ML20248F300
| ML20248F300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1988 |
| From: | Bram S CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8904130013 | |
| Download: ML20248F300 (19) | |
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10 CFR 50.59(b) REPORT OF CHANGES,-TESTS AND EXPERIMFETS COMPLETED IN 1988-1v e i I
(t CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.
INDIAN POINT UNIT 2 Docket No. 50-247 m.
March, 1989 J.
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Preface
. Discussed herein are summary descriptions of' changes; tests and~ experiments
- performed at Indian Point' Unit 2 and completed in 1988. Several items; completed in the early part of 1988 associated with the. Cycle 8/9 Refueling Outage (which ended:in January,'1988) were included in the:1987 report and.
have notLbeen. repeated here. 'The' changes presented herein have been-evaluated-and' determined lto meet'the'following criteria as established by 10 0
CFR 50.59(b):
t Criteria 1.
The probability nf' occurrence or the consequences of an accident or-
.rsifunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report has not'been increased.
2.
The possibility,for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any. evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created.
The! margin of safety as defined in the basis.for any Technical Specifi-3.
cation has not been reduced.
It.has,-therefore, been concluded that none of'these changes represents an-
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unreviewed safety question.
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t TABLE OF CONTENTS ITEM TITLE PAGE 1.
Installation of Safety Assessment System 1
2.
Facility Organization Changes.
1 3.
Provide Power Monitoring Capability for Safeguard Circuits.
1 4.
Replace Weight Stops on Main Steam Isolation Valves.
2 5.
Installation of Redundant Level Channel for RWST.
2 6.
Increase Pressurizer Relief Tank Temperature Instrument Range.
2 7.
Replace Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure Recorder.
2 8.
Install Annunciator Panel for Radiation Monitoring System.
2 9.
Receipt of Replacement Steam Generators.
3 10.
Change Control Switch Handles to Prevent Accidental Actuation.
3 11.
Move Annunciator Window for Condensate Storage Tank Level Alarm.
3 12.
Generic Piping Restraint Modifications.
4 13.
Generic Pump Seal Replacement.
4 14.
Modify Argon Supply to High-Radiation Sample System.
4 15.
Rewire EDG Local / Remote Control Switches 4
16.
Modify Power Feed to Superheater Fuel Oil,Pnnp 5
17.
Install Modified Brackets for Main Low Pressure Turbine Differ-ential Expansion Probes.
5 18.
Change Power Source to Fublic Address System 5
19.
Fabricate and Install New Pump Leveling Support.
5 20.
Replace Regulators for Pressure Controllers.
5 21.
Replace the Auto-Transfer Switch for MCC-10C 6
22.
Replace Starting Air Compressor Motor for EDG 22 6
23.
Replace Splices for Service Water Pumps 23 and 24.
6 6
24.
Replace EDG Pre-lube Pump Motor.
i
r 25.
Replace Pressure Relief Tank Level Transmitter 7
'l 26.
Alternate Accumulator Topping Capability.
7
- 27. Treatment of Radwaste by Filter-Demineralized System 7
28.
Operation With Possible Steam Generator Tube Weld Leak.
7
- 29. -Remove High' Pressure Steam Turbine Equalizer Lines and Modify High Pressure Turbine Drains System.
8 30.
Remove Sample Pumps for Three Radiation Monitors.
8 31.
Retire Steam Piping in Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building.
8 32.
Bypass Interlocks for Motor Operator of 138KV Disconnect Switch..
8 33.
Block High-Vibration Trip of Gas Turbine.
9 34.
Disable Unit #1 Containment Access Control Features.
9 35.
Block Main Turbine Generator Vibration Alarm.
9 36.
Disconnect Alarm for High Temperature Magnetic Filter System.
9 37.
Temporarily Disconnect Defective Vibration Alarm for Condenser Circulating Water Pump.
9 38.
Disconnect Low Pressure Steam Dump Alarm 10 39.
Generic Service Water System Butterfly Valve Replacement.
10 40.
Plug Exhaust Ports on Extraction Steam Non-Return Test Valves.
10 41.
piversion of Condensata frcm RWST Heating Coil..
10 42.
Isolation of RWST Heating Coil...
11 43.
Install Clamp to Stop Leakage of RWST Heating Steam.
