ML20091F217
| ML20091F217 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1991 |
| From: | Hupp J, Magee R, Miller T WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20091F201 | List: |
| References | |
| WCAP-12927, NUDOCS 9112020037 | |
| Download: ML20091F217 (214) | |
Text
. - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
WIISTINGllOUSE CIASS 3 WCAP 12927 O
RESIDUAL llEAT REhiOVAL SYSTEhi AUTOCLOSURE INTERLOCK REhiOVAL 1(EPORT FOR YOGTLli ELEC11(IC GENEl(ATING PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 GEORGIA POWER Coh1PANY September 1991 T. A. hiiller J. hi. Ilupp
. R. D. hia;;-
G.E. Lang F,11.13askerville O
Westinghouse Electric Corporation ,
Nuclear Advanced Technology Division P.O. Ilox 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15:30
- 1991, Westinghouse Electric Corpormion. all rights reserved.
- WPO$$4:1D/D00491 .I 9112O20037.911120 PDR P-ADOCK 0500o424
_ ppg
O A11STitACT A review and analysis has been performed for the Vogtle Electric Generating Phnt, Units 1 and 2, which justified the removal of the autoclosure interlock associatto with the Residual llent Removal System suction / isolation valves. The methodology utilized in the analysis was based on the Westinghouse Owners Group funded generic WCAP 11736, Residual lleat Removal System Autoclosure Interlock Removal Report for the Westinghouse Owners Group" The only change to the valve interlock and circuitry is to remove the autoclosure portion of the interlock and add a control room alarm to notify the operator of an incorrectly positiored valve. Tlw valve open permissive circuit will not be altered. A probabilistic analysis and an overpressurization analysh were used to demonstrate that the removal of the autoclosure interlock is acceptable from both a core safety and Residual Heat Removal System overpressurization standpoint.
O O
O WPOSs4t10/082791
= , , . . . . , , . , , , ,
O TAllLliDF_ CONTENTS Sullun Tille htte AUSTRACI' s TABLE OF CONTENTS i
! EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
vill 1.0 INTRODUCrlON 11 1.1 Objective 11 1.2 WOG Program: WCAP 11736 14 1.3 Hackground _ 16 2.0 VOGTLE RESIDUAL llEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM 21 DESCRIPTION 2.1 General Description 21 _
2.2 Residual lleat Removal System 21 2.3 Current RilRS Suction / Isolation Valve 2 12 Interlocks and Functional Requirements 2.3.1 Current Interlocks 2 12 2.3.2 RIIRS Common Suction / Isolation Valve 2 14 Description 2.4 Reference Plant Differences 2 22 3.0 PROPOSED llASIC LOGIC ClIANGE 3 1..
O WP0ss4 1D/082791 i
1 O !
IAllLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
O 4.0 l'ROllABILISTIC ANALYSIS 41 ,
4.1 Introduction 41 4.2 Data 41 ,
4.3 Interfacing Systems LOCA Analysis 42 4,4 Residual llent Removal System Unavailability 46 .
Analysis 4.5 14w Temperature Overpressurization Analysis 4 11- l 4.5.1 initiating Events 4 12 4.5.2 Analysis 4 13 5.0 ADEQUACY OF TIIE RilRS RELIEF VALVE 51 ,
CAPACITY 6.0 PROPOSED DOCUMENT CilANGES 61 6,1 Technical Specifications 61 6.2 Final Safety Analysis Report 62
7.0 CONCLUSION
S AND RECOMMENDATIONS 71 ,
8,0 REFERENCES 81 ,
O 1 WP0554:1D/082791 li
@ TAllLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title l'ngt API'ENDICES A INTERFACING SYSTEMS LOCA ANALYSIS A1 B 111111S UNAVAILABILITY ANALYSIS 111 C 1.OW TEMPERATURE ANALYSIS C1 e i
O 1.lST 01 TAlll_liS Table Iille Eage 21 Westinghouse /llechtel Valve Identification 2 24 Cross Reference 22 Reference Plant Comparison 2 26 41 Component 1 ailure Rate Data 4 19 42 Interfacing System LOCA Frequencies With and 4 21 Without Autoclosure Interlock
- 43. RilRS Unavailability Results 4 12 4-4 Frequency of Overpressure Transients 4 23 45 Transient Event Outcome Descriptions 4 24 4-6 Vogtle Charging / Safety injection Actuation 4 28 Results 47 Vogtle 1.4tdown Isolation RilRS Operable Results 4 29 4
48- Vogtle Letdown Isolation RilP.S isolated Results 4 30 O
WPOS$4:10/DB2791 l l
O LlST_OF_ FlOUIES l'igure lille htge 21 Vogtle Residual llent Removal System 2 27 22 Current Interlocks for Valves llV 8701 A/Il and 2 28 IIV 8702A/ll (Sheet 1) 22 Current Interlocks for Valves llV 8701A/Il and 2 29 IIV 8702A/Il (Sheet 2) 23 Logic Diagram for the RilRS isolation Valves 2 30 0 2-4 RilRS Suction Valve Interlocks Process Control 2 31 Diagram 25 RliRS Suction Valve 1IV 8701A Control Circuit 2 32 _
26 RilRS Suction Valve llV 870111 Control Circuit 2 33 1
27 RilRS Suetion Valves llV 8702A Control Circuit 2 34 28 RilRS Suction Valves llV 870211 Control Circuit 2 35 O
i O
VDO$54:1D/082791--
V
?
a
!O 1.lST OF FIGURES (Continued)
O '= ** *= .
31 Proposed Interlocks for Valves IIV 8701 A/B and -
llV 8702A/B (Sheet 1) 32 31 Proposed Interlocks for Valves llV 8701 A/B and 33 IIV-8702A/B (Sheet 2) 32 RilRS Suction Valves llV 8701 A Proposed Interlock 34 Control Circuit 33 RilRS Suction Valves llV 8701B Proposed Interlock 35 O Control Circuit 34 RilRS Suction Valves llV 8702A Proposed Interlock 36 Control Circuit
.35 RilRS Suction Valves 11\ 8702B Proposed Interlock 37 ;
Control Circuit i
- 6-1 Proposed Change to Vogtle Technical Specification 64 L 4.5.2.d l
O 6-2 PrePe,ed C8 nse te vestie Teennicei Svecifiee1ie- 6s 4.4.9.3.1.
O WP0$$4:10/090591 ,
VI
O LISI QF FIGURFS (Continued)
O o= = '=
63 Vogtle Overpressure Protection Systems 6-6 Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 6-4 Proposed Vogtle FSAR Change: Section 5.4.7.1 67 6-5 Proposed Vogtle FSAR Change: Section 5.4.7.2.1 68 66 Proposed Vogtle FSAR Change: Section 5.4.7.2.4 69 67 Proposed Vogtle FSAR Change: Section 7.6.2 6 10 6-3 Current Vogtle FSAR Figure 7.6.21 6 11 69 Proposed Revision for Vogtle FSAR Figure 7.6.21 6 12 O
O O
WP0554:10/090591 vii
~
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This report provides a justification for the removal of the Autoclosure Interlock (ACl) on the Residual llent Removal System (RllRS) suction / isolation valves for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.
A literature review of decay heat removal problems indicated that approximately 28 percent of the recent loss of R11RS events were caused by inadvertent automatic closure of the R11RS suction / isolation valves. In an effort to reduce the frequency of these inadvertent automatic suction /isoh. tion valve closures, several plants have taken one or more of the following steps: 1) power lockout of these valves during plant shutdown,2) maintenance procedures that require de energizing these valves in the open position before conducting setpoint calibration or work on the inverters, and
- 3) modifications to Technical Specification surveillance requirements invohing verification of open suction / isolation valves when credit is taken for RilRS relief valves for cold overpressure mitigation. The literature recognizes that corrective actions are necessary to minimize the risk associated with loss of decay heat removal capability caused by actuation of the ACI, as well as highlights concerns associated with intersystem Loss Of Coolant Accidents (LOCA), referred to as an Event V, and RiiRS relief capacity.
p During the 1960s and 1970s, two closed valves in series isolated the RiiRS from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) while the RCS was at normal operating temperature and pressure. Both valves were to have power disconnected via admlaistrative procedures, except when the valves were to be stroked. An Open Permissive Interlock was provided to one of the valves to prevent opening until the RCS pressure was below RilRS design pressure. In 1971, the Atomic Energy Commission requirements had evolved to require L - an ACI on increasing pressure. A meeting between the industry and the Nuclear lO WP055410/082791 , , ,
Vill I:
O llegulatory Commission (NitC)in 1974 brought about three acceptable methods of preventing 111111S overpressurization while the 111111S is in operation or when returning the itCS to operation: 1) automatic closure interlocks on the IllHIS suction / isolation O valves,2) sufficient capacity of the 1111115 suction line relief valves to mitigate a pressure transient, or 3) a combination of the two.
This agreement was short lived and in 1975 the NitC required, in its Safety Evaluation Report for RESAll-41, that RilRS suction isolation valves be equipped with the ACI feature. The current NRC position is stated in Branch Technical Position RSil 51 of July 1981, which requires that the 111111S suction / isolation valves be interlocked to protect against one or both valves being open during an ItCS pressure increase above the RilRS design pressure and that adequate relief capacity shall be provided during the time period while the valves are closing. In 1984, an internal NRC Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch memo recommended that action should be taken to modify the design of the RilRS interlocks. A 1985 NRC internal memo stated that a request by a plant to remove the ACI feature sheutd be substantiated by proof that the change is a net improvement to safety and should, as a minimum, address the following:
- 1. The means available to minimize Event V concerns.
- 2. The alarms available to alert the operator of an improperly positioned valve.
- 3. Adequacy of the RilRS relief capacity.
- 4. hieans other than the ACI to ensure both hiotor Operated Valves (hiOVs) are O closed (e.g., single switch actuating both valves).
- 5. Assurance that the function of the open permissive clicuitry is not affected by the proposed change.
- 6. Assurance that h10V position indication will remain available in the control room.
- 7. Assessment of the affect of the proposed change on the reliability of the RilRS, as well as on 1.aw Temperature Overpressure concerns.
O WP0554 :1D/082791 ix
O This report prosides, for Vogtle Unit 1 and 2 the supparting: 1) RiiRS description,
- 2) current RilRS section/ isolation valve control circuity description,3) proposed ACI deletion hardware changes,4) proposed suction / isolation valve adann circuitry addition,
- 5) RliRS unavailability analysis,6) interfacing systems LOCA unalysis,
- 7) overpressurizatioa analysis,8) RilRS relief valve adequatcy analysis, and 9) proposed document changes.
This report references the study perfornled imder the Westinghouic Owners Group (WOG) that justified the deletion of the RilRS ACI for four reference (or lead) plants. This study is documented in WCAP 11736 " Residual licht Removal System Autoclosure Interlock Removal lleport for the Westinghouse Owners Group.* In order to perform the plant specific analyses for Vogtle, an analpis was performed that compared Vogtle to its reference plant identified in the WOG report. Once the differences were identified, the reference probabilistic analyses were modified to model Vogtle, Units 1 and 2, specifically.
CONCl.USIONS This report recommends the deletion of the ACI of the RilRS suction / isolation valves during shutdown. The installation of a control room alarri is recommended to warn the operator that a series suction / isolation valve (s) is not fully closed when RCS pressure is above the alarm setpoint. The results of the intersystem LOCA analysis show that the O frequencies of the Event V decreases with the removal of the ACI feature. The results of the R11RS unavailability analysis show that the removal of the ACI feature increases the RilRS availability. The results of the overpressuritation analysis show that removal O erthe ^ ci reetere 8 s e ee,itive i neet ee 8e eee'eseeeces eriew 1e m nere'ere overpressure events at Vogtle. The net effect of the ACI feature removal is considered to be a net improvement in plant safety.
O WP0554:10/DB2791 X
k , .
O
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l l
This section presents the objective of this report and provides the background information for the analysis supporting the deletion of the Vogtle, Units 1 and 2, Residual Heat Removal System (RilRS) suction / isolation valve Autoclosure Interlock i (ACl) feature. It also presents as background, a description of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) generic topical report upon which this report and the methodology used is based.
t 1.1 Objective
., The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) und the nuclear industry has expressed interest in the acceptability of removing the ACI on the RilRS suction / isolation valves.
This interest is in response to growing concerns about the loss of residual heat removal
- capability during cold shutdown and refueling operations due to inadvertent isolation of the RiiRS caused by failure of the ACI circuitry. Isolation of the RilRS while operating !
has resulted in a loss of decay heat removal capability at several operating plants. In addition, inadvertent solation prevents the RilRS from performing its function of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold overpressure mitigation and may result in RilRS pump damage.
A literature review of decay heat removal problems indicates that approximately O 28 percent of the recent loss of RiiRS events were caused by inadvertent automatic closure of the RiiRS suction / isolation valves. In an effort to reduce the frequency of these inadvertent automatic suction / isolation valve closures, several plants have taken one or more of the following steps: 1) power lockout of these valves during plant shutdown,2) maintenance procedures that require de energizing these valves in the open position before conducting setpoint calibration or work on the inverters, and ,
O WP0554:10/082791 11 e-
-m ,w,-,,-y-.w .-m, ,.,.*mnw,--,,. e. - %v,.r+.4-=--.-,.%a., ,r.-....,m#,,.-w-y,_m,,e,-%-w.m,n.rw,,,,m.. .-w,,,,,-,,,----,-
l O 3) modifications to Technical Specification surveillance requirements involving .
verification of open suction / isolation valves when credit is taken for itilRS relief valves :
for cold overpressure mitigation. The literature recognizes that corrective actions are i necessary to minimite the risk associated with loss of decay heat removal capability i caused by inadvertent actuation of the ACl, as well as highlights concerns associated with {
intersystem Loss Of Coolant Accidents (LOCA), termed an Event Y in WASil 1400 (Reference 1), and RilRS relief valve capacity.
During the 1960s and 1970s, two closed valves in series isolateo the RilRS from the RCS while the RCS was at normal operating temperature and pressure, lloth valves were to have power disconnected via administrative procedures, except when the valves were to be stroked. An Open Permissive Interlock (OPI) was provided to one of the valves to prevent opening until the RCS pressure was below R11RS design pressure. In i 1971, the Atomic Energy Commission's requirements had evolved to require an ACI on O increasies Presse,.. ^ meeties between the inde,1rx and the NRC in le74 hreeshi about three acceptable methods of preventing RllRS overpressurization while the RilRS is in operation or when returning the RCS to operation: 1) automatic closure interlocks '
on the RilRS suction / isolation valves,2) sufficient capacity of the RllRS suction line relief valves to mitiga'e a pressure transient, or 3) a combination of the two.
- This agreement was short lived and in 1975 the NRC required in its Safety Evaluation Report for RESAR 41 (Reference 2) that RilRS suction isolation valves be equipped O with the ACI feature. The current NRC position is stated in 13 ranch Technical Position RSB 5 l'(Reference 3) of July 1981, which requires that the RilRS suction / isolation valves be interlocked to protect against one or both valves being open during an RCS pressure increase above the design pressure and that adequate relief capacity shall be pro ided during the time period while the valves are closing. There have been more -
recent discussions within the NRC on this issue, in 1984, an internal NRC ,
O WP05s4i10/082791 12 ,
r ,w r w- - -wwe--.---,e,r,r.-veme-+urm+v- -
e+ , , , - --,.~i r,---v ,,-.-.-*--+-'e. ._,,-,.ea.e.~.-e.n-e---we-.---.,e--.rw-.,v-e.---=. .+.,,m-----
O Instrumentation and Control Systems llranch memo recommended . hat action should be taken to modify the design of the R11RS interlocks. A 1985 NRC internal memo Reference 4) stated that a request by a plant to remove the ACI feature should be O (ubstantiated by proof that the change is a net improveme s
minimum, address the following: i
- 1. The means available to minimize Event V concerns.
- 2. The alarms available to alert the operator of an iniproperly positioned valve.
- 3. Adequacy of the RilRS relief capacity.
4 hicans other than the ACI to ensure both hiotor Operated Relief Valves (hiOVs) are closed (e.g., single switch actuating both valves). ;
- 5. Assurance that the function of the open permissive circuitiy is not affected by the proposed change.
- 6. Assurance that hiOV position indication will remain available in the control room.
- 7. Assessment of the affect of the proposed change on the reliability of the RilRS, as well as on law Temperature Overpressure (LTOP) concerns.
liased on the concerns stated above, the WOG funded the evaluation of the removal of the ACI on the RilRS suction / isolation valves at the following four reference plants: ,
Salem Unit 1, North Anna Unit 1, Callaway Unit 1, and Shearon liarris Unit 1. 'Other WOG plants participating in the program were categorized into one of four groups led by one of the reference plants based on similar RilRS configuration and design O' characteristics. It was latended that other members of the WOG could reference the applicable lead plant in the study and provide a difference analysis, should they desire to '
, remove the RilRS ACI.
O This report is written in support of deleting the Vogtle ACI feature on the RilRS '
4 suction / isolation valves based on the methodology contained in WCAp-11736,
- Residual lO WPD5s4:10/082791
O Ileat Itemoval System Autoclosure Interlock llemoval lleport For The Westinghouse .
Owners Group"(Reference 5). A sunmary description of WCAP 11736 is presented below.
1.2 WOG Program: WCAP 11736 WCAP 11736 was written with the support and funding of the WOG, it provides on evaluation of the removal of the ACI on the 1111RS suction / isolation valves at f-)ur reference plants: Salem Unit 1, North Anna Unit 1 Callaway Unit 1, and Shearon llartis Unit 1. _The WOG plants participating in the program were categorized into one 'of four groups based on similar RilitS configurations and design characteristics.
The plants listed by group are:
Group 1 falem Unit 1 Groun 2 Callaway Unit 1 Salem Unit 2 Braidwood Units 1 & 2 D. C. Cook Units 1 & 2 Byron Units 1 & 2 indian Point Unit 3 Catawba Units 1 & 2 McQuite Units 1 & 2 Comanche Peak Units 1 & 2 Sequoyah Units 1 & 2 Trojan Unit 1 Watts Bar Units 1 & 2 Seabrook Unit 1 Zion Units 1 & 2 Vogtle Units 1 & 2 Wolf Creek Unit 1 Millstone Unit 3 South Texas Units 1 & 2 O
o a
WP0554:10/052791
, , - _ - . . . - - . .._;_..-_,..-___.___,_.____-.__-._u_._.______,.___._...
-. - ...- - . - . - - . - - - . -- . ~ . - - - - - - - - . . - -
O Gmup 3 North Anna Unit 1 Group 4 Shenron llarris Unit 1 11.11. Robinson Unit 2 Farley Units 1 & 2 Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 11eaver Valley Unit 2 Beaver Valley Unit 1 V. C. Summer Unit 1 Prairie Island Units 1 & 2 North Antia Unit 2 The choice of the four particular reference plants was made based on providing the maximum number of the other WOG members with the best possible fit should they choose to delete the ACI in the future and reference this document. It is expected that, should a plant desire to delete the ACl, a plant specific difference analysis would still be required, but the resources expended to produce and review it should be substantially less with reference to the WOG WCAP 11736.
WCAP 11736 provides, for each of the four reference plants, the supporting: 1) RilRS description,2) carrent RilRS suction / isolation valve control circulty description,
- 3) proposed ACI deletion hardware changes,4) proposed suction / isolation valve alarm circuitry addition,5) RIIRS unavailability probabilistic analysis,6) interfacing systems LOCA probabilistic analysis, and 7) probabilistic overpressurization analysis.
WCAP 11736 addresses each of the seven NRC concerns expressed in the 1985 NRC internal memo for each of the four reference plants and recommends the deletion of the O ACI feature for all WOG plants. The installation of a control room alarm is recommended for all plants to warn the operator that a series suction / isolation valve (s) is not fully closed when RCS pressure is above the alarm setpoint. The results of the WOG intersystem LOCA analysis show that the frequencies of the Event V decreases with the removal of the ACI feature. The results of the WOG RilRS unavailability _
analysis show that the removal of the ACI feature increases the RllRS availability, The O
-WP0554:10/082791 15
r ,
O results of the WOG overpressurization analysis show that removal of the ACI feature ,
- will have no effect on the heat input transients and will result in a slight increase in frequency of occurrence for some categories of the mass input transients with a decrease in others. The net effect of the ACI feature removal is considered to be a net improvement in plant safety.
The basic information presented in WCAP 11736 is applicable for use in the Vogtle, Units 1 and 2, plant specific effort. The literature review and licensing basis remain the same for all Westinghouse plants. The probabilistic models and data base can be utilized as a basis for the Vogtle plant specific effort. The recommended changes to the -
Technical Specifications t.re also applicable.
The Vogtle plant specific report builds on the generic work of WCAP li736. The Vogtle report justifies removal of the ACI based on a safety evaluation of the effect of ACI removal on LTOP, RilRS availability, and interfacing system LOCA potential.
Additionally, this report proposes basic logic changes to implement the ACI removal.
1.3 Background
The primary function of the RiiRS is to remove residual heat from the core and reduce the temperature of the RCS durint, the second phase of plant cooldown and during p refueling operations. The RilRS also serves as part of the Emergency Core Cooling V System (ECCS) during the injection phases of a LOCA. As a secondary function, the RI-IRS is used to transfer refueling water between the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and the refueling cavity before and after the refueling operations. In addition to the above functions, the RilRS suction line relief valves are used to provide mitigation of RCS cold overpressure transients.
O WD0554:10/082791 1-6
) ..
- O The RiiRS consists of'two parallel flow paths. Each path takes a suction from a separate RCS hot leg. Each flow path contains a residual heat removal pump, a residual :
heat exchanger, associated piping, valves, and instrumentation required for operational control. The return lines are connected to the cold leg of each of the reactor coolant !
loops, i
During system operation, reactor coolant flows from the RCS to the residual heat removal pump, through the tube side of a residual heat exchanger, and back to the RCS.
IIcat is transferred from the reactor coolant to the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) circulating through the shcIl side of the residual heat exchangers.
During normal and emergency conditions, it is necessary to keep low pressure systems, which are connected to the high pressure RCS, properly isolated in order to avoid damage by overpressurization or potential for loss of integrity of the low pressure system O. and possible radioactive releases. The Vogtle RllRS is a low pressure system, with a design pressure of 600 psig, with an interface to the high pressure RCS, with a normal operating pressure of 2235 psia.
Two motor-operated gate valves in series in each line isolate the two RilRS suction pipes from the RCS hot legs. These motor operated, gate valves are normally closed except when the RiiRS is in operation and function to keep the low pressure RilRS isolated from the high pressure RCS. Each of these valves is provided with a manual control switch (OPEN/CLOSE) on the Main Control Board and has two automatic interlocks associated with its control circuitry: the ACl and the OPl.
The OPI prevents inadvertent opening of the suction / isolation valves when the RCS pressure is above the design pressure of the RIIRS. Each suction / isolation valve on cach inlet line is interlocked with an independent RCS wide range pressure signal to O
WPO$5t.dD/DB2791 17
i O i provide an OPI feature to these valves. These valves are interlocked to present their :
being opened whenever the RCS pressure is greater than 365 psig.
O The ACI ensures that both suction / isolation valves in each RilRS train are fully closed when the RCS is pressurized above the RilRS design pressure. Each valve is interlocked with an independent RCS wide range pressure signal to close automatically before the RCS pressure exceeds 750 psig.
A detailed description of the Vogtle Units 1 and 2 RIIRS is provided in Section 2.0 of this report. Figure 21 presents a flow diagram of the Vogtle RilRS design.
- Note, throughout this report the actual values for the Vogtle OPI (365 psig) and ACI (750 psig) setpoints will not be specified. The OPl setpoint will be referred to as the valve opening setpoint, and the ACI setpoint as the valve closing setpoint.
l O :
O O ,
WP0554 10/082791 1~8 we .cvrwe+ , , = e -,g, -.w'e -
, , y ve,ee- , s , , ,. . - * , , , -w y..y--. ~ ,--w , ..sg.i y ,. p - e -+w w y - %-y s-y-, , 3 , , - ., ,n-,,,,- - .
O 2.0 VOGTLE RESIDUAL llEAT REhiOVAL SYSTEh! DESCRIPTION L
2.1 General Description The primary function of the RilRS is to remove decay heat from the core and RCS during plant cooldown and refueling operations. The RilRS transfers heat from the RCS to the CCWS to reduce reactor coolant temperature to the cold shutdown temperature. The cold shutdown temperature is maintained until the plant is started up again.
The RllRS also serves at part of the Safety injection System (SIS) during the injection mode t, provide Low Head Safety Injection emergency core cooling in the event of a break in either the RCS or steam system. As a secondary function, the RilRS is used to transfer refueling water between the RWST and the refueling cavity before and after the O refueling operations.
2.2 Residual Heat Removal System l
A detailed flow diagram of the RilRS is shown in Figure 21. The RilRS consists of two separate RilRS trains of equal capacity, each independently capable of meeting the
_ safety analysis design bases. Each train consists of one heat exchanger, one motor driven pump, associated piping, valves, and instrumentation necessary for operational control.
- The inlet line to each train of the RilRS is connected to a reactor coolant loop hot leg, k ,vhile the return lines are connected to the cold legs of each of the reactor coolant loops.
i The connection to the cold legs is through the 10-inch accumulator injection lines.
\O,/ Each RilRS suction line is normally isolated from the RCS by two motor operated gate valves in series, while the discharge lines are isolated by series check valves in each WP05s4:10/082791 21
O RilRS injection path. The RilRS suction /isoiation valves, the inlet line pressure relief
-valve, and the discharge lines downstream of valves llV 8809A/D and ilV 8840 are located inside containment, while the remainder of the system is located outside contairunent.
During normal RilRS operations, reactor coolant flows from the RCS hot legs 1 and 4 to the RilRS pumps, through the tube side of the RllRS heat exchangers, and back to
-the RCS through the SIS cold leg injection lines. The reactor coolant heat is transferred by the R11RS heat exchangers to the component cooling water that circulates through the shell $1de of the R11RS heat exchangers.
Coincident with R11RS normal operations, a portion of the reactor coolant flow may be diverted from downstream of the RllRS heat exchangers to the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) low pressure letdown line for cleanup, and/or pressure control.
O By regulating the diverted flowrate and the charging flow, the RCS pressure can be controlled during water solid plant operations. Pressure regulation is necessary to maintain the pressure range dictated by the reactor vessel fracture prevention criteria requirements and by the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) No. I seal differential pressure _
and net pump suction head requirements of the RCPs.
Me RCS cooldown rate is manually controlled by regulating the reactor coolant flow through the tube side of the RilRS heat exchangers. Instrumentation is provided to monitor system pressure, temperature, and total flow.
System Operation
~
~
A discussion of RIIRS operation during various reactor operating modes follows:
O WP0s54 tid /08?r91 22
O Reactor Startup Generally, during cold shutdown, the RillF operates to remove residual heat from the reactor core. The number of pumps and heat exchangers in service depends on the RilRS heat load at the time.
At initiation of plant startup, the RCS is corrpici;!y filled, and the pressurizer heaters are energized. At least one RilRS pump is operating with a portion of its discharge directed to the CVCS for purificatior, and/or pressure control via a line that is connected to a cross connect header downstream of the RilRS heat exchanger. Once a steam bubble is formed in the pressuri:er, the RilRS is isolated, and RCS pressure / inventory control are provided by the pressurizer spray, pressurizer heaters, and the normal 1:tdown and charging systems.
Power Generation and If at Standby Operation The RIIRS is not used during hot staudby or pwer operations when the RCS is at normal pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, the RilRS is aligned for operation as part of the ECCS. Upon initiation of a safety injection signal ("S" signal),
the RHRS pumps, taking suction from the RWST, inject borated water into the reactor vessel via the accumulator cold leg injection headers. When the water in the RWST is depleted, the RIIRS pumps are aligned to take suction from the conteinment sump. The O sump fluid, which is recirculated by the RIIRS pumps, is cooled by the RlIRS heat exchangers and delivered to the reactor vessel cold legs. Since the charging pumps and the safety injection pumps do not take suction from the containment sump, the RllRS pumps (low head safety injection) also supply the suction of these pumps daring recirculation. I' lot leg recirculation is initiated approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after the accident and ECCS initiation. The flow path for hot leg recirculation consists of both RilRS O
WP0554:10/082791 23
O :
1 pumps taking suction from the containment sump, discharging through the discharge cross connect valves and common discharge valve to the itCS hot legs 1 and 4 O Reactor Shutdown With the RCS borated to the cold shutdown concentration, the initial phase of reactor cooldown is accomplished by transferring heat from the RCS to the steam generators and Steam Dump System When the reactor coolant temperature and pressure are reduced to approximately 350*F and less than 365 psig, the second phase of cooldown starts with the RilRS being placed in operation.
The reactor cooldown rate is limited by RCS equipment cooling rates based on allowable stress limits, as well as the operating temperature limits of the CCWS, As the reactor
- coolant temperature decreases, the reactor coolant flow through the RilRS heat exchangers is increased to maintain a constant cooldown rate.
As cooldown continues, the pressurizer is filled with water, and the RCS is operated in a water solid condition. At this stage, pressure is controlled by regulating the charging flow rate and the letdown rate to the CVCS from the RIIRS. After the RCS is depressurized, cooled to less than or equal to 140*F, and purged to reduce dissolved hydrogen concentration to a safe level, the reactor vessel head may be removed for refueling or maintenance, Refueling During refueling, the RIIRS pumps transfer borated water from the RWST to the refueling cavity. During this operation, the isolation valves in the inlet line of the RilRS are closed, and the isolation valves from the RWST are opened. After the water level in O
- WP0$54:10/082791 2-4
O :
the refueling cavity reaches normal refueling level, the inlet isolation valves are opened, '
the RWST supply valves are closed, and normal RitRS operation resumes.
During refueling, the RilRS remains in service with the number of pumps and heat exchangers in operation as required by the heat load and the Technical Specifications.
Additionally, a portion of the RilRS flow is directed to the CVCS for purification and eventual return to the RCS via the charging system.
Following refueling, the R11RS pumps drain the refueling cavity to the top of the reactor vessel flange by pumping water from the RCS to the RWST.
Component Description This section describes the major components of the RilRS as shown in Figure 21.
RHRS Pumps Two pumps are installed in the RilRS. Each pump is sized to deliver sufficient reactor coolant flow through the RilRS heat exchangers to meet the plant cooldown requirements. The use of two pumps ensures that cooling capacity is only partially lost should one pump become inoperable.
The' RHRS pumps are protected from deadheading by miniflow bypass lines, located on the heat exchanger outlet, which Jivert part of the flow back to the suction of the pump.
A control valve located in each miniflow line is regulated by a signal from the flow switch located in each pump discharge header. The control valves open to divert flow back to the pump suction when the discharge flow is less than approximately 751 gpm and close when it exceeds approximately 1405 gpm. This arrangement ensures that the
_ s, _ ,,,
_ _ , _, . _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ __._._ u-_ _ _ _-_._ _ _
i i j
l
. RilRS pump does not overheat or cavitate when the discharge line is clostd or when the
. RCS pressure exceeds the pump shutoff head during the ECCS injection ph.<se. A ,
pressure transmitter in each pump discharge header provides pressure indic, ion with a high pressure alarm in the Main Control Room.
l The RiiRS pumps are vertical, centrifugal units with mechanical shaft seals. All pump
, surfaces in contact with reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion resistant material. '
4 RIiRS lleat Exchangers
=
- Two residual heat exchangers are installed in the RilRS. The heat exchanger design is ,
based on heat load and temperature differences between reactor coolant and component cooling water msting 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown when the temperature difference between the two systems is small. The installation of two heat exchangers ensures that the heat removal capacity of the system is only partially lost if one heat exchanger becomes inoperative.
The heat exchangers are of the shell and U tube type. Reactor coolant circulates >
- through the tubes, while component cooling water circulates through the shell. The
. tubes are welded to the tubesheet to prevent leakage of reactor coolant, RIIRS Valves Two motor operated gate valves are provided in each inlet line hom the RCS. These
-valves are normally closed, except when the R11RS is in operation. Each of these valves is provided with a manual control (open/ closed) on the Main Control Board and will fail-b in the "as isi position.
O WP0554:10/082r91 26 y e m r 4,4 at-s- -r- = a Tri ? m We e--=y Ngw - s'rriappp efrw r'-'a Ta.- s
O Valves llV 8701A,8702A,8701B, and 8702B are currently interlocked with the wide range RCS pressure transmitters PT-438,418,408, and 428, respectively. Note, a cross reference key for Westinghouse and Bechtel valve identification is provided in Table 21.
These transmitters are connected to the sensing of lines the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System outside containment. Each transmitter has a physically and electrically independent power supply to ensure that a single failure does not disable both residual heat removal loops. These inteilocks prevent inadvertent opening of the valves when the RCS pressure is.above 365 psig (Reference 6). The ACI will cause both valves to close automatically when the RCS pressure is higher than 750 psig. If the RCS has been 4
depressurized to below 365 psig and the valves are open, the ACI will close the valves automatically if the pressure increases above approximately 750 psig. >
Interlocks are also provided to prevent opening valves llV-8701 A(B) and ilV 8702A(B) a if any of the following valves are open:
IIV 8804A(B) - Valves in recirculation lines from RilRS heat exchanger to charging +
r pump and safety injection pump suctions.
. IIV 8811A(B) - Containment sump line isolation valves.
liv 8812A(B) . Isolation valves in RIIRS pump suction lines from the RWST.
O These interlocks are arranged by trains to assure functional separation of the two trains in the RilRS. Accordingly, interlocks are provided between the train A valves, and separately between the train B valves. -
O <
O .
WP05s4 iD/082791 27 a.___,a.___.._. ._.,, ,_ _ _ .... _ ._ -.a
Q l 1
l Heat Exchanger Flow Control Valves HCV 606 and HCV-607 The reactor coolant flow rate through the RIIRS heat exchangers is adjusted by air operated, butterfly valves HCV 606 and HCV 607. Positioning of these valves from the control room regulates the reactor coolant flow exiting the heat exchangers. These valves are normally full open during pwer operation.
Bypass Flow Control Valves FCV 618 and FCV-619 Each RHRS heat exchanger is provided with a bypass line co*.itaining an air operated butterfly valve that may be positioned automatically from flow instrument FICA-618 and FICA 619 or manually from the Main Control Room. As valves HCV-606 and llCV-607 are manually adjusted to adjust the heat exchanger tubeside flow and control the cooldown rate, these bypass valves will be automatically modulated by flow cerollers
'O FICA 618 and FICA 619 to maintain a constant loop return flow to the RCS. The valves can be manually positioned directly by placing them under manual contrcl at the control board manual / auto station. During power operation when the RHRS is aligned for safety injection, these valves should be in the manual control mode and fully closed.
Miniflow Stop Valves FCV-610 and FCV-611 These no;mahy aned valves are motor operated gate valves that are located in the
-O RHRS pump miniflow lines. The valves are controlled by flow switches FIS-610 and FIS-611, respectively, which are located in the discharge lines of the RHRS pumps.
These valves open when their respective pump is operating and the flow is less than approximately 751 gpm. When the pump flow exceeds approximately 1405 gpm or the RHRS pump stops, the corresponding valve will clcse. :
WP0554:10/082791
O Crosstie Valves 8716A and 8716B These motor-operated gate valves, located in the piping crosstie downstream of the RHRS exchangers, must be normally open during normal plant operation when the RHRS i; aligned for safety injection. During residual heat removal operation, the valves must be closed to prevent possible control interaction between the two independent trains of residual heat removal. These valves are controlled from the Main Control Board and fail "as is." These valves are used to align the RilRS for the recirculation pl.ases following a LOCA.
Ltd Leg Injection LJne Check Valves 8816A,B,C,D and 8948A,B,C,D There are two check valves in each branch of the cold leg injection line to prevent backflow from the RCS.
g 6 .
Gate Valve HV-8809A and HV-8809B p
V r,
There is a normally-open, motor-operated gate valvc in each parallel discharge lin . : rom the ? HRS pump, downstream of the heat exchanger and discharge crosstie beauer.
These valves are used to isolate the RHRS from the cold legs during hot leg recirculation or during refueling operation when returning water to the RWST.
- Crosstie Valves 8734A and 8734B l These two normally-closed, manual valves are used to line up a portion of the RHRS g pump discharge to be directed to the CVCS. Throttle valve HCV-128 is used to control this flow. This flow path is used during a plant coo!down and during water solid plant operations when the CVCS is used for RCS pressure control and purification.
O WP0554:10/082791
O Gate Valve HV 8840 During hot leg recirculation the RHRS pumps are aligned to deliver flow through cross-connect valves HV-8716A and HV 8716B, and common discharge valve HV 8840.
This realignment is initiated at approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after accident initiation. Hot leg recirculation prevents crystallization of boric acid in the core and quenches the steam bubble in the top of the core.
RWST Isola'ien Valves 8958A/B and 8812A/B Check valves 8958A/B and motor-operated gate valves HV 8812A/B isolate the RWST from the suction of each RHRS pump. Gate valves HV 8812A/B are interlocked with the RHRS suction isolation valves HV 8701A/B and HV 8702A/B.
Sump Isolation Valves HV-8811A/B and HV-8820A/B Check valves HV-8820A/B and motor-operated gate valve HV-8811A/B isolate the RHRS from th.e containn.cnt sump. There is one motor-operated normally closed gate valve (HV-8811 A or B) in each line leading from the containment sump to the suction of each RHRS pump. Valves HV-8811A and HV-8811B are interlocked to open automatically, when an "S" signal exists, on a 2/4 "LO" signal from RWST level instrumentation. Interlocks ensure that valves HV-8811A or B cannot be opened O remotely from their control board switches unless the a:sociated RWST suction valve HV-8812A/B and their respective residual heat removal loop suction isolation valves HV-8701A/B and HV-8702A/B are closed. A check valve (HV 8820A or B) is located in series with HV-8811A and HV-8811B, also prevents refueling water from flowing backward into the sump, O
WP055/.:10/082791 2 10
O R11RS to Charging and Safety injection Pump Suction Isolation Valves LIV 8804A/B and 8969A/B O There is one normally closed, motor-operated gate valve (liv-?304A) in the line leading from the discharge side of the RiiRS heat exchanger No. I to the suction side of the centrifugal charging pumps. The valve is normally closed for cold leg injection, opened by operator action for cold leg recirculation and remains open for hot leg recirculation.
Check valve 8969A is located in series with gate valve HV 8804A.
There is one normally closed, motor operated gate valve (HV-8804B) in the line leading from the discharge side of the RHRS heat exch nger No. 2 to the suction side of the safety injection pumps. This valve is normally closed for cold leg injection, opened by operator action for cold leg recirculation and remains open for hot leg recirculation.
Check valve 8969B is located in series with gate valve HV-8804B.
Valves HV-8804A and B are interlocked such that they cannot be opened unless the safety injection pump miniflow valves (8813 or 8920 and 8814) are closed, .he alternate charging pump r.iiniflow isolation valves (8508A or 8509B and 8508B or 85 NA) are closed, the associated residual heat removal loop suction isolation valves (l'V 8701 A/B or HV 8702A/B) are closed, and the associated stmp valve HV-8811A or B is cpen.
RHRS Discharge Relief Valves 8856A/B and 8842 O
A 3/4 inch relief"alve is located in each RHRS cold leg and hot leg discharge header.
These valves protect against overpressurization of the piping due to any RCS O deexieetese ertwermei exce eiee ertrenneo -eter. 18e oee<8e eeveeitr ertwe,e veives is 20 gpm at the setpressure of 600 psig.
O WP0554:10/082791 2-11
O Inlet Relief Valves S708A and 8708B There is one,3-inch relief valve (inside containment) in each RHRS suction line from the RCS hot leg. These relief valves prevent RHRS overpressurization and provide cold overpressurization protection by discharging to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) when pressures within the RHRS suction line exceed 450 psig. These valves have a design capacity of 900 gpm at the 450 psig setpressure.
2.3 Current RHRS Suction Isolation Valve Interlocks and Functional Requirements The following sections provide a description of the Vogtle suction / isolation valve interlocks and valve control circuits.
2.3.1 Current Interlock O
Au There are two normally closed, motor operated gate valves in series in each of the two RHRS pump suction lines from the RCS hot legs. The two valves inside the missile barrier (HV-8701B, HV-8702B) are designated as the inner isolation valves, while the twe valves outside of the missile barrier (HV-8701A, HV-8702A) are designated as the cuter isolation valves. The interlock features provided for the inner isolation valves are idepucal to those provided for the outer isolation valves.
'- Each valve is interlocked against opening unless the following conditions are met:
l
- a. The RCS pressure as measured by appropriate pressure channels is less than
_h 365 psig. This assures that the RHRS cannot be overpressurized when aligning it to the RCS and the maximum RCS pressure plus the RHRS pump head will not exceed the RHRS pump discharge design pressure.
t WP0554 10/082791-l
O b. The corresponding RHRS pump /RWST suction isolation valve is closed. This assures positive isolation of the RWST and R11RS/RWST suction piping before initiating a normal cooldown,
- c. The corresponding isolation valve in the recirculation lines to the charging / safety injection pumps is closed. This assures the suction of the safety injection and/or charging pumps cannot be overpressurized by normal cooldown flow via an open recirculation line isolation valve,
- d. The corresponding containment sump isolation valve is closed. This assures normal cooldown flow cannot be misdirected to the containment sump via an open sump isolation valve.
Each valve is also currently interlocked to automatically close on increasing RCS pressure greater than 750 psig. This assures that both valves will be closed during a plant startup prior to reaching operating conditions, should one valve have been inadvertently left open by operator omhsion.
The RCS pressure interlock for both the prevent open and the autoclosure feature on the inner isolation valves is independent and diverse from that provided to the outer isolation valves. This is specifically required to meet NRC criteria applicable to the RHRS design.
O Local operation is possible when the REMOTE / LOCAL permissive operation switch at the Local Control Board is in the Local position. Simultaneous operation from both the Main Control Board and the Local Control Board is not possible. An alarm is actuated whenever the REMOTE / LOCAL permissive operation switch is in the Local position.
O WP0554 :1D/082791 2-13
O V
When operation is from the Local Control Board, manual control is the only capability that exists and this manual control is not restricted by any interlocks, n -
O 2.3.2 RHRS Suction / Isolation Valve Description Descriotion The RHRS Inlet Isolation Valves are motor operated gate valves that can be opened or closed from the hiain Control Board or the local shutdown panel. The valves will automatically close on increasing RCS pressure (ACI). On decreasing RCS pressure, below the valve opening setpoint, the valve control circuit receives an interlock signal that allows tlie valve to be opened using the hiain Control Board switch (OPI). On RCS pressure above the setpoint, the valve control circuit is disabled and the valve cannot be g opened.
O The valve control circuit consists of control switches, limit switches, torque switches, contactors, relays, indicating lights, fuses, a 3 phase,480 VAC motor, and a pressure control loop. Control switches are located in the hiain Control Room and at the local shutdown panel. The limit switches are located in the valve motor operator and provide indication of the position of the valve. Relays are used for providing control signals.
The two contactors (starters), located in the motor control center, are switched on and O off to provide the open and close power to the valve. The contactors also provide contacts that are used in the valve control circuit. There are red and green indicating lights on the hiain Control Board and the local shutdown panel to show the position of the valve. The valve motor operator is located at the valve and is used to change the A
V position of the valve. The pressure controlloop measures RCS pressure and provides output signals to the valve control circuit based on the system pressure.
O WP0554:10/082791 2-14
O The following provides a detailed description of the valve control circuits for llV-8701 A (see Figure 2 5). The valve control circuits for valves llV-8701B, llV 8702A, and HV-8702B are similar (see Figures 2-6,2 7, and 2-8, respectively).
Clesing the Valve from the Main Control Room With the valve in the full open position, the valve can be closed from the control switch in the Main Control Room, as described in the following steps:
- 1. Placing the control board switch to the CLOSE position will energize the ciosing contactor coil (42(C)). The control board switch closing contacts are in series with the following contacts:
Limit switch contact 33ao/1, which is closed when the valve is open; A torque switch contact (33te/17) in parallel with limit switch contact 33ao/1; and Contact 42b/(O), which is closed when the opening contactor coil (42(O)), is not energized.
- 2. With all the contacts in step 1 closed, the Main Control Board switch placed in the CLOSE position will energize the contactor closing coil 42(C) with 120 VAC power from the 480/120 VAC control power step down transformer. The closing contactor O contacts 42(C) in the motor circuit close and supply 480 VAC to the valve motor operator an i the valve begins to close. The closing contactor simultaneously opens another contact (42b/(C)) in the opening control circuit which prevents the opening contactor relay from picking up while the valve is closing (i.e., the opening control circuit is interlochec' with the closing control circuit to prevent both contactor relays from being energized at the same time). An additional closing contactor contact O
WP0554:10/082791 2-15
.. . . - - - _ - - - - - . - . _ - . --_~. . . . _ . - - . -
l O
(42a/(C)) seals-in the closing circuit so that the Main Control Board switch can be released and the valve will continue to close.
As the valve begins to close, the limit switch contact 33bo/3 closes, turning on the green indicating light on the Main Control Board. The red indicating light is controlled by limit switch contact 33ac/15, and is on when the valve is open or during travel (i.e., both the red and green lights are on during travel).
