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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20196D8901998-11-30030 November 1998 Non-proprietary Reload Analysis Methodology for Songs,Units 2 & 3 ML20155F6081998-09-17017 September 1998 Non-proprietary Version of San Onofre 2 & 3 Replacement LP Rotors ML20151Q1211998-08-14014 August 1998 Rev 0 to Control of Hazard Barriers ML20248B8981998-05-26026 May 1998 Updated SG Run Time Analysis Cycle 9 ML20248B9221998-04-30030 April 1998 Rev 0 to AES 98033327-1-1, Updated Probabilistic Operational Assessment for SONGS Unit 2,Second Mid Cycle Operating Period,Cycle 9 05000361/LER-2098-003, LOCA Evaluation of Safety Significance of Failure of Emergency Sump Valve Linestarter (LER 1998-003)1998-04-0606 April 1998 LOCA Evaluation of Safety Significance of Failure of Emergency Sump Valve Linestarter (LER 1998-003) ML20217Q6161998-04-0505 April 1998 Failure Analysis Rept 98-005,Failure Analysis of 2HV9305 Motor Starter ML20217D4701998-03-0202 March 1998 Rev 1 to 90459, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis DG Cross- Tie,DCP7048.00SE ML20203K9141998-02-0303 February 1998 Rev 0 to ESFAS Radiation Monitor Single Failure Analysis. W/96 Foldout Drawings ML20199H0621997-11-13013 November 1997 Rev 0 to 90459, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis DG Cross- Tie;DCP7048.00SE SONGS Units 2 & 3 ML20248L3721997-11-0505 November 1997 Combined Annual Frequency of Tornado-Generated Missile Strike Per Unit Area of Exposure at Songs,Units 2 & 3 ML20217K0251997-10-16016 October 1997 Rev 1 to A-SONGS-9416-1168, Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of SCE SONGS Unit 3 SG W/Degraded Eggcrates ML20155B8191997-10-14014 October 1997 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 17 to San Onofre Retrofit Missile Analysis Rept ML20211D2521997-09-30030 September 1997 Rev 2 to AES 97043057-1-1, Probabilistic Operational Assessment of SG Tube Degradation at Songs,Unit 2,for Cycle 9 ML20211D2361997-09-25025 September 1997 Steam Generator Run Time Analysis Cycle 9 ML20203L0261997-07-25025 July 1997 Rev 0 to Software Configuration Data Base ML20203L0161997-05-30030 May 1997 Rev 0 to Software Evaluation Rept ML20203L6871997-02-24024 February 1997 Software Reliability Assessment of Radiation Monitoring Sys ML20203L0351996-12-20020 December 1996 Rev 4 to Chapter 1-J ML20203K8941996-06-19019 June 1996 Rev 0 to Software Verification & Validation Final Rept ML20116C6841996-05-10010 May 1996 Rev 0 to Fuel Consolidation & Storage Rept ML20203K7131996-04-0303 April 1996 Rev 1 to System Software Requirements Specifications ML20236P3931996-03-22022 March 1996 Rev 0 to Maint Rule Scoping & Risk Significance Determination Results of Expert Panel Meetings ML20095G8001995-12-31031 December 1995 IPE of External Events for SONGS Units 2 & 3 ML20100Q6271995-10-31031 October 1995 Summary Rept Primary Plant Make-Up Storage Tank Upgrade San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 ML20095B6901995-10-18018 October 1995 Rev 0 to Evaluation of Handling & Storage of 4.8 Weight Percent Enrich Fuel ML20133G4071995-08-25025 August 1995 Final Rept, Seismic Hazard at Songs. W/One Oversize Drawing ML20087B1101995-07-12012 July 1995 Safety Engineering Command & Control Evaluation ML20203K6971995-07-0707 July 1995 Rev O to Radiation Monitoring Sys Protocol Tss ML20082C3881995-03-18018 March 1995 Rev 2 to White Paper, Fastener Strength Analysis,Nuclear Safety Concern 93-11 ML20072U7071994-09-0808 September 1994 Rev 1 to White Paper Fastener Strength Analysis Nuclear Safety Concern 93-11 ML20072S8931994-08-18018 August 1994 PRA Evaluation of Population Dose Risk from Severe Accidents at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 ML20072S9351994-08-18018 August 1994 PRA Evaluation of Risk Impact of Proposed One-Time Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App J for ILRT Testing at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 ML20084C6311994-05-19019 May 1994 Rev 2 to Songs,Unit 2 Response to GL 92-01 ML20084C6431994-05-19019 May 1994 Rev 2 to Songs,Unit 3 Response to GL 92-01 ML20069Q2791994-05-19019 May 1994 Response to Generic Ltr 92-01. Response Includes Info for Units 2 & 3 ML20069H4371994-05-0606 May 1994 White Paper Fastner Strength Analysis Nuclear Safety Concern 93-11 ML20064G1731994-02-28028 February 1994 Reactor Coolant Pump 3P002 Mechanical Seal Failure ML20058G5781993-12-31031 December 1993 Evaluation of Foreign Objects in SONGS Unit 3 Steam Generators