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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217H8501999-10-14014 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 197 to License DPR-64 ML20206U2551999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-64 ML20244C3311989-04-10010 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 137 to License DPR-26 ML20215A7821986-05-0808 May 1986 Sser Re Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.3, Reactor Trip Breaker Automatic Shunt Trip. Licensee Should Submit Proposed Tech Specs Consistent W/Generic Ltr 85-09 Guidance for NRC Review.Salp Input Also Encl ML20028C3851983-01-0505 January 1983 Safety Evaluation Re Environ Qualification of safety-related Electrical Equipment.Continued Operation Presents No Undue Risk.Two Major Qualification Deficiencies Listed ML20052H3621982-05-10010 May 1982 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 44 to License DPR-64 ML19345E7771981-01-15015 January 1981 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 34 to License DPR-64 ML19340E6121980-12-18018 December 1980 Safety Evaluation Re Susceptibility of safety-related Sys to Flooding from Failure of Noncategory I Sys ML20062D2601978-11-0606 November 1978 Safety Eval Supporting Amend 18 to Facil Oper Lic DPR-64 for Subj Facil.Changes Incl Reduction in Maximum Pressurizer Heatup Rate & Change in Definition of Quadrant Pwr Tilt Ratio ML20062C9391978-10-17017 October 1978 Safety Eval Supporting Amend 42 to Facil Oper Lic DPR-26. Concludes That No Harm Will Ensue 1999-02-09
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H8501999-10-14014 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 197 to License DPR-64 ML20206U2551999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 187 to License DPR-64 ML20236Y1571998-08-0303 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re ASTM A351,GR. CF8 Matl at Indian Point Being Out of Specifications in Molybdenum & Chromium.Cause & Corrective Actions Are Not Stated ML20236V4281998-07-13013 July 1998 Safety Evaluation of TRs WCAP-14333P & WCAP-14334NP, PRA of RPS & ESFAS Test Times & Completion Times. Repts Acceptable ML20236T5511998-06-24024 June 1998 Consolidated Edison Co of Ny,Indian Point Unit 2,Drill Scenario Number 1998C ML20248B2371998-03-31031 March 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for March 1998 for Indian Point Station Unit 2 ML17264A9381997-07-10010 July 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Potential Safety Hazard Associated w/FM-Alco 251 Engin,High Pressure Fuel tube-catalog: 4401031-2 in Which Dual Failure Mode Exists.Caused by Incorrect Forming Process ML18153A1431997-06-10010 June 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Machining Defect in Certain Stainless Steel Swagelok Tube Fitting Bodies.Facilities Have Been Notified About Possible Problem ML20210E3591997-03-27027 March 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Sorrento Electronics Inc Has Determined Operation & Maint Manual May Not Adequately Define Requirements for Performing Periodic Surveillance of SR Applications.Caused by Hardware Failures.Revised RM-23A ML1005008001997-02-28028 February 1997 Conditional Extension of Rod Misalignment TS for Indian Point 3. ML20115J3981996-07-22022 July 1996 Interim Part 21 Rept Re 3/4 Schedule 80 Pipe Furnished to Consolidated Power Supply.Investigation Revealed Only One Nuclear Customer Involved in Sale of Matl ML20096E5101995-12-31031 December 1995 Resubmitted Rev 13 to QA Program 05000286/LER-1994-010, :on 941007,concluded That at Least Two EDGs Inoperable During June 1992 Surveillance Test of Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Surveillance Test Revised1994-11-0707 November 1994
- on 941007,concluded That at Least Two EDGs Inoperable During June 1992 Surveillance Test of Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Surveillance Test Revised
