ML20134N845
| ML20134N845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1985 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134N844 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-42505, TAC-42506, NUDOCS 8509050380 | |
| Download: ML20134N845 (15) | |
Text
.. -.. - --..
\\
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR. REGULATION HATCH UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKETS N05. 50-321 AND 50-366 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY INTRODUCTION Equipment which is used~te perform a necessary safety function must be demonstrated to be capable of mainteining functional operability under all service conditions postulated to occur during its installed life for the time it is required to operate. This requirement, which is embodied in General Dcsign Criteria 1 and 4 cf Appendix A and Sections III, XI, and XVII of i
Appendix B to 10 CFR 50, is applicable to equipment located inside as well as outside containment. More detailed requirements and guidance relating to the methods and procedures for demonstrating this capability for electrical equipment have been set forth in 10 CFR 50,49, " Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Sefety for Nuclear Power Plants,"
NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment" (which supplements IEEE Standard 323 ar.d various hRC Regulatory Guides and industry standards), and " Guide-
^
lines for Evaluating Envircreental Qualification of Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors" (NRC Division of Operating Reactors (DOR)
Guidelines).
BACKGROUND On February 8,1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operating plants (except those included in the systematic evaluation program (SEP)) IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-01, " Environ-mental Qualification of Class IE Equipment." This Bulletin, together with IE Circular 78-08 (issued on May 31,1978), required the licensees to perform reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.
8509050380 B N DR ADOCK 05000 1
On January 14, 1980, NRC issued IEB 79-01B which included the DOR Guidelines and NUREG-0588 as attachments 4 and 5, respectively. Subsequently, on May 23, 1980, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 was issued and stated that the DOR Guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 fonn the requirements that licensees must meet regarding environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. General Design Criterion (GDC) 4. Supplements to IEB 79-018 were issued for further clarification and definition of the staff's needs. These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.
In addition, the staff issued orders dated August 29, 1980 (amended in September 1980)andOctober 24, 1980 to all licensees. The August order required that the licensees provide a report, by November 1, 1980, docu-menting the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment. The October order required the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipment qualification records. The central file was mandated to be established by December 1, 1980. The staff subsequently issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment to the licensee on June 16, 1981. This SER directed the licensee to "either provide documentation of the missing qualification information which demonstrates that safety-related equipment meets the DOR Guidelines or NUREG-0588 requirements or connit to a correc-tiveaction(requalification, replacement (etc.))." The licensee was required to respond to NRC within 90 days of receipt of the SER.
In response to the staff SER issued in 1981, the licensee submitted additional information regarding the qualification of safety-related electrical equip-ment. This information was evaluated for the staff by the Franklin Research Center (FRC)inorderto:
1)identifyallcaseswherethelicensee's response did not resolve the significant qualification issues, 2) evaluate the licensee's qualification documentation in accordance with established criteria to determine which equipment had adequate documentation and which did not, and 3) evaluate the licensee's qualification documentation for safety-related electrical equipment located in harsh environments required for TMI Lessons Learned Implementation. A Technical Evaluation Report (TER) was issued by FRC on January 21, 1983. A Safety Evaluation Report was sub-
F r
i noser.tly issued to the Georgia Power Company on March 31,1933, with
- ne FR TERs as an attacnment.
A final rule on environmental cualification of electric eouipmen: imoortant n safety for nuclear power plants became effe:tive on Feoruary 22, 1933.
1 Tnis rule, Se: tion 50.49 of 10 CFR 50, specifies the requirements of sie:trical eouipment important to safety located in a hersh environment.
