ML20087A519
| ML20087A519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1969 |
| From: | Robert Carlson, Dodds R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086U000 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-95-36 50-219-69-04, 50-219-69-4, NUDOCS 9508070048 | |
| Download: ML20087A519 (12) | |
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REGION I l
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' DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE 7
Report of Inspection
.e CO Report No. 219/69-4 Licensee:
JERSEY CENTRAL PONER & LIGHT COMPANY (Oyster Creek 1)
License No. DPR-16 Category B
)
Dates of Inspection:
May 1 - 5, 1969 Dates of Previous Inspection:
April 9 - 16, 1969 Inspected by:
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k/hfj R. T. Dodds, Reactor [Irispector D' ate' W
6//2/[f Reviewed by :
8 R. T. Carlson, Senior 1(eactor Inspector Date' Proprietary Information:
None SCOPE Type of Facility:
Boiling Water Reactor Power Level:
5 Mwt (for low power physics tests - 1600 Mwt full-term license) 7.,ocation:
Lacey Township, Ocean Co'2nty, New Jersey T_ype of Inspection:
Routine, Announced Accnmpanying Personnel:
D. L. Caphton on May 1
.3, 1969 (Section D.l. was prepared by Mr. Caphton)
Space of Inspection:
Observation of initial approach to critical, rtview of facility records, and tour of the facility.
9508070048 950227 PDR FOIA DEKO,K95-36 PDR
SUMMARY
Safety Items - No items of safety significance were identified during the visit.
Noncompliance Items - None.
Unusual Occurrences - None.
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j Status of Previously Reported Problems -
1.
Physical security appears to have been improved.
The entrance to the reactor building has been equipped with a solenoid operated lock that is actuated from the control room.
Also, no instances were noted where the guards left the gates unattended.
(Section B.2.)
2.
The relay contact instrument noise suppressors for the fuel handling crane have been installed.
(Section F.2. )
Other Significant Items -
1.
The Chemical Supervisor has resigned to accept a position j
I with Ebasco.
A consultant will be used to fill this position until someone is hired that has the qualifications required by the technical specifications.
(Section B.l.)
2.
Discussions were held regarding the definitions of " control room", " operator at the controls" and " facility operation".
(section B.3.)
1 3.
The fuel loading was started on April 10 and completed on April 28, 1969.
(Section C.1.)
4.
Initial criticality was achieved at 2117 hours0.0245 days <br />0.588 hours <br />0.0035 weeks <br />8.055185e-4 months <br /> on May 3, 1969, at about the expected rod withdrawal positions sequence "B",
37 rods fully withdrawn plus six rods at position 12 and two rods at position 8.
(Section C.2.)
5.
The core spray system was accidentally actuated for about three seconds on one occasion.
(Section E.1.)
6.. The ambient tests of the control rod drives, including friction and rod drop tests, did not disclose any anomalous operation, (Section F.1.)
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The original fission-chambers that were u' sed for. the; fuel loading were replaced with B-lO proportional-counters.
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(Section F.2
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1.
. Manaaement Interview - The fo.11owing items were discussed in a
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j management interview with Messrs. McCluskey, l Hetrick, Hess and.Bibb.
1.
The inspector acknowledged the action taken to improve -
plant security and to correct the instrument noise problem.
2.
Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor' Operator-requirements-were discussed to ensure that 'there was nol misunderstanding:
of the provisions of the license and 10 CFR 50.
3.
The need for the resolution of problem areas between:GE and-
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JC beforehand was emphasized.
GE's-reluctance to use 1/M plots during the initial approach to critical was cited as an example.
Mr. Hetrick stated that he thought that they had had.a clear understanding on'this particular issue..However, this was not the case.
All parties agreed that this'should be the case and indicated that it would be so in the future.
4.
Er. McCluskey stated that every effort was being expended to hire a qualified Chemical Supervisor.
5.
Mr. Hetrick acknowledged that the reactor vessel low-water-level alarm should have been reset prior to the initiali approach to critical, otherwise, it should not have been specifically required as a part of the startup check list.
6.
The need for fire extinguisher protection in the record' storage room will be evaluated by JC.
DETAILS A.
Personnel Contacted:
Principal personnel contacted during the visit included the following:
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. i Jersey Central Power & Light Company (JC) f
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T. McCluskey, Station Superintendent
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D. Hetrick, Operations Supervisor I. Finfrock, Technical Supervisor 4
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.D.
