ML20084C605

AO 250-74-8:on 740219,personnel Overexposure Occurred While Attempting Maint on E Detector of Flux Mapping Equipment. Caused by Failure to Comply W/Radiation Work Permit

ML20084C605
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	08/01/1974
From:	Schmidt A FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Oleary J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
AO-250-74-8, NUDOCS 8304080116
Download: ML20084C605 (3)

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A Mr. John F. O' Leary, Director l'Qf-

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Directorate of Licensing i Office of Regulation

U. S. Atomic Energy Commission l Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O' Leary:

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE NO. 250-74-8 JULY 31, 1974 FEBRUARY 19, 1974

! OCCURRENCE DATE:

TURKEY POINT UNIT NO. 3 UNPLANNED RADIATION' EXPOSURE 1

4 A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Unit No. 3 reactor was operating in steady-state at 7 5 *,

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4 reactor power. Flux mapping of the reactor core was in progress.

3 B. DESCRIPTION OF Tile OCCURRENCE i

At 12:20 a.m. on February 19, 1974, it was determined that the

E detector of the flux mapping equipment could not bc moved by i the drive motor. The I 6 C Field Supervisor was notified and i at 1

00 a.m. he and an I G C Specialist entered Unit No. 3 containment to effect a repair. The IIcalth Physics authority for the entry was a valid Radi~ation Work Permit, RWP 74-05S, that had been prepared for a previous entry.

! The I 6 C personnel determined that the problem was due to a defective electro-dynamic brake and that the only solution was to move the detector by rotating the cable reel by hand.

Both men rotated the reel initially and then the I 6 C Special-1 ist rotated the reel slowly while the I'5 C Supervisor communicated with the Control Room. -Movement with the drive motor was again attempted but the detector' would not move. The I 6 C Specialist then rotated the cabic reel at a high rate of speed until the 4,.

detector came out of the tubing and fell on the floor beneath the reel. lie then immediately exited to the Supervisor's position about 30 feet from the reel. They then Icft the con-

)j tainment building. Both individuals'found that their pocket 2

dosimeters (0-200 mR) read off scale and assumed them to be faulty. They estimated their exposure to be 20 mrem.

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(v3 Mr. John F. O' Leary, Director I

. Page 2 August 1, 1974 Followup on the day shift by I 6 C management and Health Physics personnel revealed that a possible dose rate of 3200 ,

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Rem per hour could have existed at the work site at the time of the incident. This dose rate would result in a 40 Rem dose to the I 6 C Specialist.

The Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs) for both employees were immediately flown to Eberline Instrument Company in Santa Fe, New Mexico, for processing and the Florida Power and Light radiological medical consultant and the AEC were notified of a possible over exposure.

The TLD results revealed that no over exposure had occurred:

Specialist: 2730 mrem y (whole body) 660 mrem s (skin dose only)

Supervisor: 910 m Rem y (whole body) 180 m Rem s (skin dose only)

C. CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of this occurrence was failure to comply with the Radiation Work Permit, the Operating Procedure for repair of a" the flux detector ovivo mechanism. and the "adiation Pretert:

Manual. Specifically, survey instruments were not used as required by the'RWP, a licalth Physics survey was not called for when the detector was fully withdrawn as required by the procedure, and the pocket dosimeters were not read frequently as required by the Radiation Protection Manual.

D. ANALYSIS OF THE OCCURRENCE This incident was not initially defined by FPL management as being an Abnormal Occurrence. It was defined as a Radiation Incident and as such a thorough investigation was made and Radiation Incident Report 74-1 was written. On July 23, 1974, however, FPL was notified by AEC Regulatory Operations that the incident was, in their opinion, an Abnormal Occurrence as defined in the Technical Speci fications.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTION I

The corrective action taken included:

1. The two individuals were required to attend the next session of the radiation protection class.

2. The shi f t supervisors were instructed to confer with appropriate departaent heads when faced with unique situations.

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n J4r. John F. Oesary,. Director o'

,Page 3 August 1, 1974

3. The cont ol point guards were given additional on-the-job IIcalth Physics training.

4. The incident was discussed with plant employees at the subsequent monthly safety meeting.

5. Signs were mounted on the Unit 3 and 4 containment access hatches stating that a radiation survey instrument is required for each work group entering containment when the reactor is at power.

In addition, we are presently evaluating the feasibility of modifying the existing Area Radiation Monitoring System.

F. FAILURE DATA There is no failure data associated with this occurrence.

Very truly yours, A. D.

N Schmidt Uf Director of Power Resources DWR:cc cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley Jack R. Newman, Esquire r- --