ML20083N952

10CFR50.59 Rept to Nrc

ML20083N952
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	11/16/1994
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20083N947	List: ML20083N943 ML20083N952
References
NUDOCS 9505240013
Download: ML20083N952 (56)

Text

-

P i

i TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY f NUCLEAR GENERATION-h k

f L

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLhMT UNITS 1 AND 2

,E

[

i 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT [

TO rue l NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION

'1:

t i.

JANUARY 1, 1994 - NOVENBER 16, 1994 ,

l 4

t DOCKET NUNBER 50-327 AND 50-328 LICENSE NUNBER DPR-77 AND DPR-79 I

1 t

O P

L 9505240013 950512 '

{DR ADOCK 05000327 PDR

r ,--

a

s. j SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT 1994 l f

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Acronym List ,

I. Summary of Facility Changes Modifications 1 Temporary Alterations 33 II. Summary of Procedure Changes 36 III. Other Safety Evaluations 39 PL210201/829

p r; --

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT .

10 CFR-50.59 REPORT  !

1994 The following criteria establish the bases for the items contained in this report.

I. Facility Changes A. Modifications During 1994, Sequoyah continued the process of reviewing ECNs/DCNs to verify field-complete status in the plant and make appropriate revisions to the SAR. A cross-check of these ECNs/DCNs and previour, annual operating reports revealed that some of these ECNs/DCNs had been reported in the past. Only the ECNs/DCNs not previously reported are included in this report.

B. Temporary Alterations Temporary alterations to the facility that required a safety evaluation are reported if they were written and approved in 1994. A temporary alteration is documented on a TACF.

II. Procedures ,

Procedures that were revised have been included in this report based on Site Standard Practice SSP 12.13, "10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments." If the safety assessment on a procedure indicated the need for a safety evaluation, the procedure change is reported.

I 1

I l

g

'. 'Th3 fallowing 10 o lict-ef cbbr;victiens cnd cerenym] common to this rrport.

Abbreviations / Acronyms Definition AARP. Alternate Analysis Review Program ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ABSCE Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure ac Alternating Current

_ ACA Auxiliary Control Air AERCW Auxiliary Essential Raw Cooling Water

! AFFF Aqueous Film-Forming Foam AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AFWPT Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine AHU Air-Handling Unit AI Administrative Instruction AMSAC ATWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry ANS American National Standards ANSI American National Standards Institute AOI Abnormal Operating Instruction ARPI Analog Rod Position Indication ASCO Automatic Switch Company ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASOS Assistant Shift operations Supervisor ASTM American Society For Testing And Materials ATC Automatic Time control ATWS Anticipated Transient Without a Scram AUO Assistant Unit Operator AUX Auxiliary AWG American Wire Gauge AZ Azimuth A/C Air-Conditioning BAE Boric Acid Evaporator BAT Boric Acid Tank BATP Boric Acid Transfer Pump BISI Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication BIT Boron Injection Tank BLW Bearing Lube Water CAM Continuous Air Monitor CAQR Condition Adverse To Quality Report CATS Commitment Action Tracking System CBACS Control Building Air Cleanup System CCP Centrifugal Charging Pump CCPIT Centrifugal Charging Pump Injection Tank CCS Component Cooling System CCW Component Cooling Water CDWE Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator CE Combustion Engineering CEB Civil Engineering Branch cfm Cubic Feet Per Minute CFR Code Of Federal Regulations CGCS Combustible Gas Control System CILRT Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test CIS Containment Isolation. System CIV Containment Isolation Valve CLA Cold Leg Accumulator COLR Core Operating Limits Reports COPS Cold Overpressure Protection System CP Crankcase Pressure CPAES Containment Purge Air Exhaust System PL430201/3840

' Abbreviations /Acronyme ' Definition L

cpm Counts Per Minute CRD ' Control Rod Drive CRDM Control Room Drive Mechanism f' CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System CRI control Room Isolation CRVI Control Room Ventilation Isolation CS . Containment Spray CSP Containment Spray Pump CSS Containment Spray System CSSC Critical Systems, Structures, and Components CSST common Station Service Transformer CST Condensate Storage Tank CT Current Transformer CV Check Valve CVC(S) Chemical Volume Centrol-(System)

CVE Condenser Vacuum Exhaust CV1 Containment Vent Isolation CTT Cooling Tower Transformer DAW Dry Active Waste DBA Design Baseline Accident DBE Design Baseline Event DBVP Design Baseline Verification Program dc Direct Current DCA Design Change Authorization DCN Design Change Notice DCR Design Change Request DD Drawing Deviation DEC Digital Equipment Corporation DPH Division Procedure Manuals DPT Differential Pressure Transmitter DWCD Demineralized Water and Cask Decontamination DWST Demineralized Water Storage Tank D/G, DG Diesel Generator EBLW ' Emergency Bearing Lube Water EBR Electrical Board Room ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System ECN Engineering Change Notice EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EHC Electrohydraulic Controller el Elevation EMI Electromagnetic Interference EMSL Electrical Maintenance Section Letter ENS Emergency Notification System EOI Emergency Operating Instruction EOP Emergency Operating Procedure EQ Environmental Qualification EQIS Equipment Information System ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Feature FCR Field Change Request FCV Flow Control Valve FDCT Floor Drain Collector Tank FE Flow Element FHAEF Tuel Handling Area Exhaust Fans FHI Fuel Handling Instruction FHSS Fuel Handling and Storage System FP Fire Protection PL430201/3840

"n i l

'- Abbreviations / Acronyms 'pefinition

.FQE Field Quality Engineering FRG Function Restoration Guidelines

, FS Flow Switch FSV Flow Solenoid Valves FT Flow Transmitter ft-lb Foot-Pound FVB Fifth Vital Battery GBCS Generator Bus Cooling System GCS General Construction Specification GDC General Design Criteria GOI. General Operating Instruction gph Gallons Per Hour gpm Gallons Per Minute GSC Gland Steam Condenser HCI Hazard Control Instruction HDP Heater Drain Pump HELB High-Energy Line Break HEPA- High-Efficiency Particulate Air HERCW Hanger - ERCW HJWT High-Jacket Water Temperature hp Horsepower HPFP High-Pressure Fire Protection HUT Holdup Tank HVAC Heating, Ventilation, And Air-Conditioning I&C Instrument & Control ICF Instruction Change Form IMI Instrument Maintenance Instruction I/P Current to Pneumatic JB Junction Box kV Kilovolt kW Kilowatt LC Limit Control LCC Lower Compartment Cooler LCO Limiting Condition Of Operation LCV Level Control Valve LED Light-Emitting Diode

-LEFM Leading Edge Flow Meter LER Licensee Event Report LLRW Low-Level Radwaste LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LOOP Loso of Offsite Power LOP Luba Oil Pressure LP Low Pressure LT Level Transmitter mA Milliampere MBCW Motor Bearing Cooling Water MCC Motor-Control Center MCR Main Control Room MCRHS Main Control Room Habitability System MCRHZ Main control Room Habitability Zone MDAFWP Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump MEB Mechanical Engineering Branch MELB Moderate-Energy Line Break MFIV(s) Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (s)

MFLB Main Feedwater Line Break MFPTC Main Feedwater Pump Turbine Condenser MFW Main Feedwater PL430201/3840

[-'

. Abbreviations / Acronyms Definition MIC Microbiological 1y-Induced Corrosion

' HOP Main Oil Pump MOV Motor-Operated Valve MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration MR Man-Rem / Maintenance Request MS Main Steam MSDDT Main Steam Dump Drain Tank MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSLB Main Steam Line Break MSR Moisture Separator Reheater MSV Main Steam Valve MSVV Main Steam Valve Vault MTR Minimum Training Radius mV Millivolts MVAR Millivolt Amperes Reactive MWTP Makeup Water Treatment Plant M&AI Modifications and Additions Instruction M&TE Measuring and Test Equipment NBS National Bureau of Standards NCR Nonconformance Report NDE Nondestructive Examination NE Nuclear Engineering NEB Nuclear Engineering Branch )

NFPA National Fire Protection Association NPDES National Pollution Discharge Elimination System NIS Nuclear Instrumentation System NPG Nuclear Power Group NPSH Net Positive Suction Head NQAM Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System NUREG Nuclear Regulation OBE Operating Basis Earthquake OPS Office and Power Stores OE-MEB Office of Engineering-Mechanical Engineering Branch OH&S Occupational Health and Safety O.D. Outer Diameter PAES Purge Air Exhaust System PAM Postaccident Monitoring i PAS Postaccident Sampling PASF Postaccident Sampling Facilities PASS Postaccident Sampling System l PCB Power Circuit Breaker .

PCF Procedure Change Form PCV Pressure Control Valve PD Positive Displacement PER Problem Event Report PI Pressure Indicators PI Periodic Instructions PM Preventive Maintenance PHP Preventive Maintenance Program PMT Post Maintenance Test PORC Plant Operations Review Committee l PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve ppm Parts Per Million PRO Potential Reportable Occurrence PRT Pressure-Relief Tank PL430201/3840

gy Akkreviations/Acronyme Definition PRV- Pressure-Relief Valve l PS Pressure Switch psi Pounds Per Square Inch psia Pounds Per' Square Inch Absolute psid Pounds Per Square Inch Differential psig Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge PSO Power System Operations PT Pressure Transmitter /Preoperational Test QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control QE&C Quality. Engineering and Control QIR Quality Information Release / Request r

QMDS Qualification Maintenance Data sheet R Revision RCDT Reactor Coolant Drain Tank RCH Reactor Coolant Hanger RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RCW Raw Cooling Water REX Radiation Exposure System RF(I) Radio Frequency (Interference)

RH Relative Humidity RHR(P) Residual Heat Removal (Pump)

RHV Reactor Head Vent RIMS Retrievable Information Management System RFO Refueling Outage RM Radiation Monitor RPI Rod-Position Indicator / Indication rpm Revolutions Per Minute RPS Reactor Protection System RSW Raw Service Water RSWC Raw Service Water Cooling RTD Resistive Thermal Detector RTV Room-Treated Vulcanization RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank RX Reactor R.G. Regulatory Guide SAR Safety Analysis Report SBO Station Blackout SCAR Significant Condition Adverse to Quality SCF Standard Cubit Feet SCFH Standard cubit Feet Per Hour SCFM Standard Cubit Feet Per Minute SCR Significant Condition Report SCSA Station Control and Service Air SCV Steel Containment Vessel i SDM Shutdown Margin j SE Shift Engineer SECL Safety Evaluation Check List SER Safety Evaluation Report SFPC Spent Fuel Pool Cooling l SGBD Steam Generator Blowdown SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture SI Surveillance Instruction SI(S) Safety Injection (System)

SMI Special Maintenance Instruction SMS Status Monitoring System SNM Special Nuclear Material 1

PL430201/3840 i

Y,

' Abbreviations /Acronygg Definition SOI Standard Operating Instruction SOR Static "O" Ring i, SOS Shift Operations Supervisor SP Standard Pressure-SPDS Safety Parameter Display System SPTS Sequoyah Procedures Tracking System

• SQA sequoyah Administrative Instruction SQN Sequoyah Nuclear Plant SK Surveillance Requirement SRO Senior Reactor Operator SRST Spent Resin Storage Tank SS Stainless Steel SSD Seismic Self-Drilling SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSP Site Standard Practice SSPS Solid State Protection System STI Special Test Instruction SWHX Seal Water Heat Exchanger S/D Shutdown S/G Steam Generator TACF Temporary Alteration Control Form Tavg Average Temperature TCV Temperature Control Valve TDAFW Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater TDCT Tritiated Drain Collector Tank TDPU Time-Delay Pickup TEACP Temporary Exterior Access Control Portal TEMA Tennessee Emergency Management Agency TI Technical Instruction TS Technical Specification (s)

TS Technical Support TSC Technical Support Center TSCDS Technical Support Center Data System U2C5 Unit 2 Cycle 5 UF Underfrequency UHIH Upper-Head Injection Hanger UHI(S) Upper-Head Injection (System)

UO Unit Operator USQ Unreviewed Safety Question USQD Unreviewed Safety Question Determination UV Undervoltage U.L. Underwriters Laboratories V Volt VCT Volume-Control Tank VOM Volt / OHM Meter WC Water Column WGC Waste Gas Compressor WGDT Waste Gas Decay Tank WGS Waste Gas System WOG-ERGS Westinghouse Owners Group-Emergency Response Guidelines WP Workplan PL430201/3840

Page No. 1 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

l l

DCN/ECN DESCRIPTION SAFETY ANALYSIS D08933 This DCN changed the valve position of valves68-305 and 68-308 for These valves are air operated contairment isolation valves. Their-both Units 1 and 2 from normatty open to norantly closed. valve safety function is to close tpon receiving a conteirment isolation 68-305 is an isolation valve for the nitrogen supply to the PRT. signal. Changing their normal position from open to closed did not valve 68-308 is an isolation valve for the Line from the PRT to the affect their ability to perform this function. The solenoid valves waste gas anatyrer. SAR Figures 5.1-1, 5.1-7, 5.1-9, and 11.2.2-5, supplying air to the FCV actuator has been de-energized in this new contairment penetration tables 6.2.4-1 pages 58 and 113, and the alignment, thich does not contribute to any adverse affects. There inservice valve testing program tables SAR pages 6.8C-43 and 6.8C-44 is no canitment to provide a continuous stoply of nitrogen to the were affected by this DCN. PRT or to continuously monitor the PRT gases. Procedures were revised to require that the PRT pressure be monitored frequently to prevent it from becoming depressurized and inteakage of oxygen occurring. Therefore, this change was not detrimental to nuclear safety.

D09217 This was a docunentation-only change to revise drawings to reflect This change erhanced the Unit 1 condensate hotwell sampling system the condenser hotwell sanple system t @ing and associated manual by providing an alternate sample path between the hotwells aruf the isolation valves instatted in the turbine building. Additional titration room. Because the Unit 2 hotwett sample puups have been sample ttbing has been instatted to provide an alternate path for abandoned in place, this change provided the only path from the dettvering a sample from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 hotwetts to the hotweit to the titration room. The function of the sample system titration room. This DCN also added mique identifiers for the was maffected by this change. This change did not increase the associated manual valves on the @ ysical tteing drawings. Also, probability of an accident or reduce the margin of safety within the samples that pass through a hydrogen anatyrer in the turbine system. The possibilities and consequences of a sampling system building are not discharged into a sample drain in lieu of the malftmetion remain mchanged.

original closed loop configuration. SAR Figure 10.4.1-1 was one of the diswings revised by this change. The condensate sampling system provides no safety related fmetions.

009243 This DCN was generated specifically as a " documentation change only" This D-DCN addressed various documentation only type changes DCN, i.e. changes which do not inoact systee operation or design and identified by DDs. The drawing discrepancies included in this DCN are being made to reflect the as-built plant configuration. This include, but are not limited to, valve position changes, valve type DCN incorporated valid discrepancies, identified between actual changes, valve ackfiticra and deletions, and configuration changes, plant configuration and design output, into their appropriate All changes performed by this D-DCM are limited to design output doctnentation. Drawing devia2fons processed through this DCN have changes only. No @ ygical modifications or alterations to any .

no affect on any system operational characte-istics, methods for systems were generated by this DCM. Where applicable, reviews by ensuring compliance with the TSs, or any procedures cuttined, the appropriate disciplines were used to determine that the changes stamarized or described in the SAR. lupact to the SAR is in the made by this DCN did not Ispect system operation or integrity.

form of drawing-related changes to affected figures contained in the SAR and to Appendix 6.8C. Figures noted as partially correct or as not todated in a particular amendment will be corrected accordingly and incorporated into a future SAR amendment.

009247 These DCNs were generated specifically as a " documentation only" These DCNs addressed various documentation only type changes 009248 DCNs, f.e., changes which do not ispect system operation or design identified by drawing deviations. Att changes performed by these D09249 and are being made to reflect the as-built plant configuration. D-DCNS were limited to design output changes only. No $ ysical These DCNs incorporated valid discrepancies, identified between modifications or alterations to any system were generated by these actual plant configuration and design output, into their appropriate DCNs.

documentation. DDs processed through these DCNs had no affect on any system's operational characteristics, methods for ensuring

Page No. 2 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

compliance with TSs, or any proce&res outlined, summarized or described in the SAR. Ispect to the SAR was in the form of drawing-related changes to affected figures contained in the SAR.

Figures noted as partially correct or as not updated in a particular amerdnent were corrected accordingly end incorporated into a future SAR amendaent.

009332 These DCNs were generated specificatty as " documentation change These DCNs addressed various docunentation only type changes D09334 only" DCNs, i.e. changes tAich cb not impect system operation or identified by drawing deviations. All changes performed by these design and are being made to reflect the as-built plant configura- D-DCNs were timited to design output changes only. ~ No physical tion. These DCNs incorporated valid discrepancies, identified modifications or alterations to any system were generated by these.

between actual plant configuration and design output, into their DCNs.

appropriate documentation. Drawing deviations processed through these DCNs have no affect on any system operational characteristics, methods for ensuring conpliance with the TSs, or any procedures cuttined, sunnerized or described in the SAR. Ispect to the SAR is in the form of drawing-related changes to affected figures contained in the SAR. Figures noted as partially correct or as not updated in a particular amendnent will be corrected accordingly and incorpo-rated into a future SAR amendment.

D09339 This DCN was generated specifically as a " documentation change only" This D-DCN addressed various documentation only type changes DCN, i.e. changes which do not lapact system operation or design and identified by DDs. The drawing discrepancies included in this DCN are being made to reflect the as-built plant configuration. This include, but are not limited to, valve position changes, valve type DCN incorporated valid discrepancies, identified between actual changes, valve additions and deletions, and configuration changes.

plant contiguration and design output, into their appropriate Att changes performed by this D-DCN are limited to design output documentation. Drawing deviations processed through this DCN have changes only. No physical acdifications or alterations to any no affect on any system operational characteristics, methods for systems were generated by this DCW. Where applicable, reviews by ensuring compliance with the Trs, or any procedures outlined, the agpropriate disefptines were used to determine that the changes sumnerized or described in the SAR. Ispect to the SAR is in the made by this DCN did not lapact system operation or integrity.

form of drawing-related changes to affected figures contained in the Therefore, this design change did not increase the probability or SAR and to Appendix 6.BC. Figures noted as portfally correct or as consecpences of an accident cr malfwiction of equipment leportant to not (pdated in a particular agendment will be corrected accordingly safety previously evelpeted in the SAR, nor did it create the ,

and incorporated into a future SAR amendment. possibility of an accident or malfu1ction of equipment important to safety different than any previousty evaluated in the SAR. This design change did not redxe the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS. There is no USQ.

D09340 These DCNs were generated specifically as " documentation change These DCNs addressed various docunentation-only type changes identi-009387 only" DCNs, i.e. changes which do not ispect system operation or fled by drawing deviations. All changes performed by these D-DCNs design and are being made to reflect the as-built plant configura- were limited to design output changes only. No physical tion. These DCNs incorporated valid discrepancies, identified modifications or alterations to any system were generated by these between actual plant configuration and design output, into their DCNs.

appropriate documentation. Drawing deviations processed through these DCNs have no affect on any system operational characteristics, methods for ensuring coupliance with the TSs, or any procedures outlined, sunnerized or described in the SAR. Iapoct to the SAR is I

in the form of drawing-related changes to affected figures contained l

l l

l l

a

-  ?

n SN:

a

- Page No. 3

^

CNANGES IN THE FACILITY - It0DIFICATIONS i

I in the SAR. Figures noted as partially correct or as not updated in

a porticular amendment will be corrected accordingly and incorpo-rated into a future SAR amendment.

l

! D0944 Drawing Deviation 92006373, associated with this DCN, identified DCE D0944 addressed documentation type changes identified by-'

i discrepancies between the Logic and schematic drawings. Also, the- 92DD6373. Att changes performed by.this DCN Were limited to design i DD required that TS-31-479 be changed to TC-31-479 on instrument output changes only. No physical modifications or atteration to any .

I tabs 47s601-31-series. Nuclear Engineering evaluated this DD and systems were generated by this DCN. gecause the topic droming is found it to be valid, but did not coupletely agree with the logic conceptuel, conveying the method of instrument loop operation, the' sketch attached to the DD.. The sketch attempted to correct the components are tratelled using the physical schematic drawing 1, ~  ?

handsuitch NS-31-318 togic which was shoun leproperty to have a . 2-45N777-12, dich uns not chanand by this DD. . Since the actual ' _

l spring return to a disconnected terminst instead of spring return to plant configuration as depicted by the schematic neewing remains -

1 P-AUTO. It did not go for enough to correct the " memory bon Logic" tsichanged, there uns no lopect on the plant accident or matfisiction ? - y that uns shotes on the Logic. This is d ere solenoid valves were probability or possibility.

l shown to receive either an open signal or a etcee si p al, instead of -

] either energized or not energized. This greatly complicated the logic as well as making it incorrect. According to the TSS system engineer, the system uma operating property as installed by the j schematic draulne. .Since the logic drawing is conceptual by nature and already known to be incorrect, it uns revised to agree with the schematic drawing. NE coordinated with TSS, the originator of the -

DD, to receive concurrence on the revised logic sketch to be '

incorporated onto the logic drawing. No field work was roupstred for this DD, and as such, the subject DCN uns processed as an SOCN to finallae the DD changes onto the logic and tab dramings. This DCW uns generated specifically as a documentation change only D01, f.e.

changes which do not impact system operation or design and are made - ,

i to reflect the as-built configuration.- Dravirs deviations processed I by this DOI did not affect any systems' operational characteristics, method for insuring TSs, or any procockares outlined, summarized, or described in the SAR. This DCN documents the acceptable findings of

! 92DD6373 as approved via NE evolustion, d ich is port of the DD. -

This required the revision of a logic drawing uhich is a primary .

drawing. As a result,'the SAR. Figure 9.1.10-2 for this draulne . a

, required Ledeting.

D09626 This DCN use generated specifically as a "ha==itation change only" This 0-00t eddressed various ,a===itation only type' changes a DCM, i.e. changes editch do not impact system operation or design and identified by DDs. ' The drawing discrepancies included in this 006 ,

are being made to reflect the as-built plant configuration. This include, but are not limited to, volve position changes, volve type--

008 incorporated vetid discrepencies, identified between actual- changes, volve additions and deletions, and configuration changes.

piant configuration and destyi output, into their appropriate - All changes perfonsed by this D-DCN are limited to design output l documentation. Discrepencies resolved by this DOI have no affect on changes only. No physical modifications or etterations to any -._

a any system operationet characteristics, methods for ensuring com- systems were generated by this 001. latere applicable,' revious by -

pliance with the TSs, or any procedures outlined, summarized or the appropriate disciplines were used to determine that the changes

, described in the SAR. Impact to the SAR is in the form of ~ made by this DOI did not impact system operation or integrity, d

. drawing-related changes to affected figures contained in the SAR.

Figures noted as portf ally correct or as not todeted in a porticular amendment ullt be corrected accordingly and incorporated into a -

future SAR asenthent. Chapter 6.8 of the SAR,Section XI test i

i Page No. 4 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MG)lFICATIONS -

4 requirements, required changes to reflect valve type and normat position changes. These changes were included in en SAR change request.

009657 This DCN was generated specifically as a " documentation change only" This D-DCN addressed various documentation only type changes DCN, i.e. changes which do not ispect system operation or design and identified by drawing and procedure discrepancies. The drawing are being mede to reflect the as-built plant configuration. This discrepancies included in this DCN include, but are not timited to,.

DCN incorporated valid discrepencies, identified between actual valve position changes, valve type changes, valve additions and plant configuration and design output, into their appropriate deletions, and configuration changes. Att changes performed by this-documentation. Discrepancies resolved by this DCN have no af fect on D-DCN are timited to design output changes only. No physical any system operatiese! characteristics, methods for ensuring com- modifications or alterations to any systems were generated by this pliance with the TSs, or any procedures outlined, suunarized or DCN. Where applicable, reviews by the appropriate disciplines were described in the SAR. Ispect to the SAR is in the form of used to determine that the changes made by this DCN did not ispect drawing-related changes to affected figures contained in the SAR. system operation or integrity.