ML20063D3301993-12-0606 December 1993 PRA Evaluation of Tornado-Generated Missile Impact on SONGS 2/3 AFW Sys ML20059G5681993-11-0404 November 1993 Evaluation of Pressurizer Surge Line for Stratified Flow Conditions ML20056H2771993-09-0303 September 1993 Primary Plant Make Up Storage Tank Seismic Upgrade SONGS, Unit 2 Summary Rept ML20056F6861993-06-30030 June 1993 Nonproprietary Root Cause Evaluation for CPC Axial Shape Anomaly for Songs,Units 2 & 3 ML20035H3381993-04-30030 April 1993 Individual Plant Exam Rept for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,Units 2 & 3,in Response to GL 88-20, Submittal Document ML20128B7761993-01-22022 January 1993 Response to GL 92-01,Rev 1 ML20128B7901993-01-22022 January 1993 Response to GL 92-01,Rev 1 ML20203E3251992-06-30030 June 1992 SONGS 3 Pressurizer Level Instrument Nozzle Leakage, Root Cause Evaluation ML20101N1241992-06-24024 June 1992 Nonproprietary SCE Songs,Unit 2 Response to GL 92-01 Final Rept ML20101N1271992-06-23023 June 1992 Nonproprietary SCE Songs,Unit 3 Response to GL 92-01 Final Rept ML20099K3071992-05-13013 May 1992 Rev 2 to Design Rept, SCE - San Onofre SG Manway & Handhole Stud/Studhole Repair Evaluation Units 2 & 3 1998-09-17
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217B4471999-10-0707 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 159 & 150 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20217E3381999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Songs,Units 2 & 3 05000361/LER-1999-005-01, :on 990831,loss of Physical Separation in Control Room,Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Creacus Train a Was Returned to Standby on 9908311999-09-23023 September 1999
- on 990831,loss of Physical Separation in Control Room,Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Creacus Train a Was Returned to Standby on 990831
ML20212A1471999-09-13013 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990904,condenser Monitor Was Declared Inoperable.Difficulties Encountered During Component Replacement Precluded SCE from Restoring Monitor to Service within 72 H.Alternate Method of Monitoring Was Established ML20211R0571999-09-0909 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 158 & 149 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20212A2391999-09-0707 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 157 & 148 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20211N0511999-09-0303 September 1999 SER Approving Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.44 & 10CFR50 App A,General Design Criterion 41 to Remove Requirements from Hydrogen Control Systems from SONGS Units 2 & 3 Design Basis ML20211Q8201999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Songs,Units 2 & 3. with 05000206/LER-1999-001-02, :on 990808,unattended Security Weapon Was Discovered Inside Pa.Caused by Posted Security Officer Falling Asleep.Officer Was Relieved of Duties,Pa Access Was Removed & Officer Was Placed on Investigatory Suspension1999-08-31031 August 1999
- on 990808,unattended Security Weapon Was Discovered Inside Pa.Caused by Posted Security Officer Falling Asleep.Officer Was Relieved of Duties,Pa Access Was Removed & Officer Was Placed on Investigatory Suspension
ML20211H8621999-08-23023 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Requests for Relief RR-E-2-03 - RR-E-2-08 from Exam Requirements of Applicable ASME Code,Section Xi,For First Containment ISI Interval ML20211F2211999-08-19019 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 155 & 146 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20211E9441999-08-19019 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 156 & 147 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20210P4731999-08-11011 August 1999 COLR Cycle 10 Songs,Unit 2 ML20210P4791999-08-11011 August 1999 COLR Cycle 10 Songs,Unit 3 05000361/LER-1999-004-01, :on 990708,automatic Tgis Actuation Occurred. Caused by Small Leak in Suction Side of Tgis Train a Sample Pump.Small Leak Repaired1999-08-0606 August 1999
- on 990708,automatic Tgis Actuation Occurred. Caused by Small Leak in Suction Side of Tgis Train a Sample Pump.Small Leak Repaired
ML20210Q6521999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Songs,Units 2 & 3 ML20210L2771999-07-30030 July 1999 SONGS Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept 2nd Interval,2nd Period Cycle 10 Refueling Outage U3C10 Site Technical Services 05000362/LER-1999-005, :on 990630,discovered LTOP Sys Relief Valve Setpoint Was Higher than Allowed by Ts.Cause Indeterminate. Subject Valve Will Be Disassembled & Inspected to Determine Caused of High Setpoint.With1999-07-28028 July 1999