In accoroance with this rule, eouipment for hat:h Units 1 and 2 may oe cualified
- o tne criteria soe:ified in eitner the D0R Guicelines or NUREG-05?2. excert l
for reolacement equipment. Replacement equipment installed subsecuent to Feoruary 22. 1933 must be qualified in accordance with tne provisions of 10
- R 5C.49. usin-tne guidsnee of Regulatory Guide 1.89, unle:s tnere are l
s;un:' reasons :0 tne contrary.
l l res:tng was held with each licensee of olar.:s for which a TER nad ceen crecared for :ne staff by FRC in order to discuss all remaining open issues regarding environmental cualification, includinc accentability of tne environmental conditions for eq0ipment. qualification purposes, if tnis issue nad no: yet been resolved. On Feoruary 14, 1984, a meeting was held to
~
discuss Georgia Power's proposed method to resolve the environmental
,iustif t:ation for continued operation for thsie 'er;uipment items for which envirarter..a1 mai 11:atior is not yet ecmple:ed. The minutes cf tre meeting 1
j and rrenost: metno: of resolution for each of tne environmental cualif t:ation cef t:ien:tes are documented in March 30 and June 4,1984 suomittals from tne licensee.
i By letter dated April 4,1985,'the staff infomed the Ifeensee of its still unresolved deficiencies.
The licensee responded by letter dated May 10, 1985 with its proposed resolution of the deficiencies.
l l
^~
EVALUATION Tne evaluation of tne acceo: ability of the licensee's electrical eculpment environmental cualification program is based on the results of an audit review performed by the staff of: (1) the licensee's proposed resolutions of the environ = ental tualification deficiencies identified in the March 31, 1933 SERs anu January 21, 1933 and February 8,1985 FRC TER; (2) compliance with tne recairements of 10 CFR 50.4.9; and (3) justification for continued oceration (2C0) for tnose ecuioment items for which the environmental cualifics-tion is not ve: comoleted.
l Pr:cesed Fescie:icns cf Ice.-Fiec Leficiencies Tne precosed resciutions for :ne equipment environmental cualifica:icn l
ceficiencies. icentifiec in tne March 31, 1983 SERs, and tne F?.: TE:.s en:losed with them,,uere described in the licensee's tiarch 30 and June 4,1954 su:mittals. During tne Feoruz y 14, 1984 meeting with tne licensee, :ne staff discussed tne procosed resolution of each oeficiency for each ecutement item icentified in tne FRC TERs and found tne licensee's apcroach for resolving tne icentified environmental cualification oeficiencies ac:ec:able.
Tne majori:y cf ceficiencies icentified were documentaticn, siciiart:y, a';tr.g, cualiftec i fe and reolacement seneaule. All oren :: ems l
identified in the SERs dated March 31, 1983 were also discussed and the i
l resolution of these items, with the exception of the containment i
pressure / temperature (p/T) profiles, was subsequently found acceptable by the staff. The licensee had taken credit for early manual initiation of the drywell spray (10 minutes into the. transient) thus eliminating the long period of superheated steam conditions that are present in the drywell temperature equipment qualification profiles for other Mark I plants. Based on our review of the spray system dependencies and operator actions needed to initiate the sprays, we found that credit for drywell sprays as early as 10 minutes following onset of a transient was unacceptable. By letter dated l
April 4,1985 we informed the licensee of our concerns and provided guidance with respect to resolution of the issue. We provided a drywell temperature i
profile based on actuation of the drywell sprays 30 minutes following onset of the transient and asked the licensee to demonstrate that it could initiate the drywell sprays within this time interval and to evaluate the equipment that will be exposed to the drywell environment against this temperature profile.
The-licensee responded to our' request by letter dated May 10, 1985 The licensee informed us that, for a small break (SB) LOCA, the low pressure injection system is not required to maintain the core covered and cooled.
In.its analysis submitted in a letter dated February 24, 1984, the licensee assumed that the low pressure injection system was immediately available for and dedicated to drywell spray for 58 LOCAs.