Figures noted as partially correct or m; not updated in a particular amendment will be corrected accordingly aret incorporated into a future SAR amendnent. There were text cheapes required to the SAR as a result of the changes made by this design change. Chapter 6.8E page 12 of the SAR,Section XI test requirements, required changes.

This listing includes the valve number, ASME class, drawing coordinated, valve category, size, valve type, actuator rype, normal position, testing required, retlef request, atternative testing and remarks section. As a result of the changes outlined by this SA/SE, the valve position for valve 0-62-1057 as identified in the SAR was changed from open to locked open.

D09720 This DCN was generated specificotty as a " documentation change enty" This D-DCN addressed various documentation only type changes D09871 DCN, f.e. changes which do not tapecc system operation or design and identified by drawing deviations and walkdoms. All changes are being made to reflect the as-built plant configuration. This performed by this D-DCN were tietited to design output changes only.

DCN incorporated valid discrepencies, identified between actual No physical modifications or alterations to any systems were plant configuration and design output, into their appropriate generated by this DCN.

documentation. Discrepencies resolved by this DCN have no affect on any system operational characteristics, methods for ensuring com-pliance with the TSs, or any proced2res outlined, summarized or . e described in the SAR. Ispect to the SAR is in the form of drawing-related changes to affected figures contained in the SAR.

010037 This DCW was generated specificatty as a " documentation change only" This D-DCN addrested various documentation-only type changes identi-DCN, i.e. changes which do not lepect system operation or design and fled by drawing deviations. Att changes performed by this D-DCN are being made to reflect the as-built plant configuration. This were limited to design output changes only. No physicat DCN incorporated valid discrepencies, identified between actual modifications or alterations to any system were generated by this plant configuration and design output, into their appropriate DCN.

documentation. Drawing deviations processed through this DCN had no affect on any systems' operationet characteristics, methods for ensuring compilance with the TSs, or any procedures cuttined, sunnerized or described in the SAR. Ispect to the SAR was in the form of drawing related changes to affected figures contained in the SAR and to Appendix 6.8C. >

Page No. 5 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

010051 This DCN was generated specifically as a "docunentation change only" This D-DCN addressed various &cumentation only type changes D10053 DCN, i.e. changes which do not imact system operation or design and identified by drawing deviations. The drawing discrepancies are made to reflect the as-built plant configuration. This DCN included in the DCN inclu$e, but are not limited to, valve position incorporated valid discrepancies identified between actual plant changes, valve type changes, valve additions and deletions and configuration and design output into their appropriate docunenta- configuration changes. All changes performed by this D-DCN were tion. Drawing deviations processed through this DCN had no affect limited to design output changes mly that docanent the as-or. any system operational characteristics, methods for ensuring constructed configuration. No physical modifications or alteration compliance with the TSs, or any proce&res outlined, sunnarized or to any system was generated by this DCN.

described in the SAR. I mact on the SAR was in the form of drawing related changes to affected figures contained in the SAR.

010109 These DCNs were generated specifically as a "docunentation change These D-DCNs addressed various documentation-only type changes D10155 only" DCNs, i.e. changes which do not ispect system operation or identified by drawing deviations. The drawing discrepancies design and are being made to reflect the as-built plant configura- included in these DCNs included, but were not limited to, valve tion. These DCNs incorporated valid discrepancies, identified position changes, valve type changes, valve additions armi deletions between actual plant configuration and design output, into their and configuration changes. Att changes performed by these D-DCNs appropriate documentation. Drawing deviations processed through were limited to design output changes only. No physical modifica-this DCN had no af fect on any systems' operational characteristics, tions or alterations to any system were generated by these DCNs.

methods for ensuring cceptiance wit 2s the TSs, or any proce&res Where applicable, reviews by the appropriate disciplines were used outlined, sununarized or described in the SAR. Impact to the SAR was to determine that the changes made by these DCNs did not ispect in the form of drawing related changes to affected figures contained system operation or integrity.

In the SAR and to Appendix 6.8C.

010292 SAR Figure 9.2.7-2, Raw Cooling Water Ficw Diagram, shows the The RCW system is located in the auxiliary, turbine and additional alignment of various valves in the RCW system. The S01 for the Main equipment buildings. The RCW system's safety f metion is not to Generator Bus Duct Cooling System, 0-SO-58-1, requires that RCW impact any safety-related equipment adversely. Opening RCW valves valves 112-viv-024-0500 and 0502 to the main generator bus &ct 1&2-VLV-024-0500 and 0502 wilt not increase the probability of an train "A" heat exchanger be normally open. SAR Figure 9.2.7-2, Raw accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety because the Cooling Water Flow Diagram, shows these valves normally closed. RCW system does rot interface with other safety-related systans.

Drawing Deviation 93DD7005 was generated to document this discrep- The possibility of or the consequences of n accident or malfunctim ancy between the plant procedure and the flow diagram. This SE of epipment important to safety will not increase since the RCW addressed the safety implications of normatty opening RCW valves system is not intercomected with any other safety-related system.

1&2-YLV-024-0500 and 0502. RCW is not covered by any TS. The margin of safety as described in

, the TSs is not affecte4 <

D10341 This DCN af fected the MFW system and the Sanpling System. This DCN The No. 1 FW heater header sampling isolation valve is located in changed the No. 1 FW heater header sampling isolation valves the turbine building. The MFW system's safety functions are to 1&2-VLV-003-0549 from normally closed to normally open. SAR Figure prcvide feedwater and contairunent isolation and not impact any 10.4.7-2 was affected by this change. safety-related equipment adversely. Opening No. 1 FW heater header saspling isolation valves 112 VLV-003-0549 does not increase the probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment Isportant to safety because the No.1 FW heater header sanpting does not provide feedwater or contairunent isolation or interface with other safety-related system. The possibility of or the conse m ences of an accident or matfmetton of equipment isportant to safety was not increased. No.1 FW heater header saapting is not covered by any TS. T % margin of safety as described in the TSs was not affected.

.m x

~

l _

s 2

t.

! Page No. 6 CMANGES IN TPE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

^

l DCR 3446 This SE covers three DCNs (G03441, G03074, and G02852). These DCus Theactivitydidnotincreasetheprobabilityortheconsapences'of5 ellowed valve pecking configurations to be replaced with configurs- en accident or the probability of occurrence or conce p ences of a ;

j tions d ich achieve longer service life. The extended service life selfunction of epipment important to safety previously evolunted in

is documented in EPRI Report NP-5697, Project 2233-3, Finst Report, the SAR. The activity did not create the probability of an accident. ~-

! May 1988. The substitution was required to achieve longer packing or the probability of occurrence of a selftmetion of epipment of a

service life. The changes Irwolve

(1) improved packing meterf els, different type than any evetusted previously in the SAR.- The new (2) optimum number of packing rings and specers, and (3) stuffing packing configurations lessen the chances of teekage. The design-box tive toed devices ( den volve type permits). On velves a

configured as such, gland seel water and teekoff connections were ~Calculation basis re pirements for the ensures SCG-4M-00649 systemsthat involved continue pressure to be boundary met.- is :

integrity disconnected and the valve connection plugged or capped. SAR maintained for the plugged teekoff configuration. Safety-related Sections 5.5.7.2.1, 5.5.12.2 and 6.3.2.2 were revised to specify volves which must function to mitigste the consequences of a Dg4- -

~.

that some valve packing configurations have been upgraded to EPRI were stroke tested to ensure that they functioned as required to recommendations. stwort the desip basis and that the operVctosure rates were met.

Given these considerations, the margin of safety as defined in the-basis of the 15s is neither changes or restaced. There is no Ugsc G00937 As a result of pipe well damage caused by erosion / corrosion, it was The replacement of carbon steel with Cr No or steintees steet in~

l necessary for specific piping components at Sequoyoh to be changed locations where piping components have emperienced wolt toes as a; to Cr Mo steet or other corrosion resistent meteriet to resist - result of eroslorvcorroeien is an acceptable change h=e=-: (1)the-Cr no and carbon steel are very similar in strength and other erosion / corrosion. The EPRI developed computer program CNECEMATE was used to identify the piping components that were susceptible to properties. (The composition of the Cr No contains 1.25 percent Cr erosforVcorrosion damage. Inspections are performed during each and 0.5 percent Mo, which makes the steet slightly more difficult to -

) outage to ensure that susceptible components have sufficient well weld but the besic properties of the two steets are about the same);

. thickness to meet plant code of record and etc criteria. Sequoyah (2) carbon steel, 306, 306L, and 316 steintess stoet, and Cr No steet j porticipates in the EPRI date bone to determine where erosion are acceptable materiet for ANSI g31.1 code construction. The-4 corrosion fattures have occurred. This dote is used to identify decision to use carbon steel mes booed on economic factors because

locations at Seu likely to have erosion corrosion damage.- These carbon steet is less expensive and easier to weld; and (3)The 4 Mount

] locations are ir.epected and dummsed carbon steet pipe components dravings will be changed to show where Cr No or steintees steel is j repelred or reptoced with Cr No or other erosion corrosion resistant instelled.

a meteriets as allowed. Only the nonselemic, nonsafety-related j portions of various piping systems are attowed to have their carbon a steel piping / fittings snestituted with steintess steel via this DCN.

~

L5739 The originnt design method of a;ollecting samples consisted of These changes affect details of how the sampling process is ,

. 3/4-inch sample lines that ran from the discherge of the evaporator - implemented. ' They had no effect on the system design or function -

~

concentrate pumps in the gAE rooms to isolation valves and sagte re pirements, and such details are not discussed in the SAR. It was 1 - bombs tocated outside of the gAE rooms. The lines then return to . necessary to change SAR Figure 9.3.4-6, which shows the gAE portion the evaporators in the respective gAE room. -Problems associated of the CVCS, and Figure 9.3.3-2, which shows the equipment and floor with the original design were: (1)the creation of a radiological drain system interconnection required by the drain coming from the spill hazard in a clean eree from the teekage of the horic acid sample sink. TSs do not specifically address sempting of the gAE.

i solution at the pict discomects of the sample home , and (2)the There was no incresee in the consespsonces of or probability of a plugging of the sample line because of the lack of heet tracing and DgA. The change did not incrosse the probability of a falture of a ineutation on the sample bomb. ECM L5739 provided a permanent safety system or degrade the performance of a safety system below -

solution to the problems associated with the originet method of that ===

• In the desi s basis anetysis. The potential for a new

. sampling. -The ECW replaced the semple bomb, its isolation velves type of tmanelyzed accident or a now type of malftmetion was not

< and cpsick disconnects with a 3/4-inch tine and a root volve. The created. There was no decrease in the mergin of safety as defined -

Line and the root velve occupy the location vocated by the souple in the basis for any TS.

- bomb and its associated volves and disconnects. The new line is heet traced and insulated. Since the operating tagerature of the s- _ _ _. . .=4-m- -+ie,, ---.----=w......--..m ,,, .o. . . . . - e.,,e., m - , , , .. , . , ,

Page No. 7 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

system can be near the design temperature of 250 degrees F, liquid dram from the root valve may flash and release airborne activity into a clean area. For this reason, ECM L5739 was revised to provide a new sample method that eliminates the possibility of contaminating a clean area. The revised modification provided an enclosed sanple sink in BAE room B at et 669 Q/A13. The saspie sink serves both A and B evaporators, ard the existing 3/4-inch sample Lines have been rerouted to the sink. The configuration of the new sample tcop is the same as the old sanple loop except that the isolation and root valves are located in the BAE room B rather than outside of the BAE room. This modification reduced the tength of the sanple loop; therefore, the pcwer required for the heat tracing of the loop was decreased. In addition to the sample lines, the sample sink is equipped with a 3/4-inch demineralized water line for flushing the sink ard a 1-inch drain line for drainage. The sample sink is also provided with a short 3/4-inch vent line to direct radioactive gases and steam away from the technician in the event that the sample " flashes" while collecting. These changes were designed to meet or exceed the design requirements of the systems affected.

L6478 This modification installed an Anticipated Trarisients without Scram The ispect of this modification has been properly evaluated. The Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry which automatically trips the AMSAC system interfaces with safety-related equipnent, but the main turbine and actuates the AFW system independent of the RPS. Implementation was such that it did not degrade the RPS, AFW system, The modification was sede to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The AMSAC MFW control system, MSS, nor any other safety-related system. This signal initiation beglas upon detection of three out of four steam change did not decrease the mergin of safety as defined in the basis generator low-tow water levels. The low-tow water levet detection for any TS. AMSAC is not included in the TSs. The change did not logic then starts a timer set at approximately 30 seconds. Upon involve any USQ.

timer cospletion, if reactor power is above approximately 40 percent, the signal trips the main turbine and starts the AFW pumps.

However, this signet is blocked below power levels of approximately 40 percent. To ensure AMSAC remains armed sufficiently long enough to perform its fm etion in the event of a turbine trip, the removat of the initiation signal is delpyed by approximately 360 seconds. .

M01435 DON N01435A provided the design for the first of three stages which This modification had no affect on safe shutdown of the plant, nor upgraded the Unit I shield building vent stack effluent monitoring did it introduce any new radioactivity releases. The modification instrumentation. DCN M014358 implemented stages 2 and 3 and ensured did not introduce any new f atture modes. Att components are compliance with NUREG 0737 and Reg. Guide 1.97 R2. A thermal seismically supported and analyzed in acenrdance with the applicable dispersion velocity array type flow element was installed in the requirements and did not introdLce any additional fatture modes to EGTS, ABGTS, and each of the two containment purge ventitation existing e gipment. This activity has no affect on the performance discharge ducts. A new primary sample pump skid was installed in of any system important to safety. The new vent stack effluent the CRDM motor room on et 759 in the auxiliary building near the monitoring instrunentation is more reliable and accurate than the' existing pep skid. The new pump skid consists of two ptmps instead existing instrunentation.

of the one momted on the existing skid. Existing normat and accident Ebertine radiation monitoring equipment was replaced with Sorrento radiation monitoring equipment. RE-90-100 on et 759 was permanently removed from service after successful testing of the new Sorrento radiation monitoring equipment.

I

_ _ _ _ . .______ _____ _-_ _______ _ ___ _ _______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _2__ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _

i Page ho. 8 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS

• M02644 This safety evaluation was performed to evaluate the effects of There were no credible falture modes associated with the physical deactivating the boron injection tank relative to the capability of changes associated with this DCN, nor were there any credible the ECCS to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break. The failure modes associated with the fm etional deactivation of the GIT was functionally deactivated under DCM M02644. The injection BIT. This change did not centribute to the initiation of any DBAs.

tank physicatty remains in the safety injection system, but no There was no increase in the probebility of or consequences of an Longer serves as a source of highly concentrated boric acid. accident. The modification did not degrade the performance of a However, the injection tank continues to serve as part of the high safety system below that assumed in the design basis analysis. The head / tow flow injection path for initial emergency core cooling change did not create the potential for a new type of unanstyzed provided by the centrifugal charging puups. The boron concentration accident of a new type of malfmetion. There was no decrease in the in the injection tank is essentially that of the normat RCS charging TS margin of safety. There was no USQ.

flow. For the purpose of analysis, the boron concentration in the injection tank was assumed to be *0" ppa.

M06259 This modification added pressure differential indicators to both Three SAR figures have been revised as a result of this design sides of the station control and service air and the auxiliary change. The addition cf the pressure indicators does not affect any control air afterfitters. The need for these pressure differentist control function. They are strictly for local monitoring of the indicators was noted and reconnended under INP0/MSAC significant differential pressure across the afterfitters. The indicators do operating experience report 81-9. INPO SOER 81-9 recommended not perfcfm any nucteer safety function. A & erence to TS frequent monitoring of the filter differential pressure to ensure requirements during the instattation of the pressure Indicators that the flLter elements are not plugged or torn. Instattation of ensured that there was no reduction of margin of safety as defined pressure indicators on either side of the afterfilters attows field in the basis of the TSs. There was no USQ.

personnet to monitor differential pressure across the filters and thereby monitor the condition of the filter.

M06420 This DCN was written to s @ port replacement of the CCP 18-8 casing. The change does not affect the plant's ab!Lity to cospty with any of This work was laptemented during the Unit 1 Cycle 6 refueling the TSs reviewed. The change did not change or affect the pump's cutage. normat or safety-related fmetion. Replacament of the current carbon steel weld clad puip casings with new att stainless steel casings will assist in minimizing cracks in the pump casings which can lead to down time or possibly falture. There was no reduction in the margin of safety. The change did not involve a USQ.

M06451 PCN-0649 was issued to approve the construction of a cafeteria The systems affected by this DCN ire F-afety related. This adjacent to the plant office building and service building at activity did not 1spect. safety-rel ".ed equipment and did not lopect c Sequoyah. Because of the tight construction sche &te, TACF or create arry DBAs or anticipated operational transients. There was '

0-91-016-027 was lasued rerouting some nonsafety class H and I. no re &ction in the margin of safety. There was no USQ.

piping systems in that area to remove them from under the foundation and footings for the cafeteria. This DCM provided for the permanent routing of the ispected system piping. The DCN also covered the interfacing of systems stpplying services necessary for the opera-tion and functionability of the cafeteria.

I M06610 This modification replaced the nonsafety-related boric acid blender This modification did not involve safety-related or TS instrumenta-transmitter 2-FIT-62-142 that fmettons to monitor primary water tion. The safety evaluation was written because this change did flow to the boric acid blender and provide control input to the involve an SAR figure - the control diagram. The affected ecsalpment reactor makeup system. Since the existing sensor configuration was is not required to mitigate any accident or for safe shutdown of the composed of an in-Line rotometer magnetically cowled to the plant. The reactor makeup control system was fmettonelly echanged transmitter, the rotometer was replaced with a pipe segment as a result of this modifiestion. Additionetty, the fluid compost-containing flanges and orifice plate. The existing transmitter tion of the boric acid blender was not altered; only the momer in

Page No. 9 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

output toop current was 10-50 mA. Since the transmitter replacement which the primary water flow signet is obtained and processed eithin selection is 4-20 mA, the associated droming resistors for the loop the instrument control toop.

voltage devices 2-FC-62-142, 2-FM-62-142A, and 2-FR-62-139 were changed from 100 ohe to 250 cha. Additionally, the 10-50 aA VX252 modet indicator 2-F1-62-142 was replaced with a Mx252 4-20 mA indicator. Since the existing transmitter was provided with a built-in power sw pty, a new toop power supply 2-PX-62-142 was also added.

M07151 This DCN prepared the setpoint and scaling documents required to With the issuance of the required setpoint and scaling h = ants for provide the calibratim and adjustment for selected instrumentation the portion of Unit 1 AFW being aradified by replacement of the devices in Unit 1. With the proposed changeout of the Static"0" Ring Static"0" Ring pressure switches, the setpoints for actual transfer pressure switches in a portion of AFW syster, new updated setpoint between the 4-inch and 2-inen FW flow LCVs will be designated at new and scaling docunsats were required for their associated instrument values. The establishment of new setpoints attows for the increased devices. dea & end of the replacement devices due to the higher overrenge capability of the new design. The margin of safety for TSs was not affected by this activity, the Static"0" Ring pressure switches involved are not TS devices. There were no unreviewed safety questions.

M07152 This DCN prepared the Setpoint and Scaling Docunents (SSDs) required With the issuance of the required SSDs for the portion of Unit 2 to provide the calibration and adjustment for selected instrunenta- System 03 modified by replacement of the 50R pressure switches, the tion devices in Unit 2. With the changeout of the Static"0" Ring setpoints for actual transfer between the 4-inch and 2-inch feed pressure switches in a portion of AFW, new todeted SSDs were water flow Level control valves are designated at new values. The re w ired for their associated instrument devices. The new design establishment of the new setpoints allows for the increased des eand SOR pressure switches installed required a change of setpoints for of the replacement devices due to the higher overrange capability of the initiation of the action to transfer control of AFW tevet the new design. The valve control logic performs as designed and control valves to the steam generators. This DCN evfects the change described in the SAR, but at a new setpoint. The margin of safety of setpoints for the logic control circuits through the SSDs. for TSs were not affected by this activity. The 50R pressure switches involved are not TS devices. There were no US0s identified.

M08402 The isplementation of the thit 2 design change was the first stage No TS changes were required for this activity. TS 3/4.6.5.3 was not of a total design change of the,1ce condenser floor. The floor was affected. This TS addresses the operability of the ice condenser further evatusted and modified during refueling Cycle 6. To provide lower intet doors (also the intennediate deck doors and top deck adequate clearance at the tower intet doors, the horizontal flashing doors). The primary safety fmetion of the ice condenser is was reinstatted to its original position. To prevent the weer stab maintained. SAR section 6.5.1 was revised to include a description from acting on the horizontal flashing, the vertical flashing was of the modifications to the wear stab, floor drains, and turning removed. The flashing did not provide any structurat steport valves. A statement was added to the SAR for the condition and fmetion. This component of the doors is used to protect the acceptance of "ponding* as a result of wear stab 4:pheavat. Other original begged insulation below the door frame from damage and to SAR sections and figures were revised as necessary. There was no keep water channeled within the area that drains. The fiberglass USQ.

Insulation contained in polyethylene bags installed behind the flashing was replaced. A replacement insulator (Armstrong "Arma-flex" cellular foam) was instatted. This materiet was sized and attached to the crane valt (using Armstrong 520 ad esive). The new material provides insulation equivalent to that of the original materiet, i.e., the thermal resistances of the insulation materlats are approximately the same. - The adestve used ensures that the new

Page No. 10 CHANGES IN THE FACILITT - MODIFICATIONS -

materlat remains in place esider DBA conditions. The floor turning vanes were raised to provide clearance above the wear stab, thereby eliminating any potential loading from the wear slab and restoring the turning vanes to their original design conditions.

M08544 Obsolete turbine recorders were replaced under this DCN. These The effected system is not safety related, is not required for safe recorders were nonsafety related. An SE was required only because shutdown of the plant, and does not involve any equipment that has an SAR drewing required revision to reflect the new instatted been previously evaluated in the SAR. For those reasons, this recorder and related penet layout. This modification was considered activity did not change any previous assumptions, initial condi-an tpgrade of equipment and the function of the new components tions, initiating events or analyzed accidents contained in the SAR remains unchanged from the existing, or alter the margin of safety for any system or component as specified in the TSs. Therefore a USQ does not exist.

M08573 DCN M08573 modified valve 1-FCV-63-172. This SA/SE evaluated the Installing the 1/2-inch bypass line from the body of FCV-63-172 to instattation of a 1/2-inch bypass line from the body of FCV-63-172 the downstream piping does not affect the ability of the valve to to the downstream process piping. The bypass line contains a seat. The bypass line ensures the valve does not become pressure 1/2-inch Kerotest manual globe valve. The purpose of the bypass locked during nonnet operation precluding its opening 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> af ter line is to provide a relief path for potentially trapped fluid the initiation of ECCS contalrunent simp recirculation. Plant inside FCV-63-172 to vent. This ensures that the valve is not meintainability and performance is improved in that the existing disabled & e to the pressure locking or liquid entrapment phenomena wedge with the drilled hole in Unit 1 has been removed and the hole discussed in SOER 84-07. 1-Frv-63-172 was modified during the U1C5 eliminated by welding it closed. SAR Figure 6.3.2.1 required refuting mder DCN M06407. 'te 3/16-inch dritted hole was revision to dcpict the new 1/2-inch bypass line. The modification eliminated by welding the hole closed. Eliminating the hole and does not affect SegJoyah's ability to comply with TSs. There was no continuing to use the existing wedge minimizes the anomt of USQ.

radweste generated during refueling outages.