Ross, Technical Supervisor (In-Training)
F J. Carroll, Shift Foreman J.
Roth, Shift Foreman N. Nelson, Maintenance Supervisor E. Riggle, Electrical and Instrument Foreman R. Toole, Engineer Trainee General Electric Company (GE)
W. Hess, Site Operations Manager W. Bibb, Operations Superintendent D. Diefenderfer, Principal Test Design and Analysis Engineer i
R. Elms, Shift Supervisor G. Baston, Shift Supervisor R. Greene, Instrument Engineer B.
Administration and Organization 1
1.
Chemical Supervisor Mr. McCluskey informed the inspector that Mr. R. Doyle, Chemical Supervisor, had resigned on April 30, 1969, to accept a position with Ebasco.
The Radiation Supervisor, Mr. Kaulback, will supervise the chemical technicians and the technical supervisors will provide technical support until a qualified replacement can be hired.
GE can supply additional technical assistance as needed.
Mr. McCluskey
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thought he had found a replacement but the applicant turned down the job offer at the last minute.
Another candidate was scheduled to be interviewed on May 19, 1969, but in a phone conversation with this inspector on May 9,1969, Mr. McCluskey stated that his second prospect had declined the interview.
Therefore, a consultant from the firm of Shepart T. Powell will be utilized until a permanent replacement can be hired.
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..Mr.;McCluskey' stated thatLthe temporary absence of a
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ichemical'aupervisor'(position described by section:6.1.B.l.e.
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of the technical. specifications) was being handled the same-
.J way as if the - supervisor wais on~ vacation.
He pointed, out.
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that the chemical analysis tests were being performed in.
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accordance with approved' procedures.
He-again emphasizedi
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1 that every effort was being made to hire a _ qualified replace -
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^l 2.
Plant Security
.l It was observed that plant security had been' tightened.
No
-l instances were noted where the guards left-the' entrance to the plant unattended.. The entrance to the reactor building.
has now been equipped with a solenoid operated lock thatDean-either be unlatched locally with a key or actuated byl the, operator from the control room.
Escorts were required for all visitors in the' reactor building.
3.
operator Coverage j
1 The question of control room operator. coverage and the definition of "present at the controls during facility.
operations" was discussed with Messrs. Hetrick and Bibb.-
They stated.that the " control room", for purposes'of satisfying.
licensed operator requirements in Figure 6.1.2 of the-technical specifications,-includesz the shift supervisor's' office, restroom, and pantry that are located in the control room. ' The reactor ' operator will be considered 'to be "at the controls" as long.as he'is inside the area surrounded by the main control panels ' and in view ' of the associated instrumenta.
'l tion.
The operator will' not be considered to be "at' the controls" when in back of the main control panel.
The term " facility operation" will be construed to mean, anytime the reactor is not in the " shutdown mode".
Therefore, j
whenever the mode switch is in " refuel", "startup" or "run" j
a licensed operator will be stationed at the controls, j
Co is in agreement with the above interpretations of the requirements of the technical specifications.
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Reactor Operations ur s.
1.
Fuel Loadinq t
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'l The fuel loading was started on April 10 'and ' completed on m.
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April 28,l1969.
Details concerning the procedure for the j
'O initial-fuel. loading are contained in Sections.D and N of:
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'l CO Report No. 219/69-3.
Figure l' is a composite inverse multiplication plot-of the four source range monitors for e
the subcritical margin checks (strongest rod'plus position.10-
.I on strongest adjacent rod) as the. fuel was loaded.
2.
Initial Approach to Criticality l
l Prior to the initial approach to critical, a-detailed check list was followed to ensure that all required systems were operable.
Items checked and tested where required, included l
the following:
i a.
Atea monitors b.
Standby gas treatment system c.
Analysis of reactor water d.
Vessel low-level alarm and scram sensor e.
Vessel low-low level trip f.
Stack gas monitor g.
Radioactive waste effluent monitor h.
Valve check of core spray system 1.
Valve check of containment spray system J.
Source range monitors k.
Intermediate range monitors 1.
