ML20213A880
| ML20213A880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/2020 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson Region 3 Branch 3 |
| To: | Sharp S Northern States Power Company, Minnesota |
| References | |
| IR 2020001, IR 2020002 | |
| Download: ML20213A880 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000282/2020002
Text
July 30, 2020
Mr. Scott Sharp
Site Vice President
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
1717 Wakonade Drive East
Welch, MN 55089-9642
SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT - INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; AND
07200010/2020001
Dear Mr. Sharp:
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. On July 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the
results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this
inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One NRC-identified Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in
this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section
2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is
documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this
inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector
at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.
S. Sharp 2
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Hironori Peterson, Chief
Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000282; 05000306; and
07200010
License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60; and
SNM-2506
Enclosure:
As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
SUNSI Review
Non-Sensitive Publicly Available
Sensitive Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RIII RIII
NAME NShah:bw via email HPeterson via email
DATE 7/30/2020 7/30/2020
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000282; 05000306; 07200010
License Numbers: DPR-42, DPR-60, SNM-2506
Report Numbers: 05000282/2020002; 05000306/2020002; 07200010/2020001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0041 and I-2020-001-0143
Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
Facility: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Location: Welch, Minnesota
Inspection Dates: April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Inspectors: J. Dalzell, Health Physicist
R. Edwards, Senior Health Physicist
N. Feliz-Adorno, Branch Chief
L. Haeg, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Pusateri, Resident Inspector
Approved By: Hironori Peterson, Chief
Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,
in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the
NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer
to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-
identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71152.
List of Findings and Violations
Cask Transport Vehicle Evaluation
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report
Aspect Section
Not Applicable NCV 05000282,05000306/2020002-01 Not Applicable 60855.1
Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.146,
Design Control for failing to adequately analyze, control deviations, and translate into
procedures the design for the interfacing surfaces of the tracked Cask Transport Vehicle
(CTV) which affected quality. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to
preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a
procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and
deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled to ensure the
minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
2
PLANT STATUS
Units 1 and 2 operated at or near full power for the entirety of the inspection period, with the
exception of brief power reductions to perform surveillance testing or flexible power operations.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President
of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident
inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using
available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits
each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515,
Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In
addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a
portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the
inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some
cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented
below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1) Unit 1 caustic addition system on 04/16/2020
(2) 12 diesel-driven cooling water pump on 05/4/2020
(3) 121 safeguards travelling screen on 05/20/2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the
following:
(1) Unit 1 control rod system on 06/19/2020
3
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1) Fire zone 18 relay and cable spreading room on 04/22/2020
(2) Fire zone 58 Unit 1 charging pumps 11, 12, and 13 on 04/22/2020
(3) Fire zone 75 plant screen house elevation 695' on 05/20/2020
(4) Fire zone 74 plant screen house elevation 670' on 06/15/2020
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
(1) 695' elevation turbine building on 04/28/2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)
(1) Control room observations during a spent fuel loading campaign on 05/26/2020
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator training in the simulator on
05/27/2020
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended
function:
(1) Component cooling water system on 04/27/2020
(2) AR 501000039958; PMT unsatisfactory due to leak on 4/23/2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the
following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and
appropriate work controls were addressed;
4
(1) AR 501000039494; 23 fan coil unit damper did not re-position on 04/09/2020
(2) AR 501000039466; 2A reheater drain level control failure on 04/10/2020
(3) AR 501000039723; CV-31941 had dual indication on the control board on 04/16/2020
(4) 22 diesel-driven cooling water jacket water hose leak availability determination on
05/12/2020
(5) Maintenance risk during 12 residual heat removal pump breaker replacement on
06/23/2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1) 23 containment fan coil unit damper past operability review on 05/04/2020
(2) 22 diesel driven cooling water jacket water hose leak past operability review on
05/06/2020
(3) 22 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump bearing temperature in the alert range on
04/21/2020
