ML20151V605
| ML20151V605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1988 |
| From: | Bess J, Bundy H, Garrison D, Holler E, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151V485 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-88-39, 50-499-88-39, NUDOCS 8808220329 | |
| Download: ML20151V605 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1988039
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APPENDIX B
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/88-39 Operating License: NPF-76
50-499/88-39 Construction Permit: CPPR-129
Dockets: 50-498 Expiration Date: December 1989
50-499
Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77001
Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)
Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas
Inspection Conducted: June 1-30, 1988
Inspectors: h.6 h
M E. Bess, ResTdent Inspector, Project Section D
8/s/#
Dat/e
Division of Reactor Projects
! . ti]/lll/V)(A'b ?-3-EY
D. L. Garris'6n, Resident Inspector, Project Date
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
$/W9Y
H. F. Bundy, Reactor 7nspector, Test Programs .Date
Section, Division of Reactor Safety
49xJL A
D. M. Hunnicutt, Senior Project Engineer, Project
sh/88
Ddte/
Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
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Approved: -1' -
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i/4 6T
E. J. Foller, Chief, Project Section D, Division D6te'
of Reactor Projects
8808220329 880812
hDR ADOCK 0500o49g
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted June 1-30, 1988 (Report 50-498/88-39)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection included licensee action on
previous inspection findings, shutdown from outside the control room, monthly
maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, operational safety
verification, engineered safety feature (ESF) walkdown, and licensee action on
reported events.
Results: Within the areas inspected, three violations were identified. The
first violation involved failure to perform surveillances in accordance with
Technical Specifications (paragraph 4.a). The second violation involved
failure to meet Technical Specification requirements related to the release of
liquid effluents (paragraph 4.b). The third violation involved the plant
changing modes prior to the completion of required surveillances
(paragraph 4.c).
Inspection Conducted June 1-30, 1988 (Report 50-499/88-39)
Areas Ins)ected: Routine, unannounced inspection included nonroutine event
review, slutdown from outsided the control room, containment combustible gas
control system (hydrogen recombiners), reactor pressure boundary piping, and
safety-related components.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified.
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DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
HL&P
- W. P. Evans, Licensing Engineer
- S. M. Dew, Manager, Operations Support
- A. R. Mikus, General Supervisor, Construction
- D. C. King, Construction Manager
- J. D. Green, Manager, Inspection and Surveillance
- M. A. McBurnett, Operations Support Licensing Manager
- S. M. Head, Supervising Licensing Engineer
- M. R. Wisenburg, Plant Superintendent, Unit 1
- J. N. Bailey, Manager, Licensing and Engineering, Unit 2
- J. T. Westermeier, General Manager
- G. L. Jarvela, HP Division Manager
- M. Polishak, Project Compliance
- M. Herman, Quality Assurance Engineer
Volt
- J. Guthrie, Startup Engineer
Ebasco,
- H. A. Garcia, Senior Resident Engineer
In' addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with
various licensee, architect engineer (AE), constructor and other
contractor personnel during this inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on .
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July 6, 1988.
2. Plant Status
South Texas Project (STP), Unit 1, went critical at 6:55 a.m. (CDT) on
June 18, 1988, following an outage which began on May 25, 1968, because of
the loss of No.11 steam generator feed pump (SGFP). The No. 11 SGFP
received extensive damage during the initiation of a Loss of Offsite
Power (LOOP) test. An investigation into the cause of the.SGFP. turbine
failure concluded that the apparent root causes were: less than adequate
design to protect the SGFP, less than adequate des.'gn of the high pressure
'stop valve which lead to valve binding and inadequate isolation of steam
admission to the turbine. The modifications listed below are being
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implemented by the licensee:
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Modifications to the high pressure stop valves and actuation linkage
to ensure closure
Addition of electrical overspeed trip function set at 105 percent of
maximum rated turbine speed
Addition of vital power to the Electro-Hydraulic Control System
On June 23, 1988, a shutdown from outside control room test was performed
satisfactorily. The plant was shut down and maintained in a hot standby
condition (Mode 3) for 45 minutes from the auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP).
This was the last major test to be performed at the 30 percent reactor
power plateau. During this brief shutdown, the licensee performed a
hardness test on 23 flanges located throughout the component cooiing water
system (CCW) inside containment. The purpose of the test was to comply
with NRC Bulletin 88-05 dated hay 6, 1988. This bulletin identifies a
potential safety concern with nonconforming materials su
Supplies, Inc. (PSI) and West Jersey Manufacturing (WJM)pplied
. The test by Piping
(hardness) results on the 23 flanges indicated that 22 passed the test and
one proved to be harder than the other flanges tested. Test data is still
being evaluated. On June 27, 1988, at 6:43 a.m. (CDT) Unit i reached
48 percent reactor power.
STP, Unit 2, is 96 percent complete and preoperational testing is in
progress. Hot functional testing is scheduled to begin in mid-July.
3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
a. (Closed) Violation (498/8808-01): Emergency Preparedness
Procedure Changes - The licensee had not submitted changes made to.
its emergency preparedness procedures since Unit I was licensed
(Operating License NPF-71 later reissued as NPF-76) on August 21,
1987.
The root cause of this violation was identified by the licensee as a
failure to be fully aware of NRC reporting requirements on the part
of the Emergency Preparedness Manager, who . failed to properly notify
Operations Support Licensing of new or revised Emergency Plan
Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). The following corrective actions
have been taken by the licensee in response to this' violation:
(1) HL&P has submitted copies of all new and revised.EPIP issued
since issuance of the OL on August 21, 1987, to the NRC.
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(2) The Emergency Preparedness Manager has been specifically
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included in the list of recipients of the Reporting Manual.
