ML20087A620
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REGION I j
p DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE-
_f Report of Inspection
^L CO Report No. 219/69-8 t]
' Licensee:
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Oyster Creek 1 License No. DPR-16 Category B Dates of Inspection:
August 13-15, 1969 Dates of Previous Inspections:
July 23 and August 1, 1969 Inspected by:
AY N Afiff69 R. T. Dodds, Reactor Inspector Date Reviewed by':
4kW kN bi R. T. Carlson, Senior Reactor Inspector Date Proprietary Information:
None SCOPE Type 'of Facility:
Boiling Water Reactor Power Level:
1600 Mwt Location:
Lacey Township, Ocean County, New Jersey Type'of Inspection:
Routine, Anncunced Accompanying Personnel:
D. L. Caphton, who prepared Sections D.l.,
F.1.,
K.l. and K.2. of' report.
Scope of Inspection:
Review preparations for power ascension, review facility records, observe reactor operations and tour the facility.
SUMMARY
Safety Items - No items,of safety significance were identified during the inspection.
9508070087 950227 PDR FOIA DEKOK95-36 PDR a
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Noncompliance Items - The Maintenance Supervisor has retired and had not yet been replaced with a person meeting the qualifications j
contained in the technical specifications.
A Form AEC-592 was
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(Section B.l. )
l Status of Previously Reported Problems - None that were applicable i
to reactor operations.
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'I Other Significant Items -
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JC was still interviewing applicants for the position
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of Chemical Supervisor.
(Section B.3.)
2.
Reactor operations were delayed following issuance of i
the full power license because of a recirculation system
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pump failure - drive shaft seizure.
The pump drive j
shaft and housing have been returned to the manufacturer for repairs.
It was expected that power will be limited to 50% with four pump operation.
(Sections C and E.1.)
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3.
Criticality was achieved on August 12, 1969, with nuclear heatup started the following day, on August 14, 1969, the reactor was shut down becausa of a tube leak in the reactor cleanup demineralizer system nonregenerative heat exchanger.
While startup was expected within four to five days, it I
may be delayed because of problems with the air ejectors and the cleanup system control valves.
(Sections C and j
H.l.)
4.
The poison injection system explosive valves were acci-dentally fired.
Boron was not. injected into the primary system since the injection pumps were not started.
(Section F.1. )
5.
Excessive carry-under, because of the use of internal steam separators, will be determined and included in core performance calculations.
(section G.l.)
6.
Both reactor building railroad air lock doors have to be jacked closed to meet the secondary containment leakage rate requirement.
A cam latch redesign will be made.
(Section K.l. )
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Management Interview - The results of the visit were discussed with
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Messrs. McCluskey, Hetrick and Hess.
The item of noncompliance i
involving the failure to have a satisfactory replacement for the Maintenance Supervisor was also discussed by phone on August 21, 1969, with Messrs. McCluskey and G. Kalcec, Manager of Generating
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Stations.
The results of the discussions were as follows:
I 1.
Mr. Kalcec assured the inspector that a man meeting the qualifications contained in the technical specifica-tions would be assigned to the position of Maintenance Supervisor within 30 days.
2.
Mr. Hetrick assured the inspector that all items, such as the accidental firing of the poison system valves, would be included in the operating log regardless of whether or not they were logged by the Shift Foreman.
3.
There will be no more double use of recorder chart paper.
4.
The-inspectors observed that it would not be prudent to operate with only one reactor building railroad air lock door closed even after the latches had been repaired until a "preoperational" test had been performed to demonstrate an acceptable leakage rate.
5.
The proper documentation for procedure and checkoff list changes was discussed and was stated by the inspectors to be an item that would be reviewed further during a future visit.
DETAILS A.
Personnel Contacted:
Personnel contacted during the visit included the following.
Jersey Central Power & Light Company (JC)
T. McCluskey, Station Superintendent j
D. Hetrick, Operations Supervisor D. Ross, Technical Supervisor (In Training)
I. Finfrock, Technical Supervisor (Out-Going )
J. Maloney, Shift Foreman C. Agan, Assistant Technical Engineer
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. General Electric Company (GE) f W. Hess, Site Operations Manager i.
D. Diefenderfer, Principal Test Design and Analysis Engineer r
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B.
Administration and Organization
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1.
Maintenance Supervisor Mr. N. Nelson, Maintenance Supervisor, retired on August 1, 1969.
