in nature.

2 45 LG Consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1, current TS Table 4.3 2 Note (3) is revised.to move the "during refueling" clarification of the 18 month surveillance interval for the seven slave relays to.the Bases for ITS SR 3.3.2.6 SR1 M T h. and SR 63 3.% 3.1.2.14. 'h S'#~ '

b,2.Is 2 46 'LS 42 In ITS 3.3.1 and ITS 3.3.2, separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. Where the Required Channels are specified on a per bus or per pump basis, the applicable Condition may be entered separately for each bus or pump. If the current TS contain different formats under the " Total Number of Channels" and " Minimum Channels OPERABLE" columns, i.e. if a per bus or per pump format is used under the " Total Number of Channels" column and that format is not used under the " Minimum Channels OPERABLE" column, then the conversion to the ITS format must examine whether relaxations are involved for cases where more than one inoperable channel may be allowed by the ITS format but where the current TS would require entry into CO 3.0.3. Three Functional Units in the current TS must u examined in more detail.

For the RCP Undervoltage and RCP Underfrequency Functional Units 14 and 15 in current TS Table 3.31, the " Total Number of Channels" column lists ~4-2/ bus" and the

" Minimum Channels OPERABLE" column lists "3". Current ACTION Statement 6 allows continued operation with one channel inoperable as long as it is tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and the three remaining channels are OPERABLE. Two inoperable channels result in an LC0 3.0.3 entry, requiring preparations to exit the Applicability and go to MODE 2 at the time the second channel becomes inoperable. ~

Functions 12 and 13 of ITS Table 3.3.11 list "2 per bus" under the " Required Channels" column. With separate Condition entry per bus, ITS 3.3.1 Condition M would allow !

one inoperable channel per bus as long as it is tripped I within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . This would allow a second channel on the other bus to be inoperable for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months prior to the commencement of any additional action,1-.e. either placing j

. the second channel in trip which would result in a reactor trip if permissive P 7 were satisfied or reducing power

,? a _ , (the termination point of the power reduction is discussed separately in CN 119 LS 8). During this 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , the DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 24 5/15/97

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ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 e4 N 44ve

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ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

[

One train inoperabie.h C. s -- --- - NOTE - --- - --

% One train may be bypassed B Q%

for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for W surveillance testing

? provided the other train is 3.3-/ff

--NrrE --- 2 w 0PERABLE. NC-3.7-0/1 b;

Onl y reguiredIf Snc5n (full w* M flifh)* " ' * ' ' ' * ' J g .,

g 2 A-[2)[I",,,8 #" 1- C.2 Restore train to OPERABLE 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months $f. 7--32

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f a eguind Ac-If of L . ' 3, " nfainmed" og f k r.C0 r,/d/on , " A, ,

C.fi Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months con +,r c.d p rukk. '

Va e r tbade irvfuQlyy l '

S

e/c/fon frakanda-hk/ f"~~~~3 42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months n C.y.2 Be in MODE 5.

M L s '

D. One' channel inoperable. @ ---- -- NOTE -- ------

+-- The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to

[~2? /4 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance B testing of other channels.

b.l Place channel in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 08

[/ es d anIAdler/afn l D.2.1 Be in H0DE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months C-on$aintnen}- e. \

l !"/flf'andek a M Valwe e o. red n' -

a - JI D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hows

$ 9.7-32 (continued)

MARKUP 0F WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 26 5/15/97 a

Containment Purge er.d Sh;;;t Is@lation Instrumentation >

PS . - !

_., 3.3.6

+~.,

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME g g ........N0TE--

Only applicable in JQ g

nter ;ppiteetde g i',ie} g p g red Immediately gg (*Ad

,9 MODE 1, 2. ,. er 4. _

mca,, . 7. . ,

.............. ..... . . 7;;. . . ., .;tig

,, , ._ b. ,_A ;. 7, ,;;,; _- ' ., y n, g ...... .

.n One or more Functions Qg. ontainment withoneormoremanuaTelwelt purge '.d 1.;;;t / '

PSc

^ [1;ti;r.Vy or automatic actuationl 02 7--70 isol ve trains inoperable. k ((M a ow 7s>

T w er arc Both 73.3 32.;

radiation monitoring channels inoperable.

flace a,)ni,dmin 3.3-39 x confara,maad pays & 2.3-23 ru ly a,J ext Required Action and gjpg, g,/

I ,, n associated Completion ,. ,

Time of Condition A not s met.

/ (continued) ma ?