- on 990630,discovered LTOP Sys Relief Valve Setpoint Was Higher than Allowed by Ts.Cause Indeterminate. Subject Valve Will Be Disassembled & Inspected to Determine Caused of High Setpoint.With
05000362/LER-1999-006, :on 990623,EDG 3G003 Was Inadvertently Made Inoperable.Caused by Operators Aligning EDG to Inoperable Automatic Voltage Regulator.Licensee Will Revise Process of Locating Tags.With1999-07-26026 July 1999
- on 990623,EDG 3G003 Was Inadvertently Made Inoperable.Caused by Operators Aligning EDG to Inoperable Automatic Voltage Regulator.Licensee Will Revise Process of Locating Tags.With
ML20209G8991999-07-12012 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 154 & 145 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20209C9281999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Songs,Units 2 & 3. with 05000362/LER-1999-003-01, :on 990513,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Loss of Main Feedwater.Caused by Open Relay Contact in Output of Feedwater Regulation Control Sys.Faulty Relay Was Replaced1999-06-11011 June 1999
- on 990513,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Loss of Main Feedwater.Caused by Open Relay Contact in Output of Feedwater Regulation Control Sys.Faulty Relay Was Replaced
05000362/LER-1999-004, :on 990515,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Feedwater Control Valve Opening.Caused by Faulty Valve Positioner.Faulty Positioner Was Replaced1999-06-11011 June 1999
- on 990515,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Feedwater Control Valve Opening.Caused by Faulty Valve Positioner.Faulty Positioner Was Replaced
ML20195D3061999-06-0202 June 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR SCE-9801-P, Reload Analysis Methodology for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station,Units 2 & 3. Rept Acceptable ML20195H5491999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Songs,Units 2 & 3 05000362/LER-1999-002-01, :on 990328,RWST Outlet Isolation Valve Failed to Open After Being Closed for Testing.Caused by Degradation of Valve.Rwst Oulet Valve Was Repaired.With1999-05-20020 May 1999
- on 990328,RWST Outlet Isolation Valve Failed to Open After Being Closed for Testing.Caused by Degradation of Valve.Rwst Oulet Valve Was Repaired.With
ML20207A0211999-05-13013 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 153 & 144 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20196L3221999-05-11011 May 1999 SONGS Unit 2 ISI Summary Rept 2nd Interval,2nd Period Cycle-10 Refueling Outage ML20206H2611999-05-0505 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect Found in Potter & Brumfield Relays. Sixteen Relays Supplied in Lot 913501 by Vendor as Commercial Grade Items.Caused by Insufficient Contact Pad Welding.Relays Replaced with New Relays ML20206S7281999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Songs,Units 2 & 3 ML20206G6561999-04-27027 April 1999 SER Accepting Proposed Exemption from 10CFR50.71(e)(4) for SONGS Units 2 & 3 ML20206D1461999-04-26026 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 152 to License NPF-10 ML20205Q6221999-04-19019 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative to Use Wire Penetrameters for ISI Radiography in Place of ASME Code Requirement ML20205R0371999-04-16016 April 1999 SER Approving Proposed Deviation from Approved Fire Protection Program Incorporating Technical Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.0 That Applies to RCP Oil Fill Piping ML20205N2691999-04-0909 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 151 & 143 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20205G2611999-04-0101 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990328,3RT-7865 Was Removed from Service. Monitor Is Scheduled to Be Returned to Service Prior to Mode 4 Entry (Early May 1999) Which Will Exceed 72 H Allowed by LCS 3.3.102.Alternate Method of Monitoring Will Be Used ML20205Q0981999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Songs,Units 2 & 3 05000362/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990211,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Chilled Water Trains Being Inoperable.Warm Main Condenser Discharged Water Diverted in Salt Water Cooling (Swc)(Bs) Intake.With1999-03-12012 March 1999
- on 990211,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to Both Chilled Water Trains Being Inoperable.Warm Main Condenser Discharged Water Diverted in Salt Water Cooling (Swc)(Bs) Intake.With