11 44.
Temporary Cable Support for Reactor Vessel Head Insulation 11 45.
Installation of Mechanical Steam Generator Tube Plugs.
11 46.
Repair of Instrument Connections on Service Water Headers..
12 I
47.
Change Power Feed to SWAP Panel Instruments.
12 48.
Security Diesal Generator Power Cable Replacement.
12 l
49.
Temporary Use of Modified 0-Ring in Safety Injection Pump 12 Drain Plug..
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Install Redundant Sump Pump in Chemical Systems. Building...-..
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- 51 '. Install' Additional Sump' Pump in. Primary. Auxiliary Building..... - 13
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Use^of Temporary, Hydrogen Supplies'
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1.
Installation of Safety Assessment System A Safety Assessment System has been inatalled.
It is a computerized data system which meets the safety parameter display system requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.
The system is intended to provide assistance to the operators in monitoring and managing the progress of possible plant transients.
It receives, records and displays signals required to monitor critical plant safety functions.
It does not provide a direct safety func-tion itself and has been isolated from class 1E instrument circuits. The system does not degrade the functional capability of safety equipment and does not reduce the margin of safety for any Technical Specification.
There fore, no unreviewed safety question was involved.
2.
Facility Organization Changes The organization of the facility (both Indian Point Unit 1 and Unit 2) was defined by the Technical Specifications.
On August 1, 1988, the Technical Specification was changed to delete the organization chart, requiring in-stead that the organization changes be evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59 and that the organization be documented in the updated FSAR. The organization, as it existed in early 1988, was described in the FSAR update submitted in June, 1988.
The organization has since been changed as follows:
A.
The Environmental Health and Safety Department and the Technical Support Department have been combined into a single department (Technical Services) under the direction of a single General Man-ager.
B.
The Shift Technical Advisors, who reported directly to the General Manager of Technical Support, now report to the Chief Plant Engi-l neer, who reports to the General Manager of Technical Services.
The responsibilities, functions, activities, and interfaces of the affected groups and the individuals in them are not altered by this change. The Health Physics, Quality Assurance, Training and Nuclear Analysis functions remain separate from the plant operating organization.
Senior Con Edison management has evaluated these changes with respect to organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and concluded that they will not have an adverse effect on personnel performance or plant operation.
3.
Provide Power Monitoring Capability for Safeguards Circuits To provide additional capability for monitoring power to the safeguards actuation circuits including those associated with the Main Steam Isolation Valves, an alarm was added along with additional relays and indicator lights.
Changes were also made to the fuses within those circuits.
These changes improve the operational reliability of these circuits. The modifications do not change the design bases of the circuits and further assure their proper functioning under all postulated conditions.
The modification does not involve any unreviewed safety question.
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4.
Replace Weight Stops on Main Steam Isolation Valves The cast steel weight stops on the Main Steam Isolation Valves are no longer manufactured, and are being replaced on an "as-required" basis.
The re-placement component is fabricated from A-36 structural steel, which has properties that are equivalent to those of the original material. The replacement components have been seismically analyzed and are designed to withstand anticipated stresses.
The function of the stop was unchanged and the replacement components did not adversely affect that function.
The Technical Specifications are not affected by this replacement.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety question is involved in replacing weight stops on Main j
Steam Isolation Valves.
5.
Installation of Redundant Lovel Channel for RWST A new channel of level instrumentation for the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was installed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2 to provide control room recording and alarm capability along with input to the Safety Assessment System. The channel, which is redundant to an existing channel, is safety related, seismically designed, and meets applicable requirements of the Technical Specifications. This modification, i.e.,
installation of redundant level channel for RWST, did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
6.
Increase Pressurizer Relief Tank Temperature Instrument Range The range of the Pressurizer Relief Tank Temperature Monitoring instrument-ation was increased by recalibration of the existing temperature indicator.
This upgrade facilitates use of relief tank temperature as a backup indica-tion of pressurizer relief valve position, consistent with NUREG-0737 Sup-plement 1 and in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2.
Since it was accomplished by recalibrating the existing components in the instrument channel and did not involve or affect any Technical Specification, no unre-viewed safety question was involved.
7.
