ML20087A174
| ML20087A174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1968 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086U000 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-95-36 NUDOCS 9508040214 | |
| Download: ML20087A174 (39) | |
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I' Quality Control Inspection oftpe i
Oyster Creek Reactor Facility 4
Docket No. 50-219 May 6, 1968 i
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$t' TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
f A.
Background
i 2
B.
Objectives of the Quality control Inspection 2
C.
Planning and Organization
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4 D.
Manpower Utilization 5
E.
Inspection Results 5
1.
Primary Coolant Recirculation System 10 2.
Main Steam System t
16 3.
Automatic Depressurization System i
17 4.
Core Spray System 21 5.
Control and Drive System 23 6.
Feedwater System 25 7.
Containment System 29 8.
Miscellany
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30 l
F.
Summary of Problems Applicability and Current Status f
i 37 G.
Conclusions I
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Quality control Inspection O.~
Oyster Creek Reactor Facility 1
Docket No. 50-219 l
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A.
Backaround E
The Division of Compliance initiated a special inspection program in October 1967. This program,-different and more extensive than that normally conducted by the Division, was necessitated by the folbwing j
significant observations and occurrences:
l 1.
Conclusions by Coupliance that the Jersey Central Power &
Light Company (JC).was not expending the effort to assure
)
itself, to the degree considered necessary, that the re-actor plant it had purchased was being constructed properly.
2.
Findings by Cogliance that there was a reluctance on the part of the vendor, General Electric Company (GE), to extend its preoperational test program to meet objectives considered applicable to such plants.
3.
Observations by Compliance, and other concerned groups, of unusually poor housekeeping practices on the part of con-struction firms at the site, including the storage of crit-ically important components without protection'from detrimental environmental conditions.
j 4.
Failure of the reactor pressure vessel to pass the code-required hydrostatic test. This event grew in significance as the failure, a leak in a control rod drive penetration.
l 1ed to the discovery of widespread cracking in the control
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rod stub tubes and major deficiencies in adjacent stub tube field welds.
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5.
Recognition by Compliance that a specification for the in-
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stallation of a critical pipe run did not require nondestruc-tive examinationc. Nondestructive examinations conducted sub-sequently, indicated the existence.of poor weld quality and a necessity for extensive weld repair.
l 6.
Findings by Compliance that a firm plant completion date, which had i
'j been established by GE,was going to be adhered to by the applicant. The completion date was several months in advance l
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.of Compliance's earliest estimate of completion.
It' appeared that this coupletion date could and was being i
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est only by sacrifices in quality.-
.B.
Objectives of the Quality Control' Inspection i
m The objective of the quality control inspection was primarily to augment j
Compliance's normal inspection activities because of the. observations
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and occurrences outlined in paragraph A.
This special inspection pro-4 gram was to obtain information, in depth, in order to support the required i
" finding" that the facility was (or was not) built in accordance with the application. Adequate factual information to support this conclusion must be available prior to issuance of an operating ~ 1icense.
I A secondary objective was to ascertain the need and extent for additional inspection efforts by Compliance on other construction projecto.
C.
plannina and Ormanization A task group of seven Compliance representatives was formed in October i
1967 to conduct the special quality control inspection.- Five of these representatives were assigned as site' inspectors.. The remaining two i
representatives were supervisors who, in conjunction with our engineer-ing consultant Parameter, Incorporated, developed the detailed plan of action and the procedures under which the task group functioned.
The major features of Compliance's overall approach to this special in-spection were as follows:
1.
The inspection effort would not entail an unacceptable per-turbation to our normal inspection activities.
The time spent at the site, by each inspector, would be limited 2.
1 to several days, with sequential rather than parallel' appear-ances, so as not to overpower the on-site staffs of the applicant and his vendors.
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.t 3.
The inspection effort would be focused on systems relating to nuclear safety.
i.
4.
The inspection effort would recognize that the records at the plant site were incomplete.
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n e detailed review would focus on whether the plant was constructed in accordance with the requirements in the detailed design specifications rather than on whether the design specifications were adequate.
6.
The time allowed for the inspect. ion would be restricted v
because of the early scheduled coupletion date for the j
facility.
1 The approach to the technical problem of achieving the desired objectives -
of the inspection required that Compliance obtain the GE and the Burns di Roe (34A) design specifications for a number of the reactor systems.
n ose design specificationa included information on the prdcedures to control the procurement and installation of casoonents and complete systems. In addition, the expertise of our engineering consultant, in conjunction with Coseliance's past experiences, was used to select those systems where, from an engineering standpoint, difficulties would be ex-pected in achieving high standards of quality in construction.
An evaluation of ths information and documentation available indicated.
that the inspection effort should be concentrated on seven specific reactor systems.
It was felt that the results obtained from a sampling program of this magnitude would b~e sufficient to base an' evaluation of l
the overal quality of construction. The systems selected were es
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follows: 1 t
l 1.
Primary coolant recirculation.
2.
Main steam 3.
Automatic depressurization.
4.
5.
Control rod drives.
I 6.
7.
Ccatainment.
i The field inspectors were assigned inspection areas based on their back-i grounds and experiences. In addition, they were provided with all the JJ The pressure vessel was excluded in that a separate Compliance in-
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spection program had been in effect, and was continuing.
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0FFICIAL USE ONLY technical d ormation available on the selected systems. They were also carefully briefed at Headquarters prior to their site visits. The in -
spection areas that received heavy emphasis, both at briefings and at the site, included the following:
n 1.
Were the materials used certified appropriately as to physical and chemical properties?
2.
Had calculations been perforised to assure that the field in-stallation would be satisfactory, e.g., weight balances and flexibility analyses for piping runs?
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3.
Was the fabrication and erection of each system done in con-formance with the detailed design and/or purchase specifica-tions for that system?
4.
Was the amount of inspection done by the vendor, by B&R, by GE, and/or by another party adequate to show that specifica-tions were met?
5.
Were the results of tests conducted on completed systems, e.g., hydrostatic tests, satisfactory?
6.
Were components packaged, shipped, received, unpacked and/or stored so as to avoid physical damage or'other deleterious effects?
Compliance's experiences indicated that the results from a cross section of inquiries in these six areas, aimed at the seven selected systems, would demonstrate whether adequate attention had been given to quality control.
Although these areas were emphasized in planning, each inspector was on-l couraged, and expected, to exercise his experienced judgment in determining where to focus his attention.
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D.
Manpower Utilization The task group spent 16 man-days at the site in activities directly re-lating' to the special quality control inspection effort. This effort was supplemented by nine man-days at the GE offices in San Jose, California, and one man-day at the Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) offices at a-l Greenville. Pennsylvania. These visits were made between November 21 and December 13, 1967. Several follow-up trips were also made but these did not relate to direct inspection.
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Inspection Results a
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The inspection findings described' in this section of the' report'were ob-tained by the implementation of the plans outlined in Section C..The-p) inspection techniques actually employed were as follows.
2 2
1.
Direct observations of hardware.
t 2.
Interviews with cognisant representatives of the various firms involved.
3.
Examinations of design specifications originated by GE, 34A, and engineerin6 subcontractors.
4.
Reviews of drawings, procurement orders and specifications, construction inspection records, reports of purchaser in-spections, certifications by suppliers, radiographs, quali-fication records of welders, welding procedures, and appli-cable sections of codes.
The results of the special quality control inspection program on the seven selected systems are as follows:
1.
Primary Coolant Recirculation System a.
Description and Function i
This is a five-loop system, each loop consisting.of a recirculation pu g that removes 32,000 gym of water i
from an annular region surrounding the core and there-af ter discharging it into the plenum beneath the core.
The interconnecting stainless steel piping is 28 inches in diameter. The attachment of this piping to the vessel necessitated ten nossles, which are located below l
the elevation of the bottom of the reactor cora. The piping in each loop descends about 40 feet lower than 1
its connecting nossle, to the location of the recircula-tion pungs.
If the integrity of one of these recircula-I tion loops was lost, the pressurised system would nearly I
empty the reactor vessel of coolant. Because of the elevation differences, even though the reactor vessel
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reduced to drywe11' ambient pressure, the cooling was water in the vessel would drain to a level which would leave the core uncovered, if nothing was done to refill the vessel.
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pumps, nossles and valves' involved were central issues in the inspection of this system. Attention was also given to the support. structures for these members.
in b.
Material and Prefabrication Reliability
.H-GE field inspectors actively attempted to insure that i'
the chemical content, heat treatments, velds, dimen-'
f sional tolerances, nondestructive inspections, and
.g documentation of work done at the prefabrication shops',
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and supplie n all met the GE specifications', and/or i:he applicaole codes. The frequency of their visits to vendors' shops was about' monthly, and the problems discussed in the reports of these visits showed that an independent review of vendor performance was f
achieved by GE.
These inspectors were evidently effec-tive. We found no evidence to the contrary in our ex-amination of their reports. This examination was made in the light of the formal instructions provided to l
the GE inspectors by their firm. Also, our independent i
review of purchase specifications and material mill
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test reports reinforces this conclusion. No discrep-ancies were observed. From the range of topics discussed, and the'esaner in which they were treated in the inspec-tors' reports, one must conclude that they adequately
. j discharged their responsibilities.
i c.
Field Fabrication Installation of the recirculation piping was contracted to the Almira11-Doyle Company by 56A. GE audited both 4
firms through its field engineers, who were assigned full a}
time at the site with specific responsibilities for given I'
systems.
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(1) Stress concentration Areas Compliance noted that the specified blend contours k.
were not provided in preparation for the piping welds to the primary pusy casingt. GE had specified that 3/4" radii were to be provided. Our consul-tant concluded that the lack of acceptable contours 6
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st these' joints, and the sharp corners that were observed at the transitions.from weld
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preparations to the tapers, and also from one taper to another, posed a crack initiation.
threat. - In response,'GE issued a field' order i
that called for the grinding of such areas to obtain an acceptable transition radius.. The' j
adequacy'of the repair procedures, as well as e
the thoroughness and odequacy with which the i
j grinding was done, are subjects we intend to
,ursue.
Also,'on the subject of crack initiation, hundreds-of pins, about 3/16" diameter by 1-1/2" long, were observed welded onto the recirculation piping, puey casings and main steam system. They were intended to support insulation. After having the condition-called to their attention, GE field engineers-stated that mounting these pins by welding was' definitely not acceptable to them, and the pins were, reportedly, removed. We will determine whether total removal was accomplished and, in particular, l
whether grinding of the residual weld spots, where' l
prudent, was done.