(3) Additional instructions have been issued to recipients of the
I Reporting Manual to ensure that responsible licensee groups are
j kept fully aware of reporting requirements.
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(4) Copies of approved EPIPs are distributed to Operations Support
Licensing for submittal to NRC.
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(5) The EPIPs are distributed to Operations Support Licensing as
part of the licensee's controlled document distribution program.
This violation is considered closed,
b. (Closed) Violation (498/8816-01): Failure to Follow Procedures - The
NRC inspectors found five untagged electrical jumpers installed which
required temporary alteration tags for status information.
The NRC inspector determined that the five jumpers identified had
been installed for system testing within a scheduled work shift.
StartupAdministrativeInstruction(SAI)14, Revision 5, dated
October 23, 1987, does not require the tagging and logging of
temporary alterations made by startup engineers during a continuous
scheduled work shift. However, the testing associated with the
jumpers subsequently was rescheduled. The licensee removed three
temporary jumpers, which had been placed in preparation for safety
injection preoperational testing located in Solid State Protection
System (SSPS) Cabinet ZRR002-1. The other two jumpers were located
in the mechanical auxiliary building (MAB) HVAC system (SSPS
Cabinet ZRR004-1) and were tagged and logged in accordance with
SAI 14. Additionally, the licensee held group meetings with
engineers and technicians to reiterate the requirements of SAI 14.
This violation -is considered closed.
c. (Closed)-Violation (498/8801-01): High Head Safety In: ection Pump
Controls System Lineup - The NRC inspector found that licensee
Procedure 1 POP 02-51-0002, "Safety Injection System Normal Lineup,"
Revision 6, dated December 30, 1987, was not adequate to control
alignment of the high head safety injection pumps in hode 4 in that
following the alignment in Fonns,3, 7, and 11 of the procedure would
have made the pumps inoperable.
The NRC inspector found that the licensee had revised Fonns 3, 7,
and 11 in Procedure 1 POP 02-SI-0002 to indicate the proper handswitch
alignments for all six modes. The licensee also revised Station
Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0002, "Plant Procedures," Revision 11,' dated
February 29, 1988, to incorporate requirements for an independent
technical review of new procedures. The licensee revised Station
Procedure IP0P02-RH-0001, "Residual Heat Removal System Operation,"
Revision 8, dated January 22, 1988, and reviewed other system lineup
procedures to assure that approved procedures were consistent with
Technical Specifications (TS) requirements.
-This violation is considered closed.
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d. (Closed) Violation (498/8801-04): Containment Integrity - The
ability to :r.?et the 0.6 La criterion of Appenoix J to 10 CFR Part 50
was not determined prior to entering Mode 4 on October 31 and
November 1,1987, in that a local leak rate test had not been
performed on Containment Isolation Valve (CIV' BIRAMOV0003 after
maintenanct
The NRC inspector determined that the licensee subsequently performed
a local leak rate test (LLRT) on this valve. A review of MWRs, LLRT
data, and an HL&P office memorandum dated February 1,1988, verified
that proper testing has been completed by the licensee to assure
containment integrity. The licensee reported this failure to test
Valve CIV BIRAM0V0003 in LER 88-02, "Failure to Perform LLRT on CIV,"
dated February 4,1988.
This violation is considered closed,
e. (Closed) Violation (498/8801-06): Implementation of Technical
Specification Requirements - The NRC inspector found that the
licensee had failed to provide test procedures, which completely
implemented the final TS. Procedure 1 PSP 10-RC-0001, "Reactor Coolant
System Flow Determination," Revision 0, contained acceptance
criterion calling for a figure in the TS, which had been deleted when
the final TS were issued. Procedure OPSP10-11-0003, "Determination
of Limiting Hot Channel Factors and Axial Offset," Revision 2, dated
February 8,1988, contained an incorrect and nonconservative equation
for adjusting the core racial peaking factor limit for fractional
power levels.
The NRC inspector found that Procedure 1 PEP 04-ZG-0007, "Reactor
Coolant System Flow Measurement At Power," Revision 2, dated
January 21, 1988, was identified by the licensee as the proper
procedure for use in reactor coolant system (RCS) surveillance in
lieu of the previously referenced Procedure 1 PSP 10-RC-0001.
Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0002, Revision 11, dated February 2,1988,
requires an independent technical review of new procedures. The
procedure includes requirements to perform a "walk through" of new
surveillance procedures to confinn that the surveillance procedure
requirements can be accomplished. An attribute check sheet has been
added to confirm TS requirements.
The NRC inspector found that Procedure OPSP10-II-0003, "Determination
of Limiting Hot Channel Factors and Axial Offset," Revision 2, dated
February 8,1988, has been corrected to be consistent with TS. The
licensee completed a review of surveillance procedures to assure that
Mode 1 TS requirements are incorporated.
This violation is considered closed.
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f. (Closed) Violation (498/8801-07): Overdue Station Problem Report
Investigation - Sixty-eight of the 204 Station Problem Reports (SPRs)
were overdue (past 17 days) for completion.
The NRC inspector fnund that Procedure IP-1.45Q, "Station Problem
Reporting," Revision 1, dated February 22, 1988, increased licensee
management's involvement in the SPR process. The Plant Manager
establishes the priority and due date and SPRs are taken directly to
the Shift Supervisor by the originator. The licensee also assigned
additional licensing engineers to coordinate resolution of SPRs. The
backlog of overdue SPRs was resolved.
This violation is considered closed.
g. (Closed) Open Item (498/8801-11): Signoff Requirements for
Surveillance Tests - The NRC inspectors noted several chses where the
Unit Supervisor signed for the Shift Supervisor either to authorize
the start of testing or to signify the Operations Department's review
of the test results. Plant Operations Standing Order PRO-23,
Revision 2, allowed the Unit Supervisor to sign for the Shift
Supervisor for a number of things, but the order did not address
surveillance tests.