, . pj.

~~~,, e ,*

HARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 60 5/15/97

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2

.n pq '

BASES ACTIONS C.1.Wg@ C.2 C,1/, an/ O 7 2 3 4 7.2-7:2.

(continued)

Condition C applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the following functions:

. SI:

. Containc.ent Spray:

. Phase A Isolation:

. Phase B Isolation: and

. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump.

e ZhisERT~8 13-l3*7 023-32 This action addresses thh train orientation of the SSPS and the master and slave relays.V If one train is inoperable. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not arply. This is done by placing the unit in at least MODE 3 within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months total time) and in MODE 5 within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months (42 hours4.861111e-4 days 0.0117 hours 6.944444e-5 weeks 1.5981e-5 months totcl time). The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience.

to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one train to be bypassed for up to ! Fours for surveillance testing.

provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability analysis assumption of '.lCA" 10271 " A Ref. 8 that 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is the average time required to perform channel surveillance.

D.I. D.2.1. and D.2.2 Condition D applies to:

. Containment Pressure-High 1:

a 3 :, I (continued) )

l MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 127 5/15/97

INSERT B 3.3-127 7pg

':iw 1-- nogly an} exhaus-F Conta'nment isolation Phase A is the primary signal to ensure closing of the containment purgeWalves. If one Phase A train is inoperable, operation may continue as long as th

/yerions M }573w uee mi neerwawe maaemmerenstwtrTaMrs2af:7 AdRequired Action C.1 is modified by a Note that this Action is only required if Containment Phase A lsolation (Function 3.A.(2))is inoperable.

ty 1- 1 MGWYQl'njiy'Tl1L4 valva}

m m o c m i s A at A sf & kn n 3, r c hreJy , 9,n rz n +,

4

_a.*

4

.i 1

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. ___________________________j

l Containment Purge and Shause Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 i

rywN%9

~

BASES ACTIONS y _.n iued) 0 2.3-7+

_ter 1Ca freco itio thatit tema ing; . nne _ill tes _qd; M ll g e s.2 r* WedC Condition @ lies to all Containment Purge end Dh;ust Isolation Functions and addresses the train orientation of the

<5epoece+uDepofp3fst@.-dWaBOPiESFgi-sne-tKasirtsb $ f.7-D

@ relays for these Functions. It also addresses the failureofhot_hsuitipleradiationmonitoringchannels,orthe inability to restore a single failed radiationimonitoning channel S 27-n 4 ,'. f 3.3-30 t% 4$_fly$m,eh,jg',"0PERABLE uys status or inan us I c in annethe huiredActionA.1.

}r time a1{ owed for R

, T #*M/ d^/ 'M ,I f @eion;moreltrains_%1e a train is inoperable. ;ultipic both

'e"ff* WM MS radiationloogitoring channels are inoperable, or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not_ met. 88 '8"~4

/s / ea

operation may gontinue as long aslhetusim3psef8;,.p(VA61 4 .xdTyrMM,MZ c-- .a u c .Z" Z.icr

z. -

--fi- icr

' " "tP"L , t"T J-. d pf.L,'c"l]-

"' "~P "P' 7" "f "I y"T.yy'2" .Zy_ X. . .y"I. . p;7Zy"/.".,~

_ , , , s . - / -/~/ ///

Z. . .".,Z."f.Y A Note is added stating that Condition @ is only applicable in MODE 1, 2. 3 or 4. g y,7,74 MnMg4 C,/ amo/ cA g 9,f,. 7p c.

Condition @!Vapplies to theManua121nitiationiLAutbeatic 848EfFAS Actuation].ogiclandjActuation;Re,1aysfMRand~ Containment &7.f-31 PurgelExhaust3adiationFunctions all Centain;;nt Purg; and hhaust holation function; and addresses the train orientation of the ZPS :nd the a ster and slav; rel;y- f;r thcsc functions.

B0PfESF_AS] It also addresses the failure of multipic both radiation monitoring channels, or the inability to restore a single failed radiation; monitor _ing channel to OPERABLE status in thetimeallowediorRequNed ctionM If a train is one orimoreJBOPiESFASIlogicitrainpre inoperable multipic both tadiationimonitoring channels ire -inoperable or the Required Action and associated Completi >n Time of Co ition re not.

, met, operation may continue as long as the equired Ac on to i :: A.I A Q2 3-%

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 195 5/15/97 or thanu* l g*n~lr & 2.1-30

l CHANGE )

NUMBER .XISTIFICATION l l

\ specific response time values contained in the [FSAR]. The ITS is revised to match the current TS and the response time values are

c [ retained in the FSAR]. As is done with the Reactor Trip System and the ESFAS instrumentation, this method is an appropriate way to control response times. [SR 3.3.5.4 and SR 3.3.6 are added to require the p3.3-32 response time verifications.

4 3.3 32 Improved TS Table 3.3.61 is changed to be consistent with current f)23-32 TS [3.3.2 Functional Unit 3.c and current TS 3.9.9]. Subfunctions [

[b d] of Containment Radiation are stricken since only the gaseousQ channels provide the actuation function [and the bracketed setpoint is changed to reflect plant specific requirements]. f1.1 t1 1 1 ss u nt Aur 3.3 33 Improved TS Table 3.3.71 is revised to reflect t$ The CREYS is actuated by radiation monitors located in the air intakes, by a containment isolation Phase A signal, py i

Gent >t1Wt3vTheikM0JvpsnpKM u o s y or manually. The bracketed setpoint is revised to reflect current TS Table 3.3 6 requirements.

/.

3.3 35 Improved TS Table 3.3.81 is revised to reflect the plant design. Only the gaseous channels provide the actuation function. The bracketed setpoint is revised to reflect current TS Table 3.3 6 requirements.

3.3 36 These revisions reflect the revised BDMS setpoint in Callaway OL Amendment No. 94 dated March 7,1995.

3.3 37 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

3.3 38 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68).

3.3- T le .3.7 1 cha be ons te wi e U3

.rNI { le .3- A atio Lo cw sp tt re et PS w' fjf -f nl 4 pl abil~ y, nd -

AS rti af oc' t R uir nt in en S.

3.3 40 ha _ ao a set int Jus nt- 01 3. C 1 on p 3,3-g (Thi ,

s ila to t No for ndi on . Se in adju me is eq r 1 yt R . red ctio of r peci cati s. ' ari y c sisteficy o the ciff tio is hanc by ddi th' e o

, onditp6n Efnt i same nne as andi 'on D IV& ud.

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 5 5/15/97

INSERT 6A-5 . [ .7, G- 71

[Og DjM#

Improved TS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table 3.3.7-1 are revised td reflect the BOP-ESFAS actuation logic and associated SR requirements in CTS Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2. In the original conversion submittal, Function 2 in STS Tables 3.3.6-1 and 3.3.7-1 was modified to refer to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and new Function 3 was added to both tables to refer to the BOP-ESFAS.The Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays of the SSPS are not required to be duplicated as Function 2 in ITS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table 3.3.7-1 since this function is redundant to the ESFAS Containment Isolation -

Phase "A" Function. Condition C in ITS 3.3.2 is revised than=aMM"imo

-prseLwsmr n-n owrr.ierrasiiinendM Function 3.a.(2) of Containment Phase A isolation ic inoperable. Revising Condition C ensures that the containment purge isolation valves are maintained closed if a Containment Phase A train. .

is inoperable The Surveillance Requirements (SR 3.3.6.3 and SR 3.3.7.4 for performance f a MASTER RELAY TEST; SR 3.3.6.5 and SR 1.3.7.5 for performance of '

a SLAVE R LAY TEST) associated with Function 2 in ITS Table 3.3.6-1 and Table 3.3.7-1 are eleted. As specified in the CTS, the Surveillance Requirement associated with the A omatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP-ESFAS)is a modif'ed .

ACTUATI N LOGIC TEST on a 31 day STAGGERED TEST BASIS. STS SR 3.3.6.2 and SR 3. 7.3 have been modified by a Note to reflect the BOP-ESFAS. The Surveilla e Requirements for the Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (Solid St e Protection System) include an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, MASTER RELAY EST, and SLAVE RELAY TEST which are performed in accordance with ITS SR 3.3. 2, SR 3.3.2.4, SR 3.3.2.6, and SR 3.3.2.13.

f ce,hrn,,,a4 act a n l n'efos ha in N e' ta /

q w

ed exbnu V4 Vi r., c ett ) &

C.crr .r.2.4 c,,,hk,,, f ,,J c a -a iniInly nyria), cwrs,& wTH Re c'r]

a i

A

_ _2 1___ _ . , . . . . ..

l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.3-43 APPLICABILITY: CA, DC REQUEST: Revise ITS 3.3.1 Condition R Notes 1 and 2 per traveler TSTF-168. The 2-hour AOT should not be limited to only UVTA/STA maintenance.

Comment: TSTF pending NRR review. Based on 8/14/98 meeting TSTF rejected based on WCAP-14333 which prohibits " maintenance bypass."

FLOG RESPONSE (original): TSTF-168 has been approved by the NRC. Therefore, the FLOG continues to pursue the changes associated with JFD 3.3-43.

FLOG RESPONSF (revised): As discussed with the NRC reviewer on March 17,1999, ITS 3.3.1 Condition R Note 1 is being revised to delete the words "or for maintenance."

This wording is not in the CTS. TSTF-168 is withdrawn and all changes to the Condition R Notes are based on the CTS.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure 2, page 3/4 3-6 .

Enclosure 3A, page 6 Enclosure 3B, page 4 Enclosure 4, pages 28 and 29 Enclosure SA, Traveler Status Sheet and page 3.3-8 Enclosure 58, page B 3.3-56 Enclosure 6A, pages 6 and 13 Enclosure 68, pages 8 and 17

TABLE 3.3-1 (Centinuedl ACTION STA~EMENTS (Continued)_ I-M-LG o.- I-+34 r '""mu-ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than i theinvolv o6 f"A, C P'"26.E--*Ec i cr:n: g u s p 8cgwire/Channelsf positive y reactivity enanges. tenme/end all operat on l

l

.~.Ol/EtTT~ 3/+ J.-JA e less than the /-gst./_G ACTION 5 - a. W 8eguin/ '"ith 'mur the Channelsnumoe'r j CPEPSof L: OPERABLE n; ir; = ,. estore the channels /-47-A e

- inoperable chan6el to OPERABLE statusypnepry3 ./,f or*0ptr th: % Cter !-i; b ::hcr:. C'.': :pend !' 0;;r:r cr ex. - e g.4 i .d .#

. .f,. '/ :.:~

c l i ;; e v--, -:::ti",.ity .ach.ar.g :

1 4 - u,~.

d " .4 ~'.pt:it

,e- ...

Qelfors-fa

(, u , i K*n"r & M j d ; ; C / G I!

f n ,g_ dinned

., r.

"1 . p :et.;".~e - ; ;/ ; ;..

on c*M *Nn in e'f

'/A-3. -opf, fny' j_jg_f,g

b. Ntkno Ie 5 % xA N.r.,-)_ :"'th: *^ :t ~-i; E ::hort , -

suspend operations involving positive reactivity gpd vrput fus changes and verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN /-FI'-A requirements of 5pecification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as .

applicable, within I hour and every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereaf ter, and verify valves BG-V178 and BG-V601 are closed and secured in position within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and verified to be closed and secured in position.every days. jgg f_ g A g ACTION 6 - i J

/cguires[b rW'.uth

' Of- Channels,theSTARTUP number of OPERABLE and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed channels one provided the following conditions are satisfieg:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,-eed-or

,--b. ~h "'-Hur Ch:ent's CPEPaELE ::;ui :: rt ': m t; he rzer, /_4/_g

' /l/de: Tne inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months /-44-4 5 for surveillance testing of other channels $ g 3,y

~--3 ) f.jg y 1 3CTION 7

- b. Aeda With aneeinoperable THEArnAL S #

deyay-htimer ER isu -fkan in the -7lirip wNkinTime i2 hart.

Delay. circuitry.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that the Vessel Delta-T (Power-1, Power-2) channels in the affected pl i prStection D

rwo.re b esets in s a+riea+ aced in the He'rS-rMb f m kin t5 ppp+d La fe Ihw.9 co+ndition 4 As aet. within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . l-+2 arTI0tLB - With less tnan thegMir :;r S b: r of Ch:r n:'. : C'E F '.? L L - wi thi n j_ 4 fj

i:: d p 4::'>: j_fy A deg In/ Cbn,Jr 1 Ornun:f::cr nour ceter".ne-c; 2::r'/::icr of th:# nded '4-that the interlock is jin gn its require cg WAAd 3 state for the existing plant condition, or --Op^,g sp:::-: hour.r.

r

/-ID-M <

. C . 3 he in a+ leas + firr ETAW8f wi+lan +Le b Howin3 i l-/>-f1 '

ZNSE - 2}+ 3-4 8 ----+- I ACt jN 9 - Wi f .g_/_g.

Kegw' red .A "'th the number Channels,CP:"C of OPERABLE L: ;;. .um:r t,4 ebin at least HOTReactor STANDBY Trip Brea within-e- hours; however, one breaker may be bypassed for uo ton ####M.jy_A

. E hours or,@reaker surveillance testi19 /~l2" U provided t.% other breaker is OPERABL". <erM -Iks inoye aLIa ice kae f gzg

%prperrppreph _ -b ofeRABLE s%< m, I ko w- o e 9.y,., -

7 y,y Amendment No. 37, D; 6a v l CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 /4 3-6

e 1

l CHANGE HUMBER N2iG DESCRIPTION v g,,,, l l

1p In addition, current ACTION Statement [8] is revised for those interlocks required to be OPERABLE in H0 DES 1 and 2.

N If one channel is inoperable, the interlock must be determined to be in its required state or the plant must be in at least HOT STANDBY within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months .

The changes to current ACTION Statement [8] and the addition of new ACTION Statement [8.1] are more restrictive, consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. Current ACTION Statement [8] will continue to apply to Functional Units [18.a and 18.e.] Revised ACTION Statement [8] and new ACTION Statement [8.1] provide one less hour to exit Applicability, i.e. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months , than the current ACTION Statement [8] which has the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months interlock state verification or entry into LCO 3.0.3 which allows an additional I hour plus 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to exit Applicability, for a total of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

_ A3.]5 1 13 LS 6 [AcfIO Stat nt is evis to te t t the ho

] eact trip reak byp s al owanc for [ br er s veil' nce t ting an a ob used f r mai enan .

his ange es imp tt concl sions f

) W -10271-

,cnge t the A, pple nt Rev, ass ime. This anae since here is n con ste_

w'_h travel TSTF 68. CTION Statement [9] is y y revised to require restoration of an inoperable RTB within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or the plant must be in H0r STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , consistent with NUREG 1431 Rev.1. This is less restrictive since an additional hour is provided for the transition to MODE 3.

1 14 A In the ISTS Table 3.3.'-1 Function 20, the Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) Undervcitage and Shunt Trip Hechanisms are separate from the RTB Functional Unit. The current TS have been revised to reflect these requirements.

New [ footnote (d) has] been added to the RTB Functional Unit to note that the same OPERABILITY requirements and ACTIONS apply to a bypass breaker if it is racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB. The bypass breakers were already handled in this fashion. ACTION Statement [12] in current'TS Table 3.3-1 has been revised accordingly.

%NSEAT 3A-(, Q l~/f . 4 1 15 The Applicability for the Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip function is modified by M footnote [(c)] such that this

,) function is only required to be OPERABLE above the P 9 interlock setpoint (50% RTP). This is acceptable since the trip function is byed below P 9. [New] ACTION N~U-447 nrs ApplieditrQ%e it

re nfleded b 6N8 5/15/97 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 6n Tille N Te c / T A b # T % ,n e?

4.3-l, _

I y

6 n 2

d y g

f 2

g 3

o g 4 d g y

tg9$a e g Y A

T-7 3,

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C Y

T F s I L s s L O e e e Y Y I

B W Y A

C I

L P K P A A E 3 P 4 E

/

3 H C

S N A

T M s s s e

O e e Y T C Y Y N

E R

R

, U C N

- O Y .

N 4 E A -

L C S L

e -

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O L

B A

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R A n o e t P l d t . b n M i O h i

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.f

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 6 m}

. .M 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR N TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREHENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

^

tQ1543 ON ta men [9 is evi ed o no e t tte2 urn [a ]soeae uoredri'orbr ke b ase all wan fo [ br ker sur ill ce est' g

. air.ena e. hi ch ge ce not mpa th co lus ns fW P 02 P.

S ole nt . Re . 1 i et re 1 no chan e t the byn a me. ACTION Statement [9] is a so revised to require restoration of an inoperable Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or the plant must be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . This is less restrictive than the current TS since an additional hour is provided for the transition to HODE 3.

The proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration. This determination has been performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."

The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed.

As noted in the Bases of NUREG 1431 Rev.1, the Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is I reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without ch311enging plant systems. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and g 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by current LCO 3.0.3 for j shutdown actions. The proposed shutdown requirement Completion Time change would result in an additional hour to achieve MODE 3. By allowing a shutdown 28 5/15/97 NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION l

)

IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS 6 h@ (continued)

, time based on operating experience, this change would reduce the chances of an -

operator error or challenge to plant systems that could result from the more restrictive requirement in the current TS. The probability that an accident ,

would occur during the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months exter.sion allowed by the proposed change is hy.4J) /

extremely small.A t 2 ur ] ea or ri br ak b as al ow c -s r a e n wi tc ng th un ail 11 ie ur d d e ine co j ma f q ci i W 1 71 -A. up eme t .R si re he , vu s /

ti nee is t te ed. he proposed ch'ange will not affect any of the analysis assumption: for any of the accidents previously evaluated. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators nor will the proposed change affect the ability of any safety related ~ equipment to perform its intended function. There will be no degradation in the performance of nor an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety-related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

There are no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the method by which

~) any safety related plant system performs its safety function. The change will not affect the normal method of plant operation. Only the duration of operation in the action statement is affected. .No new accident scenarios, transient precursors. failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this change. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria for, any analyzed event. There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions. There will be no impact on any margin of safety.

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS 6* resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c); and accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.

?

)I NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 29 5/15/97

l INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.3 TRAVELER # STATUS DIFFERENCE # COMMENTS

+ -Net NRC approved,-;; ;f TE-I'ihA>f-gg TSTF 19. Rev. 1 #

Incorporated NA ta t;&r =t .ff d:te. gases,

-> us

# py.

TSTF 25.'P.cr 2- -!acerp. o md- 3.2 2' 4 y, g .

TSTF-37, Rev. 1 Not Incorporated NA ITS 5.6.8 still addresses PAM reports. Sections efter ITS 5.6.7 were not renumbered.

TSTF 51 Not Incorporated NA Requires plant-specific reanalysis to establish decay time dependence for fuel handling accident.

-TOTT-31 ;%t : x r preted -Mi-t U-i; S:t pint; end] All eble-t'sLu Tui iv . i,f celt;;; rd

d-de;r:d:d =lt;;; .:'"

y& 5' in ;hi TS. -TR. S.3 MS~

TSTF111.Rev.h Incorporated NA /hyryyw/ly Ngd, g/,pg/

r 3 'r=lr i;t= bred = p in TSTF 135)/ev.3 aIncorporated

-tt:lb

( T.341.3.3-4+,

.3 93. -=ture: decid h = b;;n 3.3 95. -eve 're; atet =1=.

P rti a ; ;f th; tr = 1;. ihot 3 7.Mj 3.3-122,3;$-14A

} 7. S -44 ti;nd 'icrtl; cirify

~'

7.3-/8$ f e p -61'it; r;4.irc..~..ta h =

5: n '= r pret;d. q,y,yg TSTF 161,tey.] Im 3.3 19 Arp<wa/1, Nsc. - Q13-79 TSTF 168 [IncTr% rated 6 NA 64 7.*S-f3

- - ~ _

TSTF 169 Incorporated 3.3 42 /lgew,/ ly Ngc. TX-3.ptys

! E 105-13yp". m Incorporated 3.3 49 ggyg "r:p = d trave'e- Incorporated 3.3 107 'E ::ini Cr;;p ^.:ti= Itr T M ~- 3 H M & S.1- fo j

'O '~~2/l Sco.yor&J 3.3-j+g g ,, .,_

~

>,,a MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 5/15/97

~

l l

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 srm Aw)) ACTIONS (continued)

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETI0h .

CONDITION

@ e)

R. One RTB train

-- - - NOTES inoperable. 1. One may be QIS-d? -

bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 3.3-03 for RTB surveillance testingy f forist m provided 9g,f43 f)Qfff -

ftheothertrainisOPERABLE.

2. One RTB may be bypassed pni,y for thejtime3 required up-te -

if/M]

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for performing ~

mintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms per ConditionIU, provided the- 3.3-117 other train is OPERABLE.

3j OneJTBjiaiaK#eibypa'ssedIfor 3.3-03 uppo,Mhourgforpbgic suryeillanceptesting per r p_onditionjQ~pr.ovidedKhe otheGtrpinjs]OPERABE.*

R.1 Restore train to OPERABLE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months status.

E R.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months One or more required S.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 3.3 44 S.

channel (s') inoperable, required state for existing unit conditions.

E S.2 Be in H0DE 3. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months (continued) 3.3 8 5/15/97 MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431)

RTS Instrumentation g B 3.3.1 y y

6.,%

!./ BASES ACTIONS 0.1 and 0.2 (continued)

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows bypassing one train up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing, f provided the other train is OPERABLE. ,

s R.1 and R.2 Condition R applies to the RTBs in H0 DES 1 and 2. These actions address the train orientation of the RTS for the RTBs. Wii.h one 4 train inoperable. I hour is allowed to restore the train to -

OPERABLE status or the unit must be placed in H0DE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable. (

based on operating experience, to reach H0DE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The ,

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Times are equal to the time allowed by LC0 3.0.3 for shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of RTS Function. Placing the unit in H00E 3 ~7#-23%%$

emir ~ et fr- tW yti:&r T;..dien. r em/fr r^-~

Tn ::Cen th: /#m

/ C twby TP one R7l$ +rnin it insjnerable . I two three Notes.

~ ) The Required Actions have be gh> Note 1 allows modified to be b ed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months d2 7.7-03 onhehennelfor RTB surveillance testingym121Fe g ,34 y

g chenaci train is OPERABLE. Note 2 allows one RTB to be bypass y C

onlyyoGthe31me7equiredlforjperforming for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for -

maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms per Condition U if the other RTB train is OPERABLE. Note ~Rallows

~

L one2TB'to7be3ypassed for.up307 tours ffor30g1c survefilance testing:per'Conditiont.QTrovided the:other-train is;0RERABLE:

t g "

The 2-houe time limitsjar,e 4s justified in References 7 5.and,$

13.

I S.1 end S.2 I Condition S applies to the P 6 and P 10 interlocks. With one or "

more. required channel (s) inoperable, for onc out of tw; Or tWO Out of four coincidcn:C logic.- the associated interlock must ineve) 3 be verifiedgobservation of the associated ceraissive A I Cannunciator wingbe in its required state for the existing 1 unit condit* Jithin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 :

within tF st 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Verifying the interlock status manually '

l accomp1 .nes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of CA-31-4 Y I

(continued)

B 3.3 56 5/15/97 MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES 9

CHANGE NUMBER JUSTfFICATION

-J N 3.3 41 ITS 3.3.1 Condition L is deleted to match the plant-specific design-ad t cJ tM crr=t TS: for the Source Range Neutron Flux Function in H0 DES 3. C4-Z5-d/4 4, and 5 with the Rod Control System incapable of :od withdrawal and

., all rods fully inserted. Under these conditions, the source range instrumentation does not provide a Reactor Trip System Function. The source range channels provide on19 indication [and inadvertent boron dilution mitigation] when in this Applicability. Requirements related to the source range neutron flux channels in H0 DES 3, 4, and 5 when all rods are fully inserted and are not capable of being withdrawn have therefore been [ moved to ITS 3.3 3 F=t=tc m cf IT T2ic 3.3.11

-1: addM tc rancti= 5 =d r=ind sc=rdingly . This change is W-7.7-#(,

consistent with traveler TSTF 135.

3.3 42 This change deletes ITS 3.3.1 Condition N per traveler TSTF-169.

Condition H is appropriate for Function 10.a to prevent sequential entry into Condition N followed by H and exceeding the evaluated Completion Time in WCAP-10271 P A, Supplement 2, Rev.1. With this change, there is no need to list separate Functions 10.a and 10.b and combining the Functions eliminates Applicability questions similar to the Condition H vs. N concern above.

3.3 43 ie haffef6/vi esjfTS/.3/ Cc/dit/ Ion /R NgteN'c Zjperm p pg74.7 1 1- .

ur T u li t t on1 UV d g g ai. en ce. Th i co ist t 't the ur nt S nd s ce a e l

,,p b au th s ifi ma- te nce ac vit wh ' h equ res h a re t ri re er b assd d s t fe _ t i art of av n he h1 .3 C[ ION No+ =fy /reable

Callawy . D e b^veWien D*y**"i+ % l* "

3.3-44 This change revises ITS 3.3.1 Conditions S and T and ITS 3.3.2 b"*

Condition L4 1s AwADe 79mber,.er geacg#CpanneJvihA15p(irJ g 7,94 CFfl# arf 6 3X.2 V.fo reflect current TS AL; HON 5tatements [8 and 20]. The Conditions apply to one or more channels [ ] because the safety function is served with the interlock in the appropriate state ut Q:gy4 3.3 45 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). J 3.3 46 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B).

l 3.3 47 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table .

(Enclosure 68). j

\

-) 3.3 48 Not i Ca Cec.. .. a . Co...y;. .c,;n T L - $ f,7-ff h'c tc ^- M." ras

[":y.

.r

- (E=l =;r; !"'

JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 6 5/15/97 l

)

1 1

CHANGE MHER .11STIFICATION

'*"{f the next one hour. Therefore, ISTS Required Actions B.2.2 and U.2.2 for Functions 1 and 20 in Table 3.3.11 are not necessary since the performance of Required Action B.2.1 and U.2.1 takes the plant to MODE 3. exits the Applicability, and requires entry i This change is consistent with ITS 1.3 and 3.0.4, an/nto Condition r4=ve/er- fRLy.m C.

i.1 r r -/ 3 C

^

6 3.3 107 Based upon operating experience to change Thermal Power in a controlled l

fashion without challenging the plant and consistent with the current TS which does not have a Completion Time for restoring one channel to '

Operable status: but does prevent going above P 10 until it is restored, the Completion Time for ITS 3.3.1 Required Actions F.1 and F.2 should be increased to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Condition F of ITS 3.3.1 is for one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable. Reactor protection would be provided by the Operable Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel and Operable Power Range Neutron Flux channels.

Indication would be available from the Operable Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channe1[, from Operable Gamma Metrics neutron flux detectors ] and from Operable Power Range Neutron Flux channels with gy,y_g7 Power approaching P 10gr ((- n. g ; y. pj; e..{c.j. r.g g naar: 7_"':. :":L ~~~ ~ ~ ^ '~ ~~3ee

~T=- --

g. - ..-...-._...y 'T' r r ~l%.'-

3.3 108 y eJle h CalI=my. See Oswea~ren do p erim p 3.3 109 ~

/ Ce //49, fe, C,n y,,,,,,, C, ,j. j p,,,jj 3.3 110 af /fe, la C4 //,u,y, fe, C,,,,,,.7,, C,p,.. ggg 3.3 111 This change adds a note to ITS SR 3.3.1.7 for source range instrumentation to verify interlocks P 6 and P 10 are in their required state for existing unit conditions. This is consistent with the current TS and is an enhancement which is easily performed and provides additional assurance that the interlocks are functioning correctly.

3.3 112 No o red / Ca }/, ,fa, Conver.rran Csyn.7,,, y p.4,r(9,g) 3.3 113 No j, je , jg, f , , Q , , , ,; , [,) ,,7,M g ,_,,.(,,gj 3.3 114 SL =-L&cle.ra,e Q , j,.e,y ,'f g ,jj,,,? f, , [,

g),

gY Q 3.3-64 3.3 115 ,c , ff,

,3, C,g,mg gy ,g,n cg g_gff 3.3 116 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68).

,n 3.3 117 This change to ITS 3.3.1 Conditio flect current TS Table [3.3 1 U-

,"' ' ACTION Statement 12] which was bas on ric Letter 85 09.

3.3 118 This change.is for consistency with ITS 3.7.10 Condition [G].

' JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES ' TS- 13 .5/15/97-

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.3-99 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ITS 3.3.5 Condition B is revised to allow 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for one bus to restore the instrument function to the capability of continued operation in Condition A. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowance is based on the ITS 3.8.1.F allowance for an inoperable sequencer.

[A new Condition C is added to ITS 3.3.5 to cover multiple channel inoperability on both ESF buses. The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is provided to restore the functional capability of Condition B.]

A new Condition (D) is also added to the Actions of ITS LCO 3.3.5. The new Condition provides the appropriate shutdown actions if Conditions (A, B, or C] are not satisfied when in Modes 1-4. Condition (D) is consistent with the actions required by the AC Sources ITS 3.8.1 for Modes 1-4.

Condition C of NUREG-1431 Rev.1 is revised to be Condition (E]. Condition (E] provides the appropriate default Condition for failure to satisfy Conditions (A, B, or CJ when the loss of power instrumentation is required operable to support the diesel generator required operable in ITS LCO 3.8.2.

