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Category:NRC TECHNICAL REPORT
MONTHYEARML20248F0001989-09-29029 September 1989 Debris in Containment Recirculation Sumps, Technical Review Rept ML20204J6141988-08-31031 August 1988 AEOD/E807, Pump Damage Due to Low Flow Cavitation ML20245B6061988-08-31031 August 1988 Inadequate NPSH in HPSI Sys in Pwrs, Engineering Evaluation Rept ML20196G5251988-06-15015 June 1988 Technical Review Rept T809, Blocked Thimble Tubes/Stuck Incore Detector ML20245H9601988-04-15015 April 1988 BWR Overfill Events Resulting in Steam Line Flooding, AEOD Engineering Evaluation Rept ML20148D0671988-03-17017 March 1988 Headquarters Daily Rept for 880317 ML20148B3291988-03-14014 March 1988 Headquarters Daily Rept for 880314 ML20196H6351988-03-0808 March 1988 Headquarters Daily Rept for 880308 ML20196G8881988-03-0303 March 1988 Headquarters Daily Rept for 880303 ML20147E3961988-01-0606 January 1988 Rept of Interview W/Rg Lagrange on 841206 & 14 to Discuss Info Contained in B Hayes 841017 Memo Identifying Series of Submittals Received from Util Between 1980 & 1984 ML20147E3211988-01-0606 January 1988 Rept of Interview W/Rg Lagrange to Discuss Gpu 830520 & s Re Environ Qualification equipment.Marked-up 850409 Statement from H Hukill Also Encl ML20237L3001987-08-24024 August 1987 AEOD/E709 Engineering Evaluation Rept Re Auxiliary Feedwater Trips Caused by Low Suction Pressure.Draft Info Notice Encl ML20235C9311987-06-23023 June 1987 Rept to ACRS Re Humboldt Bay Unit 3 - Core II ML20212F6581986-12-31031 December 1986 Technical Review Rept, Degradation of Safety Sys Due to Component Misalignment &/Or Mispositioned Control/Selector Switches ML20212D9091986-12-23023 December 1986 Localized Rod Cluster Control Assembly (Rcca) Wear at PWR Plants, Engineering Evaluation Rept ML20212B0321986-12-17017 December 1986 Emergency Diesel Generator Component Failures Due to Vibration, Engineering Evaluation Rept ML20214R4851986-10-0909 October 1986 Initial OL Review Rept for Seabrook Station Unit 1 ML20212K6641986-08-0707 August 1986 Inadvertent Recirculation Actuation Signals at C-E Plants, Technical Review Rept ML20206H0871986-03-0303 March 1986 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-85-A-013 Re Const Activities.Addl Info Requested from Alleger.Case Closed Due to Lack of Response.Related Info Encl ML20206H0761986-01-21021 January 1986 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-085 Re Alteration of Personnel Records.Based on Resolution of Allegation 4-84-A-094,case Closed ML20137X6151986-01-0909 January 1986 Engineering Evaluation of Deficient Operator Actions Following Dual Function Valve Failures ML20234F5601985-12-17017 December 1985 Draft Hazards Analysis ML20234F4751985-12-17017 December 1985 Licensing of Power Reactors by Aec ML20214T2211985-11-25025 November 1985 Initial OL Review Rept:Millstone Point Unit 3 ML20206H0621985-10-15015 October 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-85-A-045 Re Inadequate Handling/Installation Procedures for Equipment, Vendor Control Programs & Spare Parts.Based on Insp Rept 50-482/85-22,case Closed ML20206H0371985-10-0202 October 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-85-A-044 Re Lack of Effective QA Programs & QC Insps.Based on Insp Rept 50-482/85-22,allegation Closed IR 05000482/19850191985-09-30030 September 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-85-A-050 Re Mishandling of Document Control Program.Concerns Addressed in Insp Rept 50-482/85-19.Dept of Labor & Allegation Cases Closed ML20206H0131985-09-27027 September 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-076 Re Vague Administrative Procedures,Calibr Program Not Working,Test Engineer Authority & Harassment.Based on Insp Rept 50-482/85-03,case Closed ML20137B1231985-09-16016 September 1985 HPCS Sys Relief Valve Failures, Engineering Evaluation Rept ML20206G8431985-09-0303 September 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-013 Re Improper Termination of Employee Due to Refusal to Weld Laminated Pipe.Welding non-safety Related.Case Closed on 850827.W/ 840315 Telcon Record & Addl Info IR 05000482/19850311985-08-28028 August 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-85-A-077 