Liquid poison system including check of concentration, volume and temperature
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Refuel building-doors closed.'~and: locked
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Building security check-in established i.[
During the' review of-the records of-the above tests', it was.-
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'noted that 'all items' complied with.the applicable. provisions of the technical specifications.- However, the reactor. vessel' low-water level alarm actuated below the scram setpoint.-
According-to Mr. Bibb it had not.been reset at the time-because it was'not convenient...besides, it was not a require-ment of the technical specifications.- This item was ' discussed-during the exit interview.
originally, GE did not want to make an inverse multiplication plot as the control rods were withdrawn during, the initial approach to critical.
However, at JC's insistence, inverse multiplication. plots were made and,used to predict initial criticality.
The initial. approach to critical was started at' 1845 hours0.0214 days <br />0.513 hours <br />0.00305 weeks <br />7.020225e-4 months <br /> on May 3, 1969.
Criticality was achieved with a 60-second.'
period at 2117 hours0.0245 days <br />0.588 hours <br />0.0035 weeks <br />8.055185e-4 months <br /> on May 3.. A total of 37 rods -(control rod withdrawal sequence "B") were fully withdrawn', two rods were. at position 8, and six-rods were at. position 12 -at the time of initial criticality.
Also, criticality was achieved on rod withdrawal sequence "A"-.with 34 contro1L rods fully withdrawn and nine rods at position 8.*
Figure 2 is a composite Plot of the-inverse multiplication data obtained during the initial approach to critical, criticality was achieved with both rod withdrawal sequences at about the expected critical positions..About one decade was still available on the source range monitors after achieving initial criticality.
This was not enough'to make notch worth calibrations.
Therefore, a number of approaches to critical were' practiced by the operators before shutting down the reactor to install the five regular neutron sources.
The regular sources (10,000 C1) will allow use of' the regular in-core source range monitors.
khe fully withdrawn position is 48 and is equivalent to 24 notches of 6 inches each.
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Facility Procedures-J 1-l
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Plant Operating-Records i
[m A preliminary review was made of records to establish.
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compliance with technical specifications Item 6.5, " Plant
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Operating Records."
The inspector determined that JC had established all of the records specified in the. technical i
specifications; however, many of the records, due to.the early state of the; plant, did not contain data or any-
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recorded information.
l Following is a list reflecting the location'of active records:
Type Record Location -
i Smear Count Room No. 211 i
Air survey Count Room No. 211 Radiation-& Contamination Radiation Protection Office, Surveys Room No. 313 i
Stack gas sample i
Environmental release summation Marine life Chemistry Chemistry lab' Personnel exposure Radiation Protection Supervisor'.s Office Plant maintenance Maintenance Supervisor's Office Plant operations Control Room Periodic testing Technical Engineer's Office Plant operations review Operations Supervisor's Office committee
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, 'i An inspection was made of the record storage room No. 208,
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located on the second level of the personnel and office i
building.
The single entrance to the room is being kept j
locked.
Charts and logbooks were observed to be in storage.
Items were observed to be adequately identified to permit
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ease of recall.
Other items observed to be in storage were extra FSAR's, equipment maintenance and instruction manuals and spare unused logbooks.
The inspector observed no fire extinguisher or sprinkler system in the room.
Miscellaneous items of interest observed during the record inspection were:
a.
Scram reports b.
IBM printouts from R. S. Landauer & Co.,
for personnel exposures (JC has contracted Landauer for this service) c.
A report form covering 10 CFR 20.407 and 20.408 i
d.
A plant maintenance, control and authorization form, i
This form will be used by JC after the plant has been accepted from GE.
E.
Primary System 1.
A review of the reactor water quality records for the period of April 9 - May 5, 1969, disclosed the following:
0.95 umho (limit - 2.0 amho)
Conductivity 6.8 pH 0.02 ppm (limit - 0.1 ppm)
Chloride ion 1.0 ppm Boron The core spray system was accidentally actuated (operator forgot to reset the safety system when the pump breaker was jacked in) for about three seconds on April 17, 1969.
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Aside from a little turbidity in the reactor k
pressure vessel, it did not significantly affect the quality
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of the water.
5 F.
Reactivity Control and Core Physics 1.
Control Rod System l
Tests were performed on the control rod drives prior to the initial approach to critical for the purpose of determining the initial operating characteristics of the individual drives.
Tests at ambient conditions included (a) verification of control rod followed by an overtravel check on each drive, (b) measurement of the normal operating time required for " full in" and " full out" travel of each rod, (c) check of position indication for each drive, (d) measurement of drive line friction during the continuous i
insertion of each control rod, and (e) scram time of each control rod.
