IR 05000327/1993001

Insp Repts 50-327/93-01 & 50-328/93-01 on 930103-30.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Maint,Surveillance,Evaluation of Licensee self-assessment Capability,Ler Closeout & Followup on Previous Insps

ML20128G506
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	02/05/1993
From:	Holland W, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128G496	List: IR 05000327/1993001 ML20128G492
References
50-327-93-01, 50-327-93-1, 50-328-93-01, 50-328-93-1, NUDOCS 9302160028
Download: ML20128G506 (3)

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UNITED ST ATES

.# %(% - - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslONl

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.101 MARIETTA STREET '-* 2 ' ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.:' 50-327/93-01.'and 50-328/93-01 Licensee: . Tennessee Valley Authority 16N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Stree Chattanooga :TN 37402-2801-

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-Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.:- DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah' Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: ._ January 3-through'30, 1993'

Lead Inspector: M e Vd 4 6 d M M 2 - S- 9_7 W. E. Holland, Senior-Rasident ' Inspector Date Signed-Inspectors: S. M. Shaeffer, Resident Inspector

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S. E. . arks Resident Inspector-Approved by: / f 2, f3 Pa#1 L c" ' ', Chief 75ection e 4A _ DaAe Signed Division o ctor Projects <

SUMMARY ..

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This routine resident inspe'ction was. conducted on site'in,the areas: of plant; operations, plantimaintenance, plant surveillance,. evaluation of licensee _  !

self-assessment capability,-licensee event report closeout,' and; followup' on"

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previous inspection' findings. During the performance of.:this' inspection, the'

resident--inspectors conducted: several reviews of' the' licensee's backshif tL or---

weekend operations.

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9302160028 930205-PDR -ADOCK 05000327 - PDR" _

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Results:

During a review of operator aid usage, the inspectors noted- that several ,

hundred operator aids were in place which indicated that additional management attention was warranted in this area to provide for appropriate corrective actions to minimize the need for high usage'of operator aide (paragraph 3.b)..

In the Engineering / Technical Support functional area, a weakness was identit(ed with regard to the licensee's monitoring program for erosion of piping in the secondary plant. The weakness involved.not identifying target tee components for monitoring based on past-component failure history (paragraph 4.b).

In the Surveillance functional area, the inspectors observed good communications between operators and other testing. personnel during performance of two test activities (paragraph 5).

In the Engineering / Technical Support functional area the inspectors noted a relatively high number of outstanding JCOs that-were active in the operator's log which required documentation to justify operability for safety-related-systems, structures, and components (paragraph 6).

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_i REPORT DETAILS-

~ PersonsContadt'ed

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-Licensee ~ Employees) *

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• R. Fenech, Site Vice President o

• R. Beecken Plant. Manage ,'

Baumstark, Operations Manage '

• J *L=. Bryant,-Maintenance Manager

• L. Bush, Acting 0perations Manager .

• Coo)er, Site Licensing Manager '

R. Drace, Project Management.and Controls Managerc

• T. 'Flippo,- Site Quality Assurance Manager

• J. Hanson, INP0: ,'

C. Kent.- Radiological Control _' Manager:

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• D. Lundy, Nuclear Engineering Site Support Manager

• J. Haciejewski, General: Manager Nuclear Assurance- 0

• H. Palmer, Radiological: Protection Manager-

• R. - Poole, Mechanical . Instrument Group Manager '

• Proffitt,-Licensing Engineer R. Rausch,. Modifications. Manager-H. Rogers, Acting Technical- Support- Manager

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J. Smith, Regulatory Licensing Manager . ,,

• R. Thompson,_. Compliance Licensing-Manage '

• P. Trudel, Nuclear' Engineering Manager a J. Ward, Engineering and Modifications Manager- ,

N. Welch,10perations Superintendent ~

• K. Whittenburg, Public Relations

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B Wilson, Chief,- DRP-Branch 4 P.-Kellogg Chief DRP Section 4A

• Attended exit interview.- 1 Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, .

shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and.other cplant personnel.-

On January 6,: and-7, -1993, Mrv Paul Kell _ogg,J NRC, RII,i DRPLvisited 1the - i Sequoyah site._ Mr. Kellogg met with resident; inspectors and reviewed ;t ongoing plant. issues,: attended the; resident monthly exit, ' met with;-

licensee. management', and toured the plant'with the. resident: inspector ' On January;27,.-1993 : plant. management announced the' following immediate

