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.U. S.' ATOMIC ENERGY-COMMISSION i:
'k REGION I.
DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE 1
Report of Inspection CO. Report No. 219/69-6
. Licensee:
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT' COMPANY (Oyster' Creek 1)-
License No. DPR-16
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Category B m,
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Dates of Inspections:
May 27 and 28,.1969 f-June 23-27, 1969 Dates of Previous Inspection:
May 1-5, 1969
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OAlAN d.
Inspected by:
R. T. Carlson, Senior Reactor Inspector Date Reviewed by :
ON bm afa i
J.[8. Kepp:le%;, Senior Reactor Inspection.
Date Specialist Proprietary Information:
None
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SUMMARY
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A special inspection performed to verify the substantive.information contained in Amendment No. 53 ' of the Application revealed that 'in general the information was true.
Specific observations made are discussed in i
the report.
The reactor building confinement capabilities still had not been satis-factorily demonstrated as of the last visit covered by this report.
}-
GE expanded their review of Anchor valve radiographs to encompass certain~
f carbon steel valves.
CO still maintains that the. problem (cracks and 1
other defects in castings) warrents the. review of-radiographs.of addi-
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tional Anchor supplied valves.
GE has established a program to monitor cable temperatures during plant operation.
A problem was experienced with the failure of the recirculation system pumps to restart following shutdown at operating conditions.
The pump
-control circuits have been modified in an attempt to overcome the difficulties.
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Scope of Visits l'
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. A followup review of carryover items from the prelicensing phase 7
of the CO inspection program for Jersey Central Power & Light company's O)yster Creek 1 reactor facility was conducted by the writer during an announced visit to the site on May 27-28, 1969.
Mr. D. L.
/
Caphton, Reactor Inspector, CO:I accompanied the inspector during the visit.
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A special, announced inspection was performed at the site on June 23-27, 1969, by the writer, with technical assistance by Mr. W. J. Collins, Metallurgist, CO:HQ, and by Mr. R. A. Lofy, Parameter, Inc. (CO Consultant).
The principal purpose of this visit was to verify the substantive information contained in Amendment No.
53.
Because of the nature of the subject matter reviewed during these inspection's, the construction phase inspection report-format is being utilized in lieu of the operations phase format to document the observations made.
The principal persons contacted during the visits were as
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follows-H A.
May 27-28, 1969, Visit l
Jersey Central Power & Light Company (JC)
T. J. McCluskey, Plant. Superintendent i
D. E. Hetrick, Operations Supervisor D. 'A. Ross, Technical Supervisor (In-Training) i B. G. Avers, Manager, Quality Control (General Public Utilities) k i
General Electric Company (GE)
K. W. Hess, Site Operations Manager N. O. Strand, Site Construction Manager 1
L. M. Loeb, Manager, Materials and Quality Services -
Domestic Turnkey Projects (San Jose)
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JunIe-23-27, 1969, Visit F
Jerhey Central Power & -Licht Company
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i T. J. McCluskey, Plant Superintendent I. R. Finfrock, Jr.,, Technical Supervisor D. A. Ross, : Technical - Supervisor, (In-Training)
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General Electric Company.
j K. W. Hess, Site Operations Manager f
N. O. Strand, Site Construction Manager J. Omer,-Coordinating Engineer, ATAPCO Pipe Verification Program-C. Buckner, Specialist, Materials and Quality Services. --
Domestic Turnkey Projects (San Jose)
J. Freitas, Specialist, Materials and Quality. Services -
Domestic Turnkey Projects (San Jose)
Burns & Roe, Inc. ' ( B&R).
G. A. Lari, Project Engineer (Oradell)
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H. Jung, Quality Control Engineer (Oradell)
H. H. Minshall, Senior Site Representative 4
II.
Results of May 27-28, 1969, Visit A.
Status of Previously Identified Issues p
i The status of those issues previously identified (in CO i
Report No. 219/69-2) as requiring some followup by CO subsequent to issuance of the operating license,.is summarized beloW.
For purposes
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l of comparison, the paragraph numbers in the-referenced report are
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.given in parenthesis.
l.