For larger LOCA's, the -licensee
' informed us that the resultant drywell temperature profile is less severe than for SB LOCAs without drywell spray and that therefore, drywell spray operation is not necessary to ensure equipment qualification survival for line 2
breaks greater than 0.5 ft,
The licensee stated that it is formulating new emergency operating procedures (EOPs). These procedures will effectively require operator action to initiate drywell sprays within 30 minutes for in-containment high energy line breaks that would otherwise produce an environment harsher that that for which drywell equipment has been qualified. The licensee has acted out these accident scenarios using the Hatch main control room simulator and the new E0Ps. In each case, the drywell sprays were initiated by operator action L
within 30 minutes of commencement of the simulated-break. The licensee has i
revised the emergency procedures currently in use at Hatch which deal with operator action to initiate drywell sprays. The revisions require operator I
action upon occurrence of the same parameters used for manual spray initiation in the new E0Ps. Confirmation of the revised procedures will be obtained usino the control room simulator.
We conclude, on the basis of our review of the licensee response as discussed above, that the drywell sprays can be manually actuated when required, within 30 minutes _ following the onset of an accident. This will assure that the i
drywell environment will not be harsher than the temperature profile provided by the staff which was based on drywell spray actuation at 30 minutes.
The licensee also responded that environmental test data and analyses currently on file-demonstrate that each~ piece of equipment (in the drywell) will continue to perform it's intended function for the required time interval during and after exposure to the temperature profile provided in our April 4, 1985 letter.
On consideration of this information, we conclude that the pressure temperature profile issue is acceptably resolved.
ine ac:rcstn ces: riced by tne licensee for addressing and resclving vs icentified ceficiencies in:iu:es replacing equipment, perfonning actitional analyses, utili:ing additional cualification cocumentation beyond tnat revieef oy ??.0, c:taining addi-ional cualification dccumentation and ceter:1r.ing Ina: some e:uiomen: 1s outside tne scoce of 10 CFR 50.49, and tnerefore not re:uirec te ce environmentally cualified, e.g., lo:atec in a miid environment. he discussed tne proposed resolutions in cetail cr. an item by item oasis with tne licensee during the December 5,1953 meeting, iteplacing or exem: ting ecuipment, for an acceptable reason, are clearly acceptable metncds for resolving environmental cualification deficiencies.
..s The more lengthy cis:ussions with tne licensee concerned the use of additional analysts or documentation. Altnough we did not review tne additional analyses or cc:umen:ation, we discussed how analysis was being used to resolve oeficien:ies icentified in tne FRC.TE.R,30,nd,the content of tne additional cc:veentation in creer to determine the acceptability cf these methods. The licen;ee's equipment environmental qualification files will be audited by the staff during follow-up inspections to be performed by Region II, with assistance from IE Headquarters and NRR staff as necessary.
Since a significant amount of documentation has already been reviewed by the staff and Franklin Research Center, the primary objective of the file audit will be to verify inat they contain the appropria,te analyses and other necessary documentation to support tne licensee's conclusion that the equipment is qualified. The inspections will verify that the licensee's program for surveillance and maintenance of environmentally cualified equipment is adequate to assure that this equipment is maintained in the as analyzed or tested condition. The method used for tracking periodic.
replacement of parts, and implementation of the licensee's commitments and actions, e.g., regarding replacement of equipment, will also be verified.
Based on our discussions with the licensee and our review of its submittal, we find the licensee's approach for resolving the identified environmental qualification deficiencies acceptable.
r 7
Cemoliaace With *10 CFR 50.49 In its tiarch 30 and June 4,1984 submittals, the licensee has described the approach used to icentify equiprrent within the scope of paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR 50.49 relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis, events.
The l.icensee states that the FSAR is the basis for determining tne systems recuired to mitigate the effe:ts of the pestulated LOCA and HELB accidents. Tne LOCA and HELB accidents provide tne limiting environmental conditions te wnich safety related equipment would be exposed. Equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(b) is qualified to the mest severe design basis accioent during or following which the ecutoment is recuired to remain functional. All design basis events both inside and
.outside containment, including flooding, which could potentially result in a harsh environment have been identified and evaluated. For areas outside containment which may experience High Energy Line Breaks (HELBs),
temperature / pressure profiles that envelope the worst case conditions were developed using methods and assumptions that are documented in the Hatch Fina[ Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs). Fo'r. equipment inside containment, both Loss Of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs) and HELBs were evaluated. A plant specific analysis of the LOCA for Hatch is documented in the FSARs, while the drywell HELB analysis is contained in the General Electric Company document, NSEO-52-0583.
