ML20203J109
| ML20203J109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1986 |
| From: | Bielawski A COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO., ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE |
| To: | Stello V, Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608050182 | |
| Download: ML20203J109 (27) | |
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ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE COUNSELORS AT LAW THREE FIRST NATIONAL PLAZA CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 60602 YELEPHONE312 558-7500 19 S, LASALLE STREET ROBE T LIN 7 9 TELEX 2-5288 CHICAGO. ILL iS 60603 WILLIAM G BEALE. 188 %1923 edCLUDING REUBEN & PROCTOR B W ERGER 11SO CONNECTICUT AVE NUE. N W August 1, 1986 ,,,,,,S,U7N. D T 20036 202 833-9730 TO CALL WRITER DIRECT VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS Mr. James L. Taylor Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Victor Stello Executive Director for Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Sirs:
On July 25, 1986, the Village of Seneca (" Seneca")
petitioned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC or
" Commission") pursuant to 10 CFR S2.206, to institute proceedings under 10 CFR S2.202 to revoke Commonwealth Edison Company's (" Edison" or the " Company") license to operate its LaSalle Station and to direct Edison not to resume operation of LaSalle until alleged deficiencies are corrected in the LaSalle emergency plan. Seneca's petition requested that the NRC issue an order prohibiting resumption of operations no later than August 1, 1986, on which date Seneca then understood that LaSalle Unit 2 was scheduled to resume operations. (LaSalle Unit 1 is presently shut down for refueling and is not scheduled to restart until approximately 30 days after the start of Unit 2.) On Wednesday, July 30, 1986, Edison informed the NRC that it would not be in a position to restart Unit 2 until the August 5 - August 7 time frame, and yesterday Edison informed the NRC that the earliest startup date would be August 7.
In an effort to attempt to respond to Seneca's immediate concerns regarding restart of Unit 2 in light of the alleged deficiencies in the emergency plan, the NRC has requested that Edison respond to Seneca's petition. This letter is in response to that request.
F608050182 860801 3 DR ADOCK 0500 BACKGROUND The LaSalle plant has been operating since 1982.
Prior to commencing operations the State of Illinois, in it Seek 4g05 /dd: J.TMler <
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Mr. James L. Taylor Mr. Victor Stello August 1, 1986 Page Two conjunction with local units of government and other entities, developed a comprehensive emergency preparedness plan which could be implemented to protect the public in the vicinity
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of the plant in the event of an emergency. The plan has
, been tested on five separate occasions to assure its work-l ability. In addition, the plan and emergency exercises have
, been subject to intensive reviews by the various federal, j state and local agencies (including the NRC and the Federal l Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA")) with responsibility for assuring that the plan complies with applicable legal requirements and can be implemented effectively. The '
agencies have made the findings required by law that the ;
plan is adequate to protect the public health and safety.
j Seneca was one of the numerous entities that had i agreed to participate in the emergency planning effort and be responsible for implementing certain of the plan's
- provisions. Other than the usual services normally provided by a municipality to its citizenry, such as police assistance and fire protection, Seneca was principally responsible
! under the plan for receiving various communications and
- providing notifications to other participants, providing
- policemen at traffic and access control points, and other relatively minor activities. (See Attachment A to Seneca's j petition.) ,
! On June 17, 1986, Seneca expressed its concern :
l with the adequacy of the LaSalle emergency plan and withdrew l from participation in that plan, pursuant to a letter from l Mayor Anderson to the NRC. The NRC referred this letter to FEMA for review. On July 21, 1986 FEMA Region V sent a memorandum to the FEMA Headquarters expressing the Region's
! conclusion that the LaSalle emergency plan, which had pre-i viously been approved by both the NRC and FEMA, would
! continue to provide adequate protection despite seneca's a withdrawal. FEMA Region V concluded that: (1) cne plan I could be effectuated without Seneca's participation, and
! (2) Edison and local officials had expressed a commitment to ensure that activities previously performed by Seneca would
. be assumed by other entities. On July 29, 1986, FEMA 1 Headquarters sent a memorandum to the NRC adopting FEMA l Region V's conclusions regarding the effect of Seneca's
{ withdrawal and stating that "LaSalle County and the State of
! Illinois are prepared to adequately compensate for the l
- absence of Seneca's support for the IPRA." On July 31, 1986, FEMA formally requested that the State of Illinois i
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Mr. James L. Taylor
. Mr. Victor Stello August 1, 1986 Page Three identify the specific measures which would be taken to compensate for Seneca's withdrawal. We are informed that the State of Illinois and LaSalle County will be providing written responses to FEMA in the very near future.