- 3. Limit switch contacts 33ao/1 open as the valve begins to close, leaving only the parallel torque switch contact (33tc/17) to complete the circuit. The valve continues to close until the valve torque switch contact 33tc/17 opens indicating the valve is fully closed. When the limit switch contact opens, the contactor coil de-energizes and the motor contacts 42(C) open, which in turn de-energize the valve motor. The (42a/(C)) seal in contacts open, resetting the closing seal in circuit. The 42b/(C) contact in the opening control circuit closes to allow the valve opening control circuit to be actuated.
When the valve is fully closed, limit switch contact 33ac/15 opens, which turns off
- the red indicating light on the Main Control Board, leaving the green indicating light on the Main Control Board to show that the valve is closed through limit switch contact 33bo/3.
~
r 1
\
O WP0554:1D/082791 l 2-16 l
-- - - , . , . . . - e,
Opening the Valve from the Main Control R60m With the valve in the closed position as described above, the valve can be opened from the control switch in the Main Control Room as follows:
- 1. The opening of the RHRS valve is rest:icted by the RCS pressure. If the RCS pressure is below the valve opening permissia setpoint, the valve can be opened using the Main Control Board switch es described in steps 2 through 4 below. If the RCS pressure is above the valve opening setpoint, the valve cannot be opened.
When the RCS pressure is above the opening setpoint, imerlock contact K734 in the valve opening circuit is open. When cc.itact K73A is open, the valve opening contactor circuit cannot be energizea and the valve cannot be opened. If the RCS
~ essure is below the setpoint, the valve will operate u discussed below.
O 2. If the RCS pressure is below the valve opening setpoint, contact K734 will be closed in the valve opening contactor circuit. Operating the Main Control Board switch to OPEN the valve, will energize the opening contactor relay coil 42(O), provided the contacts listed below are closed. In addition, the control board switch OPEN contacts are in series with the following contacts:
RCS pressure interlock contact, K734; Two valve hmit switch contacts,33bo/4 and 33bc/5, which are closed when the vaive is closed; A torque switch contact,33to/18, in parallel with limit switch contact 33bc/5; RWST to RHRS Pump Isolation Valve HV-8812A limit switch contact,33bc/6, which is closed when the valve is fully closed; Containment Sump to RHRS Pump Isolation Valve HV-8811A limit switch contact,33bc/13, which is closed when the valve is fully closed; and O
wp0554:10/082791 2-17
(
Contact K752, which closes when valve HV-88MA RHRS pumps to Charging Pump Isolation Valve, is fully closed.
G
('/
- 3. With all the contacts in Step 2 closed, the opening contactor relay coil (42(O)) is energized with 120 VAC from the control power step down transformer. The opening contactor motor contacts (42(O)) close and supply 480 VAC to the valve motor operator and the valve begins to open. The 42(O) motor contacts connect the three phase power phases such that the motor rotation direction is reversed from the closing direction. The opening contactor simultaneously opens another contact (42b/(O)) in the closing contactor circuit which prevents the closing contactor from picking up while the valve is opening (i.e., the closing contactor is interlocked with the opening contactor to prevent both contactors from being energized at the same time). An additional opening contactor contact (42a/(O))
g that is in parallel with the opening Main Control Board switch OPEN contact closes, V which seals-in the opening contactor circuit so that the control switch can be i
released and the valve will continue to open.
As the valve begins to open, limit switch contact 33bc/5 opens leaving the parallel torque switch contact 33to/5 to complete the circuit. Also, as the valve begins to open, limit switch contact 33ac/15 closes, turning on the red indicating light on the Main Control Board. ' The green indicating light is controlled by limit switch coraact l p 33bo/3 and is on when the valve is closed or during travel.
! V
- 4. The valve continues to open until the valve limit switch contact 33bo/4 opens L indicating the valve is fully open. When the limit switch opens, the opening p
(j contactor relay coil de-energizes and the 42(O) motor contacts open, de-energizing the valve motor. The 42a/(O) seal-in contacts open resetting the opening seal-in circuit. The 42c/(0) closing interlock contact closes, allowing the valve to be closed.
O WP0554:10/082791 2-18
O v
Also, when the valve is fully open, limit switch contact (33bo/3) opens and the green indicating light on the Main Control Board is turned off. The red indicating light on the Main Control Board remains on to indicate that the valve is open through limit switch contact 33ac/15.
During the time the valve is opening, the valve and the valve opening control circuit are protected from an over torque condition by the torque switch contact 33to/18, which is in series with the seal in contact 42a/(0).
Automatic Closing of the RHRS Wlve When the RCS pressure is below the valve opening setpoint the valve can be opened or closed from the control switch in the Main Control Room, as described above. When the valve is open, an increasing RCS pressure will automatically close the valve and prevent it from opening, as described below:
An increasing RCS pressure above the valve closing setpoint will close contact K735 in the valve closing contactor circuit. If the valve is open, limit switch contact 33ao/8 and torque switch contact 33tc/17, which are in series with contact K735, will be closed. When contact K735 closes, the valve automatically begins to close.
Contact K735, which is in parallel with the scal in contact (42a/(C)) energizes the valve control circuit in the same manner as described above in the " Closing the Valve From the Main Control Room." The valve will continue to close until the valve is fully closed as described in the referenud section above. When the valve is fully closed, limit switch contact 33ac/8 and torque switch contact 33ta/17 will open preventing the re-actuation of the closing contactor from contact K735 (which will still be closed due to high pressure above the valve closing setpoint). After the valve is fully closed, it cannot be opened because the opening circuit is locked out O
WP0554:10/082791 2 19
O by pressure greater than the valve opening setpoint, as described above in the
" Opening the Valve from the Main Control Room" section.
Process Control Circuitry p Four pressure control channels (PT-408, -418, -428 and -438) provide the control signals to the four RHRS Inlet Isolation Valves (see Figure 2 3 and 2-4). The pressure control channel alignment with the series valves is such that one pressure channel controls only one isolation valve. Therefore, a failure in one pressure channel only results in the failure of a single isolation valve. The following control channel description addresses only the PT-408 loop; the other pressure loops are similar.
The RCS Hot Leg Pressure Channel, PT-408 is t. sed to provide interlock signals for p -RHRS Inlet Isolation Valve HV-8701B. The pressure signal is used to control V two auxiliary relays (K734 for Open Permissive and K735 for Auto Close).
RCS Pressure Control Loops The PT-408 RCS pressure control loop (Figure 2-4) consists of a pressure transmitter, a channel test card, a loop power supply / current to voltage transformer, a dual circuit signal comparator, a comparator trip switch, two Solid State Protection System (SSPS)
! Os relays (K1301 at K1302), which are powered from logic cabinet train C.
V I
l- The pressure transmitter measures the RCS pressure and provides a current output signal that is proportional to the measured pressure. The loop power supply converts the O
V 4 to 20 mA current signal from the pressure transmitter to a 0 to 10 V proportional voltage signal. The output of the loop power supply is input to the dual comparator.
O WP0554:10/082791 2-20
O The dual comparator compares the pressure signal (input voltage) to each of two given setpoints. The two comparator outputs are 0 Vdc or 24 Vdc depending on the signal to O
O setpoint comparison. The comparator outputs :ontrol the SSPS relays K1301 and K1302.
When the pressure is below the valve opening setpoint, the output of the dual comparator energizes the SSPS relay K1301 and provides a contact permissive to allow opening of valve HV-8701B. When the pressure is above the valve closing setpoint, the v' output of the dual comparator energizes the SSPS relay K1302 and provides a contact interlock to close valve HV-8701B.
The channel test switch, various test points and jacks and the comparator trip switch are used during maintenance and calibration of the instrument loop.
Control Loop Summary The following is a description of the RHRS valve closing comparator circuit. Whenever the RCS pressure measured by the pressure loop exceeds the valve closing setpoint, the dual comparator output circuit will close the K1302 relay contact in the valve HV-8701B closing circuit causing the valve to automatically close as discussed above. Whenever the RCS pressure is below the valve closing setpoint, the dual comparator output circuit will open the contacts in the HV-8701B closing circuit allowing it to remain open.
The following is a description of the RHRS valve opening comparator circuit. Whenever the RCS pressure exceeds the valve opening setpoint, the dual comparator output circuit will open the contacts in the valve HV-8701B opening circuit and prevent the valve from being opened as discussed above. Whenever the RCS pressure is below the setpoint, the O
V dual comparator output circuit will close the contacts in the valve opening circuit and permit valve HV-8701B to be opened from the Main Control Board control switch.
O WP0554:10/082791 2-21
. _ _ __ .- . . _ - . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - . mm _ _ _ _ . _
2.4 Reference Plant Differences
_ As discussed in the introduction of this report, the basic information presented in WCAP-11736 is applicable for use in this plant specific effort. However, the aspects that require further review are the differences between Vogtle, Units 1 and 2, and the reference plant for their category. Based on the recommendation of WCAP 11736, the O- applicable reference plant for the Vogtle Units is the Callaway Unit 1 Plant.
Table 2 2 shows a summary of general characteristics for Vogtle and Callaway.
In order to perform the difference analysis between Vogtle and the reference plant, the following documents were examined:
Control wiring diagrams for t'.e RHRS suction / isolation valves I -
Suction / isolation valve logic diagrams RHRS configuration drawings Operating Procedures Technical Specifications
- FSAR RHRS Design Basis Document Once the differences were identified, those differences that impact the Callaway l " reference" probabilistic analyses were re-modeled such that the analyses would represent the Vogtle, Units 1 and 2, specifically.
O V
O wess4:woazm 2-22
The following is the plant difference, which required the reference models to bc ,
' n ,dified:
1 The Vogtle operating procedures include the defeat of the ACI by disconnecting the
-leads from the ACI circuitry to the valves circuitry per Procedure 54840, "RCA p_ Draindown Modifications: RCS Sightglass, Tygon Tube, and Defeat of RHRS Suction Valve Auto Closure Interlock." The Callaway operating procedures do not include this action. This difference only affects the interfacing system LOCA analysis,
- 2. The Vogtle ACI logic has an independent pressure transmitter for each valve, for a total of 4 pressure transmitters, such that no single failure will isolate both trains of the RHRS The Callaway ACI logic has one pressure transmitter shared between q- two valves, for a total of 2 pressure transmitters. This difference affects all of the V analyses.
For details on how the probabilistic analyses were modified, based on the above discussion, refer to Section 4.0 of this report.
v D o WP0554:10/082791 2 23 i
(D U
TABLE 21 I
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Westinghouse /Bechtel Valve Identification Cross Reference Westinghouse Valve Bechtel Valve identification Identifission 8708A 1205 PSV8708A 8708B 1205 PSV8708B 8724A 1205 019 8724B 1205-020 8730A 1205 009 8730B 1205-010 8734A 1205 021 8734B 1205-022 8735 1205-027 8818A 12M-147 8818B- 1204 148 8818C 12M 149 8818D 1204-150 8819A 12M-143 8819B 1204 144 8819C 1204-145 8819D 1204 146 8820A 12M 122 8820B 1204-123 '
8342 12M HV8842
- 8856A 1205 PSV8856A
.r m- - 8856B 1205-PSV8856B K-!b- 8922A 1204-139 8922B 1204-140 8922C 1204 141 l 8922D 1204 142 l 6 .' 8948A -1204 083 l t, 8948B~ 1204-084 L 8948C 1204-085 l 8948D 1204-086 8958A 1205-001 l
8958B- 1205-002 WP0554:1D/082791 2-24
?6
' k, TABLE 2-1 Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Westinghouse /Bechtel Valve Identification Cross Reference (Continued)
Westinghouse Valve Bechtel Valve Identification Identification 8969A 1208-436 8569B 12N 163 FCV610 1205 FV610 FCV611 1205 FV611 FCY618 1205 FV618 FCVt:19 1205 FV619 HCVO6 1205 HV606 HCVo07 1205-HV607 N HV8701A 1201 HV8701A
-( '-
HV8701B 1201-HV8701B HV8702A 1201-HV8702A HV8702B 1201-HV8702B HV8716A 1205-HV8716A HV8716B 1205 HV8716B HV8804A 1205 HV8804A HV8804B 1205 HV88MB HV8809A 1204-HV8809A HV8809B 1204-HV8809B
^
' HV8811A 1205-HV8811 A
,- HV8811B 1205 HV8811B
( HV8812A 1205-HV8812A HV8812B 1205-HV8812B
-HV8840 1204-HV8840 NO E TAG # 1205-226 L
1
,e -
LJ WP0554:10/082791 2-25
l O
TAllLE 2 2 REFERENCE PIANT COMPARISON O Parameter Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Callaway Unit 1 O No. Loops 4 4 No. RHRS Drop Lines 2 (HL Loop 1&4) 2 (HL I_nop 1&3)
RHRS Operation Parameters 400 psig,350 F 425 psig,350 F RHRS Isolation Valves 2 MOVS 2 MOVS O Prevent Open Setpoint 365 psig 360 psig Autoclosure Setpoint 750 psig 682 psig Relief Valve Design Setpoint 450 psig 450 psig Relief Valve Design Flowrate 900 gpm 900 gpm O COPS Design Criteria RHRS Relief Valves RilRS Relief Valves O
O WP0554:10/082791 2-26
. - - - . . ~ . . ~ . - - - . - . . . . s .n . . .-. - . .
, p=.
91und Qts - smau sis v : $NJECTION ' thJECTION
, J6 bksom ) wuA
! . {:' 41
- me L me -- .
2.--
SettA y HCV6% -
}-'
LtM 1 e v HypsoeA g g l
[' ((...
M Hvee04A j -
08tte
'1 V
' s716A FL e734A
,g g SIS COLD 6' Ak N
i -
LEG to- :
&& . ui i
i P
SUCTEN D4ADER e ,
4 Sit RC3 gl2
, Cl11 , ,
- Hvts40 l ,
- s. ,
f ne +h b raaw sis Frow sts i b
- 1 I ' ,,
s INJECTION JNJECTION g
HV871GS 4
.. . ri r 802tc ha . 88A48 IRC l ORC 84190'- 8418C pg3
. TD COLD , js t A e= c
- g
, ~, .
{}
ll te4ec 9618C FC 4 i 11%
H 89404 -
' ^ TRAlh
- 4. .
1l' = % 80440'
- LOW 4 -
' N46180 a
4 4
4
/EC-0534 6 91 DDG:-
1'-
- "'% ',/%
r , -, , ,y...._,_,.,._,,,,_,,,. -. .,-,._-,..,.-_.,,..m--,-_,_-.m-...-.--,..-..,_,.--.. ~ . , , , . ~ , , - - , . . . . - . . , - , . , - - . _ _ _ _ , ,
_m, N A -
FCYt 0 57064 I
[G--
n
"" u nw
g
' l d2 / RC3 W1 LEG mg I i gl LO - -
F F 7 T LIEP I W8701 A W 97018 revne ilkll "
N SI
- r. , s sk !Q
=155" Al'EllTUR E avn - 4.,u ' # <"<u mr. "'
CARD r---
j_.....p-----
j i Also Available On L---- ------ J l Aperture Carri i
$735 228 TD CVCS LITNhrH KA1 DOWMR v
- ^ :
rev ii .
n 87248
.m twNo s'd -
tma A 73 v me I me i 1 rig Ou
<T2 - m mi tra 1
Qn
- n-n i i
Ag, A,a TRAIN $ I es2co (b +- _
A
- ,Tuu
, , N A t LATIth --
='2
r---g---------/
j.,,.
t---- _------ J me l se f
i l
I Fig. ire 2-1 Vogtle Residual Heat Removal System 1
l 2-27 1 j i i I V -,
YOGTLE UNITS 1 & 2 INTERLOCK SHEET RHR$ PUMP SUCTION VALVES FROM RCS
_m
&Mit? 10F 2 Spalh e tc g
- f tVmN TO *****----***-***-**-----*----- --++
,, ht VT R AL nec t SpathQ PETURN TO h!UTRAL CLO58 ht pg h P t he0TE LOCAL OPth h CL0tt
! 4 i
)
l l ......w...... 9....................
- ! i t k f hec B s
! RCS HOT LSQ PAIS&URE l l hoff 4 I %T .A i i ' ;
4 1 1 1 0 1 4 P8 .
j
/O il I
- ! l i ' N I l ! A PT I q I Pt ** D
! h0TE 1 SUndP SUCTION VLv CW==0 j H+GH HI A.D buPPtv W/ CLOst0 <
pwst SUCTION Vtf Clott0 f
1~ -
to , .
O n j i I
l i
n 4 o o o n l l i t CLott CPt N VALyt VALVI RWhd6 MC Figure 2-2 Current Interlocks for Valves HV-8701A/B and HV-8702A/B (Sheet 1)
WP0554:1D/082791 2-28
. . . - , . . . . - ~ - , . - ~ . ~ . ~ - ~ . . - . . . - . - + - . ~ ~ ~ ~ - . - . ~ - . . . - . . . _
V0GTLE UNils 1 & 2 INTERLOCK SHEET RHRS PUMP SUCTION VALVES FROM RCS
~
- \
SMtti 3 or 3 INTERLOCK TABLE s INTERLOCK VALVE 8701 A 8702 A 8701B 8702 8 WITH Sump Suction 8811 A 8811 3 8811 A 8811 8 Velve - LS 1 LS 2 LS 2 LS 1 i
Hi-he a d 8804 A 8804 8 8804 A 88048 Supply Valve LS 1 LS 2 LS 2 Ls 1 RWST Suction 8812 A 8812 8 8812 A 8812 8 Valve -- LS 1 LS 2 LS 2 LS 1 PT 438 418 408 428 Train A D C B
(
NOTE 1: DE-ENERGlZE BELOW LOW SETPOINT < 365 PSIG NOTE 2: ENERGlZE ABOVE HIGH SETPOINT > 750 PSIG
~
BISTABLE OUTPUT IS LOGIC
- 1
- WHEN MEASURED PARAMETER
- IS GREATER THAN THE SETPOINT VALUE.
BISTABLE OUTPUT IS LOGIC ' 1
- WHEN MEASURED PARAMETER l- IS LESS THAN SETPOINT VALUE, l
lO Lo O Figure 2-2 Current Interlocks for Valves HV-8701A/B and HV-8702A/B (Sheet 2)
WP0554:10/082791 2-29
is:2: 2 O
J MCB
O SPRING RETURN TO NEUTRAL FROM OPEN NEUTRAL CLOSE BOTH SIDES PTm f-RCS HIGH PRESSURE
I RCS HIGH PRESSURE
- RECIRCULATION LINE ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED RHR PUMP /RWST ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED SUMP LINE ISOLAllON VALVE CLOSED tO v u o ir o u <,
EE M EE v v OPEN VALVE CLOSE VALVE NOTE: LOGIC FOR VALVES IN EACH FLUID SYSTEM TR AIN IS IDENTICAL O a. Autornetic close setpoint.
- b. Prevent open setpoint.
- c. PT. Pressure transtnitter.
PT 408 inMOV 8701 B interlock (for inner volve).
PT 418 in MOV 8702 A interiock (for outer utve).
(A PT 428 in MOV 8702 B interlock (for inner valve).
PT 438 in MOV 8701 A intertock (for outer valve).
- d. MC8 Main control board (local panel not shown).
( Figure 2-3 Logic Diagram for the RHRS isolation Valves WP0554:10/082791 2-30 1
.. - ~. --
(D.
.Q)
BirTAatt RELAY g COMSARATCR TRP SWITCH K1301 r PS 408 A l CHANNQ, SIGM ~
Wl COMPARATOR TRAIN C 4g l TEST lg PS 408 SWITCH PB 408 A. B
~
BrSTAR1LE COWPWTOR RELAY l MP ?KINH " K 1502 1 } 9'S 408 B B: STABLE COWARATOR RELAY g TRIP SWTTCH
~
K1301 PS 418 A CHANND. 51G%
TEST SWITCH M C0 5 CouPARATOR TRAIN O 45 PS 418 TER PB 418 A, B B1 STABLE COWPARATOR RQ AY TRP SWITCH K1302 PS 418 8 BISTAllLE RELAY b/ g COWPARATOR TRP SWITCH K734 PS 428 A CHANNEL SICK 48> TEST SWITCH M g ,
WCOWPARATOR [ TRAIN B PS 428 PB 428 A, B BISTABLE COWPARATOR RELAY TRP SWITCH K735 '
PS 428 8 BtSTABLE '
COWARATOR RQ.AY ,
,C) TRP SWITCH K734 (j PS 438 A CHANNQ. SIGM 48> TEST SWITCH M CO 5 COWARATOR TRAIN A PS 438 PB 438 A B BISTA8LE A - CouPARATOR RELAY i
TRP SwfTCH g733 PS 438 B i
L l
r^
l l
l
() Figure 2-4 RHRS Suction Valve Interlocks Process Control Diagram (Sheet 1)
WP0554:1D/CB2791 2-31 1
a . . _ . , - e s .m. n. --.wu,-.a-- asa -...s --a,-us ..a q A sp .s .en,,a >no.-s _ - . - r q .}
% i^L h$
cc*
V en2> fit q '. . =as V '9n 0$A dl xxs8
'b
_. i 8gli a .ga b] !
E n:
$7 E
n'.
i li a Ejaw
@R26R2 -n 0 0 .*. $
--~-
~Hl 'ik !! @ mla @ :ll2 'ik- n - $$]e s n t, t, , x x v.s n } j dj g - -
- ass
\J . ;OR 2 a S E l 222 ese
- lig g i, I tl I {!
ET I!
@ A *6M 'E, f
[s yl 5 ,,
@R8 R=
a =' f n n
- n. . ..
+
\. I g
C -O e ll
- 'Tr
, a D
.. I:h 5
~
JGT l lN fl t ! Hl
- O s
.l i
!%l iw
- .i 8 I ij, t .i. -n
--"< N
- 3::
c i~
' gll 3 p
.g' .it
!iin gi n , ,,o i! l .. y.. _
-:m ,,
~
iii g- .ll ,,
l Figure 2-5 RHRS Suction Valve HV-8701A Control Circuit WP0554:1D/082791 32 l.
1- _ - --
i 1
I
) O 1
l l
l 5 af- . ..........a-e y' . am
. .. tm...<41.sstEAT
..m. am5'
. _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . y
._. es ames E.tPT ; ._ e_
q__o_ _ . __ __ o_@
a R A .
O, _@n g .......s..
.o.
% z_ nO, , n _ ; n l
i
~
y ...~.......n
~ 7 tc de t.
1
- m. .
@ \ -@33 N__Qi 1
21 ... """" (Z33 %l __33 w --=
T I L
' 7 = --w j
g _-1 g IJ s op.a = = a7ois 2
_ _ " " 1 <_
=
C T "". ""'[ 5_3
. l-i
. , = = *M t=2 u. 2 -
7 Z ximi (oc)
- c -
w 33, ,A_ y l
p 4e v - 3 $- so Str p
-ar- -
n O
a s70ts l to < l a ' N =f' @
e l Hi, .
b l ', o Z n / f-
~'
A _ss le u aso4A --be ""
a 42( )
O
- --42(c) -
w 4- ,,
- - -T.-
O t& ,,
o o _Z 42(c) a L1 1.2 L3 42(c [ , _ _42(o) -
N# Tres*erener Z 42(e) y' b 7
__6
$, 4ao-12o v
- 2. "*****'"*"** 42
.- 42
- n. g .__________________________________ g,)
L .
@ -L- 49 W
7 r
" o I Note 1: K 1302 Closes on RCS Hi Pressure o <
Note 2: K1301 Closes on RCS Lo Pressure Note 3: Circuit shown with Tronsfer Snitch u in REMOTE position l
f
- -.I 't ;[- ! l(([tL St ~ )
eeh r r u ut c (n
s si se seSw 0 @u
s
)
r r PP iHL of s r
e n
(c SS a r
)
e CC T
( RR h n
- W 2
- nniio t t oowi
- 4_T - s e s no s
s se wp F
A 1 2 0 )
0 3 (
c loo h l o E 7 1 sc 2 CC sT G
,,t o g u '- e - c '- e 4 b ituE u
' h i Tg' -_2 p b
_b z~ 00 21 33 cR gs_
Ae_ 76}(s 1 1 ir KKC i n w a e
2 e
e 2 4
- n o : : :
O p t 1 - 1 23 o e e e e -
- M s s a e e e t t t
,c
,b o o o NNN
_ k_-
_ c-e-
w s t
r e
i n
s a
c c
g,, t @vu' i
o = h n
e
_ c 7 =
u e
A 1 o A t
2 3 e
N 011 H, - ) )
e guee 7 e (
2 c
(
2 4 b s
4 4.
j/
z_71}c O _.- 4(
- vo e2 1
_ w-n e ee tr 4
, 2 L
. )
a e
= (
=
2_
9 _
._Fi.
n e
m.
. I A i.
= .. 1__
P" s =? -
i
=
o -d .
O E"a.
E'
- eJ ce e
n o
w s-il. r.
rk.
_ n o
s 1 i[
(
2 4=
c s
i m N. _}4
$a'$".$" m *:"e. w ". .
m t; '
- '3 L
=
n
.fJ==e
. e - m m - **
9 s = ,
n u
.d *e -
_II 6 2
L=
O m. Inm i== g es
- ms:
E". s .
- a...j; a v n
. o =
s .
e jl lA .- "
I:m..
u r -. 4 L=
1 a._ 'h O
m g-g wO Wfm mc3gm <FN x< muoM> O0EE. g:;- 9
.['V hgg. .
wQ#
> l1
_.,._.._m_m -..m_ .-_m._.u.,.__. _....#._~m.__._____~___
N o < h i" hhi c-U eR2 i E -I i O, 238
- L 4 0 I
! if . =0*J
=@
'p i 58*5 O
- I ia 1!b
'euenH I 'iir ul u eu ? .,
n '< s :3!s A A '! $ i t 4 t,l tl 0061 18 O i a i I
.!S u l
u[ g e en i l==" j - - Q )s' t,g,h ll ' 1ls b > t I
*8 .
- -- ~
Q A <, ll1
'w a i'
t! j
', TE Q' ds HI O i!!!
.. n[! y'l .
r +- x
.1. -
=
- .- e
,i s
i l ou...i A . .'a:: ,, jj ? - --< m 3l F- r, = O i,;;,l;ll,l11._,..It! ;"; i - e , 3]j 4 W s, f L Figure 2 8 -RIIRS Suction Valve HV 8702D Control Circuit wessmo/cami 2 35 l-l- l
O 3.0 l'RopOSED llASIC LOGIC CilANGE The proposed interlock changes for Vogtle, Units 1 and 2, removes the ACI feature from the RllRS suction / isolation valves (IIV 8701 A/ll, llV 8702A/ll). With removal of toe ACI feature, valves llV 8701 A/11 and ilV 8702A/II will not close automaticult. on increasing RCS pressure greater than the valve cle:'ng setpoint. Alarms will be added (for each ItllRS suction / isolation valve) that actuate in the main control room given a i
" VALVE NOT FULLY CLOSED" signal in conjunction with a RCS PilESSURE IllGil" signal. The intent of the alarms is to alert the operator that a RCS RIIRS suction / isolation valve (s) is not fully closed, and that double valve isolation from the RCS to the R11RS is not being maintained. Vale position indication to the alarm must be provided from the valve limit switches, and power to the limit switches must not be affected by power lockout to the valve.
The proposed interlock', for valves llV 8701 A/B and liv 8702A/Il are shown functionally on Figure 31. In addition, the proposed valve interlock changes for Vogtle , Unit 1, are shown on the elementary wiring diagrams in Figures 3 2 through 3 5. The proposed valve interlock changes for Vogtle Unit 2 are identical and therefore, have not been included. The only change to the valve interlock and circuitry is to remove the autoclosure portion of the interlock and add a control room alarm. The valve open permissive circuit will not be altered. O . In summary, the propored Vogtle interlock changes provide deletion of the ACI feature from the RilRS suction / isolation valves, while still meeting the regulatory requirements to retain the open permissive portion of the interlock. In addition, the change provides a V control room alarm to r.lert the operator if a RilRS suction / isolation valve is not fully closed. The annunciator for the alarm wil! he located next to the existing RilRS alarms, i O WP0$s4:1D/090491 31 1 _ _ _ _ _ , _ . _ . . _ , . _ . . _ . _ , _ - - . . . . . _ , . . . , . _ _ _ , _ _ . - . . . _ , m, . . _ , . _ .
V0G1Li UNIT $ 1 & F INT ERLOCK SHEET RHRS PUMP SUCil0N VALVf 5 FROM RC$ ___ = :- butit
- of I t *
- ih o LC S ettgeh to htvtpst 680 D S P* lh0 Pitt p h to h t Vi >AL l
CLCII h 0*t h j (*fh h C4088 g'gg g , p j
# 5 WOTT LDCAL i i, e
.....w. .......I......... .......
4 ! .
,4 I I 1
e / 640 0 DCS 6e3T tie PSI 65U88 k9II_t
' ^
_LL t t p,
," w ',',..,,%
~~
+ N n t
. i pg ',/v,j i -V !
. I hoft t I
! tubsp tuCTsDe VLV CLD880 t 7iisTM AD tuPetY VLV CLott0 i f Pwet tyCTaoh VLV CLbMD ,
i i
! l j e ol' l l i
-. i I !
! : i l M T i i I I t t l l -
A + l i i __1.t_ ye 4 1 ( \ f a s / \ v' V W l
, t CLott vatyg C*th V4V8
. . Wl t s.
Figure 3-1 Proposed Interlocks for Valves llV.8701A/B and liv.8702A/B (Sheet 1) WP0554:10/082791 32
_. . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ___ _ _ ___ _ ____ .__. . . . _ _ __. - l l V0GTLE UNITS 1 & 2 l INTERLOCK SHEET . l RHR$ PUMP $UCTION VALV[$ FROM RC$ i v ! watt a on : O IN T E R LOCK INTERLOCK TABLE WITH Sump Suction 8411 A 88113 8811A 8 811 D Volvo tS 1 LS 2 LS 2 LS 1 Hi-he a d 8804 A 88D4 3 8804 A 8804 B Supply Velve LS 1 LS 2 LS 2 LS 1 RWST Suction 8812 A 8412 8 8812 A 8812 B Valve LS
- LS 2 LS 2 LS 1 PT 438 418 408 428 Train A D C B Ot NOTE 1: DE-ENERGlZE BELGW LOW SETPOINT < 365 PSIG NOTE 2: ENERGlZE ABOVE HIGH SETPOINT > 750 PSIG
~
BISTABLE OUTPUT IS LOGIC '.1' WHEN WEASURED PARAMETER
- l$ GREATER THAN THE SETPOINT VALUE. _
- BISTABLE OUTPUT 18 LOGIC ' 1' WHEN WEASURED PARAMETER IS LESS THAN SETPOINT VALUE.
O O Figure 3-1 Proposed Interlocks for Valves HV 8701A/B and HV 8702A/B (Sheet 2) uP0554 10/082791-33
~
L Q$, =JT, <d]3 QG d0 ~~20 JZ pt y-.-j,ypc p p g pegy m > $ c j" oo u %_ qy e a .I yn
.t 3 t:
. .' o ccam _..
1
; _m=r %
{- SI '1 APEllTilitis, }; l CD etzt.t i
.- wem t-- -l ta; (.
CAltD / c Nv/ ,v , Nv/ ( L N/
}
Aho Available Ori O ( ) Aperture Card f~ ,, e- / ,s/ r/ N N/ l' _I L . g l- - ~. _ - - ._ .W t
.C h
i 1 r eson o Alti 43/8 y o ( p ' PP 43/l-p*00701A c Of Cl 43/l- -No!~ y P.NN . et
- f. ) l l
y{l8704A 3 1/1-4 CLDt1~~0701AL
~~ ' 1 A s
. _ - _ _ _ , g;7 3/3 mA i
MCC j l t_ _ __
.___r___,.
1AA
~
I L t)-t).t- -Kan * ,i _ , y, /
.B
.'i <,L /t t,
- T.4, o
l _ . - - - xi ,,
- ev p 1Rf.NS ~'~ b
% l' C 7 'l g g',d 2 II
". g g#, !
__ T y) - - - - - - -. - - - 9 a 9., 4a j _ 11 ' 12 '_1 Y H1h i
-- A y g wisTINGF g ^o $ d. j ?a p
~~
a.n 5 e o c . ;. y w ,s
;- --,~
- o. c.
1A
]'g 8
% 3", 9 6 n -
*I g, 5 * **'*" o*
taa=wrve t cc . w e n inus, ano is ia 0 i ) g 4 ca to C 0 q n 3 s'
- K[, }e erovest ris co omono e4 m omnisc4uw2
'm y e Q ij s g$ <t naaou act a 7
y a .; g vue esies wen, e
- s. } m t inr<,e<vtl I l . _.
h e
. m ..
y l 4B60-40524 _ e qe e o l
- 33 3J \ ,4 33 k - 33o Ep31 k - 33o k ,'e 33 k ,4 33 DC t o tie F'et be DC OC F et
{DC N.On ' t
, 7 .. in O
%-) QJ TAHf( '
--i Q
~ s ,, u o" g l lg 'gg.N/r <-405 [
a a u s u ,,~r tet.N a $101A g i IOM E Q R . W~*'
.u n; ,: u ." l a
) D
-- C__
n:(f ) (~3fy~~ < ~~~~1 l L _ _. _ _ ._.._ - _. _. _ l ~
'd Q) ' kl* *$ Q l Q. . ; - v_. - y- _ .
_ m
. q . .[,,. -., - - - - .~ _m y
_- =r - , s.,97, . ,. e - 4----_. . g- - .g _ q l gni ESC t~1 t ,, ks.'F 3 4 I~~t. F. 43/l . . 43/1 At 43fl. I 35 g73g
- 8701A" R 9701A I 2 on rs R A 8701A pp; m t
- l u . .(t<C >l i .. .
t
.m .p .t ,
1 p, i?S r, 0. ti m ^i !!$ cA,}d%l =
. o m n- , <
cP(N IAL g 43pg, g
=
l 0701A l bC 12A g bC 00llA 7'_O$ .
- t,' W ii 1*' '" H L
' m_.m y.l. m a..- m -air
- h*8L
- i. '--.
1 4> a _1
,J 7?-D2 A W65'~ [1 g A4-D4 1
~
,. A b M~ T ~
' ' U*I 1
- N-h4xtPLKIE l M
\ j_ ,,,e
.f ;
1/2 O 7,*, ist ptcca O R 74{pe t l (FRONil 3/4 g o o * * . ., . n i, , !, , ""j, ELEC7ROSN11CH $tRl[S 2DK Ki~81L. 1 fl+Dit 1/l.070lA . 1/4-8701AL :
---------. ,e,r, 0i I
, . wu RDtOfL
'Ifb cr C3-03 L 1 t
k
. LOCAL IE64 R I
- . TF(r5 x i 35~is * . [
- --- - - - .- .J @i@ Q---
vm_d,'{ s T 2 1. l
- r. nr se amur, e nr- ema ; ako e S 9 . .,.
c- .sts a/Arte w4 s. 4 m,We uw.imin., 43/1-3701 A 111;.I ll . 3L
/
[ROMffAW ?LQl M734 A(PCIEG Mit) CLO'it$ Ofj RCS LOV PRE $$tHC ,\ ! g WC91ngh0018 IltClfic C0fp0fallon WA1(R Rt ACTOR DM310NS . MONR0!VILLt. PA. U.S A. Qw,4,u,,,e,gic,,,e 3.1*M735CLCSESOP4 RCS HI PRC E '" "'% / i.u , w geo,.ca 4.BK8. EQJIPrTD WITH PADLOCK CD I4 ..a s=e \ / e,icica enuca a a TRIPPED FO$lTION WITH VALVk CD ,,,,,, w coarceca awo TO FYlEVEi!T OFCNfNG OF VALVE \/
- a:Ws " /\
g's",'," 5. couTActs (IA4lT SWITC14 13,i4,ls,isC/M As OrtRA1T TCD . ' " , 7 g MOTOR OPERATE 0 VALVE 1-0701 A ' oi, e s i.en v IN FIELD ARE LHauZCD FOR VALVC - , g, ,,,' ,,,,,,,
- wvamo wacui CLOsonE INoicATioFJ ,,, / s ,
'" *8 'C'80 N=
5,m32 ctoscs wHm utvc inou x c 271C683 @f _ l5 FULIN CLOSEO j ... \ l SUR 6 7Pr H /o l. 323 c, i.ai !_.___._ _ _ _ A i Figure 3 2 RIIRS Suction Valve IIV.8701 A Proposed Interlock Control Circuit 1
. ins- _,
i ..
._. I h- D;b$3$hdMl3$$ [bh~"
- .u _. t v E 'e T ' % ."O 'e ] ':
l %E&g t<. i
" %g%
r SI l O.l. -
" *" r,L("o vi.*
APEltTUllE - I ' e, , .s , CAllD L- ','", CD -- C Also Availat)le On r. v , p ',
,y Aperture Card - v l .LC u :- . _ ,_ _ n -
p- - .-. - -_ _ gg 43f I DI 'A7 4 r :.3/ )
-yc "
et Cl[,l'7019 43/4
.j ANN. .
h[:hf0 0 l 3 1/l-
& CLOSE :::b 70lpL e L ~~~ q 4 l P *J 43/1 07000
-]
., MCC i t,. -
,AA
'1' 'T? '\' L i -. u,
< h <!)>k)---y-- ncit 9 ,,
- ,. 8/,
31
~
i .. E _ k. ~. m, o _t Ib'
.. - . ,4 c 3, 7. , .
..}. g __ ____ _.
hs y"___
- n u .1 (2 Y y
V{$N-O >n
- m 2 s ;
ek, --$ 5e . .. x m3mx l e, WQ > ~ ij =' d@.1 no s
=
, "p' s 4 me=4 m h. 9 e o d *y- 1 o "$Ws *~c ece n~
a 3a g t
?. s?
ni M to. 4, 5' 3;
.N N,-
c i4=vnre i o N . c i d ' %g p )i g ; Q v,vii. ..c a e LB s m a s u, (q st tu cJ to n Td. ,,lh' o -) t - U @w
~ i F$ j$ i t
te'*c' R o~ cm, .n 8G T Q q ' '
] Qob d N 2 D Atro18 pcd t g, '
[ m* ha N '
- w. .
-M%1 M
~
vw
"^
y l (-
^
^ -~--(yQ'( Q.gg
~ % N$li -
kng . g n%gn %" fg ,"*""
'n O O O
%n % 23 ~% v %;@n% s'fd^l"'ft93'L**
Ci i r .T* '" (8 */ t' )
~~** I., ,
T** T" > **" E '
~
o T **o T**g - -
%o 33 . h2 f'i.~ tams mima.ma. _-- -
-c - _
o o 33 33 n
~ 33 43 33 33 33
_ ~l 'o* , } bt {cc [bt g oo } bo {oo fbo
^
r 3,p d_ t/l. )l WW y- 67010 l <
, 9 N dt all AJ I ,. '
$0$$ T d q; as As; .s; q: gi r _"" = ca v "a~""a" -
d,
- rs
\ \
w ( ) T L.Q ~ - -l, 33 oc _::3 eg roc u* 33 \ . 33' 33 \ *33 d ,33 1 bt oo be ^oo be m;. af AW q: l i 9'l j,---(@e{#- .. -d;s
}t g,._~
b s t-. u-- - . J t. o -. h Q s
'n'* J
-~~ _ . . --~- e H _
=~-- ~
rE _ _'_ ,
,+c- ,, ,- c, lo, ,.
o,. I
#d sN!;
j pgj; $'J:$N!s J$'::Nli n l 0 8 t - th . m' 4 my in> ou brs [
- Ni; "
b :ui; d :ui; w:Ni; mi rc-- _Ti.- t/l+ Ti. - _1 4 [ gs1De u' gstLa 7- gsTtM & f eNf; l b l$04$l bef58tA l o thga F t N!i I c - ('T: o a L . *$ .L ' *T p. 193 { 1 yer su Ihh wc r I (.J na ox2 7 IPLAft % ; ,r g_ .l.. 2 7
,7 (. $ in eLocx if80NU un o o o
x yw- T-
;;:4' 3,4 a 'o hP , ,
4 i (LCCTROSHtfCH $tRlt$ 20K f1[] L l/yg, f
-------------Q,,, l ,- TMEEr 7 -
RD10TE Ofbi X Locat TrM"~ T - h.h.g - J (_.- gg"E jg-P HOUSE PROPRttiARY
~ . . . - - , . ,
N* / ey, e,y Westingh0U38 IltClflC C0fp0fallon w , i cce. nee mee4 tar, TA IN C (NOTE 8 $H.tli e
, / ,,,g
' 3, 3,K1301 Ct.0$tt CN ftCS LON PAf8SURE ... . .N
[$8,U4c7, 36
% . c~ms d.df,',"C 4. 1+K.1302 CLC$tt ON AC,S HI PAf$$URf-
,,,,, \ s/ / ~ '-
. . pyimo
!affvAJ 'a m H ;818, n' ger.
mb- '" m,' ';ft:0
/\ HOTOR OPERATED VALVE 1- 07010 isois es w #Aar to OPENING 0 vA.Yk. / \
t sci ornts taan tut 6, Lt2T $NITCH CAM OPERATOR FoM we iacx u m m tio wt m /' ' n< = ac. * *
- m e.
hM H*** (# '"8 CONTACh 1314. %l(sJ% ADJUSTED 464 FillbD ARE, UTILII tip FOR YAWE CLoikURG tNot C Ar#0N.
'"/
Me m
~
\ c 271C683
\ l SUB fp,f 6/9 [.. 3 2 4,.
A i ., , I j Figure 3 3 RHRS Suction Valve HV.8701D Proposed Interlock Control Circuit
~ ~ ~
.~ - -
. _ _ - I b- 3 -3 2) 3 cs 23
_ .u_X$9 2'e.__I it 1*'s.3" n" T** l W..wM'~ % w - - .--
~ w%
r--- - - - - - - - - SI APEllTUllE ! CE '
=]b $5a CAllD l rh t $W a45 sh; Also Available On Cl t M Aperture Card r - 'd "h3 dh3 '
l TC _L - t_c_ _ ___ _e _ ___o _ rp3DB~ 7 ~{~~h~ .<. A C L'.YO! I;2 fJ4N . [ 3 t/l= _ CL0ttj!8702AL A 43/l+
- - q 0702A
{ 14C C i i L ._ _ l j J. A L-- - _._ T}--' -- i 4 m l1 '~lC I x1 y h ,. . . . 47 1 . . at t? X 8 I
,_ -. .r "'
rT-ici g y,- --------. 6 k ) gg -+- 4 9 T l _ _T 1 12 I
---_-.e ,
- cc Att- @. p "5m e g$$L. m ni
$ e O N
b t%- % 9h bel (OC m n) Rs e.Km i UJ Q s c* 4
'g ,
(( T{ i cowout t a u4 wilt
?s n
% VI W 4 0-
'N' Qm' "1 '$sO e
tuxtoste C hD,
- h(. Omt44 04 ej h (: $ PvtPOW f leit Pt04 wIl%
=.
*r* C6
, ? ,.%%
6 !).: L' '*V 4 --
~
(ipn lG O g g M. hH f; I f. 0 L.
- t v ( / 7 0.' A )
\ w) ' u \ w) 3 bc :
33 3 to *' " de
'M 3) Q.O3) k
" oc 3J e\A*33 y @33%
Li '$ A la g r,e u u ur c. ors m
. N /_ A C S. P A s sw t.f. .
* } &** } i'C ph "rm m xr N E N
~
e - o o ~ b 2) 33 3J 4 3J 33 31 33 l } ot
- - - ~ *~~""
}bc {or Dc
{co }po {oo { bo
/* l 1
---b~-- t.t
""} is 040 l 1 343 d VI- '
f'
? D'"I% p- 670! A ~I g t-{9814 i L2 tt N, $1 tie MasHtt2 PD$lfl0N $d1TCHts
~
T __' . 3[ _ 3',J
- q i b-l -O u
-} [tM i
" ] p T* V oc loc T*c T" T ** T" T **
rM L b, A b, *b LV; I y.- > g l-~
+
/I i .. 4 i; .,$
, _. __ 9__ -w
_e ._y.__._. _e/Q L- i l' 'u lyL; j __q - - g -_
% y 4C.___ -
r
-- . h - e avi. - -
u o - o-q-
\y (D) il 9- t t 8- 1,8 -
I a t.1 a vi . I 'I Ato as/t- l y b;7lcf'a <ul
;p.4"wh E " "_ @"" _'IE " " !
.g
'- --f[do\M2 U'A "' "
U _ _ _ m ._ c - r c] 4 - p 49i n evi- cit evi- l
,p un,.
a gp vi- ru att a, non ,9f una _ _ _ _ _._ ___ q < d ui.
- vam "
nLn a l N[sre wmo., Inui L wf= Fanoi ma ::,,,,s 1 ,4 O$N i l L 5"*S1'K_ 'HE.3 K 5Hl8 { .g {tJL
- ,gt _L[
_q_ _ o a ;gs
. . +4
..g._-..__-----.q w a ou p
_reinu_ _ _s i / R g,, y,# n/2 O O K Ej+6_,,,,1._
'T 141 ELOCli:
ttnoN11 v4 x o o gb 2
.' I LttetRoswitot SIRits 20<
-m ei I in-evon I/l-e702AL IE+C1 Dc di t i 1
... .--------- f,2, c
- l inw a ui f<uiott }t-R t
** toCAL c 4.9)~~_
cJ a 1 l jf.fis 1. 1 ' c F65 x J fa ffk j}%@ *1 . .
