ML20063B651

RO 82-32:on 820817,steam Generator 22 Blowdown Outer Isolation Valve CV1215A Closed.Caused by Failure of 1315A Solenoid Valve.Jumper Installed in Instrument Air Sys to Establish Blowdown.Also Reportable Per Part 21

ML20063B651
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	08/18/1982
From:	Christopher Jackson CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
REF-PT21-82 RO-82-32, NUDOCS 8208260132
Download: ML20063B651 (2)

Text

- - * . . . ChcrOs W. Jackson

• v ce prevoent Coasohdated Ed: son Company of New York, loc <

twan Point Station August 18, 1982 Broacway & EeaMey Ave ,

Buchanan. NY 10511 Temphone (914) 737-8116 Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docke t No. 50-247 1,1 -lis Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

In accordance with the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, the following confinns notification on August 17, 1982 to Mr. Peter Koltay of your of fice, by Mr. John Basile of Consolidated Edison of a potential Reportable Occurrence LER 82-32. This event is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification, Section 6.9.1.7.

On August 17,1982 at 1:15am, Steam Generator 22 blowdown outer isolation valve CV1215A failed closed due to the failure of 1315A solenoid valve The General Manager-NPG received telephone notification at 3:15am from the Senior Watch Supervisor. Permission was requested to install a jumper in the instrument air system so that the outer isolation valve could be opened. The purpose was to establish blowdown and have a blowdown chemistry sample taken. The General Manager-NPG discussed the various ramifications with the Senior Watch Supervisor and the Shif t Technical Advisor who were on duty. Included in this discussion were the applicability of the Technical Specifications for containment integrity and the concern with chloride concentrations in the steam generators. During the preceding day chloride concentrations had exceeded normal values. It was known that the containment integrity was not compromised because the isolation valve had failed closed and that in opening the valve we would enter the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6. It was agreed the valve should be opened with precautions. The precautions were to test the inner containment isolation valve valve by cycling it closed and then test valve CV1215A, af ter installing the jumper, to demonstrate that it would close. In addition, an operator would be stationed at the valve while it was open to remove the air supply to permit the valve to close whenever required. Communication with the operator was clearly established at the operator's position with both the page system and the two-way Gai-Tronic phone system. At 4:15am the valve was opened to establish blowdown and to take a sample, and at 5:45am the valve was shut.

During the regular Tuesday morning Station Nuclear Safety Committee (SNSC) meeting, the opening of the steam generator outer isolation valve for the purpose of controlling chloride concentration was reviewed. The Committee discussed that by opening the valve the action statement was entered and a review was made of whether an action statement should be voluntarily entered. The review included NRC Inspection 8208260132 820818 PDR ADOCK 05000247 <\

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Report No. 50-247/77-38 which, in closing unresolved item 247/76-35-04, concluded that licensees could voluntarily enter LCO action statements providing a reportable occurrence was reported and the action statement was not frequently entered.

Mr. Peter Koltay, NRC Resident Inspector was informed of the plant status at approximately noon by the General Manager-Nuclear Power Generation.

He also explained to Mr. Koltay what actions had been taken and were being planned.

At 12:35pm the valve was reopened with the same precautions followed in the first instance and a sample was obtained. The valve was closed at 1:15pm.

About 1:30pm Messrs. Koltay and Kenney, hTC Resident Inspectors, came to the of fice of the General Manager-Nuclear Power Generation to further review the plant status. After additional evaluation of the event, Con Edison decided that an orderly shutdown should be commenced pending further analysis of the event. At 2:05pm the order was given to commence shutdown and required notifications were initiated.

After further discussions of the requirements for containment integrity, the General Manager-NPG telephoned Mr. H. Kister, Section Chief, at Region I at approximately 2:30pm. The General Manager-Nuclear Power Generation discussed with him the interpretation of these requirements. Con Edison decided that Indian Point 2 had met the LimitingConditions for containment integrity and was not in an action statement with the valve closed. The order to terminate the plant shutdown was given at approximately 3:10pm.

The unit load had been decreased approximately 70MW.

At 6:30pm the repair of the solenoid valve was completed and the isolation valve was successfully tested.

Consolidated Edison believes that this report also satisfies the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.

Very truly yours, l' l Lj

/

cc: Mr. William Mcdonald, Director (2 copies)

Office of. Management Information and Program Control c/o Distribution Services Branch, DDC, ADM U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 28 Buchanan, NY 10511