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management; and organizational * changes for Sequoyah_ ' Nuclear Plant.-  :

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In Operations,-Hr. Jim Baumstark was named as the Operations: . . . 4

- Manager. _The Fir.e Protection group was placed directly under'the; Operations Manager"in= order to-better focus 1 management attention--

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A full-time Outage Manager position for the outage organization was created reporting directly to the Plant Manager. Mr. John Gates was named as the Outage Manage The Chemistry and Radiological Controls organizations were merged into one organization. Mr. Charles Kent was named as manager of the organizatio In addition, Mr Dennis Lundy was named as the new Manager of Technical Support effective April 5, 199 Acronyms and initialisms used in this report are listed in the last paragrap . Plant Status 4 Unit I began the inspection period in MODE 3. The unit was taken -

critical on January 3, returned power operation on January 4 and resumed full power operation on January 6, 1993. The unit operated at approximately full power for the duration of the inspection perio ,

Unit 2 began the inspection period in MODE-l with preparations being made to connect the turbine generator to the grid. The unit was shut down to MODE 3 on January 7 in order to perform additional testing on VCT and RWST isolation valves. The unit was taken critical on January 9 and returned to power operation on January 10. Power operation continued until January 29, when the unit was shut down to conduct maintenance on secondary plant components. The unit was taken critical on January 30 and was continuing with the startup when the inspection period ende . Operational Safety Verification (71707) Daily Inspections The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:

control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operato adherence to approved procedures,-TS, and LCOs;. examination o panels containing instrumentation and other. reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of contr'o1 room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, temporary. modification iogs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved. procedure The inspectors also routinely accompanied plant management on plant tours and observed the effectiveness of management' influence on activities being performed by plant personne Weekly Inspections

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The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas: operability verification of selected ESF systems by valve-alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component, and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to ,

system actuation or performance. Plant-tours were conducted which -

included observation of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, missile hazards, and plant housekeeping conditions / cleanlines During a plan-of-the-day meeting on January 22, 1993 the inspectors observed that operations supervision identified that several hundred operator aids were in use throughout the plant and that this was too high a number. The inspectors noted that the quarterly operator aids review was ongoing at this tim The inspectors obtained a copy of the current operator aid log sheets frcm operations management and made the following observations:

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There was a total of 433 active operator aids -located throughout the plant. Most of the aids had been installed by operations personne Aids were used for assistance in equipment operation, safety information, as part of corrective actions for PERs, for identification of abandoned equipment, as_ cautionary information during equipment operation, and.for notification of others during evolution The inspectors consider that an operator. aid process, when used as a short term interim. action, was useful. However, the inspectors agreed with licensee operations management that too many operator aids were in use throughout the plant.--They also noted the aggressive attitude that operations was taking to reduce the number of aids. However, the fact that several hundred aids were in place indicated that additional' management attention was warranted in this area to provide for appropriate corrective actions to minimize the need for high usage of operator aid Biweekly Inspections The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas: verification review and walkdown of safety-related-tagouts in effect; review of the sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant _ liquid and gasecus samples); observation of control room shift turnover;-

review of implementation and use of the plant corrective action program; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineups;-and verification that notices to workers are

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posted as required by 10 CFR 1 : .

4 , Other Inspection Activities Inspection areas included the turbine building, diesel generator building, ERCW pumphouse, protected area yard, control room, vital 6.9 KV shutdown board rooms, 480 V breaker and battery rooms, and auxiliary building areas including all- accessible safety-related pump and heat exchanger room RCS leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate actions were taken, if required. The inspectors routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC RCS leak rate computer program specifically formatted for Sequoyah. RWPs were reviewed, and specific work activities were monitored to assure they were being accomplished per the RWP Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequencies were verified.- Physical Security Program Inspections In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program.-The-performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital-area access controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors; badge issuance a;1d retrieval; and patrols and compensatory posts. In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, and protected and vital areas barrier integrit Within the_ areas inspected, no violations were identifie . Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700)

During te reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance-activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures and requirements. Inspection areas included the following: During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed activities associated with identified leakage through. steam generator blowdown sample isolation valves. -The inspectors noted that the licensee had identified-that_6 of the 8 sample valves (3 on each unit) were leaking which required operators to declare the _ valves inoperable and enter TS LCO ACTION 3.6.3.c. The licensee subsequently replaced two of.the leaking valves (one on each unit) .

