ML20198A333

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Advises of Planned Insp Effort for Next Six Months at Point Beach Npp.Info Provided to Minimize Resource Impact on Staff & Allow for Scheduling Conflicts & Personnel Availability to Be Resolved in Advance of Insp.Plant Issue Listing Encl
ML20198A333
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/02/1998
From: Burgess B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Reddemann M
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 9812160230
Download: ML20198A333 (52)


Text

December 2, 1998 Mr. M. Reddemann Site Vice President Point Beach Nuclear Plant 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT:

MID-YEAR INSPECTION RESOURCE PLANNING MEETING - POINT BEACH

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On November 4,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting (IRPM).

The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region til to adjust inspection schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in April 1999.

Enclosure 1 to this letter advises you of our planned inspection effort for the next 6 months at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

This attached information is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

Enclosure 2 contains a historicallisting of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during the IRPM. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Wisconsin Electric Power Company.

1 We wiliinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please i contact me at (630) 829-9629.

Sincerely,

/s/ B. L. Burgess l Bruce L. Burgess, Chief l Reactor Projects Branch 7 Docket No.: 50-266;50-301 License No.: DRP-24; DRP-27

Enclosures:

1. Inspection Plan ,
2. Plant Issues Matrix l See Attached Distribution DOCUMENT NAME: G:\POIN\lNSPPLN7. pol l To receive a copy of this document. Indicate in the box "C* = Copy without attachinent/ enclosure "E* = Copy with attachment / enclosure j

! "N' = No copy i OFFICE Rlll fA[/ L , C Rllh 3[' C- l NAME Kun}Msk1Ico Bfr/e'ss DATE 12/ }/98' 12/4/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 9812160230 981202 PDR ADOCK 05000266 G PDR L

Mr. M. Reddemann Site Vice President Point Beach Nuclear Plant 6610 Nuclear Road Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT:

MID-YEAR INSPECTION RESOURCE PLANNING MEETING - POINT BEACH

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On November 4,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting (IRPM).

The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region ill to adjust inspection schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in April 1999. to this letter advises you of our planned inspection effort for the next 6 months at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

This attached information is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is ,

provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident l inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.  ! contains a historicallisting of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during the IRPM. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Wisconsin Electric Power Company.

We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at (630) 829 9629.

Sincerely, Bruce L. Burgess, Chief l Reactor Projects Branch 7 Docket No.: 50-266; 50-301 License No.: DRP-24; DRP-27

Enclosures:

1. Inspection Plan
2. Plant Issues Matrix See Attached Distribution DOCUMENT NAME: G:\POIN\lNSPPLN7. pol To receive a copy of this document. indicate In the box *C* = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E' = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N* = No copy OFFICE Rlli C Rlll NAME Kunowski:co MAk Burgess DATE 11/)V/98 11/ /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

.- - - . - . . - _ - . ~_ .. -- .-

M. Reddemann cc w/encis: . R. Grigg, President and Chief Operating Officer, WEPCO M. Sellman, Chief Nuclear Officer

- R. Mende, Plant Manager

'J. O'Neill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge '

K. Duveneck, Town Chairman Town of Two Creeks B. Burks, P.E., Director Bureau of Field Operations J. Mettner, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission S. Jenkins, Electric Division Wisconsin Public Service Commission State Liaison Officer Distribution:

CAC (E-Mail)

RPC (E-Mail)

Project Mgr., NRR w/encls J. Caldwell, Rlli w/encis C. Pederson, Rlli w/encls -1 B. Clayton, Rlli w/encls i SRI Point Bea'ch w/encls l DRP w/encls TSS w/encls

(

1 DRS (2) w/encls f RlliPRR effels phi PUBLIC IE- 1 w/encls l Docket Fildw encls l GREENS' ,

IEO (E-Mail)  !

DOCDESK (E-Mail)

~

160020

l 1

I l

l

, POINT BEACH INSPECTION PLAN l DECEMBER 1998 THROUGH APRIL 1999 NUMBER OF TYPE OF 1 NRC INSPECTION /

INSPECTIONI TITLE / PROGRAM INSPECTORSI PLANNED DATES ACTIVITY-ACTIVITY AREA INDIVIDUALS COMMENTS IP62706 Maintenance Rule 1 December 8 - 10, Regional Followup 1998 Initiative

  • 1 IP83729 Radiation Protection 1 January 4 - 8,1999 Regional Outage Activities initiative" IP81700 Security 1 January 11 - 15,1999 Core IP84750 Chemistry / 1 February 15 - 19, Core Radiation Monitors 1999 IP37550 E&TS, Effectiveness 6-8 February 22 - Core IP40500 of Licensee Controls March 12, and IP37001 in identifying, 1999 Regional Resolving and Initiative
  • Preventing Problems, and 50.59 IP82701 EP Program 1 March 8 - 12,1999 Core IP84750 Radiological 1 May 10 - 14,1999 Core Environmental Monitoring Program /

Effluents Legend:

IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary Instruction Core - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)

Regional Initiative - Discretionary inspections

  • Followup on previously identified issues.

" Provide Unit 2 outage radiation protection coverage.

M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Brach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; SALP Area = " Operations * ; Beginrung Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = '9f30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 9/30/1998 Positive IR 98017(DRP) NRC Operations 1A The plant was operated safely during the report period. Minor problems were not6d in the areas of equipment status control, command and control in the control room, controls for operator manipulation of equipment, and auxiliary operator performance of rounds. Each of these issues was entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

2 9/14/1998 LER LER 1998-026 NRC Operations 1A The licensee determined that the operation of the Potential Dilution in Progress alarm was not controlled in accordance with the intent of Technical Specifications. The specification requires that the operability of the alarm be verified prior to placing the plant in cold shutdown. Although the alarm was verified operable as required prior to placing the plant in cold shutdown, the licensee believes that the intent is also for the alarm to remain operable as long as the plant remains in cold shutdown, even though this is not stated in Technical Specifications.

3 8/17/1998 Positive IR 98014(DRP) NRC Operations 1A Auxiliary feedwater system material condition and housekeeping were general!y acceptable. Procedures were adequate to ensure proper systern operation under accrient conditions.

4 8/17/1998 Positive IR 98014(DRP) NRC Operations 1C The licensee identified a condition where one train of the Unit 2 safety injection system and the opposite train of the Unit 2 residual heat removal system (Iow pressure safety injection) were inoperab!e simultaneously.

Even though allowed by Technical Specifications, the licensee determined that the configuration was undesirable and established administrative controls and guidance on addressing unplanned configuraticns of this type in the future.

5 8/17/1998 Negative IR 98014(DRP) NRC Operations 1C Several minor inspector-identified discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and were corrected or placed into the station's corrective action program. Some problems were also noted by the inspectors with regard to controls for ensuring that changes to operator rounds logs did not invalidate NRC commitments and actions taken by the licensee in response to industry lessons-leamed.

6 8/17/1998 Positive IR 98014(DRP) NRC Operations 5B Members of the Off-Site Safety Committee posed challenging and probing questions to station department managers during a recent meeting. This was a noted improvement in committee performance from that observed previously by the inspectors.

Page 1 of 13

"r23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Paint Baach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* , SALP Area =

  • Operations
  • Beginning Date = *10/1/97* ; Ereng Date = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 7 7/17/1998 Negative IR 98014(DRP) NRC Operations 1A During plant walkdowns, the inspectors observed conditions with plant equipment, such as packing leaks and missing pipe insulation, that had not been documented via work order requests or condition reports, indicating that plant operators were not thorough in identifying equipment problems during their operator rounds.

8 7/14/1998 LER LER 1998-022 Licensee Oparations 1C Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations permit having one component of the safety injection system out of service at the same time as one component from the opposite train of the residual heat removal system. Existing plant procedures were not written for cross train alignment of RHR discharge to the safety injection system for containment sump recirculation.

9 7/8/1998 LER LER 1998-010-01 Licensee Operations 3B Circuit testing of the containment spray logic was potentia!!y inadequate and constituted a missed Technical Specification surveillance for channel functional test. Subsequent testing proved continuity through the bistable test switch but continuity to both trains of core spray actuation logic through the safeguards logic test switches was not independently verified.

10 7/6/1998 Positive IR 98011(DRP) NRC Operations 1A Unit 1 fuel movements were performed in a careful and deliberate manner and distractions for fuel handling personnel from concurrent activities in the containment were kept to a minimum.

11 7/6/1998 Weakness IR 98011(DRP) NRC Operations 1C The licensee had not effectively implemented a recently developed defense-in-depth, system maintenance planning matrix. This did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements; however,it represented a deficiency within the production planning group.

12 6/27/1998 Strength IR 98011(DRP) NRC Operations 1C Control room operators and supervisors demonstrated a safety-focused and concervative approach to the Unit 1 reactor startup. Briefings for infrequently performed tests or evolutions were good to outstanding, and reactor operator performance during the approach to criticality was good with consistent three-way communications and constant control board monitoring and attentiveness evident.

13 6/27/1998 Negative IR 98011(DRP) NRC Operations 2A During startup of Unit 1, operators had to contend with unnecessary cha!!enges from secondary system components which distracted their attention and complicated their efforts during the unit startup.

Page 2 of 13

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ' 'S8 Paint B2ach Search Sorted by Date (Desce<xsng) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP* ; SALP Area = " Operations" Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Dato = "9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 14 6/25/1998 Misc IR 98301(DRS) NRC Operations 1A The plant specific simulator accurately mimicked changing plant parameters during varied equipment malfunctions and plant conditions.

However, a number of long standing software and hardware problems have the potential of impacting future simulator performance and licensed operator training, if not resolved.

15 6/25/1998 Weakness IR 98301(DRS) NRC Operations 1A While the licensee was meeting the requirements of the licensed operator requalification program, the licensee's decision to consider a scheduled refueling cutage an " unforseen circumstance" for deletion of a scheduled simulator training session may not have been appropriate. As a result, two operating crews received 30% less simulator training than the other four operating crews and selected operators from the two crews had documented performance weaknesses during training which included one failure of the annual operating evaluation.

16 6/25/1998 Positive IR 98301(DRS) NRC Operations 1C An appropriate level of attention to detail was observed during a main control room walkdown and parameter logging evolution. Control operator actions were consistent with licensee expectations as outlined in their administrative procedures.

17 6/25/1998 Strength IR 98301(DRS) NRC Operations 1C The licensee provided a competent technical review and verification of the examination validity and provided positive feedback to the examiners when modification was required. The licensee maintained a high level of examination security.

18 6/25/1998 Negative IR 98301(DRS) NRC Operations 3A Operating procedures were generally accurate and complete for performing the task assigned. However, the examiners identified a procedural deficiency attributed to inadequate verification during the technical accuracy reviev process. The licensee was unable to determine whether the procedural error had been a technical or clerical mistake.

19 6/16/1998 NCV IR 98011(DRP) Self- Operations 3A A valve mispositioning event was the result of operator error in recalling Revealed the specific valve required to be closed. The licensee identified the error and eggressively took actions to evaluate and correct the problem. ,

[ Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V]. l Page 3 of 13

M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Bsach search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* , SALP Area =

  • Operations * ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = '9/30S8*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 20 6/6/1998 Negative IR 98011(DRP) NRC Operations SA The inspectors discussed with station management deficiencies with scheduling an emergency diesel generator post-maintenance test involving the potential inappropriate entry into limiting conditions for operation for the Unit 1 Train *A* residual heat removal system. Upon further review of this issue by station management, the testing was rescheduled to allow for correct plant conditions to be established for performing the test.

21 5/23/1998 NCV IR 98009 Licensee Operations 3A A minor, non-cited violation of Technical Specifications occurred when a ,

radioactive effluent discharge was made without first source checking an in-line radiation monitor. This failure could have been prevented by better control room command and control of shift activities, operator turnover, 1 procedural adherence, and operator self-verification. The tracking number for this non-cited violation of Technical Specification 15.7.4 is No.