When questioned about a replacement, Mr. McCluskey stated that Mr. Sullivan, with McCluskey's assistance, was handling the paper-shuffling duties (issuance of job order and work assignments to Maintenance Foreman) until a suit-able replacement has been named.
Mr. Sullivan is an Associate E' gineer with about four years of power plant n
experience.
Section 6.1.B.l.d. of the technical specifica-tions require that the position be filled by a person having at least 10 years of power plant experience with at least five years of responsible supervisory experience.
Mr. McCluskey stated that the man he had originally selected as Nelson's replacement had not worked out.
He had a better man in mind, but he did not have the qualifications (supervisory experience) required by the technical specifica-tions.
Also, to fill the position at this time with one of his three Maintenance Foremen (instrument, electrical and mechanical) would substantially weaken the maintenance organization during a crucial period.
Mr. McCluskey recognized that the organization as it now exists does not wholly comply with the technical specifications but felt that he was in a bind until the first of the year.
A form AEC-592 was sent to the licensee referencing this matter.
2.
Reactor Operators The technical specifications (Figure 6.1.2.) require that there shall be two licensed operators in the control room during all startups, shutdowns and other periods involving planned control rod manipulations.
According to Mr. Hetrick, t
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JC has interpreted this specification to require only one
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licensed reactor operator in the control room when the reactor is in the " refueling" mode and no manipulations i
of the control rods are planned.
(NOTE:
Interlocks l
prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod in i
the refueling mode. )
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3.
Chemical Supervisor JC has not yet hired a Chemical Supervisor but was still utilizing the services of a consultant.
Several applicants for the job have already been interviewed and a couple more have been scheduled for interviews.
Mr. McCluskey was hopeful of filling the Chemical Supervisor position with one of these applicants.
4.
General Office Review Board (GORB)
GORB was scheduled to meet at the site on August 19, 1969.
for the purpose of reviewing the results of the power ascension tests completed to date.
The last formal meeting was held on June 19, 1969.
A telephone meeting was held on August 8, 1969, to discuss and approve four pump versus five pump operation because of the failure of one of the primary coolant pumps - shaft seizure.
The minutes of the June 19, 1969, meeting were reviewed.
From discussions with Mr. McCluskey and a review of the minutes, it appears that GORB is functioning in accordance with Part 6.1.C.2. of the technical specifications.
C.
Operations Reactor operations were delayed following issuance of the full power license because of the seizure of the drive shaft of one of j
the primary coolant recirculation pumps.
The pump was removed and 1
the drive shaft and housing were shipped to the manufacturer (Byron-Jackson) for repair.
Operations will be limited to 50% power until the pump has been replaced.
Criticality was achieved at 2252 hours0.0261 days <br />0.626 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56886e-4 months <br /> on August 12, 1969.
j Nuclear heatup of the primary system was initiated the following day.
On August 14, 1969, the reactor was shut down and the primary system depressurized because of a tube leak in the cleanup system
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, nonregenerative heat exchanger.
The maximum primary system operating conditions obtained were about 500 psi at 4700 F.
The reactor power
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during this period was about 8-10 Mwt.
The outage was expected to '
5 last four or five days.
The following problems were noted during the short span of reactor heatup.
1.
The air ejector system was not operating properly.
It was obvious that vacuum could not be maintained at substantial power levels.
The fault appeared to be with the drain line system for the air ejector condensers.
2.
The pressure and flow control valves for the cleanup system were "over controlling" - the control system appears sluggish.
The cause of the flow control problem was being investigated.
Corrective action would be taken before operating at any substantial power levels.
D.
Facility Procedures 1.
Operating Procedures Two procedures were selected at random for auditing from the control room procedure file; procedure No. 309, Reactor Building closed Cooling Water System, and procedure No. 323, Normal Operation of Condenser Valves for the Circulating Water System.
The procedures with check-off lists were filed in the control room procedure manual.
The check-off lists used for the current startup were in a looseleaf type notebook.
The procedures had no markings; however, the used check-off lists contained some editing changes.
The check-off lists were signed by the operator making the checks and a shift foreman.
Procedure No. 309 step 309.3.1. step 1 states " Valves aligned as per attached valve lists".
Four valves were noted on the check-off lists to have been aligned differently from that shown as the normal position in the check-off list.
Four steps on the check-off list had been crossed out.
Procedure No. 323 had one valve noted on the check-off list to be aligned differently than the normal position indicated by the printed check-off list.
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, Mr. Hetrick was asked to. review with the inspector the documentation for the approvals for changes made to the check-off lists.