Replace Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure Recorder The recorder for the Wide Range Reactor Coolant Pressure Channel was replac-ed to achieve consistency with NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 and per the guidance provided by Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 2.
The new recorder, which is located in the control room, has two pens, one providing a range of 0 to 750 psig and the other a range of 0 to 3000 psig.
The recorder is Class 1E and has been seismically qualified and installed. No Technical Specifications were involved or affected and no unreviewed safety question was involved.
8.
Install Annunciator Panel for Radiation Monitoring System An annunciator panel was installed which provides separate windows for each of three alarms for each of the four radioactive iodine monitoring channels, and a window for high radiation on any of area monitor channels R1 through R8.
Previously there was one annunciator window for these 13 alarm signals.
This modification only involved the enhancement of the annunciation func-tion.
It did not inve'. r or affect any Technical Specifications or their bases and no unreviewad saiety question was involved. _
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9.
Receipt of Replacement Steam Generators Replacement steam generators (RSGs) for the Indian Point Station were re-ceived and placed in storage for future installation.
They were shipped to the site by barge, which docked at the Con Edison Indian Point Unit No. 1 1,cding dock. A barge-mounted derrick crane lifted each RSG from the barge and placed it on a multi-axle, multi-tire transporter vehicle. The RSGs were then secured to the vehicle and transported to an onsite storage facility.
The dock.is located southwest of the intake structure for Unit 1, between it and the intake structure for Unit 3.
The Indian Foint Unit 2 intake structure is located to the northeast of the intake structure for Unit 1.
The dock was inspected (31 evaluated to assure that it was capable of carry-ing the loads. The follv ing items were evaluated to assure that no safety hazard was involved in transporting the RSGs on the Indian Point site:
- buried structures and utilities;
- slopes adjacent to the roadways;
- overhead and lateral clearances; and
- consequences of a postulated overturning of the transporter.
Installation and use of the RSGs were beyond the scope of this evaluation.
Based on these considerations, it was concluded that the steam generator receipt, transport and storage would not adversely affect the reactor cool-ant pressure boundary, containment integrity, spent fuel pool cooling, safe plant shutdown or accident mitigation. The Technical Specifications were not impacted and no unreviewed safety question was involved.
10.
Change Control Switch Handles to Prevent Accidental Actuation The handles on five control switches were changed from pistol grip to round notched type. This change was made to resolve a human engineering issue identified during the detailed control room design review, related to i
possible accidental actuation of control switches. There is no impact on functioning of the associated equipment or on the Technical Specifications.
Thus, no unreviewed safety question was involved.
11.
Relocate Annunciator Window for Condensate Storage Tank Level Alarm To improve the functional grouping of the condensate storage tank annunci-ators, the alarm window for the high/ low level alarm was relocated to a spare position within the same annunciator panel. There was no change to any safety related equipment and no effect on the functioning of the alarm or its associated components. No Technical Specification was affected and no unreviewed safety question was involved.
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Gent-ic Piping Restraint Modifications Ir Piping' restraints and supports are'being replaced and/or removed on an "as-needed" basis. Evaluations conducted for each individual application have j
demonstrated that the revised design will not adversely affect the operatien, performance or function of its system and will maintain material compatibility. These evaluations also address the need for temporary supports during installation.- These modifications are not applicable to the removal of any restraint or support required by a Technical Specification.
The evaluations discussed above assure that the revised configuration will perform the same function as the original and that design requirements are met during and after modifications. Therefore, no change to the bases of the Technical Specification are involved and no unroviewed safety question is involved.
13.
Generic Pump Seal Replacement Shaft seals (both packed and mechanical) of pumps are being replaced on an "as-needed" basis with Chesterton mechanical seals which are expected to have an extended service life compared to the previous seals. The replacement seals meet or exceed the design requirements (including leakage limits) of the original seal, perform the same function, do not adversely affect the pump, and maintain material compatibility.
Seismic capabilities are not affected. Thus, there is no unreviewed. safety question involved.
14.
Modify Argon Supply to High-Radiation Sample System Argon is used as the carrier gas in the chromatograph of the higii radiation sample system. The wall-mounted argon pressure regul' ting valve was removed and replaced by a regulating valve mounted on the argon storage cylinder.