Equipment inside the drywell will be qualified to the temperature / pressure profiles for both types of accidents. Therefore, all design basis events at Hatch Units 1 and 2 were considered within the scope of Paragraph (b)(1) of 10 CFR 50.49.
Tne licensee's approach for identifying eouipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(1) is in accordance with the requirements of that paragraph, and therefore acceptable.
The method used by the licensee for ioentification of electrical equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 50.49, nonsafety-related electric equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions, is summarized below:
1.
Equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49(b) is qualified to the most severe design basis accident during or following which the equipment is required to remain functional. All design basis events both inside and
-8 outside' containment, including ficoding, which could potentially result t
.in'a harsh environment have been identified and evaluated. For areas outside containment which may experience High Energy Line Breaks
'(HELBs),-temperature / pressure profiles that-envelop the worst case conditions w'ere developed using methods and assumptions that are documented in the Hatch Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs). For equipment inside containment, both Loss Of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs) and HELBs were b
evaluated. A plant specific analysis of the LOCA for Hatch is. documented in the FSARs, while the. drywell HELB. analysis. is contained in the General Electric Company document, NSEO-52-0583. Equipment inside the drywell will be qualified to the temperature / pressure profiles;for both types of accidents.
I 2.
The elementary wi' ring diagrams of the safety-related electrical
{
equipment icentified in item 1 above were reviewed to identify any I
auxiliary devices electrically connected directly intc the control or power circuitry of the safety-related equipment (e.g., automatic trips) whose failure due to postulated environmental conditions could prevent required operation of the safety-related equipment.
3.
Auxiliary equipment required to support accident mitigation is included in the Hatch'oualification equipment list if it is located in a harsh environment.
4.
The GPC review of. elementary diagrams included analysis of all j
circuitry electrically connected to the safety related components. In j
each situation a review was made to ensure that the non-safety-related circuits were electrically isolated from the safety-related circuits by 3
i fuses or circuit breakers.
We find the methodology used by the.l'icensee is acceptable since.it provides 1
l reasonable assurance that equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(2) of i
10 CFR 50.49 has been identified.
.i l
With regard to paragraph (b)(3) of 10 CFR 50;49, the l' censee' refers to its i
March 30,1984 letter for identification of instrumentation and sarrpling -
~
equipment which requires environmental. qualification to meet the intent of 1
Regulatory Guide 1.97. The staff has not.yet completed its review for con-1
_ _ _ - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _
fsrmance to Regulatory Guide 1.97.
However, in the March 30, 1984 letter tne licensee states that GPC is presently not comitted to all of the cositions of Regulatory Guide 1.97; however, instrumentation which has been or will be classified by GPC as within the scope of categories I or 2 of R.G.1.97, will be cualified to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. The staff will determine the acceptability of any exceptions as part of its review for confermance with Regulatory Guide 1.97. This further staff review for Regulatory Guide 1.97 conformance may result in the licensee being required to include additional equipment in its environmental qualification program.,
however,the licensee has included in its environmental qualification program certain post-accident monitoring equipment using the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.97.
He find the licensee's approach to identifying equipment within the scope of caragraph (b)(3) of 10 CFR 50.49 acceptable since it is in accordance with the requirements of that paragraph.
- Justification for Continued Goeration The licensee has provided, in its June 4, July 24 and September 26, 1984 and :tarch 4,1985 submittals, justification for continued operation addressing each iten of equipment for which the environmental qualification is not yet completed (see enclosure for the JC0 equipment list).