SENECA'S PETITION Seneca is requesting that the NRC institute license revocation proceedings and direct Edison not to resume operations because it asserts the LaSalle emergency plan is deficient. Seneca bases its request on its own withdrawal from the plan and on a number of additional reasons which are independent of its withdrawal.
Clearly, Seneca's withdrawal presents new facts which are relevant to the effectiveness of the emergency plan. FEMA has reviewed these new facts, reviewed the plan, and conferred with the State and local officials who will carry out the functions previously assigned to Seneca.
After conducting this investigation, FEMA concluded that the plan can be effectively implemented despite Seneca's with-drawal. At this point, Seneca's withdrawal necessitates only that the plan be revised to formally accomplish the assumption of Seneca's responsibilities by other parties.
That process is ongoing and Edison anticipates that it will be completed shortly. Seneca presents no reasons why the State and County cannot or will not be able to carry out Seneca's former functions under the plan, nor could it realistically do so. And, as is discussed in the next section of this letter, the NRC's regulations clearly permit a nuclear plant to operate pending revisions to an emergency plan such as those which will be made to the LaSalle plan.
Seneca's remaining reasons for instituting revoca-tion proceedings or ordering that LaSalle remain shut down raise nothing new regarding the emergency plan. Indeed, many of the " issues" raised by Seneca, in particular those included in Exhibit C to its petition, have no bearing whatsoever on the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
Insofar as the " issues" pertain to emergency planning,
- nothing has changed since FEMA and the NRC approved the 4
LaSalle plan to give any credence to the claim that these
" issues" create deficiencies which necessitate that LaSalle remain shut down.
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Mr. James L. Taylor
. Iir. Victor Stello August 1, 1986 Page Four As described in the attachment to this letter, many of these " issues" are simply irrelevant to the issue in this petition -- Seneca's expression of concern regarding the effective operation of the emergency plan. Furthermore, many of the " issues" raised by Seneca question provisions of the NRC's rules or the Atomic Energy Act rather than the LaSalle emergency plan. Since Seneca can petition the Commission under 10 CFR S2.802 (a) to amend the regulations '
to which it objects, a proceeding under 10 CFR S2.206 "is not a proper mechanism for attacking regulations on sub-stantive grounds." Seacoast Anti-Pollution League of New Hampshire v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1982). Similarly, it is simply not appropriate to ask the NRC to rewrite the statutes under which it operates. See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
NRC'S REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Under a December 7, 1979 Presidential directive, FEMA assumed lead responsibility for off-site emergency preparedness for nuclear generating stations. NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, 45 Fed. Reg. 5847, 5848 (1980).
Once FEMA finds, as it has here, that state and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of implementation, the NRC reviews these findings and makes a final deter-mination whether emergency preparedness is adequate.
Id.;
see also County of Rockland v. NRC, 709 F.2d 766 (2d CIr.
1983).
As the Commission has noted, the regulatory structure established by its emergency planning rules is intended to be flexible, in recognition of the fact that
" emergency planning is a fluid process, requiring regular updating, testing, and adjustment." Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York State (Indian Point Unit Nos. 2& 3), CLI-83-16, I7 NRC 1006, 1011 (1983). These regulations provide that generally, when the Commission finds an emergency plan does i
not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radio-logical emergency, the utility affected receives a few months " grace period" in which to correct any plan deficiencies.
10 CFR 550.54 (s) (2) (ii) . This regulatory approach recognizes that it is reasonable to allow existing plants adequate time l
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Mr. James L. Taylor Mr. Victor Stello August 1, 1986 Page Five to achieve emergency preparedness before being subjected to enforcement action, and that public health and safety will be reasonably assured in the interim by continued licensee compliance with Commission regulations aimed at keeping the probability of serious accidents extremely low. Consolidated Edison, 17 NRC at 1008; Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), DD-84-5, 19 N.R.C. 542 (1984); Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station) , DD 15, 18 N.R.C.~738 (1983).