Comment: Reject - Scope issue - Adopt ISTS for loss of redundancy and loss of function for inoperable LOP actuation channels. The staff notes that the proposed 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months repair time for a second, third or fourth inoperable channel which is a change to the CTS that is neither identified nor discussed in the CTS markup and its justifications. There is sufficient operational flexibility in the ISTS LOP conditions if channel cannot be repaired since LCO 3.3.5 requires the supported DG to be declared inoperable. Other problems with the proposed ITS are the actions related to offsite circuits. The offsite circuits are not supported by the DG LOP instrume 1tation, rather offsite circuits are alternate sources of power and operability is treated in ITS LCO 3.8.1. The one hour repair AOT (Condition B)is an allowance provided by the staff to trouble shoot equipment problems.

This time period represents an equivalent to the first hour of LCO 3.0.3. At the end of the hour the supported system is declared inoperable.

FLOG RESPONSE (original): As discussed during meetings with NRC staff on September 15 and 16,1998, ITS 3.3.5 Required Action B.1 has been revised to immediately declare the associated load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS) inoperable. To support this change to Required Action B.1, the shutdown portion of one LSELS was added to the ITS 3.8.2 LCO as was a new Condition C. See also the response to Comment Number 2-18-LS-31 for revisions to that DOC and LS-31 that further support this change.

For Wolf Creek, the CTS has no requirem- fs for the LSELS in MODES 5 and 6. The equivalent ITS 3.8.2 changes are incorpora ted into CTS 3.8.1.2 using DOC 1-70-M.

In addition, reverting Condition A back to the STS wording was also discussed during the September meeting. However, further discussions with our Operations personnel indicate that the STS wording presents confusion. Condition A shall be entered at the time one channel on one bus becomes inoperable. However, the STS wording "per bus" is literally read to mean Condition A is not entered until "one channel per bus", i.e., one channel on the A bus and one channel on the B bus, are inoperable. This is incorrect.

The proposed wording, approved for Vogtle, is superior and eliminates operator confusion.

FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): In order to address NRC comments on ITS 3.3.5 and the responses to Comment Numbers Q 2-18 and Q 3.3-99, the attached pages include revisions to CTS Table 3.3-3 ACTION 19, DOC 2-18-LS-31, NSHC LS-31, ITS 3.3.5 and Bases, and JFD 3.3-99.

FLOG RESPONSE (supplement): As discussed with the NRC reviewers on March 11, 1999, the ITS 3.3.5,3.8.1, and 3.8.2 Bases are being modified to provide clarification that the EDGs receive a start signal from the Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer (LSELS) on a loss of voltage condition.

ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 -ITS 3.3 8, pages B 3.3-181, B 3.3-184, insert B 3.3-184(b), and B 3.3-185 4, CTS 3/4.8 - ITS 3.8 Enclosure SB, pages B 3.8-2, B 3.8-4 and Insert, B 3.8-40 and Insert, and B 3.8-43 (Insert B 3.8-43) i l

1 LOP DG Start Instrumentation-B 3.3.5 1

(QW+L s.-

, B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5- Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The DGs prc/ide a source of emergency power when offsite power 1s-either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe uni operation. ICa]1osslofjoltage&%l--fjgC C_i--! Rim! S 7.7-19 _

ocmatithe336ikyiESFltLusMFJglermWdi1{-5 iRefiln H luJ rAaJ =- and \

fr,vrJad eme.pene J Is d, reynear (ltrez r) a) ItiPitheX16Ilg[prefetr_ed)6raelMuthalterJ!L@ejbusM breatetsttoiremov_e3heidetmenw;aggeggD3!B8!ILCC the~.plass11EIMuj$sey'fresMan!gei b) shedralgamposwhomia!!cep!stagalet..gissent 1 1.oad:centemandicenteLfugai _ r~

~

- =+3namac!ra!> .

1 bdesifor.tet 12atierr .-

c,. , v -r % J . -

= F B 8I y c) Gegetate3n_M011$ tart 11Lsjplal; TheteZareMuoiset$3fLQvg}tagehMQ}MM3l peg each3216]kLIEMvstes;b!!s2f.act3l$$gggs%@pM8f yoltage!)ndideggadedlyoltageMMaCJJourjgptegtig transfogg!LsloEgcMbosM _de3)e3 N c M I thehM1veLdevice83 sedgometieaahesejinacticasg3ll6 und! tryottagelprotection21rcuitsareidesecitagars!sgeggitan 82'(171737JRefE1); J' adcrvelt;;; p.etation will gx ;t; :n L^"

t;rt if ; i ;; cf v;lt;g er d;; ;ded v;lt ;; ;;-.ditic , e;;ur; in th; ; witchy;rd. ";c; r- tw; L^" ; tat ;i ,..;1;. ; .; for cch i 4.10 k',' vitel b;.

Eoug Three instantaneous undervoltage relays with an" Assoc $ged timeldelay inva;- tin chanteri; tic; are provided en tog each

"" "'-- '" '- "--- ' E16kV:CJiass3EIsystem bus for detecting l e ;;;t;i a d d;;.--ded v;1t;; ca.ditir. Or a loss of bus voltage. )

The outputs rekys are combined in'a two out of three four logic _

to generate an' LOP signal if the voltage is below apptosisately i 70% 754 for 6,__ ,_

_._m m____, m. . A. . . . --. _er ki;w ^^t fr : 12.; tin._, ,",;; LO" C A

__m 6% Adr J QQ /sm/erir,fjeh,ygan.r ree nd Gmi letat}r % kerren . A & dely andemMal dea // /f,,e.

l

^ - '

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 181 5/15/97 l l

1 i

,.._.....o-,.

- . -,...i............ .

LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 y m.

BASES (continued)

LC0 TheLCOforLOPDGstartinstrumentationrequiresthatthreefout channels per 4;16JkV;NB1 system bus of both the loss of voltage and degraded voltage Functions shall be OPERABLE in iODES 1, 2.

3, LJ 4 when the LOP DG start instrumentation supports safety systems associated with the ESFAS. In MODES 5 and 6. the three four channels must be OPERA 6LE whenever the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE. to m ure tMt tM ;;t = tic ; tert of the-BG i; milabic at;n n;;id. Loss of the LOP DG Start Instrumentation Function could result in thelopetationlo.f,2 circuit !

breaker.s pfuseslandil ockout;rel aysithroughoutitheIassociated i train;andjn the delay of safety systems initiation when required. This could lead to unacceptable consequences during accidents. During the loss of offsite the DG powers the CA-7.7-03 '

motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump &#r.amuna2

'Z7/Eg7'n ew @tpMNMmvhlas well as remov an 1 through the f4 increasedpotentialforalosgfdeg M

/dge 23L//g secondary system.

79 J /' L DIESt783'.S-114(a)

APPLICABILITY The LOP DG Start Instrumentation Functions are required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because ESF Functions are designed to provide protection in these MODES. Actuation in MODE 5 or 6 is required e enever the required DG aust be OPERABLE so that it can perform its function on an LC" or degraded power to the vital l

bus.

ACTIONS In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the channel is found inoperable. then the function that channel provides must be ,

declared inoperable and the LCO Condition entered for the particular protection function affected.

Because the required channels are specified on a per bus basis.

the Condition may be entered separately for each bus as l appropriate.

A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application !

of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered indepondently for each Function listed in the LCO.

The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the n, time the Condition was entered for that Function.

q (continued)

HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 184 5/15/97

i INSERT B 3.3-184(a) CA-3.3-026 '

e._

' N-@d

<&,7 which are automatically started after expiration of the appropriate *ime delay by the j LSELS. Failure of these pumps to start would leave only the turLee driven pump, started by the BOP-ESFAS directly upon receipt of a loss of voltage signal from the LSELS f

output relays, INSERT B 3.3-184(b) Q 3.3-99 OPERABILITY of the Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer is addressed in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

p d= .

4 Iw

LOP DG Siart Instrumentation B 3.3.5' bu r ', , a

@ BASES ACTIONS -U (continued)

Condition A a lies to the LOP DG start Functions with one loss of voltage _ r one degraded voltage channel 6 423'-19 61noperable, yee Ju L.GG S

If one channel is inoperable, Required Action A.1 1res that 7.7-41 channel to be slaced in tri) within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . With a channel in trip, thed3FA4t4PUfiWMMonfigured to cA-M-dd

~

provide a one-out of three 1 'ic to initiate a trip of the inconing offsite power o ener-le an Lef bG .rf= Sir 5-Q 3.M1 A Note is added to allow Eypassing an cinoperabl/r Vshed EEFL to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels. This allowance is made where bypassing the channel does not cause an actuation and where at least two other channels are monitoring that parameter.

The specified Completion Time and time allowed'for bypassing one channel are reasonable considering the Function rer' ~ns fully OPERABLE on every bus and the low probability of an revent occurring during these intervals.

U .mreer- 8xs-/W G23'47 y er Condition B (applies when more than one loss of vol ge $ r

$2J4f 4' +e asui

\

rep 4,'mu.roersla} l*nd inonerable.

!l*Al" more than ore degraded voltage channel ed m na lond ' n =" " ^ -

ICg8d8M r #C) .._ _ jg]$hj@ondition3heJeffgtedletstgeentgtget$g I apssionvgitagemgegraded moltagenmagmgangenthemissit 82M

/, rm,/t,4 4 /,,,j 7, mg,, J fa11ure"oroofrortisy nongsg1gypoctiona]Mpt3t!stamtetal

ry,7,d'./,.'" I tesransmsseseapper tsantswwwwstm9luss

/ be9ssitedmconditions . T - - -

p y.7-g

[.;f o W j4 .. . :.

y n, u __

_ _or an .

.1 1 mi - - - _ -

an n i d M 4 N s;appropg1 ate;mmennes gheJ M acted instrumentichannelsIGos_s2cfJvoltageMjdsgradedMQ)3geSm 427-91 inpgsItaltheg5ELSIand TelyionjtSEESicircuitsito3etforsM

7. required 3ptuationsmincelthelectuationllogictandActuattan

w (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 185 5/15/97

AC Sources Operating

( g 3.5 -99 ( .

ys B 3.8.1 t ;, ~%-

w BASES BACKGROUND (continued) injection pressure (SI)containment or high signal (i.e., low pressurizer pressure signals) or os pressu(

/)WrZ) @eam line ESF bus undervoltage signal (refer to LCO 3.3.5, " Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation"). After the DG has started. it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus

- undervoltage or degr6ded voltage, iii,-rant of or coincident with an SI signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the stantby mode without tying to the ESF bus on an SI signal alone.

Following the trip of offsite power, a Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer (LSELS) strips nonpermanent loads from the ESF bus. When the DG is tied to the ESF bus, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the LSELS.

The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals

. to motor breakers to i,rewn; overloading the DG by automatic load application.

In the event of a loss of preferred power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

Certain required unit loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process. Within Eli minute after the initiating signal is received. all loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.

Ratings for Train A and Train B DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating of each DG is f9000} x ; kW with fl0}t overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period. The ESF loads that are pc;;.ed from the 4.16 kV ESF buses are listed in Reference 2.

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the FSAR, SAFETY ANALYSES Chapter f6} (Ref. 4) and Chapter f15} (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and b

g (continued)

MARK UP OF NLREG 1431 BASES B 3.8 2 5/15/97 l

- - . . . _ . . .. ]

AC Sources Operating -

B 3.8.1

/.

, BASES LCO Switchyard 0; A. c4 i; 7;d - -

through breaker PA 0201, E (continued) ;n_itr.; tk ESF transformer M. which, in turn, powers the4e

.m -

ESF bus through its normal feeder breaker M Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished within

{401 E seconds. Each DG sust also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel

. test mode.

(1Me ch ,

is 1 f 1 or ,

The AC sources in one train must be separate and independent (to the extent-possible) of the AC sources in the other train. For the DGs, separation and independence are complete.

F7r the offsite AC sources, separation and independence are to the extent practical. A circuit may be connected to more than one ESF bus ' - - - .. - .. - -

m

-x;d;;;ty O ^.L .^.: . ;;rs;; r frl. ;.. 7 t vttu g ;t % . ;rit,.-i;. Acirait'.M'. O it, r d O ;r.'."

0; O .;eir.d O M; CO ' fut tier.;%r Ot;rM re;Mr.ir.r O ;t is;' t.;. '.;" On; O ;.,., it CO!;!"' ;f 3 s \ \ S \ \ \

CM/ I G 3.8.1- o't C W O.w #

(continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.8 4 5/15/97

insert of Q 3.3.99

- Bases Pages B 3.8-4 and B 3.8-40 Initiating a DG start upon a detected undervoitage condition, tripping of the incoming offsite power upon a detected undervoltage or degraded voltage condition, shedding of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing of loads are required functions of LSELS and .

required for DG OPERABILITY. OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and degraded voltage instrumentation functions are addressed in LCO 3.3.5, " Loss of Power (LOP)

Diesel Generator (DG) Start instrumentation."

I AC Sources - Shutdown .

B 3.8.2

-~~

m J sASES LCO and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC .v)urces to (continued) operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fur.

l handling accidents). g3,g,go.ot cw j The qualified offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequenr.y and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident. while connected to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) bus (es). Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. ~

'- Offsit; circuit #1 ;;r.;i;ts of 0;f;;;;;i Trs.n;ferar 0, did i; suppli;d f.a Ritdy cd i; 0, e .d is f;d thra#, tr; der 50 3 pri.aring tra 00T transferar ;r:001, did, ir. tu r., pe ;.s tra

1 SCI be, th.eaf. its Terrel fa der tr dcr. 04 ;;;end effsit; cir;;it ee..;i;t; ;f tra St;-t4 Tr n;ferar, did i; recally f;d f. , tra 0.;itdy;rd L; A, and is f;d thr #, tr; der FA 0001 pri ;.-in; tra i.0T tre..;fe.a. , did,17. tu r., pea a tre 00 SST b;; thi z f. it; Terr I 7;;,k.. Lic itr.

The DG aust be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within {4&} g seconds. The DG aust be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby e with the engine hot and DG in standby at ambient conditions. _

i (Insert 's i of loa ,i ludi tri i nes[ntd P

. l'! . oa s, s r ir f i for OPEMI .

Q 3.~5 *l 4 (continued)

NARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.8 40 5/1E/97

1 Insert of Q 3.3.99

. Bases Pages B 3.8-4 and B 3.8-40 initiating a DG start upon a detected undervoltage condition, tripping of the incoming offsite power upon a detected undervoltage or degraded voltage condition, shedding of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing of loads are required functions of LSELS and required for DG OPERABILITY. OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and degraded voltage instrumentation functions are addressed in LCO 3.3.5, " Loss of Power (LOP)

Jiesel Generator (DG) Start instrumentation."

AC Sources - Shutdown .

B 3.8.2 F

r BASES ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. B.1. B.2. B.3. and B.4 (continued)

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6. the Distribution System's ETIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to av 3 required ESF I

bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered.

This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss j of the offsite circuit, whether or not a train is de energized.

LCO 3.8.10 would provide the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de energized train. )

.rn/SE M 8 3.P-42 h].3~$)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. 2 0 .0 .1 .0 % . . ; . c. g ir ed t k a ; ; t a ;.1^,

einiu cirait u i;gi.;d t M - -J.'f'l. J 2 0.0.1.17 O i t

(~. .

regir.d t k a M; x ik . ;gir.d 0. C".'?'l "O';; O c ;

i;gired O .r.d ; ,; g rkd; ;f M t; ;.r-0.7 124 % i k efOt t

irait.

, ~ ,, .. ...

<a SR 3.8.1.20 is acepted because starting independence is not mquired with the DG(e that is not required to be operable.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DGfe from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during performance of SRs, and to preclude deenergizing a required 4160 Y ESF bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event could coepromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs M

... 4 y , :. 4 , ( . ,

w .p, r; . . . ~ , - ..#. . ..;- " must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit is required to be O

g.a v (conunued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.8 43 5/15/97

, INSERT B 3.8-43 k Z 7$

The shutdown portion of thefk6 ads [ed/er/nd$rrlerdrufyM'dfig(ysh E an essential support system to both the offsite circuit and the DG associated with a given ESF bus. Furthermore, the sequencer is on the primary success path for most AC electrically powered safety systems powered from the associated ESF bus. With the required LSELS (shutdown portion) inoperab!e, immediately declare the affected DG and offsite circuit inoperable and take the Required Actions of Conditions A and B. The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attentiori.

Regdid Acb c.1 pr.vaa asm* a w A& N yprograk Acido h e nhech hv N. Abd'd DG AL *tr rs h. circott if we shou.wn p.rk*.+ of N. Lod skcDer sk Emergency L.d S quencay (LSELS)lo4.c.nd [nopted(a.,

w. .

1

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.3-002 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Reflect feedwater isolation changes approved in OL Amendment No.126 dated April 23,1998. DOC 2-42-LS-38 is no longer needed and it is removed from the out of scope list.

REQUEST (supplement): The attached ITS 3.3 Bases paces have been revised in response to NRC reviewer comments received on March 4,1999.

ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 B, insert B 3.3-110 (pages 1 and 2 of 2) and pages B 3.3-111 and B 3.3-149

-j

TNSERT B 3.3-110 (Page 1 of 2) 7.1-d0 2 ma irarde i dwa r+ sa

~ DUap r- pn fj&),!*'yj,A ,,orne

#"'wAan w cmJ,-l,

"t"7"A h

e. Eeedwate solation - bu . Generator Water Level - Low Low

, SG Wa r Level - Low Low provides protection against a loss of heat sink by >nsuring the is tion of normal feedwater and AFW delivery to the ster m generator ,/ 'n the location of the feedwater line check CA- N 2 valves}'A feedwater ~ ie break or a loss of MFW would result in a loss of SG Water level. SG Water Level - Low Low provides input to the SG Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system which may then require a protection function actuation and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Thus, four .

OPERABLE channels are required to satisfy the requirements with two- l' out-of-four logic (thgAhljan '

functions also use a two-out-of-four

( logic). Two-out-of-rour low lei y SG initiates feedwater isolation. As discussed in Referenc , e .: Wate- Levei - Low Low trip function #E!DB2ib has been modified to allow a lower Trip Setpoint e under normal containment environmental conditions and a delaved trip when THERMAL POWER is less than or equal tof RTP. C A-7 7C

'rleE4m/TTb

,,_ircuitry reduces the potential f r inad rtent trip CA-73-ool nvironmental Allowance Modific M ,s g on tpcontainment e

pressure, and the ErfVL TT ependent on vessel AT Q .g j ~

CtusAMIAuwthwdMwLtransmitters (d/p cellsgocated insi e -

4f fr/e/ dontamment

/

experienc!Eb adverse environmental

[f conditionhu ofa7 edline breakdfie huhfddanfatAdless;atm20 4 ,j g,u,d' GEdFFAEGiWREPHi!> EAM funetion mR#flie presence lii 4 % g '

sc ws,r adverse containment conditibns (elevated pressure) and enables th Steam Leve/ Generator Water Level - Low Low 6ip setpoigi dverse) eflect[

the increased transmitter uncertainties due to thisdn rironment. The EAM

4sNa lower Steam Generator Water Level - Low Logtrip 'g f l

setpointG53i3iDwhen these conditions are not present, thus allowing l mpre margin to trip for normal operating conditions. The Gh5 i addga_l operating margin eT.ec.co a.2+mem> .

l durin< earl h-cewenby allowing the operator time to recover leve vhen the primary side load is sufficiently small to 6 Th TTD wws Le+continuougmonito$igilEDpri ary side power I nol reyuiru en earfre f e froldt,Q

~

delorrA. delee fr ofaMn on Ce MheLue/ Low-1.owpMeve6y juerrdt y

e..w- INSERT B 3.3-110 (Page 2 of 2) CA-7 N

.(;jf

e. Feedwater Isolation - Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low dM9fi rw u<anrVe sel AT. Scaling of the Vessel AT channels is cA-2 N dependent on the loop-specific values for pT j , discussed under the OTDT l and OPDT trips. Two time delays are7[msde based on the primary side power levege magnitugf the trip delgy M i power. m.mmnwMe EAM or TTEVf(,decreas lp with increa required channels, it is acceptable to place the inoperable channels in the trippe condition and continue operation. Placing the inoperable channels in Edf scEmi322AR enabME@the Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low (Adverse) function, for the , or 4EBib removD the trip delaygfor the TTD. E9G rwr=samhe team Generator *

}[ater el - Lo ' Lgormal%ction dBEMf5E2 eq6iibd channelhy,3'-M 4, th channe g!fbe tripped.fr u is acceptable to place the associated channels in the tripped condition and continue operati rforming the latter a referred since a partial trip is av ' , however, this will result in the enab m Steam G or Water Level - Low Low (Adverse) function which conservative (higher level) trip setpoint. At this time i d also be accepta lace the inoperable Steam Generat ater Level - Low Low (Normal) ch .. 'n the bypass ondition to prevent an inadvertent Reactor Trip or ESF

- ation. V CGvWhr Lewl.W-ba C M S-do The frip Segoigt. reclect uriP"RNriimboth steady state and adverse environment mstWn rTtglisagan3The Trip Setpoints for the Steam Generator Water Lev {el - I%w Low (Adverse #

and (Normal Containment Environment) bistables are 2 20.2% and 214.8% of narrow range span, respectively. The Trip Setpoints for the Vessel AT (Power 1) and (Power 2) bistables are < Vessel AT Equivalent . .

toQand 5 Vessel AT Equivalent t espectively, CA-?.7-#1 with corresponding trip time delays of 5 232 seconds and 5122 seconds.

The Trip Setpoint for the Containment Pressure - Environmental Allowance Modifier bistables is 51.5 psig.

i

J

i i

l

-j ESFAS Instrumentation j_

B 3.3.2 5 7%

w BASES APPLICABLE 5. Turbine Trio and Feedwater Isolation . (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES. O LCO. and "~";. xd ;; xteted'b3gn nia; are closed. sd d; W/a.P ,

APPLICABILITY nti a ted ;? is;1;ted by ; ci xd = =;l ni n J.s t *d +

1

#^ l'

""J be inSysts u In ei;;r;tient inMODES

r;tien c.r.d 3; 4. 5. andtk 6turbix gar;terf=y tk ""J Sy . g g .5

rd tk turbin; gar;ter er; ret in nrvi;; sd Functi "4 1 reauired to be OPERA 8LE. A// ,/fe, /CEneb s .candCe.(1.)nre) mu.r+ 4a NtDRAttfo%

6 iharv rediher N8&/hl(eweg g- *ll A ea .a and*3 ex x gf a

The AFW System is designed to prov de a secondar si heat sink for the reactor in the event that i.ne MFW Syrtem .

is not available. The system has two motor driven purps and a turbine daiven pump, making it available during ch, '

normal unit operation, during a loss of AC power, a '.oss of MFW, and during a Feedwater System pipe break. 'ihe

' normal source of water for the AFW System is the condensate storage tank (CST) (Terr.;11y ret nf;ty related). A-lw 1;ni in th; OSI@Xs eQsurA' h!)

i Pre'ssere3colgidentWittCanfeRigggEfegdyggituaggLn !

I sfgnaE4AFJSJJ will. automatically realign the pump i suctions to tne safetyRelated Essential Service Water >

(ESW) System. (s;fety r;l;ted). The AFW System is aligned u so that upon a pump start, flow is initiated to the respective SGs immediately. f

~

af AuxfMa MrTeediitater"rMahdal'Itatt13 tion

!h. in 1@3lDgjatiop3f3milDrifi.4h-@3aghe accomp11tsheAdom3te:=$tfiltoonME_act@Dtte t.iregerogaps;tissialwish;m!LnimalrAFM s 1MtM9Ghe_WLMWWireeMingnrrtgle j OBEBE gl e

b;e- Auxiliary Feedwater Autnmatic Actuation Loaic and !

Actuatici Relays -

(SSPS)

Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner an described for ESFAS Function 1.b.

k

&a r-e

'M (continued)

MARK UP OF _NUREG 147J s.u, 3 B 3.3 111 5/15/97. ,

s

Table:B73.T2G L.a'";~iC J %Q %EZELi(Pagel2 of'4) l FUNCTION TRIP;SETPOINT b CA-7.u/4 j 14j Steam'..Ljneilsolation a; ManuarIniti; tion N;A:

b. Automatic [Actuationitogic N.A.

and;ActuationJRelays;(SSPS) ,

l cl.; AutomaticiActuationflogic N A:

and7ActuatiynIRelays IMSFIS) di Containmen_tfressurel s37.0'ipsig High 2 e; Steam:.Line.; Pressure (1) Low E;615?psig (2) NegativelRate?"Hjgh sgD0fpsjiwithla2atellag control]erjtime:tonstant E501sec:

5; Turbine 1Ttipiandleedwater Isolatjon

a. Automatic" Actuation. Logic N;A; and: Actuation _ Relays 3SSPS) b; AutomaticTActuation? Logic N:A7 and':ActuationtRelays QtSFIS)

c. SG~Watertlevel?-2High;High il787:of.;parrow range Fl14) instrument; span d; Safety" Injection See:Eunction;;1 16.

G. SG Waler L.evel Auxiliary;feedwater

/ m-/_w g

(Safety'J(njection);?,f

] ,e f,j 5 W.M

' ~

a. Man. ual:Ini.tiat. ion.

N.A2 -

b; Automatic Actuation Logic N: A'.'

and Actuation _ Relays _(SSPS) I b-b c2 Automatic [ Actuation; Logic N[A and' Actuation Re].ays1(B0P ESFAS)

(continaed)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 149 5/15/97

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.3-006 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Clarify Bases for SR 3.3.1.3.

REQUEST (revised): Based on NRC reviewer comments on March 4,1999, the SF 3.3.1.3 Bases insert has been revised as attached.

ATTACHED PAGES:

Attachment 9, CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure SB, page B 3.3-62 and insert B 3.3-62A

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.

mg BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS In addition, control room operators periodically monitor

%.soant indications and alarms to detect deviations in channel outputs.

SR 3.3.1.3 l; ggg CA-IJ-A4 SR 3.3.1.3 compares the incore system to ithe mpsNIS

, cis. .h. Ba every 31 EFPD. If the absolute difference is 2 21, the NIS channel is still OPERASLE.,but must be read.1usted. cj) y,y g

.' fkT4Y:ZMPPy*9"9'?/^

p er a. mi um nn cnannel ce.. ou propei sy reaaJusted, the channel is declared inoperable. This Surveillance is performed to verify the f(aI) input to the'0vertemperature aT Function.

Two Notes modify SR 3.3.1.3. Note 1 indicates that the excore NIS channel shall be adjusted if the absolute difference between the incore and excore AFD is a 34 22.

(MddN/ Note 2 clarifies that the @% M4 Surveillance is required only if reace power is 2 E4 50J RTP and that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed for perfoi ing the first Surveillance after reaching E4 50% RTP. .-2"'AME47 8 E3--42 8 7. M 4 The Frequency of every 31 EFPD is adequate. It is based on unit operating experience. considering instrument reliability and operating history data for instrument drift. Also, the slow changes in neutron flux during the fuel cycle can be detected during this interval.

SR 3.3.1.4 SR 3.3.1.4 is the performance of a TA30T every 31 days on a I STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This test shall verify OPERABILITY by actuation of the end devices.

The RTB test shall include separate verification of the undervoltage and shunt trip mechanisms. Independent verification of RTB undervoltage and shunt trip Function is not required for the bypass breakers. No capability is provided for performing

+ such a test at power. The independent test for bypass breakers

a. ,l,. u,-

(continued)

MARK UP OF.NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 62 5/15/97

INSERT B 3.3-62A CA-3.3 006 l

The purpose of the comparison is to check for differences that result from core power distribution changes that may have occurred since the last required adjustment or incore-excore calibration (SR 3.3.1.6).

g

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.3-024 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ITS Tables 3.3.6-1 and 3.3.7-1 (formatting only) as well as several ITS 3.3 Bases are revised in response to NRC reviewer comments on the CPSES Bases that are generic to Callaway.

REQUEST (supplement): The attached ITS 3.3.3 Bases change is made in response to comments received from the NRC reviewer on March 12,1999.

ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 Enclosure SB, page B 3.3-168 and insert B 3.3-168 l

PM Instrumentation B 3.3.3-

,c~ .

W9 ^

BASES-G 2.1-2L i LCO -/f, g Refuelinaifater'Storaae7anrfRidSTT"1Mel l (continued)

Refuelinggiateratoragelank3Mel3ggIDpe] - _

able? nf V " : ~ ' #eand -

. BE

_ Gle ay$o1h h hD offsurmuidedmyp1M.tigg,g pS"*

' assist 3rCaonitottngtandgut4 tit!gg3!BhdemfateDqppNf watergoggsafetyangettanAnstnatainmannsprey J x _

CM'3-03&

APPLICABILITY The PM instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES 1. 2 and 3.

These variables'are related to the diagnosis and pre planned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The app 11'c able DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1, 2 and 3._ In MODES 4, 5 and 6. unit-conditions are such that the likelihood of.an event that would require PM instrumentation is low; therefore, the PM

- instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS Note 1 has been added in the ACTIONS to exclude the MODE change restriction of LC0 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually required unit shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the passive function of the instruments, the operator's ability to respond to an accident using alternate.

instruments and methods, and the low probability of an event requiring these instnments.

Note 2 has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.31. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for.

that Function. When;the:RequiredIchannelsdnHableg;31! State -

spec 11[1edlonfa; pet 1SBNLbasisnthen3he $J.J-2 /

Conditionr=y .belentfrediseparatelyJforfschRd@3ElE!ES

~

H c:8FABlij@BP>

, , - {t .

. : 9 .. a r ]

(continued) .

MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431' BASES B 3.3 168 5/15/97-

a 1

INSERT B 3.3-168 CA-3.3-024 Table 2'of Reference 5 requires all plant-specific Type A variables to meet Category 1 design and qualification criteria; however, RWST Level is specifically identified in that .