Re 6 Rem Exposure in Containment Bldg Due to Pipe Break.Allegation Investigated During Insp 50-482/85-31 on 850715-19 & Found Unsubstantiated ML20206G8051985-08-27027 August 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-114 Re Drugs Planted at Plant.Evidence Destroyed in Testing.Based on Insp Rept 50-482/85-03 & Mullikin 850429 Memo,Case Closed ML20206G7781985-08-27027 August 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-195 Re Quality First.Fuel Load Issue Resolved in Insp Rept 50-482/85-10. Technical Issues to Be Resolved Prior to Full Power Licensing.Case Closed w/850815 Memo to File ML20209G3051985-08-0909 August 1985 Closure of ECCS Min Flow Valves, Engineering Evaluation Rept.Recommends IE Issue Info Notice to Remind Licensees of Importance of Min Flow Bypass Capability as Essential Pump Protection Feature ML20206H1021985-07-30030 July 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-008 Re Improper Const Practices.Insp Rept 50-482/84-12 Issued on 841012 & Closeout Ltr Sent on 850405 ML20206H0801985-07-30030 July 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-007 Re Intimidation of QC Inspector.Forwards Documents Closing Allegation.W/O Encls ML20147E4401985-06-20020 June 1985 Rept of Interview W/Cw Smyth on 850510.Smyth Advised of Unfamiliarity W/Environ Qualification Program in Technical Sense & W/Documentation Needed to Qualify Individual components.Marked-up Lw Harding Statement Encl ML20199G0701985-05-0303 May 1985 Partially Withheld Statement of Decision Re Allegation AQ-38 Concerning Alleged Harassment of QC Inspectors Upon Observation of Weld Defects on vendor-inspected Restraints. Allegation Substantiated.Addl Allegation Repts Encl ML20147H0101985-04-16016 April 1985 Draft Summary Rept for Regional Evaluation of Texas Utils Electric Co,Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station ML20206G9151985-03-12012 March 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-015 Re Harassment of Mechanical/Welding QC Inspector for Writing Nonconformance Rept Re Improper Welding Amperage by Superintendent.Util Rept Issued & Case Closed ML20147G9901985-01-31031 January 1985 Summary Rept for Regional Evaluation of Texas Utils Electric Co,Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station ML20205Q7691985-01-18018 January 1985 Status Rept Mechanical/Piping Area. Related Info Encl ML20206G8861985-01-0909 January 1985 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-85-A-004 Re Electrical Installations.Insp Required.Related Info Encl ML20214R5681984-12-31031 December 1984 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Initial OL Readiness Assessment ML20214T7251984-11-30030 November 1984 Summary Rept for Regional Evaluation of Diablo Canyon Unit 2 ML20206G8131984-10-0303 October 1984 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-102 Re Visual Insp Through Paint,Unfair Intimidation to Produce Results, Rejection of Previous Inspected Welds,Defective Welds & Missing Beams.Addl Info Encl ML20206G7731984-10-0101 October 1984 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-098 Re Qa/Qc Program Allegations Re Matl Verification, post-ok Reviews by Engineers & Improper Verification of Snubber Transaction Assemblies ML20206H2431984-09-13013 September 1984 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-89 Re Kickbacks & Coverups in QA Dept.State of Ks Interested.No Federal Regulations Violated If Kickback Allegations true.W/840912 Telcon Record.Related Info Encl ML20205Q7591984-08-31031 August 1984 Preliminary Summary of Allegations for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206H2321984-08-17017 August 1984 Allegation Review Data Sheet for Case 4-84-A-80 Re False Resume Submitted to Louisiana Power & Light Co W/Plant Listed as Former Place of Employment 1989-09-29