50-266/98009-02(DRP); 50-301/98009-02(DRP). ,

22 5/23/1998 Weakness IR 98009 NRC Operations 3C The relatively high level of management attention which was required to ensure safe and effective completion of outage activities, coupled with the large backlog of corrective action and modification work, prevented resource allocation for necessary program improvement initiatives, effectively prevented immediate resolution of all degraded and nonconforming plant conditions, and diluted plant management's ability to drive committed improvements to completion. As a result, the licensee was evaluating a significant restructuring of commitment dates for program and hardware reviews and upgrades. Senior licensee management indicated that any change in docketed commitment dates would be formally submitted to the NRC in writing.

23 5/23/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Operations 3C Senior plant and corporate management continued to demonstrate a strong comrfitment to improving performance. Examples of this commitment acluded increases in plant staffing, additional management changes, ind extending the U1R24 outage to allow insta!!ation of many modifications. Significant progress was made during this outage in addressing main control board wire separation issues, electrical separation issues associated with safe shutdown equipment, removal of partial length control rod drive housings, and inspection and repair of service water system piping and pipe supports in containment.

Page 4 of 13

U/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascerxhng): Search Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area = "Operatiorts" . Begintnng Data =

  • ton /97* ; Ending Data = "9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 24 5/23/1998 Positive IR 98009 Licensee Operations 5A The licensee performed an effective self-assessment of the conduct of operations. The use of industry peers was highly beneficia!. The need for improvement to bring the operations department up to current industry i standards was identified. All self- assessment findings were consistent with the inspectors' observations.

25 5/23/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Operations SA The licensee's root cause evaluation for a February 7,1998, waterhammer event attributed the event to a poor operating procedure and poor decisions by the operating crew. The corrective actions were appropriate and thorough, with the exception that the licensee did not address a poor drain trap configuration associated with main steam piping on the 8-foot level of the turbine building. In addition, the inspectors identified a failed, nonsafety-related pipe support which licensee staff had overlooked during the event assessment and routine operator rounds.

26 5/13/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Operations 5A The Manager's Supervisory Staff (MSS), which compose the station's onsite review committee, appropriately identified weaknesses with a proposed safety evaluation (SE) for a new fuel load. Because of the incomplete staff work associated with the SE, the MSS actively participated in development of the final product. Although no problems were identified with the SE reviewed by the inspectors, the practice of having MSS members provide so much input into SEs had the potential to ,

affect the objectivity of the MSS.

i 27 5/12/1998 URI 1R 98009 NRC Operations 2B The inspectors determined that the containment spray system was aligned correctly during a safety system walkdown. The inspectors noted many discrepancies regarding the manner in which the containment spray system is tested. This issue is considered a URI pending a review by NRR. The tracking number for this issue is No. 50-266/98009-01(DRP);

50-301/98009-01(DRP)).

28 5/12/1998 Negative IR 98009 NRC Operations 3A The Unit 2 licensed operator was not aware of a Unit 1 abnormal I chemical and volume control system (CVCS) lineup and the impact this lineup had on the Unit 2 CVCS due to an incomplete tum-over and problems with control room activity coordination.  ;

29 4/24/1998 LER LER 1998-004 Licensee Operations 1A The licensee identified a condition that resulted in Unit 2 being operated (Unit 2) on April 24,1998, at an average power of 1519.1 megawatts-thermal, in excess of the maximum permitted reactor thermal output of 1518.5 megawatts-thermal.

Page 5 of 13

M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Peint Brach Search Sorted by Date (Descendeg) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" , SALP Area = Operations , Beginning Date = *10/1GP , Ending Data = '9GOS8*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION  !

30 4/16/1998 LER LER 1998-013 Licensee Operations 1A The licensee determined that the discharge pressure indicator root valves (1/2SI-848G and 1/2SI-848H) for the containment spray pumps were not shut as required to provide a closed system boundary for the spray system cutside containment.

31 3/28/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A Operations personnel involved with the restart of the Unit 2 reactor exercised good control of reactivity changes. Clear, consistent communications were used by operators.

32 3/14/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A A reactor operator who was *at the controls

  • for a unit that was shut down and defueled, left the authorized survei!!ance area for a short period of time without being appropriately relieved by another reactor operator.

This action was contrary to the requirements of the licensee procedure for the conduct of operations and was a violation of Criterion V," Instructions.

Procedures, and Drawings," of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/98006-01(DRP).

33 3/10/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Operations 1A 3A Operators responded appropriately when the second stage seal of an idle reactor coolant pump partially opened. Planning of the pump restart and communications and procedure adherence during the restart were appropriate and effective.

34 3/2/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Operations 1A Operations personnel safely conducted and controlled fuel movements.

However, containment work activities lacked coordination, and there was minimal management oversight of containment activities early in the refueling outage.

35 3/2/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Operations 1A Operators were observed using reactor engineering instructions (REls),

such as REI 11, "End of Life Coastdown," to change reactor power. The REls provided specific operational guidance and steps which were more appropriate for operating procedures.

36 3/2/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Opernt;ons 3A Personnel who inspected new fuel assemblies demonstrated appropriate attention-to-detail.

Page 6 of 13

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M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B2ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" ; SALP Area =

  • Operations
  • Beginning Date = *10/1/97* : Ending Date = "9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 37 3/2/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Operations 3A 1A Operators were observed circumventing the licensee's work control process by verbally directing adjustments to nonsafety-related control valves during a unit startup. Operators performing informal troubleshooting caused an unplanned closure of the moisture separator reheater steam flow control valves during a unit shutdown, resulting in a four percent reactor power transient. The operator response to this minor transient was adequate, but the control room command and control roles ,

were not consistent with the expectations in the procedure for conduct of operations.

38 3/2/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Operations 3B A deficiency existed in auxiliary cperator knowledge and understanding of the operation of oil reservoirs on rafety-related pumps. Licensee management indicated that training enhancements would ba made to address this deficiency.

39 3/2/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Operations SA 4A Plant staff, including design engineering personnel, continued to identify design basis issues. These issues were entered into the corrective action program in a prompt manner, and plant management evaluated and responded to each in an appropriate fashion.

40 2/7/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Operations 3A 1A **

The Unit 2 startup on February 7,1998, was conducted we!!; however, operators continued with unit startup without completely understanding the cause, or identifying all of the effects, of a waterhammer which occurred in the main steam piping during startup preparations. This was indicative of a lack of sensitivity to the potential consequences of waterhammer events. Licensee management initiated a high-level root cause evaluation of the event and the operator response.

41 2/2/1998 LER LER 98001 (Unit 2) Self- Operations 1A While Unit 2 was heating up following a maintenance outage, plant Revealed operators discovered a steam plume near the main steam vent lines. The steam was issuing from an open vent valve that had been inadvertently left open during outage because of an inadequate procedure.

Page 7 of 13

11/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Beach Search Soned by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area =

  • Operations
  • Beginning Data = *10/1/97* ; Ending Date = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 42 1/22/1998 NCV IR 98003 LER Self- Operations 28 4B Several non-essential loads of the service water system were isolated by 98006 50.72 No. Revealed an automatic actuation that was not anticipated. This partial actuation of 33576 an engineered safety feature (ESF) occurred during a special test of emergency diesel generator G-02. The systems to which the service water was isolated were not ESF systems and were not essential to accident mitigation or safe shutdown of the plant. The isolated service water supplies were restored within a matter of minutes, and the associated systems restored without incident. The event was caused by ,

an inadequate test procedure. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-266/98003-05(DRP); 50-301/98003-05(DRP).

Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 43 1/20/1998 Negative IR 97026 NRC Operations 2A The licensee's use of the temporary information tag program was generally acceptable. However, the inspectors identified several instances where tags were left hanging on equipment longer than intended, and examples of the use of temporary information tags on abandoned in-place radioactive waste equipment instead of danger tags, which would have been more appropriate. Inadequate Oversight 44 1/20/1998 Positive IR 97026 NRC Operations SC Corrective actions for problems with several procedures and for the premature securing of cooling water to a reactor coolant pump were reviewed and found to be complete and thorough. Involved Management 45 1/8/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 97026 LER Self- Operations 2A 1B SA The Unit 1 high voltage station auxiliary transformer failed on January 8, ,

98002 Revealed 1998. The operators responded well, and safety-related equipment worked as expected. The failure was caused by insulation degradation which was attributable to inoperable bus duct strip heaters. An automatic fast bus transfer did not occur as designed due to a design error. The  ;

licensee performed a thorough and insightful review of this event and i identified a fundamental weakness in the use of some aspects of I Technical Specifications (TSs) by licensed operators. The NRC review ,

identified inappropriata procedural adherence standards regarding the use of emergency and abnormal operating procedures. One violation of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, was identified for an inadequate procedure. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97026-01(DRP); 50-301/97026-01(DRP). Another violation was i identified for the failure to prepare for a shutdown of the reactor as required by Technical Specification 15.3.0. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97026-02(DRP); 50-301/97026-01(DRP).

Equipment Maifunction Page 8 of 13 L

'/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Pcint Baach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area = "Operatons" . Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Data = '9/3o/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 46 12/15/1997 Positive IR 97025 NRC Operations 2B 3B Opera *,r knowledge was consistent with their responsibility for implementation of the maintenance rule. There was no indication that the maintenance rule detracted from the operators' ability to safely operate the plant. Teamwork / Skill Level 47 11/30/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Operations 1A 3A Good command and control, deliberate conduct of operations, and good procedure adherence were observed during the shutdown of Unit 2 and the startup of Unit 1. Teamwork / Skill Level 48 11/30/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Operations 1A 3A The facility was operated in a sefe manner with a strong safety focus and generally conservative operational decisions. Two notable examples were the decision to promptly shut down Unit 2 when reactor protection instrumentation test problems could not be resolved within the a!! owed time and the decision to delay the startup of Unit 1 while a nuclear instrument detector was repaired. Conservative Decision 49 11/30/1997 Misc IR 97021 NRC Operations 1A SA Unit 2 was at full power and Unit 1 was in an extended outage at the M of the inspection period. Two-unit operation was precluded due to previously identified concerns with the auxiliary feedwater system. Unit 2 was shutdown on November 15,1997, after the licensee identified that complete testing of reactor protection system instrumentation and control circuitry had not been completed as required by T/Ss. Unit 1 startup began November 21,1997, and was completed November 30,1997.

50 11/30/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97021 NRC Operations 18 Most component cooling water (CCW) system normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures were considered appropriate, but the inspectors identified a weakness with the failure of the emergency operating procedure to provide positive isolation of nonsafety-related CCW flow paths during the containment sump recirculation phase of accident mitigation. This procedure weakness was considered one aspect of a test control violation (Criterion XI,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B). The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97021-04(DRP);

50-301/97021-04(DRP). Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 51 11/30/1997 NeSative IR 97021 NRC Operations 2A Prior to unit restart, the inspectors determined that Unit 1 containment cleanliness was sufficient to prevent immediate safety concems; however, the inspectors identified several items, including loose electrical tape, which should not have been present. Inadequate Oversight Page 9 of 13

/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Bzach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

  • Operations * , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* . Ending Date = "9/30S8*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 52 11/30/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Operations 28 The licensee had taken adequate measures to ensure those safety systems susceptible to freezing during the winter months were protected.  !

Also, the licensee had taken acceptable actions in addressing concems with the facade freeze protection system discussed in a previous inspection report. Involved Management 53 11/30/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Operations 3B Operator knowledge of the CCW system and its operation was good.