(4) 11 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump past operability review on 06/04/2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system
operability and functionality:
(1) AR 501000038420; 23 containment fan coil unit damper did not re-position on
04/09/2020
(2) Maintenance on 13 charging pump breaker following instantaneous trip test failure on
04/22/2020
(3) AR 501000039981; PMT planning issues on 2SM-5-4 on 04/23/2020
(4) D5 emergency diesel generator ventilation system testing following damper
maintenance on 06/10/2020
(5) 22 component cooling water heat exchanger temperature control valve failure on
06/02/2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1) SP 1856; Bus 26 undervoltage test on 4/28/20
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1) SP 1089A; RHR quarterly pump and valve test on 05/08/2020
5
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)
(1) Licensed operator re-qualification training with DEP Performance Indicator evaluation
on 06/19/2020
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
(1) MSPI high pressure injection 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/22/2020
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
(1) MSPI heat removal 2Q19 through 1Q20 on 04/23/2020
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program during the period of
January 1, 2020, through June 30, 2020, for potential adverse trends in maintenance
practices that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program
related to the following issues:
(1) RCE 501000036932; Breaker 26-16 undersized on 03/31/2020
OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants
Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants (1 Sample)
(1) Due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, the inspectors remotely evaluated the
licensees Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) cask loading through
use of the licensee's in-plant camera system on May 26 - May 29, 2020. To complete
this inspection, the inspectors intend to visit the Prairie Island ISFSI before the end of
2020 to evaluate the material and radiological conditions of the site. This site visit is
pending further reductions in risk associated with travel during the public health
emergency. During the remote portion of the inspection, the inspectors observed the
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following activities:
- Fuel selection and fuel loading for the third and final cask in the campaign,
cask number 47
- Heavy load movement of the cask out of the spent fuel pool to the cask
processing area, and movement of the cask in preparation for transport to the
- Drying and backfill evolutions
- Closure operations
- Cask transport evolutions
- Radiological field surveys
The inspectors evaluated the following change reviews:
- Selected corrective action program documents
- Selected 72.48 screenings and evaluations
INSPECTION RESULTS
Cask Transport Vehicle Evaluation
Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report
Aspect Section
Not Severity Level IV Not 60855.1
Applicable NCV 05000282,05000306/2020002-01 Applicable
Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 72.146,
Design Control for failing to adequately analyze, control deviations, and translate into
procedures the design for the interfacing surfaces of the tracked Cask Transport Vehicle
(CTV) which affected quality. Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to
preclude the new CTV from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using
a procedure that reflected the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and
deviations from the design and installed configuration were not controlled to ensure the
minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
Description:
A new CTV was procured by the licensee for transporting TN-40/40HT casks between the
Auxiliary Building and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad.
Calculation No. 2018-03457, "Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for
Loading Associated with New Cask Transport Vehicle," Revision 0, was a safety related
analysis that included an evaluation of the stability of spent fuel casks (empty and full) and
the CTV (loaded and unloaded). The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) ISFSI
was licensed by the NRC in Renewed License SNM-2506, License for Independent Spent
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, Amendment 10. License Condition 9,
Authorized Use, of SNM-2506, states, in part, that the basis for this license was submitted in
the Safety Analysis Report dated August 31, 1990 and as further supplemented and
amended in accordance with 10 CFR 72.70 and 10 CFR 72.48. Calculation No. 2018-03457
utilized the ISFSI design basis to establish the acceptance criteria for factors of safety against
sliding and tipping. Specifically, section 6.1 of Calculation No. 2018-03457 states the factors
of safety against sliding and overturning shall be 1.1 or greater per Ref[erence]s. 5a and 6a.
Reference 5a is Revision 18 of the PINGP ISFSI Safety Analysis Report which established
1.1 as the minimum factor of safety to sliding in section 4.2.1, Structures, for postulated
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earthquake loads. The TN-40/40HT cask is safety-related equipment and the Auxiliary
Building slab foundation is considered a safety-related structure.
In Calculation No. 2018-03457, a sliding analysis was performed to assess whether the CTV
will slide during a postulated design basis earthquake. The conclusion that the cask would
not slide was based on an assumed coefficient of friction of 0.5 between the Auxiliary Building
concrete slab and the CTV tracks. This coefficient of friction value was taken from
Calculation No. 8708-320, Spent Fuel Storage Cask Transporter for Xcel Energy Prairie
Island Nuclear Generating Plant," Revision 3. In Calculation No. 8708-320, the coefficient of
friction was specified as coefficient of friction to road; however, the interfacing surfaces for
this value are not described and the CTV travels over multiple surfaces on the haul path
towards the ISFSI, including concrete and gravel. Calculation No. 2018-03457 also permits
SS [stainless steel] deck plates or plywoods may be placed to protect concrete surfaces if
the contact areas between CTV treads and SS deck plates/plywoods are not greater than
8.0 ft2 with maximum thickness of 3/8 in[ch].