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML18094B3211990-02-28028 February 1990 Annual Operating Repts for 1989 for Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations ML20012A9011990-02-27027 February 1990 Suppls 900213 10CFR21 Rept Re Chilled Water Sys Operation. Evaluation of Crystal River Determined That Postulated High Energy Line Break in Intermediate Bldg May Be Subj to Steam Loads Higher than Normal Loads,Causing Rising Water Temp ML20011F1941990-02-22022 February 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Abb 27/59 Relay Catalog Series 211L.Solder Connections to Printed Wiring Runs on Bottom of Circuit Board Deteriorated Due to Thermal Stress.No Actual Failure Occurred & Relays to Be Changed at Next Outage ML20011F5971990-02-22022 February 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Solder Connections in Abb 27/59 Relays Deteriorated Due to Thermal Stress,Causing Bonding of Printed Wiring Pattern to Glass Epoxy Circuit Board.Interim Circuit Board W/Larger Pads & Higher Wattage Will Be Used ML18153C1011990-02-0202 February 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Two of Three Pc Cards in GE Type SLV11A1 Over/Undervoltage Relays Failing to Produce Output.Short Between Leads Would Result in Damage to Component 1C5. Sketch of Threshold Detection Board Encl ML17223A7451990-01-26026 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Backup Rings Furnished in Spare Parts Seal Kits & in 25 Gpm 4 Way Valves as Part of Actuators Made of Incorrect Matl.Rings Should Be Viton & Have Been Identified as Buna N ML20006A8231990-01-10010 January 1990 Errata to Rev 3 to BAW-1543, Master Integrated Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program Consisting of Revised Tables 3-20 & E-1 ML20005G6831990-01-0505 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Installation Instructions for Grommet Use Range for Patel Conduit Seal P/N 841206.Conduit Seals in Environ Qualification Applications Inspected for Proper Wire Use Range & Grommets Replaced ML17347B4621989-12-31031 December 1989 App a to USI A-46 & Generic Ltr 87-02. ML18094B1471989-10-25025 October 1989 Emergency Plan Annual Exercise 1989 for Artificial Island on 891025. W/One Oversize Drawing ML19325E0861989-10-16016 October 1989 Followup Part 21 Rept Re Class 1E Battery Chargers W/ Transformers Running at Temps Exceeding Those Used in Qualification Rept When Operating at or Near Full Load Rating of Equipment.Listed Corrective Actions Underway ML19351A2941989-10-0909 October 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Potential of Ambient Compensated Molded Case Circuit Breakers to Deviate from Published Info. Instantaneous Trip Check Will Be Instituted on All Class 1E Thermal/Magnetic Ambient Breakers Prior to Shipment ML20248G8291989-10-0202 October 1989 Rev 19 to YOQAP-I-A, Operational QA Program ML17347B3821989-09-30030 September 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 & St Lucie Units 1 & 2.W/891016 Ltr ML19327C0681989-09-30030 September 1989 Nuclear Safety & Compliance Semiannual Rept Number 11,Apr- Sept 1989. W/891027 Ltr ML19351A4191989-09-30030 September 1989 Mark-BW Reload LOCA Analysis for Catawba & McGuire Units. ML20248F0001989-09-29029 September 1989 Debris in Containment Recirculation Sumps, Technical Review Rept ML19325C9521989-09-29029 September 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Common Failure of SMB-000 & SMB-00 Cam Type Torque Switches Supplied Prior to 1981 & 1976. Vendor Recommends That Switch W/Fiber Spacer Be Replaced ML20248E0121989-09-13013 September 1989 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Six Specific Engine Control Devices in Air Start,Lube Oil, Jacket Water & Crankcase Sys.Initially Reported on 890429. California Controls Co Will Redesign Valve Seating ML20248D1571989-09-13013 September 1989 Rev 56 to QA Program ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247E3761989-09-0707 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122,34,143 & 40 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML17347B3341989-08-31031 August 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 & St Lucie Units 1 & 2.W/890913 Ltr ML20246D6871989-08-14014 August 1989 Rev 1 to Criticality Analysis of Byron & Braidwood Station High Density Fuel Racks ML20248C0731989-08-0303 August 1989 Sser Accepting 880601,0909 & 890602 Changes to ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry for Plants ML18008A0311989-07-31031 July 1989 NTH-TR-01 Decrease in Heat Removal by Secondary Sys. ML17347B2731989-07-31031 July 