Reactor operators were familiar with the CCW system status and the cause for CCW system annunciators. Teamwork / Skill Level 54 11/30/1997 Positive IR 97021 Ucensee Operations SC 3A The licensee identified and corrected three examples of the use of inappropriate procedures. The need for numerous other proodure changes was identified by operators prior to the use of inappropriate procedures. Despite these problems with procedure development and review, the inspectors considered the use of procedures in Operations to i be good. This strong performance was based, in part, on Operations Department initiatives to ensure that all required procedures were performed as written, to ensure that activities requiring procedures we a performed using procedures rather than work plans, and to provide mentors who reinforced the need for procedural control of activities affecting quality. The tracking number for the Non-Cited Violation regarding the inadequate procedures is No. 50-266/97021-01(DRP); 50- '

301/97021-01(DRP). Self-Critical 55 11/15/1997 Positive 50.72 No. 33264 Licensee Operations SA 1A The licensee identified potential discrepancies in the testing of the reactor protection logic permissives that constituted a missed survei!!ance of these permissives under Technical Specification Table 15.4.1-1, item

  1. 45. The licensee determined that the surveillance could not be performed in the allowed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and subsequently shutdown the Unit 2 '

reactor. Conservative Decision 56 11/7/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97023 NRC Operations 3A 1A The licensee made significant improvements in operational procedural guidance and adherence; however, a repeat problem with danger tag sequencing not being completed in accordance with procedures was identified and was cited as an example of a procedure adherence violation (Criterion V,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B). The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97023-01(DRS); 50-301/97023-01(DRS). '

inadequate Oversight Page 10 of 13

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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 11/23/98 Paint Bcach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP' ; SALP A ea =

  • Operations * , Beginrsng Date = *10/1/97* ; Erdng Data = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 57 11/7/1997 Positive IR 97023 NRC Operations 3A 1A Shift tumovers were of good quality, panel walkdowns were of adequat, frequency, and control room manning exceeded administrative guidance. Involved Management 58 11/7/1997 Negative IR 97023 NRC Operations SA The industry operating experience feedback program effectively handled t the majority of issues that the inspectors reviewed. However, review of '

two important issues was significantly delayed. In another case, an i

applicable industry issue was closed without actions during the industry operating experience review. Inadequate Oversight 59 11/7/1997 Weakness IR 97023 NRC Operations SC The corrective action system lacked prioritization and there was limited accountability for ensuring that actions were completed. These contributed to the large backlog of open items in the system.

Inadequate Oversight 60 11/7/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97023 NRC Operations SC Quality Assurance audit findings and self-assessments appeared to provide a critical review of the areas assessed. Licensee corrective actions in response to the audit findings were not always timely, and, in some cases, due dates and priorities for actions were not assigned. The inspectors concluded that the corrective action process did not always capture specific issues raised in programmatic quality condition reports, resulting in these issues not being formally addressed. A violation for the failure to perform an operability determination, associated with a valve testing deficiency identified during a quality assurance audit, was identified, inadequate Oversight 61 10/23/1997 Negative IR 97023 NRC Operations 2A 3A The October 23,1997, low-temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) actuation event could have been prevented had there been a larger initial j margin between nominal reactor coolant pressure and the LTOP actuation setpoint, had a pre-job briefing been performed, and had procedural guidance specifying operator actions to control pressure during the evolution been available. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction Page 11 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 1/23/98 Print Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" : SALP Area =

  • Operations" ; Beginning Date = *10n/97* : Ending Data = "9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SEM CODES DESCRIPTION 62 10/20/1997 NCV IR 97020 NRC Operations 1A Several cases were noted where procedural controls were not appropriate for the circumstances. Also, an operating procedure did not provide clear guidance on controlling a reactor coolant system parameter, procedural adherence policy at the facility was subject to misinterpretation, and significant manipulations of the residual heat removal system were controlled by a work plan in lieu of a controlled procedure. Two non-cited violations were identified for inadequate procedures (Criterion V,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B). The tracking i numbers for those Non-Cited Violations are No. 50-266/97020-03(DRP);

50-301/97020-03(DRP) and No. 50-266/97020-04(DRP); 50-301/97020- ,

04(DRP). Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 63 10/20/1997 Negative IR 97020 NRC Operations 4B The use of the station gas turbine (G05) for load peaking purposes was determined to be consistent with G05's designation as an attemate attemating cu' rent source under 10 CFR 50.63, the Station Blackout Rule. However, a v sakness was identified in that the safety evaluation screenings associated with operation of G05 did not reference or consider the contents of safety evaluation reports for the facility's compliance with the 'iute. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 64 10/6/1997 Negative IR 97020 Licensee Operations 3A 1C Personnel reclainJng space in the spent fuel pool exhibited poor control of crane activities and knocked a steel coverinto the bottom of the pool.

No damage resulted to the spent fuel, but lack of sensitivity to spent fuel pool operations was of concem to the NRC. Inadequate Oversight Page 12 of 13

11/23/98 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FIM TA2LE LABELS

  1. A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

DATE The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report da!e.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID CY Identification of vrho discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements " Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal EE!* Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accoraance B - During Transients LER License Event Report to the NRC with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes Licensing Licensing issue frorn NRR Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. 2 Material Condition:

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.) However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the P M entries 3 Human Performance:

Positive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance are made. Before the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities enforcement decision, the licensee will be URl" Unresolved Inspection Item C - Work Environment provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-l Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-Il Notice of Violation - Severity Level !! (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level 111 conference. B - Engineering S,upport VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV " UR!s are unresolved items about which C - Prograrm: saa Processes Weakness

  • 0 Overall Weak Licensee Performance 5 Problem Identification and Resolut%:

t u que s acceptable item, a deviation, a A - Identification nonconformance. or : v;utation. However, B - Analysis ID BY the NRC h not reached its final C - Resolution Licensee The licensed utility I conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission _ _ .

entries may be modified when the final Self-Revealed Identification by an event (e.g., equipmet *ureakdown) conclusions are made.

Other Identification unknown Page 13 of 13

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX "i23rs8 Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descerdng) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" ; SALP Area =

  • Maintenance * , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* ; Erdng Data = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 9/30/1998 Negative IR 98017(DRP) NRC Maintenance 2A Plant operators were challenged by some matenal condition problems in the secondary systems. Licensee response to individual problems was generally good; however, the inspectors were concemed by the potential for long-term degradation of plant systems from high vibration or high pressure transient loadings. No immediate safety concems were  !

identified by the inspectors, and the licensee indicated an awareness and l appreciation of the potential tong-term degradation. l 2 9/29/1998 Positive IR 98017(DRP) NRC Maintenance 38 28 The licensee conducted a good pre-job briefing for the Unit 1 "A" steam generator feedwater pump rep 6ir work. The repair work was completed in a timely manner, consistent with planned estimates. ,

3 8/17/1998 Negative IR 98014(DRP) NRC Maintenance 1C Overall, plant operators performed a Technical Specification-required rod exercise test with an appropriate level of supervisory oversight and followed operating standards for the conduct of such tests. The inspectors identified that the test contained weak controls for ensuring that the operator selected the correct control rod bank prior to moving a rod bank, creating the potential for the incorrect rod bank to be moved.

4 8/17/1998 Positive !R 98014(DRP) NRC Maintenance 2B The licensee had effectively implemented a 12-week work planning and scheduling process, which was an improvement over past practices.

Even though problems were encountered, no safety-related equipment remained out-of-service for an unacceptable duration as a result. The types of problems encountered were typical for a new program in the initial implementation stage. Many past program problems observed by the inspectors were not evident during this review.

5 8/17/1998 Positive IR 98014(DRP) NRC Maintenance 3B The maintenance organization effectively replaced the "C" service water pump in accordance with station procedures. The work was planned and scheduled appropriately and limiting conditions for operation durations were closely monitored throughout the evolution. Previous inspector-identified concems with other service water pump work conducted earlier '

this year were not evident.

Page 1 of 15

ii/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descendmg) and SMM Codes (Ascerxfing): Search Column = "SALP" ; SALP Area =

  • Maintenance * : Begirring Data = *10/1/97" ; Errfing Data = "S/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY l SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 6 7/21/1998 LER LER 1998-024 Self. Maintenance 3B During performance of post-maintenance testing on emergency diesel (Unit 1) Revealed G01, technicians installed an efectrical jumper wire that unexpectedfy started the diesel. The jumper was installed by the work plan, but its installation was not expected to start the diesel. The licensee's investigation confirmed that installation of the jumper started the diesel as designed. The inspectors determined that the use of the inadequate work p!an was a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," with a tracking number of 50-266/98017-01(DRP); 50-301/98017-01(DRP).  !

7 7/16/1998 Negative IR 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenance 2A The NRC inspection team reviewed the data conceming disassembly of six Westinghouse 4.16-kilovolt type DH breakers and concluded that the condition of the lubricant and various moving parts was minima!!y acceptable. The results revealed indications of deteriorated lubrication on '

various breaker intemal components which ind cated poor maintenance practices.

8 7/16/1998 URI 1R 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenance 2A SA NRC Information Notice IN 97-53, " Circuit Breakers Left Racked Out in Non-Seismically Oualified Positions," issued on July 18,1997, had not been adequately evaluated. The NRC inspection team identified some

, racked out breakers, without prior seismic evaluation, and considered this an unresolved item. The tracking number for this item is 50-266/98013-01(DRS); 50-301/98013-01(DRS).

9 7/16/1998 Weakness IR 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenance 2B The NRC inspection team concluded that adequate maintenance and failure history of breakers was not maintained. The plant engineers were not perfonming any root cause evaluations or trending of breaker failures.

The team considered this a significant weakness.

10 7/16/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenance 2B Failure to properly implement significant portions of the breaker maintenance requirements in maintenance procedures was not consistent with vendor recommendations and was not a proactive t approach to good breaker maintenance. A no-response violation of 10 i CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,* was cited, with tracking number 50-266/98013-02(DRS); 50-301/98013-02(DRS).  ;

Page 2 of 15

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 11/23/98 Point B2ach Sea.ch Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" , SALP Area = " Maintenance * , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Data = '9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 11 7/16/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenanca 28 The NRC inspection team determined that adequate measures were not established to ensure that only approved and authorized cleaning compounds and lubricants were used to clean / lubricate safety-related electrical breaker components. Consequently, unapproved and non-standard cleaners / lubricants were used. A no-response violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, " Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components," was cited, with tracking number 50-266/98013-03(DRS);

50-301/98013-03(DRS).

12 7/16/1993 VIO/SL-IV IR 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenance 28 Adequate deiare controls were not in place to verify that the voltages available at tl., close and trip coils of medium and low-voltage circuit breakers would be adequate to safely operate the breakers in accident ,

conditions. The NRC inspection team cor.cluded that the original calculation of circuit breaker control voltage lacked the rigor normally seen in safety-related calculations. As a result, the breaker test procedures used a control voltage that was much higher than the vendor design data. A no-response violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion ill, " Design Control," was cited, with tracking number 50-266/98013-04(DRS); 50-301/98013-04(DRS).

13 7/16/1998 Negative IR 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenance 3B The NRC inspection team noted that adequate training was not provided to the technicians on correct lubrication practices. The team also noted a weakness that Point Beach did not provide training to the technicians on any revisions of the breaker maintenance procedures even when revisions were substantial.

14 7/16/1998 Negative IR 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenance SA Previous self-assessments and quality verification audits did not identify  ;

the problems identified during this NRC inspection of medium- and low-voltage power circuit breakers.

s 15 7/16/1998 Positive IR 98013(DRS) NRC Maintenance SA 2B The NRC inspection team concluded that Point Beach had participated in user groups relating to breakers. Point Beach had a number of technical personnel involved in the Westinghouse and Asea Brown Boveri User Groups that resulted in good access to vendor technical information.

16 6/26/1998 Positive IR 98011(DRP) NRC Maintenance 3B Engineering personnel provided good support to the maintenance personnel involved in the troubleshooting, repair, and testing of a Unit 1 i "A" main steam line snubber. Itaintenance personnel adhered to applicable procedures during the repair work. Appropriate controls existed for foreign material exclusion and use of replacement parts.

Page 3 of 15

M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B:::ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; SALP Area =

  • Maintenance * . Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Data = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 17 6/15/1998 NCV IR 98011(DRP) Licensee Maintenance SC The licensee identified and effectively corrected a problem regarding the failure to maintain the environmental qualification (EO) status of the containment hydrogen monitors for both Units 1 and 2. A Non-Cited Violation [10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V] was identified involving the failure to provide an adequate procedure to maintain the EO status of a safety-related component.

18 5/30/1998 Negative IR 98011(DRP) NRC Maintenance 3B The installation of the Unit 1 reactor vessel head was conducted in a safe manner. However, a job supervisor's understanding of the requirements of Nuclear Business Unit Procedure 1.1.4,

  • Procedure Use and Adherence," regarding procedural adherence was inaccurate.