M08574 SOER 84-07 identified several different phenomena which could render The modification provides assurance that the valve will open for hot certain types of gate valves inoperable if certain conditions teg recirculation and not be pressure locked. Total RNR hot leg occurred during the operation of a plant. As a result of a flow is unaffected by this change. A minor peak clad temperature system / component review for potentially affected gate valves, valves impact results as a result of disc teakage calculated for injection 1-FCV-63-172 and 2-FCV-63-172 were identified as potentially arvi cold teg recirculation. There was no significant impact on ECCS affected valves. This change involved a modification to the RHR hot performance or core cooling. Containment isolation of this closed leg recirculation isolstion valve 2-FCV-62-172. A body bypass valve system was not affected. There was no USQ.

and piping are added to the TVA f: lass "B" isolation valve to abate .

potential pressure Locking per IMPO SOER 84-07.

M08653 The existing obsolete turbine recorders mounted on the 2-M-1 panel An SE was required only because a change was required to SAR Figure in the MCR were replaced. They were declared obsolete because they 7.1.4-1. It was revised to reflect the new instatted recorders and were out of manufacture and spare parts were no longer available for related penet layout. The stbject recorders are not safety related.

repairs. The fmetions of the three existing turbine recorde s were This modification was considered an spgrade of equipment, and the conbined into two state-of-the-art Johnson-Yokogawa MR2500E record- fmetions of the new components remain unchanged from those ers. This modification also combined the existing 15 tenperature previously existing. The affected system is not safety related and points previously mmitored by 2-TR-47-1 with the 24 temperature is not required for safe shutdown of the plant and does not involve points monitored by 2-TR-47-2 into a new hybrid recorder redesig- any equipment that has been previously evaluated in the SAR. This noted as 2-TR-47-1 for tenperature only. The 15 vibration / expansion modification did not change any orevious assumptions, initial points previously monitored by 2-XR-47-3 were instatted on a new conditions, initiating events or anatyred accidents contained in the separate hybrid recorder redesignated as 2-XR-47-2. SAR or alter the mergin of safety for any system or component as specified in the TS. There was no USQ.

Page No. 11 CHANGES IN THE FACILITT - MODIFICATIONS -

MC8688 This Unit 1 modification replaced the origina. LCV-06-106A&8 control As part of this modification, SAR flyJres 10.4.9-1 and 10.4.9-5 were valves in the discharge of the No. 3 heater drain punps with new revised to show the piping and control logic arrangement. SAR text valves that are better suited for the type of service required. The and tables were also revised to reflect new rmback logic. No TSs change was i gtemented in two phases. The first phate could occur were inpacted by this modification. This modification did not in a preoutage power redJction that involved only inserting the ispect nuclear safety armi did not represent a USQ.

valve into the existing system. Phase 2 occurred daring the Cycle 6 RFO end included piping modifications and changes to the instrument toops 1-L-06-106 and 1-F-06-107. The changes result in more relisble system operation and less incidents of spurious mit toad runbacks.

MC8716 This modification permanently installed a Fluke 2286A Data Logger The te m eratures being monitored and alarmed are nonsafety related and extender chassis in Rack 112 in the auxiliary instrunent room of and are not used to determine TS compliance. These temperatures do Unit 1. The rack was extended to enclose and protect the Fluke and not reduce the effects or prevent any accidents. For these reasons associated cables. A similar modification was performed on Rack the probability of an accident or matfmetion of egalpment leportant 111. In audition, the recorders were connected to the TSCDS to to safety or the censegJences of an accident or malfunction of allow the operator to monitor any guint from the MCR. Th( existing equipment isportant to safety evaluated in the SAR are not -

recorders were removed and patches instatted on penet M-10. This increased. There are no new accidents or equipment malfmetions sodificatlan also changed various setpoints associated with the CRDM different than those previously evaluated in the SAR created by the cooters exhaust tesperature, the LCCs intake and the exhaust laptementation of this DCN. This temperature monitoring system is teeperrture, the typer compartment cooters intake and exhaust not covered by TSs. Therefore, the margin of safety for any TS is temperature, the CRDM shroud outlet temperature, and the condensate not reduced. The setpoint changes have been reviewed and quellfled booster bearing temperatures. In addition, the setpoint for the by various Quality Information Releases, and/or based on revised main feed pm p turbine stop valve ten erature was deleted. These vendor information or calculations. The specific justification for changes were made to ellainate nuisance alarms. each change is contained in the safety assessment for this DCN.

M08720 The tenperature sensors for the Unit 1 reactor building tower This modification did not involve an m reviewed safety question.

conpartment tir: the vicinity of the control rod drive cooters) are The equipment involved is not safety related. The equipment is leproperly located with inappropriate setpoints and as such indicate quality related for seismic I(L), and it is not regJired to be an area high temperature alarm cordition when none is present. The operated in the automatic mode. These fans, together with the LCCs, high temperature condition causes start @ of starxty coolers whea have sufficient margin to maintain the average air temperetures the cooters are in an automatic mode of operation. Startm of these within the SQN TS. The local contalrunent average air temperature coolers may result in average air mass temperature outside the TS sensors provide the operators indication of lower contairinent limits. The cooters are therefore operated in a manual mode, temperatures. Therefore, automatic fan operation based on existing shutting down on a contalrunent Phase B signal enty. The A-P auto tesperature switches is not required. Past operating records mode is not used. This alarm and ecs:!anent startw is considered a provide data substantiating this conclusim as well as the fact that raJisance and required correction. This modification accomplished this equipacnt has been operated in manual for some time.

two things. First, the A-P auto control circuit was modified by deletion of the high tenperature and low flow signals as irputs thereby leaving the contairunent isolation phase 8 signal as the only nonmanual control signal. Second, the high temperature alarm originating at these temperature switches was eliminated. Because of asbestos cable, the temperature switches and cables connecting to them were abandoned in place. Additionalty, the wiring, conduit, and cable for the CRDM fans, dangers and associated equipment were detrained because the fan motors were never purchased as safety related.

if Page No. 12 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MG)1FICAf t0NS -

M08721 The te g erature sensors for the Unit 2 reactor building lower This modification did not involve a USQ. The equipment involved is cogartment (in the vicinity of the control red drive cooters) were not safety related. The equipment is quality related for seismic isoroperly located with inappropriate setpoints and as such indi- 1(L) and is not required to be operated in the automatic mode, cated an area high tegerature alarm condition when none was These fans, together with the LCCs, have sufficient margin to present. This modification accoglished two things. One, the A-P maintain the average air tesperatures within the SON TS. The local auto control circuit was modified by deletion of the high containment everage air temperature sensors provide the operators temperature and low flow signals as inputs thereby leaving the indication of lower contalrusent tesperatures. Therefore, automatic containment isolation gAase 8 signal n the only nonmanual control fan operation based on existing tesperature switches is not signal. Two, the high tesperature alarm originating at these required. Past operating records provided data stbetantiating this temperature switches was eliminated. Additionally, the wiring, conclusion as well as the fact that this equipment has been operated conduit, and cable for the CSDM fans, despers and associated in manual for some time, equipment were detrained because the fan motors were never purchased as safety related.

M08748 This DCh provided drawing changes for the unit board and main CSST system normal alignment to the plants auxiliary power system control room electrical board circuit breaker controtter nameplates during normal plant operation is a plant uesign enhancement. This to indicate that the normal power stepties to the 6.9 kV tritt boards modification is being implemented to provide additional protection will be from the offsite power system stpplied CSSTs via the start to equipment connected to the power systems. Baced on the results buses instead of the nuclear unit (main generator) supplied USSie. reached in the safety evatustion and NSSS styptier Westinghouse's In addition, electrical key diagrams and unit board single Lines and review and approvst of SAR Chapter 15 changes and a6erence to the connection drawings were revised to authorize circuit breaker special requirement provided in the safety assessaient, completion of alignment changes for the tritt board normal power stpply to be from fast transfer circuitry modifications, the modifications could be the CSSTs and alternate st@ ply to be from the USSTs. Also, the 54 implemented as proposed since no USO was involved.

conductor - 500 MCM cable bus between CSST C secondary windings X and Y (27 condJctors per power feed) and the start boards (start buses 28 and 18) was replaced with 750 MCM cables to provide sufficient cable ampacity. The cabling replaced and the replacement cables cre rated for 8 kV service with a SQN 6.9 kV (nominal) service application. The worst case loading condition (2 taitt operation) with the CSST system normally aligned to supply the plants auxiliary power system exceeds aspacity ratings for the existing 500 MCM cable bus configuration. The existing tsidergrotrid conduit duct banks were utilized for these new replacement cables.

M08797 The originnt Unit 2 LCV-06-106Adi control valves in the discharge of As part of this modification, SAR figures 10.4.9-1 and 10.4.9-5 the No. 3 heater drain ptsps were replaced with new valves that are required revision to show the piping and control logic arrangement.

better suited for the type of service required. The change was SAR text and tables also required revision to reflect new rts1 beck taptemented in two phases: Phase 1 - in preoutage poicer reduction logic. No TSs were impacted by this modification. - This that would involve only inserting the valve into the existing modificatfor' did not tapact nuclear safety and did not represent ao system; Phase 2 - during the Cycle 6 refueling outage or sooner if unreviewed safety question.

a tsilt outage occurred of sufficient duration to allow implementa-tion of piping modifications ersi changes to the instrument loops 2-L-06-106 and 2-F-06-107. These changes result in more reliable system operation and less incidents of spurious unit tosd rtribacks.

M08910 The Unit 1 RCS toops 1 through 4 hot leg temperature modifiers and An SE was required because SAR Figures 5.1-2, -3, -4, and -5 (TVA frdicators for nonsafety-related instrument loops 68-1C,68-24C, drawings 47W610-68-1, -2, -3, and -4, respectively) required 68-43C and 68-65C were replaced with new instrtaients. A new power revision to show the tesperature modiffer relocations and to add stpply was also added to these instrtament loops. The temperature symbots for the new power sg ply. There were no changes to the

Page No. 13 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS

• modifiers were retocated from existing penet 1-L-181 located inside systen function or operation as described in the SAR. The the Unit 1 reactor building crane watt, et 693 to the Unit 1 reactor temperature modifier replacements and relocation, and the tempera-building instrtment room, et 693, and mounted on new local penet ture indicator replacements, futty meet seismic Category 1L @ atifi-i 1-L-562. New cables were routed in new conduits from penet 1-L-181 cation, separation criteria, and TS requirements.

te penet 1-L-562 to tinit the relocated temperature modifiers and new power st.oply on panel 1-L-652 with the existing electrical circuits on penet 1-L-181. The intent of this modification is to replace obsclete equipment and to relocate the tesperature modifiers away from a high radiation area for ALARA purposes. As a result of the replacement of these obsolete instruments, and the addition of a new power supply, the instrwent loop current ranges have changed from 10-50 millianps to 4-20 mitilasps.

M08911 The Unit 2 RCS Loops 1 through 4 hot leg tenperature modifiers and A safety evaluation was required because SAR Figures 5.1-2, 5.1-3, Indicators for nonsafety-related instrument toops 68-1C,68-24C, 5.1-4, and 5.1-5 (TVA drawings 47W610-68-1, 2, 3, and 4, respec-68-43C, and 68-65C were replaced with new instruments. The tively) required revision to show the temperature modifier reloca-temperature modifiers were relocated from existing panel 2-L-181 tions and to add symbols for the new power stpply. There were no tocated inside the Unit 2 reactor building crane wall, el 693 to the changes to the system fmetion or operation as described in the SAR.

Unit 2 reactor building instrument rces, el 693, and mounted on new The tesperature modifier replacements and relocation and the local panel 2-L-562. New cables were routed in new conduits from temperature frdicator replacements fully meet seismic category 1L parat 2-L-181 to panel 2-L-562 to link the relecated temperature qualification, separation criteria, and TS re w irements.

moolfiers and new power supply on penet 2-L-562 with existing electrical circuits on panel 2-L-181. The intent of this modification was to replace obsolete equipment and to relocate the tenperature modif f ers away from the high radiation arec for ALARA purposes. As a result of the replacement of these obsolete instrtments and the addition of a new power stoply, the instrument loop current ranges changed from 10-50 milliasps to 4-20 mittianps.

M08924 The modifications performed on the ice condenser system in accor- Water intrusion into the wear stab with freeze / thaw action has Base SE dance with this DCN provide additional clearance, from the as found heaved the stab upward. However, there is no adverse effect on the condition, between the wear slab and the door frame. Additional structural integrity of the structural concrete stab as a result of clearance is provided by towering the stab by Jacking if required, the intrusion of water ulder the wear stab and the movement of the The jacking forces the wear stab downward toward the design wear stab. Monitors werg instatted in accordance with TACF elevation. Another atternative to provide additionet clearance is 1-92-0017-061 to measure wear stab movement and available clearance modifying the door frame. The 1=x1"x12 ga. angte attached to the between the door frame and the wear stab. With the modification 3 bottom of the door frame sill mey be modified to provide additional performed under this DCN (1)to seal the wear stab Joints to clearance. With the sofification of the 12 ga. angle, the flashing eliminate water intrusion, and (2)to provide additional clearance will also require modification. Before Jacking, the floor is from the as found condition, and with continued monitoring of the thawed / dried. The warming of the stab may lower tha wear stab. To wear stab movement as defined by 0-PI-Sxx-061-001.0 to ensure no seat the gaps between the drains and the pipe socket, this DCN additional ewipment lepacts are incurred as a result of wear slab modified the floor drains by placing a stainless steel sheet metal spheavat, binding of the tower intet doors will be prevented and the insert into the drain opening and seating with rubber gasket and lower inlet doors will meet the design basis for opening.

sealant. The joints around the perimeter of each bay and the cracks of the wear stabs were seated with a li p id membrane. Included in this DCN is taking of core sanples of the foam concrete from att 24 boys and the repair of the hole. The repair consists of the

Page ho. 14 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS ~-

instattation of a drain ttbe to allow for future water removat if required af ter defrosting. Instattation of horizontal foam concrete drains was also performed in Bay 12.

P08924 This SE was written to determine if the degraded foam concrete The ice condenser is a passive safety device. The falture of the Stgpte- encomtered while isplecanting DCN M08924 has created a USQ. Core wear stab as a result of the degraded condition of the foam concrete ment drilling was performed on April 7,1993. The core dritted hole was will not occur until af ter the accident has occurred and the ice conpletely full of water. Saples removed from the boring were sent condenser has begm to perform its intended fmetion. This chain of ts Singleton Laboratory for analysis. Att sanples were observed to events is known by reviewing the time-history of the pressure be saturated. Results presented in Singleton Laboratories Report buildup within the tower ice condenser plenun. By the time 209-038-001A showed a moisture content by weight cf a foam concrete sufficient pressure has developed w. thin the tower ice condenser sanple to be 193.75%. Singleton Laboratories Report 209-038-001B plenun to fait the wear stab, the doors will have opened and ice yielded an ultimate unconfined strength of a foam concrete sample fo mett-out will have started. Any secondary effects resulting from 48 psi. The design strength of the foam concrete was specified as the wear stab failure have been evaluated and fomd not to involve a 110 psi. With the discovery of the water in Bay 15, additional bays USQ.

were core dritted. Water was found in att of them. The remaining bays were then core drilled with water being found in all 24 bays.

The foem concrete was visually inspected by Civil Engineering. As the result of freeze-thaw action, the integrity of the foam concrete has been conpromised. Inspection of the worst case core holes was recorded on videotape. The inspections revealed that in the worst bays, the tower portion (approximately 9 inches) of the foam concrete was in its original condition though saturated with water.

The upper portion of some bays displayed fissures and voids with the typermost portion twing disrtpted by freeze-thew action. The degradation of the foam concrete results in the loss or adequate bearing support for the wear slab & ring a DBA. Because cf this, yielding of the wear slab will occur & ring a DBA and the stab will break essentially into three large pieces. An extensive met of reinforcing steel and glycol piping will prevent the pieces from separating and migrating. The failure of the wear stab will result in some secondary effects that have been investigated as possible fatture modes.

M08986 This Unit 1 DCN implemented modification of hardware in the CVCS to The NRC reviewed TS Cha-de 92-08 in support of this change. The function with 3.5 - 4.0 wt percent boric acid. The feasibility for approvst of TS Change 92-08 was a special requirement of this SA/SE.

the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to operate using 3.5 - 4.0 wt percent the flow rates and concentrations downstream of the blending tee are boric acid in lieu of 11.5 - 12.5 wt percent and the supporting essentially the same after taptementation of this project and are doctmentation for this system operational design change is addressed therefore bomded by previous analysis. The emergency boration in the Boric Acid RedJction Project, CEM-602, prepared by Asea grown addition rate of boren to the core, however, is reduced to Bovert Combustion Engineering Nuclear Services. agproximately 30 percent of its previous maximum rate based on the 11.5 - 12.5 wt percent boric acid concentration being reduced to 3.5

- 4.0 ut percent boric acid concentration and the actual flow rate remaining the same. Following this design change, the emergency boration flow rate of 35 spm of 3.5 wt percent concentrated boric aF d as required by the TS change is still achievable.

Page No. 15 CMANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

M08987 This Unit 2 DCN implemented modification of hardware in the CVCS to The NRC reviewed TS Change 92-08 in support of this change. The function with 3.5 - 4.0 wt percent boric acid. The feasibility for flow rates and concentrations downstream of the olending tee are the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to operate using 3.5 - 4.0 wt percent essentietty the same after i n tementation of this project and are boric acid in lieu of 11.5 - 12.5 wt percent and the s @ porting therefore bomded by previous analysis. The emergency boration docunentation for this system operational design change is addressed addition rate of boron to the core, however, is redJeed to in the Boric Acid Reduction Project, CEN-602, prepared by Asea Brown approximately 30 percent of its previous maximum rate based on the Boveri Cortustion Engineering Nuclear Servic e . This design change 11.5 - 12.5 wt percent boric acid concentration being redaced to 3.5 consisted primarily of piping and component changes required to - 4.0 wt percent boric acid concentration and the actual flow rate sw port the use of 3.5 - 4.0 vt percent boric acid, the flushing of remaining the same. Following this design change, the emergency the associated lines to remove the 11.5 - 12.5 wt percent boric boration flow rate of 35 ops of 3.5 wt percent concentrated boric acid, disconnecting the associated heat trace, and sw porting the acid as regJired by the TS change is still achievable.

tinit 1 (DCN M08986) instattation of the area tenperature monitoring system to be used for compliance the revised TSs.

M09023 This change involved replacing obsolete Barton transmitters used for This change did not affect the basic function, design, or system tevel control and indication of the VCT with a newer Rosesount regJirements of the original configuration and egalpment. The same model. This change did away with the instatted remote sensing system parameters are maintained and the interface with the process bettows and fitted capillary interface and replaced them with a is enhanced by removing the transfer fmettons associated with -

direct interface sense Line arrangement. This change did not affect remote sensing and transfer vist fluid-fitted capillaries. This the fmetion or design of the system, but required the revision of equipment is not required for safety tnt is quality related. The SAR Figure 9.3.4-9, control diagram 47W610-62-3, and SAR Figure SAR and TSs were not affected by other than SAR figure revision as 9.3.4-1, flow diagram 47W609-1. These revisions are minor in nature described previously.

and did not significantly affect the information depicted on the drawings.

M09039 This modification was timited to the elimination of Muuan Factor /Mu- The system operations were not affected by the modification except man Engineering Discrepancies. This modificatim added new indica- for the cperation of 2-FCV-70-153 and 156. The additional status tors for MPFP system pressure, service air pressure, auxiliary indication, additional annunciation points, and the tens change all control air pressure, control air pressure, control air low pressure eliminate Hunan Factor /Munan Engineering Discrepancies and make the annmelation and CCS intet pressure to 081/082 on MCR penets so that control rocss more user friendly. The plant was able to operate the operators can better ascertain those systems' operating status. without these changes and is still able to operate af ter these This modification also added new anrmetator drops for the various changes were instatted but more efficiently. The operators are isolation signals as well as grouped them on Panet 2-M-6 so that the better able to ascertain plant status and thus make more informed operator can readily identify which signal caused the isolaticri and decisions. These changes.did not result in any tlSQ.

react accordingly. The modification also installed redJndant status indication of certain conponents on Penet 2-M-6 so that the operators will not have to exit the horseshoe area to nrify the required steps of the EOP. As part of the modification, the control circuits for Movs 2-FCV-70-153 and 156 were modified to attow throttle control of these valves from the MCR. The tens covers for the RVLIS isolation status lights (2-XI-68-387A arti 390A were cisanged to blue and anber to comply with the design standard.

M09051 Incident investigation II-S-91094 was written to document the The new valve setting and design condition of the piping from valve assessment of intersystem LOCA from the SWHX to the VCT during a 62-647 through the tube side of the SWHX to valve 62-650 is the same smatt break LOCA. This DCN documents the new ttbe side SWHX and rating as the piping system both getream arti downstream of the piping design pressure rating of 200 psig at 150 degrees F; subject piping. The pressure rating for tbla piping sectico has purchased the regJired spring and reset the SWHX safety valve already been analyzed and found acceptable, inclufing the Swat.

2-62-649; and revised supporting documentaticn, drawings and code This new, higher pressure setting for SRV-62-649 redaces the

j Page No.16 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

records. By installing a rtw spring in valve 62-649, this probability of actuation, thus re&cing the probability of systra modification increased tN pressure of the t@e side SWHX from 150 operational transients. Because this change of pressure is net psig to 200 psig. C1/a analysis already qualifies this piping rm greater than the piping system and SWttX design pressure, the to 200 nsig for tl*' ,non-TS eqLipment. Westinghouse letter magnitude and extent of DBAs and anticipated verational transients

..n-92-243 moicated that this set pressure will preclude the is not changed. Overall, this change reduces the possibilities for intersystem LOCA. In accordence with Atlas Industrial Mfg. Co. operational transients and improvea system realibility/avaltability letter dated 09/09/92, the t @ e side of the SWHX may be rerated to for dealing with a DBA (small break LOCA).

200 psig. The subject intercomecting piping is 4-inch schedule 40s SS rated for 1490 psig at 150 degr es F. Thus, adequate overpresF 4 protection is maintained. The new valve setting ard design c m dition of the piping froni valve 62-647 through the tube side of the SWHX to valve 62-650 via the new spring in valve 62-649 necessitated a change to SAR Figure 9.3.4-1 and Table 9.3.4-3 Sheet 3 to show the new setting of 200 psig for the t se side of the SWHX.

M09177 Existing obsolete ice bed tenperature monitoring system was replaced This modification did not change any of the existing fatture modes with state-of-the-art microprocessor based system. The change to identified, nor did it create any new malfunctions or pathways the ice condenser system cmsists of replacing the MCR recorder and previously evaluated. This modification did not affect the margin the replacement of the existing multiplexing mits at the seat table of safety as defined as the basis for any TSs and, therefore, did with new scanner mits. Additionally, this modification removes the not constitute a USQ.

two obsolete contairmient moisture recorders and replaces them with a new single three pen recorder. Various changes to Panet 1-N-10 and 1-L-437 were required to accommodate the new hardware. SAR figure 9.4.8.1 required revision to show the changes to the contairinent moisture recording loops. This was the extent of the SAR impact.