The inspectors reviewed all of the data associated with the tests that were performed after the fuel loading.
A summary of the results of the tests follows:
Overtravel check
- Satisfactory operation Withdraw time 52 seconds (limit 43-53 seconds)
Insert time 52 seconds (limit 43-53 seconds)
Friction Differential Pmssure-65-90 psig*
10%
50%
90%
100%
j Scram time (seconds)
- 0.31.0.40 0.82-1.01 1.35-1.68 1.56-1.91 Tech. Spec. limit (sec) 0.70 2.05 5.0 none.
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- The differential drive pressure during the friction test should not vary by more than 15 psig.
Several rods did not meet this require-ment; however, individual notch-by-notch tests using a recording oscilloscope to display differential pressure, demonstrated that the rods were operating properly.
The settling pressures were verified to be greater than 40 psig and did not vary by more than 13 psig over the full length of the stroke.
Settling times appeared to be normat - less than two seconds.
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The rod worth minimizer has been operable each time rods
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have been withdrawn except for one occasion when the fuel loading first commenced.
All rod withdrawals made during
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the period the minimizer was not operable were observed by 3
two licensed operators in accordance with the requirement of the technical specifications.
2.
Nuclear Instrumentation After about 1/3 of the core had been loaded, the four in-core fission chambers
(" dunking chambers") were replaced 1
with B-10 proportional counters which are more sensitive than fission chambers.
This change was required because the fission chamber count rates were approaching the 3 cps lower limit after the chambers were moved for fuel addition.
The minimum count rate observed during the loading before chamber replacement was 4 cps.
The four B-10 chambers were reading 29-39 cps for the fully loaded core.
The discriminator and voltage plateau curves for the B-10 chambers were examined.
The signal to noise ratio for each channel exceeded 50 to 1.
The four startup channels were adequate for the fuel loading and the initial approach to critical.
- However, they were too sensitive for the calibration of control rod notch worth because they indicated about 1 x 104 cps with the reactor just critical.
The automatic rod block has been 5
set at 1 x 105 cps and the scrams set at about 5 x 10 eps in the "startup" mode.
The five regular Am-Be sources (10,000 curies total) were scheduled to arrive at the plant on May 5, 1969, and would be installed as soon as possible.
This would permit the use of the regular in-core startup chambers and eliminate the requirement for auxiliary chambers.
Mr. Bibb informed the inspector that the relay contact noise suppressors (resistance-capcitor suppressors) for the bridge crane have been installed and appear to be operating satisfactorily.
However, the core had already been loaded so it was difficult to tell if they were of any real value.
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3.
Standby Liquid Control System
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3 The records for the standby liquid ~ control system for the
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period of April 1 - May 5,1969, were reviewed.- The: records
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show that the solution volume, concentration and temperature
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have been maintained in accordance with the requirements-of
- L' Figures 3.2.-l and -2 of.the technical specifications.
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June 20, 1968 J. P. O'Reilly, Chief, Emacter Inspection and Raforcement Brameh Division of Compliance MINTES OF CGIFLIANCE= JERSEY CENTRAL PGIER & L3GET COMPANY METING.
MY 15,1968, cr81ER CasaK WEIT NO.1, DOCKET NO. 50-219 A aceting 'among representatives of Jersey Central Power & Light Company, General Elestria Cogasy, and ceay11ance was held at the Oyster Creek site sa May 15, 1968. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss set-standing issues relating to the prosperational testing and initial fuel loading programs. Attendees at the sneeting weret 8Ekl$9 M
i R. T. Carlson T. J. McCluskey J. O. Keppler I. R. Fimfrock i
F. J. Nolas D. E. Retrick P. P. 011vadati ConBULTANES E. W. Reas F. Schwoorar. Pickard, C. E. Forwaan Love & Associates T. R. Bobbias, MUS Corp.
This meeting was a follow-up to an earlier meeting held on January 30, 1968.*
A sumoary of the principal itsas discussed and the degree of progress made toward resolving these issues is provided in the enclocure.
Itans requir-ing further follow-up by CO will be eevered la future inspection reports or subsequent sneating minutes.
The post-loading startup testing program was not included at this meeting i
pending further review by Co. It is planned to discuss this program, along with the remaimias outstanding testing problems, in depth with the appli-i cant and GE at a future meeting (probably im July).