05000361/LER-1999-002, :on 990208,pressurizer Safety Valves Were Above TS Limit.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Sce Submitted License Amend Application on 980904 Requesting Tolerence Be Changed to +3/-2%.With1999-03-10010 March 1999
- on 990208,pressurizer Safety Valves Were Above TS Limit.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Sce Submitted License Amend Application on 980904 Requesting Tolerence Be Changed to +3/-2%.With
05000361/LER-1999-001, :on 990201,automatic Start of EDG Was Noted. Caused by Workers Closing Breaker 2A0418 by Discharging Closing Springs.Operators Restored SDC in Approx 26 Minutes. with1999-03-0303 March 1999
- on 990201,automatic Start of EDG Was Noted. Caused by Workers Closing Breaker 2A0418 by Discharging Closing Springs.Operators Restored SDC in Approx 26 Minutes. with
ML20204F8101999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Songs,Units 2 & 3.With ML20203J1131999-02-12012 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 150 & 142 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20203J1981999-02-12012 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 149 & 141 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20202F7041999-01-21021 January 1999 Special Rept:On 990106,SCE Began to Modify 2RT-7865.2RT-7865 to Allow Monitor to Provide Input to New Radiation Monitoring Data Acquisition Sys.Monitor Found to Exceeds 72 H Allowed Bt LCS 3.3.102.Alternate Monitoring Established ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML20199F0771998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Songs,Units 2 & 3 ML20198H5401998-12-21021 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 146 & 138 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20206N6281998-12-16016 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 145 & 137 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively ML20198A6731998-12-11011 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981124,meteorological Sys Wind Direction Sensor Was Observed to Be Inoperable.Caused by Loss of Communication from Tower to Cr.Sensor Was Replaced & Sys Was Declared Operable on 981204 ML20198C3471998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Songs,Units 2 & 3 1999-09-09
[Table view] |
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FINAL REPORT TO AEC REGULATORY STAFF ADEQUACY OF THE STRUCTURAL CRITERIA FOR SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 Southern California Edison Company San Diego Gas and Electric Company AEC Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 by N. M. Newmark and W. J. Ha l l 6 July 1972 8710210265 8710i4 b
AD Bh-462 PDR
l ADEQUACY OF THE SD1UCTURAL CRITERIA FOR SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 I
Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company by N. M. Newma r k and W. J. Ha l l INTRODUCTION This report is concerned with the adequacy of the containment structures and components for a 2-unit nuclea r power station, San Onof re Units 2 and 3, for which appilcation for a construction permit has been made to the U.S. Atomic Energy Comntssion by the Southern California Ealson Company and the San Diego Gas and Electric Company.
The facility is located on the west coast of Southern California on the Pac!fic Ocean In San Diego County, approximately 62 miles southeast of Los Angeles and approximately 51 miles northwest of San Diego.
This report Is based on Information and criteria set forth in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and amendments thereto, as listed at the end of this report. Also, we have participated in discussions with the AEC Regulatory Staff concerning the design of this unit.
The two units will be constructed on the existing San Onof re site and will be located immediately south of San Onof re Unit 1.
DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY The San Onof re Units 2 and 3 will each consist of nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) with an associated pressurized water reactor t hat will operate at core power levels up to 3390 MWt.
The core and the NSSS design are similar to that of Hutchinson Island Unit 1, and the reactor coolant system 1s quite similar to that for Palisades Unit 1.
3
2 The reactor containment structure, which houses the reactor and steam generators, consists of a concrete vertical right cylinder with a flat base and a shallow-domed roof.