Also noted by Compliance was that numerous unnec-essary welding are strikes had been made on the nossles of the reactor vessel, resulting in pitting.
AlthoughtheappitcablecodesdonotprohibitunusedN arc strikes, our welding consultant warned of tEeTr general undesirability. GE stated their. intent to-repair the pits on the nossles and conduct a search
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for similar areas elsewhere in the primary system.
-l We will verify that the first has been accomplished, I
and review the adequacy and results of the additional j
inspection' and, if appropriate, repairs.
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(2) lasoection of Welds j
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The recirculation piping welds were fully radiographed, l
as required. The on-site radiography was performed j
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initially by the Eastern Testing Laboratories, Inc.
However, this fire did not provide acceptable radio- -
graphs, with respect to definition, contrast, and other code requirements.
It was replaced by Branch 7
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s Eadiographic Laboratories, Inc. A review by Compliance of the records of three-fourths of i
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the 38 field welds in the'five recirculation q
loops revealed that seven had required repair.
a The necessary repairs were successfully accom-plished, according to the radiographic evidence available.
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4 The' Division of Compliance welding consultant. -
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-Mr. J. Chyle, of Parameter,'Inc., reviewed a
.j sampling of radiographs that_ represented typical' welds on the system..-This selection included examples of vertical and horizontal" welds. The
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weld quality was considered acceptable. The radio-graphs themselves were evaluated as satisfactory with a few exceptions that involved the lack of j
penetrameters or their concealment by weld identi-fication numbers. Technically, it can be argued that this does, or, on the other hand does not,.
represent a deviation from Section I, FW-51 of the ASIE Code. GE was advised by Compliance that it
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was our position that penetrameters should be used
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for all radiographs at this site and on other reactor j
projects. GE stated that this would be done.
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The recirculation piping'was sufficiently large to permit personnel to enter it for visual inspection, which helped the contractor achieve an acceptable quality in the field assembly welds..This eliminated l
the blind welding, baffling, and remote inspection that was anticipated. Compliance representatives l
visually inspected the outward appearance of. one leg
.1 of a recirculation loop, and found that the weldments were smooth, and showed an acceptable degree of fusion, while there were no indications of burn-through.
(3) Alignment and Fit-up Although the GE specifications permitted weld peening to be used to obtain alignment of piping sections as they were joined, this technique was not employed.
'j Instead, on the initiative of GE's field engineers.
2' selective application of tungsten inert gas -(TIC) and metal arc weld deposits, by way of both location and depth, was utilized. This is an acceptable means 8
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of obtaining minor alignment adjustments and,
' I according to a Gg field engineer who was ques-i tioned, was employed successfully... including j
d' the achievement of the 0.055-inch vertical align-ment tolerance for the pusy casings. As a side issue, our engineering consultant raised questions
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regarding the possibility that bending moments,
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which might be expected to be transmitted through
,f the pumps as their loops are heated, were not con-sidered in the pump design requirements. The Division of Compliance plans to obtain more detail 4
on this point.
No records were available on the fit-up and final closure welding which affect the installed stress condition of the loop. However, from discussions with GE's field engineer about details of the 1
methods utilized, Compliance concluded that the closures were made so as to avoid unacceptable residual stresses.
(4) Care of Completed System i
It was learned that when the loops are drained the l
main hangers must be blocked to avoid over-stressing the piping. This matter will be pursued further to
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assure that the hangers were, 'and will be, released and reblocked in a timely manner during filling and draining operations associated with hydrostatic test-e ing, chemical cleaning, and similar tasks.
(5) Weld Wire control The Division of Compliance independently verified that reasonable control was being maintained over the com-y position of weld wire. for the TIG process. On an un-announced basis 'several sasyles of Types 316 and 308 stainless steel wire were obtained through GE from i
the weld crib of Almira11-Doyle. Our ID laboratories
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analysed the wires for chemical content. All con-stituents were within ASTM specifications, except the j
nickel content in the type 308 wire, which was determined to be 9.4
- 0.3 we. %(spec. - 10.00 ' to 12.00 wt. %), and the chromium content in the 316 wire, which was 19.00 t 0.7 wt. % (spec. - 16.00 to 18.00 wt. %). Reference to 9
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the DES, confirms that departures of the magnitude
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observed are unimportant to the obtainment of sound welds.
1 d.
Conclusions.
Our conclusions' regarding the recirculation system were:
1;.
-l (1) There is adequate evidence to conclude that the GE field inspectors were professionally qualified and ai maintained an acceptable degree of survei,11ance over the vendors that supplied the pumps, piping, valves, I
and the support system. No evidence was observed that significant deficiencies exist in. the materials used, or that fabrication methods or results departed from i
the procurement specifications.
9
.o (2) - Unused _ arc strikes, unnecessary stud attachments, and Tailure to meet contour specifications are three ob-servations that cause some concern about the quality-of the field erection effort. However, firsthand ex-i i
amination of a portion of the system, an expert review of radiographic evidence of the quality of weldsents, j
examination of a large sampling of the weld histories, t
GE's conserva' ism in achieving stress-free final t
closures, interior vis'ual-examination of pipe welds as erection proceeded, and a spot check that indicated i
reasonable control over weld wire composition, are all factors that indicate that the recirculation system has been satisfactorily constructed.
(3) There are several items that compliance intends to pur-sue further. These are mainly to verify that GE has followed its intended course of action in remedial tasks.
2.
Main Steam System 1
I a.
Description and Function I
l Two 22-inch lines conduct the saturated steam raised in the reactor vessel to penetrations in the drywall, and from there to the turbine. On each side of the drywell membrane an 4
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q Cer1Cru. us: Om.T isolation valve is located in each line -- four valves are involved. One valve in each line must close tightly if'the drywell is to be successfully isolated. Flow restrictors in the form of venturis are mounted in each line, approximately 40 feet from the reactor vessel.
Their purpose is to limit steam flow in the' event of a break in the line downstream from their location.
It is necessary to restrict flow if a break occurred in a staan line, in order to limit the loss of coolant from the reactor vessel during the period that the isolation valves are y
l closing.
b.
Material and Prefabrication Reliability (1)(certification of Pios In reviewing the procurement-history of the major ~
portion of the stes:s piping, which was supplied by -
the U. 8. Steel Company, Compliance encountered con-flicting material certifications, lack of certifica-tion that supplementary ASTM requirements igosed by B&R were met, long delays on the part of those asked to supply corrected certifications,.and evidence that off-site assembly of pipe sections was undertaken before the pipe at hand was properly certified. -Accepting after-the-fact certifications, the suppliers' excuse that typographical errors led to the. conflicting certi-.
fications, and the four party (GE/B&R)tlhwQApe Inc./U.S. Steel) chain through which the certifications I
had to pass,as the cause for the delay in certification of pipe assembled off-site, there is still some un-certainty as to whether the main steam piping met. the specifications intended by 361. It is Coay11ance's intent to pursue the matter to determine the accept-i
. ability of the pipe used for the main steam line.
1 l
hItwasnotedthataGEVendorQualityControlinspector made reference in a report to pits in a section of steam piping. The minimum wall thickness at the loca-tion of the deepest pit was asasured to be 1.095",
j whichwassaidtoexceedthe1.066"requiredbycode.)
However, it was also noted that the B&R specification required an additional corrosion thickness allowance of 0.088" above that required by code. Based on this, the minimum well thickness is at least 0.059" below f
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I that specified. A determination will be made j
that the pipe was -specifically approved for use ~
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' by GE after the defects were discovered.
j L-(2)[Be11ows Classification -
Cogliance inquired.why the California. State In-V i -
spector certified the bellows expansioni joints ego j
located at the drywell penetrations as' Class C f'
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vessels, rather than Class B (ASIS Section. III, N-132 & N-133). After GE had explored the matter,
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~t it.came to the conclusion that it had erroneously I
specified.the bello'ws to be Class C vessels, which.
led to the State inspector's notation that they were inspected against Class C requirements..The' j
o manufacturer. Solar Aircraft Co., claims to have manufactured the bellows to Class B standards, even though not required to do so, according to GE repre-sentatives. GE is attempting to have the bellows
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recertified as Class 3 vessels.
(3)pFlow Restrictors Following their fabrication the venturis,' or flow i
restrictors, in the steam lines were to have been c
shipped to a testing laboratory for calibration.
Subsequent to the issuance of initial B&R specifica-tions, the requirement for their calibration was eliminated. Compliance will review the reasons for
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the elimination of this reouirement and ascertain the.
necessity for verification of performance.
i (4) Vendor Shop Radioaraphy One of the rubcontractors (Tubeco. Inc.) responsible i
for main steam pipe subassemblies experienced difficulty in achieving acceptable radiographic services from three different firms.- The difficulty resulted in re-(
radiographing some of the subassemblies af ter installa-l tion in the reactor system. The new radiographs dis-l closed seven questionable welds, of which surface r
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inspection or treatment eliminated all but two from 4
further consideration. Further investigation and possi-l
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ble repair of these two welds was promised by GE.
Coupliance will review this matter further.
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Field Fabrication g
I (1) Bellows Restraints j
g Again in regard to t.he bellows expansion joints, l
travel restrainers were specified'by B&R. Although.
the large position stops were observed to be in j
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. place by CompMance, the bellows travel restrainers f
could not be located. On-site GE engineers reasoned l
at the ties that the restrainers were unnecessary..
4 b.
i in view of the large stops. Subsequent to that dis-P g-
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cussion, it was learned that GE determined the.re-O i
strainers were necessary and proceeded to have them
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installed. Since bellows expansion joints are used l
in numerous other places in the plant, we have re-quested that GE verify that, where needed, specified stops and travel restrainers exist on all bellows used in conjunction with the containment. structure, j
Compliance will ensure that a verification takes c
place.
~W (2) Stress Relief Review of the records of the stress relief of a weld connecting a main steen line to the reactor vessel indicated the stress relief temperature specified (12500 F.) was exceeded for 85 minutes. The maximum K
stress relief temperature noted during this period '
was 13100 F.
The B&R specification admonished that -
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't "more-than-normal' care" should be tahan to see that M@ '
the stress relief temperature was not exceeded by more
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than 25' F.; also, that a sufficient number of thermo-M)
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couples should be used to assure proper control.