@rbS'fr
- -sica 1HOU$t PROPRIETARY M* / gej Westinghouse Electric Corp 0fallon UAM EW { '
, S Willt 1[ AC10R DIYl$10Ns . MONt0tYltlt. P A.115 L
- 1. TRAIN D (NOTE S $H.11) / hs
[q',Ni # 'e'veias; 2,1 kt301 Ctt$tt DN RCS Loa PRttsuRE, '.".e.e e'.'.*\ N/ marie ntac. 1. l*K1302 C(Ott$ CN KCS HI PAtt$URC. g,. f ~-
.'a,0 y,[ rug'oe *tmutwe
+
4, t n tutiaMITC H C AM OPE R ATOR FOR ..e 7 w . u,,c, ' 3.icks ce ponsi vo conTgO 14 Fili ARE UT.LIEE.D FORis it is n .,, it c. acausic.o
/ . v. HOTOR OPERATED VALVE 1-8702A p ec.im,.-
- on: ' 'aa...'"' VALV '*" / Ns H4 n'a**- * = 6 60-t w a ,5 wCLOLURE uINotCAT 10N.
.. .,o .i u e.u ->
a.,, i< ,,,, uc.,, m ,.. m,
,4 m ,,,m e .- ~ ~m ~
.. w , ,
.~/,, s c 271C683
,,,,, \ , , , , , , %, ,,,,
A 3 Figure 3-4 RIIRS Suction Valve IIV-8702A Proposed Interlock Control Circuit
...u..m...........
D 00 3 36 r --
/
-4 I ~ ~
~ ~ ~
L tu@ un @ @ on LnG ~ u~n 0 Io bn%u e
.a T." l _"u_'N'"2 1_"d" m ' * ' ' * '
t' SI ME@ "
'l ""
APERTURE CARD l ha,
, (to[
r - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 Also Available On lCB Aperture Car d " *ilr67vi.ara l d u _. . u u su I, .
' \
- C ' '
,j l .
'M '8 l TC u - .:Y
_s_s). l F PSDB o' o [ At 42/l I
-c b
'Ald1/l*
a er 1cto Cl 4 (b,d h p .
,q.2/l-
- m. .
-c am '.h.
L-i n it/i-f q ~l l k l MCC _ j t._ __ _. . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ 4, g-- __ _.._ . - - - ( a ,r, l - yg N mi 1 - tene. : :a i 1:"::$g _il
$ :(( :: g i x g_________.
_____n u>_td __ _ ? 3
! Agggg_(3? =7"9
&0 w e ,
s.$,s g. e t a __& wcwrca ce re g' 0 (8 1 6 's a. tt
, e
- ,, ccscenza wan
., i .
( ! A i g %g fielWTit0 70 90
.i '("t ,
d 9 . ' , g N tr.tt. 470 3 70 8t if g N , .!, i eso.tu rec u t
/
a U Q 8 e w 9$% hw (o}'! ICE'cE,m .U. rsesa wuntie g wil%'90VM W A1
., i
=% .*
l .
Y I {}_ bed ~ 'h D.-(? 'l-I
\
p.3 L3.\ ,3 \. 1
~
33 33 3 3 3
. O
, 1s 1 c ss 2m 2-w n :m I t I .t. .__ ._a. _ .___
.ky W' Y.AtHL
- - - - . ~.- - - -
-m hl
- y. G yb
&~ yn p ;$og,_ ng (gy)D) '
vEg~ nn n~ ua.,a A. yn g ** Hf f(C 5 I l' t & & d f C
,..I 95 as au 's ig I>---
g .-}. ._ 1, L _ __ __ _ _ _ __ _
= ;
-a < > ,-
^
g 4 N' N'[ Lh e .A 0 I ~"' v~. v-
~- .
v v._ .-
- -_ .4
---, - - , ~- vy u "'%
-m - - _- 'S -
q l
~
4, Y ~~~ ~ ~~ ~ o o o ~~l IUI
; ! I A 43/J R C70.4.
At R 43/
- S 10.j4 .
At 43/)3 8: 5106 l l i.
'" k 735 4i ts g dr.i 174 l i O*Cle u
;*h:(%!;
t 5 8{1 52 L _ ' ll .o2 5 .1.1.J__ o)J
? % :Ml; ^iM;^llMi'F'UhI 2c-- - = - -
{ te t .i oiP ri.
- rc - n. !
l/t. l 51tw (P $1tse &
-1 <i
< OrtM('*470tB 41/g. I 22 l- 33 1 stot ni 23 g.
}
2 Dic2D M LM tec E01 g>c tal: j$ -l
' At 491
- i I b sten L 59' 1 m" mn j I.mnt2 M 8ct ; '
- P-- d 11
~
I N A444 ,
"* * * * -; ._. _ N*$ I i f,*, f*;f.2T' % s / f\i';'r-A 7 \ ,
v b 181 (*LOCa (F RMil 3/4 I/2 o o x JGs_2
*f x o o -g 7 8
- g l tuc1kotwitcH stalis 20s: lifiii L g {/,}~91029
**"2" CLtML ,'
l m.m. g Vuott id!)-m thC3 T l htc<>.t. TCM T'
~~~
-----3 1
U tver a twitch Q'~-fi 193--~ r
~~
{g wo -
; g%gM n T m m --T
- r. [%";[g ED nesm i 155 MOPRIETARY T* /. ge/ Yit'tnf.01:!I Ilt ttilC C0f p0ftllon
'A El '"*
- l. TT.'.1N f (ROTI O CH.lli " "'\ / Witti t! Atitt OfYt3!33 . NCERt!Yl'.Lt. P A. L'11 }
NENxra,: 2 147 4 CLC*!C C:4 f.00 LC'l Pi.EC'Jtt /
'Th e
- epoos tem a a 1 14733 CLCSE$ Cl &CC HI PAISMt ",.*.."."\ 8
- 4. llMIT EJITC14 C A>4 of'UMTOR F081 i -
K/ j
$ca [.a$ i ** courActs i.sais ic. As aosus,Tuo
.n
/\
su1 to
,0 d** M IN FIELO ARE UTILIMO FOR VALVE CLOWRF. IN DIC, A'n0 H.
/ \ MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 1- 87020
...u we. mn.c, M.
a"
/ \ $ 8' ' H a' a o - **6*o
- tm , u acou-,, m.or,,,,~m m
- , , , , ,, , . cw. ~ ,w., -
y x C
-- x 271C683 i, g, m n , , ,, ,.,
Figure 3-5 RIIRS Suction Valve IIV.8702B I'rol>osed Interlock Control Circuit
~ '
3-7
i O ' 4.0 PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS 4.1 Introduction This section describes the probabilistic analysis performed to justify removal of the ACI from the RllRS suction isolation valves for Vogtle, Units 1 and 2. Three different areas were examined in this analysis: 1) the likelihood of an interfacing system LOCA;
- 2) Rl!RS availability, and 3) low temperature overpressurization concerns. Each of the three areas was analyzed utilizing the current control circuitry configuration and then with the proposed modification to the control circuitry. The net change in each area was 1 determined, and the detriments and benefits were weighed to determine the acceptability of removal of the ACI from a probabilistic standpoint. <
I 4.2 Data The data used in this analysis was derived primarily from two doeurnents - NUREG/CR 2815 Rev.1,"Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedures Guide" (Reference 7) and IEEE 500,"IEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic, Sensing Component, and Mechanical Equipment Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"(Reference 8). The component failure data is , presented in Table 4-1. O V Testing information was obtained from the Technical Specifications, while maintenance information was extracted from the " Individual Plant Evaluation Methodology for Pressurized Water Reactors,"(Reference 9). x The mean human error probabilities were calculated utilizing the medians and error factors from NUREG/CR 1278 (Reference 10) and assuming a log normal distribution. l0 WP0554 iD/082791 41
i O v Each human error calculation is explained in the individual analysis and is shown in the . Appendices. O 4.3 Interfacing Systems LOCA Analysis An interfacing systems LOCA, referred to as an Event V in WASii 1400, is a breach of O the high pressure RCS boundary at an interface with the low pressure piping system. This breach has the potential to cause a LOCA in which the containment and , containment safeguards radionuclide protective barriers are bypassed. An RHRS LOCA is classified as a non mitigable LOCA outside containment. It is assumed to occur if the valves in the RilRS suction line fall open when the RCS is at normal operating pressure (2235 psla). Since the RIIRS is designed for a much lower pressure (600 psig), the result of both suction / isolation valves failing open is O overpressurization of the R11RS, which is assumed to lead to gross failure of the R11RS boundary. Since most of the RiiRS is located outside of containment, gross failure of the RIIRS boundary is assumed to result in an uncontained LOCA. In this section, the frequency of an interfacing system LOCA is calculated for the RHRS RCS interface for two cases: 1) with the present interlock configuration, and
- 2) with the proposed control circuitry modification. Appendix A provides the detailed calculations.
Typically, RHRS suction paths are the dominant V sequence source. Usually there are two motor operated gate valves in series on the RHRS suction line from the RCS. Failure of these normally closed valves during power operation (at high pressures) would expose the low pressure piping downstream of the valves to the existing RCS pressure. ., O ' VP0554:10/082791 4-2 L
O in this analysis, several failure combinations are considered which would result in both suction valves being in the *OPEN" position. These failure modes are defined as:
- 1) rupture of the two motor operated gate valves,in series, in the IlllRS suction line, and 2) failure to have closed one suction valve (or spurious opening of the valve) and subsequent rupture of the other valve. 'llic latter failure mode actually includes two combinations the failure to close the valve closer to the RCS (or spurious opening O of the valve) and subsequent rupture of the valve closer to the RilRS and vice versa.
Failure to close both 1(llRS suction valves during startup is not considered a credible failure mode becaun the condition would become apparent and corrective action would be taken. (The RllRS relief valve would lift as the RCS pressure increased, an alarm would sound, and the RCS pressure would increase more slowly than if the suction valves were closed.) The general expression used to calculate the frequency of an Event V (F(VSEO)) O utilizing the above failure modes is: F(VSEO) = X [ (g)2 O(Vi ) + (g): O(V2 ) + (8)2 O(Vi R)] where X = the number of RllRS suction lines (1 or 2) (g)2 = failure rate of RllilS valve closest to the RCS (due to rupture) (g) = failure rate of valve closest to the RilRS (due to rupture) O(V ) 3
= probability that RllRS valve is open O(V 2) = probability that RCS valve is open O(V R) 3
= probability of rupture of RilRS valve O
WPD554:1D/082791 4-3
O The following boundary conditions and assumptions were applied in each of the analyses: 1, The calculation is based on an occurrence when the plant is in Mode 1,2, or 3. i
- 2. The valve closest to the itCS is at itCS pressure and the valve closer to the 111111S is at itCS pressure only if the valve closest to the IICS falls open.
- 3. No common cause rupture of the valves is considered. This is based on the fact that no common cause ruptures of these valves have actually occurred.
i I 4 The frequency of valve rupture is that of catastrophic internal leakage. The failure rate is the same for either valve given that the valve is exposed to ItCS pressure.
- 5. All electrical power to the control circuitry (i.e.,480 V AC bus) is assumed to be available with a probability 1.0.
- 6. A refueling outage occurs approximately every 18 months (assumed to be the only time at which the plant will be in cold shutdown, on average).
Fault trees were developed to determine the probability that one of the 111111S suction valves is open at power conditions (O(V3 ) or Q(V2 )). These fault trees (shown in Appendix A) were developed in detail to show the failures down to the control circuitry component level. The scenarios examined in the fault tree for the case with the ACI t-are: 1) the operator fails to remove power to the valve by racking out the circuit breaker, and subsequently the valve spuriously cpens during power operation, or 2) the-operator fails to close the valve during startup (or the operator attempts to close the valve but due to some component failure, the valve does not close), and the ACI fails to WP0ss4 iD/D52791 44 l y---e.- -y-.m ,,-. ,-----..,w p,.,.y---4 _m.y,-weg,- ., ,_,y... 9 m r g.w.w.-q.,,,.mmy- w,-,9,,i,y9y--.p.99- _ , _,,.y.g m.-i p 9 . 9, p-. - ggi =aa p.y--Ut-e ,e a>- w
O perform its function and dacs not close the valve, and an operator fails to detect that the valve is not closed during startup or power operation. ! O For the case with the ACI removed, the scenarios developed in the fault tree are: 1) the i operator fails to remove power to the valve by tacking out the circuit breaker, and subsequently the valve spuriously opens during power operation, or 2) the operator fails
.to close the valve during startup (or the operator attempts to close the valve but it does not close),' and the operator fails to detect that the vulve is not closed via the presence of an alarm (or the alarm falls to operate).
The probabilitics generated from the fault trees were input into the equation for the frequency of an interfacing system LOCA for Vogtle, The frequencies were calculated ) for the case with the ACI present and without the ACI and with an alarm (the proposed change). The frequencies are shown in Table 4 2 along with the percent change in the frequency, I
-The frequency of an Event V decreases with removal of the ACl. The main contributor to the frequencies in each case is a rupture of the RCS valve followed by rupture of the '
RilRS valve (frequency of 5.76E 07/ year). The deletion of the ACI has no impact on this contributor. The other dominant contributor (the rupture of one valve while the other valve has failed open) does not contribute as significantly in the ACI deletion case as it does in the ACI available case. This causes an overall reduction in the frequency of O- an Event V when ACI is deleted. O , WP05s4:10/082791 45
~ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . - _ _ . - . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . . . . . . _ . - - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
O Furthermore, several factors were not considered in the analyses, but are worth mentioning: O 1. The suction valves have OPIs that prevent the valves from being opened whenever the RCS pressure is greater than the setpoint of the open permissive. Thus, an operator error in which he inadvertently opens the valves is not very likely.
- 2. It is highly unlikely that a suction valve couu move against the high differential ;
pressure across the valve when the plant is in Modes 1,2, or 3 because the valve , motor size is inadequate to open the valve given the high differential pressure. ;
- 3. -If an Event V should occur, the RIIRS relief valve would operate. This relief valve discharges inside containment to the PRT. This relief valve would decrease the consequences of an Event V. .
O Thus, from a probabilistic standpoint, the deletion of the ACI and the inclusion of a , control room alarm is beneficial in reducing the frequency of an interfacing syvems LOCA and the potential for a significant radionuclide release outside containment. 4.4 Residual IIcat Removal System Unavailability Analysis The availability of the RHRS during cold shutdown has been of increasing concern in the nuclear industry. Many events have occurred in which the ability to remove decay heat has been lost, either because of a loss of flow in the RIIRS or because of a loss of the heat sink. Abnormal events that occur shortly after initiation of RilRS operation, while the decay heat generation rate is high, can cause bulk boiling conditions if decay heat removal is lost and not restored by the operator in a time period as short as twenty minutes. The Vogtle RIIRS was analyzed to determine the unavailability bf the I O WP0554:1D/090'i91 46 i
._,_ _.-._ _ ._. _ _ :.._. _ _ _.._ ....- - - _.~~ _-_ -. _ __ _ _ _ _ ..~
I O U system to remove decay heat and the impact of removal of the ACI on this unavailability due to rpurious closure of the suction valves. Appendix 11 provides the detailed OG description of the analysis. The availability of the RilRS to remove decay heat is considered in three phases in this analysis. First, the RilRS must be placed into service and go through a warm up period in order to minimize the thermal shock to the system. Secondly, during the initial phase of cooldown, the decay heat load is high. For this phase, the two trains of the RilRS (two pumps and two heat exchangers) are assumed to be in operation foi 72 hours. The final phase of cooldown is long term decay heat removal. The decay heat load is low and only one train of the RllRS (oni pump and one heat exchanger) is assumed to be in operation. Six weeks was the time period assumed for this phase (based on the average refueling outage time period). O V Fault trees were constructed for each of the three phases, The components in the R11RS were modeled in the fault tree. Separate fault trees were developed, with and without the RHRS suction / isolation valves ACl, in order to show the change in RllRS unavailability due to the removal of the ACl. These RilRS suction / isolation valves from the RCS hot legs were modeled in detail down to the control circuitry level in order to show the change in unavailability. The following boundary conditions and assumptions were utilized in the analysis, v
- 1. Both trains of the RilRS are operating, injecting into two of four cold legs for
_ 72 hour, following initiation of RilRS operation (short term phase).
/T C/
f / \ WPD$54:10/082791
O
- 2. One train of 111114S is operating, injecting into two of four cold legs for the 'ong term 111111S cooldown phase of 6 weeks (representative of the time of a refueling outage).
- 3. No testing or maintenance operations are assumed to occur during the initial phase of couldown using the 111111S (first 72 hours).
4 During the warm up period of the 111111S, both 111111S purnps are started and must run for approximately two hours before injection into the itCS cold legs.
- 5. All electric power (AC and DC) is assumed to be available with a probability of 1.0.
- 6. For long term cooliny, it is assumed that the Train A pump is operating and the O Train B pump is in standby, and thus, must start and run should the Train A pump fail. No suitching of trains during long term cooling is assumed.
- 7. No common cause failure of components is considered.
The three phases of cooldown are described below: Failure to initiateElitS Oneration A single fault tree was developed for this phase of RilRS operati m to identify those faults that could impact the initiation of RilRS operation, which is defined as being approximately the first two hours of operation. An additional fault tree was not developed because this phase of operation is not dependent on the ACl, but on the OP1, which has remained unchanged. O WP0554:1b/090491 4-8
l l l lG The basis for the fault tree development for this phase was provided by the operating procedures for initiating decay heat removal by the RilRS. Each of the steps modeled in the IlllRS initiation fault tree involved an operator error or a component failure or both, as appropriate. Q A!nShort Term Cooling O b
' liv: hatt trees developed for this phase of couldown reflect that both illlRS trains are
- unirmd to be in operation. Injection into two of four RCS cold legs is required for inmen in this phase, or more precisely, failure to supply cooling flow from the tao RilR$ trains to at least two cold legs constitutes RilRS failure. The short term coolin.; fault tree primarily features spurious closing of various valves, failure of check valves to open, and failure of the RiiRS pumps to run over the 72 hour period.
c Spurious closure of the RilRS suction / isolation valves due to the ACI is explicitly V) modeled in the fault trees. Edme of Long Term Cooling Only one RilRS train is assumed to operate for six weeks in the long term cooling phase to ptovide adequate cooling. Injection into any two of four itCS cold legs in required for success in this phase, or inversely, failure to supply cooling flow from either of (~) two RilRS trains to the cold legs results in RilRS failure. LJ Toe long term cooling fault tree shows spurious closing of various valves over the six week period along with failure of the operating pump to continue running, and upon O l
!] failure of the running pump, failure of the second RilRS pump to start, run or be otherwise unavailable due to test or maintenance.
O WP05s4110/0B2791 4-9
O llstlu The fault trees for each phase were quantified to determine the unavailabilities. The results are shown in Table 4 3. For the failure of the initiation fault tree, the dominant failure modes are the RilRS pumps falling to start and the operator error in which the operator fails to open the suction valves. The deletion of the ACI has no impact on the failure probability for RiiRS initiation. The failure probabilities for the short term cooling phase are reduced by approximately 26 percent with the deletion of the ACI for Vogtle. The dominant failure mode for each case is the failure of either pump to run for 72 hours (both pumps are assumed to be required for success in this phase). For the case with the ACI, failures of components associated with the ACI contribute approximately 4.5E 05 to the failure probability. In the long term cooling phase, the failure of both pumps to run for six weeks is the dominant contributor to the system unavailability. For the deletion of the ACl, the failure probability is reduced by approximately 40 percent. For the case with the ACI present, the failure of a component associated with the ACI such as the power supplies, signal comparators, comparator trip switches or pressure transmitters in combination with failure of one of the pumps to run contributes approximately 7.2E 03 to the system O unavailability. The results of the quantification of the Vogtle RilRS unavailability fault trees show that O deietien efthe ^Ciredecesthe eember ef ,nerieescie,ere,efthe sectien vaive,.eed thus, increases the availability of the RiiRS. O - WP0554:iD/DS?791 4 10
O 4.5 Low Temperature Overpressurization Analysis A number of plants have experienced pressure transients in which the temperature - pressure limits for the reactor vessel as specified in the Technical Specifications have been exceeded. A majority of these events have occurred during startup or shutdown conditions and have been caused by equipment malfuru Kn, procedural deficiencies, or incorrect operator action. These pressure transients are of concern because the RilRS may be subject to overpressurization, and since the reactor vessel material is more brittle 1
- at relatively low temperatures than at operating temperatures, the requirements of i i
10CFR50 Appendix 0 may be exceeded. '
- The effect of an overpressure transient at cold shutdown conditions will be altered by removal of the ACI. With removal of the interloch, the RIIRS muy also be subject to overpressurization, llowever, the RI-IRS relief valve (s) will be available to mitigate the
- transient. The trade-offs between these two effects must be considered in the analysis of l
the RilRS ACI. The overpressurization analysis uses event trees to model the mitigating actions (both -
. automatic and manual) following the occurrente of LTOP events. These mitigating actions affect the severity of the overpressurization events and reduce the possibility of damage to the plant. The analysis is dMded into two parts: 1) determination of the frequency of cold overpressure events; and 2) the effect of mitigation on the transients. 1 Each part is discussed below. More detail is provided in Appendix C. ,
O
- O L
WPO$54:10/082791 4 11 l
. , - . , .,m,_ - . . _ . . . . - , . . .._-.,. -. _ _ ,_ _. . . , , . . _ _ . ~ . . . . . . , . , _ . , . , . . . . - _ - . , , . , , - . ~
.--..-,.m.,.,,.,-
4.5.1 Inhiating Events h'.way past reports have characterized the different types of transients possible at cold shutdown. The following lists the overpressure transients that have been examined:
- 1. Premature opening of the RiiRS (i.e., R11RS operation prior to reaching RIIRS operating parameters).
- 2. Rod v ithdrawal.
3.= Failure to isolate R11RS During Startup.
-4 Actuation of Pressurizer lleaters.
- 5. Startup of Inactive Loop. (Startup of a RCP.)
- 6. less of RIIRS Cooling Train.
- 7. Opening of Accumulator Discharge isolation Valves.
- 8. Letdown isolation a) RHRS operable b) RHRS isolated.
- 9. Actuation of Charging / Safety Injection Pump.
The transients described above were researched in order to determine the frequency of-these events based on past experience. - Appendix D of the WOG analysis (WCAP 11736) details the events that have occurred and the quantification of the frequencies of these transients. Table 4 4 lists the transients and the frequencies O calculated based on operating experience. i-These events have been grouped into two general categories that describe their effect on the plant: 1) events that affect the balance between mass addition and mass letdown; I and 2) events that affect the heat input / heat removal balance. These types of events have actually occurred and the NRC has expressed concern over the frequency of these O > WP0554 iD/082791 4 12
O events. The heat transients and mass input transients, along with their effect on the RIIRS, are described in the WOO WCAP 11736. O 4.5.2 Analysis 11 EAT INPUT ANAIESIS 13ased on the discussion of LTOP initiating events in WCAP 11736, only the mass input analysis needed to be conducted to determine the impact of ACI removal. The heat input analysis, provided in WCAP 11736, showed no effect caused by ACI removal since the heat input transients occur quickly and the RilRS would be subjected to the high pressures before the RIIRS suction / isolation valves could close. MASS INPUT ANALYSIS O In order to depict the mass input transients, which are slower than the heat input ; transients, event trees were utilized to model the mitigating actions that occur following the transients. Operator actions and mitigating systems are included in the event trees. The effec; of the rnass input overpressure transic:"s identified in the WOO analysis was evaluated utilizing event trees (charging / safety injection pump actuation and letdown isolation). Each mitigating system and operator action was modeled as a top node on the event tree for.the given transient. The following describes the event tree structure, the success criteria defined for each transient, and the nodal probabilities utilized in the quantification and the results.
'The safety functions (i.e., the event tree top events or nodes) for the Vogtle event trees are defined below:
O i 4 13 i _ , , ._ _ . m., , , . _ _ . , . _ _ _ _ _ , _ . _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ _. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . _ . ._
O
- 1. Initiating Event (IE): The mass input initiator that could lead to overpressurization and/or possible R111tS damage, either charging pump actuation or letdo,vn isolation (both with the RllRS operable and with the RilRS isolated). The safety injection pumps are not included with the charging pumps since their breakers are racked out, however, the positive displacement pump is included.
- 2. R11RS isolated (RI): The RilRS will be isolated during certain periods of shutdown dictating whether or not the RilRS relief valves are available to mitigate the transient and if the possibility exists for damage to the RilRS. The event tree allows for both trains of RilRS to be isolated, one train or no trains.
- 3. RilRS Suction Relief Valve Lifts (RV): If the RilRS is not isolated, the spring loaded relief valves will open at the setpoint pressure, if one train of R11RS is isolated, only one RilRS relief valve is available and if both trains are isolated, there are no RilRS relief valves available to mitigate the transient.
- 4. COPS Operates: The Cold Overpressure Protection System (COPS) consists of two redundant and independent systems utilizing the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) of the pressurizer. When the system is energized and reactor coolant temperature is below 350 F, a high pressure signal (above the COPS setpoint) will trip the system automatically and open a PORV until the pressure drops below the reset value. For Vogtle, the COPS has a variable setpoint. An auctior.eered system temperature is continuously converted to an allowable pressure and then compared to the actual RCS pressure. The system logie will first annunciate a Main Control Board alarm whenever the measured pressure approaches within a predetermined amount of the allowable pressure. On a further increase in measured pressure, an actuation signal is transmitted to the O
WP0554110/DB2791 4 14
i l O PORV. For this analysis,it was assumed that the COPS would actuate at its lowest setpoint (505 psig). O Sa. RilRS Suction / Isolation Valves Automatically Close (RSV): When the pressure
~
increases to the autoclosure setpoint, the ACI receives a pressure signal that > actuates the circuitry and closes the motor operated gate valves. This node is O addressed in the case with the ACI only. Sb. Operator Detects Overpressure Alarm and Isolates the RilRS (OD): For the modification case, an alarm would sound when the pressure reached the alarm ! setpoint. Through a revision in operating procedures, it is assumed that the I operator will detect t'. ; overpressure and isc'aie the RllRS before the pressure reaches 150 percent of the RIIRS design pressure. O 6. Operator Secures Running Pump (OA1): Given an alarm consed when the RilRS relief valves open to the PRT and actuate one of its alarms, or from the operation of at least one train of COPS or from the high pressure alarm on the RIIRS suction valves (in the modification case only), the operator will stop the i extra running pump (either an Si or charging pump). If the operator stops the running pump, the overpressure event is halted. A 7. Operator Opens a PORV (OA2): Given an alarm, if no or one relief valve operates successfully and the pressure still continues to rise, the operator may open a PORV in order to reduce the pressure. The operator may also open a PORV if he falls to stop the running pump in order to increase the time available -
-to mitigate the transient. !
O WP0$s4:10/082791 . .-. ..__a...... _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ ,_.- ._. _. . . . - . _ _ _ ~ - _ . - _ . _ _ . - . _ . . ~ . , ~ . _ . _ _ , . . _ . , _ . _ , .
O -
- 8. R11RS Relief Valve Rescats (llVR): Given that the RilRS relief valves successfully operate and the transient is termhated, the relief valves must rescat or coolant would be lost to the PRT. If the transient is not stopped, the relief valves will cycle open and closed arid are assumed to eventually fall open.
- 9. Pressurirer PORY Rescats (POR): Given that a PORV has opened and the transient has been stopped, the l'ORV must close in order to avert a loss of coolant condition.
I For each of these nodes, failure probabilities were calculated. These nodal probability calculations for Vogtle are shown in Appendix C. The success criteria for the event trees were determined based on conservative estimates of the flow rates and relieving capacities of the relief valves. For the charging pump actuation case, it was assumed that either two PORVs or two RPRS relief valves, or !- both one PORV and one RilRS relief valve are required to mitigate the transient, since the maximum flow rate to the RilRS from the two charging pumps and the positive displacement pump is 1208 ppm (conservative assumption that all three pumps operate l at their maximum flow rates; 555,555, and 98 gpm). The maximum flow rate calculated by Westinghouse for the charging pumps actuation case for the Vogtle LTOP Analysis was 673 gpm at 495 psia, llowever, the 1208 gpm flow rate is being cor.servatively used != to maintain consistency with the WOG WCAP.11736 methodology. The following assumpticns were also utilized in the analysis of the charging mass input transient.
- 1. No credit is taken for venting via the Reactor Vessel llead Vent System.
A l 2. A failure detection time of 24 hours was assumed to detect RilRS suction valve failures, while a detection time r,f six weeks (1008 hours) was assumed to detect
- WP0554:1D/090491 4 16 7
- - - - . - - - . _ _ _- - . - .- .-. - - . - - ~ - - _ - _ . . . -.-
~~
()i I PORVs and block valves (assumed to be representative of a refueling outage). These times were conservatively determined from the monitoring frequency of the Q ')
/ valves.
The event trees for these cases are presented in Appendix C.
/b & The results from the quantification of the event trees for Vogtle show that most of the overpressure consequence categories remain unchanged with the deletion of the ACI.
Table 4-5 described the consequence categories. The results from the quantification of the event trees for Vogtle are shown in Tables 4-6 to 4 8. For the charging pump actuation case, the frequency of the consequence categories MSFO and MSCO increased insignificantly by 3.76E 12 and 2.35E-12/ shutdown sear, fm The HOPV category decreased slightly. ( /) For the letdown isolation - RHRS operable case, the frequency of the consequence category MOPI decreased insignificantly by 1.00E 16/ shutdown year, while the HOPV category increased by 4.30E 17/ shutdown year. For the letdown isolation - RHRS isolated case, the frequency of all the impacted consequence categories decreased due to the reduction in the initiating event frequency (] (i.e.; the reduction in the loss of letdown due to spurious closure of the RHRS suction I
'm/
valves). The conclusion to be drawn from the overpressure analysis is that removal of the ACI im V has a positive impact on the consequences of LTOP events for Vogtle.
\ _,/
WP0554:10/082791 4-17
O , it should be understood that the ACI was not installed to mitigate overpressure transients. The RIIRS suction valves are slow acting and take approximately two minutes to close. The ACI will rat potect the R, lib " om a fast acting overpressure transient such as the ;tartup of a RCP. The major impact with respect to overpressure concerns is that removal of the ACI will significantly reduce the number of letdown isolation transients. O O O O WP0554:1D/082791 4-18 l ' -
O TABLE 41 COMPONENT FAILURE RATE DATA O COMPONENT FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE SOURCE Air operated valve Failure to operate 1.0E-05/hr 2815 ( Check vah. Failure to open 2.0E-07/hr 2815 Check valve Failure to close 2.0E-06/hr 2815 Motor operated valve Failure to open 1.0E-05/hr 2815 Motor operated valve Fail to remain open 2.0E-07/hr 2815 Motor operated valve Fail to close 1.0E-05/hr 2815 , Motor operated valve Catastrophic 1.0E07/h; 2815 Manual valve Failure to operate 2.0E-07/hr 2815 Motor driven pump Failure to start 1.0E-05/hr 2815 Motor driven pump Failure to run 1.0E-04/hr 2815 Thermal Overload Premature open 1.5E-07/hr Fuse Rate Diode (Std quality) All 7.56E-09/hr MllHDBK p Resistor (Std quality) All 4.90E-09/hr MIL HDBK Relay All MIL HDBK ( Bistable High Output 8.7E-08/hr 2.40E-06/hr MIL HDBK Bistable Low Output 1.65E-06/hr MIL HDBK Pressure Sensors All 2.80E-06/hr MIL HDBK I;>op Power Supply All 5.80E-06/hr MIL HDBK Comparator All 2.90E-06/hr MIL IIDUK Annunciator All 4.25E 06/hr IEEE Torque Switch Failure to operate 2.00E-07/hr 2815 Current Transformer All 3.50E-07/hr IEEE Relay Contacts- Fail to transfer 1,00E-06/hr 2815
-Relay Coil All 3.00E-06/hr 2815
} Circuit Breaker Fail to close 3.00E-08/hr IEEE
- {V Circuit Breaker Fail to open 2.00E-08/hr IEEE Circuit Breaker Open w/o command 1.00E-08/hr IEEE Push button switch All 1.22E-06/hr IEEE Rotary switch All 8.10E-07/hr IEEE
- Toggle switch All 2.33E-07/hr IEEE d Fuse All 1.50E 07/hr - IEEE Limit switch All 7.22E-06/hr IEEE Motor Starter contacts Spurious operation 3.00E-08/hr IEEE O
WP0554:1D/081/91 4-19
O TABLE 41 I COMPONENT FAILURE RATE DATA (Continued)- COMPONENT FAILURE MODE FAILURE RATE SOURCE O Relay Contacts Relief Valve Spurious operation Fail to open Fail to close 2.00E 08/hr 3E 04/ demand IEEE IPE IPE Relief Valve 3E-02/ demand l I E Converter All 2.00E 07/hr 'IEEE i Isolator E E converter All 4.8E-07/hr IEEE Pressure Transmitter All 1.73E-06/hr IEEE Comparator Trip Switch All 5.80E-07/hr IEEE 1 Amplifier All 7,0E-07/hr IEEE l RTD Sensor All 8.6E-06/hr MIL IIDBK DC Controller All 2.41E 06/hr IEEE O
- Notes:
IEEE . Reference ' 8 2815- - Reference - 7 MIL HDBK- Reference 14 IPE - Reference 9 O O O WP0554:1D/PS2791 . 4 20
l O TABLE 4-2 INTERFACING SYSTEM LOCA FREQUENCIES WITII AND WITilOUT AUTOCLOSURE INTERLOCK WITli AUTOCLOSURE WITilOUT AUTOCLOSURE PERCENT INTERLOCK INTERLOCK CliANGE O 2.28E-06/ YEAR 1.48E 06/ YEAR -35 lO O O O WP0554:10/082791 4-21
O . TABLE 4 3 RIiRS UNAVAILABILITY RESULTS O WIT 11 AUTOCLOSURE AUTOCLOSURE WITliOUT PERCENT CilANGE INTERLOCK INTERLOCK O RHRS INITIATION 1.05E-01 1.05E 01 0 SHORT TERM COOLING 1.96E-02 1.46E-02 25.5 LONG TERM COOLING 1.96E-02 1.18E-02 39.8 O O O i. WP0554:10/082791 4-22
. . . - - . , = . ~ . . . - . . _... . . - - .....-,- .. _ . - . .
cO TABLE 4-4 FREQUENCY OF OVERPRESSURE TRANSIENTS O -TOTAL FREQUENCY NUMBER OF (EVENTS / SHUTDOWN OCCURRENCES YEAR) O OPENING OF ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE ISOIATION VALVES 4 3.56E-02 STARTUP OF INACTIVE LOOP 11 9.79E-02 ISOLATION OF LETDOWN , WHILE CHARGING CONTINUES 14 1.25E-01 CHARGING / SAFETY INJECTION 14 1.25E-01
. ISOLATION OF LETDOWN WHILE CHARGING CONTINUES RHRS ISOLATED 50 4.45E-01 TOTAL 93 8.27E-01 O
J O O VPD554 10/082791' 4-23
, . -, , _.-- ,_ _ _ _ . ._. . . ~ . - _.
O TABLE 4-5 TRANSIENT EVENT OUTCOME DESCRIPTIONS O CATEGORY OUTCOME DESCRIPTION LSFO law pressure with small loss of coolant and the RHRS is open to the RCS. The running pump has been stopped but one of the relief valves O has failed to rescat. The operater must take action to rescat the valve or isolate it and then must add me.keup. LSFI - Low pressure with small loss of coolant and the RHRS is isolated from the RCS The running pump has been stopped but one of the relief valves has failed to reseat. The operator must take action to reseat the valve or isolate it and then must add mekeup. He must also reinitialize RHRS operation. LSCO Low pressure with small Mss of coolant :nd th RHRS is open to the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and coolant is exiting via one relief valve. The operator must take action to stop the running pump
- or isolate it and then must check that the relief valves have resented completely.
LSCI Low pressure with small loss of coolant and the RHRS is isolated from the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and coolant is exiting via one relief valve. The operator must take action to stop the running pump or isolate it and then must check that the relief valves have rescated completely.
-LLFO Low pressure with large loss of coolant and the RHRS is open to the RCS. The running pump has been stopped but two or more of the relief valves have failed to rescat. The operator must take action to resent the O valves or isolate them and then must add makeup.
LLFI Low pressure with large loss of coolant and the RHRS is isolated from the RCS. The running pump has been stopped but two or more of the qq relief valves have failed to rescat. The operator must take action to Q - rescat the valves or isolate them and then must add makeup. He must also reinitialize RHRS operation. ..bi 3 WP0554:10/082791 4-24
O TABLE 4 5 TRANSIENT EVENT OUTCOME DESCRIPTIONS (Continued) CATEGORY OUTCOME DESCRIPTION LLCO 1.ow pressure with large loss of coolant and the RHRS is open to the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and coolant is exiting via two or more relief valves. The operator must take action to stop the running pump or isolate it and then must check that the relief valves have rescated completely. The operator must also be aware of possible deadheading or air entrainment of the RHRS pumps. LLCI 1.nw pressure with large loss of coolant and the RHRS is isolated from the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and coolant is exiting via two or more relief valves. The operator must take action to stop the running pump or isolate it and then must check that the relief valves have rescated completely. O MSFO Medium pressure with small loss of coolant and the RHRS is open to the RCS. The running pump has been stopped but one of the relief valves has failed to reseat. The operator must take action to resent the valve or isolate it and then must add makeup. He must also reduce the RCS pressure and check on the integrity of the RHRS. MSFI Medium pressure with small loss of coolant and the RHRS is isolated from the RCS. The running pump has been stopped but one of the relief valves has failed to reseat. The operator must take action to res:at the valve or isolate it and then must add makeup. He must also reduce the p RCS pressure and then reinitialize RHRS operation. V MSCO Medium pressure with smallloss of coolant and the RHRS is open .o the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and coolant is exiting via one relief valve. The operator must take action to stop the running pump or isolate it and then must check that the relief valves have reseated completely. He must also reduce the RCS pressure and check on the integrity of the RHRS. WP0554:10/082791 4-25
\ TABLE 4 5 TRANSIENT EVENT OUTCOME DESCRIPTIONS (Continued) CATEGORY OUTCOME DESCRIPTION e O MSCI Medium pressure with small loss of coolant and the RilRS is isolated from the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and coolant is exiting via one relief valve. The operator must take action to stop the running pump or isolate it and then must check that the relief valves have reseated completely. MLFO Medium pressure with large loss of coolant and the RHRS is open to the RCS. The running pump has been stopped but two or more of the relief valves has failed to rescat. The operator must take action to reseat the valves or isolate them and then must add makeup. He must also reduce the RCS pressure and check on the integrity of the RHRS. MLFI Medium pressure with large loss of coolant and the RHRS is isolated
\ fro.n the RCS. The running pump has been stopped but two or more of the relief valves has failed to rescat. The operator must take action to rescat the valves or isolate them and then must add makeup. He must also reduce the RCS pressure and then reinitialize RHRS operation.
MLCO Medium pressure with large loss of coolant and the RHRS is open to the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and coolant is exiting via two or more relief valves. The operator must take action to stop the running pump or isolate it and then must check that the relief valves have rescated completely. The operator must also be aware of possible deadheading or air entrainment of the RHRS pumps. He must also reduce the RCS pressure and check on the integrity of the RHRS. MLCI . Medium pressure with large loss of coolant and the RHRS is isolated from the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and coolant is exiting via two or more relief valves. The operator must take action to stop the rtmning pump ar isolate it and then must check that the relief valves have reseated completely. He must also reduce the RCS pressure. O WP0554:10/082791 4-26
f\ o TABLE 4 5 TRANSIENT EVENT OUTCOME DESCRIPTIONS (Continued) .!3 v CATEOORY OUTCOME DESCRIPTION MOPI Medium overpressure with the RHRS isolated from the RCS. The U -
- 'ing pump has been stopped but no relief valves have actuated. The "or must reduce the RCS pressure and then reinitialize RHRS
.m HOPI ... w tre with the RHRS isolated from the RCS. The running
'a -e pped but no relief valves have actuated, The operator
/i'S nressure, possibly through the RCS vents or prc.
- ss.
HOPV High overpressu.s vAih the RHRS open to the RCS. The running pump has not been stopped and no relief valves have actuated. The RHRS 9 integrity is assumed to be lost and an interfacing systems LOCA has (V occurred. The operator must attempt to isolate the RHRS. .l X.J u VP0554:10/082791 4-27
O TABLE 4-6 VOGTLE O CilARGING ACTUATION RESULTS CONSEQUENCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY CATEGORY WITil ACI WITilOUT ACI CHANGE SUCCESS 8.667E-02 8.667E-02 0 LSFO 2.761E-N 2.761E-N 0 LSCI 0.00 0.00 0 LSCO 0.00 0.00 0 LLFO 4.671E-03 4.671E-03 0 LLCO 3.171E-02 3.171E-02 0 LLCI 1.661E-03 1.661 E-03 0 LSF1 0.00 0.00 0 LLFI 2.412E-07 2.412E-07 0 MSFO 1.479E-13 3.906E-12 + 3.758E 12 MLFO 0.00 0 00 0 _ MSFI 1.355E-05 1.355E-05 0 MLFI 0.00 0 00 0 MSCO 9.238E-14 2.439E-12 + 2.347E 12 MSCI 7.739E-06 7.739E-06 0 MLCO 0.00 0.00 0 MLCl 0.00 0.00 0 MOPl 5.821E-07 5.821E-07 0 HOPI 2.245E-06 2.244E-06 0 HOPV 2.836E-16 7.488E-15 -7.204E-15 TOTAL 1.25 E-01 1.25E-01 WP0554 10/082791 4-28
O TAHLE 4 7 VOGTLE LETDOWN ISOLATION RilRS OPERABLE RESULTS CONSEQUENCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY CATEGORY WITIl ACI WITilOUT ACI CllANGE SUCCESS 8.613E-02 8.613E 02 0 LSFO 1.649E 06 1.649E-06 0 LSCI 5.786E-13 5.786E-13 0 LSCO 2.003E-05 2.003E-05 0 LLFO 5.494E-03 5.494E 03 0 LLCO 3.336E-02 3.336E-02 0 LLCl 0.00 0.00 0 LSFI 5.177E-17 5.177E-17 0 LLFI 0.00 0.00 0 MSFO 0.00 0.00 0 MLFO 0.00 0.00 0 MSF1 0.00 0.00 0 MLFI 0.00 0.00 0 MSCO 0.00 0.00 0 MSCI 0.00 0.00 0 MLCO 0.00 0.00 0 MLCI 0.00 0.00 0 MOPI 5.213E-13 5.212E-13 -1.00E-16 HOPI 3.255 E-13 3.255E-13 0 1IOPV 1.693E-18 4.470E-17 + 4.30E-17 TOTAL 1.25 E-01 1.25 E-01 WP0554:10/082791 4 29
I I O 1 TABLE 4 8-VOGTLE LETDOWN ISOLATION RiiRS ISOLATED RESULTS CONSEQUENCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY CATEGORY WITil ACI WITIIOUT ACI CilANGE SUCCESS 3.261E-01 1.627E-01 -1.634E 01 LSFO 0.00 0.00 0 LSCI 1.402E-03 6.994E-04 -7.026E-04 LSCO 0.00 0.00 0 LLFO 0.00 0.00 0
.LLCO 0.00 0.00 0 LLCI 1.174E-01 5.856E-02 -5.884E 02 LSFI- 1.016E 07 5.069E-08 5.091E-08 LLFI 1.701E-05 8.488E 06 -8.522E-06 MSFO 0.00 0.00 0 MLFO 0.00 0.00 0 MSFI 0.00 0.00 0 MLFI 0.00. 0.00 0 MSCO 0.00 0.00 0 MSCI 0.00 0.00 0 MLCO 0.00- 0.00 0
-MLCI 0.00 0.00 0 MOPI 0.00 -0.00 0 HOPI 1.339E 6.682E-05 -6.708E-05
-HOPV 0.00 0.00 0 TOTAL 4.45E-01 2.22E-01
-WP055411D/082791 4-30
l I O 5.0 ADEOUACY OF TIIE RilRS RELIEF VALVE CAPACITY The Vogtle R11RS is protected from inadvertent overpressurization by ASME Code relief valves located in each RHRS pump's suction line from the RCS hot leg, downstream of the inlet isolation valves. The main purpose of the RIIRS relief valves are to protect the RilRS from overpressurization during residual heat removal operation. In addition, the RHRS relief valves have been qualified as an acceptable RCS Overpressure Protection System required by Appendix G to 10CFR50. Org;!nally, the Westinghouse sizing basis for the valves provided RHRS overpressure protection for the potential overpressure transient caused by the mismatch between the charging and letdown systems while the RCS is water solid. This event was chosen as the original design basis since operating procedures and precautions were in place to prevent other, more severe, RHRS overpressurization events (e.g., inadvertent RCP O restart or inadvertent safety injection). Based on this condition, the relief valves were sized to relieve the combined flow of all three charging pumps at the relief valve setpressure. The Procurement / Equipment Specification requirements of the valves indicate that the original valve design assumed a single design condition at the valve setpressure of 450 psig, plus 10 percent accumulation: inlet temperature = 400 F relieving rate = 900 gpm maximum backpressure = 50 psig It is noted that actual backpressure developed in the discharge piping layout at the rated flow and temperature will exceed the 50 psig design limit. O Wp0554:10/082791 51
- - - - _ ~ - . _ . . _ - . .- . - . -- -- .-.