The NRC inspector determined that Plant Operations Standing Order,
"PRO-23 Unit 1," Revision 4, dated March 15, 1988, paragraph 4.6
states, "The Unit Supervisor has signature authority for the Shift
Supervisor for surveillance tests. In these instances the Unit
Supervisor shall ensure the Shift Supervisor is kept informed of
ongoing surveillances."
This item is closed,
h. (Closed) Violation (498/8817-01): Failure to Follow Procedures: The
NRC inspector found that the unit supervisor log and the reactor
operator log for the period February 29 through March 3,1988, noted
several entries into LC0 conditions which had been logged into one of
the two logs, but not in both logs.
The NRC inspector found that Procedure OPOP01-ZQ-0030, "Maintenance
of Plant Operations Logbooks," was revised on June 4, 1988, to
eliminate the use of dual logbooks. The Unit Supervisor and Reactor
Operator Logbooks have been combined into the "Control Room Logbook."
The control room logbook is maintained by the Reactor Operator.
This violation is considered is closed.
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4. Onsite Followup of Events (93702)
a. Failure to Meet Surveillance Requirements
On February 11, 1988, the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Train IB
quarterly valve operability test was performed. Review by the test
coordinator and the shift supervisor for valve stroke time limits
showed acceptable results, and the package was fomarded for review.
Procedure OPGP03-ZE-0021, Revision 3. "Inservice Testing Program for
Valves," requires the System Engineer to review the completed
surveillance package and perform a stroke time change evaluation.
The required review and evaluation for this test package was not
performed until mid May by the System Engineer.
On May 18, 1988, the Systems Engineer's stroke time change evaluation
for Valve FV-4548 (the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchange Outlet
Valve) indicated an increase in stroke time greater than 25 percent
of its previous stroke time. In accordance with OPGP03-ZE-0021,
paragraph 7.3.1, the referenced valve surveillance frequency should
have been increased to monthly. However, because of the lack of
timely review and evaluation of the test package, two required
surveillances were missed. The licenste intends to identify the
causes and corrective activities in LER 88-035. This is an apparent
violation (498/8839-01). -
b. Failure to Comply With Technical Specifications Related to Unmonitored
Release of Radioactive Effluent
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On June 4, 1988, at approximately 6:30 p.m. with the plant in cold
shutdown (Mode 5), approximately 1500 gallons of unanalyzed water was
discharged from Waste Monitor Tank (WMT) 1D to the Main Cooling
Reservoi r. WHTs 10, IE, and 1F were in recirculation prior to the
discharge. The licensee's investigation of the incident, as to
causes and corrective actions, indicates that two independent
surveillance data packages were received by the Radwaste Control Room
Operator to make the release from WMT 1E as required by the
licensee's Liquid Waste Effluent Release procedures. . Liquid Waste.
Effluent Radiation Monitor RT-8038 was not operable at this time. In
accordance with TS 3.3.3.10 effluent releases may continue with
Liquid Waste Effluent Radiation Monitor RT-8038 inoperable provided
at least two independent samples are analyzed in accordance with
TS 4.11.1.1.1 and at least two qualified members of the facility
staff independently verify the release rate calculations and
discharge line valving. At approximately 6:24 p.m., on June 7, 1988,
the MAB Roving Operator opened the manual isolation' valves on the
common discharge line. The Radwaste Control Room Operator (RW0)
mistakenly placed the WMT 10 Pump Discharge Valve handswitch in the
discharge position. The RWO should have placed.WMT 1E Pump Discharge
handswitch in the discharge position. At approximately 6:30 p.m., on
June 7,1988, the RWO placed the discharge header three-way valve
handswitch in the discharge position, which resulted in a discharge
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from WMT 1D. After discovering that the wrong tank was lined up and
discharging, the RWO terminated flow at approximately 6:35 p.m., on
June 7, 1988. A total of approximately 1500 gallons of unanalyzed
water from WMT 1D was discharged to the Main Cooling Reservoir. The
licensee intends to identify the causes and corrective action in
LER 88-036. This is an apparent violation (498/8839-02),
c. Failure to Meet Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements
On June 13, 1988, at approximately 6:50 a.m., Unit 1 entered Mode 2.
At approximately 11 a.m., on June 13, 1988, the licensee discovered
that the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruments had not had an Analog
Channel Operational Test performed in the previous 31 days as
required by TS 4.3.1.1. On June 12, 1988, prior to changing from
Mode 3 to Mode 2, the shift supervisor attempted to obtain various
department managers' signatures to verify that a review of their work
activities, including surveillance tests, supported a mode change in
accordance with the Plant Operation procedure. The Maintenance
Manager erroneously informed the shift supervisor that there were no
mode change restraints. After the plant entered Mode 2, the I&C
Divisional Surveillance Coordinator informed the shift supervisor
that the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation Analog Channel
Operatior:a1 Test had not been performed. On June 13, 1988, at
approximately 10:30 a.m. , the tests were satisfactorily performed.
Since this surveillance test was required prior to entering Mode 2,
the licensee was not in compliance with TS 4.0.4 from 6:55 a.m. on
June 13, 1988, to 10:35 a.m. on June 13, 1988. The licensee intends
to identify the causes and corrective actions in LER 88-038. This is
anapparentviolation(498/8839-03).
5. Shutdown from Outside the Control Room - Unit 1 (725838)
The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether the test was
consistent with regulatory requirements, guidance, licensee commitments,
and TS.