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, Senior Rasetor
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Inspection Specialist l
Enclosure:
Division of Coupliance Principal Items of Discussion Qc:
R. T. Carlson w/enci
- Minutes of this earlier meeting were issued on February 20.
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PRINGIFAL HBIB 0F D13cU5810E PREW'RBATIQST,158T443 AfDJNITIAL31rgL_LemIEp.fROGRAM (Meeting with Jersey Centrel Power & Light Company May 15,1968)
A.
Freep, rat W I.Teeilan 1.
Control Rod Drive Testina January 30 status - GE's program for eostrol red drive testias" was not considered by C0 to be ma adequate checheut of the syntes prior to operation. The major esmeers with the propeeed program was that no testing was being performed at elevated temperatures prior to mastear operaties. In light of C0's sensern, 08 agreed to review their proposed program.
May 15 Moottaa - Foreman outlined GE's modified program of control rod drive teattag as follows:
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Fuel is Rosetor geput*'*M Power No Fuel An-300 600 1000 Ascom-1001 Test Cold bient est sei est sico Power Friction All All scram (normal charge) 5 timas e*a*
All 4
4 AMAP All Ecram (minimum charge) 4 4
Scram (sero charge) 4 High Level 4
In/Out - Timing 8 times os.
4 overtravel 8 times ea. All 4
Posities Indication 8 times os. All 4
All Bods Scram 2
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C0 Report No. 219/64-1.
- Following the individual control rod serse tests, the slowest and
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m ile this program represente a dettaite isysevennet, part h tarly la the unmiber of eeld seven tests, it still did met immerporate meestagful eentrol ved drive tests at elevated temperatures (esemastaan). In owport of this, et peroommel reempbestsed the testing that uns performed la a apostal meek-up rig at see Jose in thish the Syster Creek opetsel ved drives were tested ender mesmal and antisipated eteesmal operettas eenditions. hey alas pointed set that possible pueblems reseltias from I
thesmal supeestem were est asesidered to be likely besesse of the design tolerenees. CO askmewledged the above, het stated that there to still eeneera for the following reasons:
- 1) mesy emeesposted problems have been enesentered with sentrol med drive systems la genere1. 2) that the level of esperienee attained by W to date is not suffistaat te lead een-fidense that problems will met seest, and 3) that the syster Creek drives are - three feet Imager than the EER drives. C0 fismir restated their origiant positten that genteel red drive system seemet be eensidered fully shocked out with(ignif teemt mesleer poser operaties.fff of mammis j
temperettaos prior to s Og is surrently reviewing the control sed drive prosperational test pro-grams in light of C0's stated posities.
i la response to eartata senseras raised by 88 and agreed to by CO, the j
eestrol red drive testing daring the fuel leading program hss been slightly
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modified by GE.
All plaans) eestrel red drive feastiment testing does met i
have to occur after the etatret sell has been leaded. newever, prior to making ear attempts to askieve eriticality, eseh emessel ved will be fully withdraws twies, driven in ease, and seremmed ease at ambient temperature esaditimes. The serem test will he timed 3.
Y1bretten Measurenesta of Reacter Vessel laterests j
Jammerr 30 state - De pseeedere wee eensidered by ce to be dettaient la that measurements en the steem dryer assembly were not testuded and that testing asseptance ariteria were not spesified. OE agreed to ressanias the test precedere in light of the onesora empressed by CO.
i per 15 Meettaa..- peremma stated that the vibratima measure-meets pressen ked been empended to instude maneurements en the intet flew diffesor ender perturbed flow distribution eenditions.
Vibration measurneente en the steem dryers were seasidered by GE and rejected for the fellowing spesific reasoas
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- s. ' he needtags se the structure are esasidesahty teos them the ultimate sessesth.
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Vibsettens are met empeeted beoemas of the eas11 driving foress threagh the dryer teams (~three ft/ses).
e.
Air-water flew tests of the Syster Creek type dryer vases have shows se vibratiensk tendometes.
AR's susluottaa of this matter will be reviewed with 3RL.
Se subjoet of test aseepaanse ersteria wee not diseaseed at ehts meeties and v111 he pursued during deture visits. SB hee stated, benever, that aseeptamos ersteria vill be 8 7 x.ted into the test peseedure.
3.
Roseter Teasel Safstr Valves
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- GE had confissed that the oefety velves would be bemeh tested at the site prior to lasta11ation. R ia, uns aseeptable to co.