19 5/28/1998 LER LER 1998-018 Licensee Maintenance 2B The licensee identified that vent valves on certain electrical penetration assemblies were not subject to periodic local leak rate testing in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J testing commitments.

20 5/23/1998 Negative IR 98009 NRC Maintenance 2A The inspectors identified that minor damage had occurred to instrument  ;

tubing and cables located near work areas within the Unit 1 reactor coolant system loop cubicles. The licensee initiated corrective actions for i the specific damage and committed to review the process controls for preventing such damage. No other conduct of maintenance problems were identified in the refueling area during the inspection period.

2* 5/23/1998 Negative IR 98009 Licensee Maintenance 2A inadequate maintenance for cont?inment upper personnel hatch latch and interlock mechanism components was determined to be the cause of repetitive surveillance test failures.

22 5/23/1998 Positive IR 98009 Licensee Maintenance 4C The licensee responded promptly to two 10 CFR Part 21 vendor notifications, resulting in the removal of defective or degraded components from the auxiliary feedwater system and the emergency diesel generators.

23 5/12/1998 LER LER 1998-017 Licensee Maintenance 2A The licensee identified deficiencies in welds on a portion of a support for (Unit 1) the *B* reactor coolant loop resistance temperature detector bypass piping.

24 5/7/1998 Negative IR 98009 Self- Maintenance 2A Annunciator alarms for flow spiking of the seal water retum from the Revealed reactor coolant pumps were a distraction to the operators. The alarms began when the gas stripper system was taken out-of-service to address material condition problems; however, the licensee was unsure of why the out-of-service gas stripper caused the spiking.

Page 4 of 15 '

11/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B2ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; SALP Area =

  • Maintenance * , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 25 5/5/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Maintenance 2B Inservice Inspection procedures and data reviewed by the inspector complied with ASME Code,Section V and Section XI requirements.

26 5/5/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Maintenance 28 State-of-the art equipment and procedures were utilized to perform the inservice inspections. Licensee and contractor audits and surveillance were adequate to assure compliance to procedures and the steam generator examination guidelines.

27 5/1/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Maintenance 3A A senior reactor operator with no concurrent duties was assigned to directly supervise the reactor operators who performed the Unit 2 bi-weekly rod exercise test. The operators appropriately exercised self-checking techniques, independent verification, and three-way communications. The senior reactor operator maintained a good overview and ensured control room distractions were minimized. The operators utilized the surveillance procedure, and signed off each step as it was performed, consistent with licensee procedural controls.

28 4/27/1998 LER LER 1998-016 Licensee Maintenance 28 Following an investigation and evaluation of a quality assurance condition report conceming the adequacy of testing of refueling system interlocks as required by Technical Specification Table 15.4.1-2, item 14, the licensee determined that refueling interlock testing conducted in accordance with plant procedure ORT-15, " Fuel Manipulator and Fuel Transfer System Checkout," was not adequate to verify each of the interlock and safety features described in Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5 29 4/17/1998 LER LER 1998-014 Self- Maintenance 2A During the post-modificaiton testing of 1 A52-60, the G01 emergency (Unit 1) Revealed diesel generator output breaker to the Unit 14160-volt safeguards bus (1 A05), two service water pumps started unexpectedly.

30 4/7/1998 LER LER 1998-003 Licensee Maintenance 2B On April 7,1998, the licensee determined that an increased frequency (Unit 2) surveillance test for a Unit 2 reactor coolant drain tank vent valve (2WG-1787) should have been performed by March 30,1998, as required by the Amercian Society of Mechanical EngineersSection XI Code,1986 Edition, Subsection IWV, but was not. The valve stroke test was scheduled and successfully completed later that day on April 7,1998 31 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 2A The use of tape to cover the bearing grease port of the residual heat removal pump motor reflected an acceptance of substandard conditions by auxiliary operators.

Page 5 of 15

/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Brach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP' ; SALP Area = " Maintenance" . Beginning Date = *10nf;T , Ending Date = "9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 32 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 2B Main control board wire separation work was conducted in a professional i and thorough manner. All work observed was performed with the appropriate work order plan present and in active use.

33 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 2B SC Many observed maintenance activities were comp lcted in accordance with requirements specified in administrative and work control procedures. However, cases were noted where administrative requirements were not being implemented. Some of the corrective actions for these issues were narrowly focused, and the effort to address the inconsistencies in application of administrative requirements within the maintenance department was not an integrated effort.

34 3/30/1998 LER LER 1998-012 Lic9nsee Maintenance 2B The licensee determined that 27 containment penetration pressure tests (Units 1&2) required by the American Society of Mechanical EngineersSection XI Code had not been conducted in accordance with the Code. The tests had been conducted in accordance with the licensee's 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J program; however, the relief request to permit the Apoendix J test had not been submitted to the NRC in a timely manner and had not yet been approved by the NRC. The failure to conduct the test in accordance with the Section XI Code is considered a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 15.4.2.B.1. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/98009-C5(DRP); 50-301/98009-05(DRP).

35 3/18/1998 IR 98010 NRC Maintenance 2B The overall control of M&TE was acceptable. The licensee had made several changes to improve the control of M&TE by storing them in a locked room and requiring full-time attendants to dispense the instruments.

OS 3/18/1998 Negative IR 98010 NRC Maintenance 2B The measuring and test equipment (M&TE) procedures were weak.

Three M&TE procedures contained conflicting information and did not contain adequate guidance for proper M&TE control. For example, the licensee was in the process of developing one procedure to control M&TE

'or operations, engineering, electrical / mechanical maintenance, and instrumentation and contio!s (l&C).

37 3/17/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Maintenance 3A Maintenance and operations department freeze seal pre-evolution briefings hela on March 17,1998, were thorough and covered command and control responsibilities, expected communication standards, and contingencies. Teamwork between different disciplines was very evident and participants displayed a good questioning attitude.

Page 6 of 15

'1/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Bsach Search Sosted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" , SALP Area =

  • Maintenance * , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Data = "9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 38 3/13/1998 Negative LER 1998- Licensee Maintenance 2A SA During radiography of the component cooling water (CCW) system, the 002(U2) 50.72 No. licensee identified that the CCW containment retum check valve, CC-745, 33897 was open with no flow in the pipe. The valve provides a redundant means for preventing loss of CCW fluid in the event of a failure of a CCW pipe inside containment.

39 3/13/1998 VIO/SL-IV 1R 98010 NRC Maintenance 2B Evaluations of some lost, damaged, or out-of-tolerance M&TE were not performed or inadequately performed. One violation of NRC requirements was identified. A violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," was identified and assigned a tracking number of No. 50-266/98010-01(DRS); 50-301/98010-01(DRS).

40 2/4/1998 VIO/SL-IV 1R 98006 NRC Maintenance 28 Maintenance and health physics organizations were not effectively prepared to perform the lower internals lift based on planning meetings conducted 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the initiation of work. Early in the evolution, maintenance workers failed to follow procedures resulting in a violation of Technical Specification 15.6.8.1. Later in the evolution, the maintenance organization displayed better control of the activity, and the lower intemals were moved without incident. The tracking number for this violation is No.

50-266/98006-02(DRP).

41 3/2/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Maintenance 2B The licensee implemented improved work planning processes for on-line maintenance and refueling outages. Safety significant modifications were either completed or were scheduled for completion during upcoming outage periods. Notwithstanding these positive accomplishments, there was a large backlog of safety-related repairs and planned modifications, and some work activities were being deferred from their originally scheduled outage windows. The inspectors did not identify any examples of unsafe conditions created by the deferral of work items, but were concerned that the delays in implementing modifications would affect plant operations, such as the power transient described in Section 01.2 of Inspection Report No. 50-266/98003; 50-301/98003.

The licensee provided the fol!owing backlog information: Open Corrective Maintenance Items - 2069 (212 identified as high priority); Open Condition Reports - 2424; Operations Workarounds - 36; Open Engineering Work Requests - 309; Open Modifications - 465.

Page 7 of 15

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 11/23/98 Point Bsach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) .L /* CMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" ; SALP Area = *Maintenarme* , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = "9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 42 3/2/1998 Negative IR 9%03 NRC Maintenance 2B 3A Maintenance staff performed lifts of the reactor vessel head and upper intemals without incident. Procedures were followed; however, a lack of strong oversight, coordination, and control in containment was noted when foreign material entered the refueling cavity pool during the upper intemals lift.

43 2/13/1998 LER LER 98010 Licensee Maintenance SA 28 As part of an ongoing review of NRC Generic Letter 96-01, " Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits," the licensee identified that circuit testing of the containment spray logic was potentially inadequate based on a potentia!!y undetectable safety logic switch failure. Special testing of the containment spray actuation circuitry to verify proper continuity of the bistable trip switches was performed on February 14,1998, and indicated that the switches were fully operable.

44 2/3/1998 LER LER 98008 Licensee Maintenance 2A 4C After receiving a 10 CFR Part 21 notification from the vendor, the licensee identified that seven installed air start solenoid valves used in the emergency diesel generators did not meet the minimum direct current voltage requirements when inlet pressures below 200 pounds-per-square-inch-gauge were applied to the valves. Calculations were performed and indicated that only one of the diesels (G03) had sufficient post-accident voltage.

45 2/3/1998 LER LER 98009 Licensee Maintenance 9, 28 The licensee identified that 12 480-vo!'. attemating current undervoltage relay contacts for opposite Unit safeguards sequence circuitry were inadequately tested, contrary to Technical Specification surveillance requirements. The inadequate surveil'ance testing was discovered during the licensee's review of NRC Generic Letter 96-01, " Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits."

46 1/28/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98003 NRC Maintenance 2B One violation was identified for a safety-related service water pump that was replaced with a work package which was inappropriate to the circumstances. An effective licensee follow-up assessment of material control concerns identified the need for some broad improvements in the control of nuclear grade parts and material. Programmatic corrective actions were planned at the end of the period; however, short term corrective actions did not receive the appropriate level of documentation and follow-up. The tracking number for this violation ie No. 50-266/98003 .

06(DRP); 50-301/98003-06(DRP).

Page 8 of 15

11/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Pcint Beach ,

Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = "SALP* ; SALP Area = " Maintenance" , Beg;nning Data = *10/1/97* . Ending Date = "9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 47 1/23/1998 Positive LER 98007 Licensee Maintenance 2A 5A in response to a 10 CFR Part 21 notification on potentially incomplete solder connections in a specific model of time delay relay, the licensee inspected the nine time delay relays onsite and identified that a relay installed in the 1P-29 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and two relays in the spare parts supply had the potentially incomplete solder.

Other/NA 48 1/22/1998 NCV IR 98003 LER Self- Maintenance 2B During first-time performance of a special test procedure to requalify the 98006 50.72 No. Revealed G02 emergency diesel generator, an unanticipated engineered safety 33576 feature actuation occurred which caused a partial service water system ,

isolation. However, the isolation occurred as designed, but was '

unanticipated because the procedure did not recognize that one would

, occur. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation (of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) is No. 50-266/98003-05(DRP); 50-301/98003-05(DRP). Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 49 1/22/1998 Positive IR 98003 NRC Maintenance 2B 3A Operators performed well during a special test of an emergency diesel generator. Additional staff was provided for performance of the test and the test was effectively coordinated. Operators promptly identified and corrected an inadvertent service water isolation caused by an inadequate test procedure.

50 1/21/1998 NCV IR 98003 LER Licensee Maintenance 3A The licensee identified that the control rod exercise test required by 98005 Technical Specifications had not been performed as required because of a data entry error in the compute"ized maintenance planning and scheduling system. The test is required to be performed at a two-week '

interval and was last performed on December 19,1997. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification Table 15.4.1-2, item 10 is No. 50-266/98003-04(DRP). Personnel Performance Deficiency 51 1/20/1998 Negative IR 97026 NRC Maintenance SC Two completed corrective actions were reviewed in the maintenance area. One, for a foreign material exclusion issue, was determined to be narrowly focused, and th 3 other was appropriate, but the corrective action was not accurately d0cumersted in the licensee's issue tracking database (NUTRK). The licensee indicated that a broad evaluation was being performed in the area of foreign material exclusion under a separate action from that reviewed by the inspectors. Inadequate Oversight Page 9 of 15

M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B2ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" : SALP Area = " Maintenance * , Beginning Data = *10/1S7* , Ending Date = '9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 52 1/2/1998 LER LER 98001 Licensee Maintenance SA 2B The licensee determined that five 40-month pressure tests (required by ASME Section XI) that were originally identified in September 1996 as not having been conducted were considered missed surveillances.

Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 53 12/16/1997 LER LER 97044 (Units Licensee Maintenance SA 2B The licensee identified that certain inservice test procedures employed 1&2)

  • dedicated operators" to replace the automatic containment spray adddive function. As written, these procedures rendered inoperable the automatic function which injects sodium hydroxide to both trains of containment spray during a design basis accident. Inadequate Procedure / instruction 54 12/15/1997 Negative IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2A in general, the material condition of the systems examined was acceptable. However, the maintenance department and the system engineer were not effectively mon!toring battery electrolyte levels.

Involved Management 55 12/15/1997 URI IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2A 2B The NRC inspectors questioned why leakage between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 component cooling water systems was not a functional failure under 10 CFR 50.65. NRC review of the license's evaluation of this issue is an Unresolved item. The tracking number for this Unresolved item is No. 50- <

266/97025-07(DRS); 50-301/97025-07(DRS).

56 12/15/1997 Positive IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2B The process to balance availability and reliability appeared adequate.

Adjustments had been made to preventive maintenance tasks on some systems as a result of these evaluations. Conse;vative Decision i 57 12/15/1997 Positive IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2B Processes for assessing plant risk resulting from taking equipment out of service during at-power and shutdown conditions were adequate. Plans for an on-line risk monitor, additional probabilistic safety assessment model insights in the matrix, and a shutdown probabilistic safety assessment model will strengthen the licensee's assessment processes. Conservative Decision Page 10 of 15

i/2a/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX  ;

Point Beach  ;

Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; SALP Area =

  • Maintenance" . Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = '9/30/98*

y.

Q DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY _ SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION t 8 12/15/1997 V!O/SL-IV IR 97025 NRC W.intenance 2B in general, performance criteria were appropriately established to ,

measure system performance. Performance criteria for one system did  ;

not adequately measure system performance. Established goals were generally conservative; however, two 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) systems (the ,

reactor coolant and residual heat removal systems) had inappropriate goals and a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b) was identified. A weakness existed in the process for establishing and revising performance criteria in that new or revised criteria were not formally reviewed by an individual responsible for the maintenance rule program. A number of performance criteria documentation discrepancies were also identified. The tracking '

number for this violation is No. 50-266/97025-05(DRS); 50-301/97025-05(DRS).

59 12/15/1997 Positive IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2B The approach to establishing the safety significance ranking for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) within the maintenance rule scope was adequate. The expert panel's safety determinations effectively compensated for the limitations of the probabilistic safety ,

assessment applications. A weakness in the determination process was '

the use of a probabilistic safety assessment model that did not reflect plant configuration modifications and contained old plant-specific data.

Conservative Decision

, 60 12/15/1997 Positive IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2B With the exception of inadvertently omitted performance monitoring criteria, the structure monitoring program was well-organized and comprehensive. Overall, with the exception of baseplate-to-structure hanger support gaps, the structures inspected were in good condition.

The licensee noted that the hanger baseplate-to-structure inspection had not yet been performed, but was forthcoming. Involved Management 61 12/15/1997 Strength IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2B With the exception of the inappropriate goal for the residual heat removal system and the untimely identification of exceeding the component cooling water criteria, the maintenance rule was properly implemented for the systems the team examined. Classifying a number of systems (a)(1)

[of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)] due to performance concems, although no performance criteria had been exceeded, was considered a strength.

Involved Management Page 11 of 15

/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B:ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP' SALP Area =

  • Maintenance" , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* ; Ending Daie = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 62 12/15/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 28 A violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was identified for the failuro of the licensee to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the 120-volt attemating current electrical system and associated emergency lighting system had been effectively controlled by performing appiopriate preventive maintenance. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish adequate measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the preventive "

maintenance on these systems. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97025-02a(DRS); 50-301/97025-02a(DRS). Inadequate Oversight 63 12/15/1997 Positive IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2B SA During implementation of the maintenance rule program, three audits and a Nuclear Energy Institute evaluation provided good observations and findings in several aspects of maintenance rule implementation. The most recent audit (May 1997) of the maintenance rule program was extremely thorough and was considered a strength. Corrective actions sampled by the team were appropriately implemented. Self-Critical 64 12/15/1997 Positive IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2B 5A The procedure for performing periodic assessments met the requirements of the maintenance rule and the intent of the Nuclear Management Resource Council implementing guidance. The yearly assessment, issued March 19,1997, was acceptable. Conservative Decision 65 12/15/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97025 NRC Maintenance 2B SA in general, scoping of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) was considered adequate. Rescoping efforts in response to the May 1997, self-assessment findings appropriately placed additional SSCs in the maintenance rule program scope; however, two SSCs - the facade freeze r protection system and the 345-kilovolt switchyard control building - were still inappropriately excluded. A violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b) was identified. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97025-01(DRS); 50-301/97025-01(DRS). Inadequate Procedure / instruction 66 11/30/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Maintenance 2A No problems were noted during observations of maintenance and surveillance activities involving the Unit 1 feedwater isolation feature and the auxiliary feedwater, safety injection, and residual heat removal systems. Involved Management Page 12 of 15

e-e

'1/23/98 f PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; SALP Area = " Maintenance * . Beginning Data = *10/1/97* , Ending Data = '9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 67 11/30/1997 Negative IR 97021 NRC Maintenance 2B Maintenance supervision effectively responded to problems with maintenance procedures for the CCW pump and motor repairs.

Inadequacies in the work scoping process and insufficient lead time following procedure development contributed to the procedure problems. "*""""

68 11/15/1997 LER LER 97043-01 Licensee Maintenance SA 2B During reviews being performed in accordance with NRC Gerieric Letter '

96-01, " Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits," the licensee identified that the reactor protection circuits (relay contacts in the nuclear instrument system permissive matrix logic circuitry) associated with reactor trip system interlocks of both Units were not being tested appropriately. Inadequate Procedure /!nstruction 69 11/7/1997 Positive IR 97023 NRC Maintenance 2B Recent revisions to the maintenance procedures provided sufficient ,

restoration steps for reassembly and post maintenance testing. Involved !

Management 70 11/7/1997 VIO/SL-IV i IR 97023 NRC Maintenance 28 The licensee failed to use calibrated test equipment, controlled by a  ;

measuring and test equipment control program, to measure timed acceptance limits in a technical specification monthly surveillance. A violation of Criterion X!! (" Control of Measuring and Test Equipment"),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, was identified and has a tracking number of No. 50-301/97023-02(DRS). Inadequate Oversight 71 10/30/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97021 LER Licensee Maintenance 4C An inadequately controlled modification performed in December 1996 97042(U1) defeated the Urdt 1 containment upper hatch interlock system. This caused a violation of Teci:nical Specification 15.3.6.A.1.d.2 when the required compensatory actions were not implemented. No instances were identified where containment integrity had been degraded during the ;

interlock system inoperability. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97021-02(DRP); 50-301/97021-02(DRP).

Engineering / Design Deficiency  !

72 10/20/1997 Positive IR 97020 NRC Maintenance 28 The Unit 1 integrated leak rate test (ILRT) was performed in accordance with appropriate procedures and controls. Technical Specification 15.4.4 and the containment leakage rate testing program acceptance criteria  !

were met. Involved Management Page 13 of 15

1/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Pcaint Brch Search Sorted by Date (Descending) ard SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area = "Maintenancs* ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97" ; Erding Date = '9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 73 10/20/1997 Positive IR 97020 NRC Maintenance 28 3A Surveillance tests on the safety injection pumps and the control rod drives were performed in a professional and thorough manner. Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The work packages were present at the job site and actively used by the technicians for all work observed. System engineers were frequently observed monitoring job progress. Involved Management Page 14 of 15

11/23/98 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS

  1. A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

U The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of securrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of iocrtification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC luspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID CY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and All/Muftiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements

  • Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal eel' Escala'ed Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients LER License Event Report to the NRC with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes Licensing Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Licensing Issue from NRR 2 Material Condition:

(Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600.

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.) . ,owever, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3 Muman Performance:

Positive individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance are made. Before the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities enforcement decision, the licensee will be URl" Unresolved Inspection item C - Work Environment provided with an opportunity to either  !

VIO/SL-I Notice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering /0esign: i VIO/SL-il Notice of Violation - Severity Level II (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-Ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level 111 conference. B - Engineenng Support VIO/S!-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV " URis are unresolved items about which C - Programt and Processes Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 5 8r mI ification and Resolution:

wh th ue in es sa acceptable item, a deviation, a ID BY nonconformance, or a violation. However, B-A.'ap the NRC has not reached its final C - Resduton Licensee The licensed trility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final l Self-Revealed Identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other Identification unknown Page 15 of 15


m-___.. _w=-_n---..~ - , _ _ - . - - - -

1 /23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Pcint B ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP" , SALP Area =

  • Engineering" , Beginning Date = *10n/97* , Ending Data = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 9/30/1998 IR 98017(DRP) Licensee Engineering 4B The licensee identified an unexpected foaming of the coolant for the two Train "B" emergency diesel generators. Licensee management and system engineers displayed conservative decision-making in response to the foaming; however, the initial efforts to correct the condition were hampered by the absence of effective oversight. Performance improved after a project manager was appointed.

2 8/17/1998 Positive IR 98014(DRP) NRC Engineering 3B The initial training material for engineering support personnel appeared to be sufficient in depth and scope. The training instructors were knowledgeable, well prepared, and presented the material effectively.

3 8/17/1998 Positive IR 98014(DRP) NRC Engineering 3B During the review of the auxiliary feedwater system, the inspectors noted that the cognizant system engineer was knowledgeable of system operational concerns and outstanding maintenance work requests. The engineer displayed a clear sense of ownership for the system and was effectively involved in the work control process.

4 7/31/1998 LER LER 1998-021 Licensee Engineering 38 Missed Technical Specification Surveillance. Inservice stroke test required by ASME Section XI had not been adequately performed on two low head safety injection core deluge isolation valves as schedu!ed during

the recent refueling outage. During a subsequent review, the licensee identified two additional steam generator sample isolation valves had not been stroke tested within their required periodicity.

5 7/31/1998 LER LER 1998-025, Licensee Engineering 4A Operation of the control room smoke exhaust fan during control room 50.72 No. 34593 ventilation operation in an emergency mode would prevent maintaining a positive pressure in the control room. Administrative controls were placed on this fan to prevent operation except for its design purpose of smoke removal 6 7/31/1998 Positive iR 98015(DRS) NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors concluded that the licenses's reviews regarding the applicability of logic testing concems described in NRC Information Notices were adequately addressed.

7 7/31/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRS) NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors concluded that the Technical Specifications related logic circuit functions reviewed during the inspection were tested in an acceptable manner.

8 7/31/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRS) NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors concluded that the licensee was identifying and controlling changes to systems containing logic circuits in an acceptable manner to ensure that required logic testing was being performed.

Page 1 of 10

M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending); Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

  • Engineering * . Beginning Date = *10/1/97* Ending Data = "9/30,98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 9 7/31/1998 Strength IR 98015(DRS) NRC Engineering 4C The inspectors concluded that the licensee's logic testing program and supporting documentation was good and met the intent of Generic Letter 96-01 (all sections).

10 7/31/1998 Positive IR 98015(DRS) NRC Engineering SA The inspectors concluded that the Quality Assurance (OA) organization effectively reviewed the Generic Letter 96-01 project resulting in positive changes to the project that led to improved management oversight and direction.

11 7/18/1998 LER 1R 98017(DRP) Licensee Engineering 4A The design basis wind loading analysis for the circulating water LER 1998-023 pumphouse did not address roof uplift caused by tomado winds. A preliminary evaluation indicated that the reinforcing steel at the edge of the roof slab would be above its allowable design stress and would thereby yield, though not break. Yielding of reinforcing steelis outside the design basis requirements for Class 1 structures at Point Beach.