Edison believes that Seneca has not demonstrated any deficiency in the LaSalle plan. Even if the plan is in some way deficient, such a deficiency is not so grave or persistent, and interim compensatory measures are not so inadequate, as to counsel the drastic remedies sought by Seneca. Consolidated Edison at 1011. The immediate concern caused by Seneca's request has been addressed. All that remains is the formal process of revising the plan so that it reflects the new responsibilities which State and local officials have agreed to assume. And as discussed in the attachment to this letter, Seneca's remaining concerns are either not valid, or simply not relevant to the effective-ness of the emergency plan.*/
Seneca's request that the Commission issue a show cause order instituting license revocation proceedings is also unwarranted. The Commission need not enter a show cause order under 10 CFR S2.206 in the absence of a "sub-stantial health and safety issue." Lorion v. NRC, 785 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Because the record indicates that the LaSalle plan is not deficient, Seneca has not properly raised an issue of any kind which would require the Commission 4 to undertake revocation or other proceedings.
- / In reviewing Seneca's request for emergency relief, the NRC should also consider the fact that granting such a request would clearly harm Edison, its ratepayers and the public interest. If Edison is not permitted to resume operation at LaSalle, the Company will lose approximately $500,000 for every day operation is prohibited. Edison's ratepayers will lose the benefit of low-cost electric generation provided by LaSalle,
- and will instead be required to pay for electricity generated by higher cost sources.
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Mr. James L.. Taylor
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Mr. Victor Stello August 1, 1986 Page Six In conclusion, Seneca's petition does not present any supportable basis for granting the relief requested. We would therefore urge that the petition be denied in its entirety. ;
Sincerely,
- s Alan P lelaws 1 APB/gi Attachment cc: BPI Bridget Arimond, Esq.
James Keppler Charles Jones i
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ATTACHMENT
- 1. An open policy by the Utility and NRC on all information and data requested by local govern-ments and public affected by the location of the Utility. Absolutely nothing should be held back-or secretive. The plant was constructed in our midst and affects our lives and property. Included in this should be all pertinent data and information as it regards the leak rate. Likewise, all data, including perhaps, independent inspection of the soundness of the containment structure.
ANSWER: All design, testing and operational information provided to the NRC in the course of licensing and operation of the is available to the public in the public document rooms for LaSalle Station.
This information includes reports on leak rate tests.
In any event, the concerns raised in this item are not pertinent to the question of whether the LaSalle emergency plan will operate effectively to protect the public health and safety.
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- 2. The NRC should have representatives at the plant 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> out of every week, rather than just 5 days a week on the " day shift".
ANSUER: The scope of the NRC's inspection program is solely within the NRC's authority to determine.
Moreover, there has been no showing that the NRC's current inspection program creates a deficiency in the emergency plan. Indeed, no such showing could be made because the NRC's inspection program is i not part of the emergency plan for LaSalle.
Accordingly, this issue cannot affect the adequacy of that emergency plan.
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- 3. A code of ethics for the NRC, ESDA, and FEMA.
A. Members of these agencies should not be hired from a Utility, and likewise barred from leaving the agency and becoming employed, on the board, or holding stock in a Utility.
Basically, members of these agencies should be wholly loyal to the people they are hired to represent. Certainly, they should not be placed in a position where their loyalties became questionable, or for that matter, fall prey to special interests. Presently, it appears as these agencies " sleep in the same bed" as the Utility.
ANSWER: Congress and the Illinois legislature have enacted laws concerning governmental ethics which presumably address the concerns raised in this item. In any case, a code of ethics for state and federal employees is completely unrelated to the adequacy of an emergency plan. Accordingly, the absence of the suggested limits on employment cannot be considered a deficiency in the emergency plan.
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- 4. Radiation monitors should be strategically placed within each community located within the potentially affected radius of the plant. These monitors should be paid for by the Utility and checked by independents who would also be compensated by the Utility, but through the affected Villages.