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Maintenance Procedure No. D95.10, "Tracked Cask
Transporter Vehicle Operations," Revision 0, provided the detailed instructions for the
inspection, startup, and operation of the tracked CTV. This procedure did not contain any
limitations or guidance regarding the material, size, or placement of the protective surfaces
between the Auxiliary Building slab and the tracked CTV. The actual configuration, as
remotely observed by the inspectors during ISFSI operations on May 28, 2020, consisted of
1/2-inch-thick high-density plastic sheets placed between the steel CTV treads and the
painted Auxiliary Building concrete slab. Since the design for protective surfaces was not
translated into a procedure, the installed protective surfaces were not as analyzed in
Calculation No. 2018-03457 and deviations to the design were not controlled. Specifically,
there were 3 examples where the interfacing surfaces relied upon to preclude the new CTV
from sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was inadequately analyzed, deviations were
not controlled, and the installation of these surfaces was not controlled by a procedure to
ensure the configuration matched the design:
- The chosen coefficient of friction value of 0.5 for the surface between the Auxiliary
Building floor and tracks of the CTV was taken from a haul path analysis where these
surfaces differed from the interfacing surfaces in the Auxiliary Building (the Auxiliary
Building had relatively smooth, painted, concrete floors).
- To protect the Auxiliary Building floor, Calculation No. 2018-03457 stated up to 8.0 ft2
of 3/8-inch-thick plywood or stainless-steel plates on the Auxiliary Building floor were
permissible, but no analysis was provided about how these multiple surfaces impact
sliding or tipping. That is, the analysis did not analyze the interfacing surfaces
between the floor and plywood/plate, and similarly did not consider the interfacing
surface between the plywood/plate and the tracks on the CTV.
- The 3/8-inch plywood or stainless-steel plates were not used. Instead, 1/2-inch-thick
high-density plastic sheets were used; however, the change in material and thickness
was not analyzed for how it might impact the sliding and tipping analysis.
Corrective Actions: The inspector identified this concern during the transfer of the last cask in
the loading campaign. Transfer of the loaded cask to the ISFSI was completed safely and
without incident. The concern was placed in the corrective action program, and while
corrective actions were still being developed at the conclusion of the inspection, preliminary
actions include revising Calculation No. 2018-03457.
8
Corrective Action References: AR 501000041132; New Cask Transporter Revise Evaluation;
May 29, 2020
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors concluded that measures were inadequate to
ensure that the design basis was correctly translated into Procedure No. D95.10, the design
calculation was accurate, and deviations to appropriate quality standards specified in design
Calculation No. 2018-03457 were controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to
sliding were met which resulted in a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance
using IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix E, "Example of Minor
Issues." Example 3.e was found to be similar in that the licensee failed to establish
measures to ensure that the procedures for setting up the CTV in the auxiliary building were
in accordance with the design which lead to reasonable doubt whether the seismic sliding
and tipping analysis requirements were met for a CTV loaded with spent fuel. In the 3.e
example, the design was correct; however, the installed configuration was not. In this case,
the design analysis had deficiencies as well as the procedure, which led to a conclusion that
the multiple deficiencies was an issue of more than minor concern.
Significance: In accordance with Section 2.2 of the Enforcement Policy, ISFSIs are not
subject to the SDP and traditional enforcement will be used for these facilities. Traditional
enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
Enforcement:
Severity: The inspectors determined that the violation could be evaluated, using Section
6.5.d.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, as a violation of very low safety significance (Severity
Level IV) because the licensee failed to meet a regulatory requirement that had a more than
minor safety significance.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 72.146, "Design Control," states, in part, that the licensee shall
establish measures to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis,
as specified in the license for those structures, systems, and components to which this
section applies, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and
instructions. These measures must include provisions to ensure that appropriate quality
standards are specified and included in design documents and that deviations from standards
are controlled.
Contrary to the above, on May 28, 2020, measures were inadequate to ensure the design
basis was correctly translated into Procedure No. D95.10, the design calculation was
accurate, and deviations to appropriate quality standards specified in design Calculation No.
2018-03457 were controlled to ensure the minimum factors of safety to sliding were met.
