ML20087A215
| ML20087A215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1968 |
| From: | Robert Carlson, James Keppler US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086U000 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-95-36 50-219-68-07, 50-219-68-7, NUDOCS 9508040227 | |
| Download: ML20087A215 (11) | |
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION g,,7 );
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Report of; Inspection.
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I i CO Report No.' 219/68-7.
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, gtf Licensee:
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY j
f (Oyster Creek 1) l sg Construction Permit No. CPPR-15 l
.j Category B.
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':.,g May 7, 8,'9,.14 and 15,=1968 T
Dates of Inspections:
June 13tand 14,-1968 j
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July 29 and 30,-1968
.j September 13,.19 and 20,.1968 i
Date of Previous Inspection:
March 28, 1968 l
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l 2Af44 Inspected by:
i R. T. Carlson, Senior Reactor Inspector Date Reviewed by : O h Ma a._
l J# G. KeptHAr, Senior Reactor Inspection Specialist' Date Proprietary Information:
None 1
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SUMMARY
A review of the physical installation;of portions of four reactor j
protection systems, selected on a sampling basis,, revealed-non-
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i conformance with separations criteria statements 'in the application
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in two of the four systems reviewed.. Additional possible-areas of r
L nonconformance with separations criteria were identified in;the 125V DC control system.
GE has undertaken an' investigation into the
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overall separations criteria area, i
The results of a follow-up meeting with JC-GE relating to pre-j operational testing and initial fuel loading programs _are discussed in the report.
Some resolution was accomplished in some of the '
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identified problem areas.
Additional followup by CO on outstanding
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issues as of this meeting will be discussed in future reports.
Mr. D. Ross, former Acting Director at the Penn State University TRIGA reactor, has accepted employment with the licensee and is
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scheduled to replace Mr. Finfrock, the Station Technical Supervisor.
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Additional resolution ~ of items of concern in the area of radiation protection procedures was accomplished.
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- Base line and _ annual whole body counts are now included in the 1
personnel monitoring program for station personnel.
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other results of the inspections covered by this report are i
documented in CO Report Nos. 219/68-5 and 219/68-6.
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k DETAILS I
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Scope of Visits Announced visits were made to the Oyster Creek Unit No. 1 facility by Mr. R. T. Carlson, Senior Reactor Inspectory Region I, f
on May 7 - 9, 14 and-15, 1968, June 13 and 14, 1968, July 29 and 30, i
1968, and September 19,end 20, 1964 and by Mr.' G. W. Reinmuth,
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Reactor Inspector (Program-Standards), Headquarters,on September 13
,i and 20, 1968.
Mr. Carlson was accompanied by Messrs. Keppler and
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Nolan, Senior Reactor Inspection Specialists, Headquarters, during I
e the May 14 and 15, 1968 visit, by Mr. Faulkenberry, Reactor Inspector, Region I, during the July'29 and 30, 1968 visit, and by Mr. Keppler j
during the September 19 and 20, 1968 visit.
Mr..Reinmuth was
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accompanied by Mr. W. J. Collins, Metallurgical Engineer, Head-quarters, during the September 13, 1968 visit.
The above visits represented a continuation of the construction-phase inspection program and included tours of the facility, observation of construction activities, reviews of pertinent records, and discussions with cognizant licensee.and contractor personnel.
This report covers part of the list of subject areas reviewed during the course of these visits.
Other pertinent i
information developed during the course of these visits is discussed.
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in CO Report.No. 219/68-5 and 219/68-6.
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i Principal persons contacted during the visits included the l
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followings t
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V et Jersey Central Power & Light Company (JC) l
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- 1 Mr. G. H. Ritter, Vice President (Parsippany) 1p Mr. T. J. McCluskey, LPlant Superintendent '
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- Mr.. I. - R. Finfrock, Jr., Technical-Supervisor 1
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Mr. D. E. Hetrick, Operations Supervisor' "h
Mr. N. M. Nelson, Maintenance-Supervisor.