M09184 Significant Corrective Action reports SQSCA910003 and SQFIR920072 This activity deleted and removed the differentist pressure trans-documented that the DPTs 2-PDT-70-94,104,117 and 126 for the CCS mitters for the CCS thernet barrier heat exchangers and capped the thermal barrier heat exchangers are not rated for reactor coolant ends of the associated piping. These components did not perform any pressure. Consequently, a possibility existed that a small LOCA control or logic fLrictions, nor were they required to s@ port the could occur through these DPTs exposed to RCS temperature and function of eqJipment important to safety. The s* ject components pressure if the t @ e fer the thermat barrier heat exchangers provided indication only for the differential pressure of the CCW ruptures and if the diaphragm for the DPis ruptures. The corrective between the intet and outlet of the thennst barrier heat exchangers.

action for SQSCA910003 recomunendqd isolation of the s4 ject compo- These tranreitters were npt described in the SAR of the SON TSs.

nents. The subject DPTs have been isolated from the system and are The removal of these DPTs and their associated loops did not ro longer in service. These cosponents are being stysically removed increase the probability or consequences of an accident, nor did it from the system for operational reasons to avoid any accident. The create any possibility of a different type of an accident or DPTs are not required by design bases or to provide any safety malfunction of equipment important to safety previountw evaluated in fmetion. However, SAR Figures 9.2.1-3 and 9.2.1-7 required the SAR. There was no re&ction to the margin of safety strEe these revision to address the changes. changes removed the potential for a smatt break LOCA.

M09193 The existing main steam radiation monitor detectors, two per Calibration factors for the main steam line RMs have been revised to steamline, were replaced with one new detector. Existing RMs were incorporate the new detectors. Demonstrated accuracy calculation provided with low and high range detectors. SQ910175 identified the has been revised to demonstrate the RM toops with the new detectors low range detector as falling as a result of high nominal anblent and calibration factors meets the PAM required range and occuracy, temperatures s4jected onto the detector located in the MSW. The The new range still overlaps the SAR Table 7.5-2 PAM required range.

vendor, Sorrento Electronics Inc. has designed a single detector The RM EPROM chips are progranuned at Sorrento Electrics. The which will not f ait as a result of high nominal anblent temperatures sof tware QA is handled by Sorrento. A software assessment has been and cover the PAM Reg. Guide 1.97 required range. The RM has been performed which concluded that the Sorrento software handling

o Page No.17 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

reprograarsed fce the new detector with a new output range. New RM conplies with SSP-2.12, " Control of comp 4ter Application Sof tware."

EPRCM chips replaced the existing RM EPROM chips. The EPROMs charged the sof tware program to use the new detector instead of the existing two detector setup. An SE was required because of chapter 11 of the SAR discussing how two detectors are used on the main steam RMs. These portions of the SAR required updating.

M09198 This DCN simplified the existing TDAFU tevet control system in Operation of the TDAFWP and its associated four LCys have not accordance with INPO recommendations by replacing the automatic adversely affected the required performance of the AFW system and is control scheme with manual reactor operator control of the turbine discussed in Westinghouse SECL 93-229 and Westinghouse tetter speed and the four (turbine flow path) level control valves. The TVA-93-28. The supporting SA/SE discusslore, simulator exercises, valve's failure position has been changed from fait closed to fall and Westinghouse analysis demonstrate that the margin of safety open. This change incorporated four high pressure air bottles to provided by the AFW system has not decreased white incorporating the turbine's tevet controt valves for station blackout consider- hardware and actions necessary to meet the 580 commitments under 10 ations, a steam-driven turbine controtter setpoint change, the CFR 50.63. The changes to the tevet control schess have in essence addition of air test comections, and additional emergency battery yielded increated avaltability of th AFW LCVs and their respective lighting. flow paths to the S/Gs for att events and transients. Using manual operator control over the LCys and turbine speed is consistent with recovery operations of most domestic utilities and the Westinghouse EOPs. The bases section (text) of SON Unit 2 TSs required revision to delete the work " automatic" from the S/G LCV discussion since the LCVs uitI now he manuatly c(osed as needed.

M09218 This modification relocated quality-related smoke detectors XS This modification did not involve an unreviewed safety cpaestion. An 41F (Fire Zone 235) and XS-13-41E (Fire Zone 236) inside the Unit 1 SE was required because SAR Figures 9.5.1-26, 27,and 45 (drawings control rod drive equipment room, auxiliary building, el 759. This 47W600-245, 244, and 47W611-13-3) were revised to show the addition DCN also added two quality-related cross zone smoke detectors of the new smote detectors. There was no change to the system XS-13-26P (Fire Zone 184) and XS-13-260 (Fire Zone 185) in the 6900V function or operation as described in the SAR.

shutdown board room A corridor, auxiliary building, el 734, and swo quality-related cross zone smoke detectors XS-13-27P (Fire Zone 186) and XS-13-270 (Fire Zone 187) in the 6900V shutdown board room 8 corridor, auxiliary building, et 734. Existing associated cables and conduits were reworked and rerouted as required, and new cebtes and conduits were added as required in order to make these changes. ,

Some of the cables were partially routed in existing cable trays.

These changes were part of the corrective action for SQNFlR920020.

M09226 This Unit 2 modification reptece* the existing obsolete ice bed This aedification did not change any of the existing failure modes tenperature monitoring system with a state of the art microprocessor identified, ner did it create any new malfmettons or pathways based system. The change to the ice condenser system consisted of previously evaluated. This modification did not affect the margin replacing the MCR recorder and replacing the existing multiplexing of safety as cefined as the basis for any TSs and, therefore, did mits at the seat table with new scanner units. Additionally, this not constitute a USQ.

modification removes the two obsolete containment moisture recorders and replaced them with a new single three pen recorder. Various changes to Panet 2-M-10 and 2-L-437 were required to accomanodate the new hardware. SAR Figure 9.4.8.1 required revision to show the changes to the contairveent moisture recording loops.

7 ;30 p -f

. ~

i e 1 ;

• a _

J+: ,

Page No.18 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MCOIFICATIONS

~

~

M f

~

M09275 This modification replaced nonsafety-related PCs 5034 from en This modification did not involve a USg. An SE ues required h = aa==

l obsolete Mitachte 500kV power circuit breeker to a ASEA Broun . SAR Figure 8.2.1-1 required revision. The estating breaker mes

} aoverie Type 550 PM SF6 circuit breaker. This breeker connects the rated at 30004 continuous and a 38,00lNWA class.' The neu brooker is i 500kV buss 1 with mein bank 1, and serves es the Unit 1 generator ~ rated at 3000A continuous and 50,000A Interrigsting capability. This >:

l breeker, bus tie breeker, and can be used as a spore line breeker in is ecpsivetent to a 47,600MWA class. There were no changes to the :

i the 500kV switchyard. Also included in the DCN uns a procedure system design, ftsiction, or operation as described in the SAR. ~

covering the placement of the new breaker in service and the phasing l of att associated relay circuitry. SAR Figure 8.2.1-1 (drautre -

45N500) required revision to denote the increase in interrupting capacity of the new breeker. This breeker uns reptoced cksring a schedsted Unit 1 refueling outage.

i M09326 This modification increases the flou setpoint for flow switch This modification did not constitute a Use. The leptementation did 1-F15-70-81 from 100 spa to 156 spa. The flow switch is used to not effect any systems required to mitigste or respond to any stort the thernet booster plays on (ou thernet barrier heet operational transients or DgAs addressed in Chapter 15 of the SAR. -

exchanger sigply heeder low flow. The flow switch sends signets to The credible felture modes of the equipment affected by this DCN.

both booster ptmps through isolatierVseparation relays. The will not affect-the operation of any etysipment roepsired to mitigate setpoint for 1-FS-70-81A uns increeeed from 100 spa to 156 spa etso. or respond to any operationet transients or sens addresud in :

The flow switch feede an alarm in the MCR to alert operators of tou Chapter 15 of the SAR. This activity did not incrosse the flow in the thermal barrier heet exchanger returft heeder. The probability of an accident because none of the espsipsont required _

setpoint vos increased to match that of the booster pumps auto-start for any Dg4 uns effected by this activity. :The probability of -

setpoint. A time delay relay uns added to the auto-start circuit to occurrence of a motfisiction of etysipsont important to eefety uns not i ensure that the booster pamps do not start prematurely on toss of increased because the ability of the onsite pouer system to perform -

cffsite power. The time delay relay disables the auto-start circuit its recraired safety functions uns not adversely !apacted. 'This DCN -

for 0.70 seconds after pouer is restored following loss of offsite did not affect any espalpeant rocpsired for any egA; therefore, the -

power. A time delay relay uns added to the seet in circuit for the Limits of 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 for esposure are maintelnad. The booster pumps. The relay is energized on a start signet and will consequences of an accident or espsipment motfunction were not not drop out until 1.0 seconds after a loss of power to the pumps. Increened. No new failure modes were created by this activity.

The relay provides a seet in charing sementary power interrtptions - There were no TS changes, and there uns no reduction in the margin -

caused by board transfers.

~

~

of safety.

M09342 The inittet advance authorization for this Unit'1 DCN instetted e - No TSs were lopected by this modification. The changes leptemented replacement volve for the TDAFWP steen styply MOW 1 FCV-1-17. The did not change the aweitablLity of the TBAMP or the required replacement vetve is similar to the originot volve but uns segplied opening / closing time of t%e steen heeder toelation velve, 1 FCW C by the Anchor /Derling Velve Co. (originally for the Hartsvitte and 1-1/. euellfication calculations and testing ensure the system Phipps gend Nucteer Pouer Plants). This reptocement velve is a meets the envirorumental, seismic, and deslyt requirements.D Piping 4-inch, ASME Class 2, 600s carbon steel gate vetve with a pressure stress problem N2-3-7A uns rennelyaedi establishing neu strees seel ring. A replacement pressure seel gasket and spacer ring were ' levels edlich esere found to be within the code attouables and in instelled, and the pecking uns reptoced with an leproved packing compliance with the design criteria requirements and SAR ceaseit--

taider another DCN. The in-line tength of the velve body for the monts. Turbine notate Leeds increened, but were within the-replacement vetve is shorter then the existing volve; therefore, a x allouables af ter the sigpert modifications were perfensed.

pipe spool esos instelled between 1-FCV-1 17 and 18 to makeup the Additionally,,thersel movement of the piping increased reoutting in .

difference. The second advance authorization for this DCN modified an interference with the esisting platfone grating. Nence platform-the pipe sipports on the 4-inch steen sipply to the TDAFWP, as welt grating uns modified as required to % pipe movement. The as platform grating. These modifications are in response to PER affected portion of the system is tot required to be operable in S0911514 editch identified a discrepancy related to using an accordance with TSs charing laptementation of the initial and second incorrect spring toed in problem N2-3-TA and another discrepancy for edwence authorisations in modes, 4, 5 or 6, and were not returned to not using revised main steem heeder movement date. . Additionetty, operations before issuance of the finst BCN package.- Therefore, .

the replacement of 1-FCV-1-17 uns factored into the reenotysis and there was no impact on the TSs for.these features, the change did

I i

Page No. 19 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS

• l l

subsequent pipe support modificatfor.s. The AFW flow diagram, SAR not lapact nuclear safety, nor did it represent a USQ.

Figure 10.4.7-12 required revision to show the replacement valve (etimination of the packing leakoff lines) and the additional section of piping between 1-FCV-1-17 and 18. No other SAR changes were required.

M09347 This modification replaced 16 ERCW and 12 CCS skid mo mted Att replacement materlat is ASME III, Class 3 or better, in maintenance valves which isolate the auxiliary systems on the safety accordance with the TVA piping class. It does not alter or ispect injection, containment spray, and centrifugal charging p e ps. The the operation of the safety injection, contalrunent spray, or j existing valves were removed and replaced with pipe (where other centrifugal charging ptsups in any way. It does not alter or lupact system isolation valves are available) or replaced with valvea of the operation of the cooling water systems (ERCW or CCS) that these different materlat (stainless steet). The modification was required valves are part of, and it improves the reliability of the systems.

In response to a SCAR which documented the fatture of the existing No TSs were tapacted by this modification. Falture of a freeze plug l valves as a result of valve stem corrosion because the valve during instattation of this modification would not affect the materlat was bronze or brass. The failure of the existing valves redundant ERCW train. A failed freeze seat would be isolated by i

resulted in flow blockage to the pump auxillaries and a cois erie 1-FCV-67-127 as would any other ERCW ventitation cooter styply ing unavailaMlity of the ptsup they served. header or branch line fatture. Therefore, this modification did not lopect nuclear safety and does not represent a USQ.

M09358 The modifications made under this DCN allow for the acMition of a The existing system operations were not affected by this podifica-new anntmelator on MCR panet 1-M-6 for RWST high/ low temperature so tion. The additional anremcletion point makes the MCR more user that the operators will have a heightened awareness of abnormal friendly. The plant was able to operate without these changes and temperature conditions. is still able to operate after these changes were made, but more efficiently. The operators are better able to ascertain plant status and thus make more informed decisions. These changes did not result in any USQs.

M09371 This modification allowed for the addition of a new emunciator on The system operations that existed previous to this modification MCR Panet 2-M-6 for RWST high/ low temperature so that the operators were not affected. The additional annmciation point makes the MCR will have a heightened awareness of abnormat temperature conditions. more user friendly. The plant was able to operate without these changes and is able to operate after these changes were made. The operators are better able to ascertain plant status and thus make more informed decisions. There was no USQ.

M09378 This Unit 2 modification removed computer inverter 2 and replaced it The computer power stypty' system is not rapired for any accident with new computer power stpply 2. Tte new power stypty is fed from mitigation and is property isolated electricatty and physically from the TSC inverter through a fused disconnect switch, and the output any e@ignment important to safety and, therefore, camot increase -

of the pcwer stoply feeds computer distribution penet 2 through the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR. The another fused disconnect switch. The power supply is provided with two overcurrent trip setpoints changed by this modification are not a bypass feed from the computer maintenance steply transfer switch required for any accident mitigation. There wss no ispect on any through an mfused disconnect switch. The modification was equipment important to safety. There was no redJction in the margin performed to increase the reliability of the power feed to the P250 of safety as described in any TS. There was no USQ.

computer and to re & ce the load on the preferred transfer switch.

The overcurrent trip setpoints of breaker 125 in 480V auxiliary building comanon board was increased from 200 amps to 264 amps and the overcurrent trip setpoint of breaker 11A in 480V shutdown board 2Al-A was increased from 200 anpa to 231 amps. The loads on the breakers are nonsafety related, nondivisional, non-train as is the consson board. The setpoints were increased to attow 250V battery

~ ^

__ u

u. 3

~ i

+

l' Page No. 20 CHANGES IN TNE FACILITY - M(BIFICATIONS J+:

i charger 2 to go into current timit without tripping the feeder breekers. Administrative controls have been placed on preferred inverter 2 to place it on 250 bettery 2 before placing preferred transfer switch 2 in the alternete feed position. nemoving the ,

preferred inverter from the preferred transfer switch reduces the toed on breeker 11A in 480V shutdom board 2A1-A before it closes

iAlch will prevent that breaker from tripping if 250V bettery charger 2 goes into current limit * =T m t to the breaker closure.

! The modification did not change any text or tables in the SAR; j however, SAR Figure 8.2.1-3 required revision to reflect the removat

} cf the computer inverter as a load on the 250V station bettery. No changes to TS were required.

M09379 This Unit 1 modification removed Computer Inverter 1 and replaced it The computer power sagsply system is not respaired for any accident with new Computer Power Supply 1. The new power sigiply is fed from mitigation and is property leolated electricatty and phyelcelly from the TSC inverter through a fused disconnect switch, and the output any espsipment important to safety. The three overcurrent trip 4

of the power sigipty feeds Computer Distribution Panel 1 through setpoints changed by this modificetten are not roupstred for any-another fused disconnect switch. The power magiply is provided with accident mitigation. This modification did not affect any espalpment -

a bypass feed from the Computer Maintenance Sigiply Transfer Switch important to safety or any equipment respaired t5 mitigste an through an e fused disconnect switch. The modification uns accident. The failure modes of the computer pouer oggiply are such performed to increase the rettability of the pouer feed to the P250 that no credible failure of the pouer angiply could prevent computer and to reduce the toed on the preferred transfer switch. safety-related espalpment from performing its intended safety ftec -

Also, the overcurrent trip setpoint of breaker 38 in 480V aunillary tion. . There are no TS respairements applicalde to the computer pouer -

building commen board uns increased from 200 amps to 264 amps. The system; therefore, there is no decreece to the margin of safety as --

setpoint uns increased to allow 250V Bettery Charger 1 to go into - defined as the basis for and TS. This modification did not charge _

current timit without tripping the feeder breeker. Administrative any text or tables in the SAR: however, SAR figure 8.2.1-3 respaired controts have been placed on Preferred Inverter 1 to place it on 250 revision to reflect the removal of the computer inverter as a load Battery 1 before placing Preferred Transfer Switch 1 in the on the 250V station bettery.- There were no changes to TSs.'

etternate feed position. Removing the preferred inverter from the-preferred transfer switch reduces the toed on breaker 11A in 480V S/D goerd 141-A before its closing which ulti prevent that breaker from tripping if 250V Settery Cherger 1 goes into current timit i **=9mt to the breaker closure. This modification also increened

. the overcurrent trip setpoint of hreeker 35 in the anstillary - .

i buildire common boord from 200 amps to 264 amps. The overcurrent trip setpoint of breeker 11A in 480V S/D Board 1Al-A and breaker 11A-in 480V S/0 goerd 182-s from 200 amps to 231 amps. The incrossed -

~

setpoints allow the associated 250V bettery chargers to go into current limit without tripping the breakers.

M09472 This Unit 1 modification revised the control configuration for the. -The modification involved nonsafety-related espeipment that le not CgPs and the essociated suction teotation velve to remove the - roupstred for TS operation er compliance. The modification uns -

automatic actuation signals and to pr w ide for opurator manuel assessed and uns determined to be oefe in att areas associated with. ~

control of each component. This corrected deficiencies that existed rusclear safety. The SAR lapact hos been identified and submittats in the analog type control arrorgement. The SAR respaired revision were included as part of the DCE package. There more no additionet to correct the text for the system description in section 10.4.7.1.2 lapacts to prevent this modification from proceeding.

~

and SAR Figures 10.4.1-2, 1-3, and 7-3 to show the correct configuration.

4

-, --.-,,,~..-,.-.v.. . . - ~ - w -e ---v , - - , - - ~ .n . e -- --- > - , - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ - - . _ - - _ - - - - _ = _ - - _ _ - - _ _ - _ -

'A _ $

.= ~ -

_1 w =

> Page No. 21 CHANGES IN TWE FACILITY A MODIFICATIONS -

a

~

, M09678 This Unit 1 modification revised the control configuration for the The modification involved nonsofety-related espalpment that is notl condensate domineralizer pisups and the associated suction isolation respaired to TS operation or compliance. The modification uns :

volve to remove the automatic actuation signets and to provide for essessed and uns determined to be safe in att areas aseeciated with t i-i operator manuel control of each couponent. This corrects deficien nucteer safety. The SAR lopect has been identified and endunittels cies that exist in the analog type control arrangement that- . were included in the DOI nar*===. There more no additional lopects _ '

1 currently exists. The SAR uns revised to correct the text for the to prevent this modification from proceeding.

system description in section 10.4.7.1.2, and SAR Figures 10.4.1-4, 7-6, and 7-6 were revised to show the correct configuration. .

~

M09505 This modification added a redundant method of ensuring adosquete . This modification recpsired the revision of severet SAR figures. p (9.2.1-6, 9.2.1-9, 9.3.4-8, and 9.3.4-15).

, cooling to the CVCS letdoun heet exchanger. The CVCS piping These changes were dounstream of the heet exchanger has not been analyzed for the necessary to show the new circuit added by this modification. -There f ~

temperature daru==nted in SGPER920028. The cooling unter is uns no lopect to any TS. There uns no Uge. ,~

supplied by the CCS. The control velve for the CCS cooling unter (TCV-70-192) is felt open on toss of air, but a failure in the i control circuit (T-62-78) could result in the control velve going 1 closed. The failure of T-62-78 would also result in the teos of a enn ecletor point TA-62-78 (high temperature eters). This circuit addition utilizes a contact in the existing TIS-62-79 to detect this

control circuit fatture and operate a new solenoid (TSV-70-192) to cause the TCV to go full open. The existing control for the TCV .;

ullt not be affected unless a high temperature is detected by the .

new circuit, Indicating a felture in the outsting circuit. This modification respaired the addition of cable, conesit, a jtsiction ,

bom, the TSV, interconnectirg t4fng, and associated herthsere to the

~

plant. -

i M09507 The changes included in this modification alloued for the addition The system operations that existed before the modification more ,

4 of a new rechandent controt circuit for the control and service air affected by adding features that leprove the ovellability of the compressors, relocated moisture elements, and teuered the high compressors by makisg thee teos wutnerable to component failures.

l moisture stars for control and aunillery controt air to 2 percent - The plant uns able to operate without these changes and continues to ,

t RM. Additionally, camponent cooling fans were added to Penel, operate after the changes have been unde, but with grooter -

0-L-240.- reliability.- The operators are better obte to ascerteln plant status and thus make more informed decisions. These changes did not _ i j -result in a Use. i

~

! N09618 This modification replaced existing generator cooling unter differ- The espelpment invetwed in this modification is not a direct cause -

l entist pressure switches 1-PDS-035-120A,120s, and 120C (now perton for any accident considered with the design basis. '.This system is ' l 288) with more rettable S.O.R. Offferential Pressure Switches, Model not important to safety; hauever, a trip does chattense safety

1. 101-u3-K45-34-C1A-RR. The S.O.R. switches maintain their ceti- systems in that a tw bine trip will cause a reactor trip if it.  ;

brated accuracy for a greater period of time. 1-PDS-035-120A (tow) .eccurs at'a greater .then 50 percent loed. 'The new evitches are more  ;

and 1-POS-035-120C (high) differentist preneure switches actuate and rettable and make spurious trips nettibely.' This change did not _-

• initialize Aterm o04-035-1204 and PDA-035-120C (accordingly) on degrade the performance of any of the three flesien preekset _

+

l tacet Penet 1-L-39 when the differential preseure fatts beteu or ' barriers. The control system for these switdtes is not utilized to Incrosses above the deslyt setpoints.- 1-POS-035-120s when actuated sitigste accidents, and the change did not create en accident of a .

• l as a result of a Low-Low differentist pressure (and generator different type. The margin of eefety defined in the basis of TSs:

I leading greater then 15 percent) will initiate a turbine trip and .wes rewfound, and there are no TSs reteted to this installation.~

ann e ciate Alarm P0/TA-035-106 en 1-M-2 in the NCR. The replacement Therefore, .the margin of safety uns not reshaced by this modifice . -

of 1-POS-035-120s with the 5.0.R. differential pressure switch - tion.

~

• N'  ? " - -

,.e

,_._-,..m_, _-,m , , , , , , _ . . - , ,-.n_m. .. . . ~,- ,v-. ,_, . . , ~ 4 . .. , . - . . . . _ _ . - - , . - . - mm _, . ~ .- _ _ _ . l___ __ J______

~ ~

C"  ; , gg 7 q ._fr:

~ '

"g

" ~

- : .x

- - x

~

Page No. 22 CnANGES IN THE FACILITY - fuelFICATIONS

~.

i deleted the need of the interposing relay and circuit resistor show -

l in SAR Figure 10.2.2-1. The deletion of this relay and resistor .

from the SAR figure created the need for a safety evolustion, n09627 The flow toops for RNR/ SIS flow had become unreliable as a result of This modification only replaced the devices; the toep intended - '

. calibration drif t caused by obsolete and outdated eepsipment. faction and design were not ettered. . TherW e, the previous SAR '

Maintenance costs to properly maintain the loops had reached an .evolustions were not effected. The compliance and TS roupsirements

[ m ecceptable level because of calibration frequency incrosses and remain the same. This modificetten uns laptemented without .

~ w

, repelr cost increases. This Unit 1 modification replaced the loop violating any existing plant respairements. The monitoring f a ction a

components associated with RNR/ SIS flow. . Additionally, 1-Fet-63-91C for ant / SIS flow Indication is enhanced by the addition of more and 92C equere root converters were no longer respaired h==== the accurate and rettable components. The modification retains pouer replacesant transmitters convert the flow input to a tinser output. separation and single fatture criteria. The modification did not-They were removed from service and returned to pouer stores. .The reduce the margin of safety as defined in the assis for any TS.

