ML20234E066

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Marked-up Safety Issues in Bodega Bay Reactor, Draft Outline
ML20234E066
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Bodega Bay
Issue date: 06/24/1963
From: Beck C
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20234A767 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-85-665 NUDOCS 8709220272
Download: ML20234E066 (3)


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~' DRAFT l CDecksv1 l 6/24 /63 i

SAFETY ISSUg8 3 BODECA BAY REACTOR 1

1. The Bodega Bay reactor proposed by PG&E is similar in all important i design e.oncepts to several other successfully operating reactors.
2. There are no innovations, new principles or concepts of any substance  !

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in this application. For example, most of the systems follow the )

, design concepts and principles already in successful une in other plants, including such systems ass, 4, Wgj,lj y,im/A :n ~ ri~ dj'~'" < f

) # g',/g - (gf the* pressure v6ssel W_ h the primary system pi the core design ,

the control system the inetrissentation system .*

,1#jgo p'y],fjr the poison injection system ,

  • .,,./y / l emergency cooling systems the auxiliary power system *[ j, ' ,,

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radiation monitoring y; 1 ( ,J/, .4  ;

waste treatment, storage, disposa l.

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$ fM & J r*) n . % A J 2.., D k s- W ',: ' j^ ~ ~ C Matters on which some thought will'be given as the detailed design is finalized includes

a. The thickness of fuel element cladding, now entatively proposed as 11 mils. The applicant may decide later o use thicker cladding. g If th(Deladding is used, the occurrence of fa lures before intended cad of life, which would release fission products into the primary  ;

n- j coolant, might force uneconomical shutdowns. j ;The% > 4 be no re would 3 i

substantial he.sards, and the eventual outcome would depend on i economic balances to the operator. j I

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1 l- b. Design of control blades,now under study, may result in in'breased assurance that inadvertent blade drop-out would e s

g not occur, Nf/*WAw n ,a n ). M *

c. The design details on the over-all contaimsent volmes' and on individual penetrations of containment must be developed to :

mee w te a initial and subsequent periodic pressure and leek test measurements to an extent which has not.previoisslyr been

. required N This p.um dods6 .n fu 7./' L A o not ari from extra hazards. in this plant .

nor from less favorable site, but from realization that procedures -

in previous plants have not been adequate.

d. The number and location of isolation valhs' in the primary system pipes-leaving the suppression pool containment have not been finally settled. M/ 7 ) i"7 p brAJ '- .a t)"~~j f a R -* ~-

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e. The applicant proposes to operate with a higher percentage of steam voltane in the core.t'han has been customary. Further analytical, work and some limited and controlled initial' operations of the h plant will eventually determine whether or. not this is feasible.)f 'Y u.,,.f A 1.h g JA bsa veh vr..-s,:4 .r..4:u 4 . O .

l 4. There are ab systems on which research and development mund.u be y.,,

doney, to settle concepts, principles and general arrangements.

5. On some matters, further work and collection of infonsation must be done in finalising design details,
s. Where and to what extent internal baffles are needed in the suppression pool will be determined by experiments now 3

in progress at Hoss Landing.

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b. 'An environmental monitoring program, including surveys of ocean 4 9

currents, marine life, etc. as well as radioactivity levels is I i

being conducted to provide a reference level for determination /

whether any changes occur later as' a result of plant operation.-

c. Detailed meteorological observations are being made to provide Infomation needed in detemining operating procedures and license limitations.
6. Accident calculations and site characteristics lead ' to determination of contaimeent pressure and leakage specifications 'and to containment voltanes, as follows: _. _ _.._ -. .-

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The plant dry well and suppression pool are designed to these values i

respectively, and, we believe, are adequate.

7. The site for this reactor is an excellent one in all respects but one, naaely, the proximity to the well-known St. Andreas earthquake, which runs \@ P feet to the northeast of the proposed reactor location. The population distribution is favorable, the isolation distance factors are well within acceptable ranges, the meteorology, 'though not good for certain portions of the time, is as good or better than that in California generally, and, with the isolation distances, the contaimeent characteristics already described, and generally known ap successfully proven plant characteristics, is considered acceptable The on (.fM 4 ') ly rea issue yet to be cattled, either in plant location or i.n the extra and additional design safeguards on otherwise adequate plant systems, is the proeimity of the plant to the St. Andreas fault and the implications this has for the plant.

xl Except for the earthquake question, the site & design features would pemit Eranting of a construction permit forthwith. Because of the question,'however, on which further data remain to be assembled, the acceptability' of the site is not -

settled, and if a9ceptable, chether and to what extent extra safeguards and -

structural reinforcements on components and systems also remain to be detemined.

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