Operability of the service water system was not affected.

12 7/17/1998 LER LER 1998-015-01 Licensee Engineering 2A Containment fan cooler test results outside acceptance criteria. Revision '

to LER identified source of b!cckage to *D' cooler due to presence of zebra mussel shells in the cooling water supply manifold.

13 7/14/1998 LER LER 1998-019 Licensee Engineering 2A Protective coating applied to the hydrogen monitors electrical terminal strips (for environmental qualification requirements) needed to be replaced if the connections were ever disturbed. Maintenance and replacement of sensors internal to the monitors resulted in all four of the monitors' terminal strips being affected. These terminal strips had nc intact coating that could be assured to withstand the harsh environmec inside containment post accident.

14 7/6/1998 NCV IR 98011(DRP) Ucensee Engineering 28 The licensee identified in September 1996, that six containment isolation '

valves associated with the containment heating steam system were inappropriately being tested in the reverse direction. The valves were ,

subsequently removed via a modification. The heating supply line and  !

condensate return line were cut and capped. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation of Ill.C.1 of Appendix J, was considered an NC V.

Page 2 of 10

ui2as38 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ,

Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" , SALP Area =

  • Engineering" , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* ; Ending Date = "9/30S8*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 15 7/6/1998 Positive IR 98011(DRP) NRC Engineering SA A recently completed quality assurance audit of design engineering activities contained additional examples of previously identified concems with the design engineering organization. The inspectors concluded that, overall, the audit was probing and thorough and appropriately identified design engineering deficiencies.

16 6/27/1998 Weakness IR 98011(DRP) Licensee Engineering 5A The licensee's procedures used during reactor startups a .d the approach to criticality contained deficiencies which reflected a non-conservative approach to reactivity management since the procedures did not incorporate well-established industry guidance for criticality estimations when using boron dilution to achieve criticality.

17 5/29/1998 Positive IR 98011(DRP) Licensee Engineering SA The licensee identified a calculational error in the service water system hydraulic flow model and subsequently implemented adequate interim administrative operational restrictions as corrective actions. Licensee management committed to submit a Technical Specification change request no later than July 31,1998, to address the error in the long-term.

18 5/13/1998 Negative IR 98009 Licensee Engineering 4B A draft SE, presented to the MSS for approval, for a slightly longer than normal operating cycle core load was conceptually adequate, but lacked appropriate reference to allowable plant conditions. The design i engineers who developed the SE had not proposed appropriate administrative controls for ensuring that the plant conditions covered (allowed) by the proposed SE were maintained while the SE was in effect.

19 5/5/1998 Positive IR 98007 NRC Engineering 3A The licensee's decision to remove the Unit 1 part length control rod drive housings in response to the leaking part length control rod drive housing at Prairie Island demonstrated a conservative decision based on safety.

Observation and review of the work procedures confirmed that the modification was performed in accordance with applicable ASME Code and regulatory requirements.

20 4/22/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98009 NRC Engineering 2B The licensee engineering and regulatory affairs staff who responded to a licensee quality assurance finding of inadequate surveillance testing for refueling system interlocks failed to apply sufficient rigor in their assessment of the issue. Inspector intervention was required to ensure that the Technical Specification-required test was performed appropriately. One violation of Technical Specifications was identified.

Page 3 of 10

1 /23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" : SALP Area =

  • Engineering * , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = "9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES l DESCRIPTION 21 4/20/1998 LER LER 1998-015 Ucensee Engineering 2A The licensee declared all the Unit 1 containment fan coo!drs inoperable (Unit 1) after personnel questioned whether the total uncertainty identified in calculations for testing one of the coolers needed to be added to the calculated test results in order to determine the acceptability of the test.

With the uncertainty added, the acceptance criterion of the test could not be met.

22 4/13/1998 Positive IR 98009 Licensee Engineering SA A licensee quality assurance report was effective in that it identified programmatic weaknesses in the licensee's response to Generic Letter 96-01, " Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits," specific concems with the licensee's current position on some Generic Letter 96-01 issues, and !

a failure to perform some aspects of a required surveillance.

23 3/31/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98006 NRC Engineering 4A The inspectors concluded that the 125-Volt direct current (Vdc) system was capable of meeting design basis functions. However, the failure to maintain an up-to-date battery loading calculation was considered a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion !!!, " Design Control."

The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/98006-07(DRP); 50-301/98006-07(DRP).

24 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98006 NRC Engineering 48 The practice of duty technical advisors (DTAs) serving two consecutive 24-hour watches was not consistent with the intent of program procedures and raised questions regarding the DTA's fitness-for-duty.

Although, no specific performance issues were identified as a result of the DTA standing consecutive watches, licensee management immediately revised expectations regarding this practice to preclude potential fitness- t for-duty issues.

25 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98006 NRC Engineering 4C A ventilation control panel in an emergency diesel generator room was misclassified as nonsafety-related. The licensee's initial corrective actions did not include determining if operability of the system had been challenged while the component was incorrectly classified as being nonsafety-related. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," was identified and assigned a tracking number of No. 50-301/98006-04(DRP).

Page 4 of 10

1 /23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

  • Engineering" ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97 Ending Data = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 26 3/31/1998 Negative IR 98006 NRC Engineering 4C Offsite, corporate office-based engineering personnel working on a corrective action commitment initiative to assess the adequacy of a separation of seismically qualified and non-qualified piping systems were performing analyses and taking credit for components to function in a manner that may not have previously been considered in the design basis. The engineers had not evaluated whether such relianca might constitute a design basis change. Additionally, onsite licensee personnel performing concurrent and interrelated corrective action ir'itiatives had not been informed of the potential design engineering activities that could have af'ected the results of these other initiatives.

27 3/31/1998 NCV IR 98006 Licensee Engineering 5A The licensee identified and corrected two cases where valves between seismically qualified piping systems and non-qualified piping systems were not maintained in a closed position as required by the Final Safety Analysis Report. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil,

  • Design Control," was identified and assigned a tracking number of No. 50-266/98006-05(DRP); 50-301/98006-05(DRP).

28 3/28/1998 Negative IR 98006 Licensee Engineering 4B The reactor engineering organization did not provide accurate critical rate position data to operations personnel during an initial attempt to start Unit

2. The problems revealed during the startup were considered additional 3xamples of reactor engineering performance concems which were the subject of a Notice of Violation from Inspection Report No. 50-266/98003(DRP); 50-301/98003(DRP).

29 3/2/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Engineering 4C SC Engineering evaluations were used to disposition failures of inservice test acceptance criteria. Engineering management responded promptly by issuing informal clarification of the expectation to use the condition report and operability determination system for such failures. After additional inspector involvement, the appropriate procedures were also modified to more clearly discuss this expectation.

30 3/2/1998 Negative IR 98003 NRC Engineering SC 48 Reactor engineering department actions to resolve a repetitive reactor coolant pump seal leak-off alarm were not prompt or coordinated well, resulting in a long-standing distraction to operators in the control room.

No formal mechanism existed to disable control room annunciatcrs or to retum them to service.

Page 5 of 10

_ _ _ _ - _ - . -- _ = _ _ _ _ _ --_ _ -_ __ =__ __

1 /23/98 Pi_ ANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B2ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Co:les (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; sALP Area =

  • Engineering" . Beginning Data = *10/1/97* , Ending Data = "9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 31 2/26/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98003 NRC Engineering 1A The licensee procedures for operation of the two units were inappropriate in that they created the potential for sustained operation at a reactor thermal power in excess of the facility license limits. Two examples of a violation (of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) were identified. ,

The licensee responded promptly to this inspector finding, and the procedures were revised prior to the exit meeting. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/98003-02(DRP); 50-301/98003-02(DRP).

32 2/13/1998 VIO!SL-IV IR 98003 NRC Engineering 3A 3B One violation (of Criterion V of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) was identified for an engineer who failed to follow the danger tag procedure for operating permits. No training had been provided to engineers on the operating permit controls. Corrective actions were taken by the licensee prior to the end of the inspection period. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-301/98003-03(DRP).

33 1/20/1998 Positive IR 97026 NRC Engineering 5B 4C The engineering department conducted a thorough root cause evaluation of problems associated with the installation of the wrong tubing in a reactor vessel level indication system modification. Self-Critical 34 1/20/1998- VIO/SL-IV IR 97026 NRC Engineering SC Test control deficiencies associated with the containment accident fan coolers had been identified in 1995, and new tests were to have been performed shortly after the August 1997 restart of Unit 2. However, the new tests had not been performed as of the end of November 1997. The tracking number for this violation of Criterion XI (" Test Control") of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, is No. 50-266/97026-05(DRP); 50-301/97026- i 05(DRP). Inadequate Oversight 35 1/20/1998 NCV IR 97026 Licensee Engineering SC SA 2B The inspectors concluded that the licensee had misapplied the TS requirements relating to the performance of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section XI inservice testing associated with pressure tests for Class 2 and 3 systems. However, the licensee  !

effectively identified and corrected the problem. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-266/97026-04(DRP); 50-301/97026-04(DRP). Self-Critical 36 1/9/1998 LER LER 1998-003-01 Licensee Engineering SA 4A The licensee identified the Unit 1 and 2 containment accident fan motor 50.72 Nos. 33511 cooler (heat exchanger) cooiing water flow rates may be below the ,

& 33516 minimum design. This condition is the result of cooler supply and retum "

piping flow losses not being accounted for because of the location of differential pressure flow indicator taps. Engineering / Design Deficiency Page 6 of 10

. . . , . ~ , . , . . . . , - . . .. . _, . . . - <

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX "' 'S8 Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) ar.d SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area = *Engineei:. " g" , Beginning Date = *10/1/97" ; Ending Data = '9130/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 37 12/15/1997 Positive IR 97025 NRC Engineering 48 2B System engineers were experienced and knowledgeable about their systems. System engineers were generally familiar with the maintenance rule program, although some system engineers were not knowledgeable of certain aspects of the program. Teamwork / Skill Level 38 11/30/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Engineering 3B SA A system engineer identified the potential for an unreviewed safety question if a test of spare ventilation equipment, committed to in a Licensee Event Report, was performed at power. This identification was the result of a comprehensive and thorough review of the proposed test by the system engineer. Conservative Decision 39 11/30/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97021 NRC Engineering 4A 4B The inspectors independently identified that CCW system testing had not '

demonstrated the system's ability to provide its safety-related function i when instrument inaccuracies and potential accident condition system lineups were cor'sidered. The inspectors also determined that four licensee operaWty determinations for these problems generated between December 1996 and November 1997 were inadequate. The licensee developed an adequate operability determination after the inspectors brought this issue to the attention of plant management. One violation of Criterion XI (" Test Control"),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, was identified and has a tracking number of No. 50-266/97021-04(DRP); 50- t 301/97021-04(DRP). And one violation of Criterion XVI (" Corrective Action"),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, was identified and has a tracking number of No. 50-266/97021-05(DRP); 50-301/97021-05(DRP).

Inadequate Oversight 4 40 11/7/1997 Negative IR 97023 NRC Engineering 4A Formal procedural guidance for updating the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) had been established, but was imprecise!y worded. The procedure assigned primary responsibility for preparing and submitting the periodic update of the FSAR to an indiWual without any guidance on timeliness. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction .

I i

Page 7 of 10 *

/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Brach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Scarch Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area =

  • Engineering , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* Erdng Date = '9/30/98*

I

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 41 11/7/1997 VIO/SL-IV 1R 97023 NRC Engineering 4A 4B The safety evaluations and screenings being performed were of good quality and some were considerably above average. However, one screening failed to identify that the FSAR did not reflect the current plant procedures. In addition, the licensee failed to revise the FSAR to correct the description of the effects of a loss of a transmission line to the plant, although the need for such a revision was identified in 1983. A violation (of Criterion XVI," Corrective Action," 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B) was cited for these two failures involving the FSAR. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97023-03(DRS); 50-301/97023-03(DRS).