There are no safety related or seismically designed equipment in the i
vicinity of this equipment. This equipment is not described in, and this change does not impact the Technical Specifications or their bases. No unreviewed safety question is involved.
15.
Rewire EDG Local / Remote Control Switches The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) LOCAL / REMOTE control switches origin-ally provided for remote speed and voltage control circuits, which were never installed.
In this circumstance, if the switch were placed in the REMOTE position, the auto voltage control rheostat and governor switch would be switched out of their circuits. All three emergency diesel generators were rewired to maintain these control devices in the circuit, regardless of the position of the local / remote switch. The modification did not affect seismic or fire protection considerations, did not change electrical loading or electrical separation criteria, and did not involve the basis of any Technical Specification. Thus no unreviewed safety question uas presented. -_-____.-- - _ _ _ _ _ _
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't 16.
Modify Power Feed to Superheater fuel Oil Pump f
Superheater Fuel Oil Pump No. 11, originally part of Indian Point Unit 1, is used to recirculate fuel oil for the house service boiler.
Its power supply was removed and was replaced by the power supply for retired Pump No. 12.
This power supply is not safety-related. This modification did not adversely affect any safety related equipment or function and did not involve the Technical Specifications or their bases, and therefore no unreviewed safety question was involved.
17.
Install Modified Brackets for Main Low Pressure Turbine Differential Expansion Probes k
The single semi-circular bracket used to mount the differential expansion i
probes on the main low pressure turbine was replaced by two brackets, one on each side of the outer cylinder base centerline, consistent with the manu-facturer's recommendation. The alarm and trip setpoints were not changed.
The same probes and wiring were utilized. This equipment is not safety-related. The Technical Specification was not impacted by this change and it i
did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
18.
Change Power Source to Public Address System The power source for the Indian Point Unit 1 public address (PA) system, located in the turbine building, was changed. Neither the PA system nor the power supplies are safety-related or referenced in any Technical Specification or basis.
This change in power source did not adversely affect the PA system or impact any safety related systems and no unreviewed safety question was involved.
19.
Fabricate. and Install New Pump Leveling Support A new leveling support for Instrument Air Compressor Closed Cooling Water Pump No. 21 was fabricated and installed. The new support was constructed from structural steel which has mechanical properties which are equivalent to those of the original casting.
Stresses in the new support, including those from seismic events, are within allowable limits.
Therefore, no unre-viewed safety question was involved.
20.
Replace Regulators for Pressure Controllers The Pressure Control Valves in the Containment Penetration and Weld Channel Pressurization System naintain the specified pressure in the supply lines to the penetrations and weld channels.
Air is required at a constant pressure for operation of the pressure control valves. The air regulators which sup-ply this air to the pressure control valves have been replaced.
The re-placement regulators will perform the same function as the original, and have pressure ratings that are higher.
System response is unaffected by the change. The materials of the replacement regulators and connecting tubing are compatible with the other system components. Seismic requirements of the system are met, and there is no change in the FSAR single failure analy-sis.
This change does not involve the bases of the Technical Specifications or an unreviewed safety question...
3 21.
Replace the Auto-transfer Switch for MCC-10C j
On loss of power from the normal feeder to Motor Control Center 10C (MCC-10C), the auto-transfer switch automatically switches to the standby feeder.
The switch, which became defective, was replaced like in kind. MCC-10C supplies power to a control room air conditioning unit which is provided for
,i personnel comfort and is not required for habitability, electrical services in the west guard house, and nuclear fresh water make-up Pump No. 11.
To maintain power to these areas and equipment during the replacement, a temporary feeder cable was installed.
The transfer switch, the MCC, and the electrical loads supplied are not safety-related and are not mentioned in the Technical Specifications or their bases and no unreviewed safety question was involved.
i 22.
Replace Starting Air Compressor Motor for EDG 22 The emergency diesel generators (EDG) are started by compressed air.
Each EDG has its own starting system, including compressors and storage tanks.
The electric motor which drives the starting air compressor for EDG No. 22 was replaced.
The replacement motor is functionally equivalent to the orig-inal, and is seismically qualified. Minor differences in RPM and amperage were evaluated by Engineering and found to be acceptable. The replacement motor is expected to be as least as reliable as the previous motor. Thus, this modification did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
23.