He r. ave reviewed each JC0 provided by the licensee in the above submittals and fi r.:.nem acceptable since they are based on essentially the same criteria that vers used by the staff and its contractor to review JCO's previously submitted by licensees. These criteria, listed below, are also essentially the same as those contained in 10 CFR 50.49(1),
a.
The safety function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that is qualified, and failure of the principal equipment as a result of the harsh environment will not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
b.
Partial test data that does not demonstrate full qualification, but provides a basis for concluding the equipment will perform its function. If it can not be concluded from the available data that o
_ ~-
. 10'-
i t
the equipment will not fail after completion of its safety function, then that failure must not result in significant degradation of any 3
safety function or provide misleading information to the operator.
i c.
Limited use of administrative controls over equipment that has not l
been demonstrated to be fully qualified.
For any equipment assumed to fail as a result of the accident environment, that failure must not result in significant degradation of any safety function or provideL misleading information to the operator.
i l
i i
i CONCLUSIONS 4
i l
Based on the above evaluation, we conclude the following with regard to the qualification of electric equipment important to safety within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
t Georgia Power's electrical equipment environmental qualification o
l program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
i The proposed resolutions for each of the environmental qualification o
}
_ deficiencies' identified in the March 31, 1983 SERs and enclosed FRC TERs j
and in the staff's April 4,1985 letter to the licensee are acceptable.
]
3 o
Continued operation until completion of the licensee's environmental qualification program will not present undue risk to the public health j
and safety.
J o
i l
i i
j i
i i
i
ENCLOSURE
[
I JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION EQUIPMENT LIST j
FOR HATCH UNIT 1 FRC TER ITEM GPC PLANT ID. NO.
NLSSER EQUIPMENT TYPE EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER /MODEL NO.
821-MOV F019 3
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class 8 Insul.
5 Ell-MOV F0040 24 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class B Insul.
i Ell-MOV F075A 23 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class 8 Insul.
Ell-MOV F006 178 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class 8 Insul.
t Ell-MOV F009 14 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class H Insul.
Ell-MOV F021A B 19 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service Class B Insul.
E21-MOV F004A,8 15 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class 8 Insul.
E21-MOV F005A,8 15 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class 8 Insul.
Ell-MOV F022 13 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service Class H Insul.
E41-MOV F001
-21 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class B Insul.
I E41-MOV F003 2
-Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class 8 Insul.
E41-MOV F006 N/A Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class 8 Insul.
E41-MOV F041 16 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class B Insul.
E41-Mov F007 N/A Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service Class B Insul.
E51-MOV F008 16 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class B Insul.
j ESI-MOV F031 6
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class 8 Insul.
G31-MOV F001 13 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class B Insul.
G31-MOV F004 16 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, DC Service, Class 8 Insul.
{
P33-P001A,8 99 Prf. Cont. Atm H &0 Hayes E63211 0 & SH6430 H Analyzers j
2 2
2 2
Analyzer i
R11-5039.40 101 Transformer Sorgel Model 101023-5 i
R24-5011, 12 97 Panelboard Westinghouse WEHB CKT 8KR EMB l
Panelboard.
~
l'52-MOV F875 3
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class B Insul.
i PS2-PIS NO21 N/A Press. Ind. Switch Ashcroft 1377TA.
i
FRC TER ITEM GPC PLANT ID. NO.
NUMBER EQUIPMENT TYPE EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER /MODEL NO.
T41-TIS N019 A,8 71 Temp. Ind. Switch Honeywell T654A1560 T41-TIS N020 A,B 71 Temp. Ind. Switch Honeywell T654A1560 T41-TIS NO21 A,B 71 Temp. Ind. Switch Honeywell T654A1560 T46-DPT N005 B,C 181 Diff. Press. Xmtr.
Rosemount Il51DP3822LfMB T47-TE N003.9 124 Temperature Element Rosemount 10414591 T48-E/S K001 120 Power Supply FGeneral Electric 570062FAAC1 t
l T48-PT N001 112 Press. Xmtr.