This modification did not involve a Use.

~

i toops were converted from 10-50 mA to 4-20 mA to comply with Irukastry standards. SAR Figure 6.3.2-2 (drawing 47W610-63-2) 3 roepstred revision to reflect the new configuration of the loops.

SAR Table 7.5-2 recesired revision to reflect the new meninse 110 ',

percent design flow rate for Rut flow to the cold legs. Calculation

Seu-SeS4-0072 doctaments that the ammisse flow rate is less then the ' -

! figure in the SAR (for Pan).

. IIO9628 The flow loops for RNR/ SIS flow are e rettable as a result of The espalpment involved is quality related, solemic IL,' and ces-

! calibration drif t caused by obsolete and outdated etysipment. - pliance and TS related. Since this modification only replaced the, Iteintenance costs to property maintain the loops has reached an devices, the loop intended f a ction and design are not altered; tmacceptable levet as a result of calibration frequency increases therefore, the previous SAR evaluations are not effected. Addition- .

i and repelr cost incrosses. This Unit 2 modification replaced the elly, the compliance and TS requirements remain the same. ~ This '

loop components associated with RNR/ SIS flow. Additionally, modification uns leptemented without violation of enr esisting plant 2-FM-63-91C and 92C equece root converters are not required h=e=== respairements. There uns no rechsetion in any TS margin of safety, the replacement trenomitters convert the flow Input to a lineer and there uns no Use.

output. They have been removed from service and returned to Pouert Stores. The loops have been converted from 10-50 mA to 4-20 mA to comply with industry standards. SAR Figure 6.3.2-2 (drawing 47W611-63-2) required revision to reflect the new configuration of

, the loops. SAR Table 7.5-2 respaired revision to reflect the neu ,

anniense 110 percent design flow rate for tout flow to the cold legs.

1909755 The Unit 1 modifications provided by this 001 consisted of a change . The conclusion of this SE indicates that there mes no impact on in setpoint of the peAFWPs pressure switches which control automatic nucteer. safety and that a use did not esist. This conclusion une switchover to the EROd and a revision to the logic for AFW pump - . beoed on the conservative direction of the setpoint change and the . ,

suction switchover to ERCW. The setpoint change was made to provide conservetive nature of the topic modification. -This modification an attouence in the setpoint to ensure that the formation of air -. Increased the reliability of the leAFWs and, therefore, improved -

entraining vortices will not occur before the transfer of suction to nucteer safety.

the ERCW system. The setpoint change use made in the conservettwe i direction (increased) and, therefore, had no impact on the ability-to switchover spon failure of the nonselenically designed suction tine located in the turt>ine buildirg. The change in switchever logic uns made to ensure that a reliable source of unter is avaltable before stort of the teAFw s in the event of a LOOP and a-seismically inchaced failure of the AFU pimp suction lines. SAR

_ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ . ea _---,- -_ m m._-- ,t-,_ wee--ie4-r, .. w ah. r e e w_ _-ww--e...-w-n.-

. ;_. e - ; pg-f /, W w: ,

, ,t

-, -g- -

,,v 2, n ~

4 Page No. 23 CHANGES IN THE FACILITT - MODIFICATIONS -

V",

s

'~

Figures 9.2.2-19,10.4.7-7 and 10.4.7-10 required revision as a

' ~

result of the modification to the switchower logic. TS Table 3.3-4 j was revised to be comistent with this setpoint change to ensure that the design basis documentation and the TS are in agreement.

Change to this TS uns not recpaired in order to implement the scope of this modification.

~

' N09939 An enctooed manuel transfer switch and receptacle were'added to the Thenewnonsafety-relatedtransfersuitches'andreceptactesaref # -

480V power circuits of CRDN cooler fans 23-s, 2C-4, and 2D-g to .. seismicatty quellfied and will enty be used den Unit 2 is in .

provide power for temporary nonsafety-related toeds inside the teuer operationel modes 5 or 6. The tasM fans are not needed during . -

conteirusent during outages (one transfer switch and one receptacle ~ operational modes 5 or 6 and are not required for any 3DAs or per fan). The new receptacle enclosures consist of atsairam anticipated operational transients. The addition of alueimas i meterial. SAR Figures 8.3.1-14, 8.3.1 15, and 8.3.1-16 (drawings receptecte enclosures does not cause the LOCA hydrogen generation -

1,2-45N749-2, 3, and 4, respectively) required revision to show the '.init inside contalment to be exceeded. The offected 480V CmM fan -

new transfer suitches and cutage-related receptacles as being part pouer circ.alts are protected by esisting circuit breakers and funes, of the 480v power circuits for these nonsafety-related fans. and the temporary loads are controlled in accordance with si 1 existing approved site F + M . There uns no use aseectated with

this modification.

. M09944 This change raised the setpoint for pressure switches 1-PS-63-180A ' The overpreseurization alarm is not required for safe shutdom of l and 1-PS-63-180s. These switches only ftmetton to provide MCR the plant.- The RM system is protected from overpreneurization by a ,

aruiunciation to unrn against high RuR pm p suction pressure.- relief veLwe d ich is sized to retfewe the combined ftcu of att the .

' Therefore, this storm feature is not safety related. The entsting charging pumps et the relief volve set pressure. - The volve setpoint ?

setpoint of 380 psig had reeutted in unenticipated nuisance alarms is 450 psig. -This change uns property anatyred in the content of--

as d===nted in SGPER930066. TWA Calculation sou-074-0053 uns- DCN N09331 and had no lapect on plant safety. There uns no Uge.1 revised establishire the neu setpoint wetue for the suitches at 405

< pais. The entsting setpoint of 300 pois uns specified in SAR s eeection 7.6.2.1. CFSAR-EEs-93-00 uns submitted to support this modification.

M10001 This modification abandoned in place the reactor coolant' letdoun TSs for primary coolant specific' activity,' monitored once per 72-tiquid radiation monitor, 1-RM-90-1063, removed a section and capped hour period, and Isotopic Anotysis for Deee Egaivetent I-131'  ;

A both the intet and outlet tubing Lines for the monitor sample, . concentration, monitored once each 14 days, are met by a6erence to

. de-terminated and abandoned the cables associated with the a;ompo- ' sampling requirements established in SI-50, "72-gour, Chemistry -

nonts of 1-R-90-104, removed 1-RR-90-104 from 0-N-12, removed Resyst rements." If the coolant grees activity adelnistrettwo limit l 1-BM-90-106A and RI-90-104 from 0-M-12, patched the holes in 0-N-12 , is exceeded,' a TS compliance verification is performed. If either--

made by the removal of 1-RR-90-106 and 100 and installed a blank dose equivalent I-131 or groes activity Limits are ====h8, action plate on the penet ideere 1-RM-90-106A and RI-90-106 were removed, is taken to initlete SI-53, " specific lodine Isotopic Activity .

i removed 1-L-266 (which resulted in the renowet of 1<G-90-106, local . Concentration and/or DEI-131 Seterminetten," dich establishes and

alarm and indicating lights), and disconnected cables from the TSC" doceents the radiochemical analysis required in the TS. Acceptance

! computer point R9013 (removed this point from scan and designated it criteria in SI-53 section 4.0 is beteu the aseissed fuel feiture used as aspere"). This monitor is not required for TS compliance and is Lin SAR Chapter 15 enetysis. This monitor and aseeciated camponeits -

! not safety related. The monitor had begun to emperience maintenance are not regaired for TS compliance and are not eefety related. TS

! problems after the first 100 percent power rim. Continued use of. 3/4.4.8, Figure 3.4-1, and Tabte 4.4-4 cover the timits required to .

' be maintained. These limits are monitored by chemical sample the monitor uns no longer practical from a maintenance and ALARA ,

stan@oint.' SAR text, tables and figures regaired revision to procachares and not by the msnitor. .TSs remain asieffected.

, delete any reference to the reactor coolant letdoom radiation monitor for Unit 1. ~

l y $

___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . = _ = - - . . ._- _ a - -__ - .L z 2..,.....-.... .-- . . , -. . .- _-

m Page No. 24 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - M(BIFICATIONS "^

M10011 This DCW endified the turbine trip circuitry. The turbine trip This modification re yfred the revision of SAR Figure 10.2.2-1. The currently generated automaticatty (after a ten second deley) by a turbine trip deleted was a nonsafety-related trip that was in -

tow-tow like oil level signet was deleted. This turbine trip is in addition to the turbine trips re wirnd by the manufacturer.. The addition to the turbine trip re ptred by the turbine manufacturer turbine is still protected by a diverse trip (tou ttee ollv i (Westinghouse). This DCN also replaced the existing 250 VDC pressure). These changes also show the new Agnetat time delay relay'-

I Westinghouse timer / relay couR>inettons with Agostet integret time (with its fore 'C' contacts) added by this endification. No TSs delay relays. These relavs are in the turbine trip and the were impacted by this modification.

generator trip frput circuits. They are fed from the 250 VDC bettery boards. The relays are located in the nonsafety-related portion of the turbine trip buses. -The relays provide annmciation, turbine trips, and generator trips based on inputs from low ttee ott Levet switch, generator cooling failure switches, and interceptor I (low pressure turbine isolation) valves closing. During testing, some of the existing timers were fo m d to be rated for only 125 VDC. =

The 250 VDC timer is no tanger available from Westinghouse and so att 250 VDC timer / relay combinations in these circuits were replaced with Agostet time delay relays, d ich are currently in generet production. The time detsy settings are not effected by the replacement of the relays.

M10074 This design change modified the overpressure protection bypass line The modification to the ERCW bypees piping did not increase the-

! at containment penetrations x-57, 59, 61, and 63 by replacing these probability of an accident or the occurrence of a motfunction of lines with stainless steel piping and valves and by relocating the equipment. It did not incrosse the conce p ences of an accident or connections to near the top of the main ERCW Line. This of a malfunction of e pipment nor did it incrosse the possibility of modification is intended to prevent a potential felture mechanism et an accident or malfunction of a different type. There was no-the valves caused by corrosion and sediment deposition. This rocksction in the mergin of safety as defined in the TSs.- This _

modification revised SAR Figure 9.2.2-3. conclusion is bened on the improvement in fastetton dich is anticipated to occur by the une of stainless steel for the piping and components and by the relocation of the line from the bottom of .

the ERCW penetration. This modification fagsroved the capability of the bypass line to perform its overpressure protection and contain-ment isolation function.

~

M10119 . Existing obsolete parton transmitter 2-LT-77-1 was replaced.with a The replacement / relocation of the nonsafety RCDT tevgl' transmitter new Rosemoet transmitter to be relocated to Penet 2-L-190 outside did not increase the possibility of occurrence or consequences of an the crane well. The modification required deleting the existing accident or malftsiction of equipment leportant to safety as - '

transmitter monsited at the RCST and rewor'ing and routing the previously evolunted in the $Nt. This modification did not create a -

existing sense lines through the crane ut.1 to the 2-L-190 penet, possibility for an accident or motfunction of a different type than  ;

Existing cable was rerouted and reused to steply power to the new previously evetuated in the SAR. The RCDT ptsups and controls serve-transmitter. A new sight glass was mo eted on the outside surface no safety functions and the revision to the setpoints did not reduce of the crane welt in the vicinity of the RCDT. The sight glass is the mergin of safety as defined in the beels for.the TSs. There wasi not to be used as a continuous monitoring device and isolation _ no use.

valves shall be norestly closed. This modification was intended to leprove maintenance and reduce perserviel radiological exposure. ~

leptementation of the modification did not impact the operation or functionet control of the RCDT circuits. No physical change to the temperature loop was made. Appropriate SAR changes were otheitted. -

6

m-r- - ,

Page No. 25

^

CMANGES IN THE FACILITY - M alFICATIONS i

M10206 This modification replaced the existing obsolete parton transmitter The replacement of the existing ITT parton level transmitter with a-1-LT-77-1 with a new R===mt transmitter to be relocated to penet Rosemoet transmitter did not charge the function of the control-1-L-190 outside the crane well. This rewired deleting the existing circuit. The setpoint changes are for p o p start and stop controls.

transmitter mo eted at the RCDT and reworking and routing the The pieup/ control circuit does not perform any safety-related l existing sense lines through the crane watt'to the 1-L-190 penet. function, and the circuits are not re wired to function to mitigste -

, Existing cable was rerouted and reused to supply power to the new any accident. The setpoint changes improve pimp operation and transmitter at penet 1-L-190. In addition, a sight stess was eliminate nuisance alarms as a recult of pump stort and high level mounted on the outside surface of the crane well in the vicinity of alarm being set too close together. The setpoint charges bring the -

the RCDT. The sight glass has limited use and will be used to SAR table into agreement with the calculation geu-EEs-PL&S da-nt.

i indicate RCDT levels & ring maintenance proce&res. The sight glass The added sight glass is protected by field instatted leolation isolation volves shall be normatty closed. This modification is vatwes. It is manufactured to withstand tp to 200 psi with helt I intended to ler -e maintenance and to reduce personnel radiological checks that will seet in the event of glass breakage thereby l exposure. There are no physical changes to setpoints. SAR Table shutting off the escape of fluid. . The figure change to correct the -

11.2.3-2 required a correction to bring it into agreement with instrument symbol did not change the instrument toop functions.

I existing design documentation. Isplementation of this modification i did not lopect the operation of the control circuit. The existing control functions were uncharged. SAR Figure 11.2.2-1 (drawing l 47W830-1) regired revision to correct an incorrect instrument ,

l symbol. The drawing showed a tooperature transmitter and was

revised to denote a temperature element instead. No physical change

[ to the temperature loop was made.

l M10303 In early 1993, inspections of the Unit 1 and 2 S/G FW nozzle This modification did not incrosse the probability of an accident I transition pieces found cracklog after less then 1 year of service. previously evolunted in the SAR because the dosi p and anetysis This Unit 2 change replaced the existing FW nozzle elbow and reeutts indicated that the new moosehty meets ASIE Code strees and l transition piece with a Westinghouse custom designed elbow with an fatigue re pirements teilte protecting the nosate-to-pipe weld; i

integret protective Liner for the purpose of mitigating therust thereby representing a lesser potentist for thernet fatigue crack-fatigue cracking. The change has been evolusted for heetty and ing. The addition of the theneal liners actually decrosses the '

cooldown transients / accidents in SAR Chapter 15 and was fomd to probability of occurrence of a malfunction because it reshaces the .

have negligible impact. probability of nozzle crackfrg which could lead to a feedline Leeki or ripture. The addition of the PW nostle thenest liners did not

, affect assumptions or conclusions in the SAR anstyees. Increened j pressure drop of the thermal liner actually retards the depressuri-ration rate, asking the SAR anstysis more conservetlye for feedline

, or steamline breaks white not interfering significantly with AFW

! flow. . Postuteted licensieg basis transients with the replacement elbow would have the same coneogences as a motfunction with the

, original component, and the thermal liner will not restrict .

suffIclent AFW from being supptled to the S/Gs.

a M10348 This modification returned to service the automatic control circuit This modification did not incresee the probability of an accident of temperature controt vetves 2-TCV-67-86, 92,100, and 108 that previously owetuated in the SAR and the safety function of the TCVs were deleted by a previous design change. The solenoid volve, canax was not changed. - The TCVs would either fall to the open position or seet, terminet boerd, Junction bou and the cables providing power to can be switched to the open position as desired by operation daring the solenoid circuits are certified to EG 50.49, 1E classification or after en accident.. The felled CPEN positlen of the TCVs provides by this DCE. The control circuit of the solenoid valve is wired to _ moulasse cooling for the tower compartment. The modification ensures provide operations the ability to CPEN the TCVs from either the MCR .thet the TCVs can perfono their intended desim faction. : There was or the aunillary control roon dependent on the position of the - no Usg. -

transfer switch in the munitiary control room. This modification 4

-.-__-.________..___.m_ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . -__..u - - - - --- .mm-_a _s =- ek

• m't--tP'4 4We w +ms--- e e- -++-e-y a

+ w e- e p--r=3w r--.g w 'W-Tr"w-w w W 4 w- e- + Wd t'Ttw^q w-w

~'

^

~

9

. 1 Page No. 26 CHANGES IN TWE FACILITY - MESIFICATIONS ' * -

_N reptoced the existing Mesanetten Model 8012 velve positioners with'

~

l-tlke-for-like een positioners. Yokogeue YS-170 temperature indicat- >

ing controtters were instetted on local penet 2-L-26A and D to -

4 control the ERCW flow through the LCCs, providing automatic

temperature control of touer containment. tapacted SAR sections and i figures remired updating to reflect the destyi changes, and SAR

Section 6.3 re gfred g deting to show these vetves added to the ASME j Section XI valve test program. -

t i

M10390 Nine 1/4-inch instrument isolation velves on the injection unter The SE perfonned for this modification concluded that there were not i lines which serve the Unit 1 CgPs A, e, and C and the No. 3 NDTP C taireviewed safety gaestions associated with this change. The volves ~

were instetted without proper doc eentation. Existing valves also' are not required for any accident and do not support the fteictionsu ,

! had ports which did not meet the regired temperature conditions. . of any equipment that is required for accident sigiport. . The TSs and ,

This modification replaced existing valves with documented valves the text of the SAR do not mention these volves. .These vetves can-L

! suitable to the temperatures to be encomtered. This DCN performed fall and cause falture of the injection unter system and not create '

e drawing review for correct details of valve, pipe, and tidning any accident not streedy analyzed. These vetves are not a part of -

Instellation. An SE uns required because SAR Figure 10.4.7.2 the basis for any margin of safety.:

regired revision. This revision shows the instrtament root velves -2 ' , _ ,

! for the injection unter lines of the CgPs. These volves were not

[ previously sheari. There mes no other SAR ispect.

M10396 Valves were instetted in the sLW and McCW sigiply tinos and suction This design change added velves of cespotible meteriet with the i lines to the EKW pimp. ' This provides a means of footating the RW- piping in which it uns installed and did not etter or lepect the  ;

l and leCW sigipty lines from the current KW sagipty lines and, operation of the CCW pumps in any mer. It did not etter or impact. 4 the operation of the R5W, FP, and CCW systems that these components therefore, facilitates the sgierede of this system. Sufficient lengths of pipe plus fittings were provided to attou instattetton of are port of, and it leproves the rettability of these systems. - The 1 1/2-inch, 3-inch, and 4-inch vetves for a total of six (6) velves.' design of the volve and piping is ogsel or sagierfor to the originet. ,

Upon luptementation of the DCN, the upgrade of the Unit 1 KW and Therefore, this modification did not restace the margin of safety as ; .

l McCW uns able to proceed with the current K W and leCW system and defined in the bases for any TS and did not involve a UIs. ~

l CCW operationet. There were no SAR text changes reeutting from this l modification. SAR Figure 9.5.1-12 required gdete to reflect the l new configuration.

M10606 . This Unit 2 modification replaced obsolete controllers for the mein The function and the operation of this system were not changed by ~  !

steem dump vetves. The operators have the same controls as before, this modification. This equipment is not leportant to safety.

' but there is an added benefit in that process pressure is neu . Therefore, any accidents or transients analynod for this system vore indicated on a larger meter then uns used before. No factions have seinffected, and the canoesysences of any previously analyzed accident been added or taken suey. The drawing has changed to reflect the have not been incrossed. No neu accidents were created. There use; controtter deletion and the modifier addition. This dreuing is SAR no lepect on the mergin of safety. The neu espalpment is more .. .

Figure 10.3.2-3. This is the only lepect on the SAR. rettable and spore parts are avellable for this espsipment unlike the

, previously installed espeipment. - geplacement of this ogsipment -

should elleinste inadvertent cootdeuns es a result of failure of *

[ .this ogsipment. There uns no use. i

! M10608 A crossover pipe and isolation volve were instetted on the= ThismodificationatteusOperationstovieustlyinspectthenotiles -;

j condensete domineretirer receiving (cation) tank drain to reshace the for uniformity and to deterielne if the notates respaire cleaning.  !

amoisit of weste meteriets and to assist Operations in the chemical The system is not e oefety-related system,' and its operetten does -

regeneration process. A portion of the poly-lined piping uns ' not affect or ispect any eefety-related systems. .The design of the.

i

, ,- . - - ~?

-m. _ _ _ . . . . _ , . . _ . . _ . 1, .' .,..m- L._, ;o,m . , . . ,_ .s - , - . , ,

.a Page No. 27 CHANGES IN THE FACILITT - MODIFICATIONS -'

replaced with rubber-lined piping to facilitate the addition of the new valve and piping is equel or s p erior to the originnt design and does not affect the design basis of the system or its operation.

new crossover piping. This change required a revision of the SAR Figure 10.4.6-1 to show the new flow path. The modification, therefore, did not involve a USG.

M10425 A teeking drain valve on the ISAFWP 1A-A was replaced with a The design of the replacement valve and piping is ecpel or s w erior cooperable valve which was avaltable at Sequoyah. As a result of to the original. The modification did not involve a USG. The this replacement. SAR Figure 10.4.7-12 required revision to show a safety evaluation was re wired because the SAR figure required j 3/4-inch diameter valve instead of a 1-inch diameter valve. revision.

M10523 Work performed by this DCN modified the Unit 2 turbine trip The deletion of the turbine trip due to low-tow (the of t level did circuitry. The turbine trip signal currently generated automati- not increase the probability of a turbine trip because the SAR cally (after a 10 second delay) by a low-tow like of t levet signet accident analysis does not consider the initiating event of the has been deleted. This turbine trip was in addition to the turbine turbine / generator trip, only the trip itself. The nonsafety-related I

j trips required by the manufacturer (Westinghouse). The turbine is portions of the circuit affected by this modification maintain all stitt protected by a diverse trip (tow tube oil pressure). The seperation and isolation re girements. The accident anetysis first out annunciator window has been deleted and the low-tow tube associated with a turbine / generator trip rammins unchanged. The i

oft levet alarm has been moved to another window. The P250 computer modification did not redace the margin of safety as defined as the

, point software description has been revised to delete the reference basis for any TS because individual turbine / gen estor trips are not j to the turbine trip for this signet. SAR Figure 10.2.2-1 (CCD: addressed in the TSs.

1,2-45N647-2) required revision to reflect the deletion of the turbine trip signal from Relay 2-02-047-CLOGR.

M10585 This Unit 2 modification replaced obsolete controtters on MCR Panel The components replaced, relocated, and/or utilized are att non-2-M-2, replaced noncompatible I/P's remote from the control valves, safety related. The fisiction of the components remained unchanged.

and the activation of new toop power em pties on 2-R-124. This There was no increase in the probability of or conse pences of an change resulted in a change to SAR Figure 10.4.1-1 to show the new accident previously evaluated. No new accident of a different type power supply configuration. was created. There was no reduction in the margin of safety. There was no USQ.

M10903 A section nf bus tocated in the 161 kV switchyard was removed from The conclusion of the safety evolustion Indicated that there was no the J-line bus o g port in Bay 20, north to the motor-operated ispect to nucteer safety and that a USQ did not exist. The circuit disconnect switch 1009 to s@ port DCN M10830 which installed a new is not a 1E circuit and the motor-operated disconnect was spared out 161kV capecitor bank. Implementation of this change required an and abandoned in place. The section of bus removed in Bay 20

. outage on Bus 2, Section 3. The only 1spect to the SAR was a change between the J-tine bus support and the motor-operated. disconnect to Figure 8.2.1-1. provide further isolation of this tsused circuit. This circuit is non-TS related.

R09639 This modification instatted an isolation valve on the potable water The potable water system in a nonsafety-related TVA Class H system.

system to attow isolation of yard piping Leaks. This allows repelr The SAR change edmitted deleted extraneous infonention regarding of the teoks while still maintaining water to the MWTP. The potable material and instattation re@lromants for the potable water system, water system is TVA Class N and serves no safety or @ etity related Meterlat and Installation requirements are shown on appropriate function. The valve was instatted in the nonseismic turbine design output drawings; therefore, this information was not required buildirg. A change to the SAR was required since the valve in the SAR.