ANSWER: There are two independent radiation monitoring systems already in place around LaSalle County Station (LSCS). The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) has sixteen radiation monitors around LSCS, each situated about two miles from the station. These IDNS radiation monitors are directly linked to the IDNS Command Center in Springfield. Additionally, IDNS has a highly-sophisticated radiation monitoring system onsite at LSCS which continuously monitors the radioactive effluents being released up the LSCS stack. This system is also linked to the IDNS Command Center.
CECO also has a number of thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and air samplers located around LSCS including some in Seneca. These radiation monitoring devices are managed by an independent radiological laboratory, Teledyne Isotopes Midwest Laboratory. Radiological analyses based on monitor results are submitted to the NRC in the LSCS Annual Operating Report. This program is audited by the NRC over the course of the year.
This report is available to the general public in the NRC Public Document Room for LSCS. CECO is willing to provide copies of this report to interested local officials and make its environ-mental specialists available to discuss the report.
This radiation monitoring program has been reviewed by the NRC and found to be adequate. There has been no showing that additional monitors are necessary to the adequacy of the emergency plan.
Accordingly, the lack of additional monitors is not a deficiency in that plan.
- 5. In the event of an " alert," or in some cases an
" unusual incident," direct notification should be made to the affected Villages and Townships.
Allow the local governments to determine what action, if any, should be taken. There is absolutely no reason why valuable time should be lost by the Utility determining if, and when, they would like to make notice. Furthermore, so much time is wasted in the Utility notifying the State, the State in turn " mulling-over" the data, and notifying the county level. Again, the county level " mulls-over" and then makes contact with local officials.
Give us immediate notification and allow us to make the decision!
ANSWER: The process by which local officials are notified of an " alert" or " unusual incident" is specified by the emergency plan developed by the State.
That process of notification is designed to ensure that emergency response efforts are coordinated to the maximum extent possible. Currently, the State believes that immediate notification of local officials by CECO would be inconsistent with effective emergency response. However, CECO is committed to work with the State to modify communi-cations procedures such that local communities are provided with timely notification and updates.
In any event, there is no basis for finding the emergency plan deficient because local officials are not directly notified by the Utility but rather by the State and county agencies which have overall responsibility for responding to an emergency.
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- 6. In addition to the sirens, additional notification systems should be implemented in the Villages and Townships, if possible. For example, cable override systems for communities on cable.
It is our opinion that the sirens could possibly lend some assistance, however, sirens have a tendency of creating more confusion and causing chaos than not. Too many times, the sirens only lead people to stand around and ask the question "what's going on, is it the real thing or what should I do"?
ANSWER: The approach used in IPRA - LaSalle to get emergency information to the general public around LSCS in the event of an accident consists of several components.
First, a combination of fixed sirens and mobile alerting routes is used to get the public's attention and to alert them that an event is occurring of which they should be aware. There are 39 mechanical sirens deployed to cover the entire 0 to 6 mile area of the LSCS EPZ and the municipalities of Grand Ridge, Seneca, Kinsman, Vernona, Marseilles and Ransom. The remaining areas of the LSCS EPZ are covered by 20 mobile alert and notification routes which involve State and county law enforce-ment vehicles traversing pre-designated areas / routes using their sirens and public address systems.
Every home and business in the EPZ has been provided with a public information booklet (PIB) which has been carefully written to inform the reader what to do in the event the sirens sound. The basic message contained in the LSCS Emergency Information Booklets is that if one hears a siren sounding continuously for three minutes or more (and it is not the first Tuesday of the month at 10:00 AM),
the individual should turn the radio on to the local station designated by the State and counties as an Emergency Broadcasting System (EBS) station.
The State and counties have established protocols with these EBS stations to provide emergency information to the stations in a timely manner for immediate rebroadcast to the public. This emergency h information will inform the public as to what protective measures should be taken. Pre-scripted emergency messages covering different scenarios are contained in the 3-SOP-8 of IPRA - LaSalle.