same table as a Type D Category 2 variable. In this specific case, as discussed in Csetions 7A.3.1 and 7A.3.6 of Reference 1 and in Section 3.2 of Reference 2, the requirements of Category 1 are met..

s a,

. - .,e

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.3-025 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ITS 3.3 Bases are revised in response to NRC reviewer comments on the WCGS Bases that are generic to Callaway.

REQUEST (supplement): Additional ESFAS Bases changes that are applicable to Callaway.

ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 B, pages B 3.3-83 and B 3.3-84

ESFAS Instrumentation-B 3.3.2 wm. .,

BASES APPLICABLE 1. Safety Iniection (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and . Phase A Isolation:

APPLICABILITY

Cent;ica;,t Nr;; B;1sticr..

. Reactor Trip:

. Turbine Trip:

. Feedwater Isolation:

. Start of motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps; e .trola L of SG//su/own ad ramfl* l4uj CA-3.%Q4

Cor,tr;l re;;;; .;r,til; tion i;;istier. er.d

. Enabling automatic switchover of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) suction to containment recir@latipg sumps ~jLcoincideptjylthWSIQowilowil t

leVell g EmergencEDG2 start *

IEitiaton[ofi!3ECSILOCA74egtlencetl

? Conta_inmentTCoolingi t EmergenefExhaustLSystealinithe:LOCAUSISLeodeff efJM e

Start H #ofvESWand'CCfWTsj a. u. <t~ rreJ. aa/

These other fun ( T L B i tialensure:3 *

Isolation of nonessential systems through containment penetrations:

. Trip of the turbine and reactor to limit power generation:

. Isolation of main feedwater (MFW) to limit secondary side mass losses:

.v.,.,

(continued)

' HARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 83 5/15/97

)

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 w~y '

BASES APPLICABLE 1. Safety Iniection (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and

Start of AFW to ensure secondary side cooling cg_yy_,37, APPLICABILITY gatg ity.j g jfg g 4 4 Km _IldfGJhwhmL ._.._

h: bit:bility. r.d

. Enabling ECCS suction from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) switchover on low 310w 1 RWST level to ensure continued cooling via use of the containment tecirculation sumpg

! Emergency 1LoadsXon40CAIatelptpperlylsegeanced3nd PoweredJ

! Containmenltoolittacrpresfeelcontskuelt Intestity!

Emergency 1E8tlaDstISystemI+ 3 y ttoniin W 3.0CA~tSIS) modeito mafntAit&theiaDxillar,dtujldjng2tje pegativeIpr sure?anditRterlitsgexhaung c4-2scas-i StytitflESWpLndlCCOtgsetylcelsafetyirelated SMG M and n m,y' e

a.

Nhy)Iniectio7fManualInitiationn.c Sgtv , f n M,.rled r,

The LC0 requires one channel per train to be OPERABLE. The operator can initiate SI at any time by using either of two switches in the control room.

This action will cause actuation of all components l in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals.

The LCO for the Manual Initiation Function ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the l manual ESFAS actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual ESFAS initiation capability.

l Each channel consists of one p;h butter, switt:l} and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic

. , .. , cabinet. Each psh butts swjtch actuates both s'

c i ,

(continued)

~ MARK UP OF NU CG-1431 BASES' B 3.3 84 5/15/97 1

l

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.3-026 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: This change incorporates Callaway OL Amendment No.130 dated April 2, 1999. To accurately reflect the incorporation of this amendment, the Note to ITS SR 3.3.2.7 is reinstated since the relays associated with tested Function have no setpoints to be verified. As such, JFD 3.3-136 is indicated as "Not used."

ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 , pages 3/4 3-18(a),3/4 3-21(b),3/4 3-26,3/4 3-36a, and 3/4 3-37 Enclosure SA, pages 3.3-33,3.3-35,3.3-44, and 3.3-58 Enclosure SB, pages B 3.3-81, insert B 3.3-81, B 3.3-83, B 3.3-84, B 3.3-115, B 3.3-130, B 3.3-131, B 3.3-138, insert B 3.3-138, B 3.3-142, insert B 3.3-142, B 3.3-181, B 3.3-182, insert B 3.3-182, B 3.3-184, insert B 3.3-184(a), B 3.3-186, insert B 3.3-186(a), B 3.3-188, insert B 3.3-188(a), insert B 3.3-188(b) A, page 15 (Insert 6A-15 page 2 of 2) B, insert 6B-21 I

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feR-05-1999 B5'57 P.08/21 TABLE 3 3-3 (Continued) ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) 9 ACTION 36 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels. STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that the Containment Pressure-Environmental Allowance Modifier channels in the affected protection sets are placed in the tr1pped condition within 6 hours. _ ACTION 37 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channe'.s are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours. (NOTE: ACTION STATEMENT 38 is located on Table 3.3-6). ACTION 39 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 s hours.

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                                                                                              .                                                                          pi                   ds            r e w s                                                                                                   ei          r                       _

VAT ALS

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LEE A. 3 ( A. n e A. A. A. cd ne or c SRT N Q N mN N N ot fp h e s r c R r te st ee ph i EY i h TAT u a . T w SLS

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en s - AEE A. (1 A. Re A. A. A. l e e i 6 HRT N M N N N N tb et d N e a cs n O c - t e nr a I N T n dv ai T O NS a ea lf 5 A I OE l th l R T IT ) l ) s is s B A T 2 i 2 ey er e l T AC ( e( ) . te vu d l N UI . ) ) v . . S h rc o A E TG A. ( 1 1 r 1 A. A. I et uc M . C M CO ( u( S b s so n 6 U AL NM H S H N N A L R n B l s er i d E T l e he n N S L o T al tv E a N N A i S hn e .L A I G N N t E su dh eB 5 H O a T eccA C M I I l hs dinR s ES TET o D cr ihaE e e

 )T        T        ACA                                                                   s                                                                    E .i u                         vwlP                  d h dSN              PUIRT                                        .            .            I            .                             .

RTho o lO o t - eY ITVES A. A. A. A. ESwh r .i M uS n E E RCEPE TADOT R N N A" N N R S GE GT 4

                                                                                                                                                                                           . p6 e e n 8vb                      n f

o i NR " N A 12 e19r p i t 0 I O TC4 1 uo t n1 U L A e s I SI7g GKn oe l .st s u r a oTQ N a T aO i d c1 sd b p C AE O h A Ldd ey ie (0R LI P T n ne iCehr E s 1 O 2CE

   - A C GET ONA                                                                 l                                                               N      oNae O             c f

iru nti u L B .a 3 N LNRT . . . l . . E sI .x r oJf q A d - SA AAES A. A. A. a A. A. L yT 0 e ef r oer R e - NIPE aA4 v E m - ADOT 4 E L N BA N N N rN Q dU7N doe P r El R _ L ee I f o T 2C TKW O bveni cs O f o LlE N r V 6A .D i ga d . A B_EA R O e 0I l aamr e e _ TF U I v ye3M la wtre t p - _ S LA T b o rh6t etKS heofnri uoc a y Y T ER a v sb reoc l E NB em.D geuto n F Nl . . . . . . o4L 6 yn pqa s o A Al A. A. A. a. A. A. tr2O 1 ai ers S l A sf6C 2ml msea s OC N N N 3 N R N a K 0 G yu r e e r eo n i D ed E m l e .h c Ncff nGo s R L E e d2a ne ol f y E t tu2e 2ert a E NK i al6 5u ef ed l N NC . . . . . cK g qt s o s e e AE A. A. A. e A.. A. dx n dese er .d e A. I l l G ii ee .i nrrrnii N CC N N N S N N N t 0r afi oDuye E s se2u fei ql m sk eb6d 6h rt y e ni ec . t K 1t earcrot nn nn n ro e y

                                                                                                                                                                        .d     n 1 nh                on ul r                                        ea                     0 n             oo           oo) o y                                    tr u                                        bm2a                    Gmo t 2. p gl             e oh y n e o n ii                    iiS i c                                      ce s                     4                         0              .N           g0. n         r n i t i ott                      ttA t n                                      et s                        -              lk6gs                         8n            weot                     _

t i aa aaF a e Fn e P l c K n y21i4 o m af a t uu uuS l g y I P r ae i a5 - w dEsl o l a tt) ttE o . hhsld dont . i o oi ccS cc s e tm p scye sel ouE sn s ti AAP AAP I m ee r i a u 0 r ilih L yi o I S O Er ft e r n yl f 9 e f otsBt i n cdS cdB " e as z T itee kifa Airt mI i n( i n( A rc Syi aiRrsac ceRl ea T o t a ta '

                                                                                     '           en                  S r                    r                 ru                   ueetihEitc s  a           s                                                         o en s u~

I ol a de d t nt g o r prf tPb ai N R a mcy mcy edu t i pniB s ai Oawf U u. oia oia s eq ro s1 c hteiv tcy rdi l r t gl t gl a he ei e1 a cncreeesel eeer

                                 'l A

o a uoe uoeh SS et r - e a o x u rih e p nh pe e N t r H ALR AlR P na PP R E C E d pT T r S O t O F V - dd i u __ O n aa gt I o . . . oo nc . . T C C a b c d Ll EA a b N . . ))) ) )) U . 0 1 123 4 + ab F 9 1 1 ((( (# + .+(( 9{>4 . C[ e mE w w" fgs" &' 0LE 8 .t

                '                                    '                          l   l!                          lL       ,ll!                             l'              jlll

1 l I ESFAS Instrumentation l 3.3.2 dy;y y ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

    $. g One_ % 1p2inopefable?           @ Jg;7;; g: NOTE?E n n 3                                   , 3,3 59-47.3 #                           e--One-trainmy:be; bypassed forlup_a:orhoursgor                        7,'3-I+r sucrei h nce_Restif!g                      wc-7.:P1pli P!pviderd_"thelothetgra1Etj OPERAB E A     rggg.yj'             - - -

Q./ @ B 11n:no0 E3; sJhouf;s O s.2 *+ 8lE 4P.72 @ BEnMBER IZEhoucs Q r.90+ 3.1-l+')

2. One a, La-M h i,,M R.I Ks.rhen k ro,(.t3 h & A**u cA-s.g.sx Inspnila. ofenste~.rMur.

f.o./ Be to, M oh s 3 54 losa \ l N q x.a.a sa t- ms w +. c,i,a., k v

i, .' MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 33 5/15/97

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2

.~

lY & SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

                                                 ~
                                                           ~

SURVEILECE - 4 0VENCY f~

                                                                                              <:h+;rema SR 3.3.2.7
                                                      %CX x              $T]ce--/lregly   J Verificatica cf relay sctpcints act re gired.                           U /pf                '
                            ~-                                          _

CA-n-oaf, Perform TADOT.

~-

M {M4 ' ' ' ~ l K - ^ x

                                                                                         ~
                                                                                              /f trw-fl.r x         __

SR 3.3.2.8 - -- - --- - -NOTE -- -- --- -- - -- Verification of setpoint not required for manual initiation functions. Perform TADOT. 18 months 8 _. SR 3.3.2.9 - -- - -- NOTE --- - -- -- -- This Surveillance shall include verification that the time constants are adjusted to the prescribed values.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months B SR 3.3.2.10 --- -- -- - - NOTE -- ------ ----.--- Not required to be performed for the turbine e driven AFW pump until 24 hours after SG pressure is a 1000 900 psig. -B PS-VerifyWedstitES RESPONSE TIMES are within IB months on a M limi WMM, STAGGERED TEST B ggg BASIS (continued) F5 s i V._ / MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 35 5/15/97

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 gg Table 3.3.2 1 (page 8 of 10) b Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation l

 " iy AFPLICABtf MODES OR omER                                .

3.3-08 SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWLLE TRIP RjNCTION COM)ITIONS CHANNELS C0f0fTIONS REQUIREENTS VALIJE5 fBPGIW"

6. Auxiliary Feestater

                 'c "" ""'*'            a,ctJ,-            J.ty -k,           .c -

pge

E ', f - 3.3-04.

                                ,                                                                       2 Trip 21me3 Delay                                                           3.

9 C/f-S.3-4B7 tar 4.:.~_"_ ~2 - M j2 I + M Jg 2.9. mal s Vesse12J fg g.1,a.5" wivalent so m 2.~3-Me m a yesse m frf,r,2,4 ttIr'a MPoupC511 y 9 7 1,jg QfJ--65~ or.G - a EN j/ p + g j g s,.2. a ,I k vesseu n

                                                                                            *fX# y,a*g- Equivalent cA-3.2-pp 7 Ircy&                                                                                        to 23:9*          R ~!P-/@

27T S)t 2.9,3 b R3yn C;;;Vesse1%iT [g g,2D,10 Q2.34

3 3P.ower W (4) contatnment Pressurry 1;;;g:::3 4

                                                                               @              :,u.a.za SR*,".r.3:225 s M M hi                   3.3-04--

Envit'onmental SRT329 w owance ~~ sg[s.a.10 & 2!?-S5~ y Modi.fjer e.4.- Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements T:e- Loss of offsite 1.2.3 2;; trains ' A@ sa 3.3.2.7 YU r ,2975-v Power 3-pee M wit' . 0.0 with . 0.0 B-PS bus = :.3.2.10 see-t+me see-t4me 3.3 M ey NA M ey

f. ec.c r.eit;;; m ;ter 1-e a-per + = :.:.2.' 2 = L; . = t.;

C;;i.nt r.;;; bus = :.:.2.0 ve m ,e wate,e 3.3 01 Z :.3.2.10 (continued) (a) h ic cr' ";;;. Un't ;g;i'i; i;;;i ..t;;i;;; ;;y a.t;in enly Alle.-;ti; '.';1a igr. ding en Cut,~;nt 3.3-08 0:4 ;;tt~ile;j . ;; ti th; . nit The%1lowable Valueidefines;the 11mitingisafetyr ystestsett1097.*See s j the' 5ases-for.'the ' Trip 'Setpoints. I (k) With'a'. time delay s."240' seconds. l

0) With a time delay GO: seconds. 3.3 04 4

MARXUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG.1431) 3.3 44 5/15/97

1 I LOP DG Start Instrumentation j 3.3.5 seg+

         .u'                                                                                                                                                                 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS                                                                                                                                I l

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ; 1 SR 3.3.5.1 Per k C".'"IL ClICK. Tie bre.akerslbetweenr480 12 har: :3.3 28 VacjbusesING01Eand'flG03:andIbetWeenJ480]Vag 71 days buseslR2?andING04, 'sj!al lsbe ? verified!open] f . . yu 3,y

                                      .__ '_Nc= N* d j 'm,e5 - -a-ur d Q uf.r*A-                                                                         cj} Ekynot SR 3.3.5.2        PerformTAD0T.                                                                                         31 days                    B-A                      ^                                                        %g SR 3.3.5.3        Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpe mt                                                             18 mortns                B PS.

A11sd,1; ":1= Trfp~Setpolttt;and! Allowable Value as follows: a; tesgorgitage;A11@able;Yeltie 8]E10riBJEIROVMEWith!8Mineidslpy ofl110!f102mM5m; Loislofayg]tageJ[ gip 3SetpojntE83EI120V BusILej tJIaltime;4e]affo_f3101seg , b? DegradeQp]tage:Allowab]elvaloe 107 E

T 38 g 120V Wusliwith T time de]ay;pf;11p1111pisecJ Degrade Q olta M Kt % SetpofntIl0 R42V II20 pus);with;gtimeldelanaginec; e M E.rffESfoNTE MZ) _

SR 3;3 4 4 Verify M [L u._..]tartENEliEliBMWElam 18'monthslonZa 3.3 31' esiglBR5mmtreiwithinMielt ~ dPJc g;3G @ STAGGEREDIIESI c::::rM. 'g BASIS S. f< ,: / n.. . MARKUP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.3 58 5/15/97

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 { o.y,p BASES CA-f.7-d V. ~ F(reymNon l BACKGROUND Balance"of'P1a~nt"TBOPTESFAS fcaujar/a (continued) r- (eg,; LIF_/_,d; Ibe80PIETFF processesisignalsifroml$5RSEsignallpnoces ;ing equipmenti)ndpla.nt;radiationfmonitorsjtolactdat.ely; EESF CA-7.3-od8 equipmentqghereJareitwoltedundant;trainiofR'ES_ 3nd;a { g, rnita;separagonggroupto*actuateithe7debineIDrive 11ary M 8cA-7 Y( Feedwaterixagwy

                           @jefy:                      j ~ 'ur%(tr Edr er" ct ti
                                                                   ~
                                                                     .n . ro _pi ;3 ~>== ua
                                                                           ~
                                                                                                     / g 2 7-P/   ?

Stontainment(CA-7.7-0.%; Purge gsolation acontro13oom;Emer,gency_V_entilationTiand Emergency;Eghaust;3ctuatignMunctions'; The280PJESFAS3asialbuiltlinlautomatic1 test 2 insertion 1featur:e MTD1whichicontinuouslyf tests l,the]systenjogicGArtyifadit detectediduring3he3esting lcauses ;anlal armEthe;mainicontrol roomloverheadlannunciatorisystenitolatertloper_ato_rs2tiolthe PtoblesztocaTM ndi~catiprtshows3heltest1stepIwhere7he7fa0]t Wasidetected; APPLICABLE Each of the analyzed accidents can be detected by one or more SAFETY ANALYSES, ESFAS Functions. One of the ESFAS Functior:s is the primary LCO, and actuation signal for that accident. An ESFAS Function may be the APPLICABILTY primary actuation signal for more than one type of accident. An ESFAS Function may also be a secondary, or backup, actuation signal for one or more other accidents. For example, Pressurizer Pressure-Low is a primary actuation signal for small loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and a backup actuation signal for steam line breaks (SLBs) outside containment. Functions such as manual initiation, not specifically credited in the accident safety analysis, are qualitatively credited. in th; ;afety :nalysi; and the NilC staff appr;ved lian;in;; basis f;r the unit. These Functions may provide protection for conditions that do not require dynamic transient analysis to demonstrate Function performance. These Functions may also serve as backups to Functions that were credited in the accident analysis (Ref. 3). The LC0 requires all instrumentation performing an ESFAS Function to be OPERABLE. Failure of any instrument renders the affe:ted channel (s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the affected Functions. The LCO generally requires OPERABILITY of four or three channels in each instrumentation function and two channels in each logic (continued) NARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 81 5/15/97

di* INSERT B 3.3-81 CA-3.3-026

       -i and reposition automatic valves (turbine steam supply valves, turbine trip and throttle valve) as required. The separation group 2 BOP-ESFAS cabinet is considered to be part of the end device (the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump) and its OPERABILITY is addressed under LCO 3.7.5, 'AFW System." The redundant trains provide actuation for the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (and reposition automatic valves as required, i.e., steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valves, ESW supply valves, CST supply. valves),
                                                                                                    )

ESFAS Instrumentation i B 3.3.2 i v :. BASES APPLICABLE 1. Safety Iniection (continued) SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and . Phase A Isolation: APPLICABILITY

                                              ;         C a toira nt Nrg; I;;lett e
                                             .          Reactor Trip:                                                  1
                                             .        Turbine Trip:
                                             .          Feedwater Isolation:
                                             .         Start of motor driven auxiliary feedw t r (AFW) pumps; e       .rro/a & o$ SG//oudown ak~ramjol*l4uf MW

Centr:1 res ;;atil;ti;n i;;1; tion; ;nd

                                             .        Enabling automatic switchover of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) suction to containment recirculation sumpsiscoincidentjw_ithrJWSTOcw3cwy leveli s        EmergencK R stat $

6 Initiatonlof33ELELOClA sjeguencerf

                                             ?        Containmenticcolig
                                             '.       Emergency! Exhaust"S.Vstem11n]theJLA g(515EmodefM &RN
                                             .        Start *of7ESrand'.CCW'      sj mal ll ^7 ~

Theseotherfudtiban157^f,

                                              .                                    da 4rn r /o u y e d .      d' ensure:D
                                             .          Isolation of nonessential systems through containment penetrations:
                                             .        Trip of the turbine and reactor to limit power generation:
                                             .          Isolation of main feedwater (MFW) to limit secondary side mass losses:

4 . . ,,

 ,,t.

e (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 83 5/ 3/97 n .. . , . .

                                                                                                                 - _ ~

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 c:m

      $Y      BASES APPLICABLE          1.      Safety Iniection (continued)

SAFE 1Y ANALYSES. / LCO. and

Start of AFW to ensure secondary si ling gj_yy.,g APPLICABILITY g ity.j g jf ,j, y f7 , 4 ,,4 E n go _ Il d d G J 4 d * & . _ .. _

h; bit;bility. ;d

                                          . Enabling ECCS suction from the refueling water .

storage tank (RWST) switchover on low!10w 1 RWST level to ensure continued cooling via use of the containment grcu]ation sumpg

                                          !     Emergeny&qadsjp2XIC!Qar_aM;gejgggjLd3gd Powere#
                                          !     contaLaienticcolinsMWnenrotammals tuteg B t

Emeegegg/MostN@ Mon 3gMMM modesmaintaff0theIeMBgggggdggggfA

          -                                     negativey!:egamanitaggitangsstemagg                        c4-2.7-o::tr 1

e. MFEWI:nW Star systems;._ tic @ 7 e e n m ,*x '- e d

a. Hffety S In_iectio)fn.c Manual .t4nd Initiationin clou 7./fe m,r@r .f.nM , r, The LCO requires one channel per train to be OPERABLE. The operator can initiate SI at any time by using either of two switches in the control room.

This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals. The LCO for the Manual Initiation Function ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual ESFAS actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual ESFAS initiation capability. Each channel consists of one push-butten switt$ and-the' interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic en, cabinet. Each push-butten siiritch actuates both

   *        /

em

        ,y (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES- B 3.3 84 , 5/15/97

h 1 ESFAS Instrumentation ! B 3.3.2 ( , te .w9 f BASES APPLICABLE- fie- Auxiliary Feedwater - Loss of Offsite Power SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and A 1;;; cf eff;it; p:r to th; : rvic; bu;;; will be APPLICABILITY . , ~ . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . , . - , . . , (continued) g;;r ;r.d th: ;;b;;;xc.t r. :d for w athc.i-ef d;;;y heat rerevel- The loss of offsite power { LOP) isdetectedbyavoltagedroponeachserviceESf bus. The;LOPfisisensedjand2pMwfIbyph,,/ CA4'f'OM circuitr$forlWjES_tattLTEMEnE maey Load.1 Sequencer)M; fed 330PJESFAS)yJIe1.ay actuation; Loss of power to either service ESF bus willstarttheturbinedrivenAFWpumgoensure CA '#'5d4

                    \\                   that at least one SG contains enough M ter to serve M                    as the heat sink for reactor decay heat,and sensible heat removal following the reactor tri$ In
         > d j # g g [f/ ]

q j,, 60Gigon,go!!cegneisw12genegLLtogsiareM-drigu!d I'M 4 g unito;speedigimotorJoctentaapumpsMJrte da ^"f 8 - sequelltlallfiloadediojto.It!!eIgles_ eligeneratordblasesj e Functions 6.athrough6haustbeOPERABLEinH0 DES 1.2.477b-/ and 3 to ensure that the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactorgexceptiFunctioni6Id;33);@ichiaLLst;beiOPERAB.EE39 onlyiHODES;1:andg;EVessergTJis"used;toJ11mjgthe allowed 3rfpitimeLdelaylojn y3jlenJgreater;than;10EFJ B61orlorgIPithelmacuumMaQWLlaylislpetuitted! therefote;Eno;0PERABILITErequirements*4houldibelfsposed t on':the7es.sle h'[ichannel_sA13]@E@ SG Water Level-Low Low in any operating SG will cause the motor driven AFW pumps to start. The system is aligned so that r' a start of the pump. water immediately begins to tiow to the SGs. SG Water Level-Low Low in any two operating SGs will cause the turbine driven pumps to start. These i Functions do not have to be OPERABLE in H0 DES 5 and 6 because there is not enough heat being generated in the reactor to require the SGs as a heat sink. In MODE 4. AFW actuation does not need to be OPERABLE because either AFW or residual heat removal (RHR) will elfeedy be availab]e ] ir egraticr. to remove decay heat or sufficient time is available to manually place either system in operation.

~,

l (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 115 5/15/97 1

                                                                                                          ~l
                                                                             .ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 y.g BASES ACTIONS             E.1. E.2.1. and E.2.2 (continued)

To avoid the inadvertent actuation of containment spray and Phase B containment isolation, the inoperable channel;should not' _ . be placed in the tripped condition. Inste d it is bypassed. Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status, or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass. condition within 6 hou.s. is. sufficient to assure that the Function remains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The Completion Time is further justified based on the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status, or place it in the bypassed condition within 6 hours,- requires the unit be placed'in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE. The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one additional channel to be bypassed for up to ( hours for surveillance testing. Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 4 hours for testing purposes is acceptable based on the results of Reference 8. F.1. F.2.1. and F.2.2 Condition F applies to:

Manual Initiation of Steam Line Isolation:on CA-5."J-d 4

[/gs[0%i/Pp[ver/aD m_ Pr; m r; Lw. ;rd

e. P 4 Interlock.

For the Manual Initiation and the P 4 Interlock Functions, this action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS. 6 (continued)

        ' MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES              B 3.3 130                                5/15/97 i__...'

o l 1 ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2

 % e,

_f f: Qj BASES ACTIONS F.1. F.2.1. and F.2.2 .(continued) f it b t s et ds/hel la6k ffD M3'*4 1 1p o si f a ed . ;r tre /."' 0y;t;; p;p ;;; tim tra;f;.- dem;;;.17.i; ntid. Exe-F.i;;; trat pl; cia; ; f;il;d ;t.e. .;l ir, trip daria; ep;reti m i; .et i.es;nrily ; ca;;rv;tiv; xti=. Spuri a ; trip ;f tt.i; f;r.;ti; ;;1d ;11pr. ;ta '"' Sy;ts t ; ;;r;; tt.;t i; x; . 4redi;tcly T-fi; ef u----

-ctir.; ;^7 :ti=. If a train or channel is inoperable. 48 hours dyniiowea to return it to 1 OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is ' reasonable considering the nature of these Functions, the available )

redundancy and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE. status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4. the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above. J G.I. G.2.1 and G.2.2 [ Condition G applies to the automatic actuation logic ati relays-(SSPS) for the Steam Line Isolatiois Tur .n C4 7.7#2 _;rd ?c a;t;r Ifel; $ and AFW actuation Functions.

                               ._NN fa]sojappliegoMitSRS7_automatMactukttpIC3)pg
                                        ~

Theactionaddressesthetrainorientationoftheactuattaglogic 00"0 er.d tt.: n;ter sd ;in; r:1;y; for these functions. If one train is inoperable, 6 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time for restoring a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring dering this interval. If the train cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The. allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power ' conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit

    ;y                      -systems. % % e y Fvson nex4-                                        Q3,7, Gen}
    ;;?

(continued): a WIK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 131 5/15/97

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 g :. ., v , g / BASES' l ACT! 1NS nd Iconj;iguedl tp29-d@ g fot;theIAFW~ pumps.HTh1Efunctioniha out;[of,;3;ttip2ogf;c]g Therefore;cogtinuedjoperationysIa1Iowedpith;one31nopeyable channelsuntilithe petformagce;op M aonth_ly R o @ nelof thelotterEchagnelsgsagng3s2the t _noperablelghannd]ligplataji In;ttjpJwithinillhourMCondition sluodifind2.by;aINoteist.at_1gg o that LC0;3:0;gistnottapplicabjerLMODELchangeslargpermitted gjthlanJnoperab]elchange_lf 878 rse aroerded anilry-feedwAcefmf6%udie E:.L deeld ckmty) imp,, ~r,,b!e

                                                                                 ,enite,imdMel p.resy Lco when      ou o, mn

2. 7.s; gg.

_M Ra 1 st [unctionW _m _ y _ . c ys. aft AM l3 J.syys y m y wyyyj at.1g! i W - i dTA ^ siytsl@ E i a C , 2 _ 1.s' _._at J 1.l,;1 _ _a r- . J_ ~ l j _ _ab j nd' $ 7,7-fkf-Condition pjes;toltheJAMHierKEpedwategBalaILceIofEP]aDt ESFWautomaticiactuati_ongogicfandfactuatjoq1telaysHWithlo_ne traind noperableMilelun,igmust;beibt ought;@oME*31within 6]hoursland" NODE 92WithjgtheHoT10wingEhbors]133eguirjg! Act1gns_areznodifjed byla1 Note;that;alloWslogeIQainZtol#e j bypassedifotlup2to]2"ihoups;forgutyeDlanceitgti.nglproVfded%he