Replace Splices for Service Water Pumps 23 and 24 Twelve bolted and taped splices located in Manhole No. 21 have been replaced with prefabricated " Crab Joint" splices which have proven to be reliable in similar previous applications. These splices are part of the circuits for Service Water Pumps 23 and 24, are considered to be an improvement over the previous design and are expected to be more reliable under anticipated ambient operating conditions. The new installation did not adversely impact Fire Protection as the manhole was refilled with sand in accordance with Appendix R commitments. The Technical Specifications and their bases were not affected and no unreviewed safety question was involved.
24.
Replace EDG Pre-Lube Pump Motor The pre-lube pumps circulate lubricating oil in the emergency diesel genera-ter (EDG) engines when they are not running, to maintain the oil and the engine at the optimum starting temperature. The motors for the pre-lube pumps are being replaced on an "as-needed" basis with motors that are func-tionally equivalent but physically smaller. The pre-lube system does not operate when the EDG is in operation.
Capability to withstand seismic events was not affected by the replacement. The Technical Specifications were not affected by this modification and no unreviewed safety question was involved.
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25.
Replace Pressure Relief Tank Level Transmitter The Pressurizer Relief Tank level transmitter, which had become obsolete, was replaced with a new, lighter unit with a separate power supply. Yhe modified channel provides the same indication and alarm functions as the original, and provides equivalent seismic capabilities.
The channel does not perform any Class 1E safety function, and is not part of any Technical Specification or its bases. No unreviewed safety question was involved.
26.
Alternate Accumulator Topping Capability.
A pump with a separate suction was temporarily installed to provide alternate makeup to the Accumulators when the topping pump was unavailable.
The temporary installation was separated from the Safety Injection System bj double valves such that failure of the temporary installation would not affect the operation of that system. The components installed were seismically restrained to prevent interaction with safety systems during a seismic event. The equipment which was temporarily installed was not for use in accident mitigation and provided the same water quality to the Accumulators. This alternate makeup did not impact the technical specifications or their bases and did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
27.
Treatment of Radwaste by Filter-Demineralized System A Sluiceable Demineralized System has been installed and is used to treat radioactive liquid wastes.
Prior to its installation and use, a review of the system was conducted in accordance with the issues outlined in NRC IE Circular #80-18.
Potential releases to the environment as discussed in the FSAR, would be governed by station administrative procedure and controlled through the design and locati^. of the system. Whole body and thyroid doses from a postulated spill were esaluated and found to be well within the NRC guidelines. This review showed that operation of the system would not adversely affect the Technical Specifications or their bases and no I
unreviewed safety question was involved.
28.
Operation With Possible Steam Generator Tube Weld Leak A possible small tube-to-tubesheet veld leak in steam generator 22 was evaluated. Since tube plugging alone may not have stopped such leakage, the impact of operation with various potential leakage paths was evaluated.
Operation with such a leak would not have caused a primary to secondary leak greater than the Technical Specification limit and would not adversely affect the integrity of the installed mechanical plug. The potential for corrosion was evaluated and determined not to be significant.
It was concluded that such operation would not have increased the probability or consegaences of previously analyzed accidents, or resulted in a previously unanalyzed accident.
Therefore, no unreviewed safety question was involved.
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's 29.
Remove High Pressure Steam Turbine Equalizer Lines and Modify High Pressure Turbine Drains System j
Two of the three 12 inch equalizer lines downstream of the governor control valves of the High Pressure steam turbine were removed and the governor
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control valves converted from full are to partial arc admission.
The nine drain control valves were replaced, isolation valves were installed upstream of the drain control valves, three one inch drain lines were replaced with 1-1/2 inch lines, and one continuous orificed drain line was added. The equalizer line removal prevents double-shocking the turbine when going from full to partial arc admission. The drain modifications reduce the potential for water induction into the turbine.
The turbine setpoints were not chang-ed, and the overspeed controls were not affected. No safety-related equip-ment was involved, no Technical Specification was impacted, and an unreview-ed safety question was not involved.
30.
Remove Sample Pumps for Three Radiation Monitors Radiation Monitors R-39, R-40 and R-47 monitor sample flows of component cooling water and service water for contamination. The sample pumps are not needed to provide adequate sample flow rates, ond therefore have been re-moved from service. Neither the operation nor the seismic capability of the monitoring system were affected. The modification did not change the bases for any Technical Specification and did not involve any unreviewed safety question.
l 31.