. . . . For those areas in the LSCS EPZ not covered by sirens but by mobile alerting routes, the IPRA -
LaSalle provides that the law enforcement personnel implementing the mobile alerting procedure will use their public address systems to inform the public to tune to the local EBS station.
The LaSalle notification systems have been reviewed and approved by FEMA and the NRC, and have proven to be effective when used by other communities in actual emergencies. Therefore, additional measures, such as cable override systems would be unnecessar-4 ily redundant.
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- 7. We are extremely lacking in education of depart-ment heads, emergency personnel and the total community.
A. There should be a fully illustrated presenta-tion on the " worst possible scenario" for heads of local governments and their depart-ment heads. This presentation should start with what would be the occurrence at the Utility, how it would escape the containment, and the distance and speed the contamination would travel. Furthermore, it should explain what, if anything, one would see or feel.
Likewise, it should carry all the way through to the after effects of the contamination and how it would affect people and property.
ANSWER: Commonwealth Edison Company has long recognized the above-mentioned concerns of local government and, as part of the off-site emergency training program has communicated, in conjunction with State officials, information regarding accident i
scenarios, how they develop and methods for effectively reponding to such emergencies. In addition, the Company is in the process of developing a video tape presentation on emergency response.
This presentation will include a demonstration of the initiation of an incident at a nuclear station with the subsequent notification and activation of i
emergency response organizations.
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7B. Educate business and industry from their plants and businesses, and how the people should from L, that point, fall into the full' scale evacuation.
w ANSWER: This training and information is already available and has,been provided to interested businesses and industries by the State of Illinois and LaSalle County.
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7C. Investigate the possibility of locating fully trained, full time nuclear emergency people within communities. These people could coordinate and control the evacuation. Likewise, in the absence of volunteer's showing-up, these people should man the evacuation.
ANSWER: This item, in effect, alleges that the plan is deficient because of its reliance on volunteers.
The subject is addressed below in the response to item 7F. The item ignores the fact that individuals who participate in implementing the emergency plan, whether volunteers or not, are trained and fully capable of carrying out their responsibilities, h
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7D. A full scale education of the community on the potential of a disaster should be taken by the Utility and the government agencies. Presently, the Utility has been somewhat successful in the past in getting the community to " buy" its ideology on the fact that nothing would or could happen.
This truly impedes local government and emergency people to take seriously any evacuation. On the one hand the Utility and the agencies are asking the community to accept the plan and likewise the burden of making the plan effectual, however, their ideology works against successful implementa-tion of same.
ANSWER: Although studies have demonstrated that accidents are highly unlikely, Edison has not stated that an emergency involving LaSalle could or would not happen. Indeed, as part of its emergency planning effort, Edison distributes annually its emergency information boo'r.let to the public in the vicinity of the plant which details the precautions members of the public should take to prepare for an emergency and the measures to be taken in the event of an emergency.
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7E. ESDA and the NRC should take a long, hard look at the geography of the area. I would call attention to Seneca's single route through the community, which includes the business district, and that all arterial streets empty onto this single two-lane route. Furthermore, a mobile home park and other rural subdivisions to the south of Seneca would also use this single route going north by north-east to Yorkville. Add to this, the fact that in certain times of the year, Woodsmoke Ranch which is located approximately one to one and one-half miles north of Seneca, could have as many as 6,000 campers over a weekend. These people would also be evacuated onto this single two-lane roadway northbound. There is no possible way such an evacuation could be effective. In addition, there is no direct access to Route #80.
ANSWER: There are at least three routes that can be used to exit Seneca itself. These are: ILL 170 North to U.S. 6 East or the Seneca Blacktop North; ILL 170 South to DuPont Road East or River Road West;
, and Old Stage Road East. Residents of the mobile l home park and subdivisions south of Seneca can use all of the routes noted above to exit the area.
The campers at the Woodsmoke Ranch have two routes by which they can exit the area. These routes are: LaSalle County Road E 28th North to County Highway 4 and County Road E 28th South to U.S. 6.
Neither of these routes require use of the single two-lane roadway through Seneca.
The adequacy of the road network to handle an evacuation was fully considered by FEMA and re-viewed by the NRC in connection with the 44 CFR S350 approval process in 1982. Neither the road networks nor the population densities have changed substantially since that time.