There were no documented approvals for changes made to the check-off list for. procedure No. 309; a change request was on file for a change to be made to j
the check-off list for procedure No. 323.
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Mr. Hetrick stated that the check-off lists as completed were being used as the basis for correcting future check-off lists.
He pointed out that in some instances, the valves did not even exist or the item did not belong on a check-off list - like a control valve, the position of which may be irrelevant.
During the management interview, theinspector informed the licensee that the approval of the changes made to the check-off lists may have not been made in strict compliance with the administrative procedures contained in Section 6.2. of the technical specifications and that this area would be reviewed further during a future visit.
E.
Primary System 1.
Recirculation Pumps Recirculation pump "D" had to be removed from service because of a drive shaft seizure.
A blind flange was installed on the pump casing after the pump impeller and drive shaft were removed.
The pump motor was put back on the casing to provide essentially the same pipe loading as would be expected during normal operation.
The flange installation was leak tested at 1000 psig.
The cause of the shaft seizure was not apparent and had not been determined at the time of the inspection.
The pump seals were stated to be in " good shaped.
This appears to be a failure of the radial bearing.
The pump shaft along with the shaft housing have been returned to the manufacturer, Byron-Jackson, for examination and repair or replacement.
The shaft had to be cut in two places during its removal.
In addition, it was found necessary to remove the personnel air lock
- in order to get the equipment out of the dry well.
- Double gasketed, individually testable penetration.
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6-The repaired components were expected to be returned to the site by August 28, 1969.
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According to Mr. McCluskey, the motor temperature charts i
showed a small increase in the motor winding temperature E
of the frequency controller about ten minutes before pump I
seizure.
There was no vibration alarm (set at 40 mils) f nor was there any indication of an increase in seal coolant temperatures.
Mr. McCluskey stated that their review of the vibration test results showed that the "D" loop pump had the worst vibration history of all the recirculation system pumps; however, it was still within the GE specifica-tions.
He stated that they do not attach any special significance to this.
With regard to the possible applicability of the problem to the other pumps, Mr.
McCluskey stated that this had been looked at and said that there was no indication thus far that the problem was generic.
He indicated that they intended to observe closely the performance of the other pumps to confirm this observation.
1 The problem of hot restart of the recirculation pumps was discussed with Mr. Hess.
At high pressures when the pump is not turning, the drive shaft lifts and is forced against the thrust bearing.
Sufficient break-away torque can be obtained by starting the frequency controller and operating it at about 50 cps without field current on the alternator.
Once field current is applied, the controller frequency drops to about 5-10 cps with a very high output (motor starting current) of about 600-700 amperes, which provides the torque necessary to start the pump motor.
Additional tests are planned to prove out pump restart once the primary system is at full operating pressure and temperature.
2.
Primary System Expansion Primary system expansion measurements were being made during heatup to verify that primary system components were free and unrestrained.
Marking pens were attached to the pipes to measure movement in the horizontal and vertical planes.
The inspectors accompanied Messrs.
Diefenderfer and Agan during a tour of the dry well for
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.n the purpose of observing pen installations on recirculation i
and steam piping.
No significant vibration of piping was g
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However, it was noted that
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the vertical pen for recirculation pump "E" was out of adjustment and that the ' horizontal pen for pump "A" was
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j not marking.
According to Mr. McCluskey, the pens have since been adjusted to operate properly.
Detailed results will be provided after the system expansion tests have been completed.
F.
Reactivity Control and Core Physics 1.
Poison Injection System The poison injection system explosive valves were accidentally fired on May 28, 1969.
The firing occurred while the reactor was at shutdown conditions.
According to Mr. Hetrick, the pumps did not start and no poison was injected into the primary system.
Mr. Hetrick stated that GE had turned over a number of keys to JC.
While attempting to ascertain the identity of one of the keys, the Shift 1
Foreman placed the key in the switch that actuates the standby liquid control system and " jiggled" it to determine if the key would fit.
Sufficient movement of the switch was made to fire the explosive valves but not enough to start the pumps since the key was immediately returned to the off position.
The firing of the explosives valves was not logged into the operator's log; however, it was logged in the supervisor's log.
Mr. Hetrick stated that this had already been discussed with the operator and that in the future, all such occurrences would be logged in the operator's logbook.
2.
Control Rod Drives Detailed friction and scram tests were made on all drives at ambient conditions.
No problems of significance were experienced.