Retire Steam Piping in Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building The portion of the auxiliary steam piping in the Unit 1 Fuel Handling Build-ing which had supplied steam for water heating in the decontamination pit area of the Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building was retired by cutting and cap-ping. The decontamination facility supported by this piping is no longer used.
Since this modification did not impact the remaining portions of the Auxiliary Steam System or any safety system and did not affect the Technical Specification or its bases, no unreviewed safety question was involved.
32.
Bypass Interlocks for Motor Operator of 138KV Disconnect Switch Interlocks for the motor operator of 138 KV disconnect switch F3B, which is used only during plant shutdowns, were defeated by bypassing to facilitate maintenance. Administrative procedures contain precautions to be observed during operation of the switch. The switch is neither safety-related nor referenced in the Technical Specifications, and defeat of this interlock does not impact any safety related systems or equipment. Therefore, no unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Block High-Vibration Trip of Gas Turbine
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Two relays in the trip circuit of gas turbine GT-1 were temporarily blocked to prevent automatic trip on high vibration. The vibration monitoring and l
manual trip capabilities were not affected. Continuous monitoring of ges turbine vibration will be performed by a plant operator whenever the gas q
turbine is running with the automatic trip defeated to ensure manual trip-i ping on high vibration. The gas turbine automatic vibration trip is provid-ed solely to protect the gas turbine and its failure would have no impact on cther plant structures or coaponents.
This temporary modification did not affect the operability of the gas turbine nor did it involve the Technical Specifications or their bases, and therefore an unreviewed safety question was not involved.
34.
Disable Unit #1 Containment Access Control Features Since the retirement of Indian Point Unit #1, its containment has been made available for potential use as an interim onsite radwaste storage facility and serves no pressure boundary function. As a result, access control features related to that function are no longer safety related. These functions, which include a manual key operated switch and indicating light, a pressure switch,.and a pneumatic door sealing system, have been removed from service by bypassing. They are not described in the Technical Specifications or their bases. Therefore, no unreviewed safety question is involved.
35.
Block Main Turbine Generator Vibration Alarm A faulty vibration alarm for coupling #23 of the main turbine generator was i
blocked by activating a switch in the vibration monitor. This action clear-ed the associated control room annunciator, allowing it to respond to other alarms. The alarm is not safety-related, nor is it connected to any safety-related system. No Technical Specifications or their bases were involved or affected. Therefore, no unreviewed safety question was involved.
36.
Disconnect Alarm for High Temperature Magnetic Filter System The High Temperature Magnetic Filter System was installed to experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of a magnetic field for removing particulate from a feedwater sanple.
Since the filter system is no longer in operation, the system trouble alarm located in the control room has been disconnected.
The system is not safety related or referenced in the Technical Specifica-tion or its bases. Therefore, no unreviewed safety question is involved.
37.
Temporarily Disconnect Defective Vibration Alarms for Condenser Circulating Water Pumps Failed vibration alarms for Circulating Water Pumps, which were causing continuing false alarms, were temporarily disconnected per Engineering recommendation.
Installation of new vibration probes is planned for the next scheduled preventive maintenance. Neither the pump nor the vibration alarm is safety related. They are not referenced in the Technical Specifi-cations or their bases. Therefore, no unreviewed safety quest'en is involv-ed.
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-38.
Disconnect Low Pressure Steam Dump Alarm Item 60 of the 10 CFR 50.59(b) report for'1987 discussed the disarming of the low pressure steam dump system, including operation with its isolation valves closed and unpowered. The control room alarm for " Low Pressure Steam Dump Isolation Valve Not Fully Open" has no significance under those.condi-tions and has therefore been disconnected. This system is not discussed or referenced in the Technical Specifications or their bases. Disconnecting the alarm did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
39.
Generic Service Water. System Butterfly Valve Replacement Manually operated butterfly valves.in the service water system are being replaced on an "as needed" basis. Exact replacements are not available.
The replacement valves meet or exceed the specification. requirements of the original valve, perform the same function, have similar flow characteristics q
and are constructed of suitable materials. Seismic analyses are performed as required by differences between the original and the replacement valve and its installation.