Valve Cra'ck Problems - Anchor (Paragraph II. A.l.)
During this visit, GE was-informed that because of i
the problems experienced in carbon steel Anchor valves at'Monticello, the re-review of vendor radiographs 3
'should be expanded to include all valves supplied by.
i Anchor in systems that communicate with the primary system.
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-Mr. Loeb stated that GE had reviewed the vendor' radio '
- graphs of all Anchor: supplied valves'that are in systems l
that communicate with the primary syst.em but only. up.
to and including the second isolahon 'talves.
The.
carbon steel valves reviewed includer'. 6 in the shutdown y d cooling system and 4 in the feedwater system.. Mr. Loeb ce stated that no new defects.of significance were.identi--
, 3 fied.
In response.to questioning,'he stated that GE's
- <j rational for not carrying on'beyond the second. isolation' I
valve was -(in part) the~ fact that-the'. subject valves.
. j will be continually in service and that their reliability will be adequately established in this fashion.
During.a subsequent telecon with-Mr. D. K. Willett,,GE.
Project Manager for OC-1, the inspector informed Mr. Willett that Co was planning to visit / the Anchor facilities at some future date, and that if GE stills planned not to review the radiographs of.the outstand-ing valves in question, that CO would do it.
Mr. Willett made no further commitment in this regard on the part'of' GE.
_.c 2.
Cable Tray Loading (Paragraph II.A.2)
GE has established a program;to monitor cable tempera-
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tures during plant operation.
The pertinent features of the program were described by Mr. Loeb..as follows:-
j a.
The tray determined analytically to be.most-j heavily loaded (Tray 19B) will-be equipped with
-l two thermocouples which 'will be located inside-the cable pack, attached to the' insulation.
A i
third thermocouple will monitor' the ambient air j
temperature.
- b b.
The readout from all three thermocouples will be.
continuously recorded.
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This monitoring will continue for about 6 months of ~
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. plant operation, i.e., ;into commercial operation,
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d.
The intent is~to maximize the current flow'and to
.. L approximate the conditions analyzed.
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The data will be collected and sent to San Jose. for.
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review and analysi,s.
Additional-monitoring would be j
' performed should the results so indicate.
- i f.
The hoped-for timing was such that it would carry j
through the combined peak load and peak ambient temperature period.
monitoring equipment has been installed as is described'_.
j During subsequent: visits, it was determined;that'the above.
CO'will follow the results of this program.
3.
Nondestructive Testing of Safety Valves (Paracraph II.A.5.)
At the time of this visit, GE (Mr. Loeb), contrary to
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earlier indications, had nothing further to suggest that was anywhere near being responsive to the concerns of Co 30 in this matter.
This issue was subsequently resolved, together with other related issues, in meetings held o
between JC-GE and REG ' and. the Commissioners, and will be discussed in future inspection reports.
i 4.
Hot Integrated Test (Paracraph II.E.1.)
I Further review of the possible consequences 'of high ambient temperatures in the upper reaches of the drywell e
during plant' operation revealed that, contrary to earlier indications, the wide range. level instrumentation impulse line does not require. insulation.
This matter i
is considered resolved.
5.
Primary System Expansion Test (Paracraph II.E.3.)
Mr.-Hess stated GE's rational for not measuring.the,
j recirculation pump-motor plumbness during the subject test to be as follows:
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'a.
The initial measurements verified that the pumps.
. were installed as desired.
b.
The. flanged surfaces on the subject equipment-j monts ceased to be accessible once the installa-which had been used for initial plumb measure-i
.N tion of the recirculation system was completed.
No other available surface was suitable for-this-
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purpose.
c.
Any approach that would be' acceptable (example -
mounting a new reference plate) would require going back to the original reference point,'i.e., dis-i assembling the-pump-motor units.-
d.
The principal objective of obtaining proper,plumbness-is to' reduce wear on bearings.
No abnormalities i
were,noted 'regarding the bearingrs during the testing and operation conducted to date.
Discussion with Mr. McCluskey indicated that JC was:
satisfied with this matter as it stands.