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 & St Lucie Units 1 & 2 ML19327B4011989-07-31031 July 1989 Safety Evaluation for Byron/Braidwood Stations Units 1 & 2 Transition to Westinghouse 17 X 17 Vantage 5 Fuel. ML20246P7111989-07-17017 July 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Quench Cracks in Bar of A-SA-193 Grade B7 Component.Quench Cracks Found in One Bar of Matl.Listed Purchasers Informed of Potential Defect.Next Rept Will Be Submitted When Addl Info Becomes Available ML20247D3011989-07-12012 July 1989 Part 21 Rept 10CFR21-0047 Re Control Wiring Insulation of Inner Jacket Used on General Motors Diesel Generator Sets Identified as 999 or MP Series.Encl List of Owners of Units Notified ML17347B2741989-06-30030 June 1989 Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for June 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 ML17347B1851989-06-30030 June 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1989 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2 & Turkey Point Units 3 & 4.W/890717 Ltr ML20247H0711989-06-30030 June 1989 Description & Verification Summary of Computer Program, Gappipe ML20246D6711989-06-30030 June 1989 Criticality Analysis of Byron/Braidwood Fresh Fuel Racks ML20246L2571989-06-26026 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118,33,142 & 36 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247H0791989-06-22022 June 1989 App to Description & Verification Summary of Computer Program,Gappipe ML18151A5411989-06-21021 June 1989 Updated Operational QA Program Topical Rept. ML20245B6651989-06-15015 June 1989 Part 21 Rept 150 Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsr Standby Diesel Generator.Cause of Failure Determined to Be Combination of Insufficient Lubrication to Bushings.Listed Course of Action Recommended at Next Scheduled Engine Maint ML18101A4931989-06-13013 June 1989 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Rept. ML17345A7241989-06-0909 June 1989 Rev 15 to Topical QA Rept. ML20247N0621989-05-31031 May 1989 Production Training Dept,Braidwood,Malfunctions & Initial Conditions ML17345A7501989-05-31031 May 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1989 for Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 & St Lucie Units 1 & 2 ML20247L1841989-05-12012 May 1989 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation for Stainless Steel Piping, Byron & Braidwood Nuclear Power Stations Units 1 & 2 ML20247K3011989-05-12012 May 1989 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation for Carbon Steel Piping ML18094A3551989-04-30030 April 1989 Assessment of Impacts of Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations on Kemps Ridley (Lepidochelys Kempi) & Loggerhead (Carretta Caretta) Sea Turtles. ML17345A6851989-04-30030 April 1989 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1989 for Turkey Point Units 1 & 2 & St Lucie Units 1 & 2.W/890515 Ltr ML17345A7531989-04-30030 April 1989 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1989 for St Lucie Unit 2 ML20246K7401989-04-26026 April 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrectly Stamped Name Plates on Certain Asco Nuclear Qualified Valves.Vendor Will Contact Each Affected Facility & Furnish Correctly Stamped Plates & in Near Future Discontinue Sale of Rebuild Kits for Valves ML20245J0751989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 114,30,141 & 33 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20244D8161989-04-13013 April 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Rosemount Transmitters.All Failed Transmitters Replaced,Inservice Test Procedure Prepared & Monthly Test of All 12 Transmitters in RCS Throughout Cycle 2 Operation Will Be Performed.Review Continuing 1990-02-28
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[ 3/25 /64 NOTES ON GEOLOGIC-QUESTIONS RELATING TO BODEGA)
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- 1. Two aspects of earthquakes are of concern in considering the suitability )
of the proposed site for this reactor:
- a. The vibrations which would result from the earthquake
- b. The possibility of faulting, differential ground motion, in the earth (n which the reactor structures rest.