ML17059A3611994-07-0606 July 1994 Emergency Action Level Verification & Validation Rept. ML17311A0181994-05-13013 May 1994 New York State EAL Upgrade Project Verification & Validation Rept. ML20029C7801994-03-31031 March 1994 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1994 for Indian Point Unit 1. W/940415 Ltr ML20056E5171993-08-31031 August 1993 Technical Review Rept, Tardy Licensee Actions ML20062J2281993-07-23023 July 1993 Consolidated Edison Co of Ny Indian Point Unit 2,Drill Scenario 1993 ML20044B8461993-03-0404 March 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Safety Implications in Motor Operated Valve Evaluation Software Program Re Use of Total Thrust Multiplier.Utils Advised of Problem & Recommended Corrective Action in Encl Customer Bulletin 92-06 ML20118A2681992-12-31031 December 1992 Consolidated Edison Co of Ny Indian Point,Unit 2 Exercise Scenario,1992 ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20096H2301992-05-21021 May 1992 Special Rept:On 920504,south Side Lower Electrical Tunnel Detection Sys 8 Taken Out of Svc for Mod to Reposition Detection Sys Run of Conduit.Detection Sys Declared Operable on 920520 After Mod Completed & Sys Retested ML20079F9181991-05-31031 May 1991 Structural Evaluation of Indian Point,Units 2 & 3 Pressurizer Surge Lines,Considering Effects of Thermal Stratification ML20059E9461990-08-31031 August 1990 Nonproprietary Rev 2 to Indian Point 2 Tube Fatigue Reevaluation ML20059G2011990-07-31031 July 1990 Final Rept on Steam Generator Insp, Repair & Restoration Efforts During 1990 Midcycle Insp ML20058K4151990-06-30030 June 1990 Steam Generator Insp,Repair & Restoration Program Presentation to Nrc ML20058K4121990-06-30030 June 1990 Status Rept,Indian Point Unit 2 Mid-Cycle Steam Generator Insp Presentation to Nrc ML20043A4891990-05-30030 May 1990 Nonproprietary Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Insp, Repair & Restoration Program JPN-90-035, New York Power Authority Annual Rept for 19891989-12-31031 December 1989 New York Power Authority Annual Rept for 1989 ML19332B9371989-11-30030 November 1989 Nonproprietary Info Presented to NRC Re Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Secondary Side Loose Objects. ML19332D6661989-10-31031 October 1989 Nonproprietary Rev 2 to Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Girth Weld/Feedwater Nozzles Rept Spring,1989 Outage. ML20247J8161989-07-31031 July 1989 Safety Evaluation for UHS Temp Increase to 95 F at Indian Point Unit 3 05000286/LER-1989-013-01, :on 890702,contractor Security Guard Was Found Asleep at Duty Post.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error. Contract Security Officer Involved in Event Was Dismissed. All Security Personnel Reapprised of Responsibilities1989-07-28028 July 1989
- on 890702,contractor Security Guard Was Found Asleep at Duty Post.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error. Contract Security Officer Involved in Event Was Dismissed. All Security Personnel Reapprised of Responsibilities
ML20248D3631989-06-30030 June 1989 Rev 1,to Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Fluence & Ref Temp PTS Evaluations ML20248B3171989-06-30030 June 1989 Rev 1 to Nonproprietary WCAP-12294, Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Girth Weld/Feedwater Nozzles Rept,Spring 1989 Outage ML20247N5331989-05-31031 May 1989 Nonproprietary Indian Point Unit 2 Steam Generator Girth Weld/Feedwater Nozzles Rept Spring,1989 Outage ML20247J8071989-05-31031 May 1989 Containment Margin Improvement Analysis for Indian Point Unit 3 ML20247G5171989-04-30030 April 1989 Monthly Maint Category I Rept Pages from Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1989 for Indian Point 05000286/LER-1989-007, :on 890321,unauthorized Access Into Protected Area by Former Employee Utilizing Photo Identification Badge of Another Contract Employee Occurred.Caused by Security Guard Error.Security Retrained1989-04-17017 April 1989
- on 890321,unauthorized Access Into Protected Area by Former Employee Utilizing Photo Identification Badge of Another Contract Employee Occurred.Caused by Security Guard Error.Security Retrained
ML20244C3311989-04-10010 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 137 to License DPR-26 ML20248F4211989-03-31031 March 1989 NSSS Stretch Rating-3,083.4 Mwt Licensing Rept 05000286/LER-1989-001, :on 890204,initiated Safety Injection Via High Steam Flow Safety Injection Logic.Caused by Uneven Refilling of Steam Flow Instrumentation Lines.Safety Injecton Terminated & Plant Cooldown Proceeded1989-03-0303 March 1989
- on 890204,initiated Safety Injection Via High Steam Flow Safety Injection Logic.Caused by Uneven Refilling of Steam Flow Instrumentation Lines.Safety Injecton Terminated & Plant Cooldown Proceeded