Mar 15.Meetiam - asse stated that the selves will now be est at the Crosby plant is noseasbusetts shortly be9ere lasta11e-tism and that eartified vender test reeerde will be provided.
Mees pointed est that a sessiving inspection weeld he een-dested to assase that the set point has est been disensbed.
es was told that this appseesh is slee esasidered aeseptable -
to CO.
4.
Meuld Ptiste Dre.tm Jaquarr 30 statug - the test pseeedure was semeldered by ce to be defistant in that the system's injesties espebility was not belas demonstrated under operating tempeenture and j
pressure ammadeions.
Mar 15 Epetion - Bees seitersted GE's positian la Jeseary that sash a test is emmesaseary beesuse the system utilises positive displaessent pumps. OS potated est that the peesesse differ.
ential between this system and the reester was less then 400 pai and that it was est ineenseivable that the systems ebeek valves might stisk. C0 emphaaiend the importance of testiss engineered safeguards erstems to the fellest estema prestisable and meted that there was se legiest reasse for set perfessins Y
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the test. Ce summarised their peetties by stettes that the system esmid not he eensidered as choshed out untees it see tested under eyesettag posseuse esadittees.
Another restow by e is belas essenstad.
- s. emessiamama m w Jammeer 30 Steams - he test penseeure use esmoldered by Ce to be deficient la that no gematisative da===ne==eten 1
of flew distrihetsma une betag made. W stated that this matter useld be reviewed.
- Flow and peessuse deny abasesteristies will 1
be ese med es M assales in a speetal test festlity. A gestitative air flow test, usias e*=ma-se se verify that as gases pleggias amists, will be applied en the reestains meestes.' en the basis of these tests, supplemmasses the total ayaten flow measurements to be condested la the hypeec leep. S was told that this psegree is new amneidered sesept-able by Co.
6.
125 Telt B, C. Greten I
Joamary 30 Str tus - the test psegram was esanidered by CD to a
be landegnate la that 14 did not instude a sapesity test of the batteries under desige need esaditions. OR esseed to sorteur the matter further.
per 15
- Bees stated that a espeeley test of the betteries he perfoemed under a lead of 47.5 hp.
Althsagh a positive emewer semad not be psevided in response to guastians esmeessing the =adav= lead seesiresset under assident sendittene. OE and JC peresumet stated that the 47.5 hp lead was asenter them the MBA lead. Assundag this is the sese. OS esasiders the test of this system to be settadeseosy. Op will soview the NCA lead regaisuusente for the 125 volt 9. C. erstem.
8.
lat p ted Pumstammal test Jeannary 3D Statana - Ce pointed out the need Ser a susteined inte-grated fumstlemal test progran prime to feel needtag. Laeluding het testing to the desses praettsal. Additisently, emphoste was pleoed on the importemos of tieing la peroament trainius of the Jersey Central operating crews to this test program. S -JC represostatives agreed to restow the sehjeet in light of CO's esmanete.
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J. P. O*Asilly
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- SE supplied ce with a draft describias the seepe e integrated fanstlemal test paegram ukteh they had developed. Basiaally, the intended progrca esseres s.
An integrated systen test will be perfessed la osajeneties i
with the Primary System Espansies Test. the roaster and i
rectreetation loops will be heated to rated temperstere and pressure osedittees and held for $6 hours. Baseuse of the tares heat leeses which would be lepeeed en the primary epstem the reester steneur eyeten esetxel red drive system, and emergener eendemeer erotem will be feelstad. She reester steammy erster: would be pLased la spesettes teuerd the and i
of the test te observe eyeten pertosmenes.
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pe11 swiss emeldous of the roaster vessel, a toes of ese1ent aseident seesarrent with a less of power will be samm1sted to demonstrate the satisfestery operatten of the regnized ognipment. The eere spray and sentaimmmet eyear systems I
will be wived to restreelate the water to tbs terms, but will otherwtae day 11eate normal system operatises. CO guestimmed the desirability of performing the test front operatius temperature and pressure esadistees. Bees assured C0 that the demonstratism perfe==== uns virtually just as seemingful from the sold esadition. Prior se feel leading et intends to operate the diesel generster with the anximum quantity of elastrieel equipaset in operaties.
e.
As part of the latesrated sometienst test, a primary system leak will be simulated by tajesting steem into the daywell.