Specifically, the interfacing surfaces that were relied upon to preclude the new CTV from
sliding into a cask loaded with spent fuel was not installed using a procedure that reflected
the design, the design calculation contained inadequacies, and deviations from the design
and installed configuration were not controlled.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
9
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation: Safeguards Breaker Racking 71152
Procedure Inappropriate to the Circumstances
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been
entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited
violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and
Drawings," states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented
procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in
accordance with these procedures. Procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or
qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily
accomplished. Contrary to this requirement, on January 24, 2020, the licensee identified that
a 4.16kV safeguards breaker 26-16 (D6 emergency diesel generator supply to Bus 26) with
an incorrect amperage rating had been installed and in service within Bus 26 since
October 11, 2019, due, in part, to insufficient acceptance criteria within Operating Procedure
C20.5-1, "4.16kV Breaker Rack Out/Rack In," Revision 41.
Significance/Severity: Green. The finding was of very low safety significance because it was
a deficiency affecting the qualification of Bus 26 4.16kV safeguards breaker 26-16 (a
mitigating SSC), and the SSC maintained its operability.
Corrective Action References: AR 501000036932
Observation: D6 Emergency Diesel Generator Supply Breaker to Bus 26 71152
Undersized
The inspectors reviewed a past operability review and root cause evaluation following the
January 24, 2020, identification that Breaker 26-16 (D6 EDG Supply to Bus 26) was installed
with an incorrect, undersized amperage since October 11, 2019. This condition was
identified by the licensee during troubleshooting following load sequencer modifications for
which post maintenance testing was not successful. The breaker was promptly replaced with
a correctly-sized breaker prior to restoring operabilty of D6 and Bus 26. Based on the
inspector's review of the licensee's evaluation, the inspectors did not identify any past
operability or reportability concerns; however, a Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation of
Very Low Safety Significance (Green) was identified and is discussed in this report.
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152
Based on the spring of 2020 COVID-19 public health crisis, the inspectors performed a semi-
annual trend review of the licensee's corrective action program during the first and second
calendar quarters of 2020. The inspectors focused on whether any adverse trends existed
related to human performance, equipment performance, and programmatic effectiveness
during this timeframe and did not identify any concerns. For low-level trends that were
identified by the licensee, the inspectors did not identify any concerns with the trend inputs,
level of evaluation, and planned corrective actions.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
Mr. S. Sharp, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
10
- On June 12, 2020, the inspectors presented interim ISFSI cask loading inspection
results to Mr. S. Sharp, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
11
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
60855.1 ALARA Plans Radiation Protection Job Plan 2020 Dry Cask 45, 46, 47 Revision 0
Work
Radiation Work Permit 205000 Revision 0
Calculations 12911.54-SC-10 Design of Buried Electrical Ducts Subjected to Cask Revision 1
Transporter Loading
2018-03457 Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for Revision 0
Loading Associated with New Cask Transporter
Calc. No. 03457 Evaluation of Auxiliary Building Fuel Unloading Area for 12/16/2019
Loading Associated with New Cask Transporter
Corrective Action Selected Corrective Action Documents Created Since
Documents April 2018
Issue ID ISFSI Concrete Strength Greater than ISAR 02/14/2019
501000023147
Issue ID ISFSI Dose Calc Incorrect Berm Height 11/04/2019
501000034318
Corrective Action Issue ID ISFSI INS: Question 21 Response Time 05/28/2020
Documents 501000041017