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- 2. The frequency, amplitude and accelerations of vibrations from future ..
J earthquake can only be estimated by reference to what has happened in the past, as best these can be determined from seismic records (Coast j i
and Geodetic Survey). Generally, structures can be designed to withstand severe vibrational damage, j 3. From other sources, we are establishing the magnitude of a fault which
?
could be tolerated in a reactor structure, by design, etc., before serious nuclear hazard would be a possible consequence. We must establish as best we can the likelihood or probability of faulting in the earth on which the proposed reactor facility would rest, and, the magnitude of the -.
faults that might be expected. It is this basic question on which we 'l f
seek the evidence (and judgments) that can be obtained from geology (and )
the Geologic Survey): whassim the likely expectation or probability of
, faults, in. relation to the size or magnitude of faults. Defined more i explicitly, how likely are faults of (a) less than 1"; (b) of less than-10" or 12"; (c) of greater than a foot of differential displacement?
When we have this infonnation, we must then match it up with what can be tolerated in the plant design, and make a final decision.
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- 4. The estimation of possible future faulting rests on (a) the observation of faulting in this area in the past (and the assumption that what has happened in the recent past may happen again); and (b) the general knowledge and judgments of expert geologists based on their experience with faulting in general. ,
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- 5. It is obvious, of course, that 1906 type earthquakes will occ)ur again -
perhaps each 70-100 years, within the St. Andreas fault zone. What is r
the expectation of surface [ocation within the zone near Bodega, and what is the significance of this with respect to the proposed reactor site?
- 6. One of the clues to past earthquake faulting is found in the shaft fault in the excavation at the reactor site. To arrive at the to significance of this fault,/the possibility of future faulting, a number of facts, observations and questions are involved,
- a. What is relationship and relevance of the bedrock shaf t fault to other faults and the geologic regime of Bodega?
I
- b. What is the over-all significance of the sediment. shaft fault to the possibility of future f aulting and the magnitude of faulting in the plant foundations?
(1) Location and orientation of sediment fault (vis-a-vis St. Andreas).
(2) Geologic event that may have caused the sediment f ault.
l (3) The bedrock. fault is complex -- many branches, possibly caused by multiple movements (?); the sediment fault may have arisen during only one or few (?) events. What is relevance of this, and age of bedrock and sediment, to fault probability?
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(4) The age of the sediment fault may be (a) not less than a few centuries, e.g., 6 - 800 years.
From 6 or 800 years to 40,000 years i
From 40,000 years to 400,000 years.
What is evidence on and likelihood on each of these from color banding l
age of the deposits i I
" die-out" of the offset (upwards) j l
l the frequency of major faults on San Andress. I 1
(5) The magnitude of the sediment offset. Conclusion on over-all l I
significance of shaft fault to the likelihood and magnitude of l faulting within the next 100 years or so. In the context of all j l
the known facts, does the discovery of the shaft fault increase, decrease, or change in no substantial way the expected pattern of future faulting in the plant foundations.
l
- 7. Another clue to past earthquake faulting is the observation that faults outside the main San Andreas zone did occur in 1906 on Point Reyes at Inverness and Mt.
Wittenberg. What is the relevance of these events to future faulting in the l plant foundations at Bodega?
- a. Geologic similarity and geologic dissimilarity between Pt. Reyes and Bodega.
- b. What are facts and significance on the Pt. Rayes events being associated with established and previously active fault sage, scarfs?... Topolo ical 7 differences between Pt. Reyes and Bodega.
- c. Does the Pt. Reyes observations increase, decrease, or make no substantial change in the expected pattern of future faulting in the plant foundations?
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- 8. In view of the location and orientation of the plant site to the San Andreas fault line, the shaft fault and its significance, the events on Pt. Reyes and their significance, and other' aspects of .
this situation, what can be said about the future likelihood 'of faults in the plant foundations in relation to the magnitude of possible faults?