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Mr. D.15. Kaulback, Radiation Protection Supervisor Mr. E. Riggle, Instrument Foreman
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v General-Electric Company (GE) il A
8 Mr. D. K. Willett, Project Manager (San Jose) j
' Mr. N. O. Strand, Site Manager.
l Mr. L. M. Loeb, Responsible Quality Control Coordinator j
j Mr. W. C. Royce, Construction Test Director
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Mr. K. W. Hess,' Operations Manager-l 7
Mr. R. C. Haynes, Operations Superintendent Mr..E. A. Lees, Responsible Engineer - Reactor Vessel Repairs p
'f Mr. R. Robertshaw, Construction-Engineer Mr. R.~ Holt, Engineer --Non-Destructive Testing (San _ Jose):
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,.I Mr. E. Wester, Construction Electrical Engineer-l
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l Burns & Roe, Inc. (B&R)
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Mr. J. C. Archer, Lead Supervisor. Engineer (Oradell).
j Mr. G. A. Lari, Project Engineer (Oradell)
Mr. R. Moore,2 Construction Electrical Engineer.
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Results of Visit l
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A.
Organization j -
Mr. D. Ross, former Acting Director atithe Pennsylvania State University TRIGA reactor, has' accepted employment a
'f with JC and is scheduled to report in at Oyster Creek Unit.1 on November 1, 1968.
According to Mr. ' McCluskey, Mr. Ross
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will eventually replace Mr. Finfrock, who will then go to the nuclear group at Parsippany, ' New ' Jersey.
Mr. McCluskey stated that if things go according to_ plan, Mr. Ross should be adequately qualified for this change to take place within five or six months.
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- Preoperational' Testing &: Initial' Fuel Loading Programs -
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A. meeting between representatives l of JC,l GE and CO,. was -
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held'at the site on May 15, 1968, for the purpose:of-1 discussing' outstanding issues resulting from-CO's review.
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of these subject areas.
This meeting was a followup to -
an earlier meeting held at the site on January 30,f1968.*
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'P The results of the later meeting are reflected in the j
l meeting minutes, a copy of which is : incorporated 'as q
i Addendum I to this report.
' Additional' followup of out-standing _ issues as of the subject' meeting will be discussed ll
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in future reports.
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Reactor Pressure Vessel Repair Program
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The subject repair program and post repair hyuro and.
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- g inspection continues to be followed for CO at the site.
principally by Mr. Reinmuth.
Observations made'by him j.
are being documented in periodic status reports 'which are referenced here for purposes of continuity.**
j D.
Reactor Protection System - Failure to Meet Applicable
. Separations Criteria
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t the inspector j
During the June 13 and 14,-1968 visit, reviewed the physical installation of the impulse lines..
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to the sensors for four reactor protection' systems, chosen.
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from the list'. of reactor protection systems on-a sampling j
pp basis.
The four systems' examined were reactor Lo and Lo-Lo water levels, reactor high pressure and drywell high pressure.
The examination was made :in comparison to system descriptions given in the application including-the i
following statements:
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- CO Report No. 219/68-1, Paragraph II.G.
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- Memoradum, Reinmuth to Kornblith, " Oyster Creek Pressure Vessel Repair - Status Report", dated September 24, 1968, with '
- j forwarding memorandum from O'Reilly to Boyd.
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-i Amendment No. 11, Page V-6-1
" Sensors of reactor-level, reactor pressure and'drywell pressure are located on opposite sides of the. containment
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4-in pairs such-that failure of any one pair'in one loca-tion will not prevent ability to scram or to initiate 1 automatic safeguards."
1 Amendment No. 38, Page 4-1 lh
" Detailed evaluations of the arrangement of instrument and process lines and of sensors within the drywell, led-to the conclusion that there are no process pipes that can fail and whip in such a manner as to-prevent automatic actuation of the engineered safety features."
U The review of the selected systems included an examination #
of pertinent field installation drawings, discussions with cognizant field engineers and visual examination of the as-installed systems.
The following significant observations.
were made:
1.
Reactor High Pressure The.two pressure taps in the reactor pressure' vessel were noted to be on opposite sides of the-vessel as required.
The impulse line from.the first tap was i
noted to drop essentially vertically to, and pass through, a-drywell penetration in about the same vertical plane as its tap.
.The penetration ~is located just below the throat of the drywell.
Outside the dry-well, the first impulse line then went directly to'
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instrument rack :RKO2-, located directly adjacent to j
the penetration, where it supplied two reactor high i
pressure sensors.