Involved Management 42 11/7/1997 Positive IR 97023 NRC Engineering 4B Recent changes to NP 10.3.1 have resulted in improved procedural guidance for screening and writing 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations. The ;

10 CFR 50.59 procedure effectively assigned responsibility for key areas to assure that 50.59 safety evaluations were effectively prepared, reviewed and approved. Additionally, the necessary procedural guidance existed for maintaining records and formally reporting to the NRC the changes, tests, and experiments made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. Involved Management 43 11/7/1997 Positive IR 97023 NRC Engineering 4B Training and qualification of licensee personnel to perform screenings and safety evaluations appeared to meet the licensee's commitments to the NRC following the 1996 NRC Operational Safety Team inspection.

There was consistency between the training and procedural requirements for preparing safety evaluations and the training evaluation method '

appeared to be satisfactory for the short term. Involved Management 44 11/7/1997 VIO/SL-IV IR 97023 NRC Engineering 4B 3A The operability determinations reviewed were good and, in some cases, quite detailed. However, this was not true in all cases and a wide quality spectrum was observed. The inspectors identified an example where no prompt operability determination had been completed for several safety- ,

related valves that had not been property tested. An example of a procedure adherence problem was cited (Criterion V,10 CFR Part 50.

Appendix B). The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97023-01(DRS); 50-301/97023-01(DRS). """******

45 11/7/1997 Positive IR 97023 NRC Engineering 4B 4A The licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 procedure contained a comprehensive listing of licensing basis documents which would allow preparation of adequate 50.59 safety evaluations. Involved Management Page 8 of 10

"' 'S8 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ~

Paint Berch Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* ; SALP Area =

  • Engineering * ; Beginning Date = *10N97* ; Ending Date = '9/30SB*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 46 10/23/1997 Positive LER 97041 Ucensee Engineering SA 4A The licensee discovered a potential common mode failure in the control circuits of the auxiliary feedwater (APN) system. Severallow voltage signal and control cables associated with the Unit 1 turbine-driven AFW pump 1P-29 and a motor-driven AFW pump (P-38A) common to both Units were found to be located in common conduits and cable trays or wireways. Engineering / Design Deficiency 47 10/21/1997 Positive IR 97018 NRC Engineering 4B System engineers were frequently consulted regarding their systems for pre-job control room briefings for infrequent or complex evolutions.

48 10/20/1997 Positive IR 97020 Ucensee Engineering 2A The recently modified Unit 1 post-accident sampling system (PASS) performed satisfactorily during post-maintenance testing and was subsequently retumed to service. Involved Management 49 10/17/1997 Positive LER 97040- Ucensee Engineering 5A 4A Ucensee engineers reviewing a vendor calculation for pressures and 01(U1&2) temperatures of reactor coolant pump seal water retum lines discovered that a potential existed for the Unit 1 lines to fait due to thermal stresses induced during a fullloss of cooling to the reactor coolant pump seals (which could occur during a station blackout or during various Appendix R fires). Engineering / Design Deficiency Page 9 of 10

11/23/98 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS

  1. A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

DM The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the actual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection report date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID GY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering, Maintenance, Operations, Plant Support and All/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CODE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requirements

  • Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being considered for A - Normal eel

  • Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients LER License Event Report to the NRC with the " General Statement of Policy and C - Programs and Processes Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action Licensing Licensing issue from NRR 2 Material Condition:

(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.) However, the NRC has not reached its fina A - Equipment Condition NCV Non-Cited Violation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3 Human Performance:

Positive Individual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance are made. Before the NRC makes its B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities enforcement decision, the licensee will be C - Work Environment URl* Unresolved inspection item provided with an opportunity to either

_VIO/SL-l Not>ce of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-il Notice of Violation - Severity Level II (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-Ill Notice of Violation - Severity Level lis conference. B - Engineering Support VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV " UR!s are unresolved items about which C - Programs and Processes U '

Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance  ? 5 Problem en* ication and Resolution:

h ue es ns acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, B - Analys.is ID BY C - Re solution the NRC has not reached its final Licensee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission entries may be modified when the final Self-Revealed Identification by an event (e.g., equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other lldentification unknown i Page 10 of 10

11/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Paint Brach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = 'SALP* ; SALP Area = " Plant Support" : Beginning Data = *100/97" . Ending Date = "9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 1 S/30/1998 Positive IR 98017(DRP) NRC Plant 1C 3A Licensee performance during an emergency planning drill was improved Support compared to performance in a previous drill.

2 9/4/1998 Positive IR 98018(DRS) NRC Plant 1C Radiological postings and container labeling were well maintained, and Support appropriately informed workers of current plant radiological conditions.

Housekeeping and material condition of radiation protection equipment was generally good.

3 9/4/1998 Misc IR 98018(DRS) NRC Plant 1C Whole body counting was being performed in accordance with station Support procedures and consistent with industry standards. Calibration and instrument checks were properly performed and generally well documented. However, a deficiency was identified with documenting problems and their resolution.

4 9/4/1998 Positive IR 98018(DRS) NRC Plant 1C Overall, the calibration program was adequately implemented. Corrective Support actions were being developed and implemented for deficiencies in the instrument ca'@ ration program, which were identified through condition reports and the contractor performed self-assessment. Calibrations were performed as required and technicians involved with the program were knowledgeable of procedures and instruments being calibrated.

5 9/4/1998 Positive IR 98018(DRS) NRC Plant 1C 3A 3B The routine contamination and dose rate survey program was effectively Support implemented. Surveys were performed as required and were appropriately documented. Technicians were knowledgeable of procedures and survey locations, and demonstrated good survey techniques.

6 9/4/1998 Positive IR 98018(DRS) NRC Plant SA The periodic review of the radiation protection program was being r Support performed in accordance with NRC requirements. The self-assessments were of sufficient depth to identify program deficiencies. Corrective actions were being developed and implemented for identified deficiencies.

7 8/17/1998 Ne,gative IR 98014(DRP) NRC Plant 3B The licensee conducted a drill of the emergency response organization.

Support The performance of the organization during the drill, as observed by the '

licensee and the inspectors, was poor. The licensee's emergency response organization undertook several improvement initiatives to address the problems.

Page 1 of 10

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= -

lir23ms PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B2ach Search Sorted by Date (Descerdng) and SMM Codes (Ascerdng): Search Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area = " Plant Support' ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = '9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 8 7/30/1998 LER LER 1998-020 Licensee Plant 4C A group of cables were identified in the cable spreading room which may Support not meet the licensee's fire protection commitments for safe shutdown equipment in that fire zone. The Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FPER) states that all cables in the cable spread room are installed in conduit or covered cable trays. Telephone and lighting cables have been identified in the fire zone which are not in cable trays or conduits.

9 7/17/1998 NCV IR 98016(DRS) NRC Plant 3C Some fingerprint cards containing criminal history information that were Support received by the licensee from the Federal Bureau of Investigation were not promptly reviewed by the licensee upon receipt. These failures were not indicative of a programmatic breakdown and were low in safety significance. Personnel error caused the failure. Adequate corrective action was implemented. [ Violation of 10 CFR 73.56, Access Authorization]

10 7/17/1998 Positive IR 98016(DRS) NRC Plant SC Licensee security management was proactive in identifying and Support implementing aggressive security compensatory measures for two identified security problems.

11 7/17/1998 Negative IR 98016(DRS) NRC Plant SC 2B On two occasions security management was deficient in providing Support adequate oversight and ownership to resolve problems identified in the security program in a timely manner. In both cases extended security compensatory measures, which required considerable overtime, were required to be implemented. In one case the compensatory measures were in effect for 10 months, in the other case the compensatory ,

measures were in effect for 4 months. Compensatory measures remained in affect at the conclusion of the inspection.

12 7/6/1998 Strength IR 98011(DRP) NRC Plant "

Radiological postings accurately depicted the radiological conditions in Support areas inspected. Most areas were maintained free of contamination or kept to a very Icw contamination level, allowing for access to areas by operators and providing good working environments for the general outace workforce.

13 6/4/1998 Positive IR 98011(DRP) NRC Plant 38 Health physics and emergency preparedness staff appropriately Support responded during a contaminated injured worker drill. The responding medical staff maintained a clear focus on the health and safety of the

" victim

  • that was not overridden by minor radiological control concems.

Page 2 of 10

11/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Pcint Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area = " Plant Support * , Beginning Data = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = '9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 14 5/23/1998 Positive IR 98009 NRC Plant SA A self-assessment of the chemistry program identified opportunities for Support improvement (assessment findings) in the areas of chemistry system material condition and design control, chemistry procedures, and chemistry management's effectiveness in reinforcing standards and expectations. The recommendations (corrective actions) contained in the self-assessment were appropriate to address these assessment findings.

The findings were consistent with observations made by the inspectors during chemistry system walkdowns and routine review of condition reports.

15 5/22/1998 Positive IR 98012 NRC Plant 1C The solid radioactive waste processing and storage program was well Support implemented and was as described in station documents. Material condition of processing equipment and storage containers was good.

The station was evaleating additional waste reduction efforts for dry active waste, with plans to implement new efforts after the current outage was completed.

16 5/22/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98012 NRC Plant 1C One violation of Technical Specification 15.6.11 was identified for the 2

Support failure to calibrate self-reading dosimc*ers in emergency plan sampling kits at the required frequency. Correctis e actions implemented in response to a previous violation, for failure to calibrate emergency plan dosimeters, were not effective in preventing a recurrence of the violation.

The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/98012-01(DRS); 50-301/98012-01(DRS). i 17 5/22/1998 Negative IR 98012 NRC Plant 1C Several examples of poor procedural guidance were identified during this Support inspection specific to ALARA planning and high radiation area / locked high [

radiation area contro!s. These exampl:3 were similar to others identified ,

earlier this outage relating to radiation work permits and ALARA job briefings i 18 5/22/1998 Positive IR 98012 NRC Plant 1C The as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) planning and controls I Support for the resistance temperature detectors pipe support work were good.

However, a problem was identried with the job not being included in the outage schedule and there were several examples identified of weak or '

missing items in the ALARA dccumentation.

t Page 3 of 10 l r

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 1/23/98 Peint B ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP" ; SALP Area = *Ptant Support" ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97* : Ending Data = '9/3G98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 19 S/22/1998 IR 98012 NRC Plant 1C Outage work controls were effective!y carried out during work activities, Support and workers exhibited good radiation worker practices. However, total outage dose exceeded dose goals primarily due to two dose intensive emergent jobs.

20 5/22/1998 Positive IR 98012 NRC Plant 2A The radioactive material shipping program was well implemented.

Support Personnelinvolved with the shipping program were knowledgeable of regulations and station procedures. Shipping paperwork was appropriately completed with no problems identified.

21 5/22/1998 Positive IR 98012 Licensee Plant 5A The quality assurance audit of the health physics program was well Support implemented and identified several areas with deficiencies or areas where improvements could be made, with many of these areas related to weak procedures. Health physics staff were developing corrective actions for the areas needing improvement 22 4/27/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98012 NRC Plant 1C The licensee maintained effective controls over high, locked high, and Support very high radiation areas, but did not ehectively communicate expectations for contro!!ing these areas or for contro!!!ng keys a!!owing access to these areas in station procedures or training. One violation was identified for failure to properly control a locked high radiation area key as required by Technical Specification 15.6.11. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/98012-02(DRS); 50-301/98012-02(DRS).

23 3/31/1998 Positive IR 98006 NRC Plant 1C Personnel exposures during the Unit 1 refueling outage were meeting Support established licensee goals. The number of personnel contarnination events was higher than anticipated; however, most of the events were minor shoe contaminations. The health physics manager initiated a review of the causes for the higher than anticipated number of personnel contamination events. None of the events resulted in significant exposure of personnel.

1 Page 4 of 10

M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area =

  • Plant Support' , Beginning Date = *10/1/97* , Ending Date = '9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP _ SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 24 3/20/1998 Negative IR 98008 NRC Plant 1C A lack of procedural guidance was identified in the health physics Support program regarding updating radiation work permits (RWPs) with the current radiological conditions and providing workers with the current radiological conditions during pre-job briefings. The health physics staff was reviewing applicable procedures to decide if changes in procedures were required to ensure that RWPs are updated when radiological conditions change significantly and to provide supervisor responsibility for ensuring that current radiological conditions are reflected in work control documents.