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.f the.particular case at hand, 'two thermocouples were gj recorded and a third utilised to control the tempera-ture. Subsequent to pointing out to GE that the weld' had been overheated, Compliance was informed that the i
cognisant B&R engineer considered the stress relief
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to have been done satisfactorily. Compliance'is not j
in full agreassat and has requested that additional 1
. information be provided to support the conclusic t of
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the B4A engineer.
(3) Protection of Control Equisment The solenoid-controlled pneumatic valves, that direct 13 WFICIAL USE ONLY i
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e compressed air to and from the pistons that hold open the isolation valveu, were not modi-fj fied to afford them protection from the accident
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environment-(33 psis, 2750 F. saturated steam).
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similar solenoids that, operate the ~ depressuriza-tion valves, were specifically modified by the.
l addition of a cover and gasket around the' solenoid t
and an extra thick coating of epoxy on the coil.
4.y R It is mandatory that the isolation valves withstand
.the accident environment, since our contact with GE confirmed that an electrical short could result-h-
in reopening the valve..GE has indicated it would undertake a review to determine specifically whether all critical' electrical equipment susceptible l
to the accident environment was designed and fabricated so as to provide adequate protection. Compliance will follow this matter closely.
(4) Cold Sprina Our inspector noted in the B&R field record of the closure welding in'the steam lines that one of the final welds F 1008, which is inside containment, was made after the pipe was. sprung about 13/16". Although we have requested that the engineering approval for' this amount of cold spring be produced for our review, GE has not been able to do so.
Conflicting verbal' accounts of the amount of springing;that took place have lent saphasis to this inquiry. Compliance 'is pursuing its inquiry at a higher level in GE.
(5) Weldina l
The pipeline attachment welds to the penetration.
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bellows and two interior welds in the assembly became -
i a controversial subject during our examination of the
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steam system. Because of the double-wall construction, j
GE stated it was'not possible to get satisfactory.radior ;s, h j
g graphs of the welds even though the B&R specifications 4-f g.
required them to be inspected in accordance with Part N-624 of the ASDE Section III code. Our initial review j
.l of the radiographs showed them to be marginal with respect to contrast and definition. No flaws were ob-served in the welds.
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gubsequent to the first visit, the joints were re-radiographed utilising a variation' of the original
[
technique... Review of the films found four of.the
/O
)-
five welds to be adequately radiographed and sound.
3 On pet welds in the guard pipe, how-ever, could not be adequately tested, nor. wore the origins 1 films taken by the vendor in the shop. con-side' ed to satisfy the code acceptance criteria, f-l r
Although the weld in quostion is not a atrength weld,'
,F its suitability for the intended service remains an
- -f unresolved item which Compliance is pursuing.
- i d.' Conclusions I
h ere are facts concerning the fabrication of the main steen lines, and their associated components, that prohibit the making of a satisfactory finding at this time. With regard to this system, Compliance feels that they must have additional evidence in the following areas:
(1) All bellows expansion joints contributing to containment are properly equipped with travel restrainers and position stops.
(2)' All such expansion bellows were manufactured to standards for Class B vessels..
4 (3) he welds that attach the pipes to the penetra-tion bellows are suitable for the intended service.
(4) Re # pits that are known to exist in the main steam piping are inconsequential insofar as the service-ability of the piping is concerned.
t (5) ne quality of the main steam piping is unques-tionably' adequate for the intended s'ervice.
(
(6) ne excessive temperature experienced by the-
)
vessel.moasle_during stress relieving did not t
esiiiironise its serviceability.
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(7) The records of field stress relieving of other primary system components has been reviewed by GE.
- b(
(8) The two suspect welds in the main steam lines meet the applicable code acceptance criteria.
(9) The necessity for verification of performance of the steam flow restrictors has been evalu-sted..
(10) An analysis has been made of the effect of the
~
cold spring used in making weld F 1008, a final clostare, and that the resulting stress levels are acceptable.
3.
Automatic Depressurization System a.
Description s'ad Function j
The choice of this system for review was based upon its importance to the operability of the core spray system for.
the small-line break type of accident. Three of the four relief valves in the depressurization system must function properly if the primary system pressure is.to be reduced to a level that permits injection of water into the' core by
.the core spray system..The depressurization components con-sist of the valves and piping runs which conduct the steam
'i released by the valves to the depressurization pool (torus) for condensation.
b.
Material and Fabrication Reliability (1) Desian Specifications The B&R specification covering the discharge 4
piping from the relief valves, to the torus states that the piping shall comply with the Code for Fressure Piping ASA B31.1, 1955~ Edition. The t
applicable specifications in this code require
)
that.the blowoff piping for a boiler operated at j.
1000 psig be designed for service ~at 600 psig and 4900 F., instead of-the values specified by 25A -
0 180 psig and 400 F.
Compliance found, by computa-tion, that the pipe that was used does meet the ASA Code for the more stringent conditions of 600 psig and 4900 F., insofar as minimum permissible wall thickness is concerned.
16 L.
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During.the inspection, GE representatives stated that, although'not then possible,'they would be able to demonstrate by material certifications that the pipe actually used meets the specifica-tions to which it was purchased (ASTM A-106 Gr.3).
These certifications will be examined by Compliance.
(2) Protection of Control Equipment 2
As stated previously, (page 14) the procurement records showed that a cover and gasket and extra
-1 l
. thick epoxy were added on the coils of the solenoids that operate the depressurization valves. The epoxy used was the same as that used in the penetration seals, and had been tested for 29 hours3.356481e-4 days <br />0.00806 hours <br />4.794974e-5 weeks <br />1.10345e-5 months <br /> at 2810 F.
I 1
saturated' steam. Tests of the integral solenoid ~
valves in its penetration seal test chamber are planned by GE prior to achievement of full power at Oyster Creek.
While there is no evidence to show this to be a problem area, Compliance believes that the future tests should be completed. This item has been factored into our future inspection program for the Oyster Creek facility.
c.
Conclusions In view of.the fact that improper design conditions were evidently specified, Compliance. intends to obtain assurance that this piping installation is serviceable for the intended use.
4.
Core Spray System s.
Description and Function
[
This system must operate to prevent fuel melting, with the attendant release of fission products, if coolant is lost fron i
the reactor vessel. It consists of piping that will conduct l
water from the torus to the reactor vessel. Flow is established I-by page, which draw water from the pool,' through coolers, and deliver it to twin ring spargers located just above the core in the reactor vessel. Each sparger is equipped with multiple nossles, which were chosen and located to achieve a unifom spray pattern, in order that the core would be cooled effec-tively.
17 CFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Material and Prefabrication Reliability (1) Spray Nozzles 4
The spray nozzles were found to be a comeercially-
~ 'd supplied, stock item. The only information Compliance was able to obtain was that they are constructed of Type 1
303 stainless steel, which is known to be more sus-
'{
captible to corrosion than any of the odber 18-8
'1 alloys and, in particular, has poor resistance to I
intergranular corrosion - a point that Compliance l
will bear in mind during future inspections of this y system. Although no data regarding flow capacity, F
dimensional verification, or particle passing capa-l' bility were available, the efficiency of the nozzles will be evaluated from photographic evidence af ter the installed system is tested. Photographs are to be taken under full flow conditions. Compliance will compare these photographs with a motion picture that was taken of the design mockup in operation. This comparison will provide evidence upon which to base the spray nozzles' functional effectiveness.
(2) Ring Sparer 7s The ri;.
Agers to which the spray nozzles are attached, ere constructed of Type 304 stainless i
steel. The material used was properly certified.
The fabrication was audited and approved by GE quality control inspectors. However, the P. F. Avery Corpora-tion was the vendor. Since there have been recent problems with specific components manufactured by this firm, compliance has requested that GE reconfirm that the work performed by this vendor for the Oyster Creek project is, in fact, entirely satisfactory. Compliance will follow GE's progress in this matter.
1 (3) Piping No evidence of nonconformance to the appropriate specifications. ASTM-A-312 for the stainless steel
{
and ASTM-A-106 Grade B for the carbon steel, was de-I tected during Cokpliance's review of the procurement history of the pipe for the system.
18 0FFICIAL USE ONLY
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(4)' valves t:
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The' check valves, of which there are two in f
parallel for each of the two loops, were con-structed of material that met the required chemical and physical properties. The valve-bodies passed a radiographic test and two hydro-static tests, one at the fabricator's shop and a
another after their installation. Representatives
.,4 Q
of both the vendor and GE gave written approval of the dimensional accuracy, balance, and arm clearance a
f-of the valves. No deviations were noted in any aspect of procurement. of these valves.
There are about 125 other valves'in this system.
Cogliance selected, at random, the heat numbers of 20 of these valves and compared the certifications to the r
appropriate specifications. No deviations were noted.
(5) h 4
According to reports by a GE vendor inspector, the casings of the eight pues in the system were radio-graphed, and found consistent with code specifications, without deficiencies being revealed. The finished pumps est the specified flow requirements under design.
^~
conditions.-
c.
Field Fabrication (1) Pipe grection The welding of the piping runs for this system falls into two categories, because of the original fabrica-tion specifications. The high pressure portion of the system received 100% radiography. The piping from the suppression pool to the core spray pumps, the suction side of the system, was not radiographed.
l The pressure piping involved about 175 welds. Compliance visually exasised 28 of these welds and found them,-
f u6 der optical magnification ' to be free of surface indi-cations of porosity, sharp contour transitions, and ex-traneous weld material, inspection of the associated, radiographs, which themselves were of acceptable quality, 19 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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revealed no indications of flaws; a light, per-i missible 'emount of porosity was. visible' in some of the welds. ~CE site engineers estimated that I
i between 5% and 10% of the welds had required re-j pair at the time the piping runs were being 1
assembled.
j it he low pressure sections of pipe were constructed,
- I as noted above, without the aid of radiographic in-spection and, generally, to less stringent requirements j
-T than were specified for. the high pressure pipe runs.
In mid-October, GE ordered that all of the welds in l
these sections be radiographed. The result was that i
more than three-fourths of them were found to be un-acceptable. Espair of these welds was undertaken.
On a subsequent visit to the site, radiographs of nine i
of the 107 repaired welds were examined. De weld repairs were found acceptable by code standards. Two of~the
{
nine were considered borderline with respect to porosity; however, they were judged to be acceptable by all parties concerned, including Compliance. All such radiographs i
required acceptance by,GE, BMt and Almira11-Doyle--
the erection contractor.