't The impulse line from the second pressure tap was also noted to drop in an approximate vertical plane.to a, point approximately at the throat of the drywell vessel.
However, from this point the line ran in a horizontal plane around the inside of the drywell to a penetration i
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located about 6' feet'from that serving the first..
reactor lhigh pressure l impulse'line.
At this' location,.
j thelsecond impulse line was noted _to_ be within 2 feet of-the firstLimpulse lineiat the closest point.; once-
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.outside the drywell, the:second impulse line reversed-1 its direction and,-in.about the'same horizontal plane-as on the inside,;ran on the'outside of th':drywell-to:
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a point in approximately the same. vertical plane.as itsJ
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[.T tap.
Here it. departed to instrument - rack R KO 1, located ~
diagonally opposite rack RKO2 where it supplied two j
reactor high pressure, sensors.
The routing of the second impulse line as described j
above, including specifically to_such close proximity-to the first line, is in nonconformance with the i
referenced statements in=the application.
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2.
Drywell High Pressure j
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The pressure taps for the two;drywell hightpressure<
3 impulse lines were observed to exit the biological shield (around 'drywell) 18 feet-apart. _once.outside the shield, they then came together, 2 inches apart, and continued in this orientation' for a. distance of j
approximately.30' feet to an above floor where they
.j diverged and then ran to two columns, located about.
Jj 30 feet apart.: Here the impulse lines' served the! dry-well high pressure _ sensors, one impulse line at each of' j
i the two columns with each line supplying two sensors.
'i-1 The drywell high pressure sensor system installation-
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described above is in nonconformance with the statement j
.from Amendment No. 11 referenced earlier.-
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I During the visual examination of this system, it was L.
also noted that the two sets _of signal cable conduit sy leaving the two sets of sensors came to within at -least.
l 8 feet of one another at one point.
This is in direct" violation with the reactor building conduit plan'(GE Drawing. 3138-10) which specifies that a minimum 25 foot i
separation be maintained between the ' two sets of conduit.1 ]
During subsequent discussions, Mr. Wester stated that GE:
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had noted the improper routing of the conduit _and that j
the work had been stopped pending resolution of the 4
situation.
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Reactor Lo and Lo-Lo Water Level'
-A visual examination-of these systems showed~the loca 1
tions of,the pressure vessel taps, impulse lines', dry-
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well penetrationsc instrument racks ( RKOli ~ and RKO2) ~
M and sensors to be on opposite sides of the drywell
.f throughout.as required.
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During the exit interview with Mr. Strand on Junef.14, 1968,-
j when the inspector outlined the observations documented above, including specifically the nonconformance items outlined in ~
paragraphs D.1 and.D.2.
Mr. Strand stated that.as a result.
of these observations GE would undertake a complete tabulat' ion;l of all separations criteria for the plant followed:by aL 1
visual inspection of the physical installation' to confirm _
l compliance with the applicable criteria.
He emphasized:that1 0 this would be a large project including mechanical, electrical and instrumentation aspects.
The inspector indicated at:that-j 3 '
time-that the program outlined appeared to be an-adequate' and ' responsible response to this area of concern.
During a meeting with Messrs. Loeb and Strand at the time of the July 29 and 30 visit, at which. the inspector j
inquired as to the status of GE's-investigationz into the
-i separations questioni Mr. Loeb informed theLinspector that,-
~ contrary to statements made by Mr. Strand at the time of the previous visit, GE would be d6ing nothing different i
from what they had been doing right along.
He stated that each system was being.and would continue to be looked.at j
s throughout the design stage and during installation to accomplish.the intent of the applicable criteria.
He said-i that the completion ' of this review would coincide with the d-completion of the electrical work.
He stated further that
'f there were some instances where because.of physical limita-tions the criteria could not be fully complied with.
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said that the end. result would be that each system would be i
L protected against what they were trying to protect against.
l When asked if any changes would be made as a result of the =
j specific nonconformance items identified by the inspector l
during the last visit, Mr.'Loeb stated that it was GE's i
position that the installation of the subject systems was i
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t fully in agreement with commitments in the application and
' therefore no changes would be made.
He stated further that 4
the commitments relating to separations" criteria were made:
relatively late in the license review and that:GE was of.
the opinion that-they had made a reasonable effort on g
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providing separation at this facility, i.e.,
a nearly!