                                           'her train 11s1PERABEEE ZhlCEW8 3.3.I3y K^                                                                  CA4.24%

M SURVEILLANCE The SRs for ESFAS Function are identified by the SRs column REQUIREMENTS of Table 3.3.21($pdJyjkS6f:202 g 7.7-56 A Note has been added tc th; 2 Table to clarify that Table 3.3.21 @ determin which SRs apply to whichp?.7 5f ESFAS funct g 33.o S Note that each channel of process protection supplies both trains . of the ESFAS. When testing channel I, train A and train B must J be examined. Similarly, train A and train B must be examined f when testing channel II, channel III and channel IV. W { epplicabic). The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTS are performed in a l

a. {

(continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 138 5/15/97 i

 "'7,                                         INSERT B 3.3-138                      CA-3.3-026   .i Wgj R.1. R 2.1. and R.2.2 i

Condition R applies to the Auxiliary Feedwater Loss of_Offsite Power Function. With the inoperability of one or both train (s),48 hours are allowed to return the train (s) to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering this Function is only associated with the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump (TDAFP), the available redundancy provided by the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the TDAFP for mitigation. 1 l l I l m

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 ,n. h BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3 3.2.6 (continued)- REQUIREMENTS Ce- _..m_ .

                                  - - .u-.
                                           --_,____m.-.

-n. -.- - -a_.

                                                                             -mm,,_._,,m__..__.______,             _
                                                                                         = _ . = _ . _ = _ . = . . . =.. ,=. = . __

v a' ?",..M8.A,D,.4I" ah8.34,9N. S"5" 8

                       ,:.; rJ.a,2.'",

___ .. , a.- . . _,ir-st .01.3EdW3-

                                                                                      . ~ _ _-_   tM-' 0.d. E=".3    ._ 8              _
                                                                           .._ .. E ll a daW  3 '." M, ," ' **33M Se H'" '.'.L',,,, , .- afi
                       .n..

J'. 'Mm.r.,L. _ . , .a,..___-

                                .c .                                                   -

s- . . . . h r c c.cargr -

                                                                              - @N A/ 33M I W _M                                                               J
                           ;f;tTf n ".'yn.1The Fregency is adequate,'N'W"INIIW                                       based on industry S."TJ--/4 operating experie ce. considering instrument reliability and operating histor data.
                                                                     .CNJERT JA? 2.*7. .*2.fo                                 & T.2"/4 SR 3.3.2.7                                                                                                       7
                                                                                                                                          // As,ddr.

SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a TADOT everyMYThis CA-7.3-c/, test is a check of the Loss of Offsite Power. J' ndervelt;;; "C".

                       ;nd A"' "u;p Sucti;n Trensfer en Suction ."rcssur; Low Function.s. ";;h furetion is t;-t;d up to, r.ad including, tre
                       ;; ster transfer r:1;y ;;ils. The'trjpI, actuating'jtkodcertested within;the'sco*ofrSR'3!3~R7?arelh,                                                                                     yA.)

69999eAk544@ .T

                                                                                                .zurent 8 7.3-/+2 n ; t;st sis; inclui ; trip i vuzs th;t previ i ;;tu;tien

_; u_

                       .,__.,_u.._s_m_,..
                            . . . . . . .               .7 m.._u. ~_ .ee
                                                                                          ,.u _ en
                                                                               . . .ne. . . . ~ .m   2. .......t..              .r        . ~ .
                                                                                                                                                 . u. . .._ i.

excluis verification of ';;tpcints f;r releys. ".ci;y ;tpcint', r; uir; cleberet; tanch ;;libr; tion g.d er; verified during

                       #*t. I .A Miff"f
                                  . . . . PA m f T n.n A.*PT
                                                          . ~ /u..f s                     P W                                   Mn
                                                                     -l A e /r)a,,ua]

ec hY,, T* Abo 7*,rla f ende,cH yerif Indeg/rwr./-ej,y y ePEkMztxry ap 4a SR 3.3.2.8 ha,4 u,j 4o+f 4e g ,ek e,.y,/,t,f, ,,4 , e anol eer a a nt L,.e/ f ry ,s, eorr/mef-gp w SR 3.3.2.8 is t 1e p[foMffe of U, ;b,iDAsfis^a"ga, c% cit S ' k

                                                                                                                                                                 "   "' O  -

of the Manual 6:tuation Functions and AFW pump start on trip of j all HFW pumps.+ It is performed every 18 months. "ech ";nu;l cjp y y_ g . l Actuation furetion is tested up tc. ;nd in;1ading th; ;; ster ! r;l;y ;;il . In ~~ ,. in-t;re; . the t;st irciai~. ;;t;;ti;; cf ) the end i vi;; 'i.c., pu;p sterts, v;lv; cycles. etc.'. The j Frequency is adequate, based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refue" 'Nie. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes ver; non of setpoints during the TADOT for mant.41 initiation Functio.. . The manual initiation ,

#                      Functions have no associated setpoints.                                                                                                                  !

+.. (continued) ! MARK-UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 142 5/15/97 4 l l 1

N 9- INSERT B 3.3-142 CA-3.3-026 , LSELS output relays and BOP-ESFAS separation groups 1 and 4 logic associated with the automatic start of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump on an ESF bus undervoltage coridition. The Frequency is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes-verification of setpoints for relays. The trip actuating devices tested have no associated setpoint, i s

              .. .~

LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 t 6 4 *se' D.wi B 3.3 INSTRUNENTATION B 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator.(DG) Start Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The DGs provide a source of emergency power when offsite power is either unavailable or is insufficiently stable to allow safe unit operation. Iffall_oss@fivoltage'Ng)dfpGeondf_ tion d2 7.M occorpetthe*43pM7h&gsgiamm (RefEly fnyijd / /,, s/,e }l*e m)) Lg}111 emepenc lo roguanae(uez.c ' al Idpithe2Ln63d. Dppsfette@esalaand altergatell!ujs feeder braamteto;nsotepeweatsmierstourcempfuncess tl! W 48A9 0 AlatesREif!!1LEGWi!MlW ta shed33Egitl!spospejemaggiggenlagsDggig!g leL61cegggga '25lpneparemhe tLusts ____m _= _ _ _ _ y C1 - Thewaereltua;setsarmastejtageJ!!sttecejemece!gaisezae each236310L1!!Bs3.ges38;3EgtMrMfiajksgg voltage 3nnelantadeltaom tramg!n e_amletaridt-thele vi461r_e1*!eVLeessedpo3eJ! actitesgammanssa pr@!cnolt#sestratectioKrirWLts;!!ntluesmLbe!GnysiR'smaa!n! 8_anu15MRefj3)I 'Jairvelt;n pretatim will Excet; = LO"

                                 ;t;rt if ; 1;;; cf velt;g er igreid V;1t;g cenditi= ecc:;r; ir, tk wit-hy;rd. T Lc; er; tw; LO" ;t;rt ;i ,..;1            . ea; f; e n h 4.15 k" witel k;.

Eout Three instantageous undervoltage re'says with gnaiW timeldel,ay,e inxrx tin ;Mrnt;ri.: tic; are provided en f.jpg each

                                  ,,m   r,___       m_1_.---'

f161sV"ClassMEtystes bus for detecting

                                 ; x;t;ind igreid v;1t;g cenditi;n .e a loss of bus voltage.

The outputs releys are combined in a two xt of three f_ont logic to generate an LOP signal if the voltage-is below approxi.aate]y 70% 754 for 6 er kl e ^^t fer ; lea; ti n . TM L. M3,f:4

                                  ;t;rt ut; g .1= 1; e xri e d in r = . = ti m 0.: m;f. n .

9 8+, I second (nomin,, / de ),1Xe h*me defy vedt f l,J *nde.rirmilebryraer y L knrien undemN=je

                                        / ##^'Y##-                                                 (continued)     !

i MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 181' 5/15/97 o

LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 n, G BASES BACKGROUND fourydegradedi#oltageMstablesMthiassociateditimeJdelayslNie (continued) providediforleachE162kV1C] ass"1E] system bus *forrdetectings sustained 7 degraded:voltaaew =tianMne _ .1 1 m _ A-27-o.;(, _ ". 1 al nn- 4 4 r _ '~ a ~ J frN rGAY 8 S.'.HPn. Trio Setooint a Allowable Values The Trip Setpoints and associated;timeldelays used in the relays are based on Refer _encesg & t,Tandl6J th; :n: lytic;l li;it; pic;cated in IS".". Chapter 15 ("scf. Oh The selection of these Trip Setpoints is such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. The actual nominal Trip Setpoint entered into the relays is normally still more conservative than that required by the Allowable Value. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE. Setpoints adjusted in accordance with the Allowable Value ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, provid4nged the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and that the equipment functions as designed. Allowable Values and/ee Trip Setpoints are specified for each Function in tre LOO. SR~3"3!53

N;;in;l Trip 0;tp;ints er; ;is; sgcified in the unit specific setpcint c;1;ul; tion;. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoint measured by the surveillance procedure does not exceed the Allowable Value if the relay is performing as required. If the measured setpoint does not exceed the Allowable Value, the relay is considered OPERABLE. Operation with a Trip Setpoint less conservative than the nominal Trip Setpoint, but within the-Allowable Value, is acceptable provided that operation and testing is consistent with the assumptions of the unit specific setpoint calculation. Each Allowable Value and/or Trip Setpoint specified is more conservative than the analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident analyses in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip function. These fg a

uncertainties are defined in the "" nit S g ;ific ,TS/Esr^2 C4 .27,625 o, / ce/u/aMne A/

                               &i int$e)

Setp; .".cthedel-ly [eno.euey3 Study fr. -ffe * .'C"P32>)sefp/nf o WNsje (continued)

         . MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES             B 3.3 182                                   5/15/97

INSERT B 3.3-182. CA-3.3 026

~ *3

'dj Once the bistable has actuated, a timer in the LSELS circuitry provides an 8 second time delay to avoid false actuation on large motor starts other than an RCP. There are four of these 8-second timers per bus,'one for each degraded voltage channel. The bistable outputs are then combined in a two-out-of-four logic to generate a degraded voltage signal if the voltage is below approximately 90%. Once the two-out-of-four logic is satisfied, contacts in the bus feeder breaker trip circuits close to arm the tripping _ circuitry. If a safety injection signal (SIS) were to occur concurrently with or after the arming of the tripping circuitry, the bus feeder breaker would open immediately, a bus undervoltage would be sensed, and a LOP signal would be generated. Should the degraded voltage condition occur in a non-accident condition (no SIS present), an additional 111 second time delay is provided. These time delays are specific to the feeder breakers (2 per bus), if the degraded voltage condition is not alleviated in the overall 119 seconds (nominal delay), the bus feeder breaker is tripped.

LOP DG Start Instrumentation-B 3.3.5 }% - Q BASES- (continued) LCO The LCO for LOP DG start instrumentation requires that WPee fej@ channels per 136;ky1IS' system bus of both the loss of voltage-and degraded voltage Functions shall be OPERABLE-in MODES 1,- 2, 3, and 4 when the LOP DG start instrumentation supports.safetyJ systems associated with the ESFAS. In MODES 5 and 6 the G ree four channels must be OPERABLE whenever the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE. t: ;raar; tP;t tre ;;t, ti; ; tert cf tre OC i:; :=i17.51; car, rxid. Loss of the LOP DG Start - Instrumentation Function could result in thejppejgjenX3 Mets breakerJsigfusesW11ockout31aysMgtpCMat31 trainlandM n the delay of safety systems initiation when . required. This could lead to unacceptable consequences du accidents. During the loss of offsiteghe DG _ CA-77-a3 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumpsg eeJ,n.werm -- ;;'a 7,rNfEg7. G6WF)foDKA6&%'34ryw,ynmspsuspias well as an remov 1 through the g, f4 increased potential for a loss ofg secondary systemAJEM . J,7/

         /4 J

APPLICABILITY R M $f.*34?+6d The LOP DG Start Instrumentation Functions are rec .l red 1 7 jj i i MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 because ESF Functions are designed to provide protection in these MODES. Actuation in MODE 5 or 6 is required whenever the required DG sust be OPERABLE so that it can perform its function on an LOP or degraded power to the vital bus. ACTIONS In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint'is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or the channel is found inoperable, then the function that channel provides must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition entered for the particular protection function affected.. o Because the required channels are specified on a per bus basis, the Condition may be entered separately for each bus as appropriate. A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in the LCO. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the i l gG time the Condition was entered for that Function, g > (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 184 5/15/97 l

                                                                                                        ..._._..__m)

INSERT B 3.3-184(a) .CA-3.3-026

       ~
 !.i ;/

which are automatically started after expiration of the appropriate time delay by the .. LSELS. Failure of these pumps to start would leave only the turbine driven pump, started by the BOP-ESFAS directly upon receipt of a loss of voltage signal from the LSELS ' output relays,- INSERT B 3.3-184(b) Q 3.3-99 OPERABILITY of the Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer is addressed in LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." e a I

    .r n

                                                                         . LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5
 . s,
 ....g kr/         BASES                                             //

ACTIONS IL1 (continued)

                                            .rusar81. -in6) cyg-a Eel 3foryheHosEof@ohrlinstrunntsMSktugbMdtigge
                                         . _MeseL%gneratoristattDatelanfintegral;partIof@e                 v LSELSRa_gIjLnopptable%SELS;may3LsoJptevent.@e2gs.go.fzpowe 5'" M UL                N          *
                                                                                                      & 3.2-19
    $ feguo'ra/ Ack 6.2 in LCo 7.A/j               R
                                                  *g#"         r    es      aFM sffannaVW "A c J,u e e.c-                  f--                     #    +"e      = =' Completion Time.

n 4hould allow ample time to repair most fa 7,g% 4 lures and account the low probability of an event requir a takes intoLOP start' j 7, occurring'during this interval. g g arfy Md)Ef M f N W )19 0 9 R!f

Q13 U ^--- "i Ee.-4155;tselbreakeisslMimmitestem!

MZd3iG Cangsm3!ryzs praaggrgiigismatimi!g

                            -      MR#elbuses;ns (2LtndimioE402repasastigttarge!Memp seus!eent A tles  est,an9.8Eitl@eskettlplameigsmanags MpotItalbeL dMt._he;getformancelM@nutggelgneggggle maintenance 1_ TclosurelemigeMafirprimierley fargdegraded; ItagerchannemfmEWs              .iatedstgems inopecablen      itinengenditigisantry; gefennea 4- dr.rearn.r                        sf w
         /Ylove 4s               g                ~                            ,                           v LCo recli          e                                                                            0M gy,2_ff[m                  liengten.sappliesadensonestlermanetsonsranhamw haretinopefabM@nisthiESE3 Git!bTonegn3: hts 47M       conditimL. freegdgnstrumentip-22=gns3 1;gg AA/b                   andtgeroegra    . _. tagesay2mo3Longermm% Janemnoca:
                   /,              sano:Jonger; beg _. .        Itynleath1ESE 1. 22nningem N*                           operat1ginttggxgorL wM1                .Em11sttang R77#/                      condition 5 a]1g;hourag _ W8hstrumenL9anc.tLa!!gg
          . rec h y           7 ghesapab111ty2pafndits~ _ 312 E t               i    Misu!oelaams Eunctionionionefbus . _Linggne;11houre tetgeg3 Time.
            'e8e g 7.7-/17'    I    prolidestallini _ ,.1meno; correct lany' errors; . act;rypairs andjtsia      , atCfor{this;Conditim';consideting; pf,yp/                                                                  ow iw M _ loCag: event;occutejngiduring;thisjintervall _ "tspu}d Q laffLOPJfunctionitp; actuate;
  ;h                                                                ..

I'[ (continued) MAgg.UP OF NUREG.1431 BASES. B 3.3 186 5/15/97

""A INSERT B 3.3-186(a) CA-3.3-026 start via the BOP-ESFAS, motor driven AFW pumps start via the LSELS,

LOP DG Start Instrumentation B 3.3.5 w-e

     ,,y
.-L;;:1      BASES rs SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.3.5.1          (continued)

REQUIREMENTS gra : ch a ni f;ilarc. tha. it is b y to a rify'n; t ut : = in:tr; ~r.t;tien ce.tinua to ag rat; preg rly ktu r c x h CMNEi-CAL 40RAHON-Agru n nt citric r; i ter;i x d by tk unit :t:ff, h ad an ; ar:.instian ;f th: curci i=trux.: umat;intia, i=1; din; indisti;n ad raibility. If ; ch s al is ;;t:i i t k uituie, it ny k = indistien tMt tk nr.ar er tk ;i;41 y.__.....,_..,..........._.a..u__

                                                       .2          u..   ,_:- _ , _ _
                                                                               .                a. x.

raquxy i: had z. ; grating agrius tut i- r.;tata

_u __, , ,,..__ ,_ ____

                                 . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

m. . ~_ , _ , , , ~ -_ -+,.

_ _ , - - - . _. ,... . . - Q 25uF) f;rx1. Lt ar; fr;;;...t. chan of ch2x1: dria; ar21 agr;tica.1 ax of tk dispicy; nexi;ted .;ith tM LOO r;;;' ed M, JEKT~pqk

                                 .u....~....

a. De}bre$er;s%SMiand.'W_@fM81}gjegifjedL , Jggg 7, N eiery z daysz 1Ihistfr cytis based:en' Reference E lo.r.c b She of volk l .I'6L S lc pa o'c cand JapU volbje to, f io-c uid;.". SR 3.3.5.2 SR 3.3.5.2 is the performance of a TAD 0T. This test is performed every 31 days. The test checks trip devices that provide v CA-2.7-022 r- - -Y -"; ,;"- dt :".X %G=> ri != m; ---- yaa : EbbFor these tests, ttCTrip Setpoints are y verified and adjusted as necessary. The Frequency is based on the known reliability of the relays and controls and the q multichannel redundancy available, and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. ]1 TNSEkr A27-IP9(a) OA~ *M SR 3.3.5.3 SR 3.3.5.3 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The setpoints, as well as the response to a loss of voltage and a degraded voltage test, shall include a single point verification that the trip occurs within the required time delay.4= ;b.; ir. CA-7.3d'4 ' ncfc;x; 1. *

m. M8f.2-/?KA

,_ _ y J yt? j , (continued)

s l l MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 188 5/15/97 l l l l

                                                                                                                                          .......-..J

_. INSERT B 3.3-188(a) CA-3.3-026

/%

hY The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of time delays from the TADOT. Verification of the time delays for the loss of voltage and degraded voltage functions is only performed as part of the CHANNEL CAllBRATION (SR 3.3.5.3). INSERT B 3.3-188(b) CA-3.3-026 Verification of the time delays for undervoltage relays (1 second nominal) in the loss of voltage function (NB01011271DG, NB01131272DG, NB01161274DG, NB01171273DG, NB02011274DG, NB02101271DG, NB02161272DG, and NB02171273DG), for LSELS timers (8 seconds nominal) in the degraded voltage function (NFKS5000A&B, NFKS5001A&B, NFKS5002A&B, and NFKS5003A&B), and for time delay relays (111 seconds nominal) in the degraded voltage function (NB62RP332TDENB01, NB62RP332TDENB02, NB62RP333TDENB03, and NB62RP333TDENB04)is performed during the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 1

                                                                                                      )
   ..                                                                                                 I 1

1

l l

CHANGE NLMER JUSTIFICATION .-p 3.3 127 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table sQrp (Enclosure 68). , 3.3 128 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). i 1 3.3 129 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table { (Enclosure 68). i 3.3 130 lot applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 6B). 3.3 131 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.3 132 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.3 133 Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68). 3.3 134. Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table - (Enclosure 68). 3.3 135 A MODE change restriction has been added to IIS 3.3.1 Condition C per the matrix discussed in CN 102 LS-1 of the 3.0 package (see the LS 1 -l NSHC in the CTS Section 3/4.0. ITS Section 3.0 package). ! 3.3 136 er S 3. 2.7 .nc1 s rif' at' n r' a t t inc the rip ct ting devi s ng st ar t sa

        /f./

u.re l. 1 tes u er 3.3. 2.

          .ryrEAT~ $A-l[

l i JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS - 15 5/15/97 O

INSERT 6A-15 (page 2 of 2)

     '3.3-147 Changes to AFW Loss of Offsite Power and LOP DG Functions are made to reflect Callaway OL Arnendment No.130 dated April 2,1999.

II . 7 0 7 0 I / 3 4 - I O 3 2 7- /" 8 8-g, ~ d-f. e- I-y_ " 3, s - hT y, 7-

         %hd                 -

t it C c A-w l

                            #                  f 4                C f

d t e a ic o s Y s A a W sy A L la L s e r s . A o e r r o C N Y et t i i sn K ao FE mm L E s r i i, f . OR e o _ 3 0- WC Y N w 3 e d 9 l a E nr C H oe it k R C aa A N ut t n M A K ci U MA aer o N OE o o o e t f CP N N d o nh ep r s es 1 ao st in N 2-em ve e OO B rt rme LY B 6 ea n r AN _ 1 h S ei I A o o T e u 1 t R 3- eV bq DC N N _ E F cR sr e S T inC s e ag N S P _ I T Ph hn i is OL st t r Pt a ea P LO e Ci t le Dv om Nr

r. 7 o2 dy na v n o it a .

r w9 a r i3 r oo nf d ela9 t r fi t od n3 9 e da eu it n ca oR wla1 oC p ec t t A S C S s. P 2, y c le a de T wdt enn h e t cl r n e dm rC n ao it sf lei p u ee rt iue S, f. m f reA f q e a sy qh et T t6 8 fOod t e r 4. s Rf o Ci1 n o o ea t F 5 7. no dt en SUt sdd sa 1 3. ti 3a z tcte Gla d om30 1 en Cnoies L e1 3 3 di r nu as fi f aeh N Wiv hce r W t r F a o. R 3. se f ot nt h O t in wus AsN nt _ F iy oon I S 7. rp ao T t t ie e 3. S pb P I nr eo n c scm t - is 3V st R t f e en v e RR heee C s idu seq gud nFn R SC Tm S a e E nde odr hGm D CaF CDA R 3 4 5 E 6 7 4 4 4 B 4 4 1 1 1

                          -           M       1 3     3        3             U       3               n.

3 3 t

                        '             N       3                3 C

l l ' ll!jl

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER' SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA-3.3-027 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: ITS 3.3 Bases are revised in response to NRC reviewer comments. ATTACHED PAGES: , CTS 3/4.3 - ITS 3.3 8, pages B 3.3-29, B 3.3-30, B 3.3-112, and B 3.3-113 l

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1

 ..a BASES APPLICABLE          13. Underfreauency Reactor Coolant Pinnns (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and er rer RCS lo w is stcutically c a bled. thelreactor APPLICABILITY tr.ipion1Underfrequency RCP_s3Jslautomaticilyfenabled!

14. Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low The SG Water Level-Low Low trip Function ensures that protection is provided against a loss of heat sink and actuates the AFW System prior to uncovering the SG tubes. ,

l The SGs are the heat sink for the reactor. In order to act as a heat sink, the SGs must contain a minimum amount of water. A narrow range low low level in any SG is indicative of a loss of heat sink for the reactor. The level transmitters provide input to the SG Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. This Function also performs the ESFAS function of starting the AFW pumps o low low SG 1evel. Asidiscussedtirr$eference 773he;SG Q WateratevelEloWJLowLtripifunction%559BBKfias4een modifiedJto.lallowla31oWergrip]SetpointJNnderenb M flI* containment;environmenta]3onditionstandXde] itrip WheGiWERMApf0 WEE 1Eletsjthap!&egualgte _ MM

                      ~The Epcircuitrygedecesjthe; pot _egtja'QforJanad9esas Ls. rips 2Wa the! Environmental %11osanceIModjMJEAN)j!annsamengo_n                 -

w e ajy - ;gpresmgJagdttheUripWine3eTaEUURLe,j/,/ 6enfj 74A p~endent;on Of ransmittersi; vessel;ATO d/pje$ellf N

m. -aBocatedysjdercontainmengg rien F adverse s vironmental.

e nJ1% 6** g /f 0 conditions' -:tolaffeedlige[breh ~6_

                                                                           'WliAJMnctiog[.rarJ/A OrDdFeirwirMJurrL-w A h lthe:presencelofl.adverselcontainmenticondi doni (elevated: pres.sure)tand renables yhe; Steam;senerator: water fa.r #.cfed 6//e   gy,y,//s
                      /*           Leve12; flow 30WWEripasetpoint;samg,r3DArefl _ .the increased : transmitter; uncertainties Tdue30 "th'            g" f 8ee        JG W4r f,,r4 environment!sThe)EAM:N owerStean V.*vo/                         GeneratorJaterJ Leve]yfilow304tripiset )ointM1 Formal D whenitheseiconditionsIar.elnqtjpresent;ttyusg]1oLving!.more margin % trip ;forJporma]Ioperating Lconditions;@@

s CUEEEED { 6 additionalloperationallmargiD

foiefarr rue *< bry on EG m

                                        / h /<r Liv,/ L m-L m. # ,r 4 /                  (continued)

Qmidig / ,1 MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B J.J c 5/15/97

RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 jes* +' 4,9 e BASES APPLICABLE 14. Steam Generator Water Level - Low low (continued) SAFE 1Y ANALYSES. /,w,e arenneron CA-7.7-077 LCO, and GMiwr)ne4Jdur- :"#Mdurjngleanif6 APPLICABILITY 61by;al]ow1.ng3hd[cper,ator; time.itoIrecoverjevelnshen therpr,imar3fsjde90ad;is!sufficientlyisaaly of m+ regutre an e.,-//,-&gggmaTheZroMEgmapconti _ _ to_ primary 2 side;powerjmlesse1EUca11na_ ofitheles.seRAEc_hannelsfjsldependeptAthe; ! cop; D specifft5valaestfo64T5d1SiMer!d_er2ttieMfskid103 ( J wpsysTwo31me4]gysiaNp%Waaty side: magnitudeJpCthemipitie1Ay sf decrea_ Jevep;asi!igtpowet72 thi ncte Lg, EAMTorp su m .j tlons_ 6 =._ .

                                                                                                           .sj   - Te,fer.//,

1slagceptableytoIg]aceithaltnopaggtdeE* isenelfMDBile trippedmonditson2ndR:entinue.M,_E Baptg lhe (-#,InD nwgennelsun_meJu 3 6 5 ;4 + _"S_teaslegetator@geJr NelET4clNiller LAdlerselyumtjonMongtheIEAN@Ch3he $f#o4-ttip3delaypforjtheil]R _ _the;Sta== #e/-

                               ,          Generatoe water'~           we    :   InoneaJ          _mmes W /d' 4                         1redichannely;n_     :-- 21        .4 6                   v h'

fm0 /f m.y: tt :30ildt M _ in-meg.aceyysta[y^f_ted;__ mii _ . one _omf ism _-gg _ 3 a _ry ct _J10 fer. _ince) . pli app . . DL ' _ rTLt ..IglF_solg m ,l. Jings jthe

                                            .._ .. _.l   . _EW Plfeve . E lofi f _ 2 1 . _ JoD whichi X ._ conse ,. figHti El                       Et_

se.t a nt'.Mt*Js;tt ;itM1.;e1503 Acce 1 41 p _celthe11 .lable . i t ra_ tor 3 _te m 1 3 . Jir' Notsalp _nne]s11. the 3b) inadve. SRea TIrip?o/ESi;AS'ssedLft1 ti F if a [ g g _

The LCO requires four channels tf SG Water Level-Low Low per SG to be OPERABLE for four 1;;p unit; in which because these channels are shared between protection and control. In t;w. thr;;. ad four 1;;p unit: Arc thru S0 '.l:tcr ) L;i;l; er; d; dicot;d to th; ",TS, aly thr;; char.;l; p;r ' 00 er; r;;uired t; b; 0" ".'"LE. Al]I$g;)daterilevell Lowitow1 reactor;trii) Junctions;useitwoloutjof foor21ogicg Asywithlothersprotection7un.ctionsythe; single;fa11Dre crjtetionjappMesi'Shelrjp;Setpointsiforlthe1SGlWa_tjtr Level!LowitoWJAdyerselCont.inment3nvironsegt)gnd a , e (Normal" Containment; Envi ronment);bistables3reN;20_;2%3nd u-(continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.3 30 5/15/97 1 l

ESFAS Instrumentation

                                                                                            .B 3.3.2

ry BASES APPLICABLE ch Auxiliary Feedwater - Automatic Actuation Looic and SAFETY ANALYSES, Actuation Relays Cince of M=t BOP ESFAS)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays (continued) consist of the x..c simQar features and operate in the-seme assisjlat manner as described for SSPS;tn ESFAS Function 1.b. d.e- Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low SG Water Level-Low Low provides protection against a loss of heat sink. A feed line break, inside or outside of containment, or a loss of MFW, would result in a loss of SG water level. SG Water Level-Low Low provides input to the SG Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system which may then require a protection function actuation and a single failure in the othe channels providing the protection function 2HM actuation. Thus, four OPERABLE channels are - EnvTro unen/= / required to satisfy the requiremen with 483/,77y j4/lo.vance 4//frsr) two out of four logic (ttLMA.,_ jfenct19ns 7 allo!tisef al?@ louti lofif60rdlWicEdIpoloufldf-Your lodeve15signalsIjiraEFAitarasIthematorldtion AFWipumpsE1Ditwoi3GsEstarts;thelturhigpgr1Veg1FW Pump ";Asidiscussedlin;Referegcen17the5G38ter Lete1IELoW;LowltrjpXunction Mhastb%h modifjed3oIallegallowerLUrjp;SCpointysnderJAormal containmentrenv_ironmentaliconditigwidfazdeMed trfplishen5THERMg20WER;is]lesgthaniorlegual1%414- Ch1% 7 RL gg,,yg 7Xe ENh/rrb