Compliance reviewed records of welder qualifications i
and certifications of weld procedures, and found them-satisfactory. - No information was obtained other than i
the lax specifications to which the suction-side piping l
was constructed, that might explain uhy so many of j
these welds were deficient. '
- j 4
i d.
Conclusions j
The components of the core spray system were manufactured
~
'mder a reasonable emount of independent surveillance by GE.
l Compliance will confirm,'either through GE or independently, that the work done by the F. F. Avery Corporation meets-
~
j acceptable standards of quality. The possible problem with-the Type 303 stainless steel spray nozzles is recognised.
{
The field-constructed portion of the spray system was not
- i assembled originally under what'is deemed to be appropriate J
l quality standards. However, coup 11ance considers that GE's
)
action of radiographing these welds, and the ensuing repairs, i
overcame the major shortcomings. Coupliance remains cognisant i
of the large number of unacceptable welds that were dis-
]
covered.
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. orrscxAL usE oNix If no' adverse information arises regarding the per-formance of the F. F. Avery Corporation manufactured
{
components, and the system performs acceptably during 4
preoperational testing, compliance considers the core
.4
' spray system to have been adequately constructed.
y 5.
fjoy,t,rol and Drive System 4
~'
a.
Descristion and Function' l
[
There are 137 bottom-entry cruciform-shaped control. rods, j
.containing compacted boron ' carbide in sealed stainless I
steel tubes..Each rod has its own hydraulic drive mechanism.
The, inspection was focused on the coeponents -in the system that were pressure retaining members.
b.
Morerisi and Prefabrication Reliability l
(1) Quality Control Fronram The control rod assemblies are manufactured'in GE's l
shops at San Jose, California. Coupliance spent j
several days at the San Jose site, reviewing the
' l documentation zwisted to their. fabrication, and de-termining the step-by-step procedures and methods GE had applied to assure the desired quality was-i attained in the rod systems. It was found that rigid
~
4 inspection standards had been maintained, that the extent of inspections and tests was consistent with the number, subtlety, and consequences of the potential deficiencies, and that the administration of the quality j
control program was in experienced hands. The program is described in detail in hasadment Mc. 27 to the Oyster Creek Safety Analysis Report. Findings by the J
Division of Compliance support the statoesnes made in i
that document as'to the methods and procedures that were utilised during shop' manufacture.
(2) Pressure Housinas I
Each pressure' housing was certified by a California
'}
State inspector, and a GE inspector, to have been manu-factured in accordance with the ABIE nuclear code case 1270-N. The housings received a successful hydrostatic test at 1800 psig. The records of manufacture showed 21 WFICIAL USE ONLY i
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- J' that the housing flanges were steeped with identification missbers and pressure ratings, and contained an ASIE code approval symbol. The ma-terial certifications for these flanges indicated-
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they had been heat treated :and liquid penetrant.
and radiographically inspected without any devia-
/,
tions being revealed.
[
I Records of tests to which the pressure housing were i
subjected included some six' Data Sheet and Test, i
D-Report forms that were reviewed by the inspector.
Each form presented the results of some 86 tests.
i l
If a part failed to meet a given specification, the test was suspended until the deficiency was' corrected.
Detection of a deviation was followed by an inspection i
report with instructions for rework and retest..
(3) Control-Rod Drives i
One hundred forty assembly check sheets were reviewed i
by Compliance, as were an equal number of records of
?
hydrostatic, drive friction and scram tests. These records revealed that all of the rod drives sent to the Oyster Creek site had been successfully scram-tested, found to offer the appropriate driving friction, pad had been hydrostatically tested at 2110 psig.
About 200 material certifications were reviewed,15 l
of them in detail. These, along with the results of metallographic examination of 36 collet pistons and
. i 53 piston and index tubes showed that the materials-of construction met the ~ intended requirements.
1 i
c.
Field Fabrication
~ '
(1) Quality Control Proaram i'
l Three independent organizations--the installation con-tractor, 34R, and Gg--maintained surveillance over the i
j field work required to install the rod rystems. All radiographs were examined by a representative'of each.
I of the three firms. Our inspector examined five of 23 radiographs of three-inch piping welds, and found both' the radiographs and the welds acceptable. No slag ins clusions and miniani porosity were noted.
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4 Approximately 50 welder qualification test reports were examined. Some of these were i
compared to weld histories to determine if.
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.f only qualified welders.had been used. No dis-1 crepancies were noted.
I q
Five weld procedure qualification certifications
. were reviewed in detail by Compliance. The pro-cedures were detailed, and proper,1y certified to
.c the ASIS Code by the Certified Testing Labora-l tories, Inc., and approved by the Atomic Power l
J Equipment Department of GE.
Some 5,754 socket welds were made in the one-inch lines that connect l
the control modules and the pressure housing flanges.
Because of the size and type of welds involved, radio-graphy was not required. Dye penetrant tests were j
made by the welding inspector, however. These records were found to be complete, and no deficiencies were detected. During and following the hydrostatic test j
some nine defective welds were identified; their repair was underway at the time of the inspection.
They will be subjected to another hydrostatic test before they are accepted.
The material certifications available at the plant i
site were reviewed. The only deficiency noted was
+
that some of the certifications for carbon steel I
fittings did not list the actual laboratory analyses, l
but rather stated the fittings complied with the ap-
' l propriate material specifications. The GE Resident
' Engineer stated that this was not acceptable to GE, and that the measured values would be obtained.
l d.
Conclusions i
I Compliance found no substantial basis upon which to question
{
the quality of the manufacture or installation of the control 1
rod drive system. Compliance will review the results of the i
next hydrostatic test and the performance of the system during preoperational testing.
i 6.
Feedwater System l
a.
Description and Function The feedwater system removes water from the main condenser, l
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r and returns it to the reactor vessel, at an elevation and through a sparger that-provides good mixing between-
- . I it and the water being removed from the vessel by the recirculation loops. The four nozzles that permit the feedwater lines to communicate with the sparger ring are located at a higher elevation than the reactor core.-
~
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b.
Materials and Prefabrication Reliability 1
- v
- g (1) Material Certifications i
Compliance examined all of the certifications of the materials used in the manufacture of the swing-check (isolation) valves, and found that they met ASTM Standards.
(2) Valves j
l The feedwater system operates normally at 2850 F. and 1263 psig, but the design conditions specified for i
the valves are 3250 F. and 1440 psig. It was noted.
l that both the block valves and the swing-check valves (one of each is in each of the two 18-inch feedwater lines, which thereafter penetrate the drywell wall) had nameplate ratings of 8500 F. and 600 psig.
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Compliance will verify that the finally installed g
valves meet code standards.
c.
Field Fabrication f
.I j
(1) Welder Qualification Coepliance examined five of ~ the Walder Qualification Test Reports,' and found that two of the welders had been rejected because their test specimens failed to pass the bend test.
j (2)
Inspections t
A check of 20 records of field welds disclosed that root passes were fully radiographed, that the finished
)
welds were dye-penetrant checked, hydrostatically s
tested, and then radiographed. The radiographs of the.
finished welds, of which ten were examined by Comp 11ance.
24
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t-N showed the welds to be of high quality, with minimal porosity and no slag inclusions greater than 1/8 inch, which is inside the code limits.
j I
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d.
Conclusions I'
If GE can provide assurance that all the valves in the a
feedwater' lines are rated consistent with the intended service' conditions and the preoperational tests do not M
disclose any shortcomings in the feedwater system.
J Compliance will consider this system to be satisfactory.
t for service.
I 7.
Containment System a.
Description and Function Rupture of a recirculation pipeline in the primary system leads to the loss of coolant, which in the extreme case could result in pressurizing the containment structure to 33 psig with saturated steam (275' F.).
The integrity of this structure. and the penetrations of it, represent the degree of protection available to the public, following breach of the primary system. An important factor in de-termining this intqsrity is the energy absorption caps-bility of the retci used to form the structure. Also, the ability of the structure to withstand the thermal transient that accompanies the accident, and the durability of the I
penetration seals in the accident environment are important in determining the integrity of the structure.
b.
Material and prefabrication Reliability (1) Material Certifications Certifications of a'11 plate, pipe, and welding electrodes were reviewed by representatives of the Hartford Insurance l
Co., (Hartford), the firm that was retained to provide l
verification that the containment structure was construc-ted in conformity to the applicable codes. Compliance reviewed the procurement specifications for the.contain-ment vessel in their entirety, and then determined by way of mill test reports whether the material specified had actually been used. No significant deviations were i
found.
25 1
0FFICIAL USE ONIX
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(2). Shop Radioaraohv
~~
. Radiographs.of welds of materials 1/4 to 3 inches J
in thickness were reviewed by Compliance.. These radiographs were noted to be of uniformly good quality. The thinner welds were X-rayed in the l
shops of the Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. (C8&I),
+
while the thicker sections were radiograpb~ed by
)
sf the North American Testing Co. with a gamma-ray i
~
source. ~As the films were developed they were reviewed first by the shop technician, then by the -
. )
{
code inspector, and in some cases by a GE~ engineer.
Thereafter, the films are sent to CB&I headquarters, where they are re-examined. No unusual conditions were noted by. Compliance during a review of the radiographs associated with 29 welds, each of which J
were selected to show various thicknesses of ma-terial and seen arrangement.
l c.
Field Fabrication i
1 (1) Material Control Only Atom-Arc E-7018 welding electrodes were used for CB&I work; no others were permitted. These
-l
.alectrodes are coated, and have their identifying l
pumber on the surface of the coating. For these reasons,-it is considered to be unlikely for a i
welder to use the wrong type of electrode.
t (2) Field Radioaraohv The field radiographs were made with both I-ray i
machines and radioactive sources. The films pro-I duced were first examined by the C5&I welding super-i visor.and a foreman. After any repairs that appeared l
needed were completed, and radiographs for a' full i
j seen had been accumulated, they were submitted to the i
Martford inspector for his approval. Burns and Roe representatives simultaneously examined the films.
After these three reviews, and selective audits by GE representatives to assure themselves that accept-able levels of interpretation and picture quality j
were being maintained, the films were sent to C5&I's offices in M111 side, New Jersey, where a final 4
1 26 CFFICIAL USE ONLY s
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inspection of the radiographs was made. Com-pliance viewed the radiographs associated with 50 field welds and observed no deviations from f
the applicable code.