The planneJ preliminary dimensions of the containment structure are as follows:
Inside diameter,130 f t; inside height, 185 ft; cylindrical wall thickness, 4 f t; and dome thickness, 3 1/2 f t.
ne cylindrical portion of the containment structure is post-tensioned with horizontal (hoop) and vertical tendons.
The hoop tendons are anchored at 3 buttresses equally spaced around the containment structure.
These tendons extend 240 around the cylinder periphery, bypassing Intermediate buttresses.
The dcme has a 3-way post-tensioning system.
The foundation slab is conventionally reinforced with high-strength reinforcing steel.
The interior of the containment shell is steel-lined with ASTM A-285 carbon steel plate, Personnel and equipment access hatches are provided to permit access to the facility. There are a number of additional penetrations for piping and electrical conduits.
Section 2.9 of the PSAR Indicates that major structures will be founded f
I in the San Mateo foundation.
The applicant Indicates that even the heaviest structure can be supported in this material using spread. footings or mat j
f oundat i ons.
1 SOURCES OF STRESSES IN CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND CLASS I CCHPGENTS The containment structure is to be designed for the folicwing loads:
dead load, including hydrostatic pressure; live load; accident containment design pressure of 60 psig; proof test pressure at 115 percent of design pressure; j
external pressure of 2 psi; thermal load arising f rom the maximum temperature
)
i gradient through the concrete shell and mat, based on a maximum design temperature in excess of 250 F; wind load varying with the height and corresponding to a 90 miles per hour basic wind 30 f t above grade; and seismic loads, as described next.
l l
I 1
3 The applicant, in Anendment 14, indicates that the design is to be made for a Design Basis Earthquake characterized by a raximum horizontal g:cund acceleration of 0.679 to insure containment and safe shutdown; the plant is also to be designed for an Operating Basis Earthcuake based on a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.33.
These seismic design levels 9
are adequate.
COMMENTS ON ADEQUACY OF DESIGN l
Foundations and Cuts l
The PSAR presentation Indicates that heavy structures will be supported on spread footings or mat foundations, and that for these types 1
of foundations the total and differential settlement will be small. The l
foundation scheme proposed by the applicant is acceptable to us.
The applicant indicates that the highly compacted, dense nature i
of the San Mateo formation makes the chance of 1 Liquefaction of the foundation j
sands during an earthquake unlikely. We concur in this evaluation.
There is an Indication on page 11-17 of Appendix 2B that cuts as de.cp as 70 f t will be required for the construction of Units 2 and 3.
l slope stability analyses have been carried out for earthquake accelerations corresponding to 0.25g and 0.509, and we understand will be made for the higher accelerations now indicated in Anendment 14.
Further elaboration on the excavated slopes for Units 2 and 3 is l
presented in Section 2.9 beginning on page 2.9-9 (Amendment 6) and indicates that the slopes are considered critical or noncritical, depending upon whether l
slippage can cause any structural or equipment damage at the plant. The discussion given indicates that vertical earthquake effects have been considered
4 in a preliminary fashion along with the horizonta: sf fects, and that it is estimated that the amount of slippage can be handled by the terraces and other provisions incorporated in the site design. There is every reason to believe that, with careful analysis, the possibility of slope failures can be calculated adequately to insure the safety of the plant and critical items of equipment.
l On the basis that comprehensive analysis will be carried out for the appropriate l
levels of earthquake excitation finally agreed upon for the plant design, and that the design criteria will incorporate conservative safety factors against silp, we concur in the general approach adopted for the design of the cut slopes.
1 The discussion on page 1.8-38 of the PSAR indicates that the containment structure foundation will be located approximately 20 f t below the adj acent finished grade.
The method selected for handling this soil-structure l
in eraction is not presented but it is indicated that the details of the j
i procedure will be based upon the reference material given in Section B1 of Apoendix B, and will be submitted af ter a more detailed design.
1 i
On page 1.8-49 at the bottom of the page, there is a statement indicating that approximate analysis of containment structures for local loading originating f rom the earthquake excitation will be made.
It is indicated that previous work on similar containments indicates that there is disagreement l
l concerning the actual local effects on the portion of the structure below grade l
anong experts, and that the designers plan to consult with the seismologists and seismic consultants on the details.