The maximum backpressure will equal the maximum PRT pressure (100 psig) plus piping
. losses. This discrepancy was previously discussed in Westinghouse letter GP-14838 (Reference 11).
O) An analysis was performed by Westinghouse to calculate actual valve capacity at p maximum relieving backpressures. Westinghouse letter GP 14896, (Reference 12) b reported the results of this evaluation. It was concluded that the rated relief capacity was achieved even when assuming 100 psig PRT backpressure, piping losses, and the potential for two phase flow. The Vogtle Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 specifies that two RHRS suction relief valves represent an acceptable Cold Overpressure Protection System. This requires that the RHRS relief valves have adequate capacity to mitigate the design basis mass and heat j s injection events over the entire RCS temperature range for which cold overpressure protection is necessary. Assuming a single failure, one RHRS relief valve has adequate capacity to mitigate the design basis heat injection event for a primary-to-secondary delta-T of up to 50 F for an indicated RCS temperature up to 200 F. For RCS temperatures from 200 F to 350 F, one RHRS relief valve has adequate capacity to mitigate the heat injection event for a primary to-secondary delta-T that varies linearly with RCS temperature. Therefore, as p noted in Reference 12, certain procedural restrictions are required to qualify the RHRS O relief valves as an acceptable Cold Overpressure Protection System. Given these L administrative restrictions, which are reflected in the Technical Specifications, it is l- . concluded that the relief valves have adequate capacity to mitigate the affects of an _ LTOP event. l O WP0554:10/082791 5-2 1
O 8
.d 6.0 PROPOSED DOCUMENT CHANGES The following sections show the proposed changes to the Vogtle Technical Specifications and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) that would be recommended for the removal of the ACI of the RHRS isolation valves.
O 6.1 Technical Specifications In general, the RHRS ACI removal has the potential to impact the Technical Specifications in the following two places:
- 1. The Surveillance Requirement, which is required to demonstrate ECCS subsystem
_ OPERABILITY.
- 2. 'The Surveillance Requirement in the Overpressure Protection Systems specification
- for those plants, such as Vogtle, which take credit for the RllRS suction relief valves as a means of cold overpressure protection.
For Vogtle, Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.d.1 is required to demonstrate ECCS subsystem OPERABILITY. The surveillance requires that the automatic isolation and
-interlock function of the RHRS suction /isolati, valves be demonstrated OPERABLE QV on an 18 month interval.
However, with the removal of the ACI function, there is no longer a need to retain this surveillance requirement. Figure 6-1 shows the proposed change to Surveillance
- Requirement 4.5.2.d.1.
O WP0554:10/090$91 6-1
O Note, the rernoval of the RilRS ACI does not affect the OPl. -llowever, it is ' recommended that the OPl setpoint be modified to address available margins in instrumentation and piping system elevation considerations. Additionally, the 12 hour sun'eillance interval of specification 4.4.9.3.2.a and 4.4.9.3.2.b should be changed to be consistent with the surveillance interval of specification O' 4.4.9.3.1.c for verifying that the PORV isolation valves are open when the PORY is used for overpressure protection. The change is shown in Figure 6-2. 6.2 Final Safety Analysis Report Figures 6 4 through 6 7 illustrate the proposed changes to the Vogtle FSAR that would result from the removal of the ACI of the RiiRS isolation valves. The affected pages were copied from the FSAR and annotated to show the proposed changes. The sections that were affected include:
- 1. 'RIiRS, Design Bases - Section 5.4.7.1.
- 2. RI1RS, System Design, Schematic Piping, and Instrumentation' Diagrams - Section
-5.4.7.2.1, O 3. RiiRS, System Design, Control - Section 5.4.7.2.4, and 4 -
Interl ek Systems Important to Safety, Residual licat Removal Isolation Valves - . O
- Section 7.6.2.
0 V WP0554:1DfJ90591. 6-2
k O In addition, a change is proposed for Figure 7.6.2-1 (shown in Figure 6 8). The current logic diagram shown in this figure should be replaced with the proposed logic diagram shown in Figure 6 o.' Note, the removal of the RHRS ACI does not affect the OPI. liowever, it is , recommended that the OPl setpoint be modified to address available margins in instrumentation and piping system elevation considerations. O O O l: O , WP0554:1Dl090591' 6-3
--- . . = . . .-
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power lockout switches in the lockout position:
I
-\ Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position HV-8835 51 Pump Cold Leg Inj. OPEN HV-8840 RHR Pump Hot Leg inj. Cl.0 SED HV-BS13 51 Pump Mini Flow Isol. OPEN HV 8806 51 Pump Suction from RWST OPEN OQ HV-8802A, B HV-8809A, B S1 Pump Hot Leg Inj.
RHR Pump Cold Leg Inj. CLOSED OPEN"
- b. At least once per 31 days by:
- 1) Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points, and
- 2) Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is nc,t locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported te the Contain.wnt Emergency Sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection
, .I_}/ shall be performed: For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establish-1) !- ing CONTA]NMENT-!NTEGRITY, and
- 2) Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
c, At_least once per 18 months by:
- 1) Verifying automatic isolation M d W ' d action of the RHR systemfromtheReactorCoolantSystembyensuringthat7 e+[,
signal greater than or equal to SM Wig the interlocksth a sim prevent the valves from being openedo g , I.!bii 35! 55 55Ni . Nib" 5$ i= iT
'l'"l.,s'".._'".."", !ow! ". '?"
"!W ' " ' ' " " ' ' * " " " ' ' '
- ' .'". ."i 9 s . . . . .
_g um
- 2) A visual inspection of the Containment Emergency Sump and verify-
_ing that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.
"Either valve may be realigned in Mode 3 for testing pursuant to Specification 4.4.6.2.2.
V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 5-4 O Aj Figure 6-1 Proposed Change to Vogtle Technical Specification 4.5.2.d WPoSS4:10/090591 6-4
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TN OVERPRES$URE PROTECTION SYSTEM ' h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4,4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: gy 4 L V' a. Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORY is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereaf ter when the PORV is required OPERABLE;
- b. Performance of'a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORY actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and
- c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.
4.4.9.3.2 Each RHR suction relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE when the RHR suction relief valves are being used for cold evenressure protection as follows:
- a. For RHR suction relief valve PSV-870BA by verifying at least once per f 4tt hours that RHR RCS suction isolation valves HV-8701A and HV-8701B 72 are open; For RHR suction relief valve PSV-87088 by verifying at least once per p)
(' b. f r tt hours that RHR RCS suction isolation valves HV-8702A and HV-8702B 72 are open; and
- c. Testing pursuant to specification 4.0.5.
4,4.9.3.3 The RCS vent (s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours
- when the vent (s) is being used for overpressure protection.
l l i G
\
*Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed.
or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at lqv) least once per 31 days. V0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 4-36 p b Figure 6-2 Proposed Change to Vogtle Technical Specification 4.4.9.3.1 WP0554:10/090591 6-5
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM I COLD OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION O 3.4.9.3 shall be OPERABLE: At least one of the following Cold Overpressure Protection Systems
- a. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with lif t settings which vary with RCS temperature and which do not exceed the limits estaba lished in Figure 3.4-da (Unit 1), Figure 3.4-4b (Unit 2), or
- b. Two residual hea't removal (RHR) suction relief valves each with a setpoint of 450 psig i 3%, or
- c. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent capable of relieving at least 670 pm water flow at 470 psig.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head on. ACTION:
- a. With one PORV and one RHR suction relief valve inoperable, either restore two PORVs or two RHR suction relief valves to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS as specified in Specification 3.4.9.3.c, above, within the next 8 hours.
O b. With both PORVs and both RHR suction relief valves inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS as specified in Specification 3.4.9.3.c, above, within 8 hours,
- c. In the event either the PORVt. ;be RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.8.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, the RHR suction relief valves or RCS vent (s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence,
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
O O v0GTLE UNITS - 1 & 2 3/4 4 34 Figure 6-3 Vogtle Overpressure Protection Systems Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 WP0554:10/09059?
]
6-6 1
,- __ .. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . - _. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.m.__.
p)
\ -
a control room alars will alert the operators if a valve is open and the RCS pressure exceeds a preset value-VEGP-FSAR-5 365 line. Each motor-operated valve is interlocked to p vent its opening if RCS pressure is greater than approximately psig and : tut: :tir:lly :1::: 5:f::: NCC pr::;ur; :n:;;d; ?;0 The RHRS is isolated from the RCS on the discharge side by two check valves in each return-line. Also provided on the
~
\ discharge side is a normally open motor-operated valve downstream of each RHRS heat exchanger. (These check valves and motor-operated valves are not considered part of the RHRS; they are shown as part of the ECCS. See figure 6. 3.1-1. )
Each inlet line to the RHRS is equipped with a pressure relief valve designed to prevent RHRS overpressurication assuming the ( most severe overpressure transients. These relief valves pro-tect ' the system f rom inadvertent overpressurization during plant startup, shutdown, tnd cold shutdown decay heat-removal operations. Each discharge line from the RHRS to the RCS is equipped with a pressure relief valve designed to relieve the maximum possible backleakage through the valves isolating the RHRS f rom the RCS. These valves are considered part of the ECCS, as depicted in figure 6.3.2-1, sheet 3. Relief capacity of these valves is given in table 6' 3.2-2. . The RERS is-designed.for a single nuclear power unit and is not shared between units. The RERS is designed to be fully operable from the control room for normal operation. Manual operations required of the opera-tor are opening the suction isolation valves,. positioning the flow control valves downstream of.tdun residual heat exchangers, and starting the residual heat removal (RER) pumps. By nature of its redundant design, the RHRS is designed to accept all major component single failures, with the only effect being an . E extension in the required cooldown time. There are no l .. motor-operated valves in the RHRS that are subject to flooding u following a secondary side break or a LOCA. Although- ! considered to be of low probability, spurious operation-of a L tingle motor-operated valve can be accepted.without loss of L function as a result of the redundant two-train design. Missile protection,-protection against dynamic effects asso-
.( ciated with the postulated rupture of piping, and seismic design are discussed in section 3.5 and subsections 3.6.2 and 3;7.N.2, respectively, l
S.4.'7-2 l-s Figure 6-4 Proposed Vogde FSAR Change - Section 5.4.7.1 WP0554:10/090591 6-7
VEGP-FSAR-5 O The RHRS is also used for-filling the refueling cavity before refueling. After refueling operations, the RERS is used to pump the water back to the refueling water storage tank until the water level is brought down to the flange of the reactor vessel. The remainder of the water is removed via a drain connection at the bottom of the refueling canal. When the RHRS is in operation, the water chemistry is the same as that of the reactor coolant. Provision is made for the i process sampling system to extract samples from the flow of l reactor coolant downstream of the residual heat exchangers. A l local sampling point is also prov2ded on each RHR train between 1 the pump and heat exchanger. The RHRS also functions, in conjunction with the high-head portion of the ECCS, to provide injection of borated water from the refueling water storage tank into.the RCS cold legs during the injection phase following a loss-of-coolant accident . (LOCA). In its capacity as-the low-head-portion of the ECCS, the RHRS provides long-term recirculation capability for core cooling , following the injection phase of the LOCA. This function is 1 accomplished by aligning the RHRS to take fluid f rom the containment pump, cool it by circulation through the residual heat exchangers, and supply it to the core directly as well as via the centrifugal charging pumps and safety injection pumps. The.use of the RERS as part of the ECCS is more completely _ /\_/ described in-section 6.3. The RHR pumps, in order to perform their ECCS function,-are interlocked to start automatically on receipt of a safety injection signal (section 6.3).
.The RHRS-suction isolation valves in each inlet line from the RCS are separately interlocked to prevent both of them from
.being opened when RCS pressure is greater than approximately 96 psig an te e t;;e;;;elly eleee eefere CCC pseeeu;e exceede A~+?;C pe;- ese interlocks are described in more detail in 36'5 para ph 5.4.7.2.4 and subsection 7.6.2.
he RHRS suction isolation valves are.also interlocked to pre-f vent their-being opened unless the' isolation valves-in the ( . following lines are closed:
.A. Recirculation lines-from the residual heat exchanger
-outlets to the suctions of the safety injection pumps-and centrifugal charging pumps.
a control room alarm will alert the
'((h.j operators-if a valve is open and the RCS pressure exceeds a preset value.
.S.4.7-4 j1 Figure 6-5 Proposed Vogtle FSAR Change - Section 5.4.7.2.1 WP0554:1D/090591
VEGP-FSAR-5 O .
$.4.7.2.4 Control Each inlet line to the RHRS is equipped with a relief valve to prevent RHRS overpressurization during plant startup, shutdown, and-cold-shutdown decay heat-removal operation. Each valve has
[_ a relief capacity of 900 gal / min at a set pressure of 450 psig. ( An analysis has been conducted to confirm the capability of the AHRS relief valve to prevent overpressurization in the RHRS. All credible events were examined for their potential to overpressurize thg RHRS. These events included normal operating conditions, infrequent transients, and abnormal occurrences. The analysis confirmedthat one relief valve has the capability to ma'.ntain the RHRS maximum' pressure within code limits. The above capacities of the RHRS suction line relief valves are adequats, to provide relief protection necessary for the RHRS and the RCS as part of the cold overpressure mitigating system. For a discussion of the cold overpressure mitigating system and ti.e overprussure events examined, refer to WCAp-10529. Each discharge line from the RHRS to the RCS is equipped with a pressure relief valve to relieve the maximum possible back-leakage through the valves separating the RHRS from the RCS. Each valve has a relief flow capacity of 20 gal / min at a set pressure of 600 psig. These relief valves are located in the ECCS (figure 643.1 '). The fluid discharged by the suction side relief valves is collected in the pressurizer relief tank. The fluid discharged I. by the discharge side. relief valves is collected in the recycle holdup tank. The design of'the RHRS-includes two motor-operated gate isolation valves in series on each inlet line between the
'.igh-pressure RCS and the lower pressure RHRS. They are closed during normal operation.and are opened only for RH.R during a plant shutdown after the RCS pressure is reduced to approximately 400 psig or lower and RCS temperature is reduced to approximately 350'F. During a plant startup, the inlet isolation valves are shut after drawing a-bubble in the pressurizer and prior to increasing RCS-pressure above 425-psig. These isolation valves are provided with independent and diverse " prevent-open" and ";ne cle . - interlocks which are designed to prevent possible exposure of the RHRS to normal RCS
.. operating pressure. The two inlet-isolation valves in each RHR st.bsystem are independently interlocked with diverse pressure '\ signals to prevent their.being opened whenever the RCS pressure' is-greater than approximately:4++-psig. Additionally ee. 4
- ::: ind:p:nd:ntly i;n:1: t: ::::::ti::11y intf leched cit 5 dier::: p:::::::
- h Z^ pe.; Lsing 3 plant ;t j. -P :.
t-Sr; 200 p;;;; se i nc . -~ w a control roce alarm will alert the 7 perators if a valve is open and the )
- 365 RCS pressure exceeds a preset value.
5.4.7-12 REV 1 3/91 Figure 6-6 Proposed Vogtle FSAR Change . Section 5.4,7.2.4 WP0554:10/090591 6-9 w
l VEOP-FSAR-7 1 7.6.2 RESID"AL HEAT REMOVAL SOLAT:CN VALVES 7.6.0.1 Oescription The residual heat removal system (RHRS) isolation valves are C, normally closed and are only opened for residual heat removal ( PJiR ) after system pressure is reduced to approximately 425_psag and system temperature has been reduced to approximately 350'F. There are two motor-operated valves in series in en:h of the two RER purp suction lines from the reactor coolant system (ROS) h:t legs. The two valves nearest the RCS (valves HV87Cl3 and O MV87023) are designated as the inner isolation valves, while the two valves nearest the RER pumps (valves HV8701A and HVB702A) are designated as the outer isolation valves. The interlock logic provided for the isolation valvet is shown in figure 7.6.2-1. Logic for the outer valves is identical to that provided for the inner isolation valves, except that equipment diversity is employed by virtue of the fact that the pressure transmitter set used for valve interlocks on the inner valves is manufactured differently from the pressure transmitter set used for the outer valve interlocks. Each valve is interlocked so that it cannot be opened at the main control board unless the RCS pressure is below a preset pressure. This interlock prevents the valve from being opened at the main control board when the RCS pressure plus the RHR N pump pressure would be above the RHRS design pressure. A e+e+ne p::::ur: intro leck is p::vid:d t: e4::: th: ->: l v : auter:t:::.y .
;f th: 000 pr;; ur; :2::qu:ntly inc ::::: i: 2:v: ; pr::::
ve4*e. The interlock table for the inner and outer isolation valves is shown in table 7.6.2-1. Inner isolation valve HV8701B (in train C) and outer isolation valve HV8702A (in train D) are interlocked by valve position signals derived from stem-mounted switches on valves in the opposite train. The valves themselves are identified in table 7.6.2-1. These switches (designated limit switches No. 2) are operated by the position of the valve stem and are separate frcm the switches supplied with the valve motor operator (designated No. 1). The motor-operated limit switch on each valve is connected to the same electrical train as the valve motor with which it is interlocked. O Q RCS pressure control during low temperature operation is discussed in par agraph 5.2.2.10. control room alarm will alert the operators if a valve is open and the RCS pressure exceeds a preset value. (
\
7.6.2-1 Figure 6 7 Proposed Vogtle FSAR Change - Section 7.6.2 WP0554:1D/090$91 6 10
l i , 1 I *s232 1 Replace with attached figure. (G ! i MCB* i SPRING RETURN TO / l NEUTRAL FROM OPEN f l \ DOTH SIDES NEUTRAL / CLOSE
/ .
PT m l RCS HIGH PRESSURE i I \ / RCS HIGH PRESSURE
- bh j RECIRCULATION LINE-l ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED RHR PUMP /RWST ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED SUMP LINE ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED
[ n a n n u u o n V g numanuus . t l F T OPEN VALVE CLOSE VALVE l NOTE: LOG FOR VALVES IN EACH FLUID SYSTEM TRAIN IS IDENTICAL ! a. close setpoint. l h. Prenpdopen setpoint. I
- c. PT re transmmer, P 408 in MOV 87018 interlock (for inner vein).
1_(N I \ 418 in MOV B702 A interlock (for outer alw). PT 428 in MOV 8702 B interlock (for inner volw). PT 438 in MOV 8701 A interiock (for outer volw). t l d. MCS Main control board (local panel not shown). N vooTLs LOGI'C DIAGRAM FOR THE RHRS I & sLsetnic onnenArimo PLANT ISOLATION VALVES V Georgia Power al .T i Auo u. n j FIGURE 7.6.2-1 433 6 (Gj Figure 6-8 Vogtle FSAR Figure 7.6.21 WP0554t10/090591 6-11
.___..~._.......~..m_. -
----_..--._...-.--_.-_-m_m._..
_. m..._4.-~....m.__..m..___..... t sameng . LCS
, ggy,, 9, htbVRAL teC S 3pmM ptTVmh to hid4AL
"~~~'
r , f $ - CLO64 h oath pgedOTE LDCAL m't h !h- CL0tt .' wg l ..w'... j ; )
} -.
; l I..... ....... ........L............
+ + 8 i lf
./,\=ce I.
1[l j 1 i l-4 l1 RCs Mot Lte PRE &aupt .
, , f,.
- PE
+ -
{de et
. ! pg
_vhOtt 1
! l Suhde tuCT30de WLW CLD480 i
. asas numv vLv eto.a. '
awat euemi vtv ewwa I i ooo o 8 i L
, [- .l.
f l i . t i j
, t- m i ;
~
[*I t I ;
. j. i .
4 A-
.I i t ! t I
l l'l - A ., ! , r- . i o et o o p
~
{ p! n. s v.) ! 1 l: t.. t. clong-
'WALtd. OPEN WALW
..t. m l
I I Figure 6 9 Proposed Revision for Vogtle FSAR Figure 7.6.2-1
.WP0554 10/090591 6-12 l::: - . _ _- __ . . _._ _ _ _ . _. . . _ _ . . . _ _ . .
-- - - - - ~ _ - .- _. . -
O
7.0 CONCLUSION
S AND llECOhihiENDATIONS This section addresses the seven concerns expressed S, the NRC internal memorandum (Reference 4) of January,1985 stating the NRC lleactor Systems Branch position on requests for removal of the RilRS Acl. The rnemorandum stated that any proposal to remove the ACI should be substantiated by proof that the change is a net improvement d in safety and should assess, as a minimum, the following:
- 1. The means available to minimize Event V concerns.
- 2. The alarms to alert the operator of an improperly positioned RilRS hiOV.
- 3. He RIIRS relief capacity must be adequate.
- 4. Meons other than the ACI to ensure both MOVs are closed (e.g., single switch actuating both valves).
- 5. Assurance that the function of the open permissive circuitry is not affected by the proposed change.
- 6. Assurance that MOV position indication will remain avaliable in the control roem p regardless of the proposed change, d
- 7. Assessment of the affect of the proposed change on the reliability of the RilRS, as well as on LTOP concerns.
(G) Each of the seven items above wil! be commented on separately and reference wih be made to supporting analysis contained in this report, where applicable. l l wpos54:10/082 m
O hit;ms Amilable To hiinimize A LOCA Outside The Containment An interfacing systems 1.OCA, referred to as an Event V in WASil 1400, is a breach of the high pressure RCS pressure boundary at an interface with the low pressure piping system. An RilRS LOCA is classified as a non mitigable LOCA outside containment. It is assumed to occur if the isolation valves in the RllRS suction line fail open when the RCS is at normal operating pressure (2235 psia). Since the RllRS is designed for a much lower pressure (600 psig), the result of both suction / isolation valves falling open is overpressurization of the RilRS. The Vogtle RilRS is located outside of containment. Thus, a gross failure of the RllRS pressure boundary is assumed to result in an uncontained LOCA. The Vogtle RilRS has two motor operated gate suction / isola'. ion valves on each hot leg suction line from the RCS. These valves on each suction line serve as the primary RCS pressure boundary. They are remotely operated from the hiain Control Room, and are powered by separate Class 1E electrical power sources. Power to these valves is manually locked out in hindes 1,2, and 3. Plant operating procedures instruct the operator to isolate the RilRS during plant heatup, so the likelihood of these valves being left open is remote. Additionally, this report recommends the installation of a hiain Control Room alarm to alert the operator if a RllRS suction / isolation valve is not fully closed in conjunction with a "RCS PRESSURE 111011" signal (see Section 3.0). O Should a pressure peak occur in the RCS, the pressure effect on the low pressure RllRS would be mitigated by the RllRS suction line relief valves. These relief valves discharge inside containment to the PRT, A discharge would be detected by high temperature, O ievei. cea Pre,,ere eierm, ie 18e ear. O l i a sso w a m i I 72 :
O The results of the interfacing systems LOCA probabilistic analyses (Table 4 2) for Vogtle showed a 35 percent reduction in frequency with the deletion of the RilRS Act. O in conclusion, sufficient means are available to rninimize a LOCA outside of containment, and removal of the ACI feature is desirable in that it reduces the frequency of an interfacing systems LOCA in Modes 1,2, and 3. Alarms To Alert The Operator Of An Impmperly positioned EllES_liulation Valvg With the proposed interlocks and functional reouirements for Vogtle, it is recommended that an alarm be added for each suction / isolation valve, which will actuate in the Main Control Room given a VALVE NOT FULLY CLOSED" signal in conjunction with a "RCS PRESSURE IllGil" signal. The proposed Elementary Wiring Diagram modifications to the individual valve control circuitry are presented in Section 3. The intent of the alarms is to alert the operator that a RC3 RilRS, suction / isolation valve (s) in series is not fully closed, and th9 <louble valve isolation of the RilRS from the RCS is not being maintained. Valve position indication to the alarm should be provided from the valve limit switenes, and power to the limit switches must not be affected by removal of power to the valve. The alarm meets the intent of the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.139, Reference J)" Guidance For Residual lleat Removal," which states that it is the O (regulatory position on RilRS isolation that alarms in the control roo provided to alert the operator if either valve is open when the RCS pressure exceeds RilRS design pressure. O WP0554 tid /Of.2791 7-3
O yelifiention of The Adeguacy Of 111111S llelief Valveragtchy The proposed design change as described in Section 3.0 of this report has no impact on the performance and/or design basis assumption used in the original sizing of the valve. As such, the 111111S relief valves perform adequately to meet their original design basis criteria as described in Section 5.0. O hieans Other 11mn Autaclose Interlocks to Ensute lloth isolationlahnAts_ Closed (e.g.. Singir_Svitch Actuating Iloth Valves) Current Vogtle operating instructions, along with redundant position indication and the proposed alarm, are sufficient to insure isolation. The addition of a single switch to close both valves would prevent the cycling of individual suction / isolation valves. This would require Vogtle to lift leads and add jumpers during valve maintenance. The location of the existing control switches for the train A valves (llV 8701A and llV 8702A) are side by side on the Main Control Iloard. The train Il valves (llV 870111 and llV 8702B) are located below the train A valves. Layout of switches were human factored to ensure timely operator action in the event the valves needed to be closed. Additionally, assurance that the valves will remain closed is better obtained by procedural controls, such as removing power to the valves before conducting the surveillance leak tests required on both valves during startup. This procedural control would provide positive assurance that the valves remain closed during pressurization to O normal operating conditions. O O WP0554:10/DS2791 7-4
O Assurance That the_Qpen PermisdrefJicuitry is Neither Removed or Affec1cil by the Proposed ChqDgt O The proposed design change, as described in Section 3.0 of this report, leaves the OPI circuit intact, liardware changes are limited to removal of the ACI portion of the valve control circuitry and the addition of an alarm. Neither one of these changes affect the operation of the RilRS OPl. Assurance That Isplation Valve Position Indication Will Renmin Available in the Control Room Recardless of the Proposed Changt With the proposed design change, as described in Section 3.0 of this report, the valve position indication at the Main Control lloard is still provided. Assessment of the Affect of the Proposed Change on Availability of the RilRS. As Well as_l,qw Temperature Overoressure Protection RilRS UNAVAILABILITY ANALYSIS The availability of the RilRS to remove decay heat was considered in three phases for the RilRS Unavailability Analysis. The first phase covers the period during which the RilRS is placed into service and goes through a warm up period needed to minimize the O thermal shock to the system and insure boron mixing. The second phase covers the initial period of cooldown when the decay heat load is high. During this phase, two trains of R11RS (two pumps and two heat exchangers) are assumed to be in O everetieeter>2 neers. 18e18ird ewe,eceverstherie#iiee8 term verieo eteeeisewe when the heat load is smaller, For this phase only one train of RilRS (one pump and one heat exchanger) is assumed to be in operation. Six weeks was the time period O WP0$s4 tid /082791 7-5
O assumed for this phase (based on the average refueling outage time period). The results of the quantification of the Vogtle RllRS unavailability fault trees, discussed in Section 4.4, show that deletion of the ACI reduces the number of spurious closures of the suction valves and thus increases the availability of the RllRS. These results are summarized below: l'ercent Change in Availability of the RilRS B11RS Initiation 0 Short Term Cooling 25.5 increase Long Term Cooling 39.8 increase O OVERPRESSURIZATION ANALYSIS The effect of an overpressure transient at cold shutdown conditions will be altered by the removal of the RilRS ACI feature. An overpressu;ization analysis was conducted (Section 4.5), which used event trees to model the mitigating actions (both automatic and manual) following the occurrence of LTOP events. These mitigating actions affect the severity of the overpressurization events and reduce the possibility of damage to the O plant. The analysis wa; conducted in two parts: 1) determination of the frequency of cold overpressurization events; and 2) the effect of mitigation on the transients. Nine initiating events that fell into two ' a categories, heat input transients and mass input transients, were considered (Sectio. 6.5.1). O WP0s54:1D/082r91 7-6
. . _ _ _ ~ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ O For the heat input transients, which were considered, the pressure peak is either acceptably low with reference to the RllRS suction relief valves, or the transient proceeds so quickly that the RllRS ACI could not cause the slow acting RilRS suction / isolation valve to close in time to affect the transient. The analysis concludes that the removal of the RilRS ACI feature will have no effect on the heat input transients. (Refer to Section 4.5.2 and the WOG WCAP 11736 for discussion). For the slower mass input transients event trees were utilized to model the mitigating actions that occur following the transients (Section 4.5.2). Operator actions and . mitigating systems were included in the event trees. Success criteria for each event tree top event were developed and system / component failure probabilities were calculated. The conclusion to be drawn from the overpressure analysis is that removal of the ACI has a positive impact on the consequences of LTOP events for Vogtle, it should be understood that the ACI was not installed to mitigate overpressure transients. The RIIRS suction valves are slow-actim; and take approximately two minutes to close. The ACI will not protect the RilRS from a fast acting overpressure transient such as the startup of a RCP. The major impact with respect to overpressure concerns is that removal of the ACI will significantly reduce the number of letdown isolation transients. O O O WP0554:1D/082r91 77
O 8.0 REFEllENCES 1.
" Reactor Safety Study An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," WASil 1400, October 1975.
2.
" Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor l'.cgulation, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in the hiatter of Westing'iouse Electric Company Reference Safety Analysis Report RESAR 41, Docket No. STN 50-480," NUREG 75/103, December 31,1975, pages 517 to 519,715,716, and Appendix C. 3.
- Design Requirements of the Residual lleat Removal System," U.S. NRC Ilranch Technical Position RSU 51, Revision 2, July 1981.
4. Memorandum from B.W. Sheron, NRC to RSD members, " Auto Closure Interlocks for PWR Residual 11 eat Removal (RllR) Systems," January 28,1985. 5.
" Residual llent Removal System Autoclosure Interlock Removal Report for the Westinghouse Owners," WCAP 11736, Volume I and 11, February 1988.
6. Vogtle Precautions, Limits, and Setpoints Document, Revision 3, August 1988. O 7. R. A. Hari, et. al., 'Probabilistic Safety Analysis Procedures Guide," NUREG/CR 2815, Volume 1, Revision 1, August 1985. 8. IEEE,"lEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic, Sensing Component and hicchanical Equipment Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," lEEE Std. 500 1984. O WP0554:10/082791 81 _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - ~
I O 9. 1DCOR," Individual Plant Evaluation Methodology for Pressurized Water i Reactors,* Technical Report 86.3A1, April 1987. O 10. A. D. Swain ano 11. E. Guttman, "llandbook of Iluman Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Application," NUREG/CR 1278, August 1983.
- 11. " Design Bases Inconsistenues of the RllR System Relief Valves Design Bases Inconsistencies," GP 14838, May 11,1990.
- 12. *RilRS Relief Valve Performance for Cold Overpressure Protection," GP 14896, June 19,1990.
- 13. " Guidance for Residual lleat Removal," U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.139, Draft, -
May 1978.
- 14. Military 1-landbook,
- Reliability Prediction of Electrical Equipment,"
MllellDUK 2170, January 15,1982. O O O WPO$$4 iD/082791 8-2
O APPENDIX A V0GTLE INTERFACING SYSTEM LOCA ANALYSIS O O O O O 10900:10/071891
APPENDIX A O INTERFACING SYSTEM LOCA QUANTIFICATION This appendix details the calculations performed to determine the change in the frequency of an interfacing system LOCA due to removal of the autoclosure O interlock for Vogtle. An interfacing system LOCA is an important safety concern because a direct release of radionuclides to the atmosphere may occur. The frequency of an interfacing system LOCA via the RHRS suction path is calculated for two cases: 1) with the present interlock configuration; and, 2) with the proposed modification. The methodology applied in the Westinghouse Ceners Group generic program (WCAP-il736), Appendix B, is applied to the Vogtle plant. The data base from the HOG program was utilized in this analysis (Table 4-1). The following boundary conditions and assumptions were applied in the analysis:
- 1. The calculation is based on an occurrence when the plant is at power (Modes 1, 2 or 3), not in the shutdown mode.
- 2. The valve closest to the RCS is at RC$ pressure, and the valve closest to the RHRS is at RCS pressure only if the valve closest to the RCS fails open.
- 3. No common cause rupture of the valves is considered. This is based on the fact that no common cause ruptures of valves have actually occurred.
- 4. The frequency of valve rupture is that of catastrophic internal leakage.
The failure rate is the same for either valve given that the valve is exposed to RCS pressure.
- 5. All electrical power to the control circuitry (i.e., 480 V AC bus) is assumed to be available with a probability of 1.0.
O 10900:10/071891 A-1
1 l l
- 6. A refueling outage occurs approximately every 18 months (assumed to be the only time at which the plant will be in cold shutdown, on average).
The general expression from the HOG analysis used to calculate the frequency of an Event V (F(VSEQ)) for one RHRS suction line is: f(VSEQ) - X ((g)2 O(VI ) + (9)1 0(V2 ) + (9)2 0(V R)31 where 6 O X - number of RHRS suction lines (g)2 - failure rate of RHRS valve closest to the RCS (due to rupture) (g); - failure rate of valve closest to RHRS (due to rupture) Q(Vj ) - probability that RHRR valve is open O(V2 ) - probability that RCS valve is open Q(Vj R) probability of rupture of RHRS valve
'In order to determine the probabilities of the motor-operated $Uction valves being "0 PEN" (Q(V j ) and Q(V 2
)) in equation (1), detailed fault trees for the Vogtle control circuitry associated with these valves were developed.
Utilizing the present control circuitry diagram shown in Section 2.3 for suction valves HOV 8701A, 8701B, 8702A, and 8702B and the procedures for terminating the RHR$ in preparation for startup, fault trees were developed that considered how a suction valve would be "0 PEN" at power conditions. Component failures and human errors were included in the fault trees. The fault trees developed for the valves are shown in Figures A-1 and A-2. HOV 8701A and 8702B are identical and HCV 8701B and 8702A are also identical; therefore, only one fault tree for each set of valves was developed, The scenarios examined in the fault trees for the case with the ACI are: O .1) the operator fails to remove power to the valve by racking out the
- alt
. breaker and subsequently the valve spuriously opens during power operation; or, 2) the operator falls to close the valve during startup (or the operator attempts to close the valve but due to some component failure, the valve does O
1090D:10/071891- A-2 l l _ .__ _ _ _.
not close) and the ACI fails to perform its function and does not close the Os valve and an operator falls to detect that the valve is not closed durin startup or power operation, n For the deletion of the ACI and the addition of an alarm, as shown in U Section 3, detailed fault trees were also developed. The scenarios developed for this case are: 1) the operator fails to remove power to the valve by racking out the circuit breaker and subsequently the valve spuriously opens during power operation, or 2) the operator fails to close the valve during startup (or the operator attempts to close the valve but it does not close) and the operator fails to detect that the valve is not closed via the presence of an alarm (or the alarm fails to operate). The fault trees developed for this case are-shown in Figures A-3 and A-4. In each case (with the ACI and without the ACI), the first scenario is the same; only the second scenario differs due to the proposed modification. For che Vogtle analysis, the following assumptions and boundary conditions were utilized:
- 1. The Shift Supervisor or Control Room Supervisor verifies the RHRS suction valves are closed before signing off checklist 2 of procedure 13011
" Residual Heat Removal System " and Instruction A4.3.11.c of proceaure 12001-C, " Unit Heatup to Hot Shutdown."
- 2. The indicating lights associated with the RHRS suction valves do not have alarms associated with them.
- 3. A component failure would be detected in a 24 hour interval if it caused the suction isolation valve to spuriously open or fail to close.
O O 10900:10/071891 A-3
I In order to quantify the fault trees developed for these cases, each basic O event probability was calculated and then input into the appropriate fault tree. For a component failure, the following formula was used: 0(component) . ., h 1 where 0(component) - basic event probability 0 X T
- failure rate for the component
= detection interval detect Tables A-1 to A-4 show the basic event probabilities for each component utilizing a 24 hour detection interval.
The human error probabilities were calculated using "The Handbook for Human Reliability Analysis," Reference 10, and Vogtle's operating procedures for terminating the RHRS operation in preparation for startup. The calculations of the human error probabilities are shown in Table A-5. RESukIS The probabilities for Q(Vj ) and Q(V 2
), the probability that the isolation valve is open, for each case are shown below:
With Without Autoclosure Interlock Autoclosure Interlock Q(8701A) 3.21E-04 9.32E-05 Q(87018) 3.21E-04 9.32E-05 Q(8702A) 3.21E-04 9.32E-05 Q(87028) 3.21E-04 9.32E-05 O i 10900:10/071891 A-4 _ , ~ ~ _ _ . _ _ _
Themajorcutsets(failurecombinations)andtheprobabilitiesofthecutsets for each case (with and without the ACI) are shown in Tables A-6 to A-9. For - the case with the ACI (Tables A-6 and A-7), the dominant contributors are a component failure which causes the valve not to close along with the operator failing to detect that the valve did not close during startup and another operator failure to detect the wrong position during power operation. for the ACI deletion case, the dominant contributors are the valve's limit switch failing along with the operator failing to detect that the valve is not closed during startup. The dominant contributors are listed in Tables A-8 and A-9. Because Vogtle has two independent suction lines, the frequency of an interfacing system LOCA, is calculated using: F(VSEQ)-2{(X)20(V)+(1))0(V)+(K)20(VR)) I 2 I O where 2 - the number of RHRS suction lines (X)2
- failure rate of RCS valve (due to rupture)
(X), - failure rate of RHRS valve (due to rupture) 0(Vj )- - probability that RHRS valve is open Q(V2 ) - probability that RCS valve is open Q(Vj R) - probability of rupture of RHRS valve
- The failure rate due to rupture of a motor-operated valve is 1.0E-7 per hour O- ((A)) and (1)2). The quantity Q(Vj R) is determined by assuming that the total defined mission time is the time between refueling outages (i.e.,
every 18 months). The rupture of motor-operated valve is assumed to occur randomly in the time interval 0 - T gwhere T g is the total defined mission O time. Therefore, the probability of the valve rupturing is: l O l 10900:10/071891 A-5
0(VR)-(K)h I O
,1L-01 (B16Lhtihtar
- 1.di_ynti) hr 2
- 6.57E-04 Entering the failure probabilities leads to the following frequency for an interfacing system LOCA for the case with the ACI:
f(VSEQ)-2((K)2 O(Y1 ) * (A)1 O(Y2 ) * (A)2 O(YR)) 1
- 2 (1E-07/hr * (3.21E-04) + 1E-07/hr * (3.21E-04) + 1E-07/hr * (6.57E-04))
- 2 (3.21E-11/hr + 3.21E-11/hr + 6.57E-11/hr) 2{(1.30E-10/hr)*(8760 hrs /yr))
- 2.28E-06/ year The same method was applied in the case without the ACI. The following summarizes the frequencies:
Hith Hithout Autoclosure Interlock &yinclosure Intir10th F(VSEQ) 2.28E-06/yr 1.48E-06/yr The frequency of an Event V decreases by approximately 35 percent with removal of the ACI. The main contributor to the frequencies in each case is a double O rupture of W)V 8701A(8702A) then 87018(87028)(frequency of 5.76E-07/ycar in both cases). The deletion of the ACI has no impact on this contributor. As can be seen, the frequency of a double rupture dominates the second case while the other contributor (the rupture of one valve while the other valve has failed open) does not contribute significantly. (The frequency for the rupture of one valve while the other is open decreases from 5.62E-7/ year (6.42E-11/hr
- 8760 hrs / year) for the case with the ACI to 1.63E-07/ year (1.86E-11/hr
- 8760 hrs / year) for the case with the ACI deleted.) This is a 1090D:10/071891 A-6
significant decrease in the accurrence of an Event V by this failure mode. Thus, the deletion of the ACI and the inclusion of an alarm is beneficial in reducing this contribution. O O O O O O 1090D:10/071891 A-7
TABLE A-1 VALVE HV8701A HITH ACI BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES FAlt Raft vat!AhCt sautCE flME PROLalltilt VAtlAht! F1 IDENT COMP F Altutt Mcot 0.000t+00 1.35t 02 0.00t+00 F Altutt 10 OPEN (CLott) #Nkl 1.350[ 02 0.000t+00 ht itMoi Ct05t Of
$UCTION VALvil 0.000f*00 !!!! 1,200f+01 9.72t 06 0.00!*00 RO1 ART SWlfCN ALL #0011 8.100t 07 itHstiks LRF lt 1.20t 07 0.00t+00 CitCUlf BatAttt OPIN W/0 1.000E 08 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200E+01 1RNC8<151U 48 COMMAND 1.200t+01 4.20t 06 0.00t*00 CUtttNT ttANSFotMLt ALL M00tl 3.500t 07 0.000t+00 Ittt ituthp?01A F CT 1.2000+0i 1.00E 06 0.00t+00 TMitMAL OvttLOAb PRIMAfutt 1.5001 07 0.000t+00 Raft itMOL49A a F OL OPIN 1.80E 06 0.00t*00 f>ttMAL OvttLOAD PetMAtutt 1.500f 07 0.000t*00 Raft
- 200t+01 .