-i s
. g C MI retains those radiographs that indicate re-y pair of a weld is necessary, so that those ex-i l
amining the final radiographs can focus their attention on the area where repair was effected, to assure themselves of its adequacy. This is a cosamendable practice; it is not conventional.
+
Magnetic particle testing was used in those in-stances where it was physically ispossible to obtain a satisfactory radiograph. These tests were performed by C MI technicians, and witnessed by GE and MR representatives.
(3) Welder Qualification Qualification testing of welders was usually done by CMI in its own shops, but occasionally it was l
done in the field. Field tests were witnessed by GE representatives. No walders were permitted to attempt to requalify after faulty performance.
l i
If as much as 5% of a welder's work required re-I pair, he was either restricted to tack welding or to:minated.
(4) Weld Procedures Burns and Roe maintained approval authority over the welding procedures used by CMI. Both GE i
and Hartford also reviewed the procedures.
I (5)
Stress Relierina I
Field stress relieving was performed by personnel I
from CMI's affices in Hillside, New Jersey, in compliance with Section III of the ASME code.
Stress relieving procedures were prepared by C M I and submitted to M R for~ approval. Both MR and GE monitored the actual stress relieving opera-tions.
c 4
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_(6) Fit-up' and Dimensional Tolerances j
4 All fit-ups' during erection of the structure j
were witnessed by GE, to assure that normal
.. p.
fabrication techniques ~within'the.11mitations of the code were used. Areas of possible con-gy corn were application of heat'and excessive 1
[
cold working.
q.
y An outside engineering firm was retained at the coupletion of the second course to check center
'j L
lines, elevations,'and asimuth'of penetrations to insure that the vessel was properly started.
i (7) Field Observations j
Because of the advanced stages of construction.
I many sections of the containment structure could not be observed.- However, welds that were observed -
appeared sound. Successful completion of the over-pressure and leak rate tests, the records of which-i were reviewed, is further. evidence that the contain-ment. enclosure is sound.
i-
~
d.
Doctmentation Review In addition to those already mentioned Coupliance re-viewed records of weld procedure qualifications,. heat treat-monts, tensile tests, heat treatment. procedures, impact tests, code required U-1 and U-2 Manufacturer's Data Reports, i
a rubbing of the code stag, and other miscellaneous docu-_
mentation. No instances were observed where the fabrication history departed from specifications.
.s e.
Conclusions
- 1, Compliance reviewed a large portion of the documentation that exists on the fabrication of components for, and erection of, the containment structure.' Representative
.i assembly welds were reviewed and numerous selected radio-graphs of both shop and field welds were examined. No
~.{
indications of less than acceptable qualf ty of construction -
4 were observed. Compliance did not' find any area of concern
)
during this special inspection effort.
28
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WFICIAL USE ONLY
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a.
Chemical Cleanina
?
".i f Sufficient documentation was not available to Compliance i-at the time of the inspections to appraise the controls exercised during the chemical' cleaning of the primary system. However, an excerpt from the log of operations
'~
involved in th s cleaning of the condensate and steam i
,'y '
systems was reviewed,and there is reason to doubt that all of the BEA specifications were met by the cleaning con-I
. tractor - especially with regard to the' purity of the de-t mineralised water for the chelating solutions and final-flushing.- The sea specification called for water contain-ing no more than 0.10 ppa chloride. The log indicates that probably 5-10 parts-per million chloride were present in the water used. Compliance intends to pursue this
. i matter to determine whether stainless steel components might have been damaged in the course of the' cleaning, or other untoward conditions resulted.
b.
Storane of Materials and Components General storage practices were reviewed by Compliance.
In
'the case of. pipe, the usual practice was to receive it from the vendor with both ends capped, and a protective coating
(
of paint applied to the outside. surface (carbon steel pipe).
A visual examination was made of the exterior' surfaces upon-1 receipt, but the ends were kept closed. The paint was not I
inspected for integrity, nor were records of the visual ex-l aminations made. The pipe was stored on wood blocks out-doors.
It was noted that although stored on blocks, the j
pipe was in contact with sand and dirt that had drifted -
underneath the pipe.
)
i l
1 It was also observed that the complex stainless steel re-i I
actor upper grid plate structure was stored for at least a l
month in the same manner. A tarpaulin had been thrown over the top of the piece but little effort had been made to i
compleMiy protect the structure from windblown materials.
- l These casqa1 storage practices are undesirable under normal conditions. A salt air environment compounds the undesir-ability. Coupliance informed GE management of our concern about this point, and we expect to see a mondestructive examination of the grid plate and improved conditions at other GE construction sites.
29 0FFICIAL USE ONLY
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WFICIAL USE ONLY i
1 I
F.
Sussnary of Problems. Applicability and Current Status In the following section the results of our special quality control i
inspection effort on seven important primary systems are sussnarized.
{
For information, it is to be noted that these results have been dis-
}
cussed extensively and periodically-with management personnel and cognizant engineers of both Jersey Central and CE.
C r. n s c wgg 5/p.
1.
Primary Coolant Recirculation System
'T L,i
[
- a. / (1) Has the observed improper blending of radii on "j
the pump casing-piping welds been corrected?
.j (Page 6.)
/(2) Has this roblem bec.h reviewed for applicability e
to other fittings and other systems?
)
(1) Compliance has observed that the welds' at the pump casing-piping junction have been ground to I
the required transition radius.
h GE personnel have stated that all transition
[86' ey, 9. <
N*
regions have been inspected in the following, systems:
Recirculation, core spray, shutdown u g7v
~
kV d V ~ W'
/
coolant, emergency ' condenser, main sieme, feedf 3 0
7
- 4 d A "~
r* u>
water, and cleanup deImineraliser. Some improper
\\, go gjve_..
f transitions were noted and repairs have been
'#y
~
I W" #'
effected. Compliance will review these records prior to the final disposition of tSii proSliiiii.
W'"
r i
- b. s (1)
Have all insulation-support pins been removed from the recirculation piping and components?
(Page 7.)
s(2)
Has the applicability of this problem to other j
systems been appropriately consideredt iv parmM
- (h Removal of all stud pins is in progress.
M NM g/
&v f-*
p e r s ". ' "1 h M"
4 Attachment of insulation in this fashion was discontinued after the probles was identified.
30 WFICIAL USE ONLY
a, 7.
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- = j
=;.
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY j ~ J. l _
7 This limited the problem to the recircula-~.
.]
tion piping, main steam piping, and associated' pusps and valves.. Coupliance will verify that 7 g/3 -]
this renoval is accomplished.
)
I N.
}
- c. s (1) Wers residual weld spots that resulted from stud-welding the pins properly removed? (Page 7.)
i s
a GE personnel have stated that some weld spots gs c 3
'
- N f
will require grinding. This work has been
$M l
. initiated, but is incomplete.. Compliance will l
t ascertain that this condition 'is corrected.
.j
- d. / (1) Have the pits caused'by unused are strikes been
.)
removed from the vessel nossles, and from other
.j critical components when found? (Page 7.)
t The arc strikes on the vessel nozzles have not yet l
to+vr nfrastEs been removed. However, a procedure for repairing gm* 3 the pits has' been written by GE and approved by l
Combustion Engineering. GE personnel stated that' i
all piping that warrants examination has been 1
j inspected (insulation-removed). Miscellaneous.
l are strikes were found on most lines and are being repaired. According to.the GE project manager.
l all arc strikes found in this piping were con-.
sidered minor with one exception. This exception was a pit on the containment spray piping outside the drywell where it appears as if a welding lead was shorted against the pipe. GE has stated that they will' verify pipe wall thickness by UT inspec-
.f; tion in areas where significant grinding is re-
/
. {
, uired. Compliance will review records of all l
q repairs.
r 1
- e. / (1) Have bending moments through the main recircula-i tion pumps been accounted for properly in specifying I
the pump design requirements? (Page 9.)
i
)
[1)') Compliance is attempting to obtain a copy of the kwerr flexibility analysis performed by GE.
Some local W' ** d v
rm runest%>
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31
%p OFFICIALySEONLY i
.,...........,.m
.. ~ - -.. ~.. _ _.. _.
- g.. C.... _..r.'-
-o.< y:
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W, J.#
h CFFICIAL USE CIlLY
.: t t
~
t.
difficulties have.been experienced in.ob-l'..
taining this information. Action ' at a higher level has been taken. This analysis will be reviewed by our consultant, Parameter,'.Inc.,
when received.
j
- f. s(1) Have the pipe hangers been released and re..
,j l blocked in a timely manner during all filling y
and draining operations?- (Page 9.)
+f
/(2) Have procedures been written to assure this 1
is accomplished on future filling and draining operations?
l l
(1) Discussions with Jersey Central personnel indi--
cate that appropriate precautions had been taken during all past filling and draining operations..
Jersey Central has stated that suitable provisions will be included in the applicable procedures.
v i.
Compliance will assure that adequate written pro-cedures for this operation are incorporated into the Plant Procedures Manual.
2.
Main Steam System i
i
- s. /(1) Is the main steam piping. acceptable for the in-t tended'use, as shown by material certification?
(Page 11.)
[g# * )i (1) The GE project manager has' informed Compliance g,( "
that the material certifications show that the main
_ IgreF~feF 4 l g, #f tg steam piping meets the applicable specifications and this doctamentation is available for review.
gg# p Compliance will review these material certifications
, p/
and will resolve, to our satisfaction,' earlier con-flicting information.
32 CFFICIAL USE ONLY
.s.
+.
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.s a,
s.~ewa-j
's 34
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'i WFICIAL USE ONLY i
b.
(1) Eas the pipe section that contained pits been specifically approved for use by GE after the defects were discovered? (Page 11.)
go &#N sg,p u /
G*
A 10 ge,p
( 3 AW 9y psw rM g n,i g,e b g-E
. 1) The GE project manager stated that an engineer-
/w
]'
y,g,,
ing analysis was made regarding the, adequacy of this piping af ter discovery of the defects and, 15 gp,
,[My based on this evaluation, GE approved use of gpr #16 2.
'~d W
^ *f,, m,,, 4,,c/w the pipe. This subject will be. reviewed by g) l#
-]}
,.3,,
m,uugy, Compliance during future inspection visits.