We interpret these various statements to mean that further infonnation will be forthcoming as to the criteria to be employed in design to account for possible soil-structure interaction at the seismic levels now used.
l l
l 1
-________.___mm______
6 in Section B.2.3.1.1.1 and 8.2.3.1.1.2 in Appendix B of the PSAR,
" gravity coefficients" are presented.
The manner in which these vertical seismic coef ficients are presented suggests that the design for vertical excitation may involve the use of constant acceleration coefficients.
- However, in the material filed with Amendment 4, and particularly that given in Section B.2.3.1.2.1 for structures (Type A) and in Section B.2.3.1.2.2 for structures (Type B), the discussion indicates that the vertical excitation will be treated in the same manner as the horizontal excitation with regard to amplified response.
On the assumption that this is the approac' employed in the analysis, we concur.
l D ampi ng The structural damping to be employed in the design is discussed in several places in the PSAR and in Amendment 14.
The values used are listed in Tables B.2-1.
The damping values, including soils damping, are limited to an overall proportional modal damping value of 10 percent for the DBE. We concur in the damping values indicated and in the limi tation to a naximum of 10 percent.
Methods of Dynanic Analysis The presentation on page 1.8-49 indicates that the general analytical model for the analysis of the containment structure for earthquake motion has not been completed (See page 1.8-163) but that it will meet the detailed requi rements of Appendix 8.
The information presented in Appendix B and updated l
j through Amendment 4, and particularly that in section B.2, Indicates that the l
structures will evidently be categorized into two types (A and 8) and that they will be analyzed by generally available computer codr such as SMis and STARDYNE.
The general description given suggests that the approach will be satisf actory, al though few detail s are gi4n.
L
,I b
j 7
In Amendment 14'It is stated on page 1.8-121aa that the response 1
spectra corresponding to tim,e-histories 'used -in the analysis will not be available until about August 1972, but are expected to envelope the smoothed response spectra employed as the criteria for design.
.)
Seismic Analysis of Equipment and Piping The approach to be followed in the seismic analysis of equipment.is described on page 8.2-13.
It is indicated that the systems will be analyzed' by the response spectrum technique.
The description Indicates that simplified j
analytical models will be employed as re' quired.
It is also indicated that special. attention will be given to the flexibility or rigidity characteristics of pipe networks and that local restraints and hydraulic snubbers will be placed as required.
The analysis of ' reactor internals is described on page 8.3-11 and the general aoproach given is acceptable.-
Further details on the design approach for the reactor vessel, steam generators, and reactor coolant piping-pump assembly are contained in presentation in Section 8.3 beginning on page 8.3-8.
The approach given for this portion of i
the equipment and piping appears satisfactory.
It is not clear that this. covers 1
all of the Class I piping in the plant.
Other information concerning piping analysis and design is presented on page 1.8-35.
The details on the piping analysis are satisfactory in concept.
For.certain Class i systems end equipment, where analytical models and normal mode tneory may not be applicable, the applicant indicates that testing may be employed to help insure functional integrity.. This approach appears satisfactory.
i
8 Cranes The discussion on page 1.8-48 Indicates that cranes in critical areas of the nuclear facility will be designed to insure that they are adequately tied down and cannot be dislodged f rom the rails during seismic excitation.
,j This approach is satisf actory.
Class I Eautpment In Class II Structures The design approach to be followed for Class I equipment items which are located in Class II structures is discussed on page 1.8-37.
The applicant indicates that special attention will be directed to insure a conservative design approach f or those portions of the structures, and moreover that the response of Class I conponents located thereon will be examined in detail also.
j This approach appears satisfactory.
j Penetrations and t.iner Plates f
The general design approach for the penetrations and liner plates as outlined in Sectico 5 appears satisfactory insofar as the details given are concerned. We expect that the final comprehensive seismic design document referred to on page 1.8-163 of Amendment 14 will include consideration of the seismic aspects of the design of these details.
These Items should be reviewed when the document is available.
General Deston Stress Bases The conbined load expressions applicable to design are presented in Section B.3 and appear generally acceptable.
We understand from our discussion with the applicant and AEC
)
representatives in Urbana on 8 June 1972 that the design stress criteria are -
l generally such as to limit stresses to less than yleid values. We concur in this criterion.
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