The NRC inspector reviewed Procedures IFEP04-ZY-0035, "Shutdown From
Outside The Control Room," and IT0P04-Z0-0001, "Temporary Control Room
Evacuation For Power Ascension Testing." The-review determined that the
procedures contained acceptance criteria requiring that the reactor and
turbine must trip and stable hot standby conditions be established and
maintained by manipulation of controls at the Auxiliary Shutdown
Panel (ASP) for at least 45 minutes, with no intervention required from
the Main Control Room. The procedure also required operating crew to be
positioned to monitor plant parameters in the Main Control Room.
The NRC inspector attended a pretest briefing for all personnel involved
in the testing. The test started on June 23, 1988, at 4:15 p.m. (CDT).
The reactor was tripped using the reactor trip switch gear and the turbine
tripped because of the reactor trip. Control of the plant was transferred
to the ASP from the Main Control Room. The plant was declared stable
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approximately 12 minutes after the reactor tripped. The plant was
maintained in a stable, hot standby condition for 45 minutes from the ASP.
After notifying the control room Shift Supervisor, control of the plant
was returned to the Main Control Room. All switches on the ASP were
restored and independently verified and data was collected in accordance
with procedures. There were some equipment problems encountered during
the initiation and restoration phases of the test. The equipment problems
are listed below:
When control of the Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves was transferred
to the ASP, the 150 gpm orifice isolation valve (A0V-0012) closed.
This caused a loss of letdown flow. The 100 gpm crifice isolation
valve was then opened from the ASP to restore letdown flow. When
control was transferred back to the control room af ter completion of
the test, the 100 gmp orifice isolation valve remained open. The
licensee wrote Maintenance Work Request (MWR) CV-59309 to investigate
and repair the problem.
The. Emergency Response Facilities Data Acquisition and Display System
Computer (ERFDAD) digital point for Turbine Trip did not toggle from
N/ Trip to Trip on the ERFDAD terminal at the ASP. MWR-ENa10738 was
initiated to investigated and correct this problein.
The A, C, and 9 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) above seat drain
valves could not be opened from the ASP and the Train "C" . valve had
no indication. After the completion of the test and transfer of
control back to the Main Control Room, the valves still could not be
opened. This inability to open the valves did not hinder the ability
of the operators to maintain the plant in a stable, hot standby
condition. Following the competion of the test, the transfer switch '
for the Train "C" valve was manipulated several times, and indication
and control of the valve was restored at the ASP.
Nonconformance Report (NCR)88-011 had previously been written
identifying this problem.
None of the problems encountered affected the test results. The
acceptance criteria for the test were met.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Monthly Maintenance Observation - Unit 1 (62703)
The station maintenance activities listed below were observed and
documentation was reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures.
On June 9, 1988, MWRs FW-59253 and FW-59254 were initiated to perform one
of the six modifications recommended by licensee engineers to prevent
recurrence of damages received by the No.11 Steam Generator Feed
Pump (SGFP)onMay 25, 1988. This modification (Modification
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Package-88098) entailed the addition of a low net positive suction
pressure trip to three SGFPs and the Startup Steam Generator Feed
Pump (S/U SGFP). The NRC inspector observed the operation of the S/U SGFP
following the modifications. A review of Modification Package-88098 by
the NRC inspector concluded that the work was performed in compliance with
established procedures. Instructions provided to maintenance personnel in
the MWRs appeared to be adequate for the circumstances. The S/U SGFP
operability test run was within the acceptance criteria. All systems
functioned satisfactorily.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Monthly Surveillance Observation - Unit 1 (61726)
The NRC inspector observed selected portions of the surveillances listed
below to verify that the activities were being performed in accordance
with the TS and surveillance procedures. The applicable procedures were
reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified to be in
calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness.
Identified deficiencies were properly reviewed and resolved. -
a. Procedure 1 PSP 02-SI-0952, Revision 0, "Accumulator IB Level Group 4
Calibration." The NRC inspector witnessed the data acquisition, and
the verification of accuracies for channel sensor, alarm, associated
signal processing equipment, and remote displays as required by
TS 4.5.1.2.b. The NRC inspector noted that the results were within
the TS limits.
b. Procedure 1 PSP 02-SI-0955, Revision 0, "Accumulator 1C Level Group 4
Calibration." The NRC inspector observed portions of the
verification test which checked the accuracy of Channel L-0955 Hi/Lo
alanns. A review of the completed data package by the NRC inspector
confirmed that the results were within TS limits.
c. Procedure 1 PSP 06-PK-0006, Revision 0, "4.16KV Class 1E Tolerable
Degraded Voltage Coincident With SI and Sustained Degraded-Voltage
Relay Channel Calibration." The NRC inspector observed a portion of
the performance of 1 PSP 06-PK-0006 and verified that the test met the
requirements of TS 3/4.3.2, paragraph 4.3.2.1. The NRC inspector
verified that the data acquired was accurate and complete and that
affected systems were restored to normal. No discrepancies were
identified. ,
d. Procedure 1 PSP 03-CS-0003, Revision 2, "Containment Spray Pump 1C
Inservice Test." The NRC inspector observed the performance of
IPSP03-CS-0003 on Containment Spray Pump 1C and verified that the
pump was operating in compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code,Section XI. Additionally, compliance with TS 4.0.5 and
4.6.2.1.b was verified.
No violations or deviations were identified,
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8. Operational Safety Verification - Unit 1 (71707)
The objectives of this portion of the inspection were to verify that the
facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory
requirements, that management controls are effective, that selected
activities of the licensee's radiological protection programs are
implemented in conformance with plant policies and procedures and in
compliance with regulatory requirements, and to inspect the iicensee
compliance with the approved physical security plan.
The NRC inspector visited the control room on a daily basis and verified
that control room staffing, operator behavior, shift turnover, adherence
to TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCOs), and overall control room
decorum were consistent with NRC requirements.