7(
, :; w,s,n m rrIo w '.. m c.
e A c rvn *"'* N'*
- e,nw b w W,,
,,g. 4g,u - Q y;;,,,,, a.o w p,,,, y g w.
1 1
wr m e s..
k gg *o
- c. /(1)e Were the bellows expansion joints in the main er Ey gp n
I c ', 5~
steam system manufactured as Class B vessels Y
U in accordance with Section III of the ASE Code?
g ff (Page 12.)
f
/ ;,, a >
g,! I
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r f-g(2)e Have the certification records been reviewed to y
gf NI g '#
assure that other bellows, which are part of the containment system, were manufactured as Class B g
l vessels?
,,/ /
t' AM,
h pr#
{
vI g?'(g+*h
- gW l
- C'WN (1) The main steam system containment bellows were Ng n V"I ??
l A incorrectly specified as Clast C vessels. GE se>
s #p '
) Personnel have informed Compliance that the IF 4 4-trr u w*4 'ed l
bellows were manufactured to the standards of V'ga,,,s> S s
6^C i
j g.m,
eum.oro '.7$
f Class 5 vessels and that they have been recerti-f,#
, fe d.
fv/jfl1N are4 l
fied as Class B vessels.
.%w' h Records pertaining to other bellow penetrations prt#
i t/pbt.r n*ns g
g have been reviewed, according to GE, and no other ps#'
p/p deviations with code requirements were found.
p,#g e Compliance will examine the recertification records p <h f9r the bellows of the main steam system and the p.*
records of other penetration bellows.
h,$Fl~
yf
- d. g(1) Are.the bellows expansion joints that contribute blf
,g r) g,.
y w
to containment in the main steam system properly g er 89uiPPed with stops and travel restrainerst S r.,
f (Page 13.)
e,SA w /*'. /e t
r w ie na 7a- -
p/M p #'g/y f" f
m arm
~t~
!N g # p, g ***
p os *,WO
- 33
's WFICIAL USE 'CMLY
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'(2) Bas the applicability of this question to other containment bellows been evaluated by
.[
GET Recent discussions with GE personnel igly that p,#' b -
lb i * *e m *f
' the bellows in question are properly equipped-Ng i
N Q
A M '~ '
with stops and travel restrainers, and-that they j
<M mre r<- W7 have.been since installation. Since Compliance
'er wt m, m %
observed the travel restrainers to be missing, cauc errv e w '*
- and this GE position conflicts with information i
- M'.
wsm,
presented earlier by GE, further resolution of l
^
this matter by Cony 11ance is considered necessary.
j O(2) GE has informed Cogliance that the applicability aspects of this problem have been considered and that no problems were found. However, because of i
the question relating to the bellows in the main steam system, Compliance _will_ review this_ matter further.
- e. / (1) Did the excessive temperature experienced by the vessel nossle uring stress relieving compromise j
its serv ces 111ty?
(page 13.)
/(2) Did damage to other primary system components occur during stress relief operationst F
.l gg %%g(
An engineering review of the specific weld in t t D WE -
question is being conducted by GE.
In addition, Agogr<.L SM/,
W V " '* * ***F the GE project manager has notified Compliance I
4e r" ** d*a ur s s,
that a series of hardness surveys might be made--
f egs,
about the weld. Compliance will evaluate the results of the actions taken.
I j
}
(2) According to GE, stress relief operation records associated with the primary system have been re-viewed for adequate temperature control and some Sw u-ar
- specification violations were revealed. The scope i
wp, of this __ study anA_conclusionsdich, accordinglo]'
),
V GE%s been_ documented, wi.11_be__revisued by Som-4 pfiince.
34 0FFICIAL USE ONLY
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3
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4A OFFICIAL USE CItLY r
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(1) Has all' critical electrical equipment, that could be expected to be exposed to the acci--
~j dent-environment, been designed and fabricated (A
so as to provide adequate protection? (Page14.)
i
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f
~
hp
)
i N
(1 At a meeting with the applicant at d GE in late pr+[g,, 6 p
' ' ?q g a p a c.m &
January, GE stated that this mattier would be p
investigated. The status of the follow-up kgh gg p,.n,
,._g w s
'[
w exmm soc.cric<rd6 'J effort by GE regarding the subject has not been dp
~
ascertained. Compliance will ersure that a re-f weP
- f~
view of this possible problem is accomplished..
~
3 (1)e was the practice of cold spring used to close's main steam line in conformance with specifica-tions? (Page 14.)
(2) e Was the amount of cold spring reviewed and approved by GE7 4
'(1) The original B64 specification required no cold S W-W -
t springing of the pipe. GE contends that some p% m'r,. -
cold springing was permitted.
ME " ' '
~
(2) Coupliance is pursuing its original request to sie N 84f*-
DN *#M obtain a copy of the stress analysis performed by va.ve.
j
, j pera em GE.
This analysis, if deemed appropriate by Com-pe6 5"
,,m cu wit $fU pliance, will be reviewed by our-consultant, p
gyesr -ort parameeer Inc.
rr4A4
, atvora w 6 E-
, is, eM -
h.
(1)e Is the questionable interior weld in the steam pipeline to the penetration bellows suitable for -
the intended service and have applicable code re-quirements been met? (Page 14.)
gd g
7 f *,&
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[ (1) GE has admitted that this specific weld could be, M
/
4 pf faulty, based on a're-review of the radiographs.
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OFFICIAL USE OttLY
.j CE plans no further action other than docu-mentation of the review. The final position of Cosgliance on this matter has not been determined.
- 1 l
1.
(1) Have the two suspect welds in the main steam lines been repaired, or is evidence available'that they need not be? (Page 12.)'
j s
1
-)
e i
j (1) The two shop welds were found to contain slag in-l clusions and were removed by grinding. The welds j
have been repaired and successfully radiographed.
L Stress relief of the welds and a hydrostatic test remain outstanding. C9agtliance will review records 3
pertaining to the repair.
WW W D
- ~.___.
3.
Automatic Depressurization System gI
&g a.
(1)O Is the exhaust piping for the depressurization
/
system adequately designed for its intended use?
A (Page 16.)
gi s -
(1) Although Compliance found the 56A design specifica-
/g#
/[g, i (<
tion to be in error, the GE project manager has stated V
'p j
that: material certifications establish that the piping 4
complies with the code for pressure piping--ASA B31.1.
These material.,,, cert.ifications will be reviewed by y liance.
4.
Core Spray System a.
(1)g Was the fabrication of system components by the P. F. Avery Corporation of acceptable quality?
}
(Page 18.)
j l
f(1),Nany of the core internals manufactured by the j
L / Avery Corporation require repair at Oyster Creek and Nine Mile Point. CE has informed Compliance that repair of all the deficiencies noted during recent GE inspections of core internals at Jersey 36 WFICIAL USE ONLY
=Mv=e'sr.
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asse.,.
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.ll OFFICIAL USE ONLY
.l Qy f-y
[
Central will be effected. The quality of the i
~
,f core spray system components will be. evaluated:
}
further as part of Comqpliance's review of the-l-l.
[
core internals.-
j i
5.
Control Rod Drive System t
No unusual problems were detected during the special quality.
control inspection program.
"{
~
- w. f 6.
Feedwater System a.
(1) Are the block valves adequate for intended
}
service conditions?
(Page 24.)
(1) G3 personnel have stated that the valves are ade-quate for the temperature and pressure conditions.
in this system. Pertinent documentation relating' to this matter will be reviewed by Compliance.
7.
Containment System No unusual problems were detected during the special. qual,ity control inspection program.
i G.
Conclusions i
f The results' of the specisi quality control inspection program indicate to the Division of Compliance that:
i 1.
The overall attention directed to " quality assurance" at the
'7"'
Jersey Central-facility was less than that currently. considered I
necessary for a nucle;r facility.
l-4 2.
Additional efforts by Jersey Central and GE are necessary to re-solve outstanding problems and' questions. Furthermore, additional inspections must be conducted on systems.important to safety, that were not reviewed in depth by Compliance.
i 3.
The recognized need for a change in Compliance's inspection effort and emphasis in the areas of construction and quality control was demonstrated.
~
37 OFFICIAL USE W LY r
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'O UNITED STATES s
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMIS$!ON
[o; s.
Q,,,A j
I3 C
WASHWGTON, D.C. 20545
{
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?.,:ig 6 1
R. S. Eoyd, Assistent Director 7 [@ --k M
for Reactor Projects i
j 1
Division of Receto,r Licensing
.(
l
,f JERS2Y CENTR!J., PC'C2 AND LIGHT CCZ?ANY (OYSTER CREEK)
\\
i h
' D0022T No. 50-219 NIAGARA KOHAE POETER CO2P02ATION (NIIG MIII POINT)
D00KOT No. 50-220 it the enclosed report covering a visit to the Gener:1 Electric Conpcny in San Jose, California on June 5,1963, is forucrded for infor=ction.
i The visit was cade to dete:=ino first-hand the catcilurgical condition
[
of sc=ples from the Oycter Creek and Nine Mile Point rccctor pressure-7 vessels. Infor=ction contained in the report was discussed with L1L representativos, and subsequently with the ACRS, on June 7, 1968.
]
Ecsed on observations of a representctive number of sc ples cnd dis-
- 4' cussions with cognizant GE personnel, the following tentative conclusions
-l
,j were reached by Co=pliance:
i c..
The cicdding of the Oyster Creek stub tubes hcs not resulted in i
any cetectchle degrcdction of the virgin stub tube =cteric1.
l
'?
!i b.
The ccccpecnce standards for the new stub tube to control rod drive housing field welds are not clecrly defined. This cette.
,).
will be pursued by Co=pliance.
43 l
c.
No evidence of intergranular corrosion attack hcs been observed i
.g on the Nine Mile Point stub tube sa=ples re=oved in April 1968.
L0 The decision by G2 to clad or replace the vescel nozzlo ecfe-cads and to
.[
provide an additional mechcnical cupport structure for the recetor vessel I
shroud at Oyster Crech ic significant cnd de=cacerates, in cur vicu, G2 s 8
y; concern over the probcbility of further intergr.cnulcr ttcck on sensitized L
stc'.nlecs steel cc pencnts. In vieu of the possible c:.fcty i=plications which cight result from such attcck, D2L ncy wish to consider requesting
^
t fro.: each applicant the identity and location of 304 stainless steel caterials present within the recctor vessel which ccy have been sensitized
.,l by stress-relieving hect treatments.