Although hind-sight would suggest that proper consideration should have-t been ~given to the problems associated with post installa-tion me' surements, CO concurs with the GE. rational for -
a not doing it.under the circumstances.- This matter is-considered closed.
'j-B.
Status of New Issues-
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1 The ' status of issues which developed subsequent to the previously identified issues are summarized below:
1 1.
Problems with Circulating Water Pumps ji I
According to Mr. Hess,' a problem with vibration, believed
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to be related to some unidentified problem with the winding, was experienced in the motor for the No. 4 i
circulating water pump.
The unit was being prepared for shipment back to the vendor (GE) at the time'of the visit.
Mr. Hess estimated that it would be returned s
and reinstalled within three weeks.
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Mr. Hess also related an instance of.oyertightening of-the packing on the. shaft of one of the circulating.
l water pumps- (unit No. 2). resulting in overheating of j
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the packing and related parts.
New. parts are required and have been requested.of the vendor (Byron-Jackson).
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JC-GE were planning on swapping the pumps and. motors on -
'f Wy units ~2 and 4.as necessary to have,three complete' Ud circulating water pump-motor units pending correction a
of these difficulties.
1 2.
Problem with Restarting Recirculating Water Pumps, Following Shutdown at Operating Conditions Discussions with Mr. Hess ' revealed that duringi l
scheduled testing. performed during the hot functional i
test, the recirculation pumps, in all instances but one,.
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failed to restart following a shutdown while at' operating temperature and pressure.*
The trouble.-was attributed to insufficient torque to_ overcome resistance that develops as a result of loop pressure.against the pump thrust bearing.
Discussions with Mr. Hess' during l
the June 23-27, 1969, visit revealed that the condition m.,
had been corrected by modifying the. control circuit.
1 All pumps were subsequently successfully retested a minimum of three times each.
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I IIL' Results of June 23-27, 1969 Visit
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' The following is a summary of the results of the special inspection.-
performed to verify, on a sampling basis, the substantive information
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contained in Amendment No. 53.
Verbal and/or written contributions to j
this section of the report were made by Messrs. Collins and Lofy.
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l The inspection' outline followed during;the inspection was basically 1 -that suggested by CO:HQ**.
Therefore, for ease of communication, the
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1 same. outline will be utilized in documenting the results.
Also, rather
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i than give a complete accounting of the total inspection effort, only those observations of note are spoken to.
- Similar problem experienced at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station -
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CO Report No. 220/69-6, Paragraph II.A.5.f.
- Memo Route Slip, O'Reilly to Carlson, " Inspection to verify Amend-ment No. 53 of the Jersey Central Rower and Light Company's Appli-cation - Docket No. 50-219"., dated June 20, 1969.
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-g-Preliminary reports of the results of this effort were issued i
during the course of the inspection and are documented in memoranda,
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Engelken to Moryis, " Jersey Central Power and Light Company (Oyster i
Creek) Docket No. 50-219", dated June 25, June 26 and June 30, 1969.
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In general, as a result of this inspection, the information con-1 tained in Amendment No. 53 was proven to be true.
Additional pertinent l
observations are given in the following paragraphs.
i A.
ATAPCO Piping The inspection review here encompassed the following areas:
material identification (heat numbers), hardness surveys, chemical analyses, physical properties tests, radiography (CO reviewed 100% of that performed as part of verification program), hydrostatic tests, and repairs to 12-inch pipe.
l 1.
The ATAPCO " Test Reports" were acknowledged by GE to contain data from the original mill certifications for the plate only.
No additional information resulting from the processing of the material into pipe was supplied.
All of the heat numbers given are mill heat numbers.
Pipe lot numbers are not identified.
2.
In reviewing heat numbers, it was noted that a heat (No.
32975) was listed for one piece of 16" pipe (2 feet i
long) which was not shown in the Amendment No. 53 ac-counting.
The location of this pipe, in the plant or J
otherwise, is unknown to GE.
3.
The inspectors observed a small section (2.58' long) of j
14" stainless steel pipe in the shutdown cooling system which GE, in their accounting of the ATAPCO pipe, had assumed to be carbon steel.
