ML20087A229
| ML20087A229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1968 |
| From: | James O'Reilly, Thornburg H, Varela J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086U000 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-95-36 50-219-68-04, 50-219-68-4, NUDOCS 9508040233 | |
| Download: ML20087A229 (6) | |
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION I
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DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE
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Report of Inspection
,y 1:4-CO Report No. 219/68-4 7L e
Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Light Compe.ny 1
License No. CPPR-15 Categoryg8 s
Date of Inspection:
August 20, 1968 l
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Inspected By:
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D'. Thorn'ourg P'
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Reviewed By:
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Proprietary Information:
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Tne Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (CB&I) plant in Greenville, Pennsylvania, was inspected to review the fabrication of
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control rod hydraulic containment penetration assemblies for Oyster Creek reactor.
A tour of the plant was made, discussions r
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were held with shop management, and a review of record keeping vas attempted.
Records on the Vermont Yankee reactor were reviewed for comparison purposes.
Insert assemblics for Vermont.
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Yankee were examined while awaiting shipment.
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SUMMARY
'3" There was 'apparently less stringent control of quality in the Greenville shops of CELI during fabrication of the_
Oyster Creek components than has been the case on subsequent work for other facilities.
Personnel at CB&I indicated they i
were not aware of the intended service of the tubing in the insert plates.
Their contention was that they were producing equipment they believed to be for a 70 psig operating pressure.
Inadequate information was obtained en which a firm conclusion can be made regarding the Oyster Creek components.
It does appear that the positioning of tubing in a horizontal welding position and lack of position control in this case, contributed most to the problems encountered although there are conflicting i
opinions from consultants with thom Region II discussed the problem.
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Personnel Contacted I
C. Roof, Quality Control Engineer, G-E i
E. Varnum, Manager of Quality Control, CBLI J. A. Fisher, Plant Manager, CB&I (Greenville) 3.
Insoection j
The inspectors met with various representatives of the Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) to review the fabri.
l cation of the control rod hydraulic penetration insert j
plates for the Jersey Central Reactor.
Uhen questioned j
with respect to the procedure used for the fabrication of the plates at Greenville, CB&I personnel responded that 3
the procedure was no longer on file because the insert plates in question had been fabricated approximately five years ago.
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The inspectors reviewed a copy of the procedure.used for ay [
the fabrication of-ths control rod hydraulic: penetration Q
p insert plates for the Vermont Yankec plant.
The procedure p
specified the exact velding procedures to be used,' the welding positions to be employed, and the sequence, of-
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welding for. individual tubes -in the-plate.
The procedure A
also included a fabrication and nondestructive test record for. each tube in each inscrt plate.
Space-is pro-c vided for indicating the results of. liquid penetrant i
tests, weld inspection (visual inspection of the weld)',
i borescopic inspection and hydrotest at 1,875 psi.. The.
borescopic examination specifies.thr.t particular e.ttention be paid to detecting cracks, burn-through, or suck-up.'
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The_ inspectors observed that the procedure was very 1{.
detailed and served as a proper fabrication :and quality
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control lacord.
When asked to compare the Vermont Yankee' procedure to the procedures used for Jersey Central, personnel at the site si indicated that the_ Jersey Central procedures were very f
much less detailed.
The inspectors-were shown a record i
which was identified as an inspection record for each of the components of the Jersey Central _ containment i
d vessel.
The record included the part number for each l
component of the containment vessel and was provided with columns for the final results of the dye penetrent, I
radiographic or magnetic particle nondestructive test results.
Each column was marked with "O.K." if the non-destructive test results were satisfactory for each of the
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individual components.
ITo attempt was made to itemize test results.
No space was provided for the inspector 8s signature, the date, etc.
The record was not adequate j
as a quality control or fabrication. record.
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CB&I was able to produce the material certifications for the carbon steel plate material used in each of the pene-tration insert plates in question.
They were not able, however, to produce the material certifications for.the
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stainless steel tubing used in the insert plates.
They indicated that these records were on file in their Xemphis 0t 1
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shop and would be made available to the inspectors for
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subsequent inspection or review.
CB&I were unable to produce the heat-treatment records for the plate material.
't They indicated that these records could also be made available.
The inspectors observed the Vermont Yankee control rod hydraulic penetration insert plates in the Greenville shop.