ttHOL498 . F OL OPtN 1.200t+01 1.80t 06 0.00t+00 Thl.tMAL OVitLCAD PetMAfutt 1.500E 07 0.000t*00 Raft itMOL&9C F OL WlN 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 0.00t *00 1.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 innCN42 CA F CK ttLAY CONTACTS Fall 10 1RANSFit 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 0.00t+00 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1RMCN42 Ct F 41 ftLAY CONTACTS FAIL 13 1RANSFit 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 Ot00t+00' 1.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 1RHCN42 ts F CN RtLAY CONTAC11 Fall to TRANSFtt 1.200t+01 1.20t 07 0.00E*00 CB Cintulf attAtta ortW W/0 1.000( 08 0.000t+00 Itti itHCBASE152U COMMAND 1.200t+01 1.201 04 0.00t+00 1.000E 05 U.000t+00 2815 itMMv8701A E W FAILuft 70 *nott i.200t*01 8.66t 05 0.00t+00 LIMIT twitCM ALL MODES 7.220t 06 0.000t+00 !!!! itHLtB701A F LS 1.200t+01 3.601 07 0.00t+00 Motot $ tattle tPUtttus 3.00CE 08 0.000f*00 litt 1RHCb42 0 U CW OPEtAtION 1.2001+01 1.20t 05 0.006+00 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1RHCN42 C* F CW tiLAY CONYACT$ FAIL T0 ftANSFtt 1.200t+01 3.60E 05 0.00t+00 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 ilhC042 C F C0 ttLAY C0ll FAILUtt 1.80f 06 0.00t+00 FU$C ALL MUDtl 1.500t 07 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200E+01 itHFU1 4A -F FU 1.200t+01 2.40f 07 0.00t*00 CW ttLAY CONTACT 0tl SPutt0US 2.000t 08 0.000E+00 litt 1RMCh49 U OPitATION 1.200E*01 2.401 06 0.00t+00 TORQUE SW11CH FAIL 10 OPttAtt 2.000t 07 0.000f+00 2815 itMC$8701A*F CS 1,200E+01 9.72t 06 0.00t+00 tofART SWl1CH ALL M00tl 8.100t 07 0.C00t+00 Itt! 1RHC$Cl t F 5% 0.000t+00 9.801 01 0.00t+00 9.800E 01 0.000t+00 HE 1RHot 0CT2 of SECON0 OPitA10R F AIL 510 OtitCT OPEN MOV 1.200t+01 3.60t 05 0.00t+00 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1RnCOE155 *F C0 atLAY Coll FAllutt 1.200t*01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 ithCNE155 *F CN ttLAY CONTAC11 Fall TO TRANSFtk 1.200t+01 6.961-05 0.00t+00 5.800E 06 0.000t+00 TOPS itMLPPQY438F PS '.00P P0utt $UPPLY ALL Mcctl 1.200t+01 6.96t 06 0.00t+00 COMPAR ATOR TilP Swittk 5.500E 07 0.000t+00 litt itHISPS/418F CM 1.200t+01 2.08t 05 0.00E+00 TP P TRAkSultitt ALL > ODES 1.730t 06 0.000t+00 Ittt l
\
itNTPPT 455F 10900:1D/053191 A-8
TABLE A-1 (Cont.) l V VALVE HV8701A WITH ACI BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES (\ F1 ICtNT COMP F Altutt art Fall RAlt VARIANCE $0URCE f!ME PROBAI!Liff VAtlANCE itnADP843&ABF CM CCNPARATOR ALL McDil 2.900t 06 0.000t*00 TOPS 1.200t+0i 3.6BE 05 0.00t+00 ituftr$3+J tF CM CCM*AAATOR telP SW11CN l.800t 07 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 6.46t+06 0.00t+00 itMC0KT35. F CD RELAY Coll FAILU81 3.000t 06 0.000t+00 2f15 1.200t+01 3.60t 05 0.00t+00 ttLAY CONTACTS FAIL to 1.000t 06 0.000t*00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 ItHCkKT35 F . CN ftAN$FER SECOND OpttATOR F AILS 10 9.800E 01 0.000t+00 HE 0.000t+00 9.80t 01 0.00t+00 itN06. 0t1AC OE OtttCt OPtw MOV 1.200E 03 0.000f*00 NE 0.000t+00 1.208 03 0.00E+00 ItMFitACl ML of F AILUtt to Ett10kt Aut0 CLOSURE lhtttLOCKS etLAY Call Fall,Unt 3.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 1,200t+01 3.60s 05 0.00t+00 itHC0tT34 F CD RELAT CONTACT 0tl $PUR10U$ 2.000t 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 2.40t 07 0.00t+00 itMChK734.*V CN OPERATION 0.00t*00 b
\
1RMC0K156* F CD ttLAT Coll FAltunt 3.0001 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60t 05
\ 2.L. ' 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 2.40t 07 0.00t+00 itMcNK154 V CN RELAY CONTACTOR$ $PUa!OUS CPERAfl0N LS LIN11 SWtfCN ALL MoDis T.220t 06 0.000E*00 litt 1.200t+01 8.66t 05 Ot00t+00' 1RMLS8812A F MOTOR $1 ARitt SPUtlous 3.000t 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 3.60s 07 0. 00t +0-)
1 HCN42 CA V CN OPERAfl0N MotDa st Anf te $Puticos 3.000E 05 0.000t+00 litt 1.200f*01 3.60t 07 0.00t+00 ithCN42 Osav CN OPERAfl0N MCIOR STAkitR $PUR10Us 3.000t 08 0.000t+00 lEtt 1.200t+01 3.60E 07 0.00t+00 1RMC'N42 0C V CN OPERAfl0N MOTOR STARitt $PURIOUS 3.000t 08 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200t+01 3.60t 07 0.00t+00 itNCN42 0 *V CN OPitATION 1.590t 03 0.000t+00 HE 0.000f*00 1.59t 03 0.00t+00 180C8.... 0E Of OPERATOR FAILS TO RtMovt V ($UPPLY) POWit Feca (TO) VLVS p-G. (y3 - L 10900:10/053191 A-9 1
(~ TABLE A-2 ( VALVE HV87018 HITH ACI BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES ff 10 TNT COMP FAILURE
- Cot FAtt Raft VAtlANCE SOURCt flME PROBAlltiff VARIANCE
(% ................................................................................................ ......................... F AILURE 10 OPEN (Ctest) RHas 1.350t 02 0.000t+00 nt 0.000t+00 1.35t*02 0.00t*00 1RHot"CLolt Ot
$UCil0N VALvts 1Rkstits LRf SR ROYARY SWifCH ALL MTil 8.100t 07 0.000t+00 Itti 1.20Ct+01, 9.72t 06 0.00t+00 CB CIRCulf BRIAKER OPEN W/0 1.0001 08 0.000t+00 atti 1.200t+01 1.201 07 0.00t+00 1RHC$C0115*U CowND CURRtWT TRANif0RMER ALL M00t1 3.500t 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 4.201 06 0.00t+00 1RHfR87018 f Cf THERMAL OvtRLOA0 FRtMAtutt 1.5001 07 0.000t+00 RAff 1.200t+01 1.80t 06 0.00t+00 12HOL49A.* f OL OPEN
.7 iHERMAL OVtRLOAD PRtMATURE 1.5006 07 0.0000+00 2AT$ 1.2001+01 1.80t 06 0.00t+00 1RNOL498 Ot OPIN THERMAL OVERLDAD l'atMAfutt 1.500t.07 0.000f+00 Raft 1.200E+01 1.80t 06 0.00t+00 1RHOL49C 'I OL OPEN CN RtLAY CONTACTS Pall 10 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t*01 1.20t 05 0.00t*00 1RNCN42 CA f TRAN1 Fit CN RELAY CONTACfl FAIL 70 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 1RHCN42*CS f TRAN5ftR CN RtLAY CONTACTS Fall 10 1.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 0
- 00t
- 00' 1RHCN42 CC*F V YRANstin CIRCulf EREARER OPEN W/0 1.000E 08 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 1.20t*07 0.00t+00 1RMCIC011$NU C8 i COMMAND MV FAILURE 10 Clost 1.000t 05 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t 04 0.00E+00 1RNMv87018 K 7.220C 06 0.000t+00 litt 1 200t+01 8.661 05 0.00t+00 1RMLS87018 f L5 LIMlf SWlfCH ALL M00tl Mof0R stAtitR $PURIOUS 5.000E 08 0.000t+00 !!!E 1.200E+01 3.601 07 0.00t+00 1RNCN42 0 -U CN OPERAT10N 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.?00t+01 1,20t 05 0.00t*00 1RHCN42 C"f CW RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO TRANSFER RELAY COIL FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60t*05 0.00t*00 1RHC042 C" f CD 1.5005 07 0.000t+00 1EEE 1.200t+01 1.SOE 06 0.00t+00 f iRHFUi*4A *7 FU FUst ALL M00t$
0.00t+00 12HCN49 "*U CN RELAY CONTACf0Rt 5 Putt 0US 2.000t=08 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t*01 2.40E 07 OPERAflON es 102006 swifCH Fall TO OPERATE 2.000E 07 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t*01 2.40t 06 0.00t+00 1RN0587013 7 8.iO0t 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 9.728 06 0.00E+00 1RMC$C5 R"? $4 R0fARY $ WITCH ALL M@ts stCONO OPERATOR FAllt 10 9.800t 01 0.000t+CJ HE 0.000t+00 9.80E 01 0.00t+00 1RHot " Dtf2 Of D OtttCT OPEN MOV C0 RELAT Coll FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60t 05 0.00t+00 1RMCDPY4088F CN RFLAY CONTACTS FAIL 10 1.000t 06 0.000E+00 2015 1.200E*01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 1RMCNPY4088F TRANSFER 5.800E 06 0.000t+00 TOPS 1.200t+01 6.96t 05 0.00t+00 1RMLPP0Y408F Pt LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL MODES CM COMPARATOR TRIP SWifCH 5.800E 07 0.000t+00 Ittt 1.200t+0i 6.06t 06 0.00t+00 1RHi4P$/4087 1.730E 06 0.000t+00 IEEE 1.200t+01 2.08t+05 0.00t+00 L 1RNfPPT 408F TP P TRAN5MifftR ALL M0055 10900:1D/053191 A-10
TABLE A-2 (Cont.) VALVE HV87010 WITH ACI BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES ft IDINT COMP F AlLVRE M;0E fA]L Daft VAtlANtt $0URCE 11Mt PROBA3l(lTY VAklANCE ilmADPl408Alf CM COMP AR ATOR ALL M00tl 2.900t 06 0.000t+00 1001 1.200t+01 3.48t 0$ 0.00t+00 itNi&PSOEAlf CM C(MPARA104 TRIP $ witch $.800t 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 6.96t 06 0.00t+00 1tht0K1302 f C0 ftLAY COIL FAILUtt 3.000t 06 0.000t+00 2615 1.200t+01 3.60t 05 0.00t+00 itHtNL1302 f CN WELAY CONTAtti FAIL to 1.000E 06 0.000t*00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 ftAN5itt 1th0t**DifAC DE $tCOND OPitA108 # AILS 10 9.800E 01 0.000t+00 Mt 0.000t*00 9.80t 01 0.00t+00 Otttti OPik MOV itMfitAtl Mt Of FAILutt 70 tilfott Auf0CLosuat 1.2001 01 0.000t+00 Nt 0.000t+00 1.20E 03 0.00E*00 INiltLot t t ItMC0K1301 f CD atLAY Coll FAILutt 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200f+01 3.60t 05 0.00t*00 itHtNt1301 V CN ttLAY CONT AC1085 $PUti(135 2.0005 06 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 2.40t 07 0.00t+00 OrttAfl0N 1tHCOPv40BAP CD tiLAY COIL fAltutt 3.000f 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t*01 3.601 05 0.00t+00 ikpCPNV40EAVV CN tiLAY CONT ACfott $Put10L'S 2.0005 08 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 2.40t 07 0.00t+00 OPitAfl0N , 1tHLLS812A f LS LIM 11 SWifCN ALL M00tl 7.220E 06 0.000t+00 litt 1.200f+01 8.661 05 0.00t+00 itacN42 DA V CN M0104 $1AtiE4 SPut10US 3.0001 08 0.000t+00 ttiE 1.200t+01 3.60t 07 0.00t+00 OPERA 110N ttHCN42 08 v CN Motot $1Atttt $Putlaus 3.000f 08 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200t+01 3.60E 07 0.00E+00 OrtI A110N itMcN42 fC V CN M0104 $1Atttt $ Putt 0Un 3.000t 08 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200t*01 3.601 07 0.00E+00 OPitAiton itMcN42 0 Y CN M010't STAtita nPUt t0U$ 3.000t 08 0.000E+00 litt 1.200t+01 3.60t 07 0.00t+00 OPitAtt0N itHCI
- Of Of OPERATOR FA!L5 10 REMOVE 1.190t 03 0.000t+00 rt 0.000t*00 1.$9t 03 0.00t+00
($UPPLY) h0 Wit Ft(M (10) VIV$ 10900:10/053191 A-11
TABLE A-3
\
t VALVE HV8701A HITHOUT ACI BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES l FAIL RAlt VAtlANCE $0URCE flME PROSAblLitY VAtlANCE F1 ! DINT CCo* FAILURE G E 1.350t 02 0.000t+00 Mt 0.000t+00 1.35t+02 0.00t+00
' R uot "Clott 0! lAILutt 10 OPfN (CL0tt) Rhtl
$UCfl0N VALVE 8 8.1001 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.200f*01 9.721 06 0.00t+00 1RNl':ttl LRF 1R R01ARY SwifCN ALL M00tl 1.000t 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 1.20t 07 0.00t*00 iRNCSAll1510 C8 CIRCult $ttAttR OPEN W/0 CCm AND k 1RNtR" +'F Cf CURRENT TRANtf0Rutt ALL M00tl 3.500t+07 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 4.20t 06 0.00t+00 1.500t 07 0.000t+00 Raft 1.200t+01 1.80t+06 0.00t*00 1RwoL49A "F OL THIRML OVtRLOA0 PRIMAfuti OPEN 1.500t Of 0.000t+00 Raft 1.200t+0i 1.80t 06 0.00t+00 1RHOL60s ..F OL THERMAL OVERLCAD PREMAtutt OPEN 1.500E 07 0.000f*00 Raft 1.200E+01 1.80t 06 0.00t+00 1RHOL49C" F OL INtRMAL OVERLDAD PRIMatutt OPEN 1.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 0.00t+00
- C N&t CA*F CN RELAf CONTAC18 FAIL 10 1kANSFER 1.000t.06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t*05 0.001 00 iRMCW42 CD F CN RELAY CONTAttl Fall 10 TAANsitR .
1.000t*06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 OI00t+00 1RMCN62 CC F CN RELAY CONTAC11 FAIL 10 TRANiitt 1.000E 08 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 1.20t 07 0.00t+00 1RMC8A8ti520 CB CIRCulf tRfAttR OPEN W/0 COMMAND 1.000t.05 0.000C+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t 04 0.00t+00
.ithMv5701A K MV FAILutt TO Clott T.220t.06 0.000f+00 litt 1.200t+01 8.66t+05 0.00t+00 e 1RNLS8701A 7 LS limit SW11CM ALL M@tt 3.000t 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200f+01 3.601 07 0.00t+00 iRMCN42+ 0'U CN M010R 51ARftR SPURIOUS OPERAtl0N 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 0.00E+00 1RNCN62 C" F CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall to 1.000E 06 TRANSIER 1.200E+01 3.60E 05 0.00t+00 1RMC042 C"F CD RELAY C0!L PAILUtt 3.0005 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.500t.07 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 1.80C 06 0.00t+00 p 1R M FU1.4 A" F Fu Fult ALL MODil 2.000t*08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 2.40E 07 0.00t+00
' 1R MCN49""U CW RELAY CONTACTOR$ $PURIOUS OPERA 110N 0.000t+00 2815 1.200E+01 2.40t 06 0.00t+00 itkQ$6701A.F 05 TORQUE SVlfCM Fall 10 OPERAft 2.000t*07 8.100E 07 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200!*01 9.72t 06 0.00t+00 1RHC$C$ R " F - 1R R0fARY SWITCM ALL MODCS 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 9.80E 01 0.00t+00 t b 1R Hot "+0tT 2 of $tCom0 CPERATOR FA!LS 10 9.800E*01
! \ OtitCT OPEN MOV 5.800t*06 0.000t+00 .10P5 1.200t+01 6.96E 05 0.00f+00 1RMLP a" "F Pt LOOP POWER $UPP(f ALL M00t$ 1-3,000E 06 0.000C+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60E 05 0.00t+00 l 1RMC0KT35" F CD RELAY C0!L FAILURE m 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1,200t+01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 ! 1R MCNKT35' F CN RELAY CONTAC18 FAIL TO TRANsfit 4.250t 06 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 5.10E 05 0.00t+00 1RMAN " " *F AN ANNUCIATOR ALL M00tl 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60E 05 0.00t+00 1RMC0K155"F C0 RELAY C0ll FAILutt 3.000E 06 l i 10900:10/053191 A-12
e TABLE A-3 (Cont.) e VALVE HVB701A HITHOUT ACI BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES O Fi 10 TNT COMP FAlLU88 MODE FAIL 4 Aft vat!ANCt swtCE flMt Pat 4AtlLif f vat lAN(t 1 A NCkt155'F CN ttLAf CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 0.00t*00 ftANSFit itHLPPof438F PS LopP POWIt $UPF'LY ALL M00tl $.800t 06 0.0001 00 10Ps 1.200t+01 6.96t 05 0.00t+00 1tMitPS/43tf .tn COMPARAfot falP switCN 5.800t 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.200!+01 6.96t 06 0.00t+00 inHftPT.438F TP P f tANtMiffte ALL Moots 1.730t 06 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200t+01 2.085 05 0.00t+00 itMADPB3tAtF CM COMPARA104 ALL Matt $ 2.900t 06 0.000t+00 10Pt 1.200t+01 3.48t 05 0.00t+00 1tNitPl3tARF CM COMPARATOR filP SWlfCH 1.800t Of 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 6.96t 06 4.00t*00 inn 0E"0tfAN DE OPitATOR FAILS TO DtitCT VIA 2.660t 04 0.000t+00 Hi 0.000E*00 2.66t 04 0.00t+00 ANNUNCIATOR it MC0C 734" F CD ttLAT C0lt FAltutt 3.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t*01 3.60E 05 0.00t+00 ItHCNKT34"V CN ttLAY CONTACTOR$ $Put!CU$ 2.000t.08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200f+01 2.40t 07 0.00t+00 DPERATION ItMCor154"F CO tiLAY Coll FAILUtt 3.000t 06 0.000t*00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60t.05 0.00f+00 t itHCNC1$4"V (W ttLAY CONTACf0t$ SPUtl0Us 2.000t 08 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 2.40t 07 0.00t+00 l OPitAtt0N . ItHLS8812A F LS LIMlf SWifCN ALL N00tl 7.220t 06 0.000f+00 litt 1.200t+01 8.66t 0$ 0.00E*00 itHCN42 0A*V CN M0 TOR 8iARffR SPUR 10us 3.000t 08 0.000t+00 1(!I 1.200t*01 3.60E 07 0.00t+00 OPERAfl0N itHCN42 08 V CN Motot STAttt! $PUtl0Us 3.000t 08 0.000f+00 litt 1.200E+01 3.605 07 0.00t*00 OPERAfl0N 14NCN42 0CaV CN MOTOR STAtitt $PUtlWS 3.000t 08 0 000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 3.60t 07 0.00f*00 OPftAfl0N 1tNCN42 0"Y CN M0fot $fAtitt SPutl0US 3.000E 08 0.000E*00 litt 1.200t+01 3.60E 07 0.00t*00 OPttAfl0N i r itHC8"" Of DE OPERATOR FAILS 10 atM0vt 1.590t 03 0.000t+00 kt 0.000t+00 1.595 03 0.00t+00 l
\ (SUPPLY) Powet FROM (70) vtys p
d l O 10900:10/053191 A-13
i i TABLE A-4 \ VALVE HV8701B WITHOUT ACI BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES 1 Fall RAlt VAtlANCE $0)tCE flME PROSABILiff VAtlAhCE FT IDINT COMP F AILutt M001 1.350t 02 0.000E+00 ht 0.000t*00 1.35E 02 0.00t+00 itMot"CLott et FAILVat 70 CPlu (CLOSE) AMRS SVC110N VALvit 8.100t 07 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200t+01 9.72t 06 0.00f*00 ithtatts.Laf St ROTARY $WifCN ALL MTt$ 1.000t 08 0.000t+00 Ittt 1.200t+01 1.20t 07 0.00t+00 itHCBC0115*U CB CitCVlf BRCAttR OPlu W/0 ComAND 3.500t 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t*01 4.20t.06 0.00t*00 itutt".." F C1 CVetENT TkAhlFORMER ALL M00tl 1.5006 07 0.000t+00 AAff 1.200t+01 1.801 06 0.00t+00 1RHOL49A "i OL TNttMAL OvttLCAD PetMAfuRE . OPEN l 1.500t 07 0.000t+00 RAtt 1.200E+01 1.80f 06 0.00t+00 I t NOL 496. " F OL THttMAL OvttLCAD PRIMAfutt OPth 1.500E 07 0.000t+00 AA16 1.200t+01 1.80E 06. 0.00t+00 1tHOL49C "F OL TMitMAL ovitt0A0 PREMATUtt optu 1.000t 06 0.0001+00 2815 1.200t*01 1.20t 05 0.001+00 itHCN42 CA F CN tiLAY CONTAC15 FAIL TO ftANSFER 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 ltMCN42 CB+F CN ttLAY CONTACT $ Fall 10 ftANSFtt 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1 20E 05 0:00E+00 1.000E 06 [ \ itHCN42 CC F CN RELAY CONT ACis F All 10 TRANSFtt 1.0001 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+0i 1.20E 07 0.00t+00 itWctCD185NU CB C!tCulf BetAttR OPlu W/0 comAut) 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20E 04 0.00t+00 itWMv87018 K MV FAILUtt 70 CL0$t 1.000t 05 0.000t+00 fttt 1.200E+01 8.66E 05 0.00E+00 1RML$87018 F LS limit $WifCN ALL N00t$ T.220E 06 0.000t+00 !!!! 1.200t+01 3.60E 07 0.00E*00 1RNCN42 0" U CN Motot STAtttt $Putl0Js 3.000t 08 OPitAfl0N 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 itNCN42 C "F CN RELAY CONTAC18 Fall to 1.000E 06 TRANSFtt 0.000E+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60t 05 0.00t+00 1RNC042 C"F CD ttLAY Coll FAILutt 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 litt 1.200t+01 1.80E 06 0.00E+00 itHFU1.44"F FU FUSE ALL M00tl 1.500t*07 1.200t+01 2.40E 07 0.00t+00 \ 1RMCN49""U CN RELAY CONTACT 0AS $PURIOUS 2.000t 08 0.000t+00 Itti OPERATION 1.200E*01 2.40E 00 0.00t+00 1 TWOS $7015 F 08 70R0Ut SwifCM FAIL TO OPERATE 2.000E 07 0.000t+00 2815 0.000t+00 Itte 1.200t+01 9.721 06 0.00E+00 itHC$C5 t"F St totARY SVlfCN ALL MODES 8.100t.0T 9.800E 01 0.000t+00 Mt 0.000t*00 9.80t 01 0.00f*00 [ 1RMot "Ot12 DE SECOND OPitATOR fall $ TO DETECT OPtu MOV 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.200t+01 6.96t 05 0.00E+00 it HLP u n " ? - PS LOOP POWit SUPPLY ALL McDil 1.200t+01 3.60E 05 0.00E+00 itMCoci302 F C0 RELAY C0!L FAILUtt 3.000t 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.206 05 0.00t*00 itHCwt1302 F CN ttLAY CONTAC15 FAIL 70 1RAN5 Fit 0.00t+00 (OitHAN*"'F AN ANNUCI ATot ALL M@ts 4.250E 06 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200E+01 5.10E 05 0.00t+00 3.000E-06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200r+01 3.60t 05 itHCOPT408tF CD atLAY C0ll FAILutt 10900:10/053191 A-14
TABt.E A-4 (Cont.) Q/ VAtVE HVB7018 WITHOUT ACI BASIC EVEt!T PROBABil.ITIES
/*
ff 10 TNT COMP FAlluti MODE Fall tatt vat!ANCE $0utCE flME Ptogat!Liff VAtlANCt 1tNCNPV40&BF CN ttLAY CONTAC18 FAlt 70 1.000E 06 0.000!+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20E 05 0.00t*00 ftAhstta 1tNLPPQf4087 PS LOOP POWit $UPPLY ALL MColl 5.800E 06 0.000t+00 70Pl 1.200t+01, 6.964 05 0.00t+00 1kMitPL/408P CM COMPARATOR TRIP $WifCH 5.800E 07 0.000f*00 litt 1.200t+01 6.96t+06 0.00t+00 ftNfPPT.408F TP P 18ANSMiffte ALL W0ll 1. 230t .06 0.000E+00 !!!! 1.200E*01 2.081 05 0.00E*00 itHA0PB01ABF CM COMPARATOR ALL WJ0tl 2.900E 06 0.000f+00 10PS 1.200t*01 3.48t 05 0.00t*00 1ANTSP$0BABF CM COMPARATOR ft!P SWlfCH 5.800E 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 6.96t 06 0.00t+00 1AMot OffAN DE OPERAf04 FAILS TO DrftCT VIA 2.660t 04 0.000t+00 Mt 0.000t+00 2.66t.04 0.00t*00 AhWUNCIAf04 itHC0K1301 P CD AtLAY C0!L FAILUtt 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200f*01 3.60t 05 0.00t*00 1ANCht1301 V CN ttLAf CONTACf0t$ SPUAIOUS 2.000t 08 0.000t*00 litt 1.200t+01 2.40t 07 0.00t+00 OPitA110N itHCOPY408AF CD ttLAY Coll FAILutt 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200E+01 1 50E 05 0.00t*00
')1tNCNPY408AVCN ttLAY CONTACfott SPURIOUS 2.0001 08 0.000!+00 Ittt 1.200t+01 2.40t 07 0.00t+00 OPitATION ,
itML$$$12A F LS limit $WifCH ALL Mott 7.220t 06 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 8.66t 0$ 0.00t+00 1ANCN42 0A V CN MOTOR STAtift $Putl0U$ 3.0001 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+0) 3.60E 07 0.00t+00 DPERAfl0N 1RMCN42 OR V CN motor STA4Ytt SPut10ut 3.000t 08 0.000t+00 1tIi 1.200t+01 3.60t 07 0.00t+00 OPitAfl0N 1RNCN42 0C+V CN MOTOR $fttitt $PUtl0US 3.0001 08 0.000!+00 litt 1.200t+01 3.60t 07 0.00t+00 OPitAfl0N ItHCN42 0"V CN Mof04 STAkitt trutt0U5 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 Itti 1.200E*01 3.60E 07 0.00t+00 OPttAfl0N 1tMCB DE DE OPitATOR FAILS 70 atMOVE 1.590E 03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.59t 03 0.00t+00
) (SUPPLY) POWEt FROM (10) VLv5
,V
/O
() b l l 10900:10/053191 A-15
TABLE A-5 V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: CLOSE HV8701A, HV87010 HV8702A, and HV87028. Verify valves are i closed. RF' ERENCE: Step 4.1.4 in Procedure 13011. " Residual Heat R noval System." Proctedure 12001-C, " Unit Heatup to Hot Shutdown," Section A4.3,
" Mode 4 Entry."
BREAKDOWN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to close motor-operated suction valve Hedlan HEP = 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Hean HEP = 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor 3- provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator fails to close valve Median H'.P = 0.05 Table 20-12 Turn rotary control switch in Hean HEF= = 8.1E-02 (Reference 10) wrong direction w1en design Error FLctor . 5 violates a st ong populational stereotype and cperating conditions are normal kJ 3. Recovery error - Verifier fails to detect error by others Hedlan HEP = 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker Mean HEP = 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materials Error Factor = 5 i
POE = (1-3.75E-03)(8.1E-02)(0.16) + (3.75E-03)(0.16)
- 1.291E-02 + 6.0E-04
= 1.351E-02 O - 1.35E-02 Fault Tree Identifiers: 1RHOE--CLOSE lO O
L l l 10900:10/071891 A-16
l TABLE A-5 (Cont.) V0GTLE 1 l HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS l
- TASK: Operator fails to detect wrong valve position l
REFERENCE:
None BREAKDOWN OF TASK:
-1. Omission error - Operator falls to detect wrong valve pnsition '
HEP = 0.98 Table 20-25 Legend light ' (Reference 10) Other than annunciator light POE - 0.98 Fault Tree Identifiers: 1RHOE--DET2 and 1RHOE--DETAC ' l-h i l I L@ l t-
.10900:10/071891 A-17
TABLE A-5 (Cont.) V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: Restore ACI by reconnecting the leads. Step A4.3.2.f in " Unit Heatup to Hot Shutdown," procedure O
REFERENCE:
#12001-C. Section 6.3 of "RCS Oraindown Modifications: RCS Sightplass,TygonTubeandDefeatofRHRSSuctionValve Autocnosure Interlock," Procedure #54840.
BREAKDOWN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Engineering group fails to restore ACI Hedian HEP - 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Hean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Engineering group relands wrong conductor Median HEP = 0.003 Table 20-12 Improperly mate a cenriuctor Mean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10)
Error Factor - 3
- 3. Recovery error - Shif t Supervisor fails to detect error by others Median HEP - 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker Mean HEP - 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materials Error Factor - 5 POE = (1-3.75E-03)(3.75E-03)(0.16) + (3.75E-03)(0.16)
- 5.978E-04 + 6.0E-04
- 1.198E-03
- 1.20E-03 Fault Tree Identifiers: 1RHFTRACI-HE o
V LO 10900:10/071891 A-18 L \ -
l
- TABLE A-5 (Cont.) ,
t V0GTLE HUMAN ERPOR CALCULATIONS TASK: HV9701A, HV87018, (HV87018 and HV87028) open and lock circuit breakers to valves.
REFERENCE:
Steps 4.1.5.c and 4.1.5 d in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." Procedure 12001-C, " Unit Heatup to Hot Shutdown, "Section A4.3.ll.e, " Mode 4 Entry." BRE/h % N OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to open and lock open power supply breaker Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Hean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor - 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator selects wrong circuit breaker Median-HEP- - 0.005 Table 20-12 Select wrong rcuit breaker in a Hean HEP - 6.2E-03 (Reference 10) group of circe . breakers densely Error Factor - 3 grouped and identified by labels only f% Recovery error - Shif t Supervisor fails to detect error by others Q 3.
Mediua HEP - 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker Hean HEP - 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materiais Error Factor - 5 POE - (1-3.75E-03 (6.2E-03)(0.16) + (3.75E-03)(0.16)
- 9.833E-04 + 6.0E-04
- 1.580E-03
- (} -= 1.59E-03 V Fault Tree Identifiers: 1RHCB----0E f~ ( 10900:10/071891 A-19
TABLE A-5 (Cont.) V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCU'.ATIONS TASK: Operator fails to detect wrong valve position via annunciator
REFERENCE:
None BREAKDOWN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator falls to detect wrong valve position via annunciator and initiate some kind of corrective action Median HEP - 0.0001 Table 20-23 One annunciator Mean HEP - 2.66E-04 (Reference 10) -
Error Factor - 10 POE - 2.66E-04 Fault Tree Identifiers: 1RHOE--DETAN O O O O 10900:1D/071891 A-20
l TABLE A-C DOMINANT CUTSETS FOR VALVE HV8701A WITH ACI PAGE 1 TREE NAME: 8701A CUTDES V;R.1.7, 11 17 89 INPUT FILE! 8701A.CDS CUT SETS FOR CATE G0001 WITH CUTOFF PRosAs!LITY OF 1.00E 10' GATE C0001 IS: V0GTLE MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 8701A IS OPEN W/ACI e NUMBER CUTSET PROS. BA$lt EVENT NAME EVENT PRoa. IDENTIFIER f k Mov 8701A FAILS to CLOSE 1.20E-04 1RHMV8701A K
- 1. 1.15E CT SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE " DET2 OPERATOR FAILS 10 DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01- 1RHOE"DETAC
- 2. B.32E 05 LIMIT SWITCH 8701A FAILS 8.66E 05 1RHLS8701A F SECON9 LPE!!ATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN Mov 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE " DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9,80E 01 1R HOE"DE T AC
- 3. 3.46E 05 LOCrtN 42 C C0!L FA!LS 3.60E 05 1RMC042 C"F SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE"-DET2 OPERATOR F AILS to OETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE "DETAC 4 1.57E 05 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E 02 1RHOE CLOSE SECONO OPERATOR FAILE TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE-"DET2 ENGINEERING FAILS TO Rest 0RE AUTOCLOSE INTERLOCK 1.20E 03 1RMFTRACI ME
- 5. 1.15E 05 LOCKIN 42 C CONTACTS Fall TO TRANSFER 1.20E 05 1RHCN42 C" F SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E-01 1RHOE " DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO CETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1R HOE"DET AC 6, 1.15E 05 CLOSING C0!L CONTACT PHASE C 42 C FAILS TO TRANSFER 1.20E 05 1RHCN42 CC F SECOND OPERATOR 8 AILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE " DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.30E 01 1RHOE"0STAC
- 7. 1.15E-05 CLOSING C0!L CONTACY PHASE B 42 C FAILS TO TRANSFER 1.20E 05 1RHCN42 CS F SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 41 1RHOE"-DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT ODEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 09 1RH0E "0ETAC
- 8. 1.15E 05 CLOSING CO!L CONTACT PHASE A 42 C FAILS TO TRANSFER 1.20E 05 1RHCN42 CA F SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E-01 1RHOE-'DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV $701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE -DETAC
- 9. 9.34E 06 TRANSFER SWITCH TRS LR FAILS 9.72E-06 1RHSRTRS-LRF SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE" DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E-01 1RHOE "DETAC
- 10. 4.03E-06 480V/120V TRANSFORMER FAILS 4.20E-06 1RHTR8701A F SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E-01 1RHOE"-DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701 A 9.80E-01 1RHOE"DETAC REDUCED SUM OF PR06AllLITY OF FAILURE
- 3.215E 04 O
V O 1090D:1D/053191 A-21
TABLE A-7 DOMINANT CUTSETS FOR VALVE HV8701B HITH ACI [ PAGE 1 TREE NAME: 87018 CUTOES VER.1.7.11 17 89 INPUT FILE: 87018 C05 CUT $ETS FOR GATE G0001 WITM CUTOFF PROBASILITY OF 1.00E 10 GATE C0001 IS: V0GTLE MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 87018 15 OPEN W/ACI NUMBER CUTSET PROS. BASIC EVENT NAME EVENT PROB. 10ENTIFIER
- 1. 1.15E 04 MOV 87018 FAILS To CLOSE 1.20E-04 1RHMV87018 K SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87010 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2 OPERATOR F AILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE DETAC 8.32E-05 LIMIT SWITCH 87018 FAILS' 8.66E 05 1RHL$87018 F 2.
SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE DETAC LOCKlu 42 C C0!L FAILS 3.60E 05 1RNC042 C--F
- 3. 3.46E 05 SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV E7018 9.80E-01 1RHOE DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE -DETAC
- 4. 1.59E 05 OPERATOR F AIL 5 TO CLOSE VALVE DURING ST ARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E 02 1RHOE CLOSE SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE- 0ET2 ENGINEERING FAILS TO RESTORE AUTOCLOSE INTERLOCK 1.20E 03 1RHFTRACI NE
- 5. 1.15E 05 LOCKIN 42 C CONTACTS Fall TL TRANSFER 1.20E 05 1RNCN42 C"8 SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701B 9.80J 01 1RHOE 0ET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE -DETAC
- 6. 1.15E 05 Clos!NG C0ll CONTACT PHASE C 42 C FAILS TO TRANSFER 1.20E 05 1RNCN42 CC F SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT CaEN MOV B7018 9.80E 01 1RHOE- DET2 CPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE -DETAC
- 7. 1.15E-05 CLOSING C0!L CONTACY PHASE 8 42 C FAILS TO TRANSFER 1.20E 05 1RHCN42 CB F 9.80E-01 1RHOE - DET2 SECOND OPERATOR FA!LS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE DETAC OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018
- 8. 1.15E 05 Cl0 SING Coll CONTACT PHASE A 42 C FAILS 10 TRANSFER 1.20E 05 1RHCN42 CA F 9,80E 01 1RHOE- -0ET2 SECOND OPER ATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87015 9.80E-01 1RHOE -DETAC
- 9. 9.34E-06 TRANSFER SWITCH TRS-LR FAILS 9.72E 06 1RHSRTRS LRF SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E-01 1RHOE *0E12 OPERATCR FAILS TD DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE"DETAC
- 10. 4.03E 06 480V/120V TRANSFORMER FAILS 4.20E 06 1RHTR8701E F SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DE'ECT OPEu MOV 87018 9.80E 01 1RHOE "DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 9.8CE 01 1RHOE "DETAC REDUCED SUM OF PR08ABILITT OF FAILURE = 3.215E 04 10900:10/053191 A-22
t TABLE A-8 k DOMINANT CUTSETS FOR VALVE HV8701A HITHOUT ACI PAGE 1 TREE NAME: A48701A CUTDES VER.1.7. 11 17 89 INPUT FILET AN8701A.CDS CUT SETS FOR GATE G0001 WITH CUTOFF PR08A41LITT OF 1.00E 10 CATE G0001 ist V0GTLE MOTOR OPERATED VALVE 8701A 15 OPEN W/0 ACI NtetSER CUTSET PROS. BASIC EVENT hAME EVENT PROS. IDENTIFIER
- 1. 8.49E 05 LIMIT SvlTCH B701A FAILS 8.66E 05 1RHLS8701A F SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2
~
- 2. 3.52E;06 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E 02 1RHOE -CLOSE SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E-01 1RHOE DET2 OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A VIA THE ALARM 2.66E 04 1RHOE DETAN
- 3. 9.21E-07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURikG STARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E 02 1RHOE -CLOSE SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE- -DET2 ALARM POWER SUPPLT FAILS 6.96E 05 1RHLP"
- F 4 9.21E 07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E 02 1RHOE CLOSE SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE "-DET2 LOOP POWER SUPPLT pct 438 FAILS 6.96E 05 1RHLPPQT438F
- 5. 6.75E 07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2,1.e 1.35E 02 1EHOE CLOSE SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2 ALARM FAILS 5.10E 05 1RMAN F
- 6. 4.76E-07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.t. 1.35E 02 1RHOE" CLOSE SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2
$$PS IkPUT RELAT K155 Colt FAILS 3.60E 05 1RMC0K155"7 7 4.76E 07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E-02 1RHOE"CloSE SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE " DET2 SSPS . AT K735 C0!LS F AILS 3.60E 05 1RMC0K735 "F
- 8. 4.60E-07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E-02 1RHOE " CLOSL SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E-01 1RHOE*"DET2 DUAL COMPARATOR P8 438A/8 FAILS 3.A8E 05 1RHADPB3SA8F 9, 2.75E 07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E 02 1RHOE "CLOSE SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E-01 1RHOE "0ET2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-438 FAILS 2.08E 05 1RNTPPT-438F
- 10. 1.59E-07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 1.35E 02 1RHOE "CLOSE SECONO OPERATOR FAILS To DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE -DET2
( $$PS INPUT RELAT K155 CONTACTS Fall To TRANSFER 1.20E-05 1.35E-02 1RHCNK155- F 1RHOE CLOSE
- 11. 1.59E-07 OPERATOR FAILS TO C10$E VALVf DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e SECONO OPERAfon FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 8701A 9.80E 01 1RHOE "0ET2
$$PS RELAT E735 CONTACTS 1 & 2 Fall TO TRANSFER 1.20E-05 1RHCNK735 F REDUCED SUM OF PR08A81LITT OF FAILURE
- 9.327E 05 a
O l 1 10900:10/053191 A-23
\ TABLE A-9
(\ DOMINANT CUTSETS FOR VALVE HV87018 HITHOUT ACI ( PAGE 1 TREE mAME:'AN87018 CUTOES VER.1.7, 11-17 89 INPUT FILE: Ak87018.CDS 1.00E 10 CUT SET $ FOR CATE G0001 WITM CUT 0FF PRD3AttLITT OF GATE G0001 ts: V0GTLE MOTOR OPERATED VAtvE 87018 il DPEN WO ACI 8.66E 05 1RMLl87018 F 8.49E 05 LIMIT $ WITCH 87018 FAIL $ 9.80E-01 1RHOE* DET2 1. SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 1.55E 02 1RHOE CLOSE 3.52E 06 OPERATOR F A1L$ TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 9.80E 01 1RNOE
- DET2 2.
SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEa MOV 87018 2.66E 04 1RHOE* DETAN CPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 VIA THE ALARM 1.35E 02 1RHOE**CtOSE 9.21E-07 OPERATOR F AILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING $T ARTUP PER 2.1.e 9.80E 01 1RHOE- DET2
- 3. 1RHLP + **F SECOND OPERATOR F AILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 6.96E 05 ALARM POWER $UPPLY FAILS 1.35E 02 1RHOE CLOSE OPERATC4 FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DUtlkG STARTUP PER 2.1.e 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2
- 4. 9.21E-07 SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 6.96E 05 1RNLPPQY4087 LOOP POWER SUPPLY PQY 408 FAILS 1.35E 02 1RHOE- CLOSE 6.75E 07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURlWG STARTUP PER 2.1.e 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2
. f) 5.
$ECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN Mov 87018 5.10E-05 1RMAN***
- F
'G ALARM FAlts 1.35E 02 1RHOE CLOSE 4.76E 07 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING ST ARTUP PER 2.1.e 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2 6.
SECONO OPERATOR F AILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 3.60E 05 1RNCOPY4088F AuxlLIARY RELAY PY/4084 COIL FAILS 1.35E 02 1RHOE CLOSE OPERATOR FAIL $ TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e9.80E-01 1RHOE
- aET2
- 7. 4.76E 07 SECOND OPERATOR F AILS 10 DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 3.60E-05 1RHCOR1302 F
$$PS RELAY E1302 Coll $ FAtLS 1.35E 4D 1RHOE**CLOSE OPERATOR F AILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING sTARTUP PER 2.1.e9.80E 01 1RHOE* *0ET2
- 8. 4.60E-07 SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 3.48E 05 1RNADPs08A8F CUAL COMPARATOR P4 408A/S FAILS 1.35E 02 1RHOE CLOSE OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e9.80E-01 1RHOE - DET2 9, 2.75E 07 SECONO OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT CPEN MOV 87018 2.08E 05 1RHTPPT 408F PRES $URE TRANSMITTER PT 408 FAILS
/r~si 1.3!!-02 1RHOE* CLOSE ;
OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e9.80E 01 1RHOE
- DET2 d 10. 1.59E 07 SECOND OPERATOR FAILS TO DETECT UPEN MOV 87018 1.20E 05 1RNCNPY4088F AUXILIARY RELAY PY/4088 CONTACTS FAIL TO TRANSFER 1.35E 02 1RHOE CLOSI OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE VALVE DURING STARTUP PER 2.1.e 9.80E 01 1RHOE DET2 11, 1.59E-07
$ ECONO OPERATOR FAILS 10 DETECT OPEN MOV 87018 1.20E 05 1RHCNK1302 7 SSPS RELAY K1302 CONTACTS 1 & 2 Fall TO TRANSFER h
V REDUCEO $UM OF PROBASILITY OF FAILURE . 9.327E 05 m I (v) 10900:10/053191 A-24
i i j L OVERSIZE ! DOCUMENT
- PAGE PULLED
- SEE APERTURE CARDS
i ~ ( NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS , Ql1202803786e1 APERTURE CARD /HARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM' QECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT.- BRANCH t-
.-_. - . . _ . _ . _ _ _ . , _ . , _ . . - . - - _ . ~ . _ . _ _
I O APPENDIX B V0GTLE RHRS UNAVAILABILITY ANALYSIS O O O O O 1098D:10/071991
f APPENDIX B
\d RHRS UNAVAILABILITY ANALYSIS The Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) was analyzed to determine the e unavailability of the system to remove decay heat and the impact of removal of k the ACI on this unavailability due to spurious closure of the suction valves.
Fault trees were developed to determine the unavailability for startup of the RHRS System, for short term cooling (72 hours) and for long term cooling (six n weeks). This appendix describes the calculations and fault tree quantifications used to determine the system unavailabilities. The following boundary conditions and assumptions were utilized during the analysis,
- 1. Two trains of RHRS are assumed required for 72 hours injecting into 2 of 4 cold legs following initiation of the RHRS (short term cooling phase).
O 'yf 2. One train of RHRS is assumed required for 6 weeks (representative of the time of a refueling outage) injecting into 2 of 4 cold _ legs for the long term RHRS cooldown phase.
- 3. No testing or maintenance operations are assumed to occur during the initial phase of cooldown using the RHRS (first 72 hours).
- 4. During the warm-up period of the RHRS, both RHRS pumps are started and must run for approximately two hours before injection into the RCS cold legs.
- 5. All electric power (AC and DC) is assumed to be available with a probability of 1.0.
f~
- 6. For long term cooling, it is assumed that the Train A pump is operating and the Train B pump is in standby and thus must start and run should the Train A pump fail. No switching of trains during long
( term cooling is assumed. 10980:10/071991 B-1
1 Three fault trees were developed to model the RHRS unavailability for Vogtle. O These fault trees were developed from the system flow diagrams and control wiring diagrams shown and described in Section 2.0. Each fault tree is discussed below. The RHRS suction valves 8701A, 8701B, 8702A and 8702B were modeled in detail d'own to the control circuitry level to explicitly show the O change in unavailability due to removal of the ACI. EAL1JJr_e_during RHRS Initiation The fault tree developed for this phase of cooldown (Figure B-1) details the failure during initiation of the RHRS. The fault tree was developed based on the RHRS Operating Procedure 13011, Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS Cooldown." The steps for RHRS initiation are summarized below (Train B components are listed in parentheses):
- 1. Close RHRS to RCS hot leg crossover valve HV-8716A(B).
- 2. Close RHRS heat exchanger outlet valve HV-0606(0607).
- 3. Close RHRS heat exchanger bypass valve FV-0618(FV-0619).
- 4. Close RHST to RHRS pump suction valve HV-8812A(B).
- 5. Open RHR$ suction valves HV-8701A, HV-0701B (HV-8702A, HV-87028).
- 6. Remove power from the RHRS to Charging and SI Pump Isolation valves HV-8804A (HV-8804B).
O 7. Start RHRS Pump A(B).
- 8. Open RHRS heat exchanger bypass valve FV-0618 (FV-0619).
O 9. Place RHRS heat exchanger bypass valve FV-0618(FV-0619) in "AUT0" position.
- 10. Open RHRS heat exchanger outlet valve HV-0606(0607).
O 10980:10/071991 B-2
Ea'ch of these steps was modeled in the fault tree to involve an operator error or a component failure. For example, the first step requires the closing of the RHRS to RCS hot leg crossover valve. Failure of this step could involve:
- 1) the operator failing to close the valve or 2) the valve failing to close, p
\
This phase of cooldown is not dependent on the ACI but on the prevent-open i n t e r l or.k. Thus only one fault tree was developed to determine the unavailability due to RHRS initiation.
-O Loss of Short Term Coolina The fault trees developed for this phase of cooldown assumes that both trains of RHRS are required for operation. Injection into two of four cold legs for 72 hours is required for success in this phase. The RHRS suction valves were modeled in detail to show how the valves could spuriously close. Finally, fault trees were developed without the ACI and with the proposed modification to the suction valves. The fault trees developed for these cases are shown in
- g figures B-2 and B-3.