}
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e
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(Continued)
A I
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1 I'"
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=di 2-96 R.'S. Boyd,
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fit It.is to be noted thetirecent information from the sits indicates thct the'
]
general design of the shroud support structure is not in accordance with ip{';i lFG -
-Appendix B'of'the enclosed report.
i
,4%.
, Y' '
$nf ongd sC*
f g,- H. Engelken La i
?E R. E. Engelken, Assistant Director for Inspection and Enforcement -
i i
Division of Compliance.-
1s i
i
.I i,
Enclosure:
.1 CO Reports Nos. 219/68-3 i
and 220/68-3 dtd 6/12/68 1
.e..,
g cc:
(w/ enclosure)
M. M. Mann D2 j
P. A. Earris, D2L L..D. Low, CO
/ (1 E. G. Ccsc, D2S
- 2' S. Levine, DRL (6) ij D.'J. Skovholt. DRL (3)
L. Kornblith, Jr., CO w/o enci y 7., Kirhtcu, CO:I w/o enci gh.,
J. G. Davis, CO:II l
'i B.. H. Grier, CO:III I
7 D. I. Walker, CO:IV g"
R. W. Smith, CO:V DR File B
7.T y '.
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June 14, 1968 J. P. S'Estily, Chief
- P amanter laspoetiam & Referesanat Branch
.iasi. of Co.,u.ase saNT mgit&L 7est AS LIENT C131M57 (BRSET cmrreAQ CONSTRUCTIOR PEMIT 30. CFrt-15 NIAGARA IWEAMC 70lER CORPORATION (NIE NI1E FOIIrt)
CONSTRUCT 1001 FERK1T NO. CFFR-16 Emeleoed are espies of a soport severlag a recent visit to the General Electric Ceapany (G4) offices in San Jees, California, by G. W. Reinmeth, Accompanytag the inspector were L. Perse DEL and F. Patriarcha,' ORML t
(seammitant). The taformation eestatand La the report uns discussed with you, and subsegenatly with the Acts, as June 7,1968 I
The primeipal purpose of the visit uns to determine the metallurgical eendities of easyles taken frem the ett tubes of' the Oyster Creek i
and Mine Mile Point reacter pressure vessels. Der tantative concittaiens,
i based as observaties of thsee samples, are that (1) the cladding of 1
the Oyster Craek stub thee has met reselted in degradation of the 304 stub tube material, ands (2) the Bias Mila Point stub tdes had met j
esperienced intergra= Mar serresive attack as of early April 1968, the date the samples were taken.
. n,,, p-: c fu m b l
The sample of the first, meld unde at Oystar Creek withese ma*a-atic umiding maskine clearlfladiested peer gustity due to a lack of festen l
in the rest pass. The melding g:nf_. hos been and&fied, and re-qualified la aseerdamse with Seeties IX of tts ARE Code, but 64 plans as additimaal metallurgical sampling of peedentism field welds.
We latead to review the attracesis teettag methods and, :::f;.s develayed for this unld and to press G4 for==ar*- standards and sejosties levele.
i I
i The dioelosare by C4 et evid==*= ef intergresolar attack ta the aseele ease-endo emeld have signifiaast saasty supliestimme 8er neveral feellities.
We weald esseurage DEL to request from each app 11 east Ser em operating l
l i
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^
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- - -- v.) v L V T V' J Lr
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~
i
s'[.
h J. F. O'Reilly
-2 June ' 14,1968 11eoese the identity and 1seatten of the 306 stainless staat unterials i
presset la a seester pressere el and its attashments disk hoes been sanoittaed by atsees-relieving heat tseatments.
Oririnal Sigt.ed by N. L Ernst l
. Morablith, Jr.
Assisteet Disaster der 6 Programs Rivistem of Ceeplienee j
\\
Bocleenre:
CO Apt Nos. 219/68-3 & 220/68 3 by G. W. Asianoth, dtd 6/12/68 i
act L. D. Low, CO, w/o sect
- 1. E. Engelleen, CO, w/o eac1 N. C. Moseley, Cott, w/soci 41,T.Carlsen, Coil,w/enct 1
t i
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'I
!f-U.-S. ATOMIC ENERGY COBMISSION r
DIVISION OF COBS'LIANCE NEADQUARTERS Report of' Inspection C0 Report No. 219/68....
C0 Report No. 220/68-3 J
fli 7
Licensee:
JERSEY. CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY J
CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NO. CPPR-15 i
NTanAmA MORANK PONER CORPORATION-CONSTRUCTION PERNIT NO. CPPR-16 (PRESSURE VESSEL REPAIR PROGRAM)
Date and Place of Visit:
June 5,.1968 General Electric Company San Jose, California l
Date and Place of Previous Visit:
May 24, 1968
)
i i
Reacter Site Oyster Creek, New Jersey Inspected By:
C. W. Emi--th -
.I 6/12/68 e
-Reactor Inspector (Program Standards)
(Date)
~!
L. Earnblith. Jr. g [ " ~ %.
M j
Reviewed By:
6/13/68 Assistant Director,for TechnicalfPrograms (Dete)
Proprietary Information:
- Eggs, l
80m1 The General Electric Company (C-E) in San Jos'e, California, was visited to examine nietallurgical samples from the Jersey Central - Oyster Creek and the Niagara Mohawk - Nine Mile Point reactor Pressure vessels. Other details of the vessel repair Programs were also discussed.
L. Forse from I
the Division of Reactor Licensing (DEL) and P. Patriarcha, ook Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL),~ acting as consultant to DRL, accompanied the inspector.
(continued) 1
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1
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o-9
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SIRMARY
}
e Examinar. ion of stub tube metallurgical samples removed from the Oyster Creek reactor vessel did not disclose any unexpected results. The base material was observed to be sound. 'The samples were taken from two stub N.
tubes in the center of the vessel, one of which included the first control rod housing to stub tube field weld. Both had-been clad. Improvements i
f are being incorporated in the welding procedure for the field welds be-cause of the poor quality observed in the above sample.
q I
G-E has decided to clad all vessel nossle safe-ends made of 304 stain-less that are accessible. Similar safe-ends on smaller nossles that are not accessible will be cut off and replaced. Those in the vessel head will be left as is.
i An additional mechanical support structure is being designed to reduce the consequences of failure of the stainless forging incorporated in the core shroud support. Metallurgical samples from this piece also showed corrosive attack. Final details of this fix will be described in a forth-i coming license amendment.
+
]
Metallurgical samples from the Niagara Mohawk - Nine Mile Point vessel stub tubes did not show the intergranular corrosion attack observed at j
I Oyeter Creek.
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DEAIIA i
I.
Participatina Personnel The following attended the meeting and participated in the discussions:
W. R. Smith, Jr., Consulting Engineer, G-E A. M. Hubbard, Manager, Materials Engineering, C-E W. L. Walker, Engineer, Materials Engineering, G-E j
R. H. Huggins, Oyster Creek Project Engineer, C-E M. Kudlick, Project Engineer, G-E G. M. Cordon, Materials Science and Development, C-E W. R. Schmidt, Jersey Central Consultant, MPR Associates P. Patriarcha. DRL Consultant, ORNL L.. Perse, CSC Technology Branch, DRL G. W. Reinmuth, Technical Support Branch, C0 (continued)
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II.
Meetina Amanda 1.
The meeting with G-E and Jersey Central representatives consisted of a semiformal presentation covering the entire cracking problem ex-g-
perienced at Oyster Creek and the repair program. The epecific subjects
,j discussed were presented according to the eiutline enclosed with this re-port as Appendix A.
Since much of the information presented has been documented previously, only new information.will be described..Following the presentation, metallurgical samples from both Oyster Creek and Nine Mile Point vessels were directly observed with the aid of a microscope.'
III.
Rasults of Observations A.
Oratar. Creek.Itub._ Tube _Esputlas The principal purpose of the San Jose visit was to directly observe metallurgical samples removed from two of the Oyster Creek vessel stub tubes, Nos. 27-26 and 27-30. Tube 27-26 had been clad and included the stub tube to control rod drive housing field weld. Both operations had been performed according to procedures qualified for.use in the actual repair of the vessel. Approximately the top two inches
-i of tube 27-26 had been eut off, including the entire stub tube to housing field weld. Tube 27-30 had been clad only and the top one inch removed for sempling.
The intent of direct observation was to determine if welding had any effect upon tho'sensitised 304 stainless stub tube material.
Observations of several samples at magnification up to 400 diameters did not disclose any signs of degradation of the stub tube material. No cracking under the welds was noted, bonding of the. clad looked good and the grain structure throughout the sample appeared normal for sensitised material.
1' Mechanical and chemical properties of the two stub tubes were compared with normal 304 material.- All were within allowable ranges.
Miniature bend specimens from tubes 27-26'and 27-30 were satisfactory.
t Detracting from an otherwise satisfactory situation as ob--
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served from the samples, was an obviously faulty field weld on tube 27-26,
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caused by lack of fusion mostly in the area of the root pass. This was the first field weld to be performed in the vessel utilizing the newly developed automatic welding machine. Samples of qualification welds, in-cluding cut cross sectiens, had been observed previously and were sound'.
The faulty weld was stated to have been performed in compliance with the procedure.
(continued)
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The following reasons were offered by C-E as.to 'the 'cause of the poor veld:
1.
The weld and metallurgical sample from this particular 1
4 tube was requested upon relatively short notice (about i
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ten days). This, according to G-E, resulted in less attention to detail than would normally be given.
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H 2.
A leak in the helium purge line to the welding machine 1
contributed to heavy oxidation in the root of ehe weld.
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The leak was not discovered until after the weld was eampleta.
3.
The welders used a discontinuous TIG tack weld for a root pass. This also contributed to the observed heavy oxidation.
To obtain better welds in the future, the procedure has been t
modified in that the TIC root pass will be continuous and will use a heavier filler wire. This is expected to result in a. higher heat input which in turn should promote improved fusion. The leaking helium purge line was also replaced. A semple, cut from a requalification weld was-given to the inspector and is sound.
A fallout from the faulty weld was further verification of the adequacy of the ultrasonic testing (Ur) method developed for examining the field welds. Prior to weld sectioning, the defects were charted by trf. - The charted defects were then compared against the observed flaws and found to be in close agreement, both in size and location.