There was no identification on the pipe, located on the downstream side of isolation valve V-17-19 (inlet to shutdown cooling system).
Avail-able records on the ATAPCO pipe indicate that 18' of 14-inch pipe was ordered.
GE accounted for 11' in Amend-ment No. 53.
4.
Hardness surveys performed on the pipe were limited in the information obtained.
There was no survey of the weld area and heat affected zone.
The survey of the pipe walls was done only on exposed pipe where the
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in hardness testor could be' located vertically.
The hard-j ness survey purports only to indicate that the-various-
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metallurgical condition.
This hardness corresponds with.
that of solution-annealed plate.
On the basis.of present j
g' hardness - data, it has: been. concluded that the. pipe was
'i solution treated after forming because any high skin hardness due to forming'is absent.
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5.
The in-process and repair. radiographs received from.
d ATAPCO were not correlated to specific pieces 'of pipe.
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6.
Two rejectable defects were found by CO in ' the review of
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radiographs of longitudinal seams of ATAPCO piping. The first defect involved porosity indications'in excess'of a
that permitted by Section I of the ASME Code.
These in--
l dications were identified in 8-inch piping in' the' isolationL l
condenser system. ' This indication was known to GE but l
not brought to the attention of CO.
These indications are, in GE's view, technically acceptable.
CO concurred in this position. 'No further action was taken.
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7.
The replacement 12-inch pipe _ spool in the isolation con-i denser system (NE-6-1) was procured from Dravo Corporation.
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Visual examination of the spool by the inspectors showed 1
it to be marked " Alloy Tube & Pipe Corp., A 3-, TP 316."
The marking required by the ASTM was unidentifiable.
8.
A section of the original pipe in the isolation condenser ~
j system, near the replacement spool, was observed by the inspectors to be marked " Alloy Tube & Pipe Corp., A358 Class I, T-316. "
The wall thickness was stamped 0.687 j
inch.
The wall thickness for the replacement pipe, as I
marked, is 0.566 inch.
!i-9.
The documentation package on the ' replacement spool piece NE-6-1 wa::; reviewed and found to be quite complete and a good exampic of pipe certification by lot, with pedigree going back to.the plate material.
10.
Per GE, it was originally intended to repair spcsol piece NE-6-1 at GE's Philadelphia service shops.
The decision q
to replace this piece was influenced by the fact that this shop went out on strike about the time the piece was re-ceived.
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22998 and.34466).for' fittings; however, as of the time
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of the inspection GE had not been able to identify the.
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source for the material-going.into the fittings.
2.
GE reported finding a purge-block chain-in an elbow-in-
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the isolation condenser system as a result of radiography h.7 performed as part of the verification program.
The chain
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was subsequently removed.
There has been no accounting-of the purge block device itself.
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D.
Other Safety Related Fittinas 1.
The documentation on the fittings used in the cleanup domineralizer system was included in the CO review of that system.
All records reviewed were found to be in good order and sufficiently complete.
E.
Suspect Valves j
1 1.
Certifications from Crane for four replacement valves, (out of the seven to be replaced) were~ reviewed and-found to be in order.
Both material certification and l
Certificate of Tests accompanied the order for these items.
The other three small valves to be replaced are in other secondary systems and were not accounted for at the time of the inspection.
1 2.
Radiographs of girth welds adjacent to the six 10-inch check valves in the core spray system, supplied by Metro-i politan, showed portions of the castings of these valves.
4 CO's examination of these limited-view radiographs includ-i-
ing specifically that for girth weld NZ-2-5899. revealed gross indications of shrinkage cracks in one of the valves
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(No. V-20-51).
GE was aware of these shrinkage, cracks
.l and considers the defects to be acceptable-without further 3
inspection.
Efforts at resolving this issue as a separate item were discontinued for the same reason presented in paragraph III. B.
- 2. of this report.
These valves are scheduled to be replaced within approximately one year.
3.
Replacement valves for four of the six 10-inch check valves discussed in paragraph III. E. 2. above had been received at the site at the time of the inspection.
