ML20077J478

Discusses 830719 Response to V Gilinsky 830629 Question Re Failure to Communicate to ASLB or Commission Knowledge of Leak Rate Test Result Falsification

ML20077J478
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/11/1983
From:	Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
To:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
References
RTR-NUREG-0680, RTR-NUREG-680 ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8308160440
Download: ML20077J478 (4)

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l. e~r DOCKETED IIARMON & WEISS USNRC 172 5 i ST R EET, N.W.

SUIT E 506 '83 AUG 15 Pl2:23 T ELE PHON E

, G AIL McGRE EVY HARMON WAS IIINGTON, D. C. 2OOOG ELovN R weiss (202) e33 9070 wituAM s. soRo AN, "

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DIANE CURRAN 00CKETING & SERVIU LUCIA S. CRTH BRANCH OEAN R YOUSLEY gugggg }{, Jgg]

William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ,

Re: TMI-l Restart, Docket 50-289 SP

Dear Mr. Dircks,

On July 19, 1983, you sent a memorandum to Commissioner Gilinsky in response to his question of June 29, 1983. The Commissioner's question was:

Since senior NRC staff members apparently believed by March or April of 1980 that leak rate test results had likely been falsified prior to the March 28, 1979 incident at TMI-2, and that this was a potentially serious matter, why was this belief not communicated to the Licensing Board or the Commission?

(emphasis added).

Your response of July 19, 1983 begins with the observation:

"Maybe I am missing something" and goes.on to argue that "it is

reasonable and logical to infer", from the fact that the matter was referred to DOJ, that the staff believed that the leak rates had likely been fasified and that'the matter was potentially serious. I suggest that, judging by your response you are indeed " missing something." The question assumes th'at senior staff knew that the leak rates had been' falsified and that the matter was potentially serious; the question asks why you did not so inform the ASLB or Commission.

Your sole response on this point is to refer to supplements I and II of NUREG-0680, which did,.in fact, constitute the sum total of the staff's communication to the ALAB and'the hearing record regarding'this matter. -

8308160440 830811 PDR ADOCK 05000289 G ~

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William J. Dircks Page Two The pertinent sections of these documents which you cited without quoting are reproduced in their entirety below:

A separate investigative effort is being conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in response to concerns regarding falsification of leak rate test data forthe Reactor Coolant System (RCS). NRC interviews with plant personnel and records review revealed that continuing leakage from one or more of the pressurizer relief vavles had existed since the Fall of 1978. A review of the REC j leakage procedure and a Temporary Change Notice to the procedure " revealed that the basic procedure was in error resulting in miscalculations of the RCS leak rate." The leak rates, recalculated by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement using a corrected procedure on Unit 2 data, exceeded limits allowed by the Units' Technical Specifications. Additional details regarding the procedure are described in Section I.l.2.3., " RCS Leakage," of NUREG-0600. During interviews with the NRC, the SIG, and the media, allegations were made by a former TMI operator concerning the implementation of the RCS leakage procedure and improper data collection. The allegations raised concerns regarding the principles of compliance with operating procedures and management philosophy and actions. Investigative effort was initally undertaken by the NRC. Subsequently, after consultation with the DO7, the DOJ convened a Grand Jury which is currently hearing testimony in this matter. Pending completion of the DOJ investigation, the NRC has suspended its inquiry into the matter so as not to interf ere with the DOJ investigation.

We can draw no conclusions on this item pending the completion of the two investigations described above.

Based upon the outcome of the investigations, further enforcement action, which is under the jurisdiction of the NRC, will be taken if appropriate. At this time, the staff cannot predict when these investigations will be conc 1dded.

NUREG-0680, Supp. I at 37, Nov. 1980, emphasis added.

That investigation was initially undertaken by NRC and identified a number of apparent problems related to procedure adherence. NRC investigative effort was j suspended pending the conclusions of the DOJ investigation,

' at their request, to avoid parallel administrative and criminal proceedings. The DOJ investigation is still ongoing, and the NRC does not possess any information as to when it may be completed. NRC personnel involved in,the

E IIARMON & WEISS William J. Dircks Page Three suspended investigation have been requested by DOJ not to discuss the details of the matter. Since completion of the investigation of t his matter by the NRC could turn up information which is related to past management practices, the matter was included in Supplement 1 to the Evaluation Report. The NRC will resume its investigation of the concerns when DOJ has completed its investigation of the matter. However, the staff has reviewed the information that it has obtained to date on the matter, and has concluded on he basis of informaton thus far obtained that there appears to be no direct connection with the Unit 2 accident.

NUREG-0 680, Supp. II, at 9-10, March, 1981, emphasis added.

To the extent that your memo is responsive at all to Commissioner Gilinsky's question, it implies that the above-quoted language should have conveyed to the Boards and the Commission- (and presumably, the parties) that the staff believed that the TMI-2 leak rates had been systematically falsified and that this was "a potentially serious problem."

Such a suggestion is absurd and I am astonised that the NRC's Executive Director would make it. Not only do the plain words of the SER Supplements fail to convey this message,they convey precisely the opposite impression.

Supplement I specifically states that the staff draws 1"no~~~

conclusions" pending the completion of the investigations.

Supplement II goes further in the direction of active misleading of the reader; it offers the following as the~only conclusion of the staff's review: However the staff has reviewed the information that it has obtained to date on the matter, and has concluded on the basis of information thus far obtained that there appears to be no direct connection with the Unit 2 accident.

The only possible intent of that last sentence was to denigrate the significance of the leak rate falsification by claiming that it was not related to the accident. Not only was such a conclusion in. direct conflict with the conclusion reached by Harold Ornstein, who investigated this.matterffor

the Special. Inquiry' Group, the effect of offering it' as the sole conclusion'was to communicate two demonstrably false impressions

-1) that the issue was unimportant to the; Restart proceeding and 2) that no conclusion had been reached as to the.

truth of the allegations.

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'IIARMON & WEISS l

William J. Dircks Page Four Moreover, the staff's peculiarlyobsure choice of words to describe the underlying facts also served to hide the nature

.and significance of the issues involved. The Staff describes Hartman's allegations that TMI-2 leak rates had been systematically falsified on all shifts over a period of several months prior and up to the accident as follows:

. . . allegations were made by a former TMI operator concerning the implementation of the RCS leakage procedure and improper data collection. The allegations raised concerns regarding the principles of compliance with operating procedures and management philosophy and actions.

NUREG-0680, Supp. I. supra.

The investigation. . . identified a number of apparent problems related to procedure adherence.

NUR$k680,Supp.II, supra.

Systematic, flagrant and continuing falsification of leak rate calculations in violation of the plant's license conditions can harldly be described as raising only ' apparent problems related to procedure adherence," unless the intent of the writer is to obsure rather than reveal the facts.

The sad truth is that the NRC staff not only failed to inform the ASLB that it believed the TMI-2 leak rates were, in fact, falsified and that this matter was a serious one, it actively misled the-Boards and the parties. That, of course, is why everyone who heard Tim Martin tell the Commissioners in May that the staff knew three years ago that the leak rates were falsified was astonished.

As Executive Director for Operations, your duty is to supervise the staff. 'Instead of making an effort to determine who is responsible for this episode and calling those persons to account, you appear to have engaged yourself in the bureaucratic coverup. I urge you to reconsider .this course.

Very truly yours,

.Ellyn R. Weiss General Counsel UCS ERW/cpk; l cc: TMI-l Service List Commissioners E: . ~ . -