Instatted in bronze and SAR Section 9.2.4.1.2 specificatty cetted for fron valves to be installed on 3-inch and amider potable water system valves.

y_,

5- %

Page No. 28 CNANGES IN THE FACILITY - NtBIFICATIONS 'I R10149 This unit 2 DCN affected the nonsafety-related heeter drains and The hester drains and vents system is' a r.onsafety-related system vents sytem and the sampling system. This DCN changes an under located in the turbine building and does not lapact any safety pressure rated bronze sampling corsiection vetve at the No. 7 heeter fertion. The change of pressure in the sempting system has been -

I drain pumps to a carbon steet vetwe with an acceptable pressure evolusted, and sit components meet or eaceed the higher pressure

rating and h==nted the change of the sampling corvisction from the requirement.

suction to the discharge of the No. 7 heater drain pumps.. SAR Figure 10.4.9-2 and SAR Table 9.3.2-1 Sheet 5 were effected by this change.

506690 This DCN provided criteria for dredging the ERCW intake channet and Providing minimum river elevation, channel and dredging requirements steet liner intakes. The criterie consist of minimum river ensures adequete unter is avellable for the ERCW pumps. There uma elevation, channel width and dredging re w irements. These changes no USG involved with this activity.

! required revision of SAR Figures 3.8.4-55, 3.8.4-49, 1.2.3-22, 9.2.2-1, and 9.2.2-5, text Sections 2.4.11 and 9.2.5, and TS

, 3/4.7.5. The activity addressed a condition ideere additional unter

' sources from ipstroom TVA reservoirs may be necessary to ensure Seu

, ultimate heet sink is maintained. This is acceptable since SAR

' 2.4.11.1, Lou Flou in kivers and Streams, addresses this specific event.

S06723 CAQ SGP890606PER uns written to identify instrument and 480V breeker This DCN removed redtsident setpoints and erroneous SAR identifica-

' settings placed on power single line drauire. As stated in the tions on drawings. This mes a neaa==ntation change only; no field '

CAG, "the nonsol practice is to show setpoints on 473601-series: work uns required. No gdeysical changes were made by this DCN,~ and dogs. (I-tabs, or breaker setting sheets, etc.)." Identifying these no epipment classification changes were mode. This change had no setpoints on just one drawing series precludes drawing eerers ideen ispect on the operating plant or TS.

these setpoints are revised and not all draulnes are updated. The

CAO also stated that some of these drawings are incorrectly

. Identified as SAR figures on the drawings. This DCN removed the above discussed erroneous SAR identifications and redsident set-points on the drawings by making the breaker setting sheets and 1-tabs the ,eaa==nt of record for the 480V breders and instruments, respectively. This uns a documentation change W ; no field work uns required. DCN S08723 also added a note to single line drawing 45174904 to prohibit the use of breaker compartment 2D on 48Elv .

i shutdoun boord 132-2 for plant toeds. The addition of this note uns a documentation only revision and did not Ispect system operation or '

current plant configuration.

! S00851 This DCN resolved the inconsistencies among the environmental ' This DCN'provided the roussired documentation to correct inconsisten drawings, the conduit and grounding drawings, and the associated clos between the various calculations, criterie, and instructions supporting calculations. Also, this DCN corrected related calcula . pertaining to flood towels in the RM rooms, CVC letdanen heet tions D245-DS199EP and SON-SgNG-1 that use the affected environmen-- enchanger rooms, and the et 653 pipe chose rooms. There were no-tal data. Dan ==ntation inconsistencies concerning flood levels; physical modifications required to the plant as a result of this -

reported in SOSCA90019 have been corrected by this change package. design change. Revising the SAR to update the definition of live The RNR rooms, CVCS tetdoun heet enchanger rooms, and the et 653 toed to be consistent with the M C's SRP section 3.8 provided a

] pipe chose rooms have been apaelified for higher flood levels.. No method in editch to spastify the above rooms to meet the hiWier i plant physical changes were required by this DCN. - The impact to the stresses caused by the increened flood levels to 48 inches. The SAR SAR for this change package mes limited to two items - revising the change involving the possive felture snaps in the Rm pamp rooman definition of the term " live toed" and reflecting the results of - reflect the higher flooding levels that are espected as cetted out' Y

,_ - - - - ,--._ , _ _ _ ,--.w --

e 2.

Page No. 29 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS calculation 9Ni-$054-0056 which demonstrated that.the dropout penets in this change. There are no restraints or additionet requirements s in the RNR pump rooms will fait when submerged to 48 inches thereby placed on the plant as a result of this deslyt change. There was no protecting all equipment above that level. USG.

S09034 This DCst deleted the requirement that valves 1-VLV-67-540A, 540s,' Calculation osG92008 R0 determined that the highest flew through any '

2-VLV-67-540A, and 540s are required to be in the locked closed of the four hypochlorite treatment circutetton lines that are isolated by these velves was 72 spo. The flow data for the last.

~

position.

performance of the ERCW flow botance was reviewed, and ties loss of :

' 72 spm from any ERCW main agply heeder has well within the morain of flow from the components it ogpties. Therefore, there would be no adverse affect on the ERCW system if any of these velves were open. Also, the AFW system would not be adversely affected because these lines would add additionet sgply to the ISAFWs if the pimps were ogptied by the ERCW system.

509057 The permanent intet and outlet reector cavity inspection covers did The Appendix G Justifications and the ewelustion documents the not provide an admete seet cksring refueling because of plate acceptability of this activity. The temporary nozzle covers are .

werpage. This DCN allous the temporary 1/2 inch ss nozzle covers to acceptable to withstand a seismic event and are adequately sized to '

be installed on a permanent bests during noneet operation and . maintain head pressure during refueling. The new seeket material '

refueling. As such, the nozzle covers can be instatted and fastened specified is e4 Levet i meterlat and meets the envirorumental and to the refueling canst floor in a menner that would not have to be seeting recpairements for this application. The activity does not j changed during a refueling outage or for any mode of plant create or increase the chances of system or equipment falture.-

operation. The covers would have to be removed only for ISI nozzle There are no new or different failure modes created as a result of -

inspections (10 year interval) or to replace gaskets. This DOI made this activity.

other minor draulne changes and etso specified new gasket materlat +

for the nozzle covers, drain covers. and neutron detector tube covers and acceptable replacement intervels for the gaskets. This

change reduces outage time and personnel dose. A change to the SAR was submitted as part of this DOI to reflect the use of the teak before break anetysis, thereby allowing the nozzle covers to remain bolted down charing normat operation.

l i $09286 This change allous the field tn use adjustable rett clips on the The poter cranes are seismically <pantified regardtees of any change

. bridge rail of the polar crane. This change does not affect the SAR performed on the bridge rails because they rely on girjder-to-wett -

directly, but involves a licensing based da m t. NRC was notified tempers for seismic cpantification. As long as the crane is not by memorandum that the polar cranes were in compliance with " binding" on the rimusy, no undesirable loads are being enerted on .

OtAA-70-1975, section 1.4 (Runusy), which recpaires the crane risiuey . the polar crane. Calculation 30NR-7 hos determined that the new to be within a tolerance of 1 1/8 inch. DIAA-70 was written with a bridge raf t clips are adespante with regards to the original design straight runway in mind, and it was determined that as tons as the loeds. As long as the polar crane is seismically quotified, it -

i crane is not " binding" on the circular rtensey, it is not exerting cannot increase the probability of an accident or occurrence of a any tsidesirable toeding on the poter crane and meets the intent of - matftmetion of espalpment leportant to safety. It also cannot the tolerance specified in DIAA-70-1975. Increase the consequences of an accident or a malfunction of.

, espalpment. No now accidents or matfimettons of a different type than evolunted in the SAR are created. . The polar cra"e does not -

affect any TSs; therefore, no mergins of safety ore effected.

Y

-.m-_~ - - ww,< v --w -ew- -- - ws a-- -4___-,-- , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . -

.47 -g J '-%

, w

's  : '; __

S Page No. 30 CHANGES IN TNE FACILITY - NBIFICATIONS

~

m S09523 This DCN revised design documentation to reclassify (in accordance This " documentation only" change uns limited in scope and impoet to- y-j uith 10 CFR 50, Reg Guide 1.26, ANS N18.2 - Draft 1970, and SgN e slepte reclassification of instrument t 4ing to reflect the .

l Design Criteria SeN-DC-V-3.0) portions of the gottom-nomted Instru-- correct TVA safety class designation beced en the function and ".,-

mont system. The SA/SE for the OCN addressed the reclassification- destyi of the tubing. No field changes (i.e., heresere) were

! in accordance with S09523 and clarified the code classification of involved. No functionet changes were made to the system.o This :

the seet table fittings to address the situation identified in change did not decrease any design respairements associated with the -

Engineering Evolustion/JC0 No. 30JCO-92-005, Rev 0. This change did integrity of the reactor coolant preneure bewidery. The reautting , -

lapect the SAR. SAR Table 5.2.3-1, sheet 1, identifies TVA Class A classifications of machenical components of the bottemMucunted . . ,

f Reactor Cootent Pressure soundary Meterials. Included is the entry instrument system are consistent with 10 CFR 50 and TVA destyi . ..

" Instrument T@e Appurtenances - Lower Need." This entry tems criteria for classification of mechanical camponents. - The instetted revised to clarify that the guide t s es and seet table macheni.at tubing currently satisfies the new (i.e., correct) ANS classifica-components of the bottom-noimtad instrument system are TVA Ctess A, tion.

ASME Class 1, and that the flux thisbles are classified as TWA Class

'~

A e, ASME Class 2. H

' ~

S09675 Calculation SEN-70-D053-NCG-RSR-113087 R2 has verified that under The calculation verified that under certain normel eserating certain normat operating conditions the thornet berrier booster pump conditions the themet horrier booster pep discharge pressure any.

discharge pressure soy exceed the CCS design pressure. SGPER920238 exceed the CCS design pressure,s This condition exists in modes uns written to document this condition. Under this DCN, the portion ideere there is a tou CCS flou. . The Lou flou in turn incrosses the -

of piping donaistream of the booster pumps up to the RCP themet suction pressure et the booster pamp as a result of the reduced s berrier cooling unter intet piping (editch is designed for 2404 psig) pressure drop through the CCS. The preneure head differentist added .

uns evolunted for design pressure of 200 pois. SAR Section 9.2.1.2 by the booster pamp in conjunction with the piping elevation -

reflects the CCS design pressure recpsirements. This section difference induced head combine for pressures in oncess of the required revision to reflect the increase in design preneure of the' originnt design pressure of 150 pois. The CCS piping minione melt .

thernal berrier booster pimp discharge piping. In addition, the -thickness for the various pipe stres located with the identified 4 flow diagrams (SAR Figures 9.2.1-2 & 3) were revloeil to show the portion of piping esere evetuated, and results shound that the j pressure class breek; thus, the drawings need to be replaced at the . minismen pipe esell thicknees respairements were met for att piping next SAR figures update. . toten evolunted for the increened destyi preneure of 200 pois.' To address the acceptability of the volves, instriements, fittings,-

flanges, etc. aseecleted with the identified portion of pipingi

calculation SEN-geg2-0144 RO ises generated, and the evolustions i perforund in this calculation concluded that att associated compo-1 nonts tsere acceptable for the h1Weer design pressure of 200 pals, i . Calculations for setemic sysellfication of the piping egnre also -

performed. The results and cenctunions of the calculations sigport the fact then no piping, volve instrument, fitting, flerge, etc. or associated support requires replacement in the field; thus, no physical modifications were m ""ey imder this DCN. It esas a -

paper change only.

~

509767 DO 92D06479 documented that velves 0-77-882C,1-77-860, and 2-77-860.This change uns Lleited to shouing nitrogen sigpty fleepeth volves are shoosi on flou diagram 1,2-47WB30-6 as "norestly cleoed." - as "nornetty open." This change reoutted in flou diagram.

Although flees prints are not respaired to identify specific opera-1 1,2-47tE50-6 (SAR Figure 11.2.2-5) depicting the narant "in service" tional volve elipunents, it is the usunt practice to identify the ' alignment of the nitrogen supply fiengeth. These volves are port of.-

nonmet "In service" allpuent for a given system. DCN S09767 the storage supply fleupoth and are nemetty open such that nitrogen revised 1,2-47WE30-6 to show these vetves as "norantly open.". This makeup occurs automaticetty upon teu preneure in the 2400 psi commen ,

change reeutts in a flees diagram 1,2-47We30-6 depicting the norumL = . sigpty header. The reeutting flees allyment is consistent with the "in service" nitrogen supply fleepeth. These velves are part of the SAR descriptiert of the nitrogen system. Other then showing volves ;

d' s

U

_ . . - _ ~ .- _ _ ~_. __ _ _ _ _ _ .= _ _

g- y

^

'~ #

. g_

, m  :

A-Page No. 31 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS -

- D -.

storage supply floegeth and are normally open such that nitrogen 0-77-882C, 1-77-860, and 2-77-860 as "norantly open," this change _-

makeup occurs automaticall, pon tou pressure in the 240 psi ccamen did not inwelidate or change any information contained in the SAR.- -

supply heeder. SAR Section 9.5.9.2 discusses the nitrogen system.

S10092 This DCN performed " documentation only" changes to various destyi The operation of the AFW system is not' adversely affected'br this

, irput and output documents to address changes in the AFW system's documentation change. This change did not involve or require a design basis flow requirements. Previously, the SAR and other physical or operational change to the AFW system of any other c design documents indicated that for the events editch lepose the most - system. The changes in the minlaus required AFW flow rates for the

! stringent flou dmoends on the AFW system, a totet of at least 440 various accident and single failure condiinations are within the gpa must be delivered within one minute to at toest two intact - capabilities of the current AFW system and are ensured by system _ .

(non-faulted) S/Gs. hysantly, it was determined that there are . surveittance testig. No neu event initiator has been created, nor events dich lanose additionet flow requirements on the AFW system. has any har & ere been changed. Att acceptance criteria for the SAR The non-LOCA events which assume minimism AFW flow rates are: Chapter 15 anstyees editch lepose minimus AFW flow repirements have (1)toas of normat feeduster, (2) toss of offsite pouer to the station been met by the revised flow rate regirements. The margin of-auxilleries, and (3)mejor rtpture of a main feceseter pipe. - safety as defined in the basis for any TS has not been redaced.

Additionally, the only LOCA anetysis which endets miniense AFW flous is the small break LOCA.

S10139 This DCN perfonned "h-ntation only" changes that were made to Westinghouse performed a safety ewelustion of the AFU system to calculations and setpoint seating h-nts. The changes were made consider the reeutta of the models they developed for the revloed as port of a resporee to 50910274PER and So930427PER. The PERs flourates. They determined that revisions to the surveltlance tests _'

identified discrepencies in the design criterie, SAR, and TSs'with were rewired to verify that the seAFws can provide 410 som and the regard to the AFW system. TOAFWP can provide 660 spa et 1100 pela. This is consistent with the licensing basis safety analysis..

S10263 This is a documentation only change to correct discrepencies between The discrepancies between design draulnes and the as-constructed design drawings and the as-constructed plant configuration which plant configuration addressed by this D01 were evetusted by Site were identified and ewelunted on Drawing Deviation 93DD6551. Engineering on Droming Deviation 9BD6851. This evaluation con-l Drawings (including SAR Figure 10.4.2.2, drawing 47W611-2-1) were cluded that the as-constructed configurations were correct and that revised to reflect the correct control circuit wiring for FCV-2-205, the subject drawings should be revised to reflect these 210, 211, and 216 (NFW pimp turbine condenser foolation volves). . configurations.. Other minor 6 aming errors were discovered daring ~

SAR Section 10.4.7.1.3 was revised to indicate that a trip of both this ewelustion and were also corrected by this change. Drawings NFW pimps will result in the automatic isolation of one NFW pielp were revloed to illustrate that foltoning a NFW pe p trip, the NFW -

, condenser, not both condensers as previously stated. The devjces pimp turbine condenser isolation vetwes for the en& Ject condenser affected by this change provide no safety-related fwiction and no will etcee automaticatty,' provided the other NFW pump is not physical changes to the facility resulted from this DCN. tripped. This logic will not allow both NFW pimp turbine cendensers to be automatically isolated and thus ensures the avellability of a condannate flow path following a trip of both NFW pimps. The plant was configured in this menner by L-DCR 1505; however, design

' drawings were not agidsted to reflect this change., The bests for :

this configuration is further en&stantiated by WestinWoouse letter no. TVA-87-864, dated 11/19,87 and ECM L6217. This change did not incresee the probability of an accident of motfunction of e pipment .

- important to safety, the possibility of an accident or motfunction -

of a different type, or reesce the margin of esfsty.

t d

i o __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ . - .. ., - - - . . - _ . _ . _ . - , . - - . ._ _ . - , , - -

. . _, . , 4

[

3 .

l

~

w _g '

F i ,.{

L.

s -?f Page No. 32 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - NODIFICATIONS

~

S10430 This DCN uns generated specificatty as a "doctmentation change only" This S-DCN addressed various documentetlen enty type changes +

DCN,-i.e. changes which do not ispect systee operation or design and identified by drawing deviations. The drawing discrepancies '

are ande to reflect the as-built plant configuration. The purpose ! included in the DCN include, but are not limited to, component -

of this DCN uns to incorporate valid discrepancies, identified' additions and deletions and configuration charges. . Att charges . _ 9; between actuel plant configuration and design output,'into their . performed try this S-DCN were timited to design output charges only. ~j ap'

copriate &cusantation. Drawing deviations p. E -" through . No physical modifications or etterations to any system were -

ttis oCN had no affect ors any system operational chorectoristics, . generated try this DCN. Where applicable, revious by the appropriate i methods for ensuring compliance with the TSs, or any procedures disciplines were used to determine that the changes made tur this DCN -

outlined, summarized or described in the SAR. Impact to the SAR uns did not impact system operation or integrity. There use no Uge. ,

!- in the form of draulne rotated changes to effected figures contained i

in the SAR. ~

t This activity removed erroneous vendor tabets from vendor draulnes This activity is a documentation only change that has no lapset on .

~

l 510746 ...

and correct minor discrepencies on the TV4 schematic draulnes, egalpment operation. The daa==rstetten changes are minor in nature

! These changes do not lopect any processes addressed in the SAR. The and consist of deleting or correcting errors. There is no adverse l revisions made to SAR figure 8.3.2-7, schematic drawing 45N763-3, do lepect on nucteer eefety. There is no Use.- -

l not impact circuit operation or component function. _

=t.

i 510769 This DCN uns generated specifically as a " documentation change only* This S-DCN addresses various documentation enty changes identified . -

j DCN; however, it provides infonsation on the operation and function try DD. All changes performed tpy this 5-DCN are limited to desip 4 of the AFFF Foam Generator Injection System in the Security Back g output changes only. No physical modifications or etterations to

• Power Building. This DCN makes changes to reflect the as-built any systems will be generated tur this DCN. Changing the SAR Figure ~ ~

plant configuration. The purpose of this DCM is to incorporate 9.5.1-11 to reflect the AFFF Foam Generator Injection System in the vetid discrepancies, identified between actunt plant configuration Security Beck, Pouer Building does not lopect the abitity of the and design output, into appropriate daa==ntation. . DDs p. - . ___' NPFP system to perform any primary or escendary safety function.

through this DCW ullt have no effect on any systems operational This change is not covered tpy any TS, and the mergin or eefety as e characteristics, methods for ensuring compliance with the TSs, or described in the TSs is not effected. There is no Uge.

any procedures outlined, summarized or described in the SAR. This DCN provides diagramentic Information about the AFFF Foam Generator. '

i Injection System in the Security Backup power guilding. Iapect to the SAR is in the. form of drawing-related changes to effected SAR - t j Figure 9.5.1-11.

$10820 .The change made under this DCN Inwotwed revising Detail A26 op CCD Bened on the engineering equivalency evolustien performed, the cable i

No. 2,1-45W800-26 attouing containment cable tray penetrations to be tror penetration systems will perform their intended desim function - '

configured with or without troy covers outside the secondary ' of preventing fire from apreadire to any eroe outside the lamediate .

containment horrier, The covers are sheetmetet pieces that are fire aree. Therefore, the instettetten of the cobte tray covers has configured to cover the cables and the flammastic typicetty . _ been determined to provide negligitate benefit in the event of a fire instetted in cable troy penetrations. - The detetten of the covers is that unutd Jesperdize the integrity of the barrier reting. - An SE allowed based on the requirement outlined in NRC Generic Letter. 'uns regstred since the change effected SAR Figure 6.2.1-3 that is 86-10 whicta ellous an equivalency evetuation to be perfonsed. This :not part of the TVR drawing system, even thouWe it is bened on CCD DCN did not effect the requirements for cable troy covers inside the No.1,2-47 WOOD-26. No SAR tout uns effected try this change. :There :

secondary conteirusent. uns no Uge.

4 g m-- _ us- ,

.,T- v1'-W--ieT'e*m W wyWuw-9 mura-rr'--seerwe Mw'-em v4we wr w w'1warg.---. y gg m+m*-cy-. h.e ww nw w e aw .it a a, ,,,,_ aw h wey--e iewWvue swWE. --tbe- + w-'re w e erer-h ww+- e- m_ a-Ak ' -

_ _ - __ _ _ . .- . . .<. ~

e Y 2

• l Page No. 33 CNANGES IN THE FACILITY n 'norch13,1995[ c

j. Tele'ORARY IERIFICATIONS

!. O TACF DESCRIPTION SAFETY StegulRY

0-93-0068-025 This SA/SE uns written to sLgport the TACF to provide the This TACF does not incrosse the probability of an accident or proper h - ntation to justify the existence of two ANUS' the probability of occurrence of a malfmetion of egalpment..

connected to NPFP/RSW connections 0-vLV-025-576 and 0-vLv-025- feportant to safety or the consegsonces of an accident or_'

577. The TACF uns necessary as a result of a corrective- notfunction of egalpment previously sweluoted in the SAR. i It .

action to So930733PER. This PER uns written as a result of a does not create the possibility for en accident of a different generic review of gFPER930133. Water being draun off of the type or create a possibility for a malf metion of a different RSW systemiis etso a toed off of the NPFP system since both type then any previously Ct sted in the SAR. This change systems are interconnected. Surveillance Instruction 0 does not reesce the ur gin of safety as defined in the bests SFT-026-002.0 regaires and tests the NPFP system for a maximme for any TS.- The chere does not reesce nuclear safety and RSW toed as 967 spa. If the RSW toads exceed this tested does not involve a UgG. '

amoimt, the ability of the NPFP system to provide the regstred amount of unter to preveit the spread of a fire may be jeopardized. Providing YACFs for RSW connections dich are a continuous toed on the NPFP/RSW provides assurance that time - i

maximme RSW load will not be exceeded. The SE uns written i because the TACF affects SAR Figure 9.5.1-3. This TACF does not effect the safety-related function of the NPFP systemt of providing AFW to the steen generators daring flood mode.

i 0-94-0038-032 This TACF uns written to connect a ad stitute compressor with This TACF temporarily replaced permanent nonsafety-related - ,

e total capacity of 1750 SCFM es a replacement for permanent SCSA air compressors with a nonsofety-reteted air compressor.

j air compressors C and either A, 8, or 0 that normally sigply The only portion of this TACF that effectui eny safety-related -

the SCSA system.- Each permanent compressor is rated et 610 portions of enr plant systems uns the connection of the -

SCFM each, d ich totels 1220 SCFM. The additional compressor temporary air cogressor providing the normat sigply to the ,

i supplies a part of plant toads white permanent plant compres- safety-related ACA cogenents. The permanent plant check sors are out of service. The SCSA system is common for both volves that prevent backflew from the ACA to the SCSA remained 1 Seu Units 1 and 2 and is not safety rotated. The two trains ' in piece. The permanent plant afterfitters and dryers thet -

of ACA system are safety rotated. The ACA air requirements process the SCSA air before its use by the ACA system remained are engptied frem the nonsafety-related SCSA compressors in place. The perennent plant instrtementation that monitors during normat operation through the control air system. The- the SCSA elr for preneure, moisture, etc. before its use by :

two trained ACA compressors provide a rededent backip sigply . the ACA system remained in ptoce. The TACF did not prevent c of air sufficient to safety shutdoun both mits of the plant the ACA, especially the ACA compressors, from providing the in the event of an accident. The temporary compressor air regstred for safe plant shutdem. .The ACA system is provides a portion of this normet nonsafety-related sigply to trained such that either ACA compremoor ullt provide suff t-the Auxiliary Control Air sistem daring the period this TACF cient air to shutdem either or both mits in the event of an is installed. The tuo rededent ACA air cogressors will be' emergency or other transient. The backup method of providing

• maintained oweitable for operation to provide the safety- . temporary air by manuel centrol of the permanent plant -

related air engply required for safe shutdeun of the plant. compressors did not prevent the proper operation of any other i The permanent ACA after filters and air dryers mitt continue- plant system from performing a regstred safety function. Any ,

to be in service to maintain air quality for the ACA. A- failure of this backap controt usutd be no worse then the

safety evetustion uns required because the TACF temporarily . failure of the temporary air compreaeors. The leptementation

• changes the bCSA system description given in SAR Section of this TACF did not incrosse the probability.or consegsonces a 9.3.1. The connections to be made require temporary Fred of an accident or unifmetion of egsipment Igortant to safety line a) changes to Tvn drawings 1,2-47W866 dich is SAR Figure - that has been previously evolueted in the SAR. Atse, the- ,

9.311-5 and TWA drawing 1,2-47WB32-1 d ich is SAR Figure leptementation of this TACF did not incrosse the possibilityf .