Supports and/or braces are added as required to meet seismic requirements.
Compliance with fire protection requirements is main-tained. The Technical Spec.ifications and their bases are not impacted and no unreviewed safety question is-involved.
40.
Plug Exhaust Ports on Extraction Steam Non-return Test Valves l
Plugs were installed in the exhaust ports of three test valves which control non-return valves in the extraction steam lines from the main turbine to the feedwater heaters. The valves which were plugged provide capability for manually testing closure of the non-return valves. The plugged valves were l
. leaking air from the control systems of the non-return valves, and could cause the non-return valves to close unnecessarily. The modification eliminates a potential source of failure. The non-return valves and associated equipment are not safety related and are not referenced in F e Technical Specifications or their bases. This modification does not iw olve an unreviewed safety question.
41.
Diversion of Condensate from RWST Heating Coil To maintain its temperature above the specified minimum, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWS'1) has a heating coil which uses low-pressure steam from the auxiliary steam system, and normally returns condensate to the house service boilers for reuse.
Provisions were made to divert the cendensate from the coil to the radioactive liquid waste disposal system in the event of a coil leak, which could allow radioactive liquid from the RWST to enter the auxiliary steam system. The RWST contents are monitored to assure that Technical Specification limits are maintained.
Potential releases of radioactivity from the RWST through the auxiliary steam system were evaluated and would not exceed allowable limits. Functional capability of the RWST was maintained and therefore no unreviewed safety question was involved...
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42.
Isolation of RWST Heating Coil To assure that contamination from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) heating coil leak (see previous item, #41) would not' enter the auxiliary steam system, the steam piping at the coil was temporarily removed and the coil was isolated.
Steam heating was not required during isolation. The coil and its isolating fittings were analyzed to assure that the seismic capability of the tank was not impacted. Other applicable system design requirements were also met, and the bases of the Technical Specifications were not involved. Therefore, no unreviewed safety question was involved with this modification.
43.
Install Clamp to Stop Leakage of RWST Heating Steam I
1 A Power-seal clamp was temporarily installed to stop leakage in the Refuel-ing Water Storage Tank (RWST) steam heating coil.
The clamp was evaluated for compatibility with the boric acid solution and heating steam. The clamp was also evaluated and found to be capable of withstanding a safe shutdown earthquake and of allowing the RWST temperature to be maintained as designed via the auxiliary steam system heating coil.
This repair did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
44.
Temporary Cable Support for Reactor Vessel Head Insulation Carbon steel cabling is being used on a temporary basis to support the in-sulation on the Reactor Pressure Vessel upper head. The top head support ring normally provides support for the insulation, but the temporary support is being used in order to avoid the personnel radiation exposure which would have been required for an immediate repair to the support ring. The cable support system is designed to be functionally equivalent to the support ring under both normal and seismic conditions.
It is subject to monthly visual inspections.
This modification does not involve the Technical Specifica-tions or their bases.
No unreviewed safety question is involved.
- 45. Installation of Mechanical Steam Generator Tube Plugs In July, 1988, mechanical tube plugs were installed in a steam generator tube which showed evidence of degradation. The use of these plugs was evaluated in 1981 cnd they have been used since 1982.
The mechanical tube plugs were evaluated for material compatibility by the original eqoment manufacturer.
Plug reliability was determined to be equivalent to tne explosive plugs.
Seismic vibrations will have no effect on the tubes plugged. This modification did not adversely impact the operation of the steam generators, or the bases of the Technical Specifications. Thus, no unreviewed safety question was involved. 4
e i
o 46.
Repair of Instrument Connections on Service Water Headers To repair leakage from a small diameter pressure tap on the sixteen inch service water header, a pressure housing was fabricated and attached to the header. The housing encloses the leaking tap and forms a new pressure boundary encompassing the defect. This interim repair was designed in accordance with the applicable code, USAS B31.1, and was seismically analyzed. A permanent repair is planned for the 1989 refueling outage.
This interim repair restored the function of the header, met original design codes, did not adversely affect any other equipment and did not involve the Technical Specifications or their bases. Therefore, no unreviewed safety question was involved.
47.