The insert plates were in crates just prior to shipment.
It was noted that the ends of the tubes were taped over.
The insert plates and tubes appeared to be clean.
A rather rapid visual inspection indicated very little weld spatter on the stainless tubes.
There was, l
however, some weld spatter noted on the penetration plates.
It did not appear to be excessive, however.
The welds i
appeared to have a regular configuration and otherwise appeared to be deposited in a workmanlike manner.
CB&I personnel indicated that the original insert plate penetration procedure called for drilling the carbon steel plate material to accomodate the stain 1 css steel j
tubes, depositing a weld overlay around the hole, stress relieving the plate and overlay, positioning and welding
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the stainless steel tubing in place.
The welding rod used was 309 stainless steel.
Following the fabrication of the Tarapur, Niagara Mohawk, and Jersey Central contain-ment vessels, this procedure was modified.to eliminate the stainless steel weld overlay which in turn eliminated the requirement for a heat-treatment cycle.
In the subsequent control rod insert plate fabrication procedures, the plate the stainless steel tubing was positioned was drilled to size,4 thick was applied with 309 stainless 1
and a fillet weld 1/
t steel welding rod.
According to personnel at this site, the sequence of welding was controlled.
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.[.h It was learned, subsequent to the visit to the Greenville y"
shop, that the fillet welds in question deposited on control rod hydraulic insert plates in the Greenville shop were
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applied with the carbon steel plate aligned in the vertical
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and.the tubes inserted horizontally.
The welds were then applied without consideration to weld position.
It was learned that the welds were applied in a different manner in the Chicago shop.
Ihe plate was placed in the hori-zontal position and all fillet wolds were applied in the downhand welding position which would leave the plate as the heat sink during the greatest portion of the welding procedure, minimizing the time uhich the tubing, with it's comparatively small wall thickness, was acting as the heat sink.
Control of the welding position would greatly reduce the amount of tubing wall burn-through, suck-up, etc.
The i
above information was obtained during a tour of the Monti-
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cello Reactor site and through discussions with Mr. C. Roof,
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the General Electric Quality Control Engineer, following field fabrication of the Monticello Reactor vessel.
Mr. Roof had inquired into the matter of the fabrication of the control rod hydraulic insert plates for General Electric and developed the above information.
j C3&I personnel stated that the Jersey Central and Niagara Mohawk containment vessels were fabricated to Section VIII of the ASM3 Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code rhile succeding vessels were fabricated as Class 3,Section III vencels.
Personnel at the site stated that in their recollection the Section VIII vessels did not receive the fabrication care I
that the later Section III vessels received.
It was also apparent through discussions with Mr. Varnum, Manager of Quality Control, CB&I, that the Section III pressure vessel
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received much more detailed supervision at Monticello during
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fabrication.
Mr. Varnum indica. led that steps had been taken I
to correct this situation in that all CELI shop superin-tendents have a counterpart quality control superviscr who reports to the plant manager.
Mr. Varnum will have an independent representative of his central quality control i
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..l5 group in cach of the CB&I manufacturing regions.
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,f they will be stationed at one of the manufacturing shops.
'f Mr. Varnum and Mr. Fisher also illustrated other organi-zational changes which placed the emphasis on quality
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control.
The existence of a detailed procedure for the fabrication and nondestructive testing of the Vermont t
Yankee containment vessel is illustrative of C3&I's change in philosophy.
CB&I personnel indicated that at the time the Jersey Central and Kingara Mchcan containment vessels were being fabricatcd at the Creenville shop, the Tarapur containment vessels were -
alsc being fabricated plus a largo volume of work for the space industry.
CB&I personnel indicated that this busy schedule could have affected the quality of work performed during the period in question.
CELI personnel indicated that they were not aware of the intended service of the tubing in the insert plates.
They assumed the operating pressure would be 70 psig.
Based on ne paucity of information obtained at the Greenville i
shop, it is difficult to conclude that the quality of the Jersey Central control rod hydraulic penetration insert plates exceeded the quality of these same components of the containment vessel.
Direct inspection has disclosed a number of defects in the Niagara Mohawk vessel.
It would be i
logical to assume that the general quality of all components of pressure vessels fabricated during the period in question was similar.
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