V s Loss of Lona Term Coolinc The fault tree developed for this phase of plant cooldown assumes only one RHRS train (pump and heat exchanger) is required to be operating. l Injection into two of four cold legs for six weeks is the success criteria, 1 The fault trees developed for this mode of cooling are shown in Figures B-4 and B-5. The models were developed to show the suction valves with and I without the ACI. O LJ l l The fault trees were quantified for the case with and without the ACI. The
-basic event probabilities (component unavailabilities and human error probabilities) are shown in Table B-2. The equation _used to calculate the component unavailability is:
(~ ) 1 l l 0 - (1) T g (^i () l 10980:1D/071991 8-3
where Q Q - component failure probability (1) - failure rate for component Tg - total defined mission time in which the component must operate. /~g b The human error probability calculations for Vogtle are shown in Table B-3. The unavailability of the Train B pump due to test modeled in the long term A Q cooling phase is based on the Technical Specification 3.4.1.4-1 which states:
"One residual heat removal loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHRS loop is OPERABLE ard in operation." Because pump testing occurs on a quarterly basis (every 2160 hours), the unavailability due to test is calculated by:
Otest - (Y)/TT where Y - average duration of test (hours) O T V) T - interval between tests (hours) Otest - (Y)/TT
- (2 hours) / (2160 hours)
- 9.26E-04
'The unavailability.'due to maintenance, which is modeled to occur during long term cooling, was extracted from Reference 9, " Individual Plant Evaluation Methodology for Pressurized Water Reactors," April 1987, Section 2.4, f Table 2,4-2 Generic Maintenance Durations for a standby pump tested monthly or k quarterly and a component inoperability time limit of 72 hours. Therefore the unavailability due to maintenance is:
pV Omain " (Ir } II}R
- (8.42E-05 evots/ hour) (18.7 hours / event)
= 1.57E-03
- th V
-10980:1D/071991 B-4
A where f r- frequency of maintenance (events / hour) b (Y)R - mean component repair time (hours / event) l EEUL_tJi The results of the RHRS unavailability are shown in Table B-1. The dominant cutsets for each phase are shown in Tables B-4 to B-8. For the failure of initiation fault tree, the dominant failure mcdes are the operator error in which the operator fails to open the suction valves and the RHRS pumps failing to start. The deletion of the ACI has no impact on the failure probability for RHRS initiation. The failure probabilities for the short term cooling phase for Vogtle are reduced by approximately 26 percent with the deletion of the ACI. The dominant failure mode for each case is the failure of either pump to run for 72 hour', (both pumps are required for success in this phase). For the case with the ACI, failure of components associated with the ACI contribute approximately SE-03 to the failure probability. In the long term cooling phase for Vogtle, for both cases the failure of both pumps to run for six weeks is the dominant contributor to the system unavailability. For the deletion of the ACI case, the failure probability is reduced by 43 percent. For-the case with the ACI present, the failure of a component associated with the ACI such as the power supplies, signal comparators, comparator trip switches or pressure transmitters in combination with failure of one of the pumps to run contributes approximately 7.2E-03 to 3 the system unavailability. (G The results of the quantification of the Vogtle RHRS unavailability fault trees show that deletion of the ACI reduces the number of spurious closure of the suction valves and thus increases the availability of the RHRS. (] v -O V 10980:1D/071991 B-5
- - _ - - - =. . -- - - -- - . .
1 i TABLE B-1 RESULTS OF RHRS UNAVAILABILITY FOR V0GTLE FAULT TREE PERCfNT PHASE RITH AUTOCLOSUE HITHOUT AUTOCLOSUE CHANGE INITIATION 1.05E-01. 1.05E-01 -- f-l SHORT TERM COOLING 1.96E-02 1.46E-02 25.5 > 4 LONG TERM COOLING 1.96E-02 1.18E-02 39.8 L I 1 i
@ i r
i g i 1098D:1D/071991 B-6
1 l l l TABLE B-2 ~ t V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES Fi 10tnf CapP FAltual moet Fa
.............,......... .............. .....................ll4 Aft..............................................Liff VAtlANC8 SOURCE fint PtotA81 VallAuct
...u...........
tAtt152V- CB CitCulf ettAtte Optn w/0 1.000t 08 0.000t+00 litt 2.000E+00 Coma =0 2.00t 08-- 0.00t+00 1AMyotAS wy Faltual 10 CPtw 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.006 05 0.00t+00 140$01AU es fotout SwifCN Fall f0 CPitAft 2.000t 07 0.000E+00 2815 2.000t+00 4.005 07 0.00t+00 1 Atu42CV - CN N0f04 STA4fte smutt0US 3.000t 08 0.000E+00 litt 2.000t+00 6.00t 00 OpttAflom 0.00t+00 1 AC0420F - CO ttLAT cell FAILunt 3.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 6.00E M 0.00t+00 tatut.47 Fu Futt ALL meets 1.5006 07 0.000t+00 litt 2.000t+00 3.00t 07 0.00t+00 1AOLCh494- CN ttLAY ConfACfott Sputl3J5 2.000E 00 0.000E*00 litt 2. 000E +00 4.00t 08 CPERAf!Om 0.00t+00 1 Alt 01AF LS tlnti SW11CM ALL M00tl 7.220E 06 0.000t+00 litt 2.000t+00 1.44t 05 0. 00E+00 i 1 ACNE 7347 Cu RELAY Cou1AC15 Fall TO 1.000t.06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t 06 ftAustia 0.00E*00 1 AC0KT54F~ CO RELAY C0ll Faltunt 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2015 2.000E+00 6.00t 06 0.00E+00 1AcmK154F CN StLAY confACTS Fall TO - 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E 06 IRAnsFla 0.00t+00
+
1AC0K1547 - C0 afLAf Coll FAILust 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000E+00 6.00E 06 0,00t+00 1 ALP 438F Pt LOOP PClet SUPPLY ALL MODES 5.000t.06 0.000t+00 TOPS 2.000E+00 1.16E 05 0.00t+00 1APS438F- CM CCBIPARATOR filP SWlfCM 5.8006 07 0.000E+00 Itti 2.000E+00 1,16E 06 0.00E+00 1ATP4teF TP P ftAmtulffta ALL MODES 1.7308 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 2.000t+00 3.46E 06 0.00t+00 1 apt 434Asf CM CouPanAfDs ALL MODES 2.900E 06 'O.000t+00 TOPS 2.000E+00 5.80E 05 0.00t+00 1ATS434A87 CM COMPARATOR TRIP WITCM - 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 2.000E+00 1.16t 06 0.00t+00 1ANYC80E DE ' QPERATOR FAILS TO CLost C8 1.600E*03- 0.000E+oO NE 0.000E+00 1.606 03 - 0.00t+00 temvotortu at FAILunt 70 arts (ClosE) RNas- 1.350E 02 0.000E+00 NE 0.000E+00 1.35E 02 0.00E+00 Suction v4Lytt 1854010F St RCfAAY WITCN ALL Mtatt 8.1005 07 0.000E+00 .IEEE 2.000E+00 1.628 06 0.00E+00
\ 15CW420F Cu - htLAY ConfACTS Fall 10 1.000t+06 -0.000E+00 2815 -2.000E+00 2.00E 06 0.00f+00 ftANSFSR 18LS11AF LS- LIMIT WITCN ALL N0048 - 7.220E 06 0.000E+00 itet 2.000E+00 1.44E 05 0.00t+00 1BLs12AF - LS LIMIT WITCN ALL MODES 7.220E.06 0.000E+00 Ifft 2.000E+00 1.444 05 0.00E+00 181$0AAF LS LIMIT WITCN ALL N00f t 7.220E 06- 0.000t+00 IEEE d' . 000E +00 1.44t 05 0.00E+00 ftCSCSAF ~54 aCTAAT WITCN ALL MODES 8.100t 07 0.000E*00 IEEE 2.000E+00 1.628 06 0.00E+00 1AC51150 C8 Claculi BetAKER OPfu W/0 1.0006 08 0.000E+00 IEEE ' 2.000t+00 2.00E 08 0.00E+00 C13 BIAS 3 10CT4812F CT CURRENT TRAmsfonMER ALL M00Es 3.500E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 2.000t*00 - 7.00E 07 0.00E+00 OL RMAL QVIELOAD PeEMAfunt Q 180L49AF- 1.500E 07 - 0.000t+00 RAf t - 2.000E+00 3.00E 07 0.00E+00 1 sol 49er OL TNtamAL OVERLOAD PREMATURt 1.500E-07 0.000E+00 RATE 2.000E+00 3.00E 07 0.00E+00 Open 10980:10/053191 8-7 p y , y ---. ,m- - - ,, , , - ,,(-- .
i g TABLE B-2 (Cont'd)
\
V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES FT IDENT CCMP F AILLRt 6KX)E Fall Raft VAtlANC $3 ACE TIME PROM 81LitY vaplAmCE
............... ............................... ... ......................E..............................................
Avo6060ft Of OpttAf04 FAIL 5 TJ CLO51 VAlvt i .?')0t 03 0.000t+00 at 0.000t+00 1.20t 03 0.00t+00 Av0606K A0 Faltutt to OPttAtt 1.0001 05 0.000t+00 2815 2,000t+00 2.00t.05 0.00t+00 Av06070tt Of OPttATOR FAILS 70 CL0st VALyt 1.200t 03 0.000t+00 wt 0.000t+00 1.20t.03 0.00t+00 Av0607E A0 FAltvet 70 opftAit 1.000E 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t 05 0.00t+00 O,, Av06180tt of OPttAT0e F AIL S TO PLACE IN 1.800t-03 0.000t+00 kt 0.000t+00 1.80t 03 0.00t+00 NANUAL ANO CLO5E VALvt avC418E A0 FAltutt to OPikAft 1.000E 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 05 0.00t+00 Av06190ft Of OpttATOR FAILS TO PLACE IN 1,800t 03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.808 03 0.00t+00 MAmuAL AND CLOSE bALyt av0419E A0 FAILutt to OptRATE 1.000t 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t C5 0.00t+00 mv8812A0tt Ot OPttATOR FAILS TO CL0st VALvt 1.200E 03 0,000t+00 Mt 0.000t+00 1.20t 03 0.00t+00 uv8812At wy FAILutt to Clost 1.000t 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 05 0.00l+00 Mv881250tt OC OPttAtot FAILS 10 Clos! VALVE 1.200t 03 0.000t+00 nt 0.000t+00 1.20t 03 0.00E+00 wv8812tt wy FAILutt 70 CL0st 1.000t 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t 05 0.00t+00 O 1AwVotoPlu of FAILutt to OPtm (CLOSE) RNas 1.350E 02 0.000E+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.35t 02 O!00t+00
$UCil0N VALVt3 1 Alt 01AF $4 tofAAY SwifCN ALL M00t3 8.100t=07 0.000t+00 litt 2.000t+00 1.62t 06 0.00t+00 1ACN4207 CN ttLAY COMtAC11 FAIL to 1.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t 06 0.00t+00 ftANSFtt 1ALS11AF Lt LIMIT $WITCM ALL MCotS 7.220t 06 0.000E+00 Itti 2.000t+00 1.442 05 0.00t+00 1ALS12AF Lt LINIT SwifCN ALL cts 7.220t 06 0.000t+00 Itti 2.000t+00 1.44t 05 0.00E+00 1AL504AF L1 LIMIT SWITCN ALL i@ts 7.220t 06 0,000t+00 Itti 2.000E+00 1.44t 05 0,00t+00 1AC1CSAF St ROTART SWlfCN ALL M00t3 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 litt 2.000E+00 1.62E 06 0.00t+00 1ACs151u Clacult attAKIR OPtu W/0 C8 1.000E 08 0.000t+00 lEtt 2.000t+00 7.00E 08 0.00t+00 COMAJS 1ACf4412F Cf CutatNT f tANSF0 AMER ALL NW5 3.500E 07 0.000t+00 Ittt 2.000t+00
\ 7.004 07 0.00t*00 140L49AF OL THERML CNtat0AD PetMTutt 1.5005 07 0.000t+00 Raft 2.000E+00 3.00E 07 0.00t+00 CPtu 1AOL498F OL THERML OVttLCAC PetMTUtt 1.5005 07 0.000E+00 RATE 2.000t+00 3.00t 07 0.00t+00 optu OL TMitML OvtRLQA0 PatMfutt 1.500E 07 0.000t+00 RATE 2.000t+00 3.00E 07 0.00t+00 O 1AOL49CF CPin 1ACN420AF CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00t-06 0.00t+00 TRANSFit 1ACN4206F CN RELAY CONTACT". FAIL 70 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.005 06 0.00t+00 ftANSFit s 1ACN420CF - CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.0001 06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00
' 2.00t 06 0.00t+00 TRANSFtt 1098D:10/053191 B-8
TABLE B-2 (Cont'd) \ V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES F7 tctWT CCMP FAltutt 4 8 FAIL tAft vaalANCE $3;tCE flME P90EA4
.............................. ............................................... .............. ........1(lTY VARIANCE
' lot 49CF OL fut# MAL OvitLCAD PttMAfukt 1.500t.07 0.000t+00 Raft 2.000t+00 3.00E 07 0.00t+00
., OPlu
'BCh420AF Cu atLAf C0kTACTS FAlt 70 1.000t.06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t.06 0.00t+00 ftAntFit 98Ch4204F CW atLAY ConfACTS FAIL 70 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t.06 0.00t+00 ftAnsFER 18Ct420CF CN ttLAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000t.06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 06 0.00t+00 ftANSFit 1Actl5vu Cs CitCUlf satAtta OPfu w/0 1.000t 08 0.000t+00 litt 2.000t+00 2.00t.08 0.00t+00 CO*UtM0 iSNV0160 WV FAILUPt 70 OPEN 1.000E 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E.05 0.00t+00 18Q$014U QS fotout SWlfCM Fall TO OptaAf t 2.000t.07 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 4.00E 07 0.00t+00 18Ch42CV CN MOTot sfAnitt $ Punt 0US 3.000E.08 0.000t+00 sitt 2.000E+00 6,00E.08 0.00t+00 OPitATICM
+
llc 0420F C0 atLAY colt FAIL 9tt 1.000t.06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 6.00E.06 0.00t+00 18FW1.4F FU Fust ALL e tt 1.500t.07 0.000t+00 Ittt 2.000t+00 3.00E.07 0.00t+00 180LCh49U Cu etLAY CONTACT 0ts sputIOUS 2.000E.08 0.000E+00 Itte 2.000t+00 4.00E.08 0 00t+00 OPtRAfl04 O 1BL5018F L5 LIMIT SWITCM ALL Moots 7.220E.06 0.000t+00 Itti 2.000t+00 1.446 05 0.00t+00 18CmK13017 CM RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E.06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t.06 0.00t+00 ftAnsFtt 18C0K1301F CD atLAY COIL FAILUtt 3.000E.06 0.000t+00 2815 2,000t+00 6.00t.06 0.00E+00 1BChPY4087 CM RELAY CCMTACTS Fall TO 1.000E*06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00t.06 0.00E+00 ItansFER 18CPY408AF CQ ttLAY C0!L FAILust 3.000E.06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 6.00E.06 0.00E+00 18LP118F PS LOOP PMt $UPPLY ALL ett 5.800E.06 0.000E+00 TOPS 2.000t+00 1.1M 05 0.00E+00 ISLP408F PS LOOP PMR SLFPLY ALL ets 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 2.000E +00 1.1M.05 0.00E+00 18754087 CM COMPAAATot it!P SWITCM 5.800E.07 0.000E+00 Itte 2.000t+00 1.1M .06 0.00E+00 18tP408F iP P TRANSMITTER ALL M00tl 1.730E 06 0.000E+00 Ittt 2.000E+00 3.46E.06 0.00E+00 18P4408A3F CM COWAAATCR ALL ets 2.900E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 2.000E+00 5.80E 06 0.00E+00 IST5408A87 CM COMPAAATOR TRIP SWITCM 5.800E.07 0.000t+00 Ittt 2.000t+00 1.1M.06 0.00E*00 llMVC80E DE OPitATCt FAILS TO CL0tt C8 1.600E.03 0.000E+00 nt 0.000E+00 1.60E.03 0.00E+00 2AMV0E0Ptu OE FAILt4E TO OPfN (CLC$t) RMts 1.350E 02 0.000E+00 ME 0.000k+00 1.35t.02 0.00E+00 SUCT!ON VALVES 2Ast018F SR ROTAAT SWITCM ALL e tt 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 Ittt 2.000E+00 1.622-06 0.00E+00 2 Acus 207 CM ttLAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E.06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E.06 0.00E+00 TRANSFit 2AL3118F LS LIMIT SWITCM ALL M00t3 7.220E-06 0.000E+00 IEEE 2.000t+00 1.44E 05 0.00E+00 2ALS1287 L5 LIMIT SWlfCM ALL e ts 7.220E-06 0.000E+00 litt 2. 000E +0.0 1.44t-05 0.00E+00 10980:1D/053191 8-9
TABLE B-2 (Cont'd) V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES F1-10thf COMP FAILV#E e t FAIL Raft vat
........................................................................]ANCE,.$3 JECT ?!NE PtfSA4illff ~ vat lAntt 2AL50'lp ts LIMlf IbifCn ALL =0 cts 7,220006 0.000t+00 !!!! 2.000t +00 1.44t 05 0.0Ct+00 2AC5C$tF 58 .a0TARY swifCN ALL macts 8.100E 07 0.000t+00 !!!E 2.000t+00 1.62t 06 0.00t+00
'2AC81160 C8 ClaCulf BetAKER OPtW W/0 - 1,000E 08 C3etAmo 0.000E+00 Itti 2.000t+00 2.00E 08 0.00t+00 2ACf6812F- CT Cutttui TRA45FORMtt ALL NG?ts 3.500t+07 0.000E+00 litt 2.000E+00 7.00t.07 0.00t+00 2AOL49AF OL TutRmAL OvttLCAD PatmAfuat 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 RAff 2.000t+00 3.00t 07 0.00t+00 CPit 2ACL49st OL THERMAL OvtaLCAO PREMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 Raft 2.000t+00 3.00E 07 0.00t+00 OPEN' 2AOL49CF OL - THtemAL OvteLOA0 PalmATyat 1.5006 07 0.000E+00 LATE 2.000t+00 3.000 07 0.00t+00 OPtu 2ACh420AF CN atLAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E 06 0.00t+00
'tAutFtt ZAch42087 CN AfLAY ConfACT5 FAIL 10 1.0000 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00006 0.00t+00 ftAhSFER 2Ach420CF Cu etLAY ConfACTS FAIL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E M 0.00t+00 TRAusFER
+
2AC816mu CS CIRCulf 84EAKER OPtu W/0 1.000E 00 0.000E*00-IEEE 2.000E+00 2.00008 0.00t+00 coletAue 2Anv02AD mv ;PAILuet To OPEu 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2015 2.000E+00 2.00E 05 0.00t+00 2A0$02AU 05 TC#0VE sWITCN FAIL TO OP(Raft- 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 4.00E 07 0.00t+00 2ACW42CU Cu Mof0A STARTER $PURIOUS 3.000E 00 0.000E+00 IttE 2.000E+00 6.000 04 0.00E+00 OPERAfl0N 2AC04207- CD' RELAY Coll FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 6.00E 06 0.00E+00 2AFU1.4F1 fu FUSS ALL MODES 1.500E*07 0.000E+00 IEEE 2.000E+00 3.00E 07 0.00E+00 2AOLCW49U- CN RELAY CouTACTORE Spuntalt 2.000E*08 0.000E+00 IEEE 2.000E+00 4.00E 08 0.00t+00 OPERAf!Qu 2AL502AF LS ' LIMIT SWITCN ALL MODES 7.220E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE. 2.000E+00 1.440 05 0.00E+00-2AcmK1301F Cu RELAY CQuTACTS FAIL 70 1.000E 06 0.000E+40 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E 06 0.00E+00 _fRANSFEE 2.AC0K1301 F ' C0 RELAY C0!L FAILURE 3.000E*06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 6.00E 06 0.00t+00 1 2Achpf418F CN RELAY CoufACTS FAIL 1.000E 06 0.000E+00'2815 2.000E+00 2.00t.04 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2ACPY418AF CD ~ RELAY C0ll FAILURE 3.000E 06----0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 6.00E.06 0.00E+00 2ALPY118F- PS -LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL MODES :5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 2.000E+00 1.1H 05 0.00t+00 i. l 2 ALP 4187 PS LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL MODES 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 2.000E+00 1.1M 05 0.00E+00' lI 2Afs418F Cm CasPAAAf0m TRIP sWITCM 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 !Ett 2.000E+00 1.1M 06 0.00E+00 2ATP4187~ TP P TRAmsMITite ALL MODES 1.730E 06 0.000E+00 Ittt 2.000E+00 3.46E*06 0.00E*00-
- 2APS418A5F CM COMPAAAf0R ALL MODis 2.900E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 2.000E+00 5.80E 06 0.00t+00 2Afs418AsF CM COMPAAAfoe Talp sWITCM 5.000E 07 0.000E+00 - IEEE 2.000E+00 1.1M 06 0.00t+00' B-10 1098D:10/053191
> TABLE B-2 (Cont'd)
Y, V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES Ff IDEuf C3ep FAILURE =00t FAIL Raft VARIAhCE lauRCt fine PRosA
....................................................................................................... 41LITY ..................
vaalAuCE 2ANvC80E DE OPERATOR FAILS 70 CL05t CB 1,600E-03 0.000E,00 0.000t+00 NE 1.60t*03 0.008 @ 2tavoEOPt s CE FalLURE TO OPlu (CL0$t) Rats 1.350E 02 0.000E+00 ht 0.000t+00 1.35t 02 0.00t+00 SUCT10N vALVI$ 285R02tr se ROTARY swlTCn ALL moott 8.100E 07 0.000t+00 !EEE 2.000t+00 1.62t 06 0.00E+00
) 2BCW4207 CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2,00E 06 0.00t+00 TRfh5 FIR 2BLS11BF LS LIMIT SWlfCN ALL =00tl 7.220E+06 0.000t*00 lEtt 2.000E+00 1.448 05 -0.00t+00 -
2BLS12BF LS LIMIT Sw!TCM ALL 40CE$ 7.220E 06 0.000t+00 Ittt 2.000t+00 1.44E 05 0.00t+00 2OL5048F L$ LINif swifCN ALL N00t$ 7.220E 06 0.000E*00 Itti 2.000t+00 1.44E 05 0.00t+00 2SCSCSRF SR ROTARY SWITCN ALL N00ts 8.1006 07 0.000t+00 Itti 2.000t+00 1.62E 06 0.00E+00 2BC8131U C8 CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN W/0 1.000E 08 0.000t+00 Itti 2.000t+00 2.00E 08 0.00E+00 cmR4Aho 20CT4812F CT CURRENT TRAalFORMER ALL MODES 3.500t 07 0.000E+00 Itt! 2.000E+00 7.00E 07 0.00E+00' 290L49AF.. OL THERMAL OVERL0A0 PREMATURE 1.5006 07 0.000t+00 Raft 2.000t+00 3.00E 07 0.00t+00 OPEN b 2004490F OL THERMAL OVERL0A0 PREMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000t+00 RATE- 2.000E+00 3.00E 07 0'00E+00 CPEN 280L49CF OL THERMAL CVERt0AD PREMAfDRE 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 LAft 2.000t+00 3.00E 07 0.00t+00 OPEN
-2tCm420AF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000t 06 0.000E+00 2015 2.000t+00 2.00E 06 0.00t+00 TRANSFER 20Ch420eF CN _ RELAY CONTACTS Fall 70 _1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E 06 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 20CW420CF CN - RELAY CONTACTS FAIL'TO 1,000E.06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 06 0.00t+00 TRANSFER 28CB132U C3 CIRCulf SAEAKER OPEN W/0 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 IEEE 2.000E+00 2.00E 08 0.00E+00 CastAs 2Suv0200 ' NV FAILURE TO OPEN 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E 05 0.00E+%
.L b 20030290 Os Toteut SWITCM FAIL 70 OPERATE 2.000E 07 0.000E*00 2015 2.000E+00 4.00E 07 0.00E+00
-2tCW42CU CN N0 TOR STAATER SPURIOUS 3.000E 00 0.000E+00 IEtt 2.000E+00 6.00t 08 0.00E+00 OPERATION 2BC0420F CD RELAY Coll FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 6.00t 06 0.00E+00 20FU1.4F Fu Fuse ALL NODES 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 2.000E+00 3.00E 07 0.00E+00 280LCN49U CN RELAY CONTACTOR$ SpuRImit 2.000E 06 0.000E+00 lEEE 2.000E+00 4.00E 04 0.00E+00 OPERAf!ON 2tL102SF LS LIMIT SWITCW ALL maces 7.220E 06 0.000E+00 IttE 2.000t+00- 1.44t 05 --0.00t+00
-28thK7347 CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL 70 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2,000E+00 2.00E 06 0.00t+00 TRANSFER --
28C0K734F = CD RELAY C0!L FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000E+00 6.00E 06 0.00E+00 20CNK254F CM RELAY CONTACTS FAIL 70 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 2.00E 06 0.00t+00 TRANSFER 10980:10/053191- B-11
_ . - - - - - - - - . _--._--- ~ O TABLE B-2 (Cont'd) V V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES FT IctN1 COMP F AILust Ma>t FAIL RAf vnRIAnts sounct flME
.................................................................t Pt08A81LITY VARIAMCI 5
isC0K2547 CD atLAY C0!L FAILURE 3.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 6 00E*06 0.00t+00 20LP4287 PS LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL MODES 5.800t 06 0.000t+00 TOPS 2.000t+00 1.164 05 0.00t+00 2sts428F CM CmeAAAf04 TRIP sWlfCN 5.800t 07 0.000t+00 litt 2.000t+00 1.16t 06 0.00t+00 21P4287 TP P TRANsMiffit ALL Macts 1.730E 06 0.000t+00 litt 2.000E+00 3.46t 06 0.00t+00 ( ttP8428Alf CM CmPAllAfot ALL MODES 2.900t 06 0.000t+00 TOPS 2.000t+00 5.80E 06 0.00t+00 2B1$428A87 CM COMPAAATOR TRIP SWifCN 5.800t 07 0.000t+00 Itti 2.000t+00 1.16t 06 0.00t+00 28MVCE0t CE OPERAfot FAILS 10 Clost C8 1.600E 03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000E+00 1.60t 03 0.00t+00 MV716A0tK Of CPERATOR FAILS TO Clost VALVE 1.200E 03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.20E 03 0.000 00 Mv716AK MV FAILUnt 70 CLost 1.000E 05 0.000L+00 2815 2.000E*00 2.00t 05 0.00t+00 NV71680tt OE OPERATOR FAILS TO Clost VALVE 1.2005 03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.20E 03 0.00t+00 MV7168E MV FA! Lust 10 Clost 1.000E 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 05 0.00t+00 4AC80tf OC OPtRAf04 FAILS 10 ftMOVE POWER 1.600E 03 0.000D00 NE 0.000t+00 1.60E 03 0.00t+00 f tm CS 48C50tF Of OPERATOR FAILS TO REMovt POWER 1.600t 03 0.000t+00 WE 0.000E+00 1.60t 03 0400t+00 FROM CS
\
PMAs PN FAILust 70 sfART 1.000E 05 0.000e*00 2815 1.080t+03 1.08t 02 0.00t+00 PMAR PM FAIL TO RUN,GIVtN START 1.000t*04 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 04 0.00t+00 PMSS PM FAILuaE f0 tiAni 1.000t 05 0.000t+00 2815 1.080E+03 1.081 02 0.00t+00 PMSR PN Fall TO RUN.GIVEN START 1.000E 04 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 04 0.00t+00 AV06060t0- DE OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN ADV 1.200t.03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.20E 03 0.00E+00 Avf- A0 FAILust 70 OPERATE 1.000t 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00t 05 0.00t+00 Avo6070tD DE OPERATOR FA!LS TO OPEN ADV 1.200t 03' O.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.20EA03 0.00t+00 Avo6070 AO - FAILuet 70 OPitAtt 1.000E 05 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 05 0.00E+00 Mv0610V My FAILURE TO REMIN OP(M 2,000t.07 0.000E+00 2815 2.000t+00 4.00E 07 0.00t+00 'O L MV0611V MV FAILURE TO REMAIN OPfu 2.0004 07 0.000t+00 2815 2.000!+00 4.00E 07 0.00t+00 AV06180tD DE- OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN A0V 1.200E 03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.20E 03 0.00t+00 Av06180 A0 - FAlLURE TO OPERATE - 1.0006 05- 0.000t+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 05 0.00E+00 AV06190tD DE OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN A0V 1.200E 03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.20E 03 0.00t+00 AVQ6190 A0 FAILURE TO OPERAft 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 2.000t+00 2.00E 05 0.00E+00 s 10980:10/053191 B-12
1 ( TABLE B-2 (Cont'd)
\
V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES sf IDtut CCMP FAILUnt Muo
.... 8< Raft smett f!4
..............................t..................................VAh!Auct................................ PR0 6A81Liff VAalA>CE O FC06 TEA DE 0E - OPitA704 FAILS To switCM VALyt TO Auf0 1.2006 03 0.000t+00 NE 0.000t+00 1.20t 03 0.00E+00 fC061940t OE OpttATOR F AILS 70 SWif CN VALVE 70 AUTO 1.200(.03 0.000E+00 NI 0.000E+00 1.208 03 0.00E+00 CV0090 CV FAILutt 70 OPtn 2.000t 07 0.000E+00 2815 2.000E+00 b cv0100 - CV 'fAltunt 70 DPtu 4.00t 07 0.00t+00
\ 2.000t 07 0.000E+00 2815 2.000t+00 4.00t 07 0.06t+00 RNR$ $Notf Titm C00LluG CV0830 CV FAILust 70 OPfu 2.0005 07 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 1.Aet 05 CV147D 0.00t+00 CV fAltunt 70 OPEN 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 1.44t 05 0.00t+00 mv8809Av av fAttutt 70 PtmAlu optu 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E*01 Peu 1.44t.05 0.00t+00 pas FAIL 70 aUu,Glvtu s1Atf 1.000t 04 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 7.20t 03
- 0.00E*00 1Acm42CAV Cu mof08 STAtttt $Puntous 3.000t 08 OPtAAflou 0.000E+00 litt 7.200E+01 2.1M.06 0.00E+00 1ACu42C8V Cu nOfon stAttft spua!0ut 3.000E.08 0.000E+00 !!!! 7.200E+01 OPitATIDW 2.1M 06 0.00t+00 s
)1Acue2CCV Cu - M070s $7Atitt SPVal0U$ 3.000E.04 OPERATION 0.000E+00 Itt! 7.200t+01 2.16E 06 0.00E+00 1ACSC5tF SR ROTARY SWifCM ALL MODES 8.1005 07 0.000E+00 Itt! 7.200t+01 5.83E 05 0.00E+00 1Acu42CV Cu ntLAT CoufAcices sput!OUS 2.000E 08 0.000E*00 IttE 7.200E+01 CPERAftou 1.44E 06 0.00E+00 1Acut155V Cu aELAY CoufACTORS $PURIOut 2.000E 08 OPERAflou 0.000E+00 litt 7.200E+01 1.444 06 0.00t+00
-1AC0K1557 to aELAf C0!L FAILLGE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815- 7.200E+01 2.1M 04 0.00E+00 1Acut735V Cu RELAf COITACTORS SPURICUS 2.000E 08 OPERAfton - 0.000E+00 11EE 7.200E+01 1.44t 06 0.00E+00 1AC0E7357
( ( 1ATP4387 CD - RELAY COIL FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2415 7.200E+01 2.1M 04 0.00E+00 TP N P TRAmtulffta ALL ussts 1.730E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 1.25t 04 0.00E+00 1AT5438F CM CG FAAAfot falP SWITCM 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IttE 7.200E+01 4.18E 05 0.00E+00 1 ALP 438F PS LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL M00ft 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 7.200E+01 4.18E 04 0.00E+00 1AAD438A87 CM ColeAAATOR ALL MimEl 2.900E 06 0.000E*00 fops -[\ 7.200E+01 2.09E 04 0.00E+00 CM (v;1Afs438A87 ConPARATOR TRIP switCN 5.800E-07 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 4.18E 05 0.00E+00 18Cu42CAV Cu M0 fan sfAATER SPURIGJs 3.000E.08 0.000E+00 litt 7.200E+01 2.1 M 06 OPERAftou 0.00t+00 intu42C3v Cu M0f0R STARTER SPURIOUS 3.000E.08 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 2.16E 06-OPERAftou 0.00E+00
'Scus CCV Cu MOTOR STARTER SPUR 10Us 3.000t.08 0.000E+00 Itti 7.200E+01 2.16E 06 0.00E+00 OPERAf!Ou ISCSC$tF 3R ROTARY SWifCN ALL N00ts 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 ffEE 7.200E+01 5.83E.05 0.00E+00 1098D:10/053191 843
TABLE B-2 (Cont'd) AJ.- V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES Fi 10 tut COMP FAlluti MtEt Fall RATE taject fint Peosas!Liti yAalAmCt
........................*............................................VAtlANCE .....................................................
CN ttLAf CONTACicas SPUnl0VS 2.000t.08 0.000E+00 Itts 7.200t+01 1.44t 06 O'ltn42CV CPERAi!Oh 0.00(+00 18Cn4088v CN ttLAT ConfACf043 SPut!NS 2.000t.08 0.000t+00 Itti 7.200t+01 1.444 06 CPitaflom 0.00t+00 18C04088F C0 ttLAY Coll FAILUtt 3.000t.06 0.000t+00 2815 7.200t+01 2.1M 04 0.00t*00 inckt1302V CM ttLAY Cou1AC10ml $PuRIN5 CPERAfl0N 2.0004 08 0.000t+00 litt 7.200t+01 1.44t 06 0.00t+00 18C0K1302F- C0 RELAT C0ll FAILUwE 3.000E.06 0.000t+00 2815 7.200t+01 2.168 04 0.00t+00 1877408F fr > TRAh5Mifftt ALL MODES 1. 730t .06 0.000t+00 IEEE 7.200t+01 1.25t.04 0.00t+00 18tt408F CM - COMPARATOR falP SWifCN 5.800t.07 0.000E+00 Itt! 7.200t+0i 4.18t.05 0.00t+00 18LP408F PS LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL N0Det 5.800t.06 0.000t+00 TOPS 7.200t+01 4.18t.04 0.00(+00 18A0408A8F CM COMPARATOR ALL MODis 2.900t.06 0.000E+00 TOPS 7.200E+01 2.09E.04 0.00t+00 . 1875408A87 CM COMPARAtr11 ft!P SWITCM 5.800E.07 0.000t+00 lEtt 7.200E+01 4.18E.05 0.00t+00
' CV0k0 CV FAILuet TO OPlu 2,000E.07 1,448 05 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 0.00E+00 CV164D CV FAltunt to OPEN 2.000E.07 0.000t+00 2015 7.200t+01 1.44t.05 0.00t+00 Cv0850 - CV FAILust to Optu- 2.000E.07 0.000E*00 2815 7.200E+01 1.448 05 0.00E+00 CV1490 CV FAILUGE TO OPEN 2.000E.07 0,000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 1,44t.05 0.00E+00 KV88098V WV FAILUBE 70 REMalN OPtu 2,000E.07 0.000E+00 2015 7.200E+01 1.444 05 0.00E+00 PuSI PM Fall 70 RUu,Givtu START . 1.000E % 0.000t+00 2815 7.200E+01 7.20t.03 0.00t+00
'2ACm42CAV CN MOTOR STA4ftR Spuel0US 3.000E.08 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 2.16E.06 0.00t+00 OPERAflom 2Acue2CIV- Cu Mofon STAafft SPue10Us 3.000E.04 0.000E+00 IEEE
- OptaAflou 7.200E+01 2.16t.06 0.00E+00
'2Acu42CCV Cu- se: Tom STARTER SPURIOUS 3.000E.00 0,000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 2.16t.06 0.00t+00 OPERAflou 2
2ACSCser sa ROTARY SWITCM ALL MODES 8.100E-07 0.000E+00 lEtt 7.200E+01 5.83E 05 0.00t+00
., 2Ach42CV CN - RELAY CouTACTORS SPURIOUS 2.000E 08 0.000E+00 -IEEE 7.200E+01 1.444 06 0.00E+00 --(/ OPERAflou 2ACN4188V- CN RELAY CouTACTORs SPUA!Ous 2.000E-04 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 1.44t 06 ~0.00t+00 OPERATION' 2AC041887. Co -nELAY CO!L' FAILURE 3 b l.06 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 2.164 04 0.00E+00 b 2Acur1302V CM atLAY couTACTORS SPuelous 2.000E 04 0.000E+00 IEEE -7.200E+01 1.44t.06 0.00E+00 . OPERAflou 2AC0K1302F - CO ttLAY C0!L FAILust 3.000E.06 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 2.16E.04 0.00E+00 2ATP418F TP P TRANSNITTER ALL MCOES 1.730E.06 0.000E+00 'IEEE 7.200E+01 1.255 04 0.00E+00 2AT5418F CM COMPAAATOR TRIP $WITCM 5.800E.07 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 4.18E.05 0.00E+00 j lP418F PS Loop POWER SUPPLY ALL MODES 5.800E.06 0.000E+00 TOPS- 7.200E+01 4.18E.04 0.00t+00 2AAD418A8F CM COMPAAATOR ALL MODES 2.900E.06 0.000t+00 TOPS 7.200E+01 2.09E.04 0.00t+00 10980:10/053191 B-14
.(vp)
TABLE B-2 (Cont'd) V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES C: ssp FAILutt M@ t p pf
...IDEnt.................... ............................
FAIL aAft vat!AkCE SOURCE flME Pto
................................................t..tILITY VAtlAmCE 2ATS418ABF CM C09s>AAAf04 TRIP SWlfCN 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 4.18E-05 0.00E+00 2tCus2CAV CN M0f04 STAlfER $PURIOut 3,000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 2.16C 06 0.00E+00 OPERAfl04 CN mof0e $fAATER $PURICRJs 3.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 2.16E*06 0.00E+00
[' ] 2BCh42CIV OPERAf!0N 20Ch42CCV Ch MOTOR stAnfER $Put!Ous 3.000E-08 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E +01 2.16E 06 0.00E+00 OPERAfl04 28CSCSRF $4 ROfARY $W!TCN ALL MODES 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 5.83E 05 0.00E+00 2BCN42CV CN RELAY ConfACTORS SPURIOUS 2.000E-08 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 1.44E 06 0.00E+00 OPERATION 28C=t255V CN RELAY CONTACTOR$ SPURIOJS 2.000t 08 0.000E+00 lEEE 7.200E+01 1.44E 06 0.0CE+00 OPERATION 28C0K2557 CD aELAY COIL FAILuat 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 ~.200E+01 2.16E 04 0.00E+00 26Ckt735V CN RELAf ContACfons sput!Out 2.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 1.44E.06 0.00E+0'0 OPERAfl0N 2BC0K735F CD aELAY C0!L FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E 40 2815 7.200E+01 2.16E 04 0.00E+00 28tP428F fp p ftANSMlffER ALL MODES 1.730E
- 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 1.25E 04 0:00E+00 2875428F CM COMPARAfot itIP SWITCH 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E +01 4,18E 05 0.00E+00 2tLP425F PS LOOP POWR SUPPLY ALL MODES 5.800E 06 0.000E*00 TOPS 7.200E+01 4.18E 04 0.00E+00 28AD428A8F CM COMPARATOR ALL M00ES 2.900E 06 0.000E+00 T&t 7.200E+01 2.09E 04 0.00E+00 2BfS428A47 CM C:MPARATOR TRIP SWITCM 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 7.200E+01 4.18E 05 0.00E+00 cvo860 CV FAILURE TO OPEN 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 1.44E-05 0.00E+00 cv1500 cv FAILURE TO < PEN 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 7.200E+01 1.44E 05 0.00E+00 RNAS LONG TERM C00 Limb G
f jMv8809AV My Fa nuRE 70 REMAIN OPEN 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 1.008E+03 2.02E 04 0.00E+00 l LJ PMAX PM FAIL 70 tun,GIWN STAAT 1.wa0E.04 0.000E+00 2815 1.008E+03 1.01E 01 0.00E+00 1 Atk42CAV CN MOTOR STAATER SPURIOut 3.000E 08 0.000E+00 lEEE 1.008E+03 3.02E 05 0.00E+00 CPERAfl0N m 13.Cm42C8V CN MOTOR STAATER 58URICUS 3.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.008E+03 3.02E 05 0.00E+00 l j CPERATION V 1ACN42CCy CN MOTOR STARTER SPURIOJS 3.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.008E+03 3.02E 05 0.00E+00 CSERAfl0N , 11.CSC.aF - sa ROTARY SWITCN ALL Mm ES 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.008E+03 8.16E 04 0.00E+00 l l CN RELAY CONTACTORS SPVRIOut 2.000E 08 0.000E+N IEEE 1.008E+03 2.02E 05 0.00E+00 l [ n 1ACM42CV
\
OPERATION l \ 1ACNK155v CN RELAY CohTACTOR$ SPURIOUS 2.000E.08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.008t+03 2.02E 05 0.00E+00 l OPERAfl0N 1AC0(1$5F CD RELAY COIL FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.008E+03 3.02E 03 0.00E+00 8 5 10980:10/053191 1
g TABLE B-2 (ContIO
\
V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES st 10 tut CDP FAILust Mo0E - Fall RATE vat
........................................................................lanct,50ueCE T14 PeasAgtLITY vatlAmCE 1ACu T35v CW ttLAY CohtAcitas $PURIOUS U OptRAfton 2.0006 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.0084+03 2.02t 05 0.00t+00 1AtotT35F CD ttLAT Colt FAILutt 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.008t+03 3.02E 03 0.00t+00 1ATP4387 TP P TR AN$Mlf f!R ALL M00t$ 1.730E M 0.000t+00 IEEE 1.008E+03 1.74t 03 0.00t+00 1Af$438F CM COMPARATOR TRIP 5WitCN 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.008t+03 5.85t 04 0.00t+00 1 ALP 438F PS LOOP POWtt $UPPLY ALL Mcrt$ 5.800t.06 0.000t+00 TOPS 1.008E+03 5.85t 03 0.00t+00 1AAD43&AIF CM CCMPARAfon ALL NColl 2.900t 06 0.000t+00 TOPS 1.00aE+03 2.928 03 0.00t+00 1Af543&Alf CM CCMPARAfoe it!P switCN 5,800E 07 0.000E+00 IttE 1.008E+03 5.85f 04 0.00t+00 1BCh42CAv CN M0f04 STAtfER $ Putt 0US 3.000E 08 0.000E @ Itti 1.008t+03 3.02t 05 0.00t+00 DettAtton 18th42C8v C4 MOTOR STARTER SPVRIOUs 3.000E 08 0.000t+00 IEEE 1.008E+03 3.02E 05 0.00t+04 CPEAAftou
+
itC#42CCV CN mof0R STAtf[R $ Putt 3JS 3.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEtt 1.00aE+03 3.022 05 0.00E+00 OPttAflou
'1BC3Csar sa ROTART SWlfCN ALL M00E5 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 lEtt 1.00aE+03 8.1M-04 0.00t+00 O 1BCh42CV CN ttLAT CONTACTORS SPUEIGJs 2.000E 08 0.000E+00 ftEE 1.000E*03 2.02t 05 0!00E+00 i OPEAAfl0M 18Cw404eV CN ttLAf C0nfAC70as s>Uttous 2.000E.04 0.000E*00 lEEE 1.000E+03 2.02E 05 0.00E+00 OPERAfl04 itC04088F CO RELAY CCIL PAILust 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.00aE+03 3.02t 03 0.00t+00 itchr1302V CN RELAY ContACfoes SPURIOU$ 2.000E.08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.000E +0.1 2.02E 05 0.00E+00 OPtkAfl0N 1BC0K1302F C0 RELAT cell FAILunt 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.008E+03 3.02E 03 0.00E+00 1BfP408F TP P ftAmsMITTER ALL m s 1.730E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.00aE+03 1.74E 03 0.00E +00
'18784047 CM COMPARATOR TRIP SWITCN 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEtt 1.008t+03 5.85E 04 0.00E+00 1"AP4087 Ps LOOP P0t4R suPPtf ALL A t 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.00aE+03 5.85E 03 0.00t+00 B40408A87 CM COWAAATOR ALL MODES 2.900E*06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.000E+03 2.921 03 0.00E+00 Y18T5408AOF CM COMPAAATOR TRIP SWITCN 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.008E+03 5.85t 04 0.00E+00 CVC850 CV FAILURE TO OPim 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 2.02E 04 1.000E+03 0.00t+00 CV1490 ~ CV FAILURE 70 OPEu 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 1.008E+03 2.021 04 0.00E+00
, (8809eV NY FAILURE TO REMAIM OPEN 2.00CC 07 0.000E+00 2815 1.008E+03 2.021 04 0.00E+00
\. /
- " Cv0100 CV FAILURE TO OPfu 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 1.00aE+03 - 2.021 04 0.00E+00 PMSX PM FAIL T0 RUN,ofVEN 3YAni 1.000E 04 0.000E*00 2815 1.00aE+03 1.01t 01 0.00E+00 PutA PM FAILURE 70 START 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 1.040E+03 1.0aE 02 0.00E+00 INT MA PUMP MAINitNANCI 1.570E 03 0.000E+00 MAlu 0.000E+00 1.573 03 0.00E*00 i
UNAVAILA81LITT Pusitti ft PUMP TEST UNAVAILA41Liff 9.260E 04 0.000E+00 TEST 0.000!+00 9.2M 04 0.00E+00 i B-16 10980:10/053191
TABLE B-2 (Cont'd) V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES sf lotet COMP FAILUtt m00t FAIL LAff VARIANCE 80URCE T14 P90BA4tliff VAtlAmC3 O g DCh42CAV DCh42C5v Cu M0 foe stAttti $ Putt u CN Oct#Afica mCf04 $tatitt $Put!CUS 3.000t 08 3.000t 0F 0.000t+00 litt 0.000t+00 litt
- 1. 00M *03 1.008t+03 3.02f 05 3.028 05 0.00t*00 0.00t+00 QPitAfl0N 2ACh42CCV Cu MOTOR Statttt $Putl M 3.000E 08 0.000t*00 litt 1.008t+03 3.02t 05 0.00t+00 opitAfton 2AC$C$tF 54 4014Rf $WITCM ALL P'. Cit 8.100E 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.008t+03 8.16t.04 0.00t+00 2Acn42CV Cu RELAY Couf,C700', $PVRIOUS 2.0006 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.008t+03 2.021 05 0.00t+00 OPitAfl0N 2Ach4188V Cu RELAY CONT 4 foes sputi M 2.000t 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.00M+03 2.021 05 0.00t+00 OPitAfl0F ZAC04188F CD ttLAT '.0ll Fallust 3.000t M 0.000E+00 2815 1.00at+03 3.02t 03 0.00t+00 2AckK1302V Cu REL/F Contact 0el SPunt M 2.000t.08 0.000t+00 litt 1.004t+03 2.021 05 0.00t+00 CPFRAflou 2AC0K1302F CD 'tLAT C0ll F Altutt 3.00ct.06 0.000t+00 2815 1.00at+03 3.02t 03 0.00E+08 2Afp418F TP P faAnsulfftt ALL MCtts 1.7305-06 0.000t+00 litt 1.008t+03 1.74t 03 0.00t+00 2Af5418F- CM COMPARA70R falP 5WITCM 5.8006 07 0.000E+00 litt 1.008t*03 5.85t 04 0*00E+00 2 ALP 418F PS LOOP Pown SUPPLY ALL M00ts 5.8004 06 0.000t+00 TOPS 1.00et+03 5.85t 03 0.00t+00
\ 2AA041&A8F CM COMPARATOR ALL e tt 2.9006 06 0.000t+00 TOPS 1.00st+03 2.921 03 0.00t+00 2AfS418ASF CM COMPA4Af0A YtlP $WlfCN 5.800E 07 0.000t+00 Itti 1.008t+03 5.85t 04 0.00t+00 20CN42CAV Cu MOTOR STAtitt $Put! M 3.0006 08 0.000t+00 Itti 1.004t+03 3.028 05 0.00t+00 OPERAftou 28 Cue 2CIV Cu MOTOs stattle spuelout 3.000t 08 0.000t+00 lett 1.00at+03 3.021 05 ? .o D00 OPetAflou 29th42CCV Cu MOTOR sf AAftt Spuntaut 3.000t.08 0.000E+00 litt 1.00at+03 3.021 05 o.00t+00 OPERAftom s 2tCSCsar sa totaat sWITCN ALL e tt 8.1006 07 0.000t+00 litt 1.00nt+03 8.1M 04 0.00E+00 28cm42CV Cu etLAY CouTActons SPual m 2.000E 06 0.000t+00 Itti 1.00at43 2.021 05 0.00t+00 OPitAf!Ou
) 2SChK255V Cu atLAY CCulTACTORS SPVR10Us 2.000t 08 0.000t+00 Itti 1.00M+03 2.02t 05 0.00E+00 V OPitATION 2BC0K255F CD stLAY C0!L FAILust 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.00et+03 3.02t 03 0.00t+00 2sCmK735V- CN ttLAY CONTActons spual m 2.000t 06 0.000t+00 litt 1.008t+03 2.021 05 0.00t+00 OPEAAf!ON
'28C0K735F CO RELAY _C0!L FAILURE. 3.000E 06' O.000t+00 2815 1.008t+03 - 3.02E 03 0.00t+00 L \ 25fp428F TP P ftAmsMlffER ALL MODES 1.730E 06 0.000E+00 Itti 1.004t+03 1.74t.03 0.00t+00 2tf5428F CM CCMPAAATOR TRIP SWifCN 5.80C2 07 0.000E+00 litt 1.004t+03 5.85t 04 0.00t+00 2tLP428F PS LOOP POWER SUPPtf ALL MODES 5.800t*06 0.000E+00 -TOPS 1.008t+03 5.85t 03 0.00E+00
' 28A0428A8F CM COMPARATOR ALL MrEES 2.900E 06 0.000t+00 70Ps 1.008t+03 2.922 03 0.00t+00 20fS428ABF CM CCMPAaATOR falp $WifCn 5.800t.07 0.000t+00 litt 1.008t+03 5.851 04 0.00t+00 - - -
tvo860 CV FAILunt TO OPlu 2.000E+07 0.000E+00 2815 1.008t+03 2.021 04 0.00t+00 l .. 2.000E 07 0.000t+00 2815 1.008t+03 2.021 04 0.00t+00 CV1500 CV ' FAILUne TO OPfu l l 10980:10/053191 B-17 _ -. .=. _
TABLE B-3
;O i
- v. 1 V0GTLE I HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS
/ \.