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7F. Manpower and equipment is a grave question. Most
.of the communities involved operate their emergency services by volunteers. Who is to guarantee that the volunteers will show up. Likewise, most of these volunteers have full time jobs outside the community. How can an evacuation work, especially one of this size, absent the necessary manpower and equipment. It should also be pointed out that the Villages are highly dependent on their fire districts for the majority of the manpower and equipment. However, these fire districts are also responsible for the rural areas, which include townships bordering their perimeters. Therefore, in the rural areas, it will be necessary for emergency personnel to go almost " door to door."
This will slow down the evacuation plan almost to a crawl."
ANSWER: Over the years, volunteers have proven effective in responding to all kinds of emergencies. This was testified to by Illinois emergency planning officials who in the Byron proceeding described their extensive experience with using volunteers in emergencies and the training given to emergency workers. Subsequently, the NRC Licensing Board for the Byron licensing proceeding concluded that in the event of an emergency, volunteers can be counted upon to perform their duties, whether the emergency is radiological in nature or not. There is simply no reason to doubt that these conclusions are less valid with regard to the LaSalle plan than the Byron plan.
To the extent the LaSalle emergency plan is being challenged because Seneca volunteers may not participate in its implementation, the challenge is without merit. As previously mentioned, the State and County will undertake the responsibilities previously assigned to Seneca. Thus, the plan will not depend upon volunteers from the Village.
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- 8. More money for the ESDA department. Presently, monies for ESDA in LaSalle County have been allocated at approximately 25 cents per person within the corporate limits. Therefore, citing Seneca as an example, we receive approximately
$600.00 per year. Of this $480.00 of this goes to the ESDA Coordinator, which leaves very little left for equipment, training and participation in the Utility expenses of the ESDA office and dispatch. Therefore, we are digging into the general fund for additional expenses.
Add to that the fact that the ESDA Coordinator is also, in essence, coordinating evacuation from the rural areas through Seneca. We are not receiving money for rural involvement.
In addition, ESDA monies are used to cover re-quired drills. In these cases, the local govern-ment is asked to pay all costs and expenses re-lated to the drill, then place a claim for reimburse-ment. This is certainly not equitable for the community as we do not have the funds to become a
" loan organization." Likewise, very often all of the expenses incurred are not reimbursed.3 We were told by Illinois ESDA, that in the case of a disaster, local officials would remain at the EOC throughout the duration of the disaster. This included remaining in the EOC, with windows and doors taped by masking tape, until orderly return of the population could be made. This is ridiculous!
It's unbelievable to assume that anybody is going to remain in the EOC. Furthermore, there are no provisions such as stores of food, bedding and etc. in the EOC. Who would pay for such stores?
We do not feel it would be the taxpayers duty to come up with the additional monies to provide all of the inadequacies for this program. The Utility was placed here through a PR blitz by the Utility.
Therefore, responsibility of seeing to these items should be up to the Utility. It would seem ludi-crous to ask the taxpayers to carry this burden.
To do so, would be analogous to be blindfolded and tied to the post, and then asked to supply the bullets for your own firing squad.
ANSWER: Ceco has been involved in numerous discussions and meetings with municipal, township, county and state governmental officials on the subject of
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4 reimbursement for IPRA-related activities. IDNS has recognized its authority to reimburse volunteers and CECO is actively working to assure that volunteers supporting IPRA will be reimbursed and that the timing of reimbursement will not impose a financial burden upon local governments.
CECO has been informed by Illinois ESDA that it does not require that local EOCs continue to be manned after an evacuation of the local area has.
been completed nor has IESDA ever required this.
Additionally, IPRA does not require stockpiling of survival supplies in EOCs.
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- 9. There seems to be a conflict between ESDA and the NRC on the radiation contamination area. ESDA has j planned for a 10 mile area, and NRC representatives had stated a 50 mile area should be considered in light of Chernobyl. Should this be the case, should the plan be amended to remove the current-sites of approximately 25 miles, to a 50 mile site.