ML20235V5931989-03-0202 March 1989 Special Rept:During Cycle 6/7 Refueling Outage Scheduled from Feb-May 1989,openings Will Be Made in Plant Penetration Fire Barriers in Order to Install Various Mods. Fire Watches Posted & Fire Detection Tests Completed 05000286/LER-1989-003-01, :on 890205,security Gate Found Unlocked.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Upgrade of Security Procedure 4, Compensatory Measures to Clearly Define Methods of Establishing,Maintaining & Closing Posts Performed1989-02-23023 February 1989
- on 890205,security Gate Found Unlocked.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Upgrade of Security Procedure 4, Compensatory Measures to Clearly Define Methods of Establishing,Maintaining & Closing Posts Performed
ML20248F3001988-12-31031 December 1988 10CFR50.59(b) Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed in 1988 ML20246E2711988-12-31031 December 1988 Con Edison 1988 Annual Rept ML20196D3011988-10-31031 October 1988 Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program for Indian Point Unit 2 Analysis of Capsule V ML20155H2541988-09-30030 September 1988 Rev 2 to Indian Point Unit 2 (NRC Bulletin 88-008 Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to RCS) Indentification of Unisolable Piping & Determination of Insp Locations ML20154M5661988-08-31031 August 1988 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1988 for Indian Point Station Unit 2 1999-02-09
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,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION P
't WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555.0001 SAFETY E\\ ALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.197 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-64 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 3 DOCKET NO. 50-286
1.0 INTRODUCTION
j By letter dated January 29,1999, as supplemented by letter dated August 2,1999, the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY or the licensee) submitted amendments to modify Indian Point Unit 3 (IP3) Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.10.5, " Rod Misalignment Limitations" and 3.10.6, " Inoperable Rod Position Indicator Channels" and their associated BASES. The proposed amendments would allow 24 steps misalignment (currently it is 18 steps), at or below 85% of Rated Thermal Power (RTP). Above 85% of RTP, the indicated misalignment between the group step counter demand position and the analog rod position indicator shall remain less than or equal to 12 steps. The proposed change is based on an evaluation performed by Westinghouse (WCAP-14668).
The licensee's experience with the Analog Rod Position Indication (ARPI) System shows that indicated misalignment is of ten greater than 12 steps. The root cause of this phenomenon is the analog rod position indication variation with temperature, most often after a recent power level change.
i IP3 has modified TS 3.10.5.1 to allow up to 1 hour after control rod motion to verify control rod position. The 1 hour time period is consistent with the NRC approved time extensions at other i
plants.
J Westinghouse performed the evaluations of the effects of increasing the allowed control rod indicated misalignment from t12 steps to an indicated misalignment of up to *24 steps when the core power is less than or equal to 85% of RTP and i12 steps above 85% of RTP.
Changing the TS to allow t 24 steps misalignment will reduce the use of the flux mapping system. Frequent use of the flux mapping system may lead to more maintenance work required on the system, and an "As Low as is Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA) concern. The results of the analyses were documented in WCAP-14668, and submitted to the staff by PASNY letter IPN-97-024 dated February 26,1997. A review of the results is presented below.
2.0 SAFETY EVALUATION
-The ARPI system is designed to an accuracy of 12 steps. Therefore,in order to guarantee a rod misalignment of less than i 24 steps (12 steps misalignment + 12 steps ARPI uncertainty),
- the individual ARPl readings must be no larger than 12 steps. In order to justify changing the misalignment to 24 steps, the licensee did evaluations for misalignments of up to 36 steps 9910220209 901014 PDR ADOCK 05000286 P
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(12 steps indicated and 24 steps uncertainty). The TS limits on peaking factors F,and F,s increase as the power level lowers. The increase in the limit for F,and F,s was used to accommodate the larger than *12 steps misalignment at the reduced power levels.