_ _ _ , _ = - - -,--s- . - ,, emr=- -,y < - - ,-u~~w~e** ,e -- - , , - - +r.~w ,ws- 'm--3-m- - - - r n--w.- ,-e, w,*,e-,- - , . . - - < - - - ,.w , - 3-, w e v, -+ -. ,-~w#

w l -

l Page No. 34 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - Iterch.13, 1995 *:

j TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS I

l 9.5.1-12. of an occident or malfssiction different than any previounty .

l evolunted in the SAR. Therefore, this TACF did not reduce the I plant margin of safety as defined in the beels of any TS.

2-94-0004-068 This condition dealt with the inoperability of RCP motor No. 3 This conditlan did not create a Ugo and uns esfe from a WR C207857 upper thrust bearing temperature indication. To eliminate the nucleer safety stan$oint. This condition dealt with tempere- -

nuis.ance storm presented by this condition, a TACF uns written ture indication of the typer thrust bearing. ~ A toss of the to remove the storm setpoint for RCP motor No. 3 typer thrust thrtast bearing would create a loss of that RCP motor, thus is -

bearing RTD. This uns done by removing the setpoint of P250 bounded by the estating anstysis for the condition II event couruter point 2T0454A. SAR Section 5.6 states that the teper editch addresses the toss of a RCP. Therefore, this condition-

, thrtst bearing is equipped with a RTO that provides a signal . did not create the possibility of an occident of a different l for a high temperature stars and indication. SAR Figure 5.1.4 type than previously evolunted in the SAR. .The RCP motor is also lists the RTD and its associated P250 computer point. not rewired for the RCS pressure seets as with the ;nsp This temporary change ispects the SAR by remeving the alare itself. The RCP motor is not eefety rotated and not rewired ;

from limit checking. to mitigste any Chapter 15 event. No new radiation release-j paths were created by this condition, and the occurrence of a

release path uns not be created due to any malfunction.

l - Mence, the coneogences of a malftsiction of equipment uns not  ;

increased. This condition did not atter any safety system -

functions required to mitigste en abnormal situation or event

. and, therefore, did not change any margin of safety defined in i the bests of the TS. I 2-94-0014-068 This condition dealt with the Inoperability of RCP motor #1 A This condition did not create a Ugo and uns safe from a phase stator winding temperature indication. .To eliminate the nucteer stan $oint. This condition dealt with temperature ruisance alarm presented by this condition, a TACF uns written indication of the A phase stator minding. Two felture modes to remove the associated P250 point from sc;nn. This uns done. entst for the RCP motor RTDs. The RfD can fell open, in edlich by removing from scan the P250 computer pol it 2T0409A and case no reading is ovellable to the plant process computer, or _ '

ertering an arbitrary value of 10 degrees F. SAR section 5.6 the RTD can fait shorted and create circulating currents. The states that the A phase stator winding is equipped with a . RTD will not usually fail in e shorted condition, but should resistance temperature detector that provides a signet for a this type of failure occur, insufficient energy exists in the 4 high temperature atorm and indication. SAs figure 5.1.2 also circuits to damage the contelrment electricot penetration, ifsts the resistance temperature detector end its associated . motor or the pump. The RfDs do not protect the motor but ..

P250 computer point. This temporary changs lopects the SAR by provide monitoring information such that operator action can runoving the point from scan. be undertaken before overcurrent roter initiation or to reestablish cooling unter to the motor. No credible failure of the RTD will cause the RCP to fall to perform its intended 4

function. Mence, there exist no fatture modes that could impact nucteer safety. In addition, a failure mode created by .;

no temperature indication of the stator RTDs could be a RCP.- '

motor failure as a result of excessive winding temperature. A condition II event addresses the toes of a RCP and a previous SE performed for RCP 85 upper thrust bearing utillaes this analogy for the toes of a RCP.. It is still appropriate to

'saintain this analogy since the stator winding RfD effects -

only this RCP motor and since the motor is monitored with two

- other stator minding RTDs and either uould sense a temperature rise in A phase stator minding. Nence, concepences of a 1

i k

1

, -n, , .-, ,,n - , , - ,, , - - , , ~ . , . - --. , . - -- . , , . ,n . . . , - - - - - - - , - , ,

- n.

. - 5 ?--

t Page No. 35 CNANGES IN THE FACILITY -:

Iterch 13,-1995 -

TBIPORARY IqODIFICATIONS malfm etion of equipment were not increased. This conditioni did not alter any safety system fa ctions re pired to mitigste-an abnornet situation or event and therefore did not change - -

, any margin of safety defined in the bests of the.TS.-

2-94-0060-067 Additionet cooling capacity uns rewired during the Ur:lt 2 . This TACF provided additionet containment cooling capability Cycle 6 refueling outage to reduce the temperature inside during peodes 5 and 6. The systems affected by this activity, i contairusent to attou outage work to be performed. The LCCs are not required to be operable sharing stodos 5 and 6, except; l cooling unter is normally espplied by EBCW uhich charing the .

for conteirusent isolation capabilities of penetration X-139 outage uns between 70 and 85 degrees F. At this stypty - charing fuel handling activities or midtoop activities. Appro- a temperature, an adequate working envircrement could not be priate measures were established to ensure conteirusent intes-maintained. Increased cooling capacity uss accomplished by rity and isolation were maintained sharing core etterations and supplying chilled unter to one of the two cooling colts of the midloop activities. System specifications ensured tuo permanent plant LCC 23 or 2C using a temporary system of overpressurization of permanent ERCW piping and wolves and

! unter chitter packages, vatwes, and hoses connected to the LCC temporary equipment did not occur.' The ERCN system uns ERCW supply and return piping and using the LCC fans to _

realigned and restored before entering Itode 4. The centein--

I circulate containannt air as it posses over the colt struc- ment penetration uns 10 CFR 50 Appendix J tested and doctored l ture. The cooling colts for LCC 23 or 2C had maintenance work operable before entering pende 4. AsetE boundary penetration .

! performed on them charirg the outage; therefore, temporary breeches and repairs were handled in accordance with plant .

l cooling uns provided by one or the other depending on : procedures and were restored before entering Itode 4. There-I evettability. This TACF covered the instettetten and opere- was no reduction in the margin of aefety. There uma no Uge.

tion of the chillers and routing of the hoses. The temporary chilled unter system uns only in place during peodes 5 and 6.

2-96-0062-024 This TACF instetted a temporary 7.5 ton air conditioning mit. This TACF does not inwelve any safety-related or TS epipment in the additionet equipsont building to assist in maintaining - or system. The instaltetten of the temporary air canditioning .

the temperature dite the permanent mits are repelred. mit is controtted eder SgP-12.7, " Temporary Equipment Con-Cooling unter from this temporary mit is obtelned from the trol," dich ensures that it cannot demoge other espalpment .

raw cooling unter system, d ich ispects SAR Figure 9.2.7-4. rewired for safety charing a solemic event. The instelletten - .

of this temporary unit does not hinder any espalpment free .

performing its accident mitigation functions. .There is no adverse lepect to the margin of eefety.

s

, s.

5 T.

'pwe' y y ei+eM 9=+% g- My T g I'TW-*w-4--e-"- e- J 'T'--0*

• to 44# E Pw*T'+- % 4 -W -d"- d TP 'vs *T+ e%"'-- **-We-*W=6 *i.eer

..i m e 44 48er aF-'e/r* 7--he PMa m - 4em4- '

dan-- 'W-_.n-mee

, ~ ,

< ~

. u

. e Page No. 36 CHANGES TO PROCEDURES AS DESCRIgED III TIIE SAR -*

PROCEDURE DESCRIPTICII SAFETY SlegtARY '

0-SO-62.4 Holdap Tank Operation This change effected the Sell SAR or.ly with respect to the descrip-

, Rev 3 Normal operation of the BAE packages effect reclamation of tions of the radueste and CVCS (to incorporate the option of pro-borated water from NUTS A and B to prodsce concentrated boric cessing IIUT water via the redenste system) and the radioactive acid for transfer to the boric acid storage tanks and distillate liquid effluent discharge information presented in section 11.2.

which is fed to the primary water storage tanks or the monitor Although changed, the liquid effluent discharge information pres .

tank. 0-S0-62.4 describes the operation of the HUTS including ented in the SAR is still within existing reteese limits as docu--

recirculation through the BAE feed ion exchangers via the gas mented by enetyees revised in support of this change. The change stripper feed pumps, transfer between tanks, and recirculation did not affect or modify any accident analysis, TS mergin of safety, through the HUT recirculation pimp. As a result of operationet safety function, or equipment or system important to safety, as -

dif ficulty and taireliability of the SAEs, in addition to the cost described in the SAR. .This change did not involve a USG.

of operation and intensive maintenance required to maintain oper-abitity, It is advantageous to have the capabitIty of processing NUT water through the radenste system for reteese rather then for recovery via the SAEs. This change in the procedure allows transfer of HUT water to the FDCT or TDCT for processing as red-weete.

0-TI-SMX-000- greeching the Shield Building ASSCE or control Room Botsideries - The performance of 0-ft-SMX-000-016.0 for installation of open 016.0 Units 0, 1 and 2 . penetrations through the ahleid building wolt between the MSCE and -

Rev 1 This SA/SE supports the laptementation of procedure 0-TI 000- the annulus does not cause an incrossed potential ~of ro.ifoectivity' 016.0. This SA/SE allowed breeching of the shield building to be reteeced into the environs provided the opening is less then betweert the annulus and regions inside the anatillery building - or equot to an " effective" egaivelent penetration of 4.5 inches. :

that are part of the ASSCE. - Chapter 15 of the SAR =am-s a Therefore, laptementation of this , +--f_ s does not create now design annutus inleekage of 500 cfs. SgN-65-0053/EP98-BVS-030190 failure modes as long as the guidelines of this SE are followed.

Rev 5, "plextesse Allowebte Note Diameter Between Annulus and A8SCE," 2n " effective" open penetration of 4.5 inches or less will not cause an inleekage into the annutus of greeter than 500 cfm. Therefore, the LOCA anetysis as described in the SAR is not affected. Also, no flow will exist into the ABSCE from the new penetration since the amulus is at a lower pressure than the

, ASSCE. As a result, no dea reported in Chapter 15 of the SAR is adversely impacted.

0-VI-MXX-068- Vendor Refueling Instruction l The SECL demonstrates that if the ftstetional requirements are met, 003.0 This SA/SE was written for the addition of the Westinghouse ~ the use of the doible stud tensioner system will result in proper procedare STD-0P-1996-6926 to TVA procedure 0-VI-IstX-068-003.0 reactor vesset_ integrity. ~

and for SAR change. The Westinghouse procedure provides instructions for the operation of the double stud tensioner system and its accespanying heed hoist system at Sequoyah during tensioning and detensioning of the reactor vessel heed botting.

The procedure covers the proper segaence of events for the site

- checkout, instattation, operation, and removet of these systems.

Westinghouse SECL-93-050 assesses the use of the doible stud P w +w=_-W+wr + e O-~e- e se wr vidge evo-b- ww e+ ww a we e-- _ =*-mwma a- -We e-*w-' w ee,r-+"FWv e --ei *-# m3-'+-'tiv-%**ere W t ?*ee W w- 4 '* "%' e a W fD -

_& 7

O. '

Page No. 37 CMANGES TO PROCEDURES AS DESCRIBED IN THE SAR tensioner system to ensure the tool will adequately tension the studs, resulting in a proper seat of the reactor vesset, and will not result in damage to the RV head or studs.

1-PI-SFT-070- Conconent Cooling System Unit 1 A-Train Flow Balance This procedure change did not impact any SAR text, figure, table or 139.0 This change involved steps to isolate or re & ce the ERCW to the proce&re. The isolation of the ERCW from the Unit 1 A-train CCS Rev 1 Unit 1 A-train CCS heat exchangers in order to increase the CCS heat exchangers white the unit is in Mode 5 will cause the CCS to bulk tenperature greater than 70 degrees F charing periods of low heat up and the SFP to heat up if it is aligned tt Unit 1 (it any be river water temperature white performing the CCS flow balance. aligned to Unit 2). This activity and its affect on both tsilts and Low ERCW temperature and thus, low CCS temperature, are also all associated equipment were evaluated as well as the DBAs and influenced by the minimet heat load in Mode 5. During testing, credible failure modes as they relate to this activity. The it is necessary to fail open the outlet valve on the CCS side of affected systems' ability to mitigate an accident was not signiff .

the letdown heat exchanger in order to perform the flow belance. cantly affected by this activity. No equipment was adversely When the CCS tenperature is below 70 degrees F with the unit in af fected by isolating ERCW to the Unit 1 A-train CCS heat exchangers Mme 5, the opening of this valve could cause unnecessary cooling and the plant still operates within the botsida of the TSs.

of the letdown flow and VCT and ultimately the RCS. Low letdown Therefore, a USC does not exist.

and VCT temperatures may af fect the charging puip's mortensitic shaft, so new precautions during flow belancing are prudent.

1-50-14-1 Condensate Domineralizer Polishing System Manuelty isolating 1-FCV-14-3 under the system configuration and Rev 3 The discussion and procedural steps for 1-FCV-14-3 were removed operation of heater drain system leproved nuclear safety by from body of instruction and remain on valve checklist 1-14-1.02 minimizing plant transients as a result of flow swings in

. (1-50-14-1 Att 2, page 14 of 15) as identified in the closed condensate.

position only. Manual isolat*on valves for 1-FCV-14-3 (1-14-548/1-14-549) have been changed from the open position to the closed position on valve checklist 1-14-1.02. This disabled the ability to cause condensate swings as a result of quick opening / closing capabilities of 1-FCV-14-3. Manuet isolation of 1-FCV-14-3 improves nuclear safety because of the reduction of plant (potentist) transients generated from condensate flow swings as a result of 1-PDT-14-204 exceeding 60 psi and valve 1-FCV-14-3 opening within four (4) seconds and starting to close as soon as 1-PDT-14-204 Indicating a Delta P (i.e. DP) on condensate demjneralizer system control penet is required with . .

1-FCV-14-3 manually isolated. The SAR was lupacted because the plant will be operating differently than is addressed in section 10.4.6. This change was necessary because of recent changes to 1-FCV-14-3 increasing the potential for flow transients. Operat-ing with 1-FCV-14-3 (as configured) in closed and isolated condition improves the present operation and does not degrade the -

SAR evaluation for condensate domineralizer system operation.

2-$0-14-1 Condensate Demineralizer Polishing System Manuelty isolating 2-FCV-14-3 under the system configuration and Rev 3 The discussion and procedural steps for 2-FCV-14-3 were removed operation of heater drain system improved nuclear safety by from body of instruction and remain on valve checklist 2-14-1.02 minimizing plant transients as a result of flow swings in (2-50-14-1 Att 2, page 14 of 15) as identified in the closed condensate.

position only. Manuel isolation valves for 2-FCV-14-3 (2-14-548/2-14-549) have been changed from the open position to the closed position on valve checklist 2-14-1.02. This disabled l

,_ , , .. ~_ _ -. ._. . . _ . . - __ ______.___ _ _ _

+y-s- -.

+

= N- E _' ._ > f .,

s

~- Q. ~

tC- - l_$7 # l, ;-

~

., _ . , - . m:

Page No. 38 CHANGES TO PROCEDURES AS DESCRIGED IN TK SAR the ability to cause condensate swings as a result of gaick '

opening /ctosing capabilities of 2-FCV-14-3. m nust isolation of ~ .

2-FCV-14-3 improves nuclear safety because of the redaction of plant (potentiet) transients generated from condensate flow swings as a result of 2-PDT-14-204 exceedins 60 poi and valve' 2-FCV-14-3 opening within four (4) seconds and starting to close as soon as 2-POT-14-204 Indicating a Detta P (i.e. DP) on i

condensate domineralizer systes control penet is regaired with 2-FCV-14-3 manuelty isolated. The SAR was impacted because the .

plant will be operating differently than is addressed in section 10.4.6. This change was necessary because of recent changes to .

2-FCV-14-3 increasing the potential for flow transients. Operat- -

~

Ins with 2-FCV-14-3 (as configured) in closed and isolated condition taproves the present operation and does not degrade the SMt evaluation for condensate domineralizer system operation.

~

i i

b 1

i 1

M 1_ _ r -EW m- e- w- T em esuer - e+-N#* 'kaf60--umt1am e ma >eite<w.ful ir m eti t--MNy 1 m 4 **m T W

• T M'- '7 9ft * -a dM vi *F-

m , .. . , . . .~ , , . _ _ s ,

5hp

~

_ y .l

. , 5. - ,

~

+

v.' -

.l ,

j

~

• Page No. 39 OTHER 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS -

PROCEDURE /R DESCRIPTION 5AFETY StsetARY '

EVISION ~

i - .

CCDCR-55 Core Component Change Request 55 . A Reloed Safety Evetuation for Unit 2 Cycle 7 eperation with futt &

This SA/SE considers changes to the VANTAGE SM fuel assembly and its with these changes was performed by Westinghouse. This evoluetten inserts dich consist of rotated grids, a change in the positioning <. showed that att design criterie are met efter the changes were made.'

of the engraving of the essembly 10 on the top nozzle spring clamp,. These changes do not effect the function of equipment important to :

fust rod repositioning, an extended burnup botton grid with a - safety or the margin of safety in the basis of any TS. The. ~

stronger spring, and a reduction in wet annuter burnable absorber Westinghouse Retoed Safety Evolustion and the discussion given in "

length from 134 to 132 inches. The tent and figures in Chapter 4'of the ensumery confirm that the conclusions of the SAR accident the SAR that describe the wet annuter burnable absorbers required- analyses remain velid after. these changes were mode.

revision to reflect the modified configuration.

Westinghouse test loop date indicates that the flow vibration can be '

damped by rotating every other mixing vene grid 90 degrees clockwise (as viewed from the bottom). The top and botton grids are not mixing vene grido, so the third, fif th and seventh grids from the bottom were rotated 90 degrees.

Westinghouse is standardizing the manufacture of att fuel =====hties so that the bottom of the fuel is the same distance from the bottom =

of the bottom nozzle. This results in the distance from the top of the bottom nozzle to the bottom of the fuel rod and plus being changed from 1.100 inches in the previous botch of VANTAGE 5N fuel assembtles to 0.465 inches.

PER 0-TI- SPECIAL REQUIREIEENT: " Direct and constant noens of comunanication The conseguances of an accident will not 'enceed regulatory limits SXX must be maintained between the eres being breeched in excess of the provided the special respairements and requirements of the TI are.- -

-000-016. 0 50.5 scpaere inches in the control room, i.e. a watch at the : .

maintained. The breech will be acceptable from a nutteer safety'

• REV 5 penetration and a signet men for the control room. Upon receipt of sten $oint.

, an Agl, an operator in the IECR will lamediately notify the signal men, who will close or seet off the penetration with a minianan j 3/8-inch steel ptete or plus within 18 minutes." Revision 1 of this -

SA/SE ettowed any WRs, DCN, and igts that require a breech to the -

i AgSCE to be performed during Unit 2 Cycle 6 outage provided the .

f , speclet requirement d ueribed at m is laplemented for each Individ-' .

I j uel breech. The difference between revision 0 and revision 1 is '

that revision 0 permitted a breech only on a case by case basis.

, After completion of the instettation and routing of the cables,

[ hoses, etc. throusia e penetration, the penetration will be reseeled

! In accordance with itRAI 13.1 with a miniana of 12 inches of RTV foam -

l dich will reestablish the penetration meet. A 3/8-inch minimas t steet ptete may be fabricated and securely mounted (minianan 4 botts -

! or 4 cleaps espaally spaced) to any breech with or without holes to -

accept the temporary cables, hoses, etc., or plus to provide ,

l penetration seating to rechace the breech area below the 0-TI-SMX- s 000-016.0 timits for ASSCE boundary breech. The applicable portions y j of any teelt and this SA/SE will be in effect any time the  ;

. penetration is breeched. Upon completion of att outage worlt _ ..  ?

- respaired through this penetration, the cables, hoses, etc. shell be - 1 5

l I

?

^

l I

^ ^ '

2 "= ~

y

'~^

}

~ ' '

1 '+a J'd-

' K_9' '

i

~;.,- -

Page No. 40 OTHER 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS _

~}~

4 removed and the penetration witt be reseeted to n6Mnet confleura -

tien in accordance with the penetration drawings. Chaptee 15.5,

page 15.5-7 mentioned the inittet deley of 4 minutes to establish

' the AgSCE and 1 minute to drau doun the ASSCE to nogettwe 1/4-inch W.G. The referenced calculation attous a deviation of the initial ~

delay of more then 4 minutes from the SAR.

i SAR Calculation SONAPST-010 Rev 3 The design basis for the hydrogen recombiner system is to ensure Change The post-LOCA containment hydrogen concentration anetysis documented that the post-LOCA hydrogen concentration remains below the louer -

i in SeuAPS7-010 includes a quantity of additional aluminum and zinc flasmebility of 4 volume percent hydrogen, with one hydrogen inventory added as a contingency for design modifications or other recombiner begirming operation at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> post-LOCA. ~ The hydrogen changes which may ter.act the tight metals Irwentory inside contain- generation anetysis uns revised to incorporate the current-light ment. Whenever the contingency quantity is used w by changes, metals inventory of alueiruse and zine tocated inside primary SQEP-133 requires a revision to the analysis and tydete of the SAR. ' conteirument. This reonelysis uns a plarvied gdete editch is made Routing additions to the Irwentory as documented by thJ SEOP-133 eenever the Irwentory of light metals is incrossed by 10 percent.

! process and PER 50960227 are the reeson for this update to the - The irwentory program is corstrotted under procedure SQEP-133. The -

! hydrogen analysis and the SAR. The additionet quantity of alueiruse anetysis, revised to incorporate the most current Light metals and zine have reduced the available alueiruse Irwentory contingency Irwentoryi h==sts that the hydrogen volume percent inside-added for eersin; therefore, SenAPS7-010 uns revised to reenelyze 'contairement never exceeds 2.6 percent with one recombiner begirviins

! the post-LOCA hydrogen concentration insido containment. As a operation at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> post-LOCA.

result of the reenelysis, a new hydrogen a ncentration vs time profile uns established and uns incorporated in the SGN SAR by revision to Figures 6.2.5-1, 15.4.1-96, 97, and 98.