ANSWER: There is no conflict between ESDA and the NRC on the emergency planning areas nor has the Chernobyl incident led to any modifications to existing federal regulations. Current federal regulations on emergency planning for nuclear power facilities (10 CFR 50 Appendix E, NUREG-0654) call for emergency planning zones of 10 miles for the plume exposure pathway and 50 miles for the ingestion pathway.
The State of Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) Volume III - LaSalle is based upon the 10 mile and 50 mile EPZ concept.
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- 10. The nuclear industry should not have " limited ,
liability". They should be held 100% liable for l their actions to effect first rate construction of l plants, impeccable management and community concern.
ANSWER: Congress is responsible for making the public policy judgments regarding liability for nuclear power plant accidents. This item appears to challenge the Congressional practices underlying the Price Anderson provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and otherwise raises purely financial concerns which have no bearing upon the effectiveness of the emergency plan. CECO is willing to discuss these matters with local officials, and, has done so several times recently with officials from the LSCS area, including Seneca officials.
Additionally, at one of these recent meetings CECO arranged to have a representative of American Nuclear Insurers present to answer questions.
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munities, has some agency been created whose re-sponsibility would be coordinating effects on the population? It is important that such an agency be created as individual agencies such as the EPA and the NRC and continue to talk in allowable levels that affect their individual requirements.
i It appears that we do not communicate these allowable levels to one another. Therefore it appears such an agency is needed.
ANSWER: The need for inter-agency coordination matters involving ordinary exposures to radiation is not an issue which affects the adequacy of the emergency plan. Moreover, the IPRA provides for inter-agency coordination on radiation exposures arising from an accident. Thus, the absence of an agency to coordinate radiation exposure matters does not i constitute a deficiency in the emergency plan.
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- 12. In any evacuation, serious or a " fluke", will nuclear insurers' or the Utility pay for all food, 1
motel expenses, automobile expense, loss of wages, business down-time, liability claims by or against individuals or local governments and other unusual or incidental expenses? Immediately, if so, provide this in writing in contract form.
ANSWER: The LaSalle plant is covered by the same type of insurance policies which satisfied claims brought
- as a result of the Three Mile Island incident.
Many of the claims were for losses similar to those identified as concerns in this item. Again, Commonwealth Edison would be happy to share information regarding these matters with local officials and in fact has done so several times recently with officials from the LSCS area, including Seneca officials.
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- 13. Will the Utility, NRC, ESDA, FEMA, and Nuclear Insurer's of America agree to a public forum?
ANSWER: CECO has met and will continue to meet with interested local officials. There is nothing about the nature or frequency of such meetings that affects the adequacy of the emergency plan for LaSalle.
Thus, these meetings are not relevant to whether there are deficiencies in that plan.
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- 14. It should be pointed out that the residents in the Villages and townships in the affected area had a comfortable and secure, and safe, way of life for many generations. Now, due to the location of the Utility in our midst, we are asked to change our life considerably, as well as subject ourselves and families to an extreme risk. Gone is the time that we could return to our homes from a day's work to the safety and security of our home. We are now asked to live under the threat of having to immediately evacuate at any given minute of a day. The evacuation is given, should we receive adequate warning, have adequate notification, adequate manpower and equipment to evacuate.
Thus, should any of these things fail we fall victim to a disaster created in the interest of someone else's profit motive. This risk, in the interest of another's profit, seems extremely selfish and certainly un-neighborly. There must be other alternatives to this risk.
ANSWER: This item fails to recognize that all sources of electrical generation present some degree of risk and that the risks posed by nuclear power are no greater than those associated with these other sources. The emergency plans developed by the State of Illinois and approved by the federal government constitute recognition of the risk presented by nuclear power. Although the extensive review and licensing process used by the NRC renders that risk low, so low that no plant is licensed to operate until the NRC has determined that such operation poses no undue risk to public health and safety, the emergency plan provides additional protection to the public in the unlikely event of an accident. But the fact that prudent planning for dealing with the risks of nuclear power includes an emergency plan does not render that plan inadequate or deficient. Thus, the fact that an emergency plan is required does not constitute a cognizable reason for not operating a nuclear power plant.