25 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Plant 1C Radiological postings were well maintained and appropriately informed Support workers of current radiological conditions. Labeling of containers was generally in accordance with procedures with several minor deficiencies promptly corrected when reported to health physics technicians.

Housekeeping was acceptab!e, although several minor deficiencies were identified, which were also promptly corrected when brought to the licensee's attention.

26 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Plant 1C Overall radiation worker practices were effective. Workers generally Support demonstrated adequate use of ALARA techniques and were aware of the radiological conditions in work areas, in addition, workers appropriately removed protective clothing and generally performed adequate whole body frisks upon exiting containment.

27 3/20/1998 Positive IR 98008 NRC Plant 1C Outage work controls and ALARA efforts were effectively carried out Support during outage activities. Pre-job briefings were detailed and effectively communicated health physics expectations, radiation work permit (RWP) ,

requirements, and ALARA reviews; however, special instructions in ALARA reviews were not clearly documented in the RWPs. Good communication was exhibited between health physics technicians and work groups during pre-job briefings and work activities. Significant rework activity had not occurred to date; therefore, the impact on the outage dose from rework activities was small 28 3/13/1998 Negative 73.71 No. 33895 Licensee Plant 1C The licensee determined that safeguards information was lost.

Support Page 5 of 10

ur298 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point B ach Search Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = *SALP* ; SALP Area = " Plant Support' , Beginning Date = *10/1n7* ' Ending Date = "d/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 29 2/14/1998 LER LER 1998-011 Licensee Plant 3A The radioactive contents of monitor tank B were reteased to the (Units 1&2) Support environment without completion of the source check of the associated liquid discharge radiation monitor in accordance with Radiological Ef imt Technical Specifications Table 15.7.4-1.

30 2/6/1998 Positive IR 98004 URC Plant 1C Radiological postings and labels in the auxiliary building were in Support accordance with procedures and housekeeping was generally good.

Health physics staff response to thG inspector-identified overflowing bucket, labeled " Caution Radioactive Material," was considered good.

31 2/6/1998 Negative IR 98004 NRC Plant 1C The planning for the U1R24 refueling outage appropriately considered Support health physics requirements and radiological impediments associated i

with the octage. A weakness was identified where ALARA reviews did not always document how dose estimates were derived.

32 2/6/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 3B The health physics manager's qualifications indicated that he exceeded Support the position requirements in Technical Specification '5.6.3.2.

33 2/6/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant 38 1C The training program for contractor health physics technologists and Suppoit radiation workers was sufficiently detailed and effectively implemented.

The trainers conducted formal discussions, practical demonstations, and task performance evaluations to ensure an acceptable level of proficiency.

34 2/6/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98004 NRC Plant SC 1C Corrective actions for the failure to calibrate emergency plan dosimeters ,

Suppor'. were implemented except for issuing the administrative procedure outlining expectations that surveillances be performed and documented in a timely manner. The tracking number for this violation is No. 50-266/97018-01(DRS); 50-301/97018-01(DRS).  !

35 2/6/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant SC 1C Weaknesses in the protective clothing program were addressed by Support requiring that protective clo'hing be removed at contaminated area step- l off pads, and that personal clothing / modesty garments worn under protective clothing not be removed or covered up before using the contamination monitors 36 2/6/1998 Positive IR 98004 NRC Plant SC 1C Corrective actions for a failure to survey a tous before removing it from a Support contaminated area included a discussion of the event and the need to follow procedures with the health physics staff.

I Page 6 of 10

PLANT ISSUES MATRIX "' 'S8 Point Beach Search sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Ccdes (Ascending): Search Colurnn = *SALP* ; sALP Area = "P* ant Support" ; Beginning Date = *10/1/97* ; Erding Date = "9/30/98*

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCHiPTION 37 1/20/1998 VIO/SL-IV IR 98002 NRC Plant 3C 1C The inspector observed a violation when an armed security response Support officer was posted to continuously monitor an outage of a protected area intrusion alarm zone. The significance of this finding was that licensee security management was aware of this routinely implemented practice, but did not recognize that this action was in violation of a security plan requirement which required the use of a non-response force security officer. Inadequate Oversight 38 1/20/1998 Positive IR 97026 Licensee Plant SA 2A Based on the results of a close-out inspection of the Unit 2 conteinment, i Support the licensee identified the need to perform additional cleaning and improve future close-out cleanliness standards. Self-Critica!

39 1/20/1998 Positive IR 97026 NRC Plant SC 1C The inspectors determined that the health physics department was Support effective in addressing an adverse trend regarding workers failure to wear proper dosimeters. Involved Management 40 1/20/1998 Negative IR 98002 NRC Plant SC 1C The inspector observed a violation when a vehicle was inadequately Suppet searched. The violation was caused when a security officer's attention-to-detail in searching a vehicle was inadequate. Previous corrective actions '

for two similar violations were not totally effective to prevent rc.wrence.

Each failure, although slightly different, involved weak attention to deidi! i by the search officer. li appeared that previous corrective action had not i been effectively focused on addressing the issue of attention-to-detail.

Inadequate Oversight 41 1/20/1998 Negative IR 98002 NRC Plant SC 1C 3C The licensee identified a violation regarding two failures to implement a ,

Support specific compensatory measure. The events were caused when security i supervisory personnel, because of a heavy workload in the alarm stations

  • failed to implement on two occasions a specific compensatory measure.

Contributing to this implementation failure was a lack of procedural guidance to address the specific compensatory measure required for the situation. Previous corrective actions for three similar events which included actions to improve alarm station effectiveness by reducing workload activities and improving procedural guidance were not totally ,

effective. Although those actions have resulted in overall improved performance by alarm station personnel, they did not prevent the current events. Inadequate Oversight Page 7 of 10

M/23/98 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Point Beach Search Sorted by Date (Desce ding) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Search Column = "SALP* , SALP Area = " Plant Support' ; Beginning Data = *10/1/97* . Ending Data = "9/30S8'

  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE ID BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 42 1/14/1998 NCV IR 98003 LER Licensee Plant SA The licensee identified that the motor lube oil co;lection system for the 98004 50.72 No. Support Unit 2 "A" reactor pump may not comply with Section 111.O of 10 CFR Part 33530 50, Appendix R. Although the system was installed as designed and appeared to be in good condition, certain apparent deficiencies exisited, including potential leakage sites outside the system boundary and a potentially inadequate drain path between the oil deflector cone pan and leakoff trough. The tracking number for this Non-Cited Violation is No. 50-266/98003(DRP); 50-301/98003(DRP). Engineering / Design Deficiency 43 11/30/1997 Positive IR 97021 NRC Plant 2A The radiological housekeeping within the Primary Auxiliary Building was '

Support good. Involved Management 44 10/20/1997 Positive IR 97020 NRC Plant 2A Radiological housekeeping of the primary auxiliary building was generally Support good. involved Management 45 10/17/199 Positive IR 97024 NRC Plant 1C The independent spent fuel storage installation survey and environmental Support monitoring requirements were wellimplemented and survey results indicated exposures were well below regulatory requirements. Involved Management 46 10/17/1997 Negative IR 97024 NRC Plant 1C Labeling all cabinets in the auxiliary building with radioactive materials Support labels was overly conservative and not consistent with the intent of the labeling requirements in 10 CFR Part 20. Posting in the radiological!y controlled area of the auxiliary building was appropriate. Inadequate Procedure / Instruction 47 10/17/1997 Negative IR 97024 Licensee Plant SA A review indicated that the plant health physics staff had written many Support condition reports in the last two months identifying poor radiation worker practices. These included personal clothing wom under routine protective clothing; attempted radiologically controlled area entries without required ,

dosimetry; transfer of potentially contaminated items to the free-release t table without required tagging; and uncontained protective clothing found outside the Unit 1 containment lower hatch. Also, the inspectors observed a contractor health physics technician not follow good health physics practices with rubber glove usage during a survey for release of tools from a contaminated area in the maintenance shop. Personnel Performance Deficiency 48 10/17/1997 Positive IR 97024 Licensee Plant SC Plant staff were developing an action plan to address self-identified Support weaknesses in the instrument calibration program which should improve ,

the effectiveness of the program. Involved Management Page 8 of 10

S'S8 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Pcint Be:ch Seardi Sorted by Date (Descending) and SMM Codes (Ascending): Seath Column = *SALF ,- SALP Area =

  • Plant Support" : Beginning Data = *10/1/97* ' , Ending Date =9/30/98*
  1. DATE TYPE SOURCE 10BY SALP SMM CODES DESCRIPTION 49 10/17/1997 Positive IR 97024 . NRC Plant SC 1C The inspectors
  • followup of self-reading dosimeter (SRD) calibrations, Support indicated that the SRDs were calibrated and records had been maintained. New calibration curves were to be developed by the calibrator manufacturer to further address a previously identified SRD calibration deficiency. Involved Management '

50 10/2/1997 Positive IR 97020 NRC Plant SA 1C The post-exercise discussions and critiques for the annual emergency Support planning exercise were comprehensive, self-critical, and identified appropriate strengths and weaknesses. Self-Critical t

Page 9 of 10 w-- - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .

11/23/98 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE LABELS

  1. A counter number used for NRC intemal editing.

DATE The date of the event or significant issue. For those items that have a clear date of occurrence use the a tual date. If the actual date is not known, use the date the issue was identified. For issues that do not have an actual date or a date of identification, use the LER or inspection repod date.

TYPE The categorization of the issue - see the TYPE ITEM CODE table.

SOURCE The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.

ID CY Identification of who discovered the issue - see table.

SALP SALP Functional Area Codes - Engineering. Maintenance. Operations, Plant Support and A!!/ Multiple (i.e., more than one SALP area affected).

SMM CODES Senior Manager Meeting Codes - see table.

DESCRIPTION Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Executiw. Summaries.

TYPE ITEM CCDE NOTES SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING CODES DEV Deviation from NRC Requkements "

Eels are apparent violations of NRC 1 Operational Performance:

ED Escalated Discretion - No Civil Penalty requirements that are being conridered for A - Normal eel' Escalated Enforcement issue - Waiting Final NRC Action escalated enforcement action in accordance B - During Transients LER License Event Report to the NRC w C - Programs and Processes the teneral Statement of Mcy agd Licensing Licecising issue from NRR Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. 2 Material Condition:

Misc Miscellaneous (Emergency Preparedness Finding, etc.) However, the NRC has not reached its final A - Equipment Condition -

NCV Non-Cited Vistation enforcement decision on the issues B - Programs and Processes Negative Individual Poor Licensee Performance identified by the Eels and the PIM entries 3 Human Performance:

Prsitive ind.vidual Good Licensee Performance may be modified when the final decisions A - Work Performance Strength Overall Stnng Licensee Performance am mA Bafom me MC makes its

, 8 - Knowbdge, Skills, and Abilities enforcement decision, the l,censee i will be URI'* Unresolved inspection item C - Work Environment provided with an opportunity to either VIO/SL-1 No ice of Violation - Severity Level I (1) respond to the apparent violation or 4 Engineering / Design:

VIO/SL-t! Notice of Violation - Seventy Level II (2) request a predecisional enforcement A - Design VIO/SL-ill Notice of Vio!ation - Severity Level lli conference. B - Engineering Support VIO/SL-IV Notice of Violation - Severity Level IV ** URis are unresolvec' items about whicn C - Programs and Processes Weakness "

lOverall Weak Licensee Performance 5 Problem Identification and Resolution:

h h u n e a i acceptable item, a deviation, a A - Identification nemnformance, or a violation. However, B - Analysis ID BY C - Resolution the NRC has not reached its final Licensee The licensed utility conclusions on the issues, and the PIM NRC The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6ntries may be modified when the final Self-Revealed identification by an event (e.g.. equipment breakdown) conclusions are made.

Other identification unknown Page 10 of 10 e = _ ___ _ _ _ . . _ _ = _ _ _ . _ _ _- __ _ _ _. _ _. .__ -_ . - _