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finished plant.
He said that they were employing'more
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stringent separation on subsequent plants.:
The inspector then related the substance of the above conversation to Mr.,McCluskey and inquired as to what JC's position was with regard to the specific items of non-
-conformance as well as to the applicability of.these d
l' observations to the rest of the plant.
During a subsequent phone conversation on August 9, 1968, Mr.,McCluskey-informed-the inspector that JC had asked GE to satisfy them that
- F the. applicable separations criteria had been met in the-i reactor high pressure.and drywell high pressure systems.
-However, he said that he was;not in a' position at that time d
to indicate just how ' JC would handle the quest' ion of
_l applicability-to the rest of the plant.
During subsequent-communications with both GE and JC, the inspector learned-that, in apparent contrast to GE's position statement (by-
-l Mr.-Loeb) at the time of the July 29 and 30 visit, GE had undertaken an investigation into the overall separations
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criteria question as it relates'to this facility. 'The-scope-and results of these actions by GE, plus the results:of.'
additional followup _ in this ; area by Co, will be discussed in future inspection reports.
E.
125 V DC Control System Distribution - Apparent Failure 4
to Meet Applicable Separations' Criteria
- l At the time of the June 13 and 14 visit, the inspector made.
4 a cursory examination of ' the routing of the' 125 V DC. control:
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system cabling from the station battery room.
It was noted F1 that the load cables came off opposite ends of the two sets of batteries and thence to two main distribution.
panels, each bank of batteries serving one panel..However,
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.it was noted that it. appeared that all the subfeeders.from.
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F the two' main distribution ' panels-entered the same cable j
tray,.-which in turn _ exited. the ' battery room via; a tunnel i
along with several other cable strays all in a -vertical i
. array with the specific tray :in question onitop.
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-During the exit' interview with Mr. Strand on June'14, thei A
inspector' stated.the above_ installation, specifically the' apparent routing of all subfeeders--via the same cable tray, j
appeared in ' conflict with statements in, the application
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including specifically the-following.from Amendment 18,-
,l page 5-1:-
"The DC power systems for engineered safeguards meet i
the single failure criterion for redundance of j
circuitry and components.. Failure in one DC power system or any device, in the circuitry will not causel l
failure in the circuitry of the1second DC power system."
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.e The inspector also stated that the vertically stacked' cable j
tray arrangement in the tunnel exiting;the battery: room.
1 appeared to put the facility in a highly' vulnerable position l
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with respect to fire.
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At that' time,'Mr. Strand stated that'the' inspector s- (
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observations. would be included in their overall review of-j separations criteria as discussed _in paragraph II.D.Jof-1 this report.
As in the case of the areas of concern discussed in paragraph II.D, the inspector subsequent 1y' learned that these latter items-relating.to DC distribution were ultimately covered, at least in part, by the GE investigation.. This subject, including additional followup j
by CO, will be discussed ' further 'ini future inspection j
reports.
F.
Health Physics l.
Radiation Protection Procedures - Followup
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Steps taken by'JC in response to observations mad'e earlier by Co, documented in CO Report No.'219/68-1, Paragraph V.D. 1-12, were reviewed with Mr. Finfrock j
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I fl' by the inspector during several of the visits' covered by this report.
The review showed that JC had, or l
planned ' to ' supplement the existing procedures with additional detailed procedures or oral instruction and' training in each of the subject areas identified. 'This area of concern is considered by' the' inspector. to be adequately resolved.
4 2.
Personnel Monitoring JC now plans to include base and possibly yearly whole body counting for all station personnel as part of their overall monitoring program.
Previously, no whole ' body
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counting was included in their routine checks.*
JC also plans to include base and annual gamma activity urinalyses on station personnel as part of the program.
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G.
Exit Interview
,l Exit interviews were held with pertinent JC and GE
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representatives at the conclusions of some of the visits i
discussed in this report.
In other instances, exit inter-views were not required due to the nature of the visit or because the persons involved were in the company. of the inspector (s) for most or all of the visit.
In all cases, the pertinent items discussed and the significant comments made by those interviewed are contained'within the body of the report.
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- CO Report No. 2.'.9/67-6, Paragraph V.F.
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