The test will in part d=====** ate the esasitivity of the i
sump pumps to detest tasroases la tenhage. Ce metod that the salentated leakass from failure of a asetset red semb tube uns 5 y and that ^-" 37 tay11ed that sesh leakage usand be readily detested by the sump pungs. CO enemmented that verifiestles of this detestima sepability.
l es part of abs test use14 puweide monsiegful informattom.
GE stated that they westd esasider this matter.
la disenssing the aimstated primasy systen leak CO raised mesy i
questians regardies the operettomat and perde-amaa requirements of the estamatie depressorisation eyeten. It une moted that this erstem is asw with the erster creek plant. Ce genetimmed whether W had Sivem seasideratise to testieg of this system under rated pressure and temperature esadittens egnia potestas est the importaase of thew testias of engineered safety systems. It was apparent that this test had not been previsesly seasidered by the OE representatives and they agreed to give serises consideratise to this metter. C0 will fellev ^ V up.
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J. p. e'asilly 0-la genese1, og beltsves that as umsk of the seester systems ese setteetively baies tested as peastiest and thereaore enestdess the sospe of the 1stegrated fuestisest test to be adegnate. OS will follow up to accuse that edegente pseeedures are Leemed la seppert of these tests.
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xmittal put m Jemmar, so spans - co ineesmed as th. the feet leadies pseeedere was eensidered to be taadeguate and klablighted sevessi defistensies, particularly la the area of administsetive seatsels. W agreed to review the leading pseeedere la 11$t of 80's esaments.
Mar 15 Messima - A revised test program pseesdure was presented to 08 for review. This asw pueeedere was meted to beve satisfaster11y reopended to the followies previous 00 esasovant a.
The a h of shutdown margia demonstrations has been in-eressed fsem five to 14.
b.
Seren levels for the mustear instr=====*aties have been defined.
The mentres multiplicaties will be esattamenely plotted dusing e.
the needing. Resermalisaties will be does following detester movenant. It was meted that me mesties was made that fuel leading limits would be oneservatively establiehod based se y
the eeunt rate data. es stated that this westd be does.
d.
The =8=4==== oritical eere esafiguretten, with and without poises sortains, has been imeerporated late the procedure.
e.
The desian sapebility of each seetsel sed drive will be demonstrated with fuel in the reester prior to fattial ariticality.
f.
The aa=bda*=etive pseeedures beve been incomperated either directly or by reference sheets which will be attaebed to the pre @fias, gestifteattees, work Contaimosat requiremos
, health phyoies severage, staf limits, and passenste change reriew regnirements will all be oevered asserding to parames.
m CO will follow up.
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A facility eyeten cheshoff sheet is belag ineerporated as part of the leading program.
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Besteh phyelas regeisements have been laserporated into the g u.
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A psegram for operator and feel needies ogstemaet ebeek-j est wili be esadested. Ibn taspeetten psegram for esek feel assembly has not been fine 11eed. 00 will So H ow ty.
the revised pseeedere uma meted to acetata as signifiaast new ta-fesmettaa esacernies the besen stainless steel potese eartales.
So individual eartains beve est been tested for poissa verifiestism.
h is subject use d h w with W and the followies pertiment ia-femmetten was obtataed.
a.
dypseniastely 10 peroemt of the poisen eartatas wese shocked derise the minimes critical eere tests perfeemed at Valliettee.
b.
Se potees eurtains were fabrisated free seven heats of steel.
Each heet of steel was eheeked for proper beres esotent by mese speatzemoter measurements.
c.
There are tue gesspe of eartaine-- ~ 4100 pre bosom sad 4300-4400 pre bases.
d.
A single poissa strip est sentaining beron, when believed to esatain beroa, would be of significasse. Dependies sa the aere leestaan, this esaditism might set be detested and lesal molting eeund reselt.
e.
The reestivity worth of the poison eartains is approminately 10 percent g k/h.
Based on itema d. and e. Ce stated that verifiaatism (e.g., a bl==ha test) of the poisen eentent in att eartaine appeared to be regained. et agreed to review this metter further.
Jersey Caetant peracuest were asked to ubet degros they had er l
were partisipettes in the review of the fuel needies pseeedere.
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AltW some statements were modo regetding a review by the plaat I
i Operatimes Review Committee, the depth of this review sad the sole
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ef the Generel Office Review Beasd eeuld not be steerly assertained.
l R is subject will regoire further regler by Co.
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