(") TASK: Close RHRS Heat exchanger A(B) outlet flow control valves HV-0606 (HV-0607).
REFERENCE:
Step 2.b of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS Looldown," in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." (G
.g BREAKDOHN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to close air-operated heat exchanger bypass flow control valve Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Hean HEP = 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor - 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - doerator fails to close valve by selecting wrong control Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-12 Select wrong control on a panel Hean HEP = 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) from an array of similar-q Error Factor - 3 appearing controls identified ys by labels only
- 3. Recovery error - Shift supervisor fails to detect error by others Median HEP - 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker Hean HEP = 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materials Error Factor - 5 i
O i
/~] POE - (1-3.75E-03)(0.00375)(0.16) + 0.00375(0.16) l l
Q =.5.9775E-04 + 6.0E-04
- 1.198E-03
= 1.2E-03 Fault Tree Identifiers: AV06060EK and AV06070EK
(~) O 10980:10/071991 B-18
TABLE B-3-(Cont'd) bl V V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: Place in manual and close RHRS Heat exchanger A(B) bypass flow control valves FV-0618 (FV-0619). O b
REFERENCE:
Step 2.c of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS Cooldown," in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." BREAK 00HN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to close air-operated heat exchanger bypass flow control valves Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Hean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor - 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator fails to place valve in manual by selecting wrong control Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-12 Select wrong control on a panel Mean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) from an array of similar-Error Factor - 3 appearing controls identified by labels only
- 3. Commission error - Operator fails to close valve by selecting wrong control Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-12 Select wrong control on a panel Mean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) from an array of similar-Error Factor - 3 appearing controls identified by labels only
- 4. Recovery error - Shift supervisor fails to detect error by others Median HEP - 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker Mean HEP - 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materials Error Factor - 5 POE - 3.75E-03(0.16) + (1-3.75E-03)(3.75E-03)(0.16) + (1-3.75E-03)2 (3.75E-03)(0.16) n - 6.0E-04 + 5.98E-04 + 5.96E-04 V - 1.794E-03
- 1.8E-03 Fault Tree Identifiers: AV06180EK and AV06190EK O
1098D:1D/071991 B-19
TABLE B-3 (Cont'd) V0GTLE HUHAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: Close RHST to RHRS pump A(B), valve HV-8812A (HV-88128). A
REFERENCE:
Step 2.d of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS V Cooldown," in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." BREAKDOWN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to close motor-operated valve from RHST Hedian HEP - 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Hean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor - 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator fails to close valve by selecting wrong control Hedian HEP - 0.003 Table 20-12 Select wrong control on a panel Hean HEP = 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) from an array of similar-Error Factor - 3 appearing controls identified by labels only
- 3. Recovery error - Shift supervisor fails to detect error by others G Hedian HEP - 0.1 Table 20-2: Checking routine tasks, checker
' h Hean HEP - 0.16 Error Factor - 5 (Reference 10) using written materials
/%
POE - (1-3.7M-3)(3.75E-3)(0.16) + 3.75E-3(0.16)
- 5.9775E-04 + 6.0E-04
- 1.198E-03 G - 1.2E-03
'(V Fault Tree Identifiers: MV8812A0EK and MV881280EK t
10980:10/071991 B-20
TABLE B-3 (Cont'd) V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: ~iien RH'.S pump suctions from RCS loops HV-8701A, HV-87018 (HV-8702A, HV-87028).
REFERENCE:
Steps 2.f and 2 9 of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS Cooldown," in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." t!REAtDOHN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to open motor-operated suction valve using rotary switch Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Mean HEP = 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor - 3 provisions are torrectly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator fails to turn control to open valve Median HEP - 0.05 Table 20-12 Turn rotary switch in wrong Hean HEP - 8.1E-02 (Reference 10) direction when design violates Error Factor - 5 a strong populational stereotype and operation conditions are normal by O labels only
- 3. Recovery error - Verifier fails to detect error by others Median HEP - 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker Mean HEP - 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materials Error Factor - 5 O
POE - (1-3.75E-03)(8.1E-02)(0.16) + 0.00375(0.16)
- 1.291E-02 + 6.0E-04 1,351E-02
- 1.35E-02 Fault Tree Identifiers: 1AMV0EOPEN and 1BHV0EOPEN 2BHV0EOPEN and 2AMV0EOPEN O
10980:10/071991 B-21
/ n\ TABLE B-3 (Cont'd) d V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: Unlock and close the supply breakers and the K2 links to HV-8701A m (HV-8702A) and HV-8701B (HV-87028). ! /}
REFERENCE:
Steps 1.b and 1.c of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS Cooldown," in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." BREAKDOWN OF TASK: 6
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to unlock and close power supply breaker ,
and close the K2 links ; Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Mecn HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor - 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator selects wrong circuit breaker Median HEP - 0.005 Table 20-12 Select wrong circuit breaker in Mean HEP - 6.25E-03 (Reference 10) a group of circuit breakers Error Factor - 3 densely grouped and identified 7 by labels only
- 3. Commission error - Operator selects wrong K2 link Median HEP - 0.005 Table 20-12 Select wrong circuit breaker in Mean HEP = 6.25E-03 (Reference 10) a group of circuit breakers Error Factor 3 densely grouped and identified by labels only
- 4. Recovery error - Foreman fails to detect error by others Median HEP = 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker Mean HEP - 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materials Error Factor - 5 p
O POE - (1-3.75E-3)(0.00625)(0.16) + 0.00375(0.16) + (1-3.75E-03) (1-6.25E-03)(6.25E-03)(0.16) n - 9.96E-04 + 6.0E-04 + 9.90E-04
- 2.586E-03 i') - 2.60E-03 Fault Tree Identifiers: IBMVCBOE, 2BMVCBOE 1AMVCBOE, 2AMVCBOE A
l l 10980:1D/071991 B-22 l
l TABLE B-3 (Cont'd) V0GTLE I HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS i TASK: Close RHRS to RCS hot legs cross-connect HV-8716A (HV-8716B). l
REFERENCE:
Steps 2.a of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS ! Cooldown," in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." {
#REAKDOWN OF TASK:
j
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to close motor-operated valve to hot leg l cross-connect Median HEP 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items !
Hean HEP 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff , Error Factor 3 provisions are correctly used !
- 2. Commission error - Operator fails to close valve by selecting wrong control !
Median HEP 0.003 Table 20-12 Select wrong control on a panel Mean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) from an array of similar- l Errer Factor - 3 appearing controls identified by labels only
- 3. Recovery error - Shift supervisor fails to detect error by others Median HEP - 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker Mean HEP 0.16 (Reference 1G) using written materials Error Factor 5 I
O POE - (1-3.75E-3)(3.75E-3)(0.16) + 0.00375(0.16) 5.9775E-04 + 6.0E-04 1.198E 03. 1.2E-03 Fault Tree Identifiers: MV716A0EK and MV716BOEK 4 !O 1098D:10/071991 B-23
TABLE B-3 (Cont'd) O V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: Open and lock the supply breaker and open the K2 links to HV-8804A (HV-88048). O REfrRENCE: Step 3 of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS Cooldown." in procedure 1301), " Residual Heat Removal System." BREAKDOWN OF TASK: , 1. Omission error - Operator fails to open and lock power supply breaker and open K2 links Median HEP 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items i Hean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor 3 provisions are correctly used i 2. Commission error - Operator selects wrong circuit breaker Median HEP - 0.005 Table 20-12 Select wrong circuit breaker in ! Mean HEP - 6.25E-03 (Reference 10) a group of circuit breakers i Error factor - 3 densely grouped and identified l by labels only j 3. Commission error .. Operator selects wrong K2 link i Median HEP - 0.005 Table 20-12 Select wrong circuit breaker in i Mean HEP - 6.25E-03 (Reference 10) a group of circuit breakers Error Factor 3 densely grouped and identified by labels only I 4. Recovery error - Foreman fails to detect error by others l Median HEP - 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker
- Mean HEP - 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materials l Error Factor - 5 O
P 1-3.75E-3)(0.00625)(0.16) + 0.00375(0.16) + (1-3.75E-03) 1 OE -( (1-6.25E-03)(0.16)(6.25E-03)
- - 9,96E-04 + 6.0E-04 + 9.90E-04 l
- 2.586E-03 2.60E F Fault Tree Identifiers: 4ACB0EF, 4BCBOEF O
I V l l 1098D:10/071991 B-24
TABLE B-3 (Cont'd) V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: Open RHR$ HX discharge HV-0606 (HV-0607). Step 6.e of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHR$ in Service for RCS O
REFERENCE:
Cooldown," in procedure 13011, " Residual Heat Removal System." BREAKDOWN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to open air-operated HX discharge valve Heaian HEP = 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Hean HEP 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor - 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator fails to open valve by selecting wrong control Median HEP = 0.005 Table 20-12 Select wrong control on a panel Mean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) from an array of similar-Error Factor 3 appearing controls identified by labels only
- 3. Recovery error - Shift supervisor fails to detect error by others
- 0.1 Checking routine tasks, O Hedian HEP Mean HEP Error Factor 0.16 5
Table 20-22 (Reference 10) checker using written materials O POE - (1-3.75E-3)(3.75E-03)(0.16) + 0.00375(0.16)
- 5.9775E-04 + 6.0E-04
- 1.198E-03
- 1.2E-03 Fault Tree Identifiers: AV06060E0 and AV06070ED O
I 109BD:10/071991 B-25
TABLE B-3 (Cont'd) V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: Open RHRS HX bypass valve FV-0618 (fV-0619). Step 6.a of Section 4.2, " Placing RHRS in Service for RCS O
REFERENCE:
Cooldown," in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." BREAKDOWN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to open air-operated valve to cold legs Mtdian HEP 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items Mean HEP 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor . 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator fails to open valve by selecting wrong control Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-12 Select wrong control on a panel Mean HEP = 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) from an array of similar-Error Factor 3 appearing controls identified by labels only
- 3. Recovery error - Shift supervisor fails to detect error by others Checking routine tasks, checker O Hedian HEP Mean HEP Error Factor 0.1 0.16 5
Table 20-22 (Reference 10) using written materials O POE = (1-3.75E-03)(0.00375)(0.16) + 0.00375(0.16)
- 5.9775E-04 + 6.0E-04
- 1.198E-03
- 1.2E-03 Fault Tree Identifiers: AV06180ED and AV06190ED O
1098D:10/071991 B-26
TABLE B-3 (Cont'd) V0GTLE HUMAN ERROR CALCULATIONS TASK: Place RHRS HX bypass valve FV-0618 (FV-0619) in "AUT0" position. Step 6.c of Section 4.2, " Placing the RHRS in Service for RCS O
REFERENCE:
Cooldown," in procedure 13011. " Residual Heat Removal System." BREAKOOWN OF TASK:
- 1. Omission error - Operator fails to place air-operated HX bypass valve in "AUT0" position.
Median HEP - 0.003 Table 20-7 Long list > 10 items , Mean HEP - 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) When procedures with checkoff Error Factor - 3 provisions are correctly used
- 2. Commission error - Operator fails to place valve in "AUT0" by selecting wrong control Median HEP = 0.003 Table 20-12 Select wrong control on a panel Hean HEP = 3.75E-03 (Reference 10) from an array of similar-Error Factor 3 appearing controls identified by labels only
- 3. Recovery error - Shift supervisor fails to detect error by others l Median HEP - 0.1 Table 20-22 Checking routine tasks, checker l Mean HEP - 0.16 (Reference 10) using written materials Error Factor - 5 l
O POE - (1-3.75E-03)(0.00375)(0.16) + 0.00375(0.16)
- 5.9775E-04 + 6.0E-04
- 1.198E-03
- 1.2E-03 Fault Tre'e Identifiers: FC0618A0E and FC06190E l
O 1098D:10/071991 B-27
- ur w cr y--w.w vy-www w s- -ie, 't --'-8**w"Cw-%w*'s- ' '--
l l l l l TABLE B-4 V0GTLE DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS RHR$ INITIATION O BER Cut $ti PROB. BAllt (VtNT hAME EVENT PRO 8. 10tNilFIER
- 1. 1.351 02 OPERA 10R FAtLS to OPIN 8702s sutt!0N V M YE 1.350 02 2BM vot ot t N
- 2. 1.35t 02 OrtRatoR F AILt to OPIN 8702A SUCfl0N VALyt i.35t 02 2AMvoE0flN
- 3. 1.35t 02 OPERAton FAILS 10 OrtN 87018 $UttloN VALVE 1.35t 02 1BwvotoREN 4 1.35E 02 OPERATOR F AILS TO OPEN 8701 A SUCTION VALVE 1.35t 02 iAMvot0PtN
- 5. 1.0BE 02 1 RAIN 3 RkRS PUMP F AILS 10 START 1.0BC 02 PMBS
- 6. 1.08t 02 TRAIN A RHRs PUMP FAILS 10 START 1.08t 02 PMAs
- 7. 2.60E-03 Fall to REMovt P0wra & K2 ttA05 TO VALVE HV 88048 2.60E 03 4BCBot F
- 8. 2.60E 03 Fall 10 REMovt POWER & K2 LE AD$ 10 VALVE HV 8804A 2.60E 03 4ACBotF 9 2.601 03 DPERATOR FAIL $ TO RACK IN CIRCUlf BREAKER FOR 87028 2.60t 03 2BMVCBOE 10, 2.60t 03 OPERA 10R falls to RACK IN CIRCulf BREAKit FOR 8702A 2.601 03 2AMVCBot 11 2.60E 03 OPERA 10R FAILt TO RACK IN CIRCulf BREAKER FOR 87018 2.60[.03 1BMvC80t
- 12. 2.60E.03 OPERATOR FAILS TO RACK IN CIRCulf BREAt[R FOR 8701A 2.60E-03 1AMVCBOE 13, 1.801 03 RHR$ Nx SYPAlt VALVE FV0619 FAILS to Clost OPERATOR tRROR 1.80t 03 Avo6190EK
- 14. 1.80t 03 RHR$ Hx afpAss VALVE Fv0618 F4 tis 10 CLost OPERA 10A ERROR 1.80E 03 AV06180t K
- 15. 1.20E 03 Nx BYPAS$ FLOW CONTROL FIC0619A NOT PUT IN AUT0; OPERA 10a (RROR 1.20E 03 FC0619A0E
- 16. 1.20t 03 HX SYPAss FLOW CONTROL FIC0618A N01 PUT IN AUT0; OPERATOR tRROR 1.20E 03 Ft0618ADE 17 1.20E 03 RHR5 Mx BYPASS VALVE FV0619 FAILS TO OPEN; OPERATOR ERROR 1.20E 03 AV06190t0
- 18. 1.20E 03 RHR$ Mx syPAss VALVE FV0618 FAlts TO OPIN; OPERATOR ERROR 1.20E 03 Avo6180E0
- 19. 1.20t 03 RHR$ HX OUILET VALVE HV0607 F ALLS TO OPEN OPER ATOR ERRUit 1.20E-03 AV06070C0
- 20. 1.20E 03 RHR$ HX oufLET VALVE Hvo606 FAILS to OPtN OPERATOR ERROR 1.20E-03 AV06060E0
- 21. 1.20E 03 H. LEG Cross 0VER VALVE HV 87168 FAILS to (10tE OPERA 10m (RROR 1.20t 03 MV716Bott
- 22. 1.20E 03 H. LEG CR0tSOVER VALVE HV 8716A FAILS TO CGSE OPf RATOR ERROR 1.20E 03 MV716ActK
- 23. 1.202 03 RHR5 $Uti!ON RW$f VALVE 88128 FAILS M ~ vt #pATOR (RROR 1.20E 03 MVB81280CK
- 24. 1.20E.03 RHRs $UCTION RWst VALVE Bal2A FAILS 10 tL0tt OPERtTOR ERROR 1.20E 03 MVB812ActK
- 25. 1.20E 03 RHRs Mx OuYLtf VALVE Hv0607 FAlt s TO Clost OPERATOR [RROR 1.20E 03 AV06070EK 26, 1.20E 03 RHR$ Mx 0)TLET VALVE HV0606 FAILS TO Clost OPtRATOR ERROR 1.20E 03 Avo6060EK
- 27. 2.00E 04 TRAIN e RHR$ PUMP FAILt TO RUN FOR 2 HOUR 2.00E 04 PMBR
- 28. 2.00E 04 TRAIN A RHR$ PUMP FAILS TO RUN FOR 2 HOUR 2.00t-04 PMAR Rt0VCt0 SUM OF PROBABILITY OF FAILURE a 1.050E 01 3 1098D:10/071991 B-28
TABLE B-5 V0GTLE DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS LOSS OF SHORT TERM COOLING HITH AUT0 CLOSURE INTERLOCK WNBit Cutlti Ptol. &Allt tithf NAMI tyth? Ptog, 10ggttptga 1 7.20t 03 kkal PVMP 6 FAILS TO RUN FOR 72 NOUR$ 7.20t=03 Piast
- 2. 1.201 03 tutt PUMP A F AILS to RUw FOR 72 wount 7.20s.04 PnAs
- 3. 4.184 04 L40P POWtt SUPPLY Pof 428 FAILS 4.181 04 2BLP428F 4 4.18t*04 LOOP Powlt SUPPtt PQY.418 FAILS 6.18t.04 2 ALP 418F
- 5. 4.181 04 LOOP PMt SUPPLY PQY 408 FAIL $ 4.18E.04 1BLP40$F
- 6. 4.18t*04 LOOP POWtt SUPPLY PQY 438 FAILS 4.18t.04 1 ALP 43tf ,
- 7. 2.16t 04 tsps atLAY ET35 C0ll FAILS 2.16t 04 2tcotT35F
- 8. 2.16t 04 $$PS PELAY E255 Call FAILS 2.16t 04 26C0K255F
- 9. 2.16t 04 15PS RELAY E1302 COIL FAILS 2.16t 04 2AC0K1302F
- 10. 2.16t 04 AuxlLIARY ttLAY PY/418e C0ll FAILS 2.16t 04 2AC0418BF 11 2.16t 04 StPS ttLAY K1302 C0ll FAIL 1 2.16t*04 1BC0K1302F
- 12. 2.16t 04 AuxlLIARY ttLAY PY/4088 Colt FAILS 2.16t 04 18C0408st 13, 2.16t 04 strt atLAY ET35 Colt FAILS 2.16E 04 1AC0KT35F 14 2.16t 04 5tPS ttLAY till Coll FAILS 2.161 04 1AC0K155F
- 15. 2.09E 04 00AL CCMPARAf0R Pl*428A/S FAILS 2.09t 04 25AD428Alf
- 16. 2.098 04 DUAL CCMPARATOR PR 418A/S FAILS 2.09t 04 2AAD418ABF
- 17. 2.09E 04 OUAL CCnPARATOR PS 4014/t FAILS 2.0?t 04 18A0408Alf 18, 2.09t 04 DUAL COMPARA104 PS*438A/B FAlts 2.095 04 1AAD43BASF 19 1.25t 04 Pittsutt itANSMiffit PT 428 FAILS 1.25t 04 251P428F
- 20. 1.25t 04 Pittsuet itAkSMifftt PT 418 FAILS 1.258-04 2ATP418F 21 1.25t 04 Patssutt itAksMITTtt PT 408 FAILS 1.25t 04 intP408F
- 22. 1.25t 04 PRES 4Utt TRANSMifftt PT 438 FAlts 1.35t*04 1ATP418F RIDUCED SW 0F PROSABILifY OF FAltutt s 1.961t 02 1098D:10/053191 B-29
TABLE B-6 I,__ s V0GTLE OCNINANT CONTRIBUTORS LOSS OF SHORT TERM COOLING h v HITHOUT AUT0 CLOSURE INTERLOCK O U p tta CVitt! Plot. LAllC IVluf NAME tytut Ft00. 10tuf!Fitt
- 1. 7.29t 03 tHR$ PUMP I P AILS to RUN rot 72 Mout$ 2.20t 03 Puht
- 2. 7.201 03 RMel PUMP A FAILS to kuu FOR 72 Muutt 7.20t 03 FMAX
- 3. l.83t 05 CONftet swlfCN Cl t FAILS NOV 8702s $.83t*0$ 2t&ststr 4 S.83t 0$ CONit0L $wifCN C$ 4 F A!LS MOV 8702A 1.83t 05 ZAC$Cstr
$. $.83t 05 CONF 80L switCM Cs.t FAILS Mov 87018 5.83t 05 itCststr
- 6. $.83t 0$
O Coutt0L sWifCM CS R FAILS MOV 8701A 5.83E 0! sC$C$ti I 7 1.44t 05 M0f08 opt #AttD VALyt Mva8098 SPutlCU$LT CL0$tl 1.44t 05 Mv8009tv
- 8. 1.44t 05 Mcf04 OPitAftD VAlv8 8809A $Putl0U5LY CLostl 1.44E 05 Mv8809Av
- 9. 1.448 06 Locrlu CONTACT 42 C SNotts MOV 87020 1.44t 06 2tCW42CV
- 10. 1.44t+06 LOCKIN CONTACT 42 C IHotis MOV 87014 1.44t 06 2ACN42CV 11 1.44t 06 LOCr!N CONTACT 42 C SM0tf5 MOV 87010 1.44t 06 1BCN42CV
- 12. 1.44E 06 LOCKIN CONTACT 42 C SMonf 5 Nov 8701A 1.44t 06 1ACN42CV l
REDUCED $LM OF PROSA4tLiff 0F FAILVet s 1.4618 02 1 i l V l rh ( ) 1098D:10/053191 B-30
TABLE B-7 h (Q V0GTLE L DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS LOSS OF LONG TERM COOLING ; HITH AUT0 CLOSURE INTERLOCK
\
Wuktle CUitti PROS, BAllC tytt! 4Aset tythf Ptos. 10gwrlFign 1 1.07t 02 RN4 PUMP A FAILS 70 AUN FOR 1008 e l 1.018 01 PuA* t>R$ PUMP 8 FAILS to auW Foe 1008 m l 1.01t 01 P>st
- 2. 1.09t 03 t>t Pump A FAILS 70 RUN F04 1008 MOUnl 1.01t 01 Puts tht$ Pump 8 FAIL $ 70 $1AAT 1.088 02 Pm8A
- 3. $.91t 04 thq PUMP 4 FAILS TO RUN FOR 1008 MOUR$ 1.01t 01 PMAK LOOP POWER SUPPLY P0f 628 FAILS 5.8$t 03 28tP428F
- 4. l.91t 04 , RNR PUMP A FAIL 1 10 RUN FOR 1006 NOUR$ 1.01t 01 PetAs
-LOOP PowtR SUPPLY PQY 418 FAILS 5.85t 03 2 ALP 4187
$. S.91t 04 LOOP POWER $UPPLY P0f 408 FAILS $.85E 03 18LP408F thal PUNP O FAILS TO RUN FOR 1008 M(m>al 1.018 01 Pue; -
- 6. l.91t % LOOP POWER SUPPLY PQf 438 FAILS 5.85t 03 1 ALP 4387 RHal PUNP I FAILS TO RUN FOR 1008 N0utt 1.018 01 PMet
- 7. 3.0$t 04 eMt PUMP A FAILS 70 AUN FOR 1004 N0uts 1.018 01 PMAX
$$PS AtLAT KT35 Coll FAILS 3.02t 03 28C0KT357
- 8. 3.058 04 t>R PUMP A FAILS 10 RUN FOR 1004 nouns 1.01t 01 Punx
$$Pt etLAT K255 C0tt FAILS 3.02t*03 28C0K2537
- 9. 3.0$t 04 RH4 PUMP A FAILS TO RUN FOR 1008 Mouts 1.01t 01 PMAK
$1Ps etLAY K1302 Coll FAILS 3.02t 03 2AC0K1302F
- 10. 3.0$t*04 HR PUMP A FAILS 70 AUN 70s 1004 n0Uts 1.01t 01 PmAX AUXILIAAf RELAT P'/4188 C0ll FAlts 3.02t 03 2AC041887
- 11. 3.0$t 04 ltPS ACLAY K1302 Coll FAILS 3.02E 03 18C0K1302F ANAS Ptsr 8 FAILS 70 RUN FOR 1008 Houas 1. ult 01 PMex
- 12. 3.0$t 04 AuslLIAav atLAT PY/4080 C0ll FAILS 3.028 03 18C06088F AMR$ PUMP S FAILS TO RUN FOR 1008 NOURS 1.01E 01 PMet 13, 3.05t 04 sses atLAY K73$ cost FAlts 3.02t 03 1AC0KT35F O: RHR$ PUNP S FAILS TO RUN FOR 1004 NOUst 1.01E 01 PMSX 14, 3.0$t 04 $$PS RELAf Kill C0!L PAILt 3.02t 03 1AC0K155F AMR$ PUMP B FAILS TO NUN M 1008 MCn>RS 1.01t 01 PMex 15, 2.9$t 04 RNA PUMP A FAILS 70 RUN FOR 1008 N(RJas 1.012 01 Pouut DUAL COMPARATOR PS 428A/S FAILS - 2.92t 03- 28AD428A87
- 16. 2.95t 04 RH4 PUMP A FAILS 70 RUN F04~1008 NOUts 1.01t 01 PmAx DUAL COMPARATOR PS 418A/S FA!LS 2.92E 03 2AAD418A8F
- 17. 2.95E 04 DUAL C(SEPARATOR PS 408A/B FAILS 2.92t 03 18AD408A8F RNRS PUMP S FAILS TO RUN FOR 1008 NOURS 1.01t 01 PMSX i
- 18. 2.95t 04 DUAL CoePARAfon PS 438A/8 FAILS 2,92t 03 1AAD438A8F RHR$ Ptser 8 FAILS TO RUN FOR 1008 HOURS 1.01E 01 Putx AfDUCIO Stat 07 PRotAtiLit? 0F FAltutt e 2.086E 02 B-31 10980:10/053191 L
L. _.j
r TABLE B-0 V0GTLE ;
\ DOMINANT CONTRIBUTCRS LOSS OF LONG TERM COOLING WITHOUT AUTOCLOSURE INTERLOCX wumett cultti Ptol. BAllt tythf 4Amt tytut Ptos. IDikflFitt 1 1.02t.02 RNR PUMP 4 falls 10 Rue 70s 1008 Haunt 1.01t 01 PMAN RPR$ PUMP 8 Falls 70 tuu 704 1008 NOUnl 1.01t 01 Puta
- 2. 1.078 03 the PUMP A FAILS 10 #UN FOR 1008 NOURS 1.01t 01 MAX RHtt PUMP 5 FAILS TO START 1.08t*02 Pul4
- 3. 1.59t*04 RH4 PUMP A FAILt 70 avu FOR 1008 Hauts 1.01t 01 PwAX RNR$ PWP 8 UhAVAILABLE Out 10 MihitNANCE 1.$7t*03 PMSMAlkf 4.- 9.3$t*05 the Pune A FAILS to rum FOR 1008L Hauts 1.01t*01 PMX '
RNR$ PWP 8 UNAVAILABLE DUE 10 f t$f 9.2H 04 Putttst
- 5. 8.24t 0$ the PUMP A FAlts 70 tuu FOR 1004 wount 1.01t.01 PM CONft0L SWifCN Cl*t FAILS Mov 87028 8.1H 04 2stststr
'/ ] 6. 8.24t*05 kHR PWP A FAILS 10 RUW FOR 1004 NOUnl 1.01t 01 PMX CoutkOL $ WITCH CS+t FAILS MOV ST0ZA 8.1H + 04 2ACSC5tf
- f. 8.248 05 Coutt0L $WlfCN CS*a FAILS MOV 87018 8.1M
- 04 itCSC$tF Int $ PUMP 8 FAILS 70 AUN FOR 1004 NOUR$ 1.01E*01 Past 8.' 8.248 0$ CONTROL $WifCN C$.R FAILS MOV 8701 A 8.1M*04 1AC$C5tF RMR$ PWP S FAILS 70 RUN FOR 1004 NOUA8 1.01t*01 PMet 9 2.04t*05 RNA PtseP A FAILS TO RUN FOR 1006 N0uts 1.01t.01 PMX CMECK VALVI 010 FAILS TO OPEN 2.02t*04 CV0100
,10. 2.048 05 thR PUMP A FAILS TO RUN FOR 1004 HOUns 1.01t 01 -Pux MOTOR OPtRATED WALVE HV84090 SPURIOUSLT CLostl 2.02t*04 Kvo8098V
- 11. 2.046 05 Motor OPERAft0 VALVE 8409A SPURICUSLT CL0tts 2.02t 04 NV88094V tht$ PUMP S FAILS 10 AUW FOR 1006 haut$ 1.018 01 PMEX
- 12. 8.81E*06 CouttoL swifCN Cs A falls MOV 87018 8.168 04 1BCSCstF g anas PWP S FAIL 3 70 sfART 1.088 02 PMSA
- 13. 8.818 06 C0mit0L SWl1CN Cs t FAILS MOV 8701A 8.165 04 1ACstsat i
RNAS PWP S FAILS TO START 1.08t*02 PmSA 14 2.18t*06 Mof 0R OPCRAf t0 VALVE 8809A SPURIOUSLT CL0sts - 2.02t 04 WV8809AV RMel PUBIP S FAILS TO STAtt 1.08t 02 PMSA
\
REQUCIO SW OF PROSAtiLiff 0F FAILUtt e 1.195t 02 O l B-32 j~ 10980:1D/053191 L _ _. _ -_ ___ u
l OVERSIZE DOCUMENT l PAGE PULLED i l SEE APERTURE CARDS NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS 9Ii2.022037-fog i APERTURE CARD /MARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM CECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH l
I 1 1 o APPENDIX C t '4 V0GTLE A LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURIZATION ANALYSIS I s 1 ] i- ! i
- 1
! i I I , l t
=
r t i I v f i i 1 , 1 l I l .! r I :- ! f I 1 I ! .I i O ,
)
_ - ~ -- . . . _ - _ - . . - - - APPENDIX C LOH TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURIZATI0ld AtlALYSIS Th h appendix details the calculations performed to determine the change in the frequency of the consequences of low temperature overpressure transients due to removal of the ACI for Vogtle. The frequencies are calculated for two cases: 1) with the present interlock configuration and 2) with the proposed modification. The methodology applied in the Westinghouse Owners Group generic program (HCAP-11736), Appendix D is applied to the Vogtle plant. The effect of the mass input overpressure transients identified in the WOG analysis was evaluated utilizing event trees (charging / safety injection pump actuation and letdown isolation). Each mitigating system and operator action was modeled as a top node on the event tree for the given transient. The following describe the event tree structure, the success criteria defined for each transient, and the nodal probabilities utilized in the quantification and the resultt. The safety functions, i.e., the event tree top events or nodes, for the Vogtle event trees are defined below: L
- 1. Initiating Event (IE): The mass input initiator that could lead to overpressurization and/or possible RHR$ damage, either charging pump actuation or letdown isolation (both with the RHRS operable and with the RHRS isolated). Operation of the safety injection pumps is not included with the charging pumps as part of the initiating event since they are racked out, however, the positive displacement pump is included.
- 2. RHRS Isolated _(RI): The RHRS will be isolated during certain periods of shutdown. This dictates whether or not the RHRS relief valves are available to mitigate -the transient and if_ the possibility exists for damage to the RHRS. For Vogtle, the event tree alicws for both trains of RHRS to be isolated, one train or no trains.
1109D:10/073091 C-1
i 1
- 3. RHRS Suction Relief Valve Lifts (RV): If the RHRS is not isolated, the spring loaded relief valves will open at the setpoint pressure.
If one train of RHRS is isolated, only one RHRS relief valve is available and if both trains are isolated, there are no RHRS relief valves available to mitigate the transient.
- 4. COPS Operates (COP): The cold overpressure protection syste" (COPS) '
consists of two redundant and independent systems utiliz. '. .c pressurizer's PORVs. When the system is energized and reactor solant temperature is below 350*f a high pressure signal (above the COPS setpoint) will trip the system automatically and open a PORV until the pressure drops below the reset value. For Vogtle, the COPS has a variable setpoint. An auctioneered system temperature is continuously converted to an allowable pressure and then compared to the actual RCS pressure. The system logic will first annunciate a main control board alarm whenever the measured pressure approaches within e. predetermined amount of the allowable pressure. On a further increase in measured pressure, an actuation signal is transmitted to the power-operated relief valve. For this analysis, it was assumed that the COPS would actuate at its lowest setpoint (505 psig), , 5a. RHRS Suction / Isolation Valves Automatically Close (RSV): When the , pressure increases to the autotlosure setpoint (750 psig), the ACI receives a pressure signal that actuates the circuitry and closes the motor-operated valve. This node is addressed in the case with the ACI only. , 5b. Operator Detects Overpressure Alarm and Isolates the RHRS (00): for the modification case, an alarm would sound when the pressure reached approximately 750 psig. Through a revision in operating procedures. . it is assumed that the operator will detect the overpressure and isolate the RHRS before the pressure reaches 1507,of the RHRS design pressure. L , 11090:10/073091 C-2 L
l l l
- 6. Operator Secures Running Pump (OAl): Given an alarm, caused when the RHRS relief valves open to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) and actuate one of its alarms, or from the operation of at least one train of COPS, or from the high pressure alarm on the RHRS $Uction valves (in the modification case only), the operator will stop the extra running pump. If the operator stops the running pump, the i overpressure event is halted.
- 7. Operator Opens a PORV (0A2): Given an alarm, if no or one relief valve operates successfully and the pressure still continues to rise, i the operator may open a PORV in order to reduce the pressure. The operator may also open a PORV if he fails to stop the running pump in order to increase the time available to mitigate the transient.
- 8. Pressuri7er PORV Rescats (POR): Given that a PORV has opened and the transient has been stopped, the PORV must close in order to avert a loss of coolant condition.
- 9. RHRS Relief Valve Reseats (RVR): Given that a RHR$ relief valve i successfully operates and the transient is terminated, the relief valve must rescat or coolant would be lost to the PRT. If the transient is not stopped, the relief valve will cycle open and closed and is assumed to eventually fail open.
For each of these nodes, failure probabilities were calculated. These nodal probability calculations for Vogtle are shown in Table C-1 . The success criteria for the event tree top events were determined based on conservative estimates of the flow rates and relieving capacities of the L relief valves. For the charging pump actuation case, it is assumed that two i PORVs or two RHRS relief valves, or one PORV and one RHRS relief valve are required to mitigate the transient, since the maximum flow rate to the RHRS l from the two charging pumps and the positive displacement pump is 1208 gpm L (conservative assumption that all three pumps operate at their maximum flow rates; 555, 555, and 98 gpm). The Vogtle LTOP analysis, documented in Westinghouse letters FSE/SS-GAE-6397 (3/15/90) and FSD/SS-GAE-3731 (8/27/85), 11090:1D/073091 C-3 l _.
calculated the maximum flow rate for the charging pumps actuation case to be 673 gpm at 495 psig. However, the 1200 gpm number is being conservatively used to maintain consistency with the H0G-11736 methodology. The following assumptions were also utilized in the analysis of the charging mass input transient.
- 1. No credit is taken for venting via the Reactor Vessel Head Vent System.
- 2. A failure detection time was assumed to be 24 hours for the suction valve components while six weeks (1008 hours) was assumed for the FORVs and block valves (assumed to be representative of a refueling outage). These times were conservatively determined from the monitoring frequencies of the valves.
The event trees for these cases are in Figures C-6 through C-9. Figures C-1 l through C-5 are the fault trees required to quantify the event tree top events. l The results from the quantification of the event trees for Vogtle are shown in Tables C-3 to C-5. The results show that the frequencies of most of the overpressure consequence categories remain unchanged with the deletion of the ACI. Refer to Table 4-5 for a description of the consequence categories. For the charging case, the frequencies of consequence categories HSF0 and MSCO increased, while the category HOPV decreased. The two increases were 3.76E-12 and 2.35E-12/ shutdown year, respectively. .These are very insignificant increases in the frequency of these events. For the letdown isolation - RHRS operable case, the frequency of the consequence category MOPI, decreased slightly, while the category HOPV increased by 4.30E-17/ shutdown year. In the letdown isolation - RHRS isolated case, the frequencies of all the impacted consequence-categories decreased due to the reduction in the initiating event frequency (i.e., the reduction in the loss of letdown due to < spurious closure of the RHRS' suction valves). The-conclusion to be drawn from the overpressure analysis is that removal of the ACI and the inclusion of an alarm has a positive impact on the consequences of low temperature overpressure' events for Vogtle. 11090:10/062691
TABLE C-1 V0GTLE NODAL PROBASILITY CALCULATIONS
- 1. RHRS !solated (RI)
Description:
This nodo divides into three branches. The upper branch O indicates that the RHRS is isolated from the RCS, the middle branch indicates that one RHRS train is isolated from the RCS, and the bottom branch indicates that both trains of the RHRS are open to the RCS. For this node, it was assumed that the RHRS may be isolated for a period of time during cold shutdown. The nodal probabilities for the charging O actuation case are based on assumptions that both trains of the RHRS would () be isolated only 5 percent of the time and that one RHRS train would be isolated only 10 percent of the time. Thus, both trains of the RHR$ would be open 85 percent of the time. For the letdown isolation case with the RHRS operable, the nodal probability is 1.0 while for the case with the RHRS isolated, the nodal probability is 0.0. Failure probabilities: The probabilities for this node for each case are shown below: Charging pump actuation Both trains isolated 0.05 One train isolated 0.10 No trains isolated 0.85 Letdown Isolation RHR$ operable 1.0 RHRS isolated 0.0 O O O 11090:1D/073091 C-5
._ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ ____m . i f TABLE C-1 (Cont) V0GTLE NODAL PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS ;
- 2. RHRS Relief Valve Operates (RV) l
Description:
This node divides into three branches when both trains of the RHRS are open to the RCS. Two RHRS relief valves can operate r (indicated by the top branch), one RHRS relief valve can operate : (indicated by the middle branch), or both relief valves can fail to open ! (indicated by the bottom branch). When only one train of RHRS is open to - the RCS, the one operable RHRS relief valve can open (the top branch) or can fail to open (the bottom branch). [ The RHRS relief valves are spring-loaded relief valves set to actuate at 450 psig. Each relief valve can relieve 950 gpm at 450 psig. Failure probabilities: The failure of a relief valve to open is 3E-04 per demand (Refer to Table 4-1). Thus the probability for this node are: Two (of 2) RHRS relief valves fati to open - (3E-04)(3E-04)-9E-08 One (of 2) RHRS relief valve fails to open 3E-04 +3E-04 6E-04 One (of 1) RHRS relief valve fails to open - 3E-04 ; O 1 O O O 11090:10/073091 C-6
TABLE C-1 (Cont) V0GTLE NODAL PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS
- 3. PORV COPS system operates at 435 psig (COP)
Description:
The event tree divides into three branches at the C0P node. The top branch symbolizes that both Uains of COPS operate, the middle branch 5 ws only one train of COPS operates while the bottom branch signifies both trains of COPS have failed to operate. The COPS utilizes two pressurizer's PORVs. The operator must energize the system prior to reaching the RCS temperature of 350*F. An alarm is O actuated thereby alerting the operator to arm the COPS. The COPS has a variable pressure setpoint determined by the measured RTD temperature. For this analysis, the setpoint was assumed to be constant at 505 psig (the lowest setpoint allowed). Failure probabilities: The failure probabilities associated with this node were calculated utilizing fault trees. Figure C-3 shows the fault tree developed for two trains of COPS failing to operate while the failure of one train is shown in Figure C-4. The operator error in failing to enable the COPS is calculated below: Task: Operator fails to arm the COPS following alarm. Median HEP - 0.0001 Table 20-23 Failure to initiate some kind Error factor - 10 (Reference 9) of intended corrective action Mean HEP - 2.66E-04 as required The basic event probabilities utilized in the fault trees are shown in Table C-2. The failure probabilities quantified from the fault trees are: Two trains of COPS Flil - 3.01E-04 One train of COPS Fails - 1.18E-02 O O O 11090:10/073091 C-7 , unumie
TABLE C-1 (Cont) V0GTLE NODAL PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS 4a. RHRS Suction Valves Close at P=750 psig with ACI (RSV) l
Description:
The node determines hiiether or not the RHRS suction valve ACI closes the valves when the RCS pressure reaches 750 psig. It was assumed that only one valve of the two isolation valves on each train must close for success. Failure was considered to be the RHRS open to the RCS (i.e. the ACI failed to close one of two valves on each train). Failure probabilities: The failure probability associated with this node O was calculated using the fault tree shown in Figure C-1. The basic event probabilities used to quantify the fault tree are shown in Table C-2. The failure probabilities for this node are: Both trains of RHRS fail to isolate . 5.00E-07 One train of RHRS-fails to isolate - 2.50E-07 O O O O _11090:10/073091- C-8
1 TABLE C-1 (Cont) V0GTLE NODAL PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS 1 4b. Operator Isolates RHRS System Given Overpressure Alarm (00)
Description:
The proposed modification deletes the ACI and adds an alarm O to alert the operator when the pressure exceeds 750 psig and an isolation valve is in the open position. Given an overpressure transient and this alarm the operator will close at least one RHRS suction valve on each , suction line to isolate the RHRS. Failure Probabilities: The failure probability associated with this node was calculated utilizing the fault tree shown in Figure C-2. The human (O error probability with a time frame of 20 minutes was chosen since it is a low probability that both the relief valves and the PORVs will fail to open. These mitigating events increase the operator's response time. The operator error probabilities shown in the fault tree are calculated below: TASK: Operator closes isolation valve given high pressure alarm.