.The Westinghouse Advanced Nodal Computer Code (ANC) (WCAP-10965-P-A, September 1986) in the three dimensional mode was used for the analysis. Full core and quarter core models were used in the analyses. The calculations were performed by Westinghouse and documented in Topical Report WCAP-14668, as part of the submittal.
2.1 Core Models Used and Misalianment Cases Analyzed To perform the analysis of the possible rod misalignments, Westinghouse used two different ANC models of the IP3 core. The first modelis the currently operating Cycle 9, and represents the current IP3 licensing basis for fuel products and peaking factor lirnits. The second model used is intended to represent a " Bounding" future cycle; it uses higher enrichments, longer cycle length, higher peaking factors, and more burnable absorbers which may be present in future cycles.
I The number and type of rod misalignments were limited to those permitted by the failure mode and effects analysis performed by Westinghouse and presented in WCAP-14668, for the rod control system. The evaluation was limited io eingle failures, because multiple failures are not j
considered reasonable precursors of rod misalignment since there is frequent surveillance of rod position.
2.2 Misalianment Calculations 2.2.1 Analysis Results for Power s85%
To maximize effect, the licensee assumed misalignment from the power dependent insertion limit (PDIL) in order to determine the power level at which the peaking factor increase due to misalignment would be acceptable. The licensee analyzed misalignment of groups of rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) in the control bank since it is more probable that the RCCAs in one group would mis-step rather than different RCCAs from different groups would mis-step. Single RCCA misalignment calculations were also performed, i
The licensee's evaluation of operation at or below 85% RTP, indicated that rod misalignments
- for up to 124 steps between the group step counter demand position and the analog rod position indicator (ARPI), may be allowed because of the additional peaking factor margin that is introduced by the reduction in the power level. The analysis showed that the margin requirements for F s and F,(Z) are 3.5% and 6.3%, respectively, for a misalignment of 224 3
steps indicated. ' The increased limits for F s and F, exceed these values prior to operation at or 3
below 85% of RTP. The licensee concluded, therefore, that the increase in allowed indicated misalignment is acceptable. The staff concurs with this conclusion and finds that an indicated misalignment of up to 24 steps is acceptable under 85% RTP. Above 85% RTP, the number of misaligned steps remains the same, that is, 12 steps.
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<. ' 2.3 ' Safety Analyses Parameters.
The safety analyses parameters that are. expected to be affected by the increase in the rod misalignment are the rod insertion allowance (RIA), the ejected rod F,(Z) and the ejected rod worth (delta Rho ). The_ licensee's analyses (conducted throughout the power range), show l
es that the maximum effect on the RlA will occur upon the misalignment of all the rods at the rod
' insertion limit (RIL)in the inserted direction. Analysis of the results showed that the RfA increased as a result of the misalignment, consequently, the RfA for the reload safety evaluation was increased to 160 pcm to conservatively bound this effect.
Rod ejection was also analyzed subject to misalignment of individual rods, groups and entire banks of rods. The subsequent effects on F,(z) and delta Rho were determined. Results of es the analysis indicated that an increase of 1.5% in F,(z) and 3.0% iri delta Rho ; must be e
included in the safety analyses to bound the projected effects when a cycle specific analysis is not performed. The staff finds this acceptable.
RCCA misalignments up to 36 steps (24 steps indicated + 12 steps ARPI) have been evaluated
. for impact on peaking factors and reactivity worth. The results of the analysis showed that the incrementalincreases in the peaking factors were only a small fraction of the increase in the peaking factor limits for powers less than 85%. The change in reactivity worth was also shown to be well within the excess margin available. Thus it has been shown that the increase in peaking factors will be accommodated at or below 85% of RTP and the change to the technical specification to allow misalignment of up to 24 steps is acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance_with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significan' hange in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 29713). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental j
impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
I The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there l
L is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the i
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- Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: A. Attard Date: (ttober 14,1999 L}}