The NRC inspector observed the following annunciators illuminated during
each visit to the control room:
Lampbox-3M03, Window D-4-D.G. - Fuel Oil Storage Tank'11 Level Hi.
Lampbox-2M02, Window C-2 - Containment Elec. Pen. El' 60 Leak Hi.
Lampbox-2M02, Window D-2 - Containment Elec. Pen. El' 35 Leak Hi.
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Lampbox-2M02, Window E-2 - Containment Elec. Pen. El' 10 Leak Hi.
After discussing this concern with licensee management, the NRC inspector
was informed that an annunciator task force had been organized to
investigate all annunciator alarms. Futher discussions with a member of
the annunciator task force indicated that Change Authorization
Request (CAR) 88004 had been initiated to identify and correct problems
associated with Lamobox-3M03. Also, Configuration Control
Package (CCP) 1E-FST-0885 had been issued to identify and correct problems
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associated with Lampbox-2M02-C-2, D-2, and E-2. The NRC inspector will
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monitor licensee actions regarding this concern.
Tours were conducted in various locations of the plant to observe work and
operations in progress. A review of Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 88-1-0651:
was made regarding information required by licensee procedures relating to
the performance of work in a safe manner and under controlled conditions.
The NRC inspector verified that the referenced RWP contained information
which referenced: job description, radiation levels, contamination
levels, respiratory protective equipment, dosimetry, and expiration dates.
The NRC inspector noted that RWPs were prominently posted.
On a sampling basis, the NRC inspector verified that the security force
was functioning in accordance with the approved security plan. During
entrance and exits from the protected area (PA), the NRC inspector
verified that search equipment such as X-ray machines, metal detectors,
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and explosive detectors were operational. The NRC inspector noted during
tours of the vital areas that barriers were well maintained and observed
no weakness or obvious breaches.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown - Unit 1 (71710)
The NRC inspector walked down accessible portions of the tain feedwater
and main steam systems for Steam Generator 1C to verify system
operability. A review was performed to confirm that the licensee's system
operating procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built
configuration. Equipment condition, valve position, housekeeping,
labeling, and support subsystems essential to actuation of the systems
were noted. The systems were walked down using the drawings and
procedures as follows:
Main /eedwater System for "Steam Generator IC,"
Proce dure 1P0P02-FW-0001, Revision 3, Drawing SS139F00063,
Revision 11A.
Main Steam System "Steam Generator 10," Procedure 1P0P02-MS-0001,
Revision 4, Drawing SS109F0016, Revision 6.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Licensee Action on Reported Events - Unit 1 (92700)
The NRC inspector performed onsite followup on the.following licensee
event reports (LERs) to determine whether the licensee had taken
corrective actions as stated in the LERs and whether responses to the
events were adequate and met regulatory requirements, license conditions,
and commitments.
i- a. (0 pen) LER 87-03, "Actuator Motor Shaft-to-Pinion Keys Sheared Due to
Incorrect and Defective Material"
This LER reported failure of the shaft-to-pinion keys in the-
Limitorque SMB-0-25 motor operators for all three Unit 1 essential
cooling water (ECW) pumps discharge valves. The licensee also
reported these failures under 10 CFR 21 and 10 CFR 50.55(e). The
failures apparently resulted from use.of incorrect material for
fabrication of the keys. Licensee corrective-actions included
replacing all keys in SMB-0-25 operators with keys fabricated from
. the specified AISI 1018 material. This replacement was completed
only for operators installed in Unit 1. Also, the licensee inspected
a sample of six Limitorque actuator models having less than
25 foot-pounds starting torque and found no deficiencies. The
results of.this inspection were documented in Revision 6 to
NCR 87-121, which was not included in the closeout package originally
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presented to the NRC inspector. The NRC inspector questioned whether
the licensee personnel who recommended closure of this LER were aware
of the results of the sample inspection.
This LER will remain open pending replacement of the keys in the
Unit 2 SMB-0-25 actuators,
b. (Closed) LER 87-05, "Personnel Error and Incorrect Operator Response
Causes Auto-Actuation to Recirculation Mode for Control Room
Ventilation"
This event resulted from incorrect operator response to an
annunciator actuated when a cleaning person inadvertently tripped a
breaker supplying backup power to an inverter. In the restoration
attempt the inverter was deenergized. This resulted in loss of
control power to the toxic gas monitor, which caused auto actuation
of control room ventilation to the recirculation mode. The
licensee's corrective actions included posting of signs anL
appropriate retraining.
This LER is considered closed.
c. (Closed) LER 87-12, "Safety Injection (SI) Cold leg Injection Valves
Found Closed When Required Open"
This event involved having the SI system inoperable for 51 hours5.902778e-4 days <br />0.0142 hours <br />8.43254e-5 weeks <br />1.94055e-5 months <br /> with
the plant in Mode 4. The NRC inspector reviewed procedure and
turnover log changes, which should be helpful in precluding
occurrence of this event and similar events. Also, appropriate
remedial training was conducted for licensed operators.
This LER is considered closed.
d. (Closed) LER 87-14, "Control Room Ventilation Actuation to
Recirculation Mode Due to a Toxic Gas Monitor Detecting Paint Fumes"
This event resulted from inadequate administrative controls for
preventing toxic gas monitors from being exposed to paint fuices.
Contributing factors were two open pipe penetrations between
Room 501B and the air inlet chase for the control room. The licensee
posted warning signs concerning use of solvents and paints on the air
intake room doors. Procedure OPGP03-ZF-0007, Revision 2,
incorporates requirements which should prevent inadvertent
auto-actuation of control room ventilation to the recirculation mode ,
because of painting. Also, installation of air tight seals in
Room 501B was accomplished per Contractor Work Request 2348.
This LER is considered closed.