                                         @ircuitryJteducesRtSe! potential?for* inadvertent c+.TW27
                                                        ~                                      ~~

trineviaIthe f- j. ph o le tai _nmentlpressurarzana the (+r W M> RsRCPEEBMEF _.. ,4dependent*ontvesselfliT ransmitters1(d/p g lls) ,#

A g'" r on 1ocatedti side'containeen ' IIEEMir3lEEllge

                                  -/4egexperieri          adve [] Iror sentallconditionsh tofarfeedidpe?b                  .; M. .., n . o . ~
^

l 1tleWfunctiony"h h m/ ownihe 3, (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3-112 (//f/n/;h 5/15/97 l

                                                                             %4/e 83.22-/.

Aac .ue & .rc LWe4se Level +

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2

w. a, BASES APPLICABLE dje- Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Generator Water Level -

l SAFETY ANALYSES. Low Low- (continued) LCO, and APPLICABILITY thei presencelof9dyetseicatainmentJconditierts I (elevated; pressure Waters.e 1213cE6)lanrisenablesTthe:steiant p; _ _ _ guigys to ddyA.MstugEM lowerlteamwenerstonisater2ee]Mtates g", j)}

                             -                setpoint+hn                                   m!ai!!!t L       ~J presentJithugiltnjjm* gore 3nrJjEto*t:W M or (Frbd'deArFw,,6,47
                                             ,       M y ski',",';; @ , M, c'g"+*;y,*!'~% a                                                                                -. _

3!ih!w1993he:MJttmej,teggeg et,,.. sea no+-rla a c+u sure.' an ean/re, 3f -- d---/t =5= -- L .a a K *mery messeEAT3M11MLett;thogesnelgI channe]stsidependent3mitheHobpispeggggg@ Bps . foraT Twoltime. t

                                                          = discussed 3

delayssar!!r tndecme-um mmpe2LIamtr %iLQ. sider r;L _Jeagrgtaileptithe decre s SF theiEko channelsait:1sacceptaplegpapmeelgippstes! pas t r-pem4/e D channelsE1Etheltn1ppeasm:193enjeneticpatara j imab GeneratortWatet; D yekE D2nf W-etseEggi!gll14!s; for;the:Emr m iti - A g h aletaggs-foq@e _ _ . ,_ .JGensinag!t SEM C", P#*jf WaterTevelf-ZL"93CtntMtiotaal _ _

g

                                                              . bena_nnaisise n !64 m                 _

p hen inYeres( "5FAM'C' ' ='"b'M'*W '"" ~j. .Jue nannels11nahe;trJppedjconflitjanfewi { oPerats .. J'" erforming3heHatter* . ._,fis Preferredlsinc a : rtiM; 1.s9voidedithoweyet; this;w11Hresult;im 1,1pg:of;theLSteam Generator.3 dater _ r t , _ >(Adverse.EtunctLon which;has7 _.._ lconsetyativ Je h _. l e veil ) 11: g n e _/XA%thisitioGta!! auld 31so;bem 2+1e-

    '"'p-              .                         aplacelthelipoperablegteamlGenerator 3fater;.        1       y e

(continued) MARK UP OF.NUREG-1431 BASES B 3.3 113 5/15/97

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.4.11-3 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Change 4 05 LS 31 and Difference 3.4-39 Comment: TSTF-113 (presently Rev. 4) has not yet been approved by the NRC staff. FLOG RESPONSE (original): TSTF-113 Rev. 4 revises the shutdown requirements of ITS 3.4.11 to allow the plant to reduce T.,, to <500 F within 12 hours, rather than MODE 4, to address the concern of entering LCO 3.4.12 Applicability with one or more inoperable PORVs. The shutdown requirements of ITS 3.4.16 are also revised, for consistency, to allow 12 hours to reduce T.., to < 500 F. ITS 3.4.11 Condition B and C Bases changes have been made to the Callaway submittal to reflect Rev. 4 of the traveler; no changes are required for any other plants'submittals. The FLOG continues to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler. FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 1): Based on the present status of the generic change process for the STS, it appears that traveler TSTF-113 will not be approved by the NRC in time to support the initial license amendments for the FLOG plants. In order to facilitate the issuance of these initiallicense amendments, an alternate approach has been developed by CPSES and DCPP which relies on the CTS, plant-specific information, and/or the NUREG but does not rely upon the traveler. This attemate approach is hereby provided as an interim submittal to allow issuance of the initial license amendments for CPSES and DCPP. The changes which rely upon the traveler can be processed in subsequent license amendments following approval of the traveler by the NRC. Callaway and WCGS continue to pursue the changes proposed by this traveler as a beyond scope change, primarily due to their high COMS/LTOP arming temperature of 368 F. Required Actions in STS 3.4.11 for one or both PORVs inoperable would bring the plant to MODE 4 (350 F). This could involve entering the COMS/LTOP LCO Applicability (ITS 3.4.12) with no means to mitigate a cold overpressure event since RHR is just being aligned for shutdown cooling during this time frame. Callaway and WCGS propose to terminate the shutdown tracks in ITS 3.4.11 at an RCS T.,, < 500 F, rather than 350 F. At T.,, < 500 F, saturation pressure is 666 psig. The lowest MSSV lift pressure is 1185 psig with a +3/-1% setting tolerance. The SG atmospheric steam dumps (ASDs, WCGS refers to these valves as the SG atmospheric relief valves or ARVs) have a set pressure of 1125 psig. Operation in MODE 3 with RCS T.,, < 500 F renders the offsite release of radioactivity in the event of an SGTR extremely unlikely given: 1) the difference between the initial SG pressure for this RCS T.,, and the ASD/ARV set pressure; 2) the secondary side pressure increase would be driven by RCP and decay heat only since the plant is in MODE 3; and 3) operation of the steam dump to the condenser. The licensing basis SGTR analysis discussed in

FSAR/USAR Section 15.6.3 uses worst case assumptions (e.g., 3636 MWt initial core power,18 MWt RCP heat, and 939 psia initial SG pressure for Callaway corresponding to 15% tube plugging) and ignores the steam dump to condenser to intentionally drive the secondary side pressure above the ASD/ARV lift setting to evaluate offsite doses. When consideration is given to the extremely low probability of lifting the ASDs/ARVs after an actual SGTR with RCS Tu, < 500 F versus the real potential for entering COMS/LTOP LCO Applicability with no mitigation pathway, Callaway and WCGS maintain that the proposed change results in an enhancement to net plant safety. FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 2): Based on NRC reviewer comments, Callaway and WCGS have withdrawn all changes associated with TSTF-113. Based on NRC approval of OL Amendment 124 dated April 2,1998, Callaway has attached pages that support the lowering of the COMS arming temperature from 368 F to 275 F. The PORV setpoint curve (CTS Figure 3.4-4), moved to the PTLR under DOC 9-01-LG, will be revised to incorporate the arming temperature change when the PTLR is issued pursuant to ITS Section 5.6.6. WCGS will maintain their CTS at this time, but may revisit this issue via a future amendment request. FLOG RESPONSE (supplement 3): Additional changes to one Bases page and to JFD 3.4-18 are needed to reflect the changes requested in supplement 2 above. ATTACHED PAGES: 0, CTS 3/4.4 - ITS 3.4 Enclosure SB, page B 3.4-66 A, page 3

1 i i 1

                                                                                                                                       -j MGP+yetse
                                                                                                                      -B 3.4.12
       - m.

BASES BA0510U10 RCS Vent Requirements (continued) Once the RCS.is depressurized. a vent exposed to the containment

                                             - atmosphere will maintain the RCS at containment ambient pressure in an RCS overpressure transient. if the relieving requirem ts of the transient do not exceed the capabilities of the vent.G
                                                                                                                       ' Q 3.4. Gen-I ,

Thus, the vent path must be capable of relieving the flow resulting from the limiting L40P . mass or heat input. transient. .and maintaining pressure below the P/T limits. The' required vent capacity may be provided by one or more vent paths.

Ter ;; = ..c.; O n;t ^.!; ; -_:;::it; . gir ... It

    .                                          . gire; i.; ;t; ; i ;:-:uri i ;cJdi at;. . _cir.; ; C'.";

int;ci.;h. ;.7.2 dudit; it t'.1 at; t tM :;:n p;ittr.. ;-

                                               ;tikrly ;;tilicir ; .;;.'. by :;:;t; e . O ;;;t sh;. ";
                                               ..c.; i .t.';; ;.;t k 2.x ".% kul ;f rader e t..t. n n
                                               . ; t d.;'. : = 2 .. :;::

9 ~ APPLICABLE Safety anabses (Ref. 4) demarst te that the reactor vessel is SAFETY ANALYSES adequately g rotected against 0 ing the Refersnee' 1 P/T limits. It PIODES 1. 2 and f er.; ;r.;. 4 ;^J. a s u t # S Y M [: ;:cet _ ::::ftr.; r,7.Jthe pressurizer safety valves w'.11' @7.4.//~3] h'V prevent RCS pressure from exceeding the Reference 1 limits. A6 ebest-@54

                           #                                 and below..o           ssure prevention falls to two                y RCS relief v ves or to a depressurized RCS and a fficient sized RCS           . Each of these means has a limited erpressure relief c        bility.

T75*F . The actual toeperature at which the pressure in the P/T limit curve falls below the pressurizer safety valve setpoint increases as the reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each time the PTLR curves are revised.' the L40P System must be re evaluated to ensure its functional requirements can still be art using the RCS relief valve method or the depressurized and vented RCS condition. The PTLA contains the acceptance limits that define the HOP - . l requirements. Any change to the RCS.' -t be evaluated against < p. G. (continued) MARK UP 0F IntEG 1431 BASES B 3.4 66' 5/15/97 _a

CHANGE t NUM ER JUSTIFICATION Conditions A and B [ ] the LC0 3.0.4 exception was aved to apply to ) all Actions and the specific exceptions for Conditions A and B were 1 deleted. This change is made per traveler TSTF 60. I 3.4 16 Consie, tent with current TS requirements [ ), a requirement to perform 24 hour containment atmosphere samples is added when a gaseous monitor ; is inoperable [per Condition C. Required Actica B.1.1 is also revised i to strike the word " grab" since the current TS would allow the Post Accident Sampling System to satisfy the containment atmosphere sampling requirement.] Also, consistent with Conditions A and B, the performance of SR 3.4.13.1 every 24 hours as an alternative to analyzing a containment atmosphere sample is allowed. Both of these 24 hour surveillances provide a compensatory, diverse method for detecting RCS leakage to complement the remaining operable systems (i.e., sump level and particulate detection). 3.4 17 Extends surveillance interval for pressurizer heaters from 92 days to 18 months. The operability of the pressurizer heaters enhances the capability of the plant to control RCS pressure and establish naturel circulation. The purpose of the surveillance requirement is to detect potential pressurizer heater degradation. This is done by periodically demonstrating that pressurizer heaters are capable of producing power at their design rating, by testing the power supply output, and by performing electrical checks on heater ele:aents. Heater elements are simple resistive devices which are nqt prone to complex failure modes. Moreover, heater banks are made up of a number of individually powered heater elements such that a common mode failure of the elements is unlikely. The normal power supply to the heaters is in use during normal power operations and a failure of the power supply would be immediately detectable independent of the heater surveillance. The low failure rate experience with pressurizer heater elements is indicative that the su'.veillance interval may be extended without loss of heater reliability. This surveillance interval extension is consistent with the guidance of GL 93 05. This proposed change is consistent with , , , TSTF 93, . - -< ~

                                                    -        C3                       Q S.+. 9-9 _

The APPLICABILITY provisions for improved V TS WXIEAbdMAF3 3.4 18 ,

                                                                                             $25//-3 LC0 3.4.12tmqMKo rzerA=namam evuArsrm modified to be consistent with current analyses that establish the [ Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)] arming temperature, requiring [COMS] to be OPERABLE when any RCS cold leg temperature is less thgg.or equal toc 7758F hpart testrary                                 [LCO Notef 1 mRPEEEh also ,,

added to improved TS 3.4.12 to ss't1 ing provisions for

                               $9 ~f5                         .rMreWCA-3 3.4 19        Not applicable to Callaway. See Conversion Comparison Table (Enclosure 68).

42 3.4 20 One or more. safety injection (SI) pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS in H00ES 5 and 6 when the RCS water level is below the top JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 3 5/15/97 1

ADDITIONALINFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: O 3.6.3-26 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: DOC 11-05 LS-14 JFD 3.6-4 JFD 3.6-22 JFD 3.6-23 STS 3.6.3 Condition A and B Note STS 3.6.3 Action C The CTS markup for CPSES and DCPP adds a new condition to cover the case where one containment isolation valve is inoperable in a penetration flow path of he type configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system (GDC 57). This new condition is STS 3.6.3 ACTION C. The CTS /ITS markup for Callaway and WCGS does not add this new condition but deletes it based on the justification that these plants do not have GDC 57 valves. In addition, the Note associated with STS 3.6.3 Condition A and B is deleted for the same reason. Based on the rejection of the change described in Comment Number 3.6.3-10, the staff position is that the valves listed in that change are 10 CFR 50 Appendix A GDC 57 type valves and STS 3.6.3 Action C and the Note to STS 3.6.3 Conditions A and B are applicable. Comment: Revise the CTS /ITS markup to add STS 3.6.3 ACTION C and the Note to STS 3.6.3 Conditions A and B, and provide the appropriate discussions and justifications. FLOG RESPONSE: (original) No changes required. The containment isolation system design bases are documented in Section 6.2.4 of the Callaway FSAR and the Wolf Creek USAR. As noted in Section 6.2.4.3, Safety Evaluation Seven and in Figure 6.2.4-1, none of the containment isolation valve arrangements are covered by GDC-57. All applicable containment penetrations for Callaway and Wolf Creek fall under either GDC-55 or GDC-56. This information was reviewed and incorporated into the licensing basis for Callaway and Wolf Creek during the initial plant licensing. Also, see response to Comment Number 3.6.3-10. FLOG RESPONSE: (supplement) As discussed with the NRC on March 18,1999, Condition C of ISTS 3.6.3 will be incorporated 7to the ITS. This condition also applies to GDC-55 and 56 type penetration valves that meet the alternate containment isolation provisions specified in SRP 6.2.4. As discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the containment isolation provisions for the RHR System suction lines and Containment Spray System suction lines from the containment recirculation sumps and the RHR System shutdown lines are considered to be the normally closed containment isolation valve (s) and the closed, ESF-grade systems outside containment serves as the second isolation barrier. ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.12 CTS 3/4.6 -ITS 3.3 Encl. 2 3/4 6-16 (INSERT 3/4 6-16) Encl. 3A - 11 (Insert 3A-11b) Encl. 3B 8 L.._______._____.___________________m__._____

1 1 Encl.4 1, (INSERT 4-d) Encl.5A Traveler Status page, 3.6-9,3.6-11,3.6-12,3.6-13,3.6-14 Encl.58 B 3.6-20, B 3.6-21, (INSERT B 3.6-21), B 3.3-23,8 3.6-24, (INSERT D.2), B 3.6-25, B 3.6-32 Encl.6A 1, (INSERT 6A-2),4 Encl.6B 1, 3

                                                                                             /-07 A                                                                 -                <

CONTAINMENT. SYSTEMS h f d. 0 -/ ( s 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

      ,    LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 Each contali. ment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE."'*                                                                                . l l-d- 4            l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

O.$~.h ACTION:

M M8 ***4 U#

3.n-A With one or more of the containment isolation valve (s) inoperable, maintain at l least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open u.rt-A and Slow psh)-

a. ................,,...m...

                              ....___        .t.      ,____         ,_ .__ - ,_,
                                                                          ....y,          .. wr i _ . ,

_. a

                                                                                          ._-.....m. . . . . . _. ...< ,. , <_ . . ,//-//,- A ee--

b.* Isolate each affected penetratior>within 4 hours by use of at least 11-12-4 one deactivated automatic valve fecured in the isolation position;**l-od-LS or (jg,y p g c.+ Isolate each affected penetratiod within 4 hours by use of at least it-11-A one closed manual valve or blind flange or check valve with flow l-o448 through the valve securedP*'or g d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWlI within the following 30 hours.

. Th pr;;i: ins of Spnificetien 3.0.4 ere a;t :pplintlem (New) 2nsett A rd. 3/4G-Se N ' '" 5 " . A SURVEIltANCE REOUIREMENTS

         -+.0 3.1 Cech c at:!=;;t i:01stier valve shal' h d;.;eniti.ivd urERAoLE priw                                                                                          l
         - te reWrning the v:h: t: ::rvi : :fter saia+=n=nc% re;:ir er r;plen xt                                                                                    p    og
           - rk it- p:rferred = th v:h: er it: niecitt-d actester, :str;l                                                                   r p:= r circuit by ; rf: . == Of : cycling te t. ead ver4'i ntie., vi i .letten ti;e.

i.vded e ... led ciosea coni i,.-..t S:htier v hn =y M :;=:d = or I (-al- A

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              . . .            . . . . ...       . . .      . . . . . . . . . . . .                    __ .. ......,                m..                         n.g.g re et-atie- ie raasidered ischt:d if th- f' ;tth with t'e '- ;:r;bl-                                                                              3.a.4
              .v:h,,:       h: h;n i,;e,leted.                 The p=:tr:ti=__=y                       :till hva_ -Maw thrar;h it
                .. . 4. ., 4. .,, _
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              "'.th   ,,nn'er =h:t ;^- =_:'. ing, =,tr :th t.o. . ... .., n, hel,etivu
                                                                        ,,.........,,,,...._..__,r.....u, m.._...
                                                                                                        ....., r v.ivu ,(Esdiii, uv, m,
                                                                                                                                                   -__ ii, // 15' A H2 !??),12 h=re are eih=d te c;dnt ecteeter diegnesik wv.iustions e ich 3 e -.nuir.rf for nnc+ - fa+--3 = t;;tje, t,...iv,. ; ,,,t., vywietrd
              "'l '.': tg 3= AprDant r -- , J j. 8 , ,, j,,-j gg ;;h t,                        L,  ., j ;; , th; y;j g; ,,;, y,
              ^;;,v kwu for ai.v,i i,; rid ef ti- fe- +'e pe pere :f cy: ling. -

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-16 Amendment No.113

___._____.___._______._______________________________-._____._.___.J

Q 3.6.3-26 INSERT 3/4 6-16 (New) With one or more penetration flow paths of the type configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system with one containment isolation valve inoperable, isolate the affected penetration flow path within 72 hours by use of at least _ one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. t

CHANGE flVMSED ,N1% pESCRIPTION

p. 11 05 LS 14 e away / g.,46/ive d n #

le ( losur p3,r,pl$ 11-06 TR 3 Consistent with NUREG 1431, the current TS surveillance requirement to demonstrate the operability of each containment isolation valve by performance of a cycling and isolation time test prior' to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit has been deleted. Any time repairs, maintenance or modifications have affected the operability of a system or component, post maintenance testing is required to demonstrate operability of the system or component, Particular surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate operability of the system must be evaluated for each maintenance or modification performed. Explicit post-maintenance TS surveillance requirements have been deleted because these requirements are adequately addressed by administrative post maintenance testing programs. 11 07 LG Consistent with the NUREG-1431 level of detail, the descriptive material regarding the required containment isolation valve actuat%n signals in the current TS surveillance requirement is moved to the revised expanded Bases. This is acceptable as the requirement to verify actuation of the valves is retained in the Technical Specifications while the identification of the applicable actuation signals is moved to.the bases. 11-08 TR 1 The actuation surveillance is revised consistent with NUREG 1431 to clarify that an actual signal as well as a test signal may be used to verify actuation. The g7 actuation signal is moved to the bases. t , r 11 09 A Consistent with industry traveler TSTF-46, the isolation time surveillance is revised to delete the reference to verifying "each power operated" containment isolation . valve and only recuire verification of each " automatic

                                                                                               'Q3.6.

isolation valve." Containment isolation valves which an.

                               - power operated (i.e. can be remotely operated) but do not f     Yyy             receive a containment isolation signal. do not have an
               ***#               isolation time assumed in the accident analyses since they require operator action. Therefore, deleting the reference to power operated isolation valve time testing is a clarification that reduces the poteritial for misinterpreting the requirements of this SR while maintaining the a:sumptions of the accident analysis.

i DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO CURRENT TS 11 5/15/97

                                                                                                          ...m

O 3.6.3-26 INSERT 3A-11b 11-05 LS-14 A new condition is added to the current Containment isolation Valve TS to cover the case where one containment isolation ~ valves is inoperable in a penetration flow path of the type configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. General Design Criteria 57 allows the use of a closed system in combination with a containment isolation valve to provide the two containment barriers against the release of radioactive material following an accident. [This condition also applies to GDC 55 and 56 type penetration valves that meet the alternate containment isolation provisions specified in SRP 6.2.4. As discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the Containment Spray System and RHR System suction lines from the containment recirculation sumps must be opened after a LOCA to satisfy their postaccident functional requirement. For these lines, a single isolation valve located outside containment is provided because system reliability is greater with only one isolation valve in the line and because it is not practical to locate a second valve inside containment where it would be submerged after a LOCA. The Containment Spray System and the ECCS, which are closed ESF-grade systems outside containment, serve as the second containment isolation barrier. Additionally, each of the RHR System shutdown lines contains two normally closed, motor-operated valves in series inside containment. The containment isolation provisions for these lines are considered to be the normally closed system isolation vslve closest to the containment and the closed, ESF-grade ECCS to which they connect outside containment serves as the second containment isolation barrier.] Traveler TSTF-30 provides the bases for extending the completion time for this condition to allows 72 hours to isolate an inoperable isolation valve associated with a closed system. The current TS LCO 3.6.3 does not allow the use of a closed system to isolate a failed containment isolation valve even though the closed system is subjected to a Type A containment leakage test, is missile protected, and is seismic category I piping. Also, a closed system typically has flow through it during normal operation such that any loss of integrity could be observed through leakcge detection systems within containment and system ; walkdowns for closed systems outside containment. As such, the i use of a closed system is equivalent to isolating a failed containment isolation valve by use of a single valve as specified in q NUREG-1431 Required Action A.1. The 72 hours provides the < I necessary time to perform repairs on a failed containment isolation valve when relying on an intact closed system. A completion time of 72 hours is considered appropriate given the reliability of the closed system and that 72 hours is typically provided for losing one train of redundancy throughout the NUREGs. If the closed

       ,         system and associated containment isolation valve were both I
                                                                                         )

I inope~.ble {ind an isol: tion birrier not provided), the plant [may) be in LCO 3.0.3 since there is no specific Condition specified. 4

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ENCLOSURE 4 e. I h.' a 4UV N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS (NSHC) CONTENTS I. Organization ........................................ 3 II. Description of NSHC Evaluations...................... 4 III. Generic No Significant Hazards Considerations "A" - Admini strative Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 "R" Relocated Technical Speci fications. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 "LG" Less Restrictive (Noving Information Out of the Technical Speci fications) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 "N" Nore Restri ctive Requi rements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 IV. Specific No Significant Hazards Considerations."LS" LS 1................................................ 15 LS 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nef. Brel. . 4P (9 3 4. 6 -M LS 3................................................ 19 LS 4................................................ 21 LS5................................................23 LS 6................................................ 25 LS 7................................................ 27 LS-8................................................ 30 l a3.d-P2d LS 9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . /M.M. . 93- , LS 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mn. u sea - W , QW-24 LS 11............................................... 35 LS 12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 13............................................... 37 LS 14 . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . m" "n. r"yy s . --w i r. T4 'f d Q LGM. LS 15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS - 16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 LS - 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS 19............................................... 42 LS 20..........................................Not Used LS 21..........................................Not Used LS 22. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not Appl i cabl e LS-23............................................... 44 LS - 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not U sed LS25......{...........,.............................46

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NOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONS 1 5/15/97 j i j