with new valves. - The inspectors determined that the licensee intends to rebuild the replaced' valves and use them for replacement after refurbishment.- At- the end of the inspection period, 4 sample valves were considered inoperabl The-inspectors held additional-discussions with engineering and licensing personnel with regard to the problem resulting in the

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valve leakage and were informed that this issue had-been identified in a significant corrective action report. The inspectors were provided a copy of the SCAR No. SQSCA910017. The SCAR identified that various Target Rock Valves, which.were being'

used to perform a containment isolation function, were experiencing leakage due to buildup of corrosive products on the ,

valve internals. The licensee discussed the problem with the-vendor and they stated that they could provide a new seat design which should eliminate the aroblem. The licensee was considering the-vendors proposal when tie inspection aeriod ended. The inspectors will continue with review of t11s area during the next inspection perio b. On January 27, 1993 at the licensee's morning plan-of-the-day meeting, the insaectors observed dx ,cussions about a secondary plant piping le u that had been identified on Unit 2 during the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The leak was identified to be on the operating vent line for the 2A2 moisture separator reheater low pressurr drain tank. The inspectors toured the turbine building after the meeting and noted the leak location. The leak was in a location which could not be isolated from extraction steam being supplied by the high pressure main turbine. The leak area on turbine building elevations 685 and 706 had been roped off due to the hazard of steam blowing out of the pipe. The leak was described as a pipe blowout at an target tee due to erosion of the minimum radius portion of the ten elbow. The inspectors discussed the deficiency with plant management and noted that the plant had experienced similar leaks during past operatio On January 28,_1993 the licensee determined that a temporary repair could not be made at full power and commenced a power reduction on Unit 2 to reduce the stram blowdown through the lea After reducing power and making preparations for a temporary-repair, an unrelated problem on the nain-generator resulted in-a management decision to shut down and nake a permanent repai The Unit entered MODE 3 on January 29, and the leaking target tee was cut out and replaced. The licensee also inspected similar piping configurations and determined that an additional._ target tee required replacement. The_ licensee determined that adequate margin existed for restart on all other tees inspecte Unit-2 was returned to power operation on' January 31, 199 The inspectors questioned licensee management s.ith regard to whether the failed target tee was in'the licensee's-program for monitoring for detection of erosion which would allow fo identification of repair need prior to failure. The licensee stated that the failed component had not been included in the monitoring program. The inspectors consider that the licensee's failure to have not included the target tee in their monitoring program prior to failure was a program weaknes a

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Regional management was briefed on the licensee's ongoing actions to correct the target tee leakage problem on Unit 2 by the inspector Regional management-decided to send a region based specialist to review the licensee's corrective actions and monitoring programs commencing February 1, 199 .

Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie . Surveillance Inspections (61726 & 42700)

During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures and requirements. The inspection included a review of the following procedures and observation of surveillances:- On January 8, 1993 the inspectors observed the performance of special test instruction STI-152, VERIFICATION OF VCT/RWST VALVE OPERATION FOR CVCS CHARGING PUMP, Revision 0. -This test was performed on Unit 2 in order to verify proper operation of the CVCS charging pump suction valves 2-LCV-62-132, 133, 135, AND 136 with regard to coordination logic designed into the valvec control circuitry. The inspectors noted good test control,-including constant communication between the-test director in the control room and personr.el involved in the test'in the Unit 2 auxiliary instrument roo No deficiencies were noted.- On January 26, 1993 the inspectors observed the performance on surveillance instruction 2-SI-SXP-074-128.B. RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 2B-B QUARTERLY OPERABILITY TEST, Revision The-inspectors verified-that required test equipment was installed in_accordance with procedure and that calibrations were current. .The inspectors noted that good communication was being maintained.between the operators in the control room and at the pump location.- The inspectors reviewed the completed surveillance package after -

reviews were completed-by the operating crew. No deficiencies were note Within the areas inspected, no' violations were identifie . Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment _ Capability (40500)-

During-this inspection period, selected reviews were conducted of the-licensee's ongoing self-assessment. programs 'in order to -evaluate the effectiveness-of these program On January 21, 1993 the inspectors reviewed the log of active engineering evaluations /JCOs which was being maintained in the control'

room as required by SSP-12.14, JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION / WAIVERS OF COMPLIANCE, Revision The stated purpose of_ SSP-12.14 was, in part, to provide guidance for determining and formally