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e. (Closed) LER 88-17, "Pressurizer Low Pressure Safety Injection
Setpoint Too Low Due to Procedural Error"
This event involved incorrect and nonconservative translation of a TS
setpoint required for Safety Injection (SI) to surveillance
procedures, which resulted in operation with a setpoint in violation
of TS. In following up on this error, the licensee discovered the TS
setpoint for power range flux high positive rate was not covered by
surveillance procedures. The NRC inspector reviewed procedure
changes, which corrected both these errors, and audit reports stating
that no further TS translations errors exist. The licensee changed
its program, subsequent to this event, to require verification of
implementation of TS changes by the Nuclear Assurance Department.
This LER is considered closed,
f. (Closed) LER 87-19, "Slave Relay Surveillance Deficiency Due to
Personnel Error"
,
This event occurred as a r1 sult of incorrectly deleting a
surveillance procedure fie d change, which would have tested a slave
relay contact necessary for containment spray actuation. The
licensee's corrective actions included counselling instrumentation
and control group technical supervisors regarding the necessity of
independent review of field changes to surveillance procedures prior
to performing the affected procedures. Also, similar procedures were
reviewed to ensure that identical errors nad not been made.
This LER is considered closed.
g. (Closed) LER 87-21, "Inadvertent Actuation of Engineered Safety
Features (ESF) Load Sequencer and Standby Diesel Generator"
This event involved ESF Train "B" standby diesel start and load
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shedding when the load sequencer was partially deenergized for
troubleshooting. Load sequencing then began when the load sequencer
was reenergized a few minutes later. The licensee determined that
the load shedding and sequencing would.not have occurred if the load
sequencer had been deenergized by opening the main circuit breaker.
The licensee's corrective actions included the following:
- Revision of the vendor manual to clarify the proper method for
deenergizing the ESF sequencer.
- Conducting training for instrumentation and control technicians
on the proper method of deenergizing the ESF sequencer
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Placing caution signs on the ESF sequencer to warn technicians
and operators to use the main circuit breaker for deenergizing
the sequencer
This LER is considered closed.
h. LER 87-24, "Control Room Ventilation Actuation to Recirculation Mode
Due to Inadvertent Operction of Pushbutton By Technician"
This event occurred during performance of a modification to disable
the pushbutton which was inadvertently pushed to cause actuation of
the control room ventilation system to the recirculation mode. The
technician had just disabled a similar pushbutton for the fuel
handling building radiation monitoring system (RMS) and intended to
push that pushbutton. The involved pushbutton subsequer,tly was
disabled as planned. Also, a meeting was held for RMS technicians to
reinforce the need for attention to detail in performance of work.
This LER is considered closed.
i. (Closed) LER 88-04, "Loose or Corroded Toxic Gas Monitor Computer
Board Electrical Connection Results in ESF Actuation"
A failed computer chip in the toxic gas monitor caused an ESF
actuation of control room ventilation to the recirculation mode. The
licensee inspected and cleaned the monitor card cages and boards and
adjusted the card frame assembly covers. No apparent reascn for the
failure was discovered; however, the licensee believes the most
probable cause was a loose connection on an integrated circuit board.
Licensee engineering determined that vibration of the circuit board
frame should not have contributed to the loosening of connections.
The licensee doec not expect further similar failures. - A' licensee
task force is studying a design modification to reduce the number of
unnecessary ESF actuations and challenges to the system resulting
from toxic gas monitoring malfunctions.
This LER is considered closed.
_j. (Closed) LER 88-09, "Unanticipated Safety Injection Signal From'SSPS
Resulting From Procedural Deficiency"
An unanticipated ESF Train "A" SI actuation occurred during a
surveillance test of Master Relay K-736R. This was being performed
in accordance with a field _ changed procedure, which failed to require
placing the Paster Relay Selector-S switch to off prior to placing
the Mode Selector to operate. This event was similar to LER 87-019
discussed above and, therefore, indicated 'a need for more rigorous
reviews of procedure field. changes.' A similar procedure had
previously been completed successfully.for Train "B" because the
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technician performed the step without pointing out the procedure
deficiency. The licensee's corrective actions included:
Training to emphasize the importance of procedure reviews,
procedure compliance, initial performance of revised procedures,
and reporting of procedure deficiencies
Requiring a second, independent technical review of procedure
revisions and new procedures
This LER is considered closed,
k. (Closed) LER 88-11, "Non Performance of a Scheduled Test for
Essential Chilled Water Pump as a Result of a Lost Test Package"
This event occurred as a result of apparent loss of a surveillance
test package during routing between the surveillance program
scheduler and the main control room. A contributor to the event was
the failure of the missed surveillance to be properly flagged by the
overdue report feature of the program. Also, a mode change report
had the wrcng due date for tne surveillance. The frequency of this
test had recently been shortened because of previous test results in
the alert range. The licensee's corrective actions included:
- Verifying that tests were not missed in other instances when the
test frequency had been changed
Adding a requirement in Procedure OPG03-ZE-0004 for divisional
surveillance coordinators to periodically review upcoming tests
to ensure the.t test packages are received by the start date
- Documenting the method of changing the test frequency based on
previous test results in Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0055
This LER is considered closed.
1. (Clesed) LER 88-19, "Prematurely Terminating a TS Limiting Conditicn
for Operation (LCO) Requirement Cult,_o_ Personnei Error"
This event resulted from the failure:of shift operators to properly
log the inoperability of SI and containment spray when Train "A"
essential c. hiller became inoperable. This error ultimately resulted
in improperly exiting an LC0 with both Train "A" and "C" low head SI
inoperable. Licensee corrective action included:
- Revision of Procedure OPOP01-ZQ-0030 to provide a more
structured review for impact of inoperable equipnent on other
systems, including independent evaluations
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Training for operations personnel on determining impact
inoperable components may have on other systems
This LER is considered closed.