Change Power Feed to SWAP Panel Instruments i
The Steam Water Analysis Panel (SWAP) instruments received power from an instrument bus via the Flash Evaporator panel.
To allow the Flash Evapora-j tor panel to be removed, the feed to the SWAP instruments was changed to the existing power feed to the SWAP panel from distribution panel 21.
The SWAP instruments are not safety related and do not interact with any safety related system. The system is not referenced in the Technical Specifications or their bases.
No unreviewed safety question was involvd.
l 48.
Security Diesel Generator Power Cable Replacement This modification entails the replacement of a section of the power cable from the Security Diesel Generator to Security equipment in the Primary Auxiliary Building. The replacement cable is identical to the original cable and utilizes the exieting conduit in areas containing safety-related systems or equipment. The work does not affect any building structures, fire rated penetrations or safety related systems. Based on this, there is no impact on nuclear safety. No unreviewed safety question was involved.
49.
Temporary Use of Modified 0-Ring in Safety Injection Pump Drain Plug Seal Metallic o-rings seal the drain plugs on the safety injection pumps. The drain plug is threaded into the pump; the o-ring seals against leakage past the threads. A modified (resized) ring was installed for temporary use on one pump. No leakage was observed when the pump was test-run.
This temporary repair did not impact the functioning of the safety injection pumps or the system pressure boundary.
Failure of the ring would not cons-titute a pressure boundary failure, but could only create the potential for a small leak path equivalent to that discussed in the FSAR. The o-ring is compatible with system materials.
There was no impact on any of the Techni-cal Specifications or their bases, and no unreviewed safety question was in-
)
volved. -
v i,
~)
50.
Install Redundant Sump Pump in Chemical Systems Building I
One sump pump, a steam ejector, had been installed to pump liquids from the sump in the Indian Point Unit No. 1 Chemical Systems Building to the rad-j waste treatment facilities. A redundant sump. pump, driven by compressed air, was added. The second pump improves reliability, reduces the need for steam and reduces the amount of liquid radwaste to be processed.
It does not adversely affect the functional capability of the system. Any leakage of liquids being pumped would be returned to the sump.
This change does not impact the basis for any Technical Specification or involve an unreviewed safety question.
51.
Install Additional Sump Pump in Primary Auxiliary Building The Indian Point Unit No. 2 Primary Auxiliary Building had been equipped with two sump pumps. A third sump pump, driven by compressed air, was add-ed, along with check valves to prevent backflow through idle pumps. This change increases the reliability of the sump pump system. Any leakage of liquids being pumped would be returned to the sump.
No basis for any Tech-nical Specification was impacted and no unreviewed safety question was in-volved.
.52.
Use of Temporary Hydrogen Supplies i
While the main hydrogen header was isolated for repairs, temporary hydrogen supplies were provided. A bottle connection was installed for the volume control tank, and a hose was used to provide a truck connection for the hy-drogen supply to the recombiners.
The temporary supplies were designed to l
be capable of withstanding a Safe Shutdown Earthquake, and all applicable l
fire protection requirements were met.
The temporary supplies allowed all applicable requirements of the Technical Specifications to be met, and no unreviewed safety question was involved.
r - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Stephen B. Bram N
Vics Presdent
/'
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Indian Point Station Broadway & Bleakley Avenue Buchanan, NY 10511 Telephone (914) 737-8116 March 30, 1989
)
Re:
Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 l
l Document Control Desk US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 1988 10 CFR $50.' 9(b) Report for Indian Point Unit No. 2
SUBJECT:
J Pursuant to 10 CFR $50.59(b)(2) enclosed please find a copy of Indian Point Unit No. 2's $50.59(b) changes, tests and experiments accomplished during 1988.
Several items completed in the early part of 1988 i
associated with the Cycle 8/9 Refueling Outage (which ended in January, 1988) were included in the 1987 report and have not been repeated here.
If you or your staff have any further questions, please contact Mr. Jude G. Del Percio, Manager, Regulatory Affairs.
Very truly yours, Enclosure cc:
Mr. William Russell Regional Administrator - Region I US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1498 Mr. Donald S. Brinkman, Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects I/II US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 14B-2 Washington, DC 20555 Senior Resident Inspector US Nuclear Regulatory Commission PO Box 38 Buchanan, NY 10511 1
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