SAR Appendix 6.8C and 6.B The change in the test fregaency for FCV-62-72, 73, 74, and 7T from Change This evetustion h==sted the change to Appendix 6.gC and 6.9 of cpaarterly to cold shutdoun is acceptable fens a nucteer safety the SAR uhich are port of the ASME Section XI Velve Testing Program. stan$oint. The change was alloued by the applicable codes of As a reeutt of problems oncessitered with 62-662 (tetdoun retlef record for ASME Section XI velve testing.

l velve) spuriously relieving ideen stroke testing is performed on FCV-62-72, 73, 74, and 77, the test fregaancy for these four volves -

was changed from quarterly to cold shutdoun as allound by the applicable code of record for the volves for the indivichael units. -

. SAR Section 3.2 . This change uns acceptable since it only clarified the differences

Change This change to Section 3.2 of the SAR d = ==sted the differences between the ASME Section XI botsideries and the design botsideries, between the ASIE Section XI boundaries and the design botsideries.

Nuclear Engineering calculation SON-50TP-001 Justified those differ-i ences. The differences between the design botsideries and the ASIE Section XI botsiderles are a result of the use of both the AIIS 1 N18.2-August 1970 draf t and Amt M18.2-1973 for design safety classifications and the use of Regulatory Guide 1.26 for the originet ASIE Section XI boundaries, recpectively. ,

SAR Section 7.3.2.2.5 The ESF actuation system espalpment is being testing to verify the Change This change to the SAR removed the wording about online testing ocysipment ullt be able to perfone the intended fisictions. Online using the safeguards test cabinet. Corrective Action Report- testing is done on each train en a staggered basis of 62 days. This-SeP980605PER use written because of a conflict between the SAR and. test of att the ESF process and logic circuits includes a contifusity the TS documents. Section 7.3.2.2.5 of the SAR described online - test of the slave releys. Alsof entine testing operates the testing of the ESF octuation system equipment. : The section . testebte actuation devices frem the centrol room. Duriftg plant

- . - . - . - . . . , . - . . , _ . - - --- . - .. --. - - - -. - - - - . . ~ . - - .~ .. -. .. - ....,--.... _ - ---- - - ~ _ . .

m -

e-

' ' " ' ' 7 ^

1 3 ,

i

• 5

.. . W

-=- -

~a Page No. 41 OTHER 50.59 SAFETY EVALUAt!ONS I' contained a detailed description of the safeguards test cabinet shutdoun, the testirg operates steve relays and finst actuation entine testing process. - The TS does not respaire the use of the. devices. In addition to the above testing, other tests such as - -s safeguards test cabinet. response time testing verffles the operability of the ESF actuation system esp;1pment. The docessentation change does not increase the

. prohobility of an accident or motf e ction of equipment. The testing being done checks the espalpment. There is no incrosse in the ' ,

. consespaences of an accident or motfmetion as there is no change to-the espaipment. .The h-itation change does not creete a .

possibility for an accident or malfisiction w = = there uns no .

change to the ecysipment and testing is being done. -

SAR Change SOM0562PER uns written to doctament apparent discrepancies between It has been shoun that the as-configured detection / suppression is section SAR Section 9.5.1.1.g., documents referenced in SAR Section 9.5.1.3, ecceptable for the espsipment protected and is an operable system.

9.5.1 TS 3.7.11.2.c., NFPA 13, and the Sequoyah Fire Nezards Anotysis It has been demonstrated that there is no heels for a conclusion Calculation SON-26-0054/ EPM-Agg-Igg 4NA. One of the documents that this involves an unrevisued safety spsestion. This change does referenced in SAR Section 9.5.1.3 is the October 23, 1979 tetter not adversety effect any safety limits, settings, or timiting >

from L. 4. Mills to L. S. Rubenstein. The letter encloses Revision -- conditions of operation. -

4 of TVA's response to the NRC ASg fire protection revleu questions -

for Sequoyeh Nucteer Plant. In the response, the controt building corridor 669.0-C11 is listed in Table 1-1 as being protected by a "preaction sprinkler system." This in an error in Table 1-1.

Because the referenced document in the SAR is a memorandise, the h -rit itself cannot be revised to correct this error. The request for SAR change adds a note to Section 9.5.1.3 stating that information contained in these references may not reflect the '

as-configured condition of the plant._ A review of design output documentation confirms that Zone 48 and 49 d wtors for the corridor are not configured to provide for an. ometic actuation of flow control vetves 0-FCV-26-203 and 0-FCV-26-207 iditch supply unter to the sprinkler heads in the corridor. These tuo FCVs also provide unter for other designated rooms on 669.0. Given the very Lou fire

toed, lack of ignition sources, and tack of fire spreed, there is no reasonable possibility of a fire that could damage any equipment

. (conchaf t or cables) important to the safety of the plant.- It is - .

very likely that the fire brigade member responding to an eterm would use a portable extinguisher or hooe station to entinguish a fire before manuelty actuating the FCVs. - a=== of the very tou fire toed, a significant possibility exists that spri.Aler heads .

would not fuse before self-extinguishment or extinguishment by other -

means. For the reasons stated above, the "manuel" actuation of the' FCVs is acceptable for the heaerds they protect._ The roepsest for .

SAR change adds a statement to SAR Section 9.5.1.1.g. iditch provides for actuation of menues actuation of control vetves where required.

It has been demonstrated that the safety-related cables contained in conchait would not be effected by the very tou fire toed in the corridor and that the as-configured corridor sappression system is- _.

operable bened on fast fire brigade response and the ability to a manually activate the FCVs. For the reesars stated above,' the-system is acceptable and there are no changes required to the TS.

_m =*.w-=D- + ep 77 4 '

e e '-

W 449'-4 "I'9P" M '*4ktde =-eM-*W' T-9'we-1" paw 4 e W-V--# $mu'M8P'l N*W w1-wr'-+e'+'*Nra'- W -W & &- v'e-W'nm<w-F- 't-- h- P  %  :*u et W- 'e *"@M'MP4:- W We' M e+'9+ - -'=*i ah-- Ta = waW

i CL .n, 1 ~~ :

~n 1 - ~' a 3: '{

3' -

} .

g.

ls Page No. 42 OTHER.50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS 4

SAR Sec- This SA/SE uns written to revise the SAR Sections 9.2.2, " Essential These changes were made to bring the SAR into aeroenent with current ;

tions Rau Cooling Water," and 9.2.5, " Ultimate Meet Sink." The changes operating practice, design bases, system configuration, etc. There i 9.2.2 and deleted the description and SE for " Prior to Unit 2 Operation," are no accidents in Chapter 15 associated with toes or other .

i 9.2.5 corrected listing of components served by the various tralas, made motfunction of the ERCW system or ultimate heet sink. . The analysis '

miscellaneous minor changes to correct the system description, for equipment malfssictions t is gdeted as part of this change, but -

clarified / corrected statements regarding single failures, deleted the changes only describe the system configurations. None of the.

i incorrect information regarding system flow rates, g deted and changes involved a change of probability of any failure currently' corrected information regarding instrumentation and controls, cor- evetuated; for example, deleting reference to AERCW ptmps could not

' rected statements on backueshing and inspections, and clarified the change the probability of failure of one of the ERCU pumps. None of-

~

. statements in the SE regarding effects of single faltures on both the accidents evolunted in the SAR. involve a toss of ERCW or

! units. ultimate heet sink other than through the single failure criteria.

! The revised SAR wording in this change did not' affect single failure

! criteria used in the accident analysis, nor is any equipment lost in a single failure other than that the previous evaluation included.

There vos no reduction in the margin of safety. There was no USD.

SAR Section This SA/SE ues for changes to Section 8.3.2.1.2 of the SAR tAlch The evolunted activity did not make changes to any plant equipment,

! 8.3.2.1.2 describes Sequoyah's nonsafety-related de power systems. The or system. The SAR uns revised to more accurately and adequately changes were necessary to provide a more accurate and adequate describe Sou's nonsafety-related de pouer system. Att changes are-description of nonsafety-related de power systems. The entsting in agreement with other sections of the SAR. Thus, no Uge is description was inaccurate and in some cases inodoquete. The SAR as involved.

It existed talked about a 48-volt de telephone and anntsiciator pouer supply and a seperate 48-volt bettery system. In actuality, there is only one 48-volt de power system consisting of a 48-volt telephone bettery and a 48-volt plant bettery. No enrumelation system is powered by Sequoyoh's 48-volt bettery system, and the identified bettery toeds are not correct. Also, additionet information uns added to leprove the description of our 250-volt de power system. Att changes are in agreement with uther sections of the SAR. No physical work uns perfonsed on plant equipment or systems.

SAR Change The Cable Spreadine Room titled section of section 8.3.1.4.2 of the These SAR changes did not increase the probability of an accident or Repest foC SAR states, " Smoke detectors and a carbon dioxide fire protegetion the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment -

CO2 System system have been installed ensuring that potential....." . The SAR important to safety or. the consespaences of an accident or change reeds," Smoke detectors and a fire protection amoreamlan . malftssction of equipment previously evaluated in the SAR. The-

< system have been installed ensuring that the ...." (underlined - changes did not create a possibility for an accident of a different.

words or phrases indicate the changes.) -Section 8.3.1.4.4 of the- type or create a possibility for a malfm etion of a different type-SAR states that "A carbon dioulde fire protection system with manuet then any previously evaluated in the SAR. These changes did not -

control is installed in the cable spreading room as a back g."'.The reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any 75.

change reeds, "A Mid Pressure Protection agpremmiary avstan in These SAR changes clarified the description of the fire suppression-Installed as the primerv maana of fire amorension utth a carbon systems in the cable spreading room and added the D/G electricat.

dioxide fire protection system with manuet control installed in the . board room to the SAR 6scription.

cable spreading room as backg ." section S.3.1.4.4 of the SAR also states that "A carbon dionide system with automatic control is installed in each of the dieset-generator rooms, in each munillary instrument room, in the oil ptmp room of the diesel-generator -

3 building, in the munillary instrument room, and the computer room."

In this section of the SAR, the munitiary instrument room is -

i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _i _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _._..e _ -- _ .2 ,.y. ,Yr ..,,,n F,E#in~ m.m ,.- + _ - .y ---,t . .-.- e s ,-%m, m . ys.w~ . , , ,, .

-+ , - . - ~

X+ ,L ,.

1- ' *

, n .f ;.

-' ' -- _- F f p,,

w.

=. .y Page No. 43 OTHER 50.59 SAFETT EVALUATIONS #- _

W

~

.Z ,e mentioned twice and the diesel-generator electrical board rooms are ,

not mentioned. The change reeds, "A carbon dioxide' system with 2 automatic control is instatted in each of the dieset-generator- s rooms, in each of the dienet-eenerator electrical heard ranma. In the oil pump room of the dieset-generator building, in the musiliary instrument rooms, and the computer room of the enntrat buildina.= - _

SAR Section This change uns primarily for clarification and correction to these The corrections, clarifications, and change made to the SAR have no .

11.3 and sections and to more securately describe the systems and operating . impact on any previously evaluated accident or condition.

11.4 practices for Sou's Gaseous Weste System and Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring Systems. The only effective change made is s

+

the sampling frequency requirement for containment venting. Exis-t ting sampling frequency uns on a delly basis, with a 24-hour release ,

I permit being generated by the Chemistry Lab and authorization for , ,

i contalrument venting being transferred to the NCR. As conteltment pressure increases and venting is' required, Operations records-changes that have taken ptoce in containment by reviewing and recording the conteirument ist count rates (both upper and lower), and

then vents contairument according to the applicable instruction. The

' changes to the SAR change the defly sampling to weekly and allow for a 7-day containment vent reteese permit. The offsite dose methodology remains the same- therefore, determination of offsite dose is not impacted by changing sanpting frequency. These changes , (

{ to the vent sampling frequency have no impet of nucteer safety and ,

have no affect on 10 CFR 20 timits. .

SAR Section SAR Section 10.4' addresses "Other Features of the Steam and Pouer." . The hoster' drains and vents system is a nonsofety system located in -

~

10.4 Since the originot sademittet of the SAR, vertous features of the ~ the turbine building and does not lapact any safety f a ction.. The : .

heeter drains and vents system have changed or it has been . .

changes to the SAR described in this SA/SE did not incrosse the determined that'they operate differently than the description in the prshability of an accident or malfunction of equipment leportant to SAR.- This SE documented a change to the SAR to correctly describe ; safety har==* the hoster drains and wants system continues its the heater drains and wants system as it now functions in the plant. Independence from any safety-related system or f action. The consequences of an accident er motfaction of egalpment laportant to -

~

. . safety uns not incrossed. Ngeter drains and wants system is not

, covered by any TSs.

i. SAR Section This change was a hmtation change only without any impact on The specific values provided by the subject SAR figures goes beyond ^ '

8.2 any Seu physical plant feature or system. The text in section the scope and levet of detait of other information provided by the ' -

8.2.2, Transmissian metunck Analvain. uns revised to delete refer- SAR. Only the generalized reeutts of these values need to be

ences to figures 8.2.2-1 through 8.2.2-13, and figures 8.2.2-1 addressed in the SAR to address the edegamey of the offsite pouer -

through 8.2.2-13 were deleted. These figures are not included in system to segply the total required pouer to the plant's electrical ,'

the TVA drawing system and, therefore, would not be automatically aistillery power system eder norest, shutdem, and LOCA conditions-tedated in the SAR should future changes to the tranneission network for any single transmission contingency. ~ Atee, the calcutetton me.

or plant loading requirements require revision to the figures. E31930907 200,'_"Sequoyeh mucteer Plant offsite Pouer Simply," _

These figures provide only reference information in the SAR and the provides grid operating instructions to provide adegante shutdoun values shown are not used elsewhere in the SAR or TSs. pouer during the limiting condition of a LOCA on unit 2 daring an a '

outage of the 500/161/13 kV intertie transformer bordt at Sou.

Customer Group letter referenced in the SA/SE, in accordance with-i

• i

.. . , _ . __. . _ __ _ ._ _ __ ___ _ _. . n __ . . 1..__ . . _ _ _:

rs _

l

w 7e-l.

i Page No. 44 OTHER 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS

!~

! ~

established Intergrog Ag eement No. 6, provides the latest trans-( mission system analysis reeutts stoporting the ad=ry=ry of the .

, offsite power system to sLgply SGN aunf tf ary perser system '

requirements.

~

I SAR Change This SE assessed the changes to the SON SAR necessary to implement . ~ The revision to 10 CFR 20 was generated to update the code to

! 187 to CFR 20, " Standards for Protection Against Radiation."- A new clarify and refine philosophies associated with occgetionet dose to -

l revision to 10 CFR 20 was issued with an effective date of January persomet.. The SAR contains references to existing 10 CFR 20 1, 1994. The SQN SAR contains information based w on 10 CFR 20 concepts and teriminology, primarity with regard to radiation concepts and terminology with regard to describing aspects of the - protection. Revision of the SAR to g dete information which is radiation protection program. Updating of this information was based won the concepts and terminology contained in the new 10 CFR editorial in nature, but did involve new terminology and changed 20 was necessary to ensure that heelth and safety benefits are not administrative controts language. The ispect of the revisions to 10 reduced. This SAR revision did not make any significant changes in CFR 20 required generet editorial changes to the text of the SAR. commaitments identfiled in the SAR that apply to the radiation.

The 10 CFR 20 revision did not involve any test or experiment. -The protection program, did not inwotwo any changes to the facility editorial changes involved nomenclature and administrative details described in the SAR, and did not irwotwe any use pursuant to 10 CFR without any SAR heetth or safety benefits being reduced. 50.59.

SQPER920296 gypassed and Inoperable Status Indication The only portions of the wantitation system' d ich are presently- ,

Rev 2 The gypassed and Inoperable Status Indication system is a computer monitored by gISI are those d ich perform a primary safety function  ;

based system dich provides indication and ann mciation of the such as the air cteeruJp systems. These systems consist of the- ,

abnormal status of certain safety-related systems d ich have been AgGTS, EGTS, Emergency Pressurizing and Cleen g System for the MCR. ,

bypassed or deliberately placed in an abnormat condition. The gISI The only exception to this is the contairunent air. return fans, now a -

, system stoptements existing plant assninistrative processres by separate system description line item. Since 4he ECTS is a seeet-styptying MCR persomet with ongoing plant safety system status. of the Air Cleen g System, this system was replaced with Cntet Air This SE addressed an SAR change to Section 7.1.4.3, "sypassed and Return Fans. These system description changes were semantic changes ,

Inoperable Status Indication." The revision to this section changed only. The safety-related room coolers are not addressed in any LCO i the systems monitored by gISI from "Ventitation" to " Air Cteeng . or SR section inside ths unit 1 and 2 TSs. However, the room Systems"; % m-ap Gas Treatment" to "Cntet Air Return Fans"; and ' coolers are attendent equipment to the safety-related machenical added that safety-related room cooters are not monitored by gISI. systems. The room cooters are not in direct line with any- ,

safety-related mechanicet system dich is respaired to mitteste an -

event. A failure of the room cooters to start would not prevent the safety-related nochenical system from operating. The room coolers ,

. . are Leider an intenstwo PM prggram to tighten belts, Lee bearings.

vacuum the housing, etc. . This intensive PM program leproves the aveif ability of the cooters by preventing machedated down time due '

to breekdom. These room cooters areo' eing administrettwety -

controtted to respaire operations to enter the AgGTS fan, EGTS fan, >

ESF pump, etc. Into the appropriate LCO action before removing the attendant room cooter from service. ' The gISI information is not -

used dsring any OgA or anticipated operational transient. The gISI system steptements esisting plant administrative procedures by -  ;

- supplying MCR personnet with ongoing plant safety system status.

- The primary intent of gISI is to provide an indication that a safety.

system has been purposely placed in a state which could cause inoperability. The TSs shall be the basis for making the finet decision about system operability, since the operator is permitted to configure the_ system to meet TS and operator configured systems

'e v w e W% w - - -mv' _ M w un r- w w" w --T-1 "-#"- - -

v --w 1 1 es- er w w

e:

Page No. 45 OTHEt 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS may not agree with the 8151 togics. Thus, there are no accidents or transients evaluated in the SAR that are affected by not monitoring the safety-related room coolers on the SISI system.

Unit 1 Unit 1 Cycle 7 Core Operating Limits Report . The additional W(z) f m etion was determined using the same methodot-Cycle 7 The change inclu: led an optional, W(z) f m etion and a corresponding, ogy as was used for the original. It differs from the originnt only COLR more restrictive, Axial Flux Difference Limits figure and revised in that it was determined using the more restrictive Axist Flux the Shutdown Rod Insertion Limits specified in Section 2.2.1 and the Difference Limits and control rod fully withdrawn positions. The Control Red Insertion Limits specified in Figure 1 to recpaire the conclusions of att SAR accident analyses remain valid and no USQs fully withdrawn position of 1226 to 5 231 steps withdrawn for cycle exist.

burnups to 9,000 mwd /MTU.

Unit 2 Unit 2 Cycle 7 Core Reload Westinghouse performed an extensive evaluation of the SON Unit 2 Cycle 7 This SA/SE is applicable to Cycle 7 operation in all modes to a Cycle 7 core characteristics and their ispect of the !AR accident maximum core-average cycle burn @ of 20,400 mD/MTU. Confirmation analyses. This evaluation is dar - nted in the Reload Safetv that this reload core will remain within the bomds of att SAR Evaluation and confirms that the conclusions of all SAR acc'/ lit accident analyses is based on the Reload Safety Evaluation performed analyses remain valid and no Use exist.

by Westinghouse.

SON Unit 2 was refueled by replacing 94 burned fuel assemblies with 84 fresh Westinghouse vantage 5H fuel assemblies, 9 twice burned fuel assembtles previously discharged from SQN 1 Cycle 4, one once burned fuel assembly previcusly discharged from SQN 2 Cycle 4, and shuffling the remaining burned fuel assembtles for Cycle 7. The fresh fuel which was loaded consists of 68 assembtles enriched to 3.8 d U-235 and 16 assemblies enriched to 4.2 w% U-235. Of the 84 fredi assemblies, att 84 contain integral fuel burnable absorbers.

Fuel inserts including wet annular burnable absorber assemblies, secondary sources, rod cluster control assemblies, and plugging devices were also shuffled.

SQN Unit COLR was also revised to reflect changes to the following cycle 7 specific operating timits: (1) most positive as-measured Beginning of Cycle Life, Att Rods Out, Not Zero Power Moderator Temperature Coefficient; (2) Fg Limit at rated thernet power; (3)

, FNDette N limit at rated thermal pour; and (4) the burnup-dependent .

W(z) function. In addition, Table A.1 has been implemented. This table provides cycle specific predicted Fa margin decreases as a function of cycle burnup that are greater than 2% per 31 effective fatt power days and will be used in place of the 2% factor specified in TS SR 4.2.2.2.e.1.

WR C003994 WR C003994 required an ASSCE breach of a 10-inch penetration seat The consequences of an accident will not exceed regulatory limits 0-TI for penetration # S-012 editch breaches the exterior south watt of .providing the special requirements and requirements of the TI are Sxx-000- the Unit 2 additional equipment building. The penetration was used maintained. The breach will be acceptable from a nuclear safety 016.0 to route temporary cables, hoses, etc. to sgport the Unit 2 Cycle 6 standpoint.

outage. After cospletion of the instattation and routing of the cables, hoses, etc. through the penetration, the penetration will be rescated with a minisue of 12 inches of RTV foam which will.

reestablish the penetration seat. A plate may be fabricated and mounted to the penetration with holes to accept the temporary

_ __ ____ __ _ _, _ _. _ _ _ . . . ___ __._.____..._____.__.__________J

^

_e 4.

Page sto. 46 OTHER 50.59 SAFETY EVALUAT!0Its cables, hoses, etc., to reduce the breach area below the 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 timits for AgSCE boundary breech. Reseeting or reinstal-tation of the plate will be required each time the penetration is breeched to add or remove items through the penetration. The applicable portions of the ut and this SA/SE will be in affect any time the penetration is breeched. Upon coupletion of att outage work required through this penetration, the cables, hoses, etc.

shall be removed and the penetration ullt be reseeted to originet configuration in accordance with the penetration drawings. Chapter 15.5, page 15.5-7 mentioned the initial delay of 4 minutes to establish the AgSCE and 1 minute to draw doun the AgSCE to negative 1/4-inch W. G. The referenced calculation etteus a deviation of the initial delay of more than 4 minutes from the SAR.

WR C207700 This SA/SE concluded that the following evolution was safe from a This activity did not interface with any engineered safety teetures-nuclear safety standpoint. A pirhole leak had developed dounstream and is not required for safe shutdoun of the reactor. Tiverefore, of the 2s2 tow pressure MSR operating vent valve. In order to there was no increase in the probability of an accident, 'n the attempt an entire repelr, the MSR venting was accomplished through probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment igortant to the startup went path e lle the repairs to the operating vent line, safety previously evolunted in the SAR, in the coneeewees of an which was removed from service, were performed. This SA/SE accident or selfunction of equipment leportant to safety, and the evaluated the temporary system conditions (velve alignment) which possibility for an accident or a malftrction of a different type was were controlled in accordance with this WR. The piping is nonsafety not created. This toeporary system alignment involved piping and reteted and is located in the nonseismic turbine building. Opera- valves which are not TS nor TS attendent equipment. - Therefore, the tion utilizing the startup went at futt power conditions disagrees- margin of safety as defined in the beels for a v TS was not reduced.

with the SAR description dich states that the startup went will be There was no USQ.

used for starttp conditions ard the operating vent will be used for nonent power operation. An SAR change was not recp41 red since this system alignment was only in place for the tength of time required to repelr the teeking weld.

W. m-