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documenting the operability of nonconforming safety-related systems, structures, and components and preparing a justification for continued operation with the nonconforming SSC. The inspectors determined that 57 outstanding engineering evaluations were contained in the logs, some of which required operator actions to compensate for the identified deficiencies. The inspectors selected a sample of 7 evaluations from the log and reviewed these with licensee personnel on January 26. The following evaluations were reviewed:

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SQJC0-92-009, Rev. O dated June 12, 199 This issue was discovered during licensee review of a locked snubber condition, i

- SQJCO-92-010, Rev. I dated July 22, 199 This issue involved potential for non-conservative uncertainty calculations for steam generator level instrumentatio SQJCO-92-014, Rev. O dated August 6, 1992. This issue invclved main steam valve vault temperatures which exceeded design value SQJCO-92-016, Rev. O dated August 6, 199 This issue involved identification of problems with calculations used in 10CFR50.49 design output documents.-

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SQJC0-92-018, Rev. O dated August 6, 199 This issue involved calculations which had not been maintained current to reflect as-constructed plant change SQJCO-92-019, Rev. O dated August 6, 199 This issue involved a l problem associated with the letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature exceeding its analysis value.

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SQJC0-92-020, Rev. O dated August 6, 1992. This issue involved a problem with non-seismically qualified cartridge filter conversion kit The inspectors discussed each of the preceding JCOs with licensee personnel in order to understand the general status of each item in the review process. The inspectors determined that each issue was being addressed; however, they could not determine the priority of review based on safety-significance. The licensee also identified an-additional 8 items to be added to the logs making a total of 65. The l inspectors concluded that most of the JC0s did not require operator L action as a compensatory measure. However, they also concluded that the i number of outstanding J.COs appeared to be a relatively high number of-l items which required documentation to justify. operability for safety-l related systems, structures, and component Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.

! Licensee Event Report Review (92700)

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1he inspectors reviewed the LER$ listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to evaluate initial adequacy of the corrective actions. 1he inspector's review also included followup on implementation of corrective action and/or review of licensee documentation that all required corrective actions were either complete or identified in the licensee's program for tracking of outstanding action (Closed) LER 327/92-16, planned Entries into LCO 3.0.3 When Both Control Room Emergency Ventilation Irains Were Removed from Service to facilitate Damper Replacement. 1he issue involved removal of both trains of the control room ventilation system from service for planned periods of less than 20 minutes per period in order to conduct maintenance for replatement of two dampers ir the system. The inspectors were aware of the planned mainte.. ce activities, noted that the licensee had instituted comprehensive planning and contingency measures, and noted that all activities were completed as planned in minimum tim Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified, s Action on previour, insp9ction Iindings (9270),92702)

(Closed) URI 327, 328/91-02-02, Evaluation of Design Basis for the EDG

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Starting Air System. The issue was identified in inspection report 91-02 and further discussed in inspection report 92-19. lhe 93-19 report indicated tl.at the licensco's position was being ieviewed by the NRC staff with regard to the 5 start requirement specified in NUREG 0800 and ISAR 9.5.6 and whether operator actions to accomplish this requirement was acceptabl The NRC staff review, which was completed in December 1992, determined that, although the licensco's system does not meet the gnidance for air start volume, Sequoyah's decision to maintain the "save start" feature by manual isolation is preferable from a safety standpoint to establishment of an on-line five-start capability by aligning both sets of air receivers for automatic operatio Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on february 4, 1993 with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph I abov The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license l l

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' Strengths and weaknesses summarized in the results paragraph were discussed in detai Licensee management was informed of the items closed in paragraphs 7 and . List of Acronyms and initialisms CVCS - Chemical and Volume Control System ESF - Engineered Safety feature JC0 - Justification for Continued Operation KV -

Kilovolt LCO -

Limiting Condition for Operation LCV -

Level Control Valve LLR -

Licensee Event Report PER -

Problem Evaluatloa Report RCS - Reactor Coolant System RWP -

Radiation Work Permit RWST -

Refueling Water Storage Tank S -

Surveillance Instruction SOS -

Shift 0)erating Supervisor SR0 -

Senior leactor Operator SSP -

Site Standard Practice TS - Technical Specifications URI -

Unresolved item VC1 -

Volume Control Tank