GE/MAC Model 551 T48-TE N009 A.B.D 122 Temperature Element Rosemount 104-1460-1 T48-TE N009C 123 Temperature Element Rosemount 104AGP-4 T48-FIT N014 A,8 119 Flow Indicating Xmtr.
Brooks 3611 T48-HOV Fil2 A,8 98 Hydraulic Operated Valve Fisher Controls 350 T48-E/S K0ll.B 118 Power Supply Brooks 55230X T48-LT N021 A,8 N/A Diff. Press. Xmtr.
Rosemount 1153083PA T48-DPS N210.11 85 Diff. Press. Switch Barksdale DPD 2TA3' B21-DPIS N006 A,B.C.D 76 Diff. Press. Ind. Switch Barton 288 821-DPIS N007 A,B,C.D.
76 Diff. Press. Ind. Switch Barton 288 B21-DPIS N008 A,B,C.D 76 Diff. Press. Ind. Switch Barton 288 B21-DPIS N009 A,B,C.D 76 Diff. Press. Ind. Switch Barton 288 821-TS N010 A,B,C D 125 Temperature Switch Fenwall 17002-40 821-TS N0ll A,B,C.D 125 Temperature Switch Fenwall 17002-40 B21-TS N012 A.B.C,0 125 Temperature Switch Fenwall 17002-40 821-TS N013 A.B.C.D 125 Temperature Switch Fenwall 17002-40 321-LIS N017 A.B.C.D 80 Level Ind. Switch Barton 288A B21-PS NO21 B,C 76 Press. Switch Barton 288 j
B21-PS N021 A.D.E.F 81 Press. Switch Barksdale B2TM12SS I
B21-LITS NO26 A,8 78 Level Ind. Xatr. Switch Yarway 4418CE l
B21-LIS N024 A,8 78 Level Ind. Switch Yarway 4418C l
B21-LIS N025 A,B 78 Level Ind. Switch Yarway 4418C l
821-LIS NO27 109 Level Xmtr.
GE/MAC 55511180AA3PDF i
e
=
j 4
i l-FNt TER ITEM i
GPC PLANT 18. NO.
InseER EQUIPIEllT TYPE E@lMENT MAIRIFACitRES/ISSEL 18.
1 l
i B21-LIS NO31 A.B.C,0 78 Level Ind. Switch Yarway 4418C B21-LITS NO36,37 78 Level Ind. Metr. Switch Yansay 4418CE B21-L15 N042A,8 78 Level Ind. Switch Yansay 4418C 831-48W F031A,8 10 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SIS 3, AC Service Class M Insul.
1 C32-PT N0054,8 108 Press. Xmtr.
GE/MAC 551032GKZZ2556 C71-PS N002A.B.C.B 73 Press. Switch Static-0-Ring 121SB40tX E11-8PT N002A,8 114 Diff. Press. Xmtr.
Bosemount 11510P732215 j
Ell-PS N0104,B.C,0 77 Press. Switch Static-0-Ring 12NAA5X9TT Ell-PS N0llA.B.C,0 77 Press. Switch Static-0-Ring 12NAA5X9TT j
Ell-FT N0154,8 107 Flow Intr.
Barton 368 i
Ell-PS 110164,5,C,0 75 Press. Switch Static 0-Ring SNAA3X10SITT j
Ell-PS N0204,B.C,0 75 Press. Switch Static 0-Ring 5NA43X10SITT i
i Ell-OPIS IIO21A,8 79 Diff.. Press. Ind. Switch Barton 289 i
E21-FT N00M.B 110 Flow Xatr.
Bailey Meter 55511180AA43PDF E21-FIS N.B 79 Flow Ind. Switch Barton 289 E21-PS IID0 Bis.B 75 Press. Switch Static-0-Ring SIIAA3X10SITT 7
E21-PS 1100B4,5 82 Press. Switch Barksdale B21M12SS j
E41-MOV Felt 21 Notor Operated Valve Limitorque SMS, DC Service, Class B Insul.