- 1. Diagnosis within time T by control room personnel of abnormal event annunciated Median HEP - 0.01 Table 20-3 within 20 minutes Error factor - 10 (Reference 9)
Hean HEP - 2.66E-02
- 2. Operator failure in operating manual controls Median HEP - 0.001 Table 20-12 Select wrong control from an Error factor - 3 (Reference 9) array of similar-appearing Hean HEP - 1.25E-03 controls arranged in well-delineated functional groups
- 3. Recovery factor - special short term one-of-a-kind checking hec an HEP - 0.05 Table 20-22 Error factor - 5 (Reference 9)
Hean HEP - 8.07E-02 f-L _P(Fail in 20 minutes) - 2.66E-02(8.07E-02) + (1-2.66E-02)(1.25E-03) (8.07E-02)
- 2.15E-03 + 9.82E-05
- 2.25E-03 l
OU The-basic event probabilities are shown in Table C-2. quantification of the fault tree is shown- below: The result of the i Fail to Isolate two Trains - 1.32E-05 Fail to Isolate one Train - 6.60E-06 O 11090:1D/i)73C91 C-9
, TABLE C-1 (Cont) !
V0GTLE NODAL PROBABILITY CALCULAi!ONS
- 5. Operator Secures Running Pump (OA1)
I
Description:
For any operator action to occur, an alarm must be O actuated. This alarm can occur by actuation of a relief valve, or from the operation of one train of COPS, or in the modification case, the high pressure alarm on the RHRS suction valves. Failure Probability: The human error probability with a time frame of 20 minutes was chosen since it is a low probability that both the relief O valves and the PORVs will fall to open. These mitigating events increase the operator's response time. The human error probability is calculated below: 1.- Failure to diagnose transient in time T Hedian HEP - 0.1 Table 20-1 within 20 minutes Error factor - 10 (Reference 9) Hean HEP - 0.266 Select wrong control 2. Median HEP - 0.001 Table 20-12 Select wrong control Error factor - 3 (Reference o) on a panel from an array of O Mean HEP- - 1.25E-03 similar-appearing controls arranged in well-delineated functional groups P(Fail in 20 minutes) - 0.266 4 (1-0.266)(1.25E-03)
= 0.267 O
O O 11090:10/073091 C-10 i
4 l , i i l ' j ] TABLE C-1 (Cont) , V0GTLE NODAL PROBASILITY CALCULATIONS ! j ]
- 6. Operator Opens PORV (OA2) ,
t
Description:
If no relief valve operates or the ACI isolates the relief l valve, the operator can open a PORV to reduce the pressure, given an alarm has actuated. If the operator fails to secure the pump, he can open a - PORV in order to increase the time he has available in which to act. l l! ! I failure Probabilities: This action was modeled as dependent on the
- operator's success or failure to stop the running pump. The failure probabilities are
- ;
j Given failure of previous task ! l OA2 - 0.36 Table 20-18 Medium dependence i l (Reference 9) ; i I [ Given success of previous task l 1 I i OA2 = 0421 Table 20-19 Medium dependence (Reference 9) ce l. l l l= L i i- l 1-e :
-j 4
l. L9 ; 11090:10/073091 C-11 1 -
i i TABLE C-1 (Cont) f V0GTLE N0DAL PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS
- 7. RHRS Relief Valve Reseats (RVR)
Description:
Given that the transient is successfully mitigated, the RHRS relief valves must reseat (close) in order to prevent a loss of coolant. Failure Probability: The probability that the relief valve will not reseat is 3E-2-per demand (Refer to Table 4-1). If both RHRS relief ' valves actuated, both relief valves must close. If only one RHRS relief valve actuates, it must close. Thus the frilure probabilities are: Both relief valves fail to close - 3E-02 +3E 6E-02 One-relief valve fails to close - 3E-02 9 O O y O l
,11090:10/073091 C-12 ; . - .J
TABLE C-1 (Cont) V0GTLE N0DAL PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS
- 8. PORVs Reseat (POR)
Description:
Given that the transient is successfully mitigated, the PORV must close in order to prevent a loss of coolant. If the PORV fails to Os close, the operator can isolate the open PORV using the associated block valve. Failure Probability: The failure probabilities for the PORVs to reseat was calculated utilizing the fault tree shown in Figure C-5. The basic event probabilities are shown in Table C-2. Tha human error calculation Os for the operator failing to close the block valve is shown below: TASK: Operator closes block valve
- 1. Operator falls to detect leaking PORV Median HEP - 0.001 tam e 20-11 Error of commission in check Error factor ; deference 9) reading display (digital Mean HEP - 1.25E-03 indicators)
- 2. Operator selects wrong control Median HEP = 0.001 Table 20-12 Select wrong control from an O . Error Factor - 3 Hean HEP - 1.25E-03 (Reference 9) array of similar-appearing controls arranged in well-delineated functional groups
- 3. Recovery factor - special short term one-of-a-kind checking Median HEP - 0.05 Table 20-22 Error factor - 5 (Reference 9)
Mean HEP - 8.07E-02 P(Fail to close block valve) - 1.25E-03(8.07E-02) +
~
(1-1.25E-03)(1.25E-03)(8.07E-02) ( = 1.01E-04 + 1.01E-04 , - 2.02E-04 Thus, the failure probabilities for this node are: Two PORVs fail to close - 5.28E-05 One PORV fails to-close - 2.64E-05 l 11090:1D/073091 C-13 l
TABLE C-2 V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES FOR FAULT TREES FT IDENT COMP FAILURE MCol Fall Raft V AR I ANCE SOURCE TIME PROSAtlLiff VARIANCE V0GtLt DVERPRilSt*E Wl1H ACl 1ALSU Lt LIMIT switch ALL K0t5 7.220E 06 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 8.66t 05 0.00t+00 1GOL155F C0 RELAY C0ll FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60E 05 0.00t+00 14thK155F CW RELAY CoutAtis FAIL 10 1.000t 06 0.000t + 00 2815 1.200t*01 1.20E 05 0.00t*00 TRANSFER 1ALPPo+438F PS LOOP Poutt SUPPLY ALL wxtl 5.800E 06 0.000t+00 fops 1.200t+01 6.96t 05 0.00t+00 1Af$PS/438F CM COMPARATOR TRIP SWifCN 5.800E 07 0.000f*00 IEEE 1.200t+01 6.96t 06 0.00t+00 1ATPPt4387 1P P TRAN5Mif f tR ALL MODES i 730E 06 0.000t+00 litt 1.200E+01 2.081 05 0.00t+00 1A0PB438Alf CM COMPAR ATOR ALL MC0tt 2.900E 06 0.000t+00 Tors 1.200t+01 3.48t 05 0.00t+00 1Af$P13&ABF CM COMPARATOR TRIP $WlfCN 5.800E 07 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200E*01 6.96t 06 0.00t+00 1ASRF $R R0f ARY SWlfCN ALL MOCES 8.100E 07 0.000t*00 Ittt 1.200t+01 9.72[ 06 0.00t+00 1 ACNET35 F CN RELAY CONTACf8 Fall 10 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20t 05 0.00E+00 TRAN1Flt 1AC0KT35F C0 RELAY C0!L FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60E 05 0.00t+00 1Atl521U CB CIRCulf BREAttR Orth W/0 1.000E 08 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200E*01 1.20E 07 0.00t+00 COMMAND 1ACT480120F Cf CURRENT 1RANsFORMtt ALL Mcx>ts 3.500t 07 0.000t 90 Itti 1.200t+01 4.20E 06 0.00t+00 1AOL49AF OL THERMAL OVERLOAD PREMAfURE 1.500e 07 0.000t+00 RATE 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 0.00t+00 OPEN 1AOL49BF OL THERMAL OVERLOAD PREMATURE 1.500t 07 0.000E+00 RAtt 1.200t*01 1.80E 06 0.00t*00 OPEN 1AOL49CF OL THERMAL OVERLQAD PREMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000t+00 RAtt 1.200t+01 1,80E 06 0.00t+00 OPEN 1ARECN42CAF CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL 10 1.000t 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 TRANSFER 1ARICN42CBF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall 10 1.000E 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t*01 1.20E 05 0.00t+00 TRANSFit 1AttCN42ttF CW RELAY CONTAC1$ Fall TO 1.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRAN$ Fit 1Att$22U CB CIRCulf BREArtR OPEN W/0 1.000E-08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 1.20t 07 0.00t+00 COMMAND 1AMVK MV FAILURE 10 Clost 1.000t 05 0.000E+00 2815 1.200t+0i 1.20E 04 0.00t+00 1ACW420U CN RELAY CONTACTOR$ $PURIOUS 2.000E 08 0.000t+00 litt 1.200t+01 2.40E 07 0.00t*00 OPERAfl0N 1AttC042CF C0 RELAY C0ll FAILURE 3.000t 06 0.000t+00 2815 1.200t+01 3.60E 05 0.00t+00 1AFV1 FU Fust ALL MaDES 1.500E 07 0.000t+00 It[E 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 0.00!+00 iAOLCN49U CW RELAY CONTACTOR$ SPURIOUS 2.000E 08 0.000t+00 Itti 1.200t+01 2.40E 07 0.00t+00 CPERATION 1AQS8701AF QS 10 Rout $ WITCH FAIL TO OPERAft 2.000t 07 0.000t+00 281L 1.200t+01 2.40E 06 0.00t+00 11090:10/062491 C-14
l TABLE C-2 (Cont) (G b) V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES FOR FAULT TREES FT IDENT COMP FAILURE MODE FAIL RATE VARIANCE SOURCE TIME PR06A8!LITY VARIANCE 1ACN42CF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TC 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 p TRANSFER 1ACSF SR ROTARY SWITCH ALL M0JE$ 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 9.72E 06 0.00E+00 18LSU LS LIMIT SWITCH ALL MorfES 7.220E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E*01 8.66E 05 0.00E+00 18C0K408F CO RELAY C0ll FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 3.60E-05 0.00E+00
,q 1BCN4088F CN RLLAY CONTACTS FA/L TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E-05 0.00E+00 V}
f 1BALP408F PS TRANSFER LOOP POWER SUPPLf ALL MODES 5.800E-06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.200E+01 6.96E 05 0.00E+00 1BL9406F PS LOOP POWER SUPPiY AL*. MODES 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.200E+01 6.96E 05 0.00E+00 1BT54087 CM COMPARATOR TR12 SWITCH 5.600E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 6.96E 06 0.00E+00 1BTP408F TP P TRANSMITTER ALL MODES 1.730E-06 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200t+01 2.08E 05 0.00E+00 1BD408ABF CM COMPARATOR Al.t MODES 2.900E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.200E+01 3.48E 05 0.u0E+00 18TS408ABF CM COMPARATOR INIP SWITCH 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 6.96E 06 0.00E+00 1BSRF SR ROTARY SW11CH ALL MODES 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 9.72E 06 0.00E+00 18CNT1302F CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER
' O) 1BC0K1302F C0 RELAY C0ll FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 3.60E-05 0.00E+00 1BCBil5U CB CIRCU!T BREAKER OPEN W/0 1.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 1.20E 07 0.00E+00 COMMAND 18CT480120F CT CURRENT TRANSFORMER ALL MODES 3.500E-07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1 2 0E+01 4.20E 06 0.00E+00 l- 1BOLMAF OL THERMAL OVERLOAD PREMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 RATE 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 0.00E+00 OPEN 1BOL498F OL THERMAL OVERLOAP PREMATURE 1.500E-07 0.000E+00 RATE 1.200Ea1 1.80E-06 0.00E+00 OPEN 1BOL49CF OL THEEHAL OVERLOAD PNEMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 RATE 1.200E+01 1.80E-06 0.00E+00 OPEN 1BRECN42CAF CN RELAi CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00
/, TRANDFER 2 18RECN42C87 CN RELAY CONTACTS FA R TO 1.000E-06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E-05 0.00E+00 3 TRAkSFER 1BRECN42CCF CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER
/9 18CB115NU C8 CIRCulf BREAKER OPEN W/0 1.000E-08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 1.20E 07 0.00E+00 I f CO W ND
%)
1BMVK MV FAILURE TO CLOSE 1.000E-05 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 04 0.00E+00 IBCN4200 CN RELAY CONTACTCt3 SPURIOUS 2.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 2.40E-07 0.00E+00 OPERATION {] 1DREC042CF C0 RELAY C0!L FAILUR! 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2E'.5 1.200E+01 3.60E 05 0.00E+00 1BFU1 FU FJSE ALL MCX)ES 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 0.00E+00 11090:1D/052491 C-15
l TABLE C-2 (Corit)
/)
3 , V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES FOR FAULT TREES
&/
FT IDENT COMP FAILURE MCDE 641L RATE VARIANCE SOURCE T!ht PROBAllLITY VARIANCE 1BOLCN49U CN RELAY CONTACTOR$ SPURIOUS
- 000E 08
. 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 2.40E*07 0.00E+00 OPERATION I 1 g/ 1BQS8701BF QS TORout SWITCH FAIL TO OPERATE 2.000E-07 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 2.40E 06 0.00E+00 1BCN42CF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 C.00E+00 TRANSFER 1BCSF SR ROTARY SWITCH ALL G ES 8.100E-07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 9.72E 06 0.00E+00
[ ?ALSU LS LIMIT SWITCH "L RES 7.220E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 8.66E*05 0.00E+00 2AC0K418F CD RELAY Col! 'uto t 3.000E-06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 3.60E 05 0.00E+00 2ACN418BF CN 'ELAY Com " rAnL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E-05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2AALP418F PS LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL MODES 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.200E+01 6.96E-05 0.00E+00 2 ALP 418F PS LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL MDES 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.200E+01 6.96E 05 0.00E+00 2ATS4187 CM Cm PARATOR TRIP SWITCH 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 6.96E-06 0.00E+00 2ATP418F TP P TRANSMITTER ALL MODES 1.730E-06 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 2.08E 05 0.00E+00 2AD418ABF CM COMPARATOR ALL MODES 2.900E 06 0.000F +00 TOPS 1.200E+01 3.48E-05 0.00E+00 2ATS418ABF CM COMPARATOR TRIP SWITCH 5.800E 07 0.000E+00 lEEE 1.200E+01 6.96E 06 0.00E+00 f3 (v) 2ASRF 2AckK1302F SR ROTARY SWITCN ALL MODES 8.100E-07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 9.72E 06 0.00E+00 CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL 10 1.C 60E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E-05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2AC:X1302F CO RELAY C0!L FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 3.60E-05 0.00E+00 2AC81160 C8 CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN W/0 1.000E-08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 1.20E-07 0.00E+00 cmMAND 2ACT480120F CT CURRENT TRANSFORNER ALL MODES 3.500E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 4.20E 06 0.00E+00 2AOL49AF OL THERMAL OVERLOAD PREMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 RATE 1.200E+01 1.80E-06 0.00E+00 OPEN 2AOL49EF OL THERMAL OVERLOAD PREMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 RATE 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 0.00E+00 OPEN m ( ) 2AOL49CF OL THERMAL OVERLOAD PREMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 RATE 1.200E+01 1.80E-06 0.00E+00 () OPEN 2ARECN42CAF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E*00 TRANSFER 2ARECN42CBF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E-06 0.000E+00 2815 1.20LE *01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 (] 9 1 TRANSFER m L/ 2ARECN42CCF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E-05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2AC8116NU CB CIRCUlf BREAKER OPEN W/0 1.000E-08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 1.20E 07 0.00E+00 COMMAND
/N 2AMVK MY FAILURE TO CLOSE 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 04 0.00E+00
'% 2ACN420U CN RELAY CONTACTORS SPURIOUS 2.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 2.40E-07 0.00E+00 OPERATION 11090:10/062491 C-16
)
_-___ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ --_-______m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. . - . . . - - . _ . . . - - - _ - - - . . - - . - - ~
-/
-TABLE C-2 (Cont)
)(
-V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES FOR FAULT TREES I
FT IDENT COMP FAILURE MODE- Fall RATE VARIANCE SOURCE TIME PROBASILITT VARIANCE l
-2AREC042CF C0 RELAY C0ll FAILURE- 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815. 1.200E+01 3.60E 05 0.00E+00
~2AFU1 FU FUSE ALL MODES' 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 ~ 0.00E+00 2AOLCN49U CN RELAY CONTACTOR$ $ PURL 0VS 2.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 2.40E 07 0.00E+00 OPERATION 2AoS8702AF ' QS TORQUE SWITCH Fall TO OPERATE 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 2.40E 06 0.00E+00 2ACN42CF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2ACSF SR ROTARY SWITCH ALL M00ES 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 9.72E 06 0.00E+00 2BLSU LS LIMlf SWITCH ALL MODES 7.220E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 8.66E 05 0.00E+00 2BC0K255F CO RELAY C0ll FAILURE 3.000E*06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 3.60E 05 0.00E+00 2BCW255F - CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2BLP428i PS LOOP POWER SUPPLY ALL MODES 5.800E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.200E+01 6.96E 05 0.00E+00
-2BTS428F CN COMPARATOR TRIP SWITCH 5.us0E*07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 6.96f 06 0.00E+00 2BTP428F TP P TRANSMITTER ALL MODES 1.730E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 2.08E 05 0.00E+00 280P428ABF CM COMPARATOR ALL MODES 2.900E 06 0.000E+00 TOPS 1.200E+01 3.48E-05 0.00E+00 2BTS428ABF CM COMPARATOR TRIP SWITCH 5.800E 07. 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 6.96E-06 0.00E+00 2BSRF - SR ROTARY SWITCH ALL MODES 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 9.72E 06 0.00E+00 2BCNK735F CN ' RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2BC0K735F - CO - RELAY C0ll FAILURE 3.000E*06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 3.60E 05 0.00E+00 2BCB521U Ca CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN W/0 1.000E*06 0.000E+00 !EEE 1.200E+01 1.20E 07 0.00E+00 CONMAN0 2BCT480120F CT CURRENT TRANSFORMER ALL MODES 3.500E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 4.20E-06 0.00E+00 2BOL49AF~ OL THERMAL OVERLOAD PREMATURE 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 RATE 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 0.00E+00 OPEN
-r O 2001.49BF OL 1.500E 07
-( 0.000E+00 RATE THERMAL CVERLOAD PREMATURE 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 0.00E+00 OPEN 2BOL49CF OL ' THERMAL OVERLOAD PREMATURE 1.500E-07 0.000E+00 RATE 1.200E+01 1.80E-06 0.00E+00 OPEN 2BRECN42CAF CN RELAY CONTACTS Fall TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00-
. TRANSFER
.(V / 2BRECN42CBF CN - RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2BRECN42CCF CN RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.230E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2BCB522U C8 circuli BREAKER OPEN W/0 1.000E-08 0.000E+00 IE'EF 1.200E+01 1.20E 07 0.00E+00
.( COMMAND 28MVK MV FAILURE TO CLOSE 1.000E 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 04 0 ME+00 11090:10/062491 C-17 m J
TABLE C-2 (Cont) [ V0GTLE BASIC EVENT PROBABILITIES FOR FAULT TREES . FT IDENT~ COMP FAILURE McCE FAIL RATE VARIANCE SOURCE TIME PROSABILITY VARIANCE 2BCN420U CN RELAY CONTACTOR$ SPURIOUS 2.000E 08 -0.000E+00 lEEE 1.200E+01 2.40E 07 0.00E+00 h OPERATION
- -2sREC042C CO kELAY C0ll FAILURE 3.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 3.60E 05 0.00E+00 28FU1 FU - FUSE ALL MODES 1.500E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 1.80E 06 0.00E+00 2SOLCN49U CN RELAT CONTACTOR$ SPURIOUS 2.000E 08 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 2.40E 07 0.00E+00 OPERAfl0N k 29058702BF QS TOROUE SWITCH Fall TO OPERATE 2.000E 07 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 2.40E 06 0.00E+00 2BCN42CF *1 RELAY CONTACTS FAIL TO 1.000E 06 0.000E+00 2815 1.200E+01 1.20E 05 0.00E+00 TRANSFER 2BCSF SR ROTARY SWITCH ALL MODES 8.100E 07 0.000E+00 IEEE 1.200E+01 9.72E 06 0.00E+00 V0GTLE OVERPRESSURE"WITHOUT ACI WITN ALARM MV8701A0E DE 20 MINUTE OPERATOR CLOSE 2.250E 03 0.000E+00 HE 0.000E+00 2.25E 03 0.00E+00 SUCTION VALVES MV8701B06 OE 20 MINUTE OPERATOR Clost 2.250E 03 0.000E+00 HE 0.000E+00 2.25E 03 0.00E+00 SUCTION VALVES :
MV8702A0E. OE 20 MINUTE OPERATOR CLOSE 2.250E 03 0.000E+00 HE 0.000E+00 2.2SE 03 0.00E+00 ; SUCTION VALVES ( F.V870280E OE 20 MINUTE OPERATOR CLOSE 2.250E 03 0.000E+00 NE 0.000E+00 2.25E 03 0.00E+00
-SUCTION VALVES
~
VOCTLE ONE 0R TWO TRAINS OF COPS Fall TO UPERATE OPARMCOPS DE OPERATOR FA!LS TO ARMS COPS 2.660E 04 0.000E+00 HE 0.000E+00 2.66E 04 0.00E+00 PORV1 -- A0 FAILURE TO OPERATE 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 5.040E+02 5.04E 03 0.00E+00 PORV1SIG .TP P TRANSMITTER ALL MtcES 1.730E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 5.040E+02 8.72E 04 0.00E+00 PORV2 A0 FAILURE TO OPERATE' 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 5.040E+02 5.04E 03 0.00E+00 PORV2510 TP P TRANSMITTER ALL MODES 1.730E 06 0.000E+00 IEEE 5.040E+02 8.72E 04 0.00E+00
) V0GTLE PORYS Fall TO RESEAT-
_ (Q - PORV1CLOSE -A0 FAILURE TO OPERATE 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 5.040E+02 5.04E 03-- 0.00E+00 PORv1 BLOCK MV: FAILURE To CLOSE- i.000E05 0.000E+00 2815 5.040E+02 5.04E-03 0.00E+00-PORV10PERA- DE OPERATOR FAIL BLOCK VALVE 2.020E 04 0.000E+00 ME - 0.000E+00 2.02E 04- 0.00E+00 l
-PORV2CLOSE= AO - . FAILURE TO OPERATE 1.000E 05 0.000E+00- 2815 5.040E+02 5.04E-03 'O.00E+00
~Q ))
l_ PORV2 BLOCK MV FAILURE TO CLOSE 1.000E 05 0.000E+00 2815 5.040E+02 5.04E 03 0.00E+00 PORV20PERA DE OPERATOR FAIL SLOCK VALVE 2.020E 04 0.000E+00 NE - 0.000E+00 2.02E 04 0.00E+00 l
"N
\-
11090:10/062491 C-18 e - - w-
! TABLE C-3 V0GTLE CHARGING ACTUATION RESULTS O CONSEQUENCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY CATEGORY HITH ACI WITHOUT ACI CHANGE SUCCESS 8.667E-02 8.667E-02 0 2.761E-04 2.761E-04 0 O LSF0 LSCI 0.00 0.00 0 lbC0 0.00 0.00 0 LLFO 4.671E-03 4.671E-03 0 LLC 0 3.171E-02 3.171 E- 02 0 LLCI 1.661E-03 1.661E-03 0 LSFI 0.00 0.00 0 LLFI 2.412E-07 2.412E-07 0 MSF0 1.479E-13 3.906E-12 +3.758E-12 MLFO 0.00 0.00 0 O MSFI MLFI 1.355E-05 0.00 1.355E-05 0.00 0 0 MSCO 9.238E-14 2.439E-12 +2.347E-12 MSCI 7.739E-06 7.739E-06 0 HLC0 0.00 0.00 0 _ MLCI 0.00 0.00 0 HOPI 5.821E-07 3.821E-07 0 HOPI 2.245E-06 2.245E-06 0 HOPV 2.836E-16 7.488E-15 +7.204E-15 TOTAL 1.25E-01 1.25E-01 O O 11090:1D/072891 C-19
( TABLE C-4 V0GTLE LE100HN ISOLATION RHRS OPERABLE REEULTS O CONSEQUENCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY CATEGORY- HITH ACI WITHOUT ACI CHANGE SUCCESS 8.613E-02 8.613E-02 0 LSF0 1.649E-06 1.649E-06 0 0- LSCI 5.786E-13 5.786E-13 0 LSCO 2.003E-05 2,003E-05 0 LLFO 5.494E-03 5.494E-03 0 LLCO 3.336E-02 3.336E-02 0-LLCI 0.00 0.00 0 LSFI ^5.177E-17 5.177E-17 0 LLFI 0.00 0.00 0 MSFO 0.00 0.00 0 MLF0 0.00 0.00 0 MSFI 0.00 0.00 0 MLFI- 0.00 0.00 0
'MSCO -0.00 0.00 0 MSCI- 0.00 0.00 0 MLCO -0.00 0.00 0 MLCI' O.00 0.00 0 M0PI 5.213E-13 5.212E-13 -1.00E HOPI 3.255E 3.255E-13 0 HOPV' 1.693E-18: -4.470E-17 +4.30E-17 4
O
!TOTALL 1.25E-01 1~. 25 E-01 0
11090:10/072891 C-20
(m TABLE C-5 d V0GTLE LETDOWN ISOLATION-RHRS ISOLATED ; RESULTS
-A CONSEQUENCE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 1,) CATEGORY HITH ACI HITHOUT ACI CHANGE SUCCESS 3.261E-01 1.627E-01 -1 634 E-01
% LSFO 0.00 0.00 0 LSCI 1.402E 6.994E-04 -7.026E-04 LSCO: 0.00 0.00 0 LLFO 0.00 0.00 0 LLC 0 0.00 0.00 0 LLCI 1.174E-01 5.856E-02 -5.884E-02 LSFI 1.016E-07 5.069E-08 -5.091E-08
-LLFI- 1.701E-05 8.488E-06 -8.522E-06 ,
MSFO 0.00 0.00 0 MLF0 -0.00 0.00 0 MSFI- 0.00 0.00 0 HLFI 0.00 0.00 0 MSCO- 0.00 0.00 -0 MSCI -0.00 0.00 0 MLC0 0.00 0.00- 0
-MLCI 0.00 0.00 10
'M0PI 0.00 0.00 0 HOPI- 1.339E-04 6.682E -6.708E-05 HOPV 0.00 0.00 0 TOTAL 4.45E-01 2.22E .
( -_ O 11090:10/072891 -C-21
OVERSIZE DOCUMENT PAGE PULLED SEE APERTURE CARDS . NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS 9 L 1020037-/s-/6 APERTURE CARD /HARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH _ ---- - -- - - -- ~ ^ ^
s s fs. x O, n U V (J V O- . 4 -l. 3- l. 2 l 1
- , a.t. ., t c,. .s ... ... .
ID4tes f Alt l D o 1 p [%
- l eeteases f aits reases e amo a TD fumett erfS Cort r0051 Falt IS OrtRalt es ofERFpitstet C
/
[0004 - f 0003 eraWors _ l l g FrTV s rest 2 f atis IO OP19Aff f att$ fe artRatt
- #9 l
8
/\
0004
/\000F r% 7%
rees i ran, s ren, s ~Ii ru rests to etegnet rasts to eram rants so escaset satts so cets Du StiMPet$$4mt . $1GRAL 70 en etterstSSt*t 618881 fe Crta Drin A A (, 4 4 r.. re.. asis V0 GILE ELECTRIC GEtlERAlli1G PLAtJT r .. re.. si. Uti1 TS 1 AtJD 2 BOTH TRAltlS OF COPS Fall FIGURE C-3 14:15:24 91- 6-22 4 \ 3 l 2 l 1 _._.
i. O O O ' O O O i 4 1 3- l 2- l i
.19 stas e APD 2 COPS P081$ FAIL TO Off9A$E ON etteratssunt e
i 1 Ci C 0005 l
.[h !
t r
- - . l l -r >
r0AV I r0FV 2 ! 9 T AILS IQ Or(RAIE T AILS Ib OPERAIE l p 9 h a /N /\ 0002 0G05 , tm r% ,
- 1 i reev i roes i rom, a roav 2 F AIL $ 86 9f CtitE j
F AILS Ib DPEN FAILS to 9fCEIVE FAILS TO OrtM ' Om DVERPRESSURE $1sn At ?O Ou OVEPfpE1$UPE $1 CR AL f6 i OPEn 09tn k A t '! 0003 00e 0006 ' 0007 con,i ro .isia roa : reavasis V0GTLE ELECTRIC GEtlERATlHG PLAT 4T ! Util TS 1 AtlD 2 ! OllE OF TWO COPS TRAltlS FAIL TO OPERATE l FIGURE C-4 14:17:37 91- 6-22 4 l 3 l 2 l 1 i
.[~ [ /' ^* % N .f O - N.] O %.) \._) N.) .
4 1 3 1 2 I i WO6ft( COPS F0tv5 f ait, fg St$taf () D
<\
cool feev 1 A POSb 0 A350C1* iib et CCs A150fIaff D ttDCs W Attg Fait vat tf Fatt
?O C10$E 50 CIS$E C C O O 0e01 0009 o
8 1 I _ eter t reRT I Mecs topv 2 Pees 2 Mets FAlt $ 10 CtD$E tattf F Af tS f ARL E f f, ra p5E 1st51 f aits 10 C105E f 6 CteSE
- 9 8
. /\ .
/. /N .
9DRt ECLOSL f 900ftCLO$t f%
- i _
I _ F089 I BL OCs crEPAf 0A F4tLS PORT 2 SLSCs SPip AICS F 41L S talvt f ait s 50 TO CLOW V4tVE # 4tt B f te le CLS11 CL OSE SL0Cr Tot et C60$t 9tets fetti A A f
.. 0..N. -
()0 r
...L.c. re.. . on e, e n.i .e. renveen.. V0 GILE ELECTRIC GENERAilf3G PLMAT UNITS 1 AtJD 2 PORVS Fall TO RESEAT FIGURE C-5 14:23: 47 91- 6-22 4- l 3 l 2 j 1
'n- i .
FIGURE C-6. V0GTLE CHARGING HITH ACI EVENT TREE N
)
It 81 av CDP Rsv 041 OA2 tva POR 1
, 1 SUCCis 7 LLFI i
l _ 3 LLCI [f
\
r I 4 $UCCts 5 LLFI l 6 Msfl
? LLCl 8 MsCI T novi 10 SUCCts fq' ' 11 LLFO t , 12 LsF0
'N, i 13 LLFO 14 LLCO 15 SUCCI 5 l 16 LSFO 17 LSFO l 18 LLi0 19 TLC 0 20 MSFI l
21 MOPl 22 Msci __ 23 NOPI 24 SUCCts i 25 L5F0 26 LSFO l 27 LLFO 26 MSFO O ! 29 LLC 0 [. ! 30 MsCO 31 $UCCts 32 LLFO 1 33 LLC 0 34 suCCts 35 LLFI I 36 MSFI 37 LLCl l 38 MSCI 39 $UCCts
> l 40 LLFO I
41 MSFO 42 LLC 0 43 MSCO 44 MsFI 45 MOPI 46 MsCI { y
?
47 NOP)
.d 48 HCPV 49 SUCCts 50 LLFO I
51 LLCO 52 SUCCts l 53 LLFO' f^\ l 54 tsF0 55 LLFO
?,s_f 56 LLCD 57 suCCts 58 LSFO 59 LsF0 60 LLFO . fg - 61 LLCO
( , 62 MSFI
) ; i 63 MoPI uf , ,
64 Msti 11090:10/073091 C-27
FIGURE C-6. V0GTLE CHARGING HITH ACI EVENT TREE (Cont'd) r% [\ h_ IE RI RV CDP R$V OA1 OA2 RVR POR l O i 65 HOPI 66 SUCCES I 67 LSFO 68 LSFO I 69 LLF0 7D MSF0 71 LLCO 72 MSCO 73 SUCCES i I 74 LLFO I 75 LLCO 76 SUCCES I 77 LLFI I 78 NSFI l , 79 LLC 1 i 80 M;CI 81 SUCCES (^ ( i l 82 LLFO w l 83 MSFO 84 LLCO E5 MSCO 86 MSFI I 87 MOP) 88 MScl 89 HOPl 90 NOPV EVENT EVENT NAME CATEGORY DESCRIPTION
- IE CHARGING /SI INJECTION SUCCES SUCCESS RI RHRS ISOLATED LLFI LOW SMALL FINITE ISOLATED RV RHR REllEF VALVES LIFT LLCl LOW LARGE CONTINU0US ISOLATED CDP OPS PORVS OPEN MSFI MEDIUM SMALL FINITE ISOLATED RSV RHR SUCTION VALVES CLOSE MSCI MEDIUM SMALL CONTINUOUS ISOLATED
[N i CA1 OPERATOR STOPS PUMP 0A2 OPERATOR OPENS PORV NOPl LLFO MIGH OVERPRES$URE ISOLATED
\ LOW LARGE FINITE OPEN RVR RHR RELIEF RESEATS ASFO LOW TMALL FINITE OPEN POR -PORVS RESEAT LLCO LOW LARGE CONTINUOUS OPEN MOP 1 MEDIUM OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED MSFO MEDIUM SMALL FINITE OPEN MSCO MEDIUM SMALL CONTINU0US OPEN
[] HOPV HIGH OVERPRESSURE VSEQUENCE 5 1109D:1D/073091 C-28
FIGURE C-7. V0 GILE CHARGING HITHOUT ACI EVENT TREE O lt #1 RV CDP 00 OAi OA2 tyt Pot 1 SUCCtl I i I- - 2 LLF1 3 LLCl tO - l I 4 $UCCtl 5 LLF1 6 MSF! 7 LLCl 8 MSCI 9 MOPI 10 suCCis 11 LLFO 12 LSFO 13 LLFO 14 LLCO 15 suCCEl i 16 LSFO 17 LtF0 l 18 LLFO 19 LLCO _ 20 MSFt M __._ _ _ 21 MOPI r 22 MSCI i 23 HOPI 24 $UCCis l 25 tsF0 26 LSF0 I 27 LLF0 28 MsF0 V. !
$0 31 SUCCES I
32 LLF0 l 33 LLCO 34 SUCCil r 5 35 LLFI _ _l 36 MSFI 37 LLCl 38 Mst! 39 suCCt:
- I 40 LLFO l
41 MSF0 42 LLC 0 43 MSCO 44 MsFI 45 MOPt Og 5 ,' 46 MSCI 47 HOP 3 48 HOPV 49 SULCES i 50 LLFO I 51 LLCO 52 tuCCES N ! 53 LLFO
\ 54 LSF0
'y l I 55 LtF0 56 LLCO
' 57 $UCCis i
58 LSFO
, 59 LSF0 1
60 LLFO l 61 LLC 0 62 MSF1 y l 63 Mopi 64 MSCl 11090:10/073091 C-29
FIGURE C-7. V0GTLE CHARGING HITHOUT ACI EVENT TREE (Cont'd) N] v IE RI RV CDP 00 DA1 OA2 RVR POR l i 65 HOPI 66 SUCCES f] 4 l 67 LSF0 68 LSF0 l 69 LLFO 70 MSF0 71 LLCO 72 MSCO 73 SUCCES i 74 LLFO I 75 LLC 0 76 SUCCES i I 77 LLFI I 78 MSFI 79 LLCl I 80 MSCI 81 SUCCES 1 I 82 LLFO (s I 83 MSFO (' , 84 LLCO i 85 MSCO 86 MSF1 l 87 MOPl 88 MSCI
=i 89 HOP 1 90 HOPV EVENT EVENT NAME CATEGORY DESCRIPTION IE CHARGING /S! INJECTION SUCCES SUCCESS R1 RHR$ ISOLATED LLFI LOW SMALL FINITE ISOLATED RV RHR RELIEF VALVES LIFT LLCl LOW LARGE CONTINUOJS !$0 LATED CDP OPS PORVS OPEN MSFI MEDIUM SMALL FINITE ISOLATED OD OPERATOR CLOSE SUCil0N VALVES MSCI MEDIUM SMALL CONTINUOUS ISOLATED OA1 OPER ATOR STOPS PUMP HOPI HIGH OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED OA2 OPERATOR OPENS PORV LLFO LOW LARGE FINITE OPEN RVR RHR RELIEF RESEATS LSF0 LOW SMALL FINITE OPEN
'% POR PORVS RESEAT LLCO LOW LARGE CONTINUQ)S OPEN MOP 3 MEDIUM OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED MSFO MEDIUM SMALL FINITE OPEN MSCO MEDIUM SMALL CONTINU0US OPEN HOPV HIGH OVERPRESSURE VSEQUENCE 7'T U- 'O 11090:10/073;41 C-30
'.GURE C-8. V0GTLE LETDOWN ISOLATION - RHRS OPERABLE WITH ACI EVENT TREE 's IE RI RV CDP RSV OA1 OA2 RVR POR 1 SUCCES i I 2 LLFI I 3 LLCl 4 SUCCES l 5 LSFI 6 LSCI /9- 7 HOPl (j ,
8 SUCCES r i 9 LSFO I 10 LSCO 11 SUCCES L_ _ 12 LLFO l 13 LLCO 14 SUCCES i l 15 LSF0 l 16 LSCO 17 SUCCES i l 18 LSFI I 19 M&l 20 LSCI l 21 NOPI 22 HOPV l /% 23 SUCCES k 1- I 24 LLFO b l l 25 LLCO t 26 SUCCES 1 - l 27 LSFO l 28 LSCO 29 SUCCES r ! 30 LLFO I 31 LLCO 32 SUCCES i l 33 LSFO l 34 LSCO 35 $UCCES i l 36 LSFI I 37 MOP! 38 LSCI ( l 39 HOPI ( 40 HOPV EVENT EVENT NAME CATEGORY DESCRIPTION IE LETDOWN ISOLATION SUCCES SUCCESS l R1 RHRS ISOLATED LLFI LOW LARGE FINITE ISOLATED RV RHR RELIEF VALVES LIFT LLCl LOW LARGE CONTINUOUS ISOLATED j COP - OPS PORVS OPEN LSF1 LOW SMALL FINITE 1101ATED ' g RSV RHR SUCil0N VALVES CLOSE LSCI LOW SMALL CONTINU0US ISOLATED g'j OA1 OPERATOR STOPS PUMP HOPI HIGH OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED CA2 OPERATOR OPENS PORV LSFO LOW SMALL FINITE OPEN RVR RHR RELIEF RESEATS LSCO LOW SMALL CONTINUOUS OPEN POR PORVS RESEAT LLFO LOW LARGE FINITE OPEN LLCO LOW LARGE CONTINUOUS OPEN j MOP! MEDIUM OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED i [ HOPV HIGH OVERPRESSURE VSEQUENCE 1109D:10/073091 C-31
FIGURE C-9. V0GTLE LET00HN ISOLATION - RHRS OPERABLE HITHOUT ACI EVENT TREE
^
IE RI RV CDP OD OA1 OA2 RVR POR i t
/' 1 SUCCES
( r l 2 LLFI I 3 LLCl 4 $UCCES l 5 LSFI 6 LSCI 7 NOPI 8 $UCCES
\ l 9 LSFO i
I 10 LSCO 11 SUCCES
- I 12 LLFO I
13 LLCO 16 $UCCES i l 15 LSF0 l 16 LSCO 17 SUCCES 1- i 18 LSFI I 19 MOPl 20 LSCI l 21 HOPI 22 HOPV 23 SUCCES r i I 24 LLFO I 2$ LLCO 26 $UCCES i l 27 LSFO I 28 LSCO 29 SUCCES i I 30 LLFO l_ 31 LLCO 32 SUCCES
. I 33 LSFO I
34 LSCO 35 SUCCES i l 36 LSFI I 37 MOPI 38 LSCI H-. 39 HOPI 40 HOPV i k EVENT EVENT NAME CATEGORT DESCRIPil0N IE LETDOWN ISOLATION SUCCES SUCCESS Rt RHRS ISOLATED LLFI LOW LARGE FINITE ISOLATED RV RHM RELIEF VALVES LIFT LLCl LOW LARGE CONTINUOUS ISOLATED
- CDP OPS PORvS OPEN LSFI LOW SMALL FINITE ISOLATCD 00 OPERATOR CLOSES $*1CTION VALVES LSCI LOW SMALL CONTINUOUS !$0 LATED
. Oh1 OPERATOR STOPS PUMP g
N/) - OA2 OPERATOR OPENS PORV HOPI LSFO HIGH OVERPRESSURE ISCLATED LOW SMALL FINITE OPEN RVR RHR RELIEF RESEATS LSCO LOW SMALL CONTINUOUS OPEN POR PORVS RESEAT LLFO LOW LA.RGE FINITE OPEN LLCO LOW LARGE CONTINUOUS OPEN MOPI MEDIUM OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED O HOPY HIGH OVERPRESSURE VSEQUENCE l 11090:1D/073091 C-32
FIGURE C-10. V0GTLE LETDOWN ISOLATION - RHRS ISOLATED WITH ACI EVENT TREE C i IE Rt RV CDP RSV OA1 OA2 RVR POR A 1 SUCCES (b/) I i 5 2 LLFI 3 LLCl 4 $UCCES i 1 5 LSFI l 6 LSCI 7 HOPI 8 SUCCES
,k f "- l 9 LSF0 I _ 10 LSCO 11 SUCCES i
l 12 LLF0 l 13 LLCO 14 $UCCES l d 15 LSFO 16 LSCO 17 SUCCES i l 18 LSFI I 19 MOPI 20 LSCI l 21 HOP!
._ 22 HOPV 23 SUCCES fp\ r l
l 24 LLF0 V 25 LLC 0 26 $UCCES
- l 27 LSFO I
28 LSCO 29 SUCCES i 30 LLFO I 31 LLCO 32 suCCES i l 33 LSF0 l 34 LSCO 35 SUCCES i l 36 LSFI I 37 MOP! 38 LSCI I . 39 HOPI ,q 40 HOPV s_ EVENT EVENT NAME CATEGORY DESCRIPTION IE LETDOWN ISOLAT10N SUCCES SUCCESS R1 RHR$ ISOLATED LLF1 LOW LARGE FINITE ISOLATED RV RHR RELIE8 VALVES LIFT LLCl LOW LARGE CONTINUOUS ISOLATED C0P OPS PORVS OPEN LSFI LOW SMALL FINITE ISOLATED RSV RHR SUCTION VALVES CLOSE LSCI-g s\ . t CA1 OPERATOR STOPS PUMP HOP 1 LOW SMALL CONTINU0US ISOLATED HIGH OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED k.] OA2 OPERATOR OPENS PORV LSFO LOW SMALL FINITE OPEN RVR RHR RELIEF RESEATS LSCO LOW SMALL CONTINUOUS OPEN POR PORVS R2 SEAT LLFO LOW LARLE FINITE OPEN LLCO LOW LARGE CONTINUOUS OPEN MOPI MEDIUM M RPRESSURE ISOLATED HOPV MIGH OVERPRESSURE VSEQUENCE U 1109D:10/073091 C-33
FIGURE C-11.
-: V0GTLE LETDOWN ISOLATION - RHRS ISOLATED HITHOUT ACI EVENT TREE d
IE RI Ry CDP R$V OA1 Ryt
\ OA2 POR 1 SUCCES i
I 2 LLFI I 3 LLCl 4 $UCCES i l 5 LSFl g l . 6 LSCI ( 7 NOPI 8 SUCCES
- l 9 LSF0 l
10 LSCO 11 SUCCES i l 12 LLF0 l 13 LLC 0 14 $UCCES i I 15 LSF0 l 16 LSCO 17 $UCCES i l 18 LSFI I 19 MOP 1 20 LSCI l 21 HOPI [ 22 HOPV k 23 SUCCES
, l 24 LLFO I
25 LLCO 26 SUCCES i l 27 LSFO I 28 LSCO 29 $UCCES
, l 30 LLFO l 31 LLC 0 32 SUCCES i l 33 LSFO I
34 LSCO 35 SUCCES i ! 36 LSFI I -37 MOPI
,O I 38 LSCI
() 39 HOPI 40 NOPV EVENT EVENT NAME CATEGORY DESCNIPTION lE LETDOWN ISOLATION SUCCES SUCCESS RI RHR$ ISOLATED LLFI LOW LARGE FINITE ISOLATED RV- RHR RELIEF VALVES LIFT LLCI L W LARGE CONTINUOUS ISOLATED
/' i C0P OPS PORVS OPEN LSFI LOW SMALL FINITE ISOLATED RSV RNR SUCTION VALVES CLOSE LSri LOW SMALL CONTINU0US ISOLATED OL1 OPERATOR CTOPS PUMP Mob i HIGH OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED 0A2 OPERATOR OPENS PORV LSFO LOW SMALL FINITE OPEN RVR. RHR RELIEF RESEATS LSCO LOW SMALL CONTINUOUS OPEN POR PORVS RESEAT- LLFO LOW LARGE FINITE OPEN LLCO LOW LARGE CONTINUOUS OPEN MOPI MEDIUM OVERPRESSURE ISOLATED HOPY HIGH OVE!tPRESSURE VSEQUENCE 1109D:10/073091 C-34}}