In discussing the value of trr testing, G-E was questioned con-corning the acceptance standard to be employed on the field' welds.
According to W. R. Smith, the reject level has not been established.
He inferred that it could be rather loose since the depth of the field i
weld was approximately double what it needs to be to achieve the design strength. Thin inspector pointed out that for normal vesw1 seam welds, any linear indication longer than 3/4" required repair; thus, one would expect this standard to also apply to the stub tube welds as a minimum requirement. Since Mr. Smith did not appear to agree, he was advised
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that he should be prepared to defend his position on a technical basis.
(continued)
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}ist1_dtna Over Cracks A montroversial question concerning the repair by cladding of the stub tubes has been the unknown effect of applying the cladding over undetected cracks and the effect of trapped corrodents in such cracks under the weld.
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To evaluate this area, G-E induced corrosion cracking, similar to that observed at Oyster Creek,in sensitised stainless 304 saarples.
i The samples were also dye tested to further simulate the real conditions.
j 303L cladding was then applied to the samples over the cracks, thus seal-
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ing in the corrodenta.
Examination of the samples showed the weld cladding fused the cracked areas into the weld metal to a depth of approximately.050".
The weld m.etal itself was sound and showed no deleterious effects from the absorption of corrodents.
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C.
Adeausev of Clad Raosir 7
To support their conclusion that cladding is an adequate
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repair of the stub tube problem, G-E cites the following facts:
j 1.
Any crack greater than.010" will be detected by the dye penetrant test used. This has been correlated by the metallurgical testing program and demonstrated through f
numerous repetitive dye tests.
2.
All detected cracks are removed.
I 3.
If for some unknown reason a crack is overlooked, weld cladding will fuse any crack down to.050" in depth into
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4.
If a crack greater than.050" were overlooked, the clad
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would seal the crack from exposure to an oxygen environ-ment, thus inhibiting any corrosive attack.
5.
The use of 308L as the clad material provides a high re-sistance to intergranular stress corrosion as shown by recent G-E corrosion tests.
6.
Actual metallurgical and mechanical tests of the as-applied cladding demonstrate a satisfactory condition in both stub tube and clad material.
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6-IV.
Raseir of s===itized 304 Areas - Oyster Creek A.
Nossle Safe-ands Samples removed from the vessel nossle safe-ends show some
. evidence of intergranular attack although to a lesser extent than ob-served on the stub tubes. In view of these observations, G-E has made i
the following decisions.
e, 1.
All ten of the large recirculation system nossle safe-ends i
<will be clad.-
,6 2.
The two nossles to the emergency condenser will be clad if sufficient accessibility exists. If not, the safe-ends will l
be replaced.
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3.
All other 304 stainless safe-ends on smaller nozzles in the vessel (3 total) will be replaced.
4.
Three sus 11 nossles in the vessel head having 304 safe-ends j
4 will not be replaced at this time, since these can be re-l placed, if found necessary, after operation begins.
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B.
Shroud Suosort Skirt l
one sample from the stainless steel forging, which is part
- i of the shroud support structure, also showed evidence of intergranular attack. Rather than attempt to clad in place, C-E is proposing to add l
additional mechanical support. A sketch of tha proposed turn-buckle
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design is enclosed as Appendix B.
According to C-E, the forged ring
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could crack in any direction or dissolve without. causing a problem. The sketch should not be considered final as design details and stress analy-see were still in progress. An amendment covering this repair will be
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submitted in about three weeks.
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Ni== ara Mohawk - Nine Mile point plant *- --le Review I
Another purpose for visiting G-E was to directly observe metal-lurgicial samples removed from stub tubes in the Nine Mile point reactor vessel. 56 specimens were made available, of which 6 were observed under -
.i a microscope. No evidence of intergranular corrosive attack was observed (continued)
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in any of the semples. The grain structure looked normal in all areas, weld bonds were sound and the sensitization of the material was similar to that observed on Oyster Creek samples. From the evidence provided by these samples, C-E's conclusion that there has been no intergranular l
corrosive attack at the Nine Mile Point plant up to the time the samples were removed, appears to be correct.
The inspectors were informed that the Nine Mile Point vessel will be cleaned with a TSP solution, hydrostatically tested and dye tested.
If no cracking is observed after these operations are completed, clad-ding of the stub tubes would be considered unnecessary.
Enclosures:
1.
Appendix A i
2.
Appendix B l
3.
Appendix C i
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AEC PRESENTATION 1
6-5-68.
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WLW I '
GENERAL DESCRIPTION - Oyster. Creek Vessel (Sid.de #1) Vessel cross section'with' furnc.ca sensitized 304 indicatec
?i (Slide #2) Stub tube cross section a-s.
WLW II-PENETRANT AND ULTRASONIC EXAMINATIONS AND RESULTS 1
(Slide #3) Summary of PT & UT on stub tubes (Slide #4) Sequential PT tests on 5 stub tubes A.
Description of distribution of PT indications - furnace sensitized 304 i
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Working' below detection limits intended for.PT f
WLW III SAMPLING PROGRAM
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.WLW Iy METALLOGRAPHY i
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Stub Tubes
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Shop weld area s
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(Slide #5 - Tube 07 -42)
'2. Tube surface (Photo & Photomicrograph'
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- 3. Field wcld
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(Photo)
B.
Other Components
- 1. Safe Ends
'(Slide #6 - As' received & PT) nU
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A E C PRES $t.iTATIONr.
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WLW IV (B. 2. (Continued)
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Shroud Support Ring i
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.(Slide #8 - Schematic)-
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(Slide'#9 - As~ received & PT.- #16)f 1
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'(Slide #10 -Micros on #15 & #16)-
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LABORATORY WORK A.
Source of corrodent t
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Present practices to exclude corrodent in future.
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Comparison of stub tube'and normal 304 chemical and j
. mechanical properties.
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Sensitivity of PT examination c
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Welding on pre'-cracked 304 J
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(Slin #13 - PT on cracked plate) 1 (Slide #14 - Micro on cra'ck) r
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(Slide #15 - Weld and Micro on clad)
F.
Rationalle on repair (Slida.#16)
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(Wilde's calculations) j WLW 13 NIN2 MILE PODIT AND TARAPUR INSPECTIONS.& RESULTS j
A.
PT results (Slide) i
- Meta 11ography;_...
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Explanation i
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.i WLW XII.0YSTER CREEK FIX
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Alternatives and reasons for choice 4 +;;
4 (Slide #17) s 9..
'B.
Stub Tubes-iP
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Grind and clad - Pield sample,.
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(Slides 18, 19, 20,~21, 22) g-4
- . Field welds' C. -
4 Remove and reveld-(Samples)
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Shroud support ring
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Redundant mechanical support E.
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Crind and clad large'oues
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Replace small ones
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WRS EIII EXAMINE NETALLURGICAL SAMPLES, IF TIME IS AVAILABLE i
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.4t l' APPENDIX B-
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+- Upper Shroud'
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f Proposed Turn-buckle Installation-Bottom Core Guide (30 to 36 proposod)
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APPI2iDIX q 9
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SNiPLE PROGRN4 - OYSTER CREEK YESSEL REPAIR Sample i
l (10 Location Cescription Specimen Analysis Perfonned Summary Results' Reported In t
' Sh:p 1' eld Area (Uphill)
M, P. ED, EM, X Indicated IGC And Nonnal had. 29 - Fig.1 1
Stub Tube l
51-34 Base flaterial' Amd. 35 - Fig. 7 2
Stub Tube Sh:p Weld Area (Uphill)
M Indicated IGC Amd. 29 - Fig. 2 03-34 Amd. 35 - Fig. 8 3
Stub Tube Slab Sample Through M,B,P,Elj,11 IGC + Indications Of Amd.'29 - Fig. 4 03-32 Field Held Dye Penetrant - Other Amd. 35 - Fig. 9 Tests flormal 4
Stub Tube Sh:p k' eld Area (Downhill)
M, C Showed Minor Flau Uhich Amd. 29 - Fig. 8 '
03-34 Could Be Interpreted IGC.- Chemistry i?ormal
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5 Stub Tube Slab Sample Through M, F Showed Defects in F.ll.
Amd. 29 - Fig'. 7 I 39-46 Field lleld Low Ferrite (.02) 6 Stub Tube Sia5 Sample Through Shop 11, F IGC At Shop Held + Lack On File 07-42
'n' eld And Field Weld Of Fusion In F.ll. - Lou Ferrite in Tube i
8 Stub Tube Shcp Uhld Area After M
Showed Repair To Be Amd. 29 - Fig. 6 0
03-22 Repair weld Sound no Cracking
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. Sound flaterial On File 10A Steh Tube Slab Sample Through M
43-46 Field l!cid i
i 103 Stub Tube Ficlci Ucld Tolust Above M
Sound Material On l'ile I
31-02 Shop Weld Stub Tube Slice Through Tube M, C, B, Co C, Co llot Dane Reu l
.11 27-26 And CRD:t 11, D-l'o n n. 1 4
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Sample Prograa 3 0yster Creck Vessel Repair Page 2-
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__ lio Location Description Specimen Analysis Performed Summary Results Reported In 12 Stub Tube.
Slice Through Tube M, C, 8 M, B -. !!ormal New 27-30 Not Done Yet -
l 135 Safe End Inside Dia Through 1/32 M,.C, B, Co C, Co Not Done
.New' i
Recirc Inlet Flaw M, B - Normal 4
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Loop D 13B Safe End Inside Dia At Shop Held M, B, Planned Recirc Loop Junction 14A Safe End Outside Dia M,5,Co.
Cut But Not Evaluated Planned-Recirc Outlet' (flo Indications)
Loop C A '~ -
14B Safe End Outside Dia At Shop Held M, B.
Planned Recirc' Loop Junction 15 Shroud Hedge Through Indication M, B IGC At Flaw New l-
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Support Ring
' At Bottoa 340*~-O' B - Normal 16 Shroud
. Hedge Through 0.D. Grind M. B Ueld Defect Planned Support Out And Clear Area (Checking C.E. Process)
M 17 CRD llousing A-1 Position - Housing' N, C,.B Co M, B - flormal Planned
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Bottom Flange Subjected To 130 PPM Cl C, Co - flot Done-
. Stub Tube "Pov. der" Removed By C
Various Metal 0xides' '
New 18 Brushing After Overlay Normal ~ For Helding.
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