E41-Not F012
-21 Hotor Operated Valve Limitorque SIS, DC Service, Class B Insul.
E41-PS IID01A,8,C,0 82 Press. Switch Barksdale B21M1255 t
l E41-PS 11004,5 74 Press. Switch Barton 288 j
E41-FS N006 79 Flow Switch Barton 289 i
E41-FT 11008 110
' Flow Intr.
Bailey Meter 555111804A4 MAL
- E41-PS 11010 72 Press. Switch Static-0-Ring 6114A21X10SITT t
E41-PS II012A,3.C,0 72 Press. Switch Static-0-Ring 6114A21X10SITT i
j E41-PS II017A,8 72 Press. Switch Static-0-Ring 511AA3X10SITT i
E41-LS N015A,8 83 Level Switch Bobertshaw 83842A2 E41-PS 11027 82 Press. Switch Barksdale B2TN12SS i
~
E41-TE 11030A,8 126 Temperature Element PVC0 N145C3224P1 j
E41-TE N046A,8 126 Temperature Element PVC0 N145C3224P1 i
I 4
FRC TER ITEM GPC PLANT ID. NO.
NUMBER EQUIPMENT TYPE EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER /MODEL NO.
E51-TE NO268.D 126 Temperature Element PYC0 N145C3224P1
~
E51-TE N026A.C 129 Temperature Element PVC0 N145C3224P1 E51-TE N025A 8,C,0 127 Temperature Element PYC0 N!45C3224P1 ESI-TE N027A.B.C.D 128 Temperature Element PVC0 N145C3224P1 E51-TE NO23A,8 129 Temperature Element PYC0 N145C3224P1 E51-PS N012A,B.C.D 86 Press. Switch PVC0 N145C3224P1 ESI-DPIS N017.18 76 Diff. Press. Ind. Switch Barton 288 ESI-PS N019A.B.C.D 82 Press. Switch Barksdale 82TM12SS G31-TE N016A,8,0.E.F 128 Temperature Element PYC0 N145C3224P1 G31-TE NO22A,B.C.D.E.F 128 Temperature Element PYC0 N145C3224P1 G31-TE NO23A B.C.D.E.F 128 Temperature Element PVC0 N145C3224P1 F31-TE N016C.F N/A Temperature Element PYC0 N145C3224P1 G31-FT N012.36.41 115 Flow Xmtr.
GE/MAC 5551118CAA4WAK N1-4, H1-16 155 PVC Cable Okonite 600V PVC 154 PVC Cable Okonite 600V PVC H1-16 145 PVC Cable Okonite RG598/U 4
J2-03, J2-04 N3-04 148 PVC Cable Boston Insulated Wire 4/C 116 AWG MS-20s N/A PVC Cable Okonite S/C #20 AWG E41-C002(LS4)
N/A Limit Switch NAMCO D200G-ST-2 E41-C002 (SV1)
N/A Solenoid Valve Unknown N3-19 N/A PVC Jacketed Cable Unknown N3-03 N/A PVC Jacketed Cable Unknown E
e 1
e e
r m
(
l i
i l
I JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINDED OPERATION EQUIPMENT LIST FOR HATCH UNIT 2 GPC PLANT ID. NO.
NUMBER EQUIPMENT TYPE EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER /MODEL NO.
2 Ell-MOV F021A 25 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class B Insul.
2 Ell-MOV F016A 25 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMS, AC Service, Class 8 Insul.
2 Ell-MOV F0168 5
Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service, Class 8 Insul.
2 Ell-MOV F0218 21 Motor Operated Valve Limitorque SMB, AC Service Class F Insul.
2P33-P001A,8 N/A
.Prf. Cont. Atm. H &0 Consip Delphi Mark K IV/Thennon Heat 2
2 Analyzer Trace Tenninal Blocks Buchanan i
~
1 l
e
(
-.