Four drives will be tested at 300 and 600 psig during the heatup, and as many as possible at 1000 psi, to demonstrate the hydraulic characteristics of the control rod drive system.
All drives will be friction tested at operating pressure and temperature.
Also, the rods will be timed during a scram test at 1600 Mwt.
The results of the 300 psi tests did not show any anomalies.
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Nuclear _ Instrumentation b
The intermediate range monitors have been calibrated during nuclear heatup to give a 100% scale reading of g
i 16 kw on range 1 to 160 Mw on range 9.
The scram trip has been set to actuate at 120% on any range.
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G.
Core and Internals I
1.
Steam Separator Performance Mr. Hess stated that they were aware of the possibility of higher than predicted steam carry-under because of using internal steam separators.
Supposedly with the external recirculation loops, it will be possible to accurately measure carry-under and include its effects in the calcula-tion to determine the minimum critical heat flux ratio.
This item will be reviewed in more detail once power operation has started.
H.
Power Conversion System 1.
Air Eiector System The air ejector system has not been functioning properly, and it was apparent that condenser vacuum could not be maintained at appreciable power levels.
The problem appears to be with the draining of water from the inner and after condensers.
Mr. McCluskey believes that some pipe changes will be required to get the system operating properly.
K.
Containment 1.
Secondary containment Mr. Ross reviewed with the inspector the results of the secondary containment leak rate testing.
Two complete tests were run on August 8, 1969.
Six sets of readings l
were obtained from each of 10 separate manometers to provide data for an average manometer reading for each test.
Both tests were performed with a wind condition of 20 mph SW.
The average secondary containment vacuum was 0.28 inches of water for both tests.
Both the inner and
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appears that the preoperational demonstration of the t
secondary containment capability meets 'the technical
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specification requirements (1f.mit - 0.25 inches of water) f with both railroad air lock 6oors closed.
i Mr. Ross stated that preoperational tests conducted with I
the inner door open and outcr door closed, or the outer door open and the inner door closed, have not demonstrated a capability of meeting the requirements of the technical i
specifications; therefore, JC decided to operate with the requirement that both doors would be kept closed.
Mr. Ross discussed the leak rate testing technique.
He stated that based upon the large number of test runs already made and the data obtained, the accuracy of the testing technique being used gave results that were consistently within 0.02 inches of water.
He further j
stated that the integrity of the secondary containment has been demonstrated to not change after opening and closing the railroad air lock doors.
The inspector was accompanied by Mr. Hetrick for the purpose of inspecting the cam type latching mechanism for l
the inner railroad air lock door.
This permanent cam latching mechanism had failed; one part appeared to have sheared and another part was found to be bent out of shape.
Mr. Hetrick stated that the latch had proved to be too i
flimsy and that it was JC's intent to redesign the cam
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latch mechanism.
NT. Hetrick could not provide an estimated j
installation date for the redesigned latch.
A temporary jacking mechanism consisting of a pipe, nut and threaded screw was being used to jack the door closed.
This temporary mechanism was located at floor level and applied force to the bottom center of the door.
i Mr. Hetrick stated that a tsuporary jack similar to the one at the inner door was being used to jack the outer door closed.
He stated that the outer door cam latching mechanism had also malfunctioned.
The outer door was not inspected due to the fact the reactor was operating and l
secondary containment integrity was required.
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Mr. Hetrick stated that the.railroadJair lock had-been-
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-used.to remove the: failed recirculation pump. parts:on'
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August 9, 1969, one_ day after the.last complete,reactori
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building-leak. rate test _'had been run.. After the pump-.
d-parts were removed and the railroad doors' jacked closed,
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. the manometer adjacent' to the inner air lock door was
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checked and the reading used to verify building tightness.
2.
Pressure Suppression Chamber - (Torus) j Sodium dichromate (CrO ) has been added to the water in l
4 the torus for corrosion control.
The concentration was brought to 855 ppm as determined from a. sample:taken on.
July 8, 1969.
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r Sodium hydroxide was also added to the torus water'for.pH
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The pH was determined to be 8.5.
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Miscellaneous
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Recorders 3
1 Several instances were noted where recorder charts were being used twice.
For example, the charts'may have[been turned over or turned around.- During the management.
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interview, the question of whether this constituted' a legitimate record of operations was raised since data-y points could become intermingled.
Mr. McCluskey stated l
that the. practice would be discontinued immediately.. Since GE is paying for the charts until'the warranty run, Mr. Hess reluctantly accepted Mr. McCluskey's. edict.
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