Resulting from Issue ID Lesson Learned Observation of CASK 47 05/28/2020
Inspection 501000041018
Issue ID NRC ID's Steps Not Signed in PE 05/28/2020
501000041059
Issue ID NRC ID's Signoffs in PM Not Transferred 05/28/2020
501000041074
Issue ID New Cask Transporter Revise Evaluation 05/29/2020
501000041132
Miscellaneous 72.48 Evaluation PINGP ISFSI Expansion Calculation Methodology Revision 0
No. 1146 Departures
72.48 Evaluation PINGP ISFSI Expansion: AB-5 Procedure and Dose Scaling Revision 0
No. 1150 Approach Evaluation
72.48 Screening PINGP ISFSI Expansion Revision 0
No. 5565
72.48 Screening EC60100001234; PINGP ISFSI New CTV Revision 0
12
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
No. 5640
72.48 Screening EC 60100001234; PINGP ISFSI New CTV Revision 0
No. 5641
72.48 Screening EC601000002176; Sensitivity Analysis for Drop Eval of Revision 0
No. 5652 TN40HT
72.48 Screening EC 601000002232 - Revise Calculation TN40HT-0512 Revision 0
No. 5659
Cask No. 47 Cask Inventory Verification 05/26/2020
D95.1 Cask Inventory Verification 05/26/2020
D95.1 Appendix A Cask Loading Report 05/26/2020
FP-MA-COM-02 Supplemental Worker Oversight Plan 01/17/2020
OP-2014-002 Prairie Island Dry Fuel Storage Project Oversight Plan Revision 5
Sample ID: SFP Spent Fuel Pool Boric Acid 05/26/2020
0706 and 0715
NDE Reports BOP-PT-20-015 TN-40 Special Lift Fixture 04/23/2020
and BOP-MT-20-
2008
Procedures AB-5 Buried Cask Revision 3
D95.1 TN-40 Cask Loading Procedure Revision 32
D95.10 Tracked Cast Transporter Vehicle Operation Revision 0
D95.3 TN-40 Cask Removal and Storage Procedure Revision 39
SP 1075.HT TN-40HT Fuel Selection and Identification Revision 4
Radiation Survey PI-M- Cask 46 Transferred To ISFSI Pad #41 05/21/2020
Surveys 20200521-9
Self-Assessments 2019 Nuclear Oversight Prairie Island Nuclear Generating 10/01/2019
Plant Audit of Programs
Master Lessons Learned Cask 41-44 05/03/2018
600000598736 Snapshot 2020 NRC Inspection 02/28/2020
CR No. Fleet Cask Loading Challenge Board 04/09/2020
603000004605
QF0406 2020 ISFSI NRC Inspection Snapshot 02/28/2020
Work Orders WO 7000059192 SP1077 Special Lift Fixture TN-40 Cask 04/17/2020
WO 700056472 AUX Building Crane Mechanical/Electrical Inspection 02/25/2020
13
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
WO 700059191 SP 1057 TN-40 Fuel Selection & Identification 03/17/2020
WO 700061687 SP1076 ISFSI Qtr Sfty Status 03/16/2020
71111.04 Drawings NF-39252 Flow Diagram, Caustic Addition System, Units 1 and 2 Revision 83
Procedures C1.1.7-1 Unit 1 Reactor Control Checklist Revision 10
71111.05 Procedures C5-1 Rod Control System Checklist Revision 10
C6-1 System Prestart Checklist Rod Position Indication System Revision6
71111.06 Calculations ENG-ME-732 Determination of HELB/Flooding Interactions in the Turbine Revision 1
Building
ENG-ME-759 GOTHIC Internal Flooding Calculation for the Turbine Revision 1
Building
Procedures TP 1398 Internal Flooding Walkdown Revision 10
71111.12 Miscellaneous Prairie Island Maintenance Rule Basis Document 04/20/2020
Procedures FP-E-MR-03 Maintenance Rule Monitoring Revision 8
FP-E-MR-05 Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Revision 8
MSIP 5015 Swagelok Compression Tubing Fittings Revision 4
RPIP 3655 Sampling Unit 2 Pressurizer Revision 9
WO Replace Valve and Fittings as Needed Revision 0
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71111.15 Corrective Action AR 23 CFCU Damper Past Operability Review 05/04/2020
Documents 501000039494
AR 23 FCU Damper Did Not Reposition 04/08/2020
501000039494
AR PMT Planning Issues on 2SM-5-4 04/23/2020
501000039981
AR 22 DDCLP Jacket Water Hose Leak POR 05/06/2020
501000040177
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Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
AR Coolant Leak of 22 DDCLP Jacket Cooling 05/01/2020
501000040177
71111.19 Corrective Action AR PMT Planning Issues on 2SM-5-4 04/23/2020
Documents 501000039981
71111.22 Procedures SP 1089A RHR Quarterly Pump and Valve Test 05/08/2020
SP 1089A Train A RHR Pump and Suction Valve From RWST Quarterly Revision 32
Test
SP 1856 Bus 26 Undervoltage Test 04/28/2020
SP 1856 Monthly 4kV Bus 16 Undervoltage Relay Test (OMICRON) Revision 9
71151 Procedures MSPI High Pressure Injection Data 2Q19 through 1Q20 04/22/2020
FP-E-MSPI-01 Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) Revision 10
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