- 9. Hydrology also-is one of the subjects of relevance to the location and design of reactor facilities. Of particular interest are:
l
- l. a. The possibility of ocean flooding of the plant.
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- b. The normal level of the water table; the flow rate and eventual destruction of the vater table.
3
- c. The circulation, mixing and dispersion characteristics of the water on the ocean side where the cooling water effluent will b'e discharged. ,
- d. The location, dimensions, and run-off characteristics of any water sheds in the area which feed into reservoirs or serve as l
water sources for htsnan use.
l Relevant information on these phenomena would be helpful.
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pi$ \ EFORE THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 4
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' Irt the Matter of PACIFIC GAS
~
Docket No. 50-205 l AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Amendment No. 6
.)
Now comes PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (the .
Company) and amends its above-numbered application by submitting herewith Amendment No. 6. This amendment sets forth further {
l details with regard to the earthquake design criteria for Unit No. l'of the Company's Bodega Bay Atomic Park and supersedes Amendment No. 4 to the application and the material superseded in said amendment.
The Company has established earthquake. design criteria for the Unit based upon the recommendations of Dr. George W.
l Housner. In general, the usual methods of earthquake resistant design will be followed except that the lateral force factor which will be assumed as a basis for designing each critical structure, item of equipment or system will vary with the natural 3
period and damping characteristics of the particular structure, item of equipment, or system and its support.
The earthquake design criteria for all critical structures, equipment and systems are based on the maximum credible earthquake ground motion on the granite at Bodega Head.
The design of critical structures, equipment and systems will be- 1 based on the curves set forth in the attached design spectrum prepared by Dr. George W. Housner, dated September 6, 1963. -The ;
e g a n _ # M _-
Q w:7 #v' f-
i cuYves amplify the information given in Appendix V of the Pre-liminary Hazards Summary Report (PHSR) by expanding the low period range (below 0.3 seconds) and by depicting response for additional low values of critical damping. Stress levels to be used in design will conform, where applicable, to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, including applicable nuclear code cases, the ASA Code for Pressure Piping, and the Uniform Building Code of the International Conference of Build-ing Officials, 1961 Edition (except that the usual one-third allowable over-stress for structures during earthquakes will not
~.-- -
be applied).
The above design will be based on the following typical damping factors:
Structure, Equipment, System % of Critical Damping !
Steel frame structures 2.5 ,; . u ,ui A j Reinforced concrete frame structures 4.5 /
t Reinforced concrete reactor contain- 10 #*N Z (f 6 'd h ment structure Welded assemblies 1.0 Bolted assemblies 2.0 Vital piping systems 0.5 -v b ' ' "' '
In addition, the design of the Unit will be checked to assure that all critical structures, equipment and systems will be capable of withstanding earthquake ground motions cor-responding to spectrum displacement, velocity and accelerations two times as great as shown on the attached design spectrum with-out impairment of functions necessary for containment and safe plant shutdown.
2
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Critical structures (referred to as Class 1 Structures ;
in Appendix V to the PHSR) include the reactor containment structure, reactor refueling building, control building, and ventilation stack. Critical equipment and systems include the nuclear steam supply system inside containment, isolation valves, liquid poison system, emergency cooling systems, emergency electrical power system, and the necessary associated instruments-tion and controls.
All noncritical structures, equipment, and systems will be designed in accordance with applicable Company aseismic.
I design practices, j Subscribed in San Francisco, California, this 16th day of March, 1964 Respectfully submitted, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY S. L. SIBLEY By S. L. Sibley Vice President and General Manager RICHARD H. PETERSON l PHILIP A. CRANE, JR.
Attorneys for Pacific Gas and Electric Company 1
^* ^
By '
Subscribed and sworn to before me 1
this 16th day of March, 1964.
RITA J. GREEN l
(SEAL)
Rita J. Green, Notary Public in and for the City and County of San Francisco, State of California My Commission Expires' July 16, 1967 3
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