1 l Q 3.6.3-25 INSERT 4-d IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-14 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR TECHNICAL CHANGES THAT IMPOSE LESS RESTRICTIVE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS A new Condition and Required Actions consistent with NUREG-1431 and modified in accordance with TSTF-30, is added to the current Containment isolation Valve TS to cover the case where one containment isolation valves is inoperable in a penetration flow path of the type configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. General Design Criteria 57 allows the use of a closed system in combination with a containment isolation valve to provide the two containment barriers against the release of radioactive material following an accident. The current TS LCO 3.6.3 does not allow the use of a closed system to isolate a failed containment isolation valve even though the closed system is subjected to a Type A containment leakage test, is missile protected, and is seismic category I piping. A closed system also typically has flow through it during normal operation such that any loss of integrity could be continually observed through leakage detection systems within containment and system walkdowns for closed systems outside containment. [This condition also applies to GDC 55 and 56 type penetration valves that meet the alternate containment isolation provisions specified in SRP 6.2.4. As discussed in the Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the Containment Spray System and RHR System suction lines from the containment recirculation sumps must be opened after a LOCA to satisfy their postaccident functional requirement. For these lines, a single isolation valve located outside containment is provided because system reliability is greater with only one isolation valve in the firse and because it is not practical to locate a second valve inside containment where it would be submerged after a LOCA. The Containment Spray System and the ECCS, which are closed ESF-grade systems outside containment, serve as the second containment isolation barrier. Additionally, each of the RHR System shutdown lines contains two normally closed, motor-operated valves in series inside containment. The containment isolation provisions for these lines are considered to be the normally closed system isolation valve closest to the containment and the closed, ESF-grade ECCS to which they connect outside containment serves as the second containment isolation barrier.) As such, the use of a closect system is no different from isolating a failed containment isolation valve by use of a single valve as specified in NUREG-1431 Required Action A.1. Therefore, in accordance with NUREG-1431 and traveler TSTF-30, the required action for this condition allows 72 hours to isolate a failed valve associated with a closed system. The 72 hours provides the necessary time to perform repairs on a failed containment isolation valve when relying on an intact closed system. [A completion time of 72 hours is considered appropriate given the reliability of the closed system and that 72 hours is typically provided for losing one train of redundancy thrcughout the NUREGs.} If the closed system and associated containment isolation valve were both inoperable [and an isolation barrier not provided), the plant [may) be in LCO 3.0.3 since there is no specific Condition specified. . Th!s proposed TS change has been evaluated and it has been determined that it involves no signdicant hazards consideration. This determination has bee performed in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.920 as quoted below:

i O 3.6.3-26 INSERT 4-d IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-14

                                                 '(continued)

The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21 (b) or 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if ope:stion of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety "

The following evaluation is provided for the three categories of the significant hazards consideration standards:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Consistent with NUREG-1431 as modified in accordance with industry traveler TSTF-30, the proposed change adds a new Condition and Required Actions to the Containment Isolation Vaives specification for the case where one containment isolation valves is inoperable in a penetration flow path of the type configured with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. [As discussed in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the containment isolation provisions for the RHR System suction lines and Containment Spray System Suction lines from the containment recirculation sumps and the RHR System shutdown lines are considered to be the normally closed containment isolation valve. The closed ESF-grade systems outside containment serve as the second isolation barrier. The va!ves in these penetrations are normally closed. Containment isolation valves are not considered as initiators of any analyzed event. Therefore, changing the Completion Time does not impact the probability of an analyzed accident. The consequences of a previously analyzed event are dependent on the initial conditions assumed for the analysis, and the availability and successful functioning of the equipment assumed to operate in response to the analyzed event, and the setpoints at which these actions are initiated. Therefore, extending the allowable out of service time for the CIVs in a closed system does not impact the initial conditions assumed in the analysis. This change does not affect the performance of any credited equipment.] This change , does not result in any hardware changes or after the plant's ability to detect and mitigate events. l The use of a closed system is no different from isolating a failed containment isolation valve by j use of a single valve. [ Changing the Completion Time to 72 hours to isolate these penetrations l is acceptable based on 1) the reliability of the closed system to perform as a second isolation l barrier,2) the Completion Time is consistent with the time allowed for the system to be out of _ i I I i i l ______-______-________ - __ _ __- _D

O 3.6.3-26 INSERT 4-d IV. SPECIFIC NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDE 7NSIDERATIONS NSHC LS-14 (continued) service by other Specifications and 3) and the low probability of a Design Basis Event occurring during ths 72 hours.] [ Based on the above discussion,] this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or diffe.ent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change does not necessitate a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation, and does not impose any new safety analyses limits. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change adds a new Condition and Required Actions to the Containment isolation Valves specification to be consistent with the Westinghouse Standard ITS (NUREG-1431) and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change has been developed considering the importance of the containment isolation valves in limiting the consequence of a design basis event and the reasonable time to perform repairs on a failed containment isolation valve when 9lying on an intact closed system. [The margin of safety is established through equipment design, operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions are initiated. Sufficient equipment remains available for mitigation of an analyzed event. The proposed change extends the allowed out of service time for inoperable CIVs in closed systems. This change is considered appropriate given that the closed system remains intact. There is no detrimentalimpact on any equipment design parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within prescribed limits. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.] NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that the activities associated with NSHC "LS-14" resulting from the conversion to the improved TS format satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c); and accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified.

f% pg - INDUSTRY TRAVELERS APPLICABLE TO SECTION 3.6 TRAVF1FR d STATUS DIFFERENCE # ComENTS 1 TSTF 17. Rev.1 Incorporated 3.6 2 NRC Approved [ ,3,7) TSTF 30, Rev.yl- Incorporated d^ 3.6 4 L; e@lk. Lie w Wif Ciwi r.M C:115.::.,.dec Ag % W A .g S TSTF 45, Rev.1 Incorporated 3.6 5 NRC Approved TS(F 46, Rev.1 Incorporated 3.6 7 NRC Approved TSTF 51 Not Incorporated NA Not NRC Approved as of Traveller etrtnff date _ TSTPk2,bf Incorporated 3.6 1 ( ( *g^3 , W #j hJ C l-l= TSTF- Not Incorporated NA NotNRCAoprovqhasof Traveller cut 9ff date M a [ ,A WCC alg Incorporated 3.6 11 @ # 7;- _f h 3L3-// /. Tf7F*2.'? Z._ A' N&0'

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Containment Isolation Valves 'r ;pkit;, ib;.;w;ph;ri;. ::: Cer.dcr.;;r. ad el) PS 3.6.3

-      ACTIONS (continued)
   ,.                C0lOITION                  REQUIRED ACTION          COMPLETION TIME
  .a4j B                                                               1 A. (              "C"          A.1 Isolate the affected         4 hours              JAgf
           , %ly en ,lic;Ll; te            penetration flow path by use STET    '     p;r.;tretim ; p;th;         of at least one closed and                     fg,'g',3 W             .;ith tw cer.tei. c.;        de activated automatic 5%-           ini;tia v;17;;.               valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve m       __

J with flow through the valve One or more penetration secured. flow paths with one containment isolation Nil B-PS' valve inoperable M M e sr ;ti;1d : ileir.; W M-(continued) MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.6 9 5/15/97

Containment Isolation Valves '"w;pt.;ric, %' ;pteric. I;; Lc.ic.;;. , er.d el) : PS 3.6.3

 .-. a- ACTIONS (continued)

(g COWITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIE , B. C B.1 Isolate the affected I hour aA.3f; j

             %i) n,li;11; t;                penetration flow path by use

hecr Fati; tic;; 1"a ptt.; of at least one closed and g,c. ,3[ y dtt. te ar.tei.-..t de activated automatic -- , gg i;;1etier, v;1;;;. valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. One or more penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable .. - B-PS-6 m e,r 2.i;;e Li dir,; bypese . ? i M. (continued) MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.6 11 5/15/97

Containment Isolation Valv;s 'E_;p.cric, Si; ,;r t.;-ic, !;; Ow.si...;;. . e. ' "';;U ~PS 3.6.3 ; rs4 ACTIONS (continued) (~;j.C.; CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

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MARK UP OF WOG STS REY 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.6 12 5/15/97

i Containment Isolation Valv;s '",14aiic. 0,i 6$ari;. I;; Or.i.r.;;r er.d %.;" . PS ~ i 3.6.3

 .m        ACTIONS (continued) i                    C0lOITION E'.;

y' W REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME b b g . One or more penetration JK1 Isolate the affected 24 hours *

                                                                                                                      .EDe      3 flow paths with one or               penetration flow path more containment purge               by use of at laast one                                         CB PS-     i valves not within purge              closed and de activated ve h e leakage limits.               automatic valve. cle;;d 3,,3 ,,

_ _ . . .... or blind flange. M {K2 cEDx NOW.E g Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. 3.6 11 M s.m -

Verify the affected Once per 31 days I penetration flow path is for isolation isolated, devices outside containment U i Prior to entering l MODE 4 from ! MODE 5 if not i performed within l the previous 92 days for i isolation devices I inside ) containment (continued) MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.6 13 5/15/97 o _ . _ . _ . _ _ , , , _U

Containment Isolation Valv;s _gter;;. it,;; ,grari;. ::; Ord;r.;;r. ;rd i;D Ps. 3.6.3

~ .3  ACTIONS (continued) kjp                CONDITION                        REQUIRED ACTION           COMPLETION TIME i

(continued) E Perform m Once per E days ; ED E SR 3.6.3.7 for the ::3.6 18: resilient seal purge i valves clcsed to comply f O 8 ' 3 ~*h with Acti ..

         . Required Action and               .1    Be in MODE 3.           6 hocrs                         :. ED .;

I associated Completion 3,c,3 g Time not met. M E l p'.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours f 1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDENTS l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY w Ea .u. 3-w] , M Verify each > .B PSe , valve is sealed closed - 1EDr " m except for one purge valve in a . , . . penetration flow path while in Condition E E of this LCO. ._u m.J za E N

                                                                              . .      ..p
                     .                                                       mennem.as summmmmmer N

~ (continued) l MARK UP OF WOG STS REV 1 (NUREG 1431) 3.6 14 5/15/97

                                                                   -_-__--_______L

Containment ~ Isolation Valves 'At;;;,,%,.. k. 0.t.;_ A.;ric. ::: Cer.d r.;;r ;r.d ^=1; , B 3.6.3 l 14 BASES ,

 %;;y'                                                                                                                                                                                                   i ACTIONS                                            A.1 and A.2 (continued)                                                                                                        i For affected penetration flow paths that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour Completion Time and that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1,'the                                                                      l affected penetration flow paths must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that ~

containment penetrations required to be isolated following an. accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does n;t require any testing or devic NN/[dG' h 313M nigQatioGa+% _Ji-iayolves _ verificati . thr f.&;7ts we%down- thama- M ti vic s ontainment a

                                                                     ,      c        of being misoositioned are n the correct position. . The
                     ,g g                                                 Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices ggyy                                                           outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the .

devices are operated under administrative controls and the "p g;g/m)/ , probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as " prior to entering MODE 4 from HODE 5 if not performed within the . pre 71ous 92 days' is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibilitv of the

               ..                                                         isoletion devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolatior, device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.

y [Q 3.c p u. ] 6endkier. A h; h,.;.. ;;dified t,y ; .",,t; ir.di;;tir.;; th t tt.i;

                                                                          %- h 8 m.ly @ C ; O O_ x F M W . n w F .; '.".                                                           O     O.

i f3737 t2 ..,..t;ir ~r.t i nisti n ;;1;;;. i;r p a tr;tix f' s pth; Y.1 "

                                                                          .;ith cr.ly er.; mer.teii ..t is;1; tic v;;;; 7.ad ; cin;d sy;t;;.

(0;..ditim C rr,vid,.; th; ;;.,,re,,-iet; stier.;. t Required Action A.2 is modified by e E Noteg M M j applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and l allows these devices to be verified closed by use of. administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative _ metns is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is biM-b Tg.ur VA 42. 0 typically restrictedj Therefore, the probability of misalignment of tnese oeywes once they have been verified to be in the proper position. is small. d1M*=12taCthe3!RREERDtMdil5DPfrtcHP3tt@@M i (continued) MARK UP OF U EG 1431 BASES B 3.6 20 5/15/97

1 Containment Isolation Valves (At_;pheri;. ' Rb.t ;ph;-ic. I;; C...ds;;r ad Del) B 3.6.3 [ 4 BASN

 .,.y ACTIONS             A.1 and A.2 (continued)

M IB tf W S M M M N_ T2?BJj[ Ghat meJMMK3eBKetBBBMWR@GnimCEhfC19@tfG!b3n sucesame-mositermeor:'to NN y /ut ak hdcci __ , With two containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperabl , the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 r. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve 635Wes S d.OD 1 t. - MRTIERWgheM The I hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. In the event the affected

        ,                            penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action B.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis per Required Action A.2, which remains in effect.

This periodic verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the fact that the valver are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low, g ,c, g gal s Cer.ditim " i; edified by ; Lt; ir.di;etinii thi; Cenditier, is } < STET OI'IJ aEEli0eUIO IO F'~~IIGIIGI' UW rih; "iII' I^"O "tei-~i'D l i;;ietier. v;1?;;. 0;nditier. A ;f thi; LOO edds;;;;; the ~ cenditier ef er.; cat;in.~..t inletic v;1v; iagr:bic in this O tga ;f gxtreti;n 'la gth. Q b 3.4 Il {G3.r.32.r,\

                                      '.fith en er ;r; pati; tic fie pth; with ex 2.-t;i. at ini. tic v;lv; ingr; tic, th; ir gr;ti; v;1;; fiw pth w;t (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.6 21 5/15/97'

I I i O 3.6.3-26 j i INSERT B 3.6-21 C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable, the inoperable valve flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of l at least one isolation barrier that cannot be ar'versely affected by a single active failure. 1 isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration flow path. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation bounaary and the relative importance of maintaining containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1,2,3, and 4. The closed =ystem must meet the requirements of Reference 2. The Containment Spray System and the ECCS are closed ESF-grade systems outside containment, which meet the requirements of Reference 2, and serve as the second containment isolation barrier (Ref. 7). In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance v/ith Required Action C.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This periodic verification is necessary to assure that containment penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying that each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. This Note is necessary since this Condition is written specifically to address these penetration flow paths. For penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions. Required Action C.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Ailowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the propor position, is small.

Containment Isolation Valves 'n ptar : , ';.t.t ;ptaric. In ;;r.i..nr :.r.d ^=l' ! B 3.6.3 b& BASES ACTIONS ib (continued)

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rci; tin i;pertera; ef us .dery cer.teir r.t 5, s- ink.e t: tre enr:11 cer.tei. ,...t furati;r.. a 3.c. 3 -2.f l D D b k~.' ~. - _ .

                                                                                            .1.
                                                                                                          . : . =. '  '

4 in the event one or more Qontainment M rge valves in one or more penetration flow paths are not within the purg v;in leakage limits, purg w.1x leakage must be rutered Q 3.L o-2_ M to within limits. or the affected penetration flow path

y[p m-- ' r must be isolated. The method of isolation must be by the use of r at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this j criterion are a Eclosed and de activated automatic valveW CA-7.l,-Oof-veher or blind flange 3. A purge w S i.i 1 v...J x. W CD 4 l~'l val h resilient seals utilized to satisfy

*i

equirec must have been demonstrated to meet the 1eakage requir s of m_u w SR 3.6.3.7. The specified Completion Time is reasonable. considerirn that one containment purge valve remains closed so that a gross breach of containment does not exist. ~

t a 3. <. . > -z O In accordance with Required Acti E-Gr this penetration flow path must be verified to be iso ated on a periodic basis. The periodic verification is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated. will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.6 23 5/15/97

Containment Isolation Valv;s (Atr;#,eric. Sub;t .espheric, !cc Cer,inscr ord Ouel) B 3.6.3 l Q 3.G.) -v- 1 #N %m p BASES - -- w G/ .o D D4 E l ord E.3 (contipued)

                                                                                       -                    N ACTIONS               jdi'"::dmandfh?-                                               pg/rf[-d
                                                                ./'

If _. Action does not require any testTng/ or valve nipulation. Rather, it involves verificafion, threugh a .,ystem welki.qthat those isolation devices outside containment capable of being mispositioned are in the ckrect position. For the isolatial devices inside containment, fthe time period specified as " 'ior to entering H0DE 4 from 5 if not performed within t

         ,#                     previous 92 days" is base on engineering judgment a             s
                                                                                                             '4 F 62 considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibijfty'of the                                 ,

isolation devices and other administrative controls that will / ensure that isolation devi misali'gnment is an unlikely $ possibility. l[ g .gf p rg/d j4e a a[ / focaf d rcuole n,htedri) 34 P" For the Containment StiotdoWH'!b6H169eaalve-%ttAresth seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action < 3 { C.1, SRJER SR 3.6.3.7 must be performed at least once every 32 days. This assures that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the [ L___ containment purge valve does not increase during the_ time the 1 - penetration is isolated. The normal Frequency forgR 3.6.3.7, gg, y-s y

184 days, is based on an NRC initiative, Md1ti-Mant"EctibtfDicq

.-                              B 20 (Ref. -3 (). Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this Condition, it is prudent to perform the SR
                                'aore often.       Therefore, a Frequency o'f once per R2 days was               /

d p .3 chosen 2- experienc and has been shown to be acceptable based on operating 2[Q w 1Eegid1

                                             ~
                                                      . M7dmp;v . anoturf35mtentg 28L A M26 _J L                  _M"XtitthZt4ffatibHMre_sRnd 1g iall s=ity JLevt                      iver#1edwelesv@rge.Jaff 1,
                            'e ineRGWhinige IteraR&f**Iloe%IwerificptinnTtEngtrirstritivu     ~

eaE TnitdetWIW@tW1EEs1EOfgissn57it intenherestyregt dWrefetertheponabrufEgggs etsrir.iu;d[N ent g2.c.3nj oromamances twavownweetrreresetwasar M D i i M Hll Je._ . EtelM & J 38deE.2 _c 1'Actio E C2 iz.provig \

u. u t,m - m - memf ret tich11 _ .

                                                              $Mrdutedyiartie;yegr ideiritstrat _e]y,yorNurfe:Twsiv 1bckedU~1.MEoptif          i eteisew@gt2tndJbTin~a<

uesd:T 11tisgsaceeggdsifice _a theseL_2erni*tevernithewerectio6 sit 2n~Pilodt, o j L Incitig:Esealinggye#ripig j (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.6 24 5/15/97

Q 3.6.3-11

-~. BASES INSERT D.                                                                                        '

<:. 'D { Q 3.G 5 ~Q Mb Required Action 2] is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to isolation devices located in high radiation are[as and allows these devices to be verified closed by use means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted.- Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. a

Containment Isolation Valv;s '"/_;paric, Me^_;;;.-ic. Ice %dc.;;. ;ri LU

                                                                    ,                       B 3.6.3 Q 3. c,. ) - 2 6.)

n... BASES ,s / ACTIONS r.1 ;.2 P.2 (continued) U, V If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours- and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILI.ANCE 7 F SR 3.6.3.1 -

                                                                                / ,s m _ a A [Q 3.4. >-2[ ,

REQUIREMENTS Each 36 inch pontainment M rge val ameNimmematatsmanr. is required to be verified sealed closed ggGW at 31 day intervals. MRRI enessewinen mamam-saananmuunnsme

                                 ...-.m...--_..--..--..-

This Surveillance is designed to ensure that a gross breach of containment is not caused by an inadvertent or spurious opening

.c           j             of a Gontainment gulgeggurge valve. Detailed analysis of the purge valves failed to conclusively demonstrate their ability to N        close during a LOCA in time to limit' offsite doses. Therefore, these      valves are ABli'Uthgggggggg              required during MODES to1,be  in and 2, 3,  the4.sealed A      closed position A                Qontainment gggggggpurge valve that is sealed closed must have V                motive power to the valve operator removed. This can be accomplished by de, energizing the source of electric power or by removing the air supply to the valve operator. In this                          _

application, the term " sealed" has no connotation of leak g'g,o g tightness. The Frequency is a result of an NRC initiative, = Mu] realm 3Mkgglo3 8 24 (Ref. 4 5), related to containment purge valve use during plant operations. In the event-Corg29lmertt3fitgipmlh valve leakage requires entry into Condition . E- the Surveillance permits opening one purge valve in a ation flow path to perform repairs. OlBid!flYtWe iftst21W [s_6M!WN8Mye1mastaneet w- = g_g= __ 4m 1 (a3.c.e2G (continued)

    -MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES                    B 3.6 25                                5/15/97 1

CCntainment Isolation Valves ','t,r.wsphe, ic. Sabata.o;pteric, !cc Cande.,,cr ; rd Oue') B 3.6.3 BASES vgy i .. . SURVEILLANCE "," 3.C.3.11 LNoit215ejQ (continued) REQUIREMENTS

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REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 15. r @ Q 3.G.0-2 -

2. FSAR, Section 6.2.

32 Sta'ada,1dygieq1n:Ni2M s3 0;x.-i; :s ac " 20 gntermd.'Acetstgy),3sgg.

                                                                " Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration."
            .. r 4E.           0;a ri; Is;u; " 24 3 4 litid.ptlG6fft3famil!@CMQ)tm3Lf wC_Am 6- F~fAM. k_d ' -                         --

h 3,(, ,3 - h 1

                                                                                             /'                                                                     Q 3 . c. , 3 - / 0 WIL. &                                                                        .5 J       '
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                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ~-

0 4 - 4 ' ' L ----- F A

                                                                                                                                                 !M O               ^'s      ll L M Ct3 c h ,#1 &I, l

4 l MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.6 32 5/15/97 i . . . .. - . . . . . J

DIFFERENCES FROM NUREG 1431

                +                                    NUREG 1431 Section 3.6 V

' This enclosure contains a brief discussion / justification for each marked up p;l technical change to NUREG-1431 Revision 1. to make them plant specific or to i incorporate generic changes resulting from the Industry /NRC generic change process. 3- The change numbers are referenced directly from the NUREG 1431 mark ups. For enclosures 3A, 3B, 4. 6A and 6B. text in brackets "[ ]" indicates the information is plant specific and is not common to all the Joint Licensing Subcomittee (JLS) plants. Empty brackets indicate that other JLS plants may have plant specific l information in that location. l K CHANGE NUMBER JUSTIFICATION j 3.6 1 This change supports implementation of the 10CFR50 Appendix J Option B ( for performance based leakage rate testing by referencing the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program described in the Administrative Controls section. This change is consistent with the l CTS Traveler TSTF-52, 3.6 2 Consistent with Traveler TSTF 17. this change would extend the testing frequency of containtnent airlock mechanisms from 184 days to 24 months ; and delete the SR Note per implementation of Appendix J, Option B. l SR 3.6.2.2 would be revised to require testing of the air lock door interlocks at an interval of 24 months. Typically, the interlock is l j installed after each refueling outage, verified operable with this

 -                               surveillance and not disturbed until the next refueling outage. If the need for maintenance arises when the interlock is required, the performance of the interlock surveillance would be required following                                  )

the maintenance. In addition, when an air lock is opened during times ) the interlock is required, the operator first verified that one door is completely shut and the door seals pressurized before attempting to open the other door. Therefore, the interlock is not challenged except during actual testing of the interlock. Consequently, it should be i sufficient to ensure proper operation of the interlock-by testing the n interlock on a 24 month interval. Q!L U -fD , ,gstw te nas ce aoded to larify t 3.6 3 ConsQtentwit e curre t 1d. a he vakes liste are not dressed i LC0 3.6. . These v ves uti e t e stea en rato and ass iated pip' g as a osed syste inside f cun inment. These lves also ave sepa te LCOs at provid the appro iate R ired Ac ' 'is in t vent t valve yare inope ble. s

                          @     ~ g ; ' u , W .q                    3.u ~--[q'y 3 Q {Ex L ~ 0 ).

3.6 4 1 opllaw dee p vers y comparison,,M ble) 5, fo N ' Q 3.c . 3 - 2. r] QM G A-2. _ - T This change is in accordance with T5TF 45 and revises SR 3.6.3.3 and 3.6 5 SR 3.6.3.4 to specify that only containment isolation valves that are JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES TS 1 5/15/97 8

Q 3.6.3-26 INSERT 6A 3.6-4 Consistent with TSTF-30, this change takes credit for a closed system for isolating a failed containment isolation valve. The change would extend the Completion Time for a closed system flow path with an inoperable isolation valve to 72 hours. General Design Criteria (GDC) 57 allows the : use of a closed system in combination with a containment isolation valve . to provide the two containment barriers against the release 'of radioactive material following an accident. [This condition also applies to GDC 55 , and 56 type penetration valves that meet the alternate containment ~ isolaton provisions specified in SRP S.2A._ As discussed in the Safety _ Evaluation Report (NUREG-0830), the containment isolation provisions - for the RHR System suction lines and Containment Spray System suction lines from the containment recirculation sumps and the RHR System shutdown lines are considered to be the norma!!y closed containment ' isolation valve and the closed, ESF-grade systems outside containment serves as the second containment isolation barrier.] Currently, LCO 3.6.3 - does not allow the use of a closed system to isolate a failed containment isolation valve even though the closed system is subjected to a Type A containment leakage test, is missile protected, and is seismic category I piping. A closed system also typically has flow through it during normal operation such that any loss of integrity could be observed through leakage detection systems within containment and during routine system . walkdowns for closed systems outside containment. As such, the use of a closed system is no different from isolating a failed containment isolation - valve by use of a single valve as specified in Required Action A.1. Therefore, LCO 3.6.3, Required Action C.1 is revised to allow 72 hours to isolate a failed valve associated with a closed system. This 72 hours period provides the necessary time to perform repairs on a failed containment isolation valve when relying on an intact closed system. (A completion time of 72 hours is considered appropriate given the reliability of the closed system and that 72 hours is typically provided for losing one train of redundancy throughout the NUREGs.) If the closed system and associated containment isolation valve were both inoperable [and an - isolation barrier not provided), the plant [may) be in LCO 3.0.3 since there is no specific Condition specified. 6 b