11. Nonroutine Event Review - Unit 2 (90711)
The NRC inspector reviewed Interdepartmental Procedure IP-1.45Q,
Revision 1, dated February 22, 1988, "Station Problem Reporting," and
completed discussions with licensee personnel to ascertain whether the
licensee had assigned responsibilities for the review of off-normal
operating events on planned and unplanned maintenance activities. The
inspection verified the following:
"
The licensee had assigned responsibilities for a timely review and
evaluation of off-nonnal operating events to assure identification of
safety-related events. The iaquirements for the plant manager,
Station Problem Report (SPR) coordinator, nuclear assurance, Nuclear
Safety Review Board (NSRB), Plant Operating Review Comittee (PORC),
classification and control officer, security force supervisor, and
administrative controls are addressed in Procedure IP-1.45Q.
The licensee had delegated the responsibilities for the timei/ eview '
of planned and unplanned maintenance and testing activities to assure
identification of violations or potential violations or problem areas
for proposed TS Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs). (NOTE:
all requirements shall be fully applicable when the station TS are
issued in conjunction with the Operating License.)
Procedure IP-1.45Q addressed these delegations of responsibilities.
The licensee had delegated responsibilities for assuring completion
of corrective actions relating to safety-related events. The
delegation of responsibilities addressed in Procedure IP-1.450
included the originator, first-line supervision, management, SPR
coordinator, and other appropriate personnel.
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The licensee had delegated responsibilities for assuring completion
of corrective actions relatir.g to safety-related operating events.
Procedure IP-1.45Q discussed the responsibilities for corrective
actions in detail, provided guidelines for imediate investigations,
and discussed types of data which should be included in establishing
the root causes, generic implications, and the corrective actions.
12. Shutdown From Outside The Control Room - Unit 2 (70352)
The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure 1 TOP 04-Z0-0001, "Temporary Control
Room Evacauation For Power Ascension Testing," Revision 0, and
Procedure 1 PEP 04-ZY-0035, "Shutdown From Outside The Control Room,"
Revision 2.
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These procedures describe the methods to shutdown the reactor, maintain
the reactor subcritical, maintain reactor coolant inventory, and achieve
and maintain the reactor in hot standby (Mode 3) from cutside the main
control room using the minimum number of shif t operating personnel. These
procedures meet the NRC requirements, and licensee conmitments stated in
the TS (proposed); FSAR Chapter 14.2.12.3, Test Description 25,
Amendment 53; and Regulatory Guide 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for
Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2, paragraph 5, "Power
Ascension Tests," Test d.d (page 1.68-18).
13. Containment Combustible Gas Control System (Hydrogen Recombiners) -
Unit 2 (70342)
a. Description
The Electric Hydrogen Recombiners (EHR) are natural convection,
flameless, thermal reactor-type hydrogen / oxygen recombiners. The EHR
consist of two independent recombination units. Each unit contains
electric heater banks, a power supply panel, and a power control
panel. The EHRS are permanently installed inside the Reactor
ContainmentBuilding(RCB). The power supplies and control panels
are located outside the RCB.
b. Documentation and Procedure Review
The NRC inspector reviewed the following documentation and procedures
related to operation and testing of the EHR:
- 0917-00001-BWN, Revision B, "Electric Hydrogen Recombiner,"
Model B, FCR BN-00256 DE-1802, Technical Manual, South Texas
Nuclear Generatirl Station, Units 1 and 2
NSD-TO-E-74-20, "Hydrogen Recombiner Temperature Instrumentation
Checkout, Calibration & Test Procedure," Revision 1, dated
December 4, 1974
NSD ELEC-2, "Storage of Electrical Instrumentation and Control
Equipment,' Revision 2, dated August 1973
- 2-CG-P-01, "Electric Recombiner," Revision 0, dated
September 15, 1987
Regulatory Guide 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled
Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, dated August 1978 and
Appendix A. "Initial Test Program," paragraph 1.h.(4)
- FSAR, Amendment 61, Section 6.2.5, "Combustible Gas Control in
Containment" and Section 14.2.12.2 (103), "Combustible Gas
Control System Preoperational Test Summary"
Applicable Drawings are listed below:
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Vendoe Dwg. No. Sht/Rev Controlled Drawing No.
9553 0 97/1/5 N159 X 3153 - WN
9553 0 97/2/3 N159 X 3154 - WN
9553 D 97/3/1 N159 X 3155 - WN
9553 D 97/4/3 N159 X 3156 - WN
9553 0 97/5/2 N159 X 3157 - WN
c. Review of Preoperation Test Procedure
The NRC inspector reviewed Preoperational Test Procedure 2-CG-P-01,
"Electric Recombiner," Revision 0, dated September 15, 1987. This
procedure requires testing that will demonstrate the minimum air flow
(EHR design minimum air flow capacity is 10C scfm) through each EHR
1s adequate, and each EHR will have sufficient electrical power (EHR
electrical requirements are: 4-wire, 3-phase, 60 Hz. 480 VAC, 75 KW
maximum power output) to achieve recombination tempet.+.ure (1225 + or
- 10*F).