Material cer-tifications and test reports for these valves were reviewed and found to be in order.
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Non-Suspect Valves (Safety Related) l'.
Review - of the B&R-GE project to identify all' valves by -
source showed that they had indeed conducted a comprehen-sive review.. If complete, as they said it-was, every i
l valve should meet their standard of acceptance, that is:-
a.
Direct purchase from a reputable manufacturer, gg 4 e f
b.
-Purchase from an agent (requires record of agents
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order with manufacturer),
c.
Purchase from an agent if quoted by manufacturer -
(order placed on agent at direction of factory), or d.
Purchased.from a recognized distributor-from stock.
Co did not spot check to identify particular valve (s) but did review the administrative procedure by means of which they identified suppliers and confirmed factory orders.
From a; large sampling of this paper work, it appeared that B&R had pinned down the origin of most valves except those identified in Amendment No. 53 as being of unknown origin.
i 2.
During the course of this inspection,- the inspection pro-l gram was broadened to review the specific. documentation and nondestructive testing program on important' valves -
exclusive of the Metropolitan supplied valves.
This limited review, based on the June 22 informal. submittal by GE*,
included the following six high pressure valves located within the drywell:
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- Speaks to nondestructive testing performed on components in critical systems.
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..q>r Charcoal Filters
.j tested us'ing; freon'112 at a: flow of 2450 cfm by the Mine' j
- O Safety Appliance Co.. between May 13 and 17,1969..
2 Filter Train Results,1 %
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A (EF-1-8).
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B (EF-1-9) 99.91-e 3.
. Reactor'Buildino Leak Rate Tests Discussions with Messrs. McCluskey, Finfrock and Ross
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revealed that JC had rejected the results of; the subject preoperational testing conducted with the modified standby gas treatment system.to the. time'of this-inspection. The JC representatives' cited failure to include testing of the seals on both railroad airlock doors,. testing at~onlyg one wind velocity condition, and inconsistencies in:the data at reasons for rejecting the test.
This test' remained-incomplete at the conclusion of this visit.
Followup re--
d view of this matter by CO will' be discussed in future reports.
r H.
Main Stream Isolation valves A' review of the leak rate data for the outboard main stream
. isolation valves (NSO4-A & -B) by the writer.showed no significant dis-crepancies with the information-provided in Amendment.No. 53.
The'for-the-record test results, obtained from the GE test report dated June 23, j
1969, which had been approved by JC, are'given below:
Date Test Pressure,
-Leak Rate Valve Tested psic cfh NSO4-A (north) 3/31/69 20 3.8
' NSO4-B (south) 6/12/69*
20 0.0 L
6/12/69 20 0.0 6/12/69 20 0.7 Based on discussions between DRL and the licensee, a. leak rate of 11.5.cfh- (5% of L o(20)) at a test pressure of 20 psig was established t
. Tests performed subsequent to machining of pilot valve poppet to remove indentations on seating surface.
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as a maximum permissible leak rate for each of the valves.
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The results of subsequently performed leak rate tests on the in-board main stream isolation valves (NS03-A & -B) will be discussed in a i
future inspection report.
I.
Leakage at Control Rod Drive Mechanisms j
m Leakage was experienced at the 0-rings at the flange joining i
the control rod drive mechanism and its related thimble for six drive units during a'1000 psig leak test performed on the reactor and related systems subsequeld to the repairs to main stream isolation valve NSO4-B.
According to Mr. Hess, in the worst instance (estimated e*'O.1 gpm leak rate) one of the O-rings was found kinked and completely out of its i
groove.
Mr. Hess related the leak problem primarily to inherent dif-ficulties experienced in getting proper alignment of the 0-rings at the time of assembly.
He stated that each of the effected drives had previously been disassembled as the result of earlier problems *.
1 J.
Exit Interviews Exit interviews were held with Messrs. McCluskey and Hess at the conclusion of each of the visits discussed in this report.
In each case, the pertinent items discussed and the significant comments made by those interviewed are contained within the body of the report.
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- CO Report No. 219/69-1, paragraph III. D.
- 2. and 219/69-2, paragraph III. E. 4.
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