CHANGE

    . .n    NUMBER        JUSTIFICATION                                                     [ G 2.c.3- 2.t. k
    .,:s                 -

I

        .,  3.6 22        h '. ng deletar +ha nnta tn '2 A ' ennai+innc A and F. nir ch=nna            I
  "'                      w ,.vuaia ent wiUiChanwe Nw.L;r 2.0 22. e4nna Ccaditi;r C is out OppliCablC IQ ColidWdy FI~clil. gd 9 t' A .
                                                                                               .;Qt 3.L.1+1f. k 3.6 23        bisch;ng:dehte:2.C.:Cvodn.vuC. T;oa evic.vu vf the                      3 sp :ificot.en decs ov;. apply aincu Coll; ;y "hnt deer -* h="e :ry lyer0tnaticP #1 N n'th! I.Cr; thi5 svoU$tiun i3 opplivulle. Md Mj E'l'~2Y      0n tic}sd w ,-} k Callw y dTS 4.4.2 3 l, SR 3.L.c.7 is can.ses ,s ,.cl w a a ,,,inim - c oiin, us-u4 4/tdecf in eng ud!" W" Q14.t.-9 flaw cafe lu.

6- ch <-+ of .A. con ki oment cooby W-JUSTIFICATION FOR DIFFERENCES - TS 4 5/15/97

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET . ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.6-ED2 (NEW) APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: Two changes are made to Bases Section 3.6.3. One clarifies the reference to containment isolation valve listings in the FSAR. The second adds the word *or" to make the sentence grammatically correct. ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.12 CTS 3/4.6 -ITS 3.6 Encl. 5 B 3.6-14, B 3.6-15

Containment Isolat1En Valves' 'O ; pre. ;;. Ch ;pthsI;. !;; O.cir.;;r. d 0.hD

                                                                                                   'B 3.6.3 ,
    'B 3.6 CONTAllMENT SYSTEMS -
    - B 3.6.3 - Containment Isolation Valves 'O ;pteric. St t; ,;pheric. !cc 0.rir.;;r us.w   ..wa#

BASES BACKGROUND The containmed isolation valve, form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for fluid penetrationt Dow - aths-not serving accident consequence limiting systems to be-provided with two isolation barriers that are closed on a containment isolation signal. These isolation devices are either' ' passive or active (automatic). Manual valves de activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including-check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active . devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration flow; path so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that - exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system. -These barriers 'typicelly

 'l                         cer,t;ir;er.t i;;1; tier, velv;; (A' listing ;of; containment fisolation saje p the Containment valves:1slprovidediinlF[SAR'Se Isolation System (Refl~. ).                  6, . 2. J. %           lQ    3APM

2. <- A G f 'm 7,, 3,m zM Automatic isolation signals are produced.during accident conditions. Containment Phase *A* isolation occurs upon receipt of a safety injection signal. The Phase "A" isolation signal isolates nonessential process lines in order to minimize leakage of fission product radioactivity. Containment Phase "B" isolation occurs upon receipt of a containment pressure lligh lligh High 3 signal and isolates the remaining process lines, except ,

systems required for accident mitigation. In addition to the Phass "A" isolation signait listed above. the Containment purge and exhaust valves receive en a Containst.nt; Purge l Isolation signal on a containment high radiation condition. Either purge and exhaust valves or blind flanges are capable of isolating"the penetration flow paths. As a result, the containment ' isolation valves (and/or blind flanges) help ensure that the' containment atmosphere will be isolated from the environment in the event of a release of fission product radioactivity to.the containment atmosphere as a result of a C>esign Basir, Accident- (DBA). (continued)- MARK UP OF NUREG 1431-BASES eB 3.6 14 <3/15/97 t _,

Containment Isolation Valves 'Ats;pteric. 04ataspr,cric. !cc Cerder.xr erd Oue" B 3.6.3 \ BASES BACKGROUND The OPERABILITY requirements for containment isolation valves (continued) help ensure that containment is isolated within the time limits assumed in the safety analyses. Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that the containment function assumed in the safety analyses will be maintained. Containment Shutdown Purae System (36 inch ource valves) The Containment Shutdown Purge System operates to supply outside air into the containment for ventilation and cooling or heating needed 'for mprolonged ~coiltainmentf access)foll owi ng l a fshutdown? and duningirefueling; end Jhejsy_ stem may also be used to reduce the concentration of noble gases within contairment prior to and during personnel access. The supply and exhaust lines each contain two isolation valves. Because of their large size, the 36 inch ContainmentiPurge and; exhaust valves,in se units are not qualified for automatic closure from their open position under DBA conditions. Therefore, either the 36 inch Contai,nment Shutdown; Purge supplyjand,Texhaust'iisolation valves are normally maintained closed.en,)11ndiflangesIare installed in H0 DES 1, 2. 3 and 4 to ensure he containment boundary is intained. [G345-M ) JL g ,, . . .o 1 M Containment Mini ource System (18 inch ouro veN CA 3/,-Eb'2_ c-) The Contai.nment Mini purge System operates to:

a. Reduce the concentration of nobic gases within containment prior to and during personnel access, and

b. Equalize containment internal and external pressures.

Since the 18 inch valves used in the Mini purge System are-designed to meet the requirements for automatic containment isolation valves. these s lves may be opened as needed in H0 DES 1. 2, 3. and 4. APPLICABLE The containment isolation valve LCO was derived from the SAFETY ANALYSES assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the containment boundary during major-accidents. As prrt of the containment boundary, containment isolation valve OPERABILITY. supports leak tightness of the (continued) HARK UP 0F NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.6 15 5/15/97

ADDITIONALINFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.7-ED APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: (Original) Various changes that do not impact the technical content of the submittal or other FLOG members. Changes are noted with CA 3.7-ED in the margin and noted below:

1) CTS 3/4.7.1, Turbir9 Cycle, Safety Valves: the footnote to Table 3.7-1, inoperable Main Ste.sm Safety Valves versus Allowable Power and Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint in Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, is modified in two places by replacing "% RTP" with " power".

2) ITS LCO 3.7.1, Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs): the footnote to Table 3.7.1-1, OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus Maximum Allowable Power, is modified in two places by replacing "% RTP" with

                  " power".

3) ITS LCO 3.7.2, MSIVs, Condition D: two items under " Completion Time" should be highlighted.

4) ITS LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System: Action "B" (the designation letter B) should not be highlighted.

5) ITS LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System, SR 3.7.5.4: The "s"in

                  " NOTES" should be struckthrough.

6) ITS LCO 3.7.6, Condensate Storage Tank, APPLICABILITY: a redlined period should be placed at end.

7) ITS LCO 3.7.8, Essential Service Water, Action A: Under A.1 Notes, item 1, the period at end should not be struck out, but redlined.

8) ITS LCO 3.7.9, Ultimate Heat Sink, Action B: under " Completion Time" the "s" after 36 hours should not be highlighted.

9) ITS LCO 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System: Title 1;ne should I

have (CRAOS) highlighted.

10) ITS LCO 3.7.13, Emergency Exhaust System, SR 3.7.13.3: "SR 3.7.13.3" should be highlighted.

1

11) ITS LCO 3.7.17, Spent Fuel Assembly Storage: Title should be highlighted.

12) ITS LCO 3.7.17, Spent Fuel Assembly Storage: " Figure 3.7.17-1" should I be highlighted.

j

FLOG SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: The attached page corrects the description associated with DOC 07-16 LS-34. This is an editorial change to correct the statement. This revision is only applicable to Callaway and does not impact Commanche Peak, Diablo Canyon, or Wolf Creek. FLOG SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: The attached ITS page 4.0-2 was originally transmitted as part of the request CA 3.7-010. This page incorporates " Insert 5A-4b". An editorial correction is made to item f of this insert. The attached ITS Bases pages B 3.7-4 and B 3.7-5 are revised to delete a reference to Action A.2 which is deleted in the response to Q 3.7.1-4. These revisions are applicable to Callaway only. ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.13 CTS 3/4.7 -ITS 3.7 Encl. SB B 3.7-4, B 3.7-5 Att. No.17 CTS 5.0 -ITS 4.0 Encl.5A 4.0-2 (Insert 5A-4b)

MSSVS . B 3.7 1 BASES t ACTIONS A.1 una (continued) cA 3.7-ED d x_T-Tv*n1meconsesr:orr=%,m M .n 1- W , . _, ; , L , a3,7. b 7 ($ - _27iE rFD SMilRW. -n pnuesasorr==m- n_- --- nesw..3

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_i , __ o r i _ . With one or more MSSVs inoperable, ccd c; pc cr att2tIEWrt35E t"JHij so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets I .__'T af pww g.mm Reference 2 requirements m__ . x..L ~ . .ry . . . L *f

                                                                                                                                         ...               ".9
                                                                                                                                                            .. TN. . m

( *7,g_l lk1ht,$ _ h./[]gp C5ECffilEU'56peration with less than all Vs OPERABLE for each steam generator is pemissible, if POWER is prep.rtienelly limited to the relief capacity of the remaini HSSVs. ,This is accomplijed by restrjeting THERHAL POWER,__w-

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(continued) MARK UP.OF.NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 4 5/15/97 e

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                          ....          d,          . b ys. m . ._ s. ,. . __,     .d a ,s~2,    . ,_ _ ;

N,. ww. b. B.1 and B.2 it. urro. _____. L. ___i___; i_ nnen a n, - _m_.._ I,5 b5 vb 5EJdyd but si sv b ub a b ey bwl bw bw wi B r vi.rt-4. d b u base (RS'thii'P6iniCRa,@iCNiutronTEIREL3ffatiltSp!_RtfitHffc1Not

                         )gk!ced within the associated Completion Time, or if one or more steam generators have less than two MSSVs OPERABLE. the unit must be placed in a H00E in which the LCO does not app':y. -To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least H00E 3 within 6 hours,= and in H00E 4 within 12 hours, The allowed Completion
   ]                     Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3,7 5 5/15/97 r

i 7,,. Design Features 4.2 AcMi cA 3.'?- 0/O ] _ 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued)

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U 235_ enrichment B PS"

   . ~~'

of [4-5} 5_g weight percent:f,, Xtd y, o g

                                                  ,-gr eny,sggrpater7 nan <s4 0'_e; F rTeii <U~

tj u sT' 5A 4 ._h._a rc 4tri 1r.aff eieise-Ti __1rf- ,br. as_r_ i,5 lbX .shi ~ a~t?JtrT E' .emen ,2fr 73I T ; i sGt?.f' _4. 0 -3.-

b. k,,, s 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Secti E9HWiffthhTESAR:} r % B-lc] A nominal {9-H} inch center to center . B'-P5 T distance between fuel assemblies placed in the s {high dcasit-y fUElritocage;cackE: {

i _ 4.o-a ! J ~ Jr,Lc at ei1;agjrlx igFr fete gf~ 77 f ' / 7.p$//: !

                                                     ?        -
      ,                                                __ei     iflFLeg . IZt6K

_R.~ 1. 5~.,1* ifd 80.T.. f687 .sfo~.(I- - - I w ainal [10.5; inch ccatcr to =ntcr distancc 4,0-2 i 4k betwcn fx i "x=Mia PcxdinEicwd=ity f"1 l f,/)SR#t 5A stcra;c racks],] !

                                                                                                                       -           4.0- %    !
                                                                                                                                             \

_ ; TorXspen;dfue switpgorAin"5 iln16 f1it _1 /j6/f/i 4,0 eii$nm is a_r,;gy xposuf T5 w-iirf ; g.

                                                  !!cw or particily spcnt-fuci caxablicc with a                                              ;

dischcr;c burnup in thc "xxpt:bic ran;." of I figurc [2.7.17-1; may bc clicwcd unrxtrictcd stcrc;c in [cithcr]fuci stcrc;c rak';'. and] 1 {-f . !?ca or pcrtially ; pent fuci xx;blics with a B PS { disch;r;c burnup in thc "unccxptcbic rangc" of Figurc [ .7.1713 will bc storcd in x;plianc with thc firi apprcxd [:pxific drumcat contcining the ;nalytical mcthods, titic. datc. cr-spccific ccafiguration cc figurcl-(continued) MARK UP 0F WOG STS REV 1 4.0 2 5/15/97

CA 3.7-010 INSERT SA-4a For fuel with enrichments greater than 4.6 nominal weight percent of U-235, the combination of enrichment and integral fuel burnable absorbers shall be sufficient so that the requirements of 4.3.1.1.b are met. INSERT SA-4b

d. Partially spent fuel assemblies with a discharge burnup in the " Acceptable Burnup Domain for Region 2 and 3 storage" of Figure 3.7.17-1 may be allowed unrestricted storage in the fuel ~ storage racks, except for the empty cells in the checkerboarding configuration;

e. Partially spent fuel assembiies with a discharge burnup in the " Acceptable Burnup Domain for Region 3 Storage" of Figure 3.7.17-1 may be allowed unrestricted storage, except for the empty cells in the checkerboarding configuration, and exceptin Region 2 locations in a Mixed Zone Three Region configuration in the fuel storage racks; and

f. New or partially spent fuel assemblies with a discharge burnup in the

              " Unacceptable Burnup Domain for Region 2 or 3 Storage" of Figure 3.7.17-1 be stored in Region 1.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COVER SHEET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NO: CA 3.7-012 APPLICABILITY: CA REQUEST: The Bases discussion for SR 3.5.2.2, SR 3.6.6.1, SR 3.7.5.1, SR 3.7.7.1, and SR 3.7.8.1 are revised to clarify the requirements that 31-day surveillances must verify and to make the surveillance consistently worded. ATTACHED PAGES: Att. No.11 CTS 3/4.5 -ITS 3.5 Encl. 5B B 3.5-20 Att. No.12 CTS 3/4.6 -ITS 3.6 Encl. SB B 3.6-47 Att. No.13 CTS 3/4.7 -ITS 3.7 Encl. 5B B 3.7-37, B3.7-38, B 3.7-50, B 3.7-56

ECCS Operating B 3.5.2

.~

] BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.2 REQUIREENTS (continued) Ve-ifying the correct alignment for' manual, power operated,' and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper' flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or'otherwise securM in position, since these were verified to be in the correc . position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve C A 3 /;. 012. that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve.will automatically j[b reposition within the proper stroke time. Thisgiope)T1 3hgDdoes CA 3.7-012 not require any testing or valve manipulation. R'ther,a ft involves verificatiorPthat those valves capable of being - mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operat_ed unde _r ' n~i r va s1 CA 3.74/ 2' administrative control [ c e at __ f _ Ecc.f A## " C. A 3.7-0I2 sg 3.5,2,3 s- "itt, tre e,c,.pti;; ef it; ep; retia; -.. 17;.;;1 ;t.e. gia; p n. ECCS puhs are normally in a standby nonoperating mode. As @ l f N . j such, flow path piping has the potential o develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Maintaining he piping from the ECCS pumps to tie RCS full of water tw;,m --- 3--r_- 9 CA-ys q EtNsMlFIQi~_6TittiiE4]ll$ ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demandg NgettY51E9tYDty@)G2eittM5bilW!ttibMMlatte4 3f.ny_ cat '.tisi3 r W m - . -

                                                             -==t.o vwmiPr8tt15t:SotPKem hh This w              11 also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of no ondensible gas (e.g., air, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into t reactor vessel following an SI signal or during shutdown      ling. The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration t     gradual  nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the rocedural controls governing system operation.
                                                         .Z'N. TERT A 3'.H0 SR 3.5.2.4 Periodic surveillance testing of ECCS pumps to detect gross -

degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other

t. . .

(continued)

           ' MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES                 B 3.5 20'                                    5/15/97 i

CA 3.7-012 t B 3.5 INSERT A .

        , through a system walkdown (which may include the use of local or remote indicators),

INSERT C This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves and relief valves. Additionally, vent and drain valves are not within the scope of this SR. The 31-day Frequency is based on engineering judgement, is consistent with the' procedureal controls goveming valve operations, and ensures correct valve positions. +

                                                                                                  -  Ji

C$ntainment Spray and Cooling Systems 'Atrep.cri; er.d en B 3.6.6A

         )      BASES ACTIONS                 E.1 and E.2 (continued)

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D of this LC0 are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. _ The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. E1 With two containment spray trains or any combination 'of three or more containment spray and cooling trains inoperable, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, d LCC 3.0.3 must be entered immediately. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6A.1 Q g ,c d REQUIREMENTS - Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power oppe and automatic valves in the containment spray and ,_13, tat flow pathVorovides assurance that the oronar = peth N"1 avht for'C'ontainment Spray System operation. This SR does not apply 9

                   -                    to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in                                      6
                             'V 3,(,, 3- f 2
                                   ~ position, since these were verified to be in the correct position                                gb pr'ior-to-lockingde_aling, or securing.fThis SR does not require                                   $
        /             g                 a valve manipu]Atiqn.yather,it involves                                        gar j .g                verification. ...i .;; . egy        e.moe.;rghat]hosevaljes g_ _     _

_ __ - . . ., s . .s s m ....s.

                                                                                   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . ,
                                 /    Mcapable of M being mispositioned are in the correct

[v4td Wf th position, c c.A 3.7-oth

      ,  flu.. u W s f Ol'                    ,
    '     W WA &Ed'                                                                     A
                                    ; SR 3.6.6k.2                                &
                            -U~dperating each containment coo ing train fan unit for                                              '     *

15 minutes ensures that all traTns are OPERABLE end thtzt1 arreciated enntenle are functinning nennarly. Itilse cuauses MDioCKage. Tan or mvLor failurC. Oi GXs655svc v iuial'iGii sasi h ected ivi c m tiva actinn VThe31dayFrequencywas -

                                   / y k m-%.t. a : - =2 s ~CtM a,.                                                        L% rf,
         )-                        L -g, 4 ,~ t % L. p b 4 A                                                      (continued)

MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.6-47' 5/15/97

                                                                                        . CA 3.7-012 i B 3.6-47 INSERTA A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time.

INSERT B The 31' day Frequency is appropnate because the valves are operated under administrative control. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves and relief valves. Additionally, vent and drain valves are not within the scope of this SR. The 31-day frequency is based on engineering judgement, is consistent with procedural controls goveming valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions. 1 l

i

[

AFW System . B 3.7.5

BASES ACTIONS ILL1 (continued) Required Action 9 g.1 is modified by a Note indicating that all required MODE changes or power reductions are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable because it could force the unit into l a less safe condition. E:1 - In = 4. cittar th; renter ;; int ;;;p er tra = leep Gr. b; xd t; F u.id; fer;;d ;ir si;ti a. ";i; i; ;dd, and in LOO 3.4.0, ".^C0 L;;p "00 4." L'ith a; regised ?"' trein i iregiatic, Etin L;t b; t;is t; i._ di;t;ly ruter; tie ir.;gretl; trein t; 0"C"O L :t;ta . O.; i diet; O w l;ti m Tin i; cea;i; tat ;;ith LOO 3.4.0. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1

  ..      REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the AFW System water and steam supply flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist g

for AFW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that_are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since@fisHafs0 g g verified to be in the correct. position prior to locking, sealing,

       ' g gtn     n           or securingNfh s               or   no app to valve thet ca Ne e 1 m a g          ,  uch as c k alves    Thi fDe rv 'na)11

( e s no r air an tes ng r val na pul t : CA 3 SO/S at r. t nv erlictio tha tho e val sc b I be a s i s/ar dn the_ orr siti Ih1J!'5BHj[mo~dif14Rb~f747N5tehdWititillItHBtRtAM tequire~dItjo l2elirirformid7fof%theTAFWTfrtfG5htN1Di))EejDjg1], thiEAFWDis,LenJlsJplecid*inTa'OtomaticRoittr$KQlf9hnh1Th6He6T PowicTffiatp9e730tIRTP7 Inlo_rdeWfotithMTDAFPNhdINN_PtElg_0LTRABr.l@hiliRth,eM )

                               )yls em21Ein7utomiticRpn_tf_6Eo#LBbdven0%"RBAthFdiWcha.M flotiTcontr61rvalVimAUW0005216375859E10111giridm)J#s11 beliri'thip:f01_1E6penIposition"i4Th_eTLDy'BygLME_regh 0,PERABLElwithithe discharge 7fibfcontro1TVilVis3_hrdttleditd I

(continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES' B 3.7 37 5/15/97-l .- a

1

                                                                                        - CA 3.7-012 B 3.7-37 INSERTA A valve that receives an actuation signalis allowed to be in a nonaccident position -

provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.. Rather, it involves verification, I through a system walkdown (which may include the use of local or remote indicators), that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is approft. ate because the valves are operated under administrative control. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check l valves and relief valves. Additionally, vent and drain valves are not within the scope of this SR. l l

AFW System . B 3.7.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS gifttutEtt~eamigerl efatdralt96150$0t2fRIM1134tBl6Tuip%MG25t [GttittedidGeithTin7AkRfliifrEnddiMtimtDtEkjI5J3N11DB31 DEjaijQR))Ett~ittidTfitTittE1MtIon2fEMBEA51 The 31 day Freque cy.hsed on engineering judgment, is cA 3.7-of Q,

                                       ,        consistent with          procedural controls governing valve opration, and ensures correct valve positions.

uAs h SR 3.7.5.2 Verifying that each AFW pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that AFW pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential head are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref. 2). Because it is undesirable to introduce cold AFW A into the steam generators while they are operating, this testing

                                                }s pegg gngec((gqat{ong}{sjgyj{.{.y a W.
                                                . . . .  , . , .  ...........      . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . .

i,erfer. .acc. [i_stMgEeetFDc8FPJdrMricittUirst1NITT6W??ttle DF6-(turnH4WoeTetiGilit5Thlfgpd7hrfdTenWeTneD7diRh_h,38EpMsiUFe 1 pffHfiltFr3thinT6rreqGh11t41153516siawer3fidf7tht:Ec~anabTritvr6f

                                                #8ctslOAFEft~oTdiliver7a76tI111gapTf36iist!C575'"corJiltT5? steam piridrat#rJbfistUrerofs12213~pFGliiETil35hbTIftEtEdf]H4t',

I 5753 psi"Iric1Dde~sith2eninTfetiPEilTitf5il?T1diGQUEU50rgpu uellieredito?tw6fsteamIgenela_ti3&lfronI6tieIMDAFP.ETestinylttie IDAFrfori*altecirc01stion"fibW1 greeter 2theti'orTeaQ81riten7n dog ELdf,egisuting?aTdi schay,g6IprittDreTof~greitWrnfinnro1IddUIRty 16_2.53HgNelif TEi!thbTtaphb'ilitYlDXthfpWKdiliViPR3t6tTI h_u;EfibiE6fE1145r Q opsiTatYa75tTairgenstat6t!pNFssGferoT;1221MilgZ IhCfgabilitylty delijLEG1iE~gpalific1I[de_sjth6I120Igpa

TJ!$1EcuTationR]og!25;gpmitlo pLaplaW111NPVT15Fdirand?250Zgpjn pel1Veteditolfp3rlsti[amIg6hefatbrRfromithiTTDAFE Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. Performance of inservice testing discussed in the ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 2) (enly icquircd et 3 7enth intervels) satisfies this requirement. The [31] da Ircqu acy en a J STA0CCC ET 0.'.0!S testJREg0encTliriIscc~obdiheeTWithVthe IFLser,vigeles_t,gg;P.r.ogram results in testing each pump once every

).

3 months, as required by Reference 2. (continued) HARi( UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 38 5/15/97

CCW System . B 3.7.7' BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 3 hours and in MODE:5. within L6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit-conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and-without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the CCW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY.of the CCW System. Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the CCW flow path hiWFCDib'51reIPEfratM g[giW provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for W CCW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked,

   <                         sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valvesg!gy verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, CA 3'74IA or securing.         s    a so      s    t     iy     va ves na car 9 1 m sal           sha              val s.    '

y i-frid A ,#1 t~n1 s e i t re rif cat t sti t t or aiv se al p pu e s si 1 e t co p 'anci ion _ The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve pcsitions. SR 3.7.7.2 This SR verifies-proper automatic operation of the CCW valves)

                             .BNf1 MIN M 8 3 M18 W 3SNIW Ml0!iE 6

[314_tedM on an actual or simulated actuation signal. Iloie'M*Gation31dia]BLeic1HdeW6 6 3G BUGBIEZM BllIEEE thtbus13a.cgiel250AltgrlN11rifslRL'E0W50tstNBit@HEIE The CCW System is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. This Surveillance is not required for valves that aN locked. (- (continued) MARK UP 0F NUREG 1431' BASES B 3.7 50 5/15/97

CA 3.7-012

 . B 3.7-50 INSERT A A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown (which may include the une of local or remote indicators),

that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative control.. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves and relief valves. Additionally, vent and drain valves are not within the scope of this SR. 1 e

MM - B 3.7.8

                                                                                                                      'l   '

BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) the unit must be placed in at least HDDE 3 within 6 hours and in H00E 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach 1' e required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the M M components or systems may render those components inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the SWS E

                        )?steiii.

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the SWS ESWitTstbii flow path RV1E11Hrigifity

_.- teDtidWaponentY provides assurance that the proper flow paths cA 3gjg exist for SWS EsTst]ii operation. This SR does not apply to valves thatjar locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since @Fef _ verified t_o be in ; J the correct position prior toyyr'Inflpckef, spe195, of sqtu f ,L y 3ti o vaiv man ula on - w ) I s s- t ui pg [ t r i i ol s ri ica on hat hos valv s c abl of g i po tic d are in he rre po tio . is s v

p, - V ve t t nno be nadv en y sa , c 1 f, l CA 3.?-D/2s s giv - g. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment.his consistent with t.m procedural controls governing valve Qh operation, and ensures correct vaive positions. c49,74g $ l i c) p - SR 3.7.8.2 ' This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the SWS ESWIs7st_em valves serficj_ngsafetyNelatedicomponsnts%3siolatNgithe pori]s fAtEr,el,atedJcompgribj)tY on an actual or simulated actuation j signal. Rese;~ actuation 3tgnQs?;11QGid D,ss ofjPosrMISJ (continued) MARK UP OF NUREG 1431 BASES B 3.7 56 5/15/97

CA 3.7-012 B 3.7-56 INSERT A A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Ra01er, it involves verification, through a system walkdown (which may include the use of local or remote indicators), u;ut those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative control. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves and relief valves. Additionally, vent and drain valves are not within the scope of this SR. __ 1}}

ML20205L090

Text

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