The preoperational test acceptance criteria and requirements and the
EHR design characteristics are addressed for normal operating
conc'itions and postulated LOCA operating conditions. The test
procedure adequately addressed NRC requirements and licensee
commitments related to testing and verification of operating
requirements for the two EHRs. Preoperational testing of the two
EHRs are scheduled for Novernber 1988. The NRC inspector wiM observe
the preoperational testing of the EHRs at Unit 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Reactor Pressure Boundary Piping - Unit 2 (49053and49055)
The NRC inspector performed an inspection of selected systems in the
reactor pressure boundary piping, and the related records to determine
wi ether licensee activitie: associated with the fabrication of the reactor
pressure boundary piping system and docunentation of these activities had
been completed in accordance with the specifications, drawings, and
procedures. The NRC inspector selected the High Head Safety Injection
Sy stem (HHSI), Low Head Safety Injection System (LHSI), and the
Containment Spray System (CS) in the Train "B" for this inspection. These
three :ystems are located between columns 28 and 30 and on both sides of
the pump centerline from elevations -29 feet to -10 feet in the fuel
handling building,,
a. Work Observation
The NRC inspector verifiea that +.h3 as-built piping systems were
constructed in accordance with the drawings. The welding,
nondestructiveexaminations(NDE),andinstallationofpipinghangers
were not included in the inspection. This inspection verification
started at the suction header at column line 28 and proceeded through
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the bay and back through the discharge and selected auxiliary lines
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to the column 28 line, lhe piping was inspected for dimensional
conformance to the piping isometric drawings. The systems were also
inspected for nonconforming conditions, including visible or surface
damage, proper pipe sizes, fabrication errors, and related
construction and installation items. The following isometric
drawings were referenced and used for comparison during the
inspection activities:
5F-369P-SI-572, Sheet 1, Revision 7, LHSI Discharge
2F-362P-SI-572, Sheet 5, Revision 0, HHSI Discharge
2F-369P-SI-572, Sheet 4, Revision 9, LHSI & HHSI Suction
5F-069P-SI-572, Sheet A01, Revision 10, Auxiliary Systems
2F-369P-SI-572, Sheet A09, Revision 9, Auxiliary Systems
5F 369P-SI-572, Sheet A02, Revision 7, Auxiliary Systems
5F-369P-SI-572, Sheet A04, Revision 5, Auxiliary Systems
SN-129 F05014, No. 2, Revision 9, Safety Injection and Piping
Diagram
2F-369P-SI-572, Sheet 01, Revision 7. CS Suction. Discharge, and
Auxiliary Systems
- 4F-369P-CS-515, Sheet A04, Revision 6, Auxiliary Systems
5F-369P-CS-515, Sheet 04, Revision 2, Auxiliary Systems
- SN-109F 05037, No. 2, Rsfision 9, CS Piping Diagrom
The NRC inspector noted that the licensee had identified a problem
area in flange connections. A licensee procedure, "Site Specific
Procedure - 10" (SSP-10), required bolt tightening as "snug." The
NRC inspector determined that this requirement does not h?se a
functional meaning. The licensee is revising the applicable
procedures to include torque values and/or definitions to the
assembly process. The NRC inspector will reinspect the flange
connections subsequent to completion of the licensee's rework.
b. Records
The NRC inspector reviewed records packages for selected portions of
the systems inspected to assess conformance and verify that:
The records were properly identified and retrievable within a
reasonable time.
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The records confirmed that the components were installed and
inspected as required.
The records reflected that the materials installed were the
materials specified. ;
The records were complete and provided a traceable path for the
construction process. The following records were reviewed:
- High head and low head safety injection suction line flange
bolt-up, including Flanges S-1 and N-1.
- High head and-low head safety injection pumps to flange
conections. These components are detailed on Piping
Is. +ric Drawing F-369P-SI-572, Sheet 4, Revision 9, and
the ri es were designated as M21-MBFC-SI-2201-01, -02, -03,
and 4. The NRC inspector reviewed the piping fabrication
ch w ists, bills of material, bolted connections,
inspection reports, and the mechanical equipment / mechanical
supports checklist.
- Spool piece data packages for HHSI, the 6-inch discharge
line, SI-2206-DB2, which included Spool Pieces SI-2206-A,
-B, and C are shown on Drawing 2F362P-SI-572, Sheet 5,
Revision 0. The records are filed in a file designated as
505-SI-2206-A, -B, and -AB.
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The contents of the ASME Code data packages were reviewed for
the required drawings, Matarial Test Reports (MTRs), and NDE
reports.
The NRC inspector deterniined that the records were adequate and contained
the required information to complete the package and document the related
activities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Safety-Related Components - Unit 2 (50073 and 50075)
The NRC inspector performed an inspection of safety-related components to
evaluate the fabrication and installation process and to determine whether
the installation was in accordance with the applicable drawings,
a. Spray Additive Tank
1. Work
The Train "B" spray additive tank as shown on
Drawing SN-129P-05014, Sheet 2, Revision 9; em' Wettinghouse
Drawing 1212E61, Revision 2, was inspected in letail by the NP.C
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inspector. The inspection included weld quality, detail of
parts, fabrication, damage, and dimensions. The manhole covers
were inspected for cladding, bolting, and functional ability.
2. Itecords
The vendor data package was easily retrieved from the records
vault by licensee personnel. The NRC inspector reviewed the
records for required ASME Code required forms, materials test
reports for the shell, welding consumables (electrodes), bill of '
materials, drawings, and NDE records. The records were reviewed
for correctness, completeness, legibility, and identification.
No descrepancies were identified,
b. Components
The NRC inspector also inspected tha following components during the
inspection of the spray additive tank. These items were inspected
for attributes that could be identified by visual inspection.
'
Equipment / Components Inspected for:
Area radiation monitors Damage, cables, installation and
status
Emergency lighting Test function and loss of power
Valve remote control These units were being cleaned by
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disassembled reach rod licensee personnel at the time the
assemblies inspection was being performed
! HHSI, LHSI, and CS pump motors Grounding, instrumentation, oil, .
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level, damage, bolting, and
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general appearance
No violations or deviations were identified during the inspection.
16. Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) on July 6,1988, and sumarized the scope and findings _of the
inspection. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and lice- ae management ,
were held periodically during the inspection to diMuss identified
cor; ' erns . The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
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