ML20041E275
| ML20041E275 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1982 |
| From: | Lundvall A BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8203100316 | |
| Download: ML20041E275 (65) | |
Text
BALTI M O R E GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER P.O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 ARTHUR E. LUNDVALL. JR.
v.CE PsatSWd sum, Mgpch 1, lgh2 Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of truelear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washingten, D. C. 20555
Subject:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units Nos.1 & 2; Dockets Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Control of Heavy Ioads
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
Enclosed are forty copies of our phase two report providing you with the information requested in paragraphs 2.2, 2.3 and 2.h of your Decenber 22, 1980 letter. This is the final report of our review and evaluation of the Control of Heavy Loads at Calvert Cliffs in accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG-0612.
Very truly yours, ,f.
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R. E. Architzel - NRC REC 5HfED ,
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Hr.vy Lords , ,
- 1. Summary This report constitutes the BG&E "9 month" response to the NRC letter of December 22, 1980 on NUREG-0612. The following is a summary of our results:
- 1. We have presented our results in a question and response format in Section 11 of this document.
- 2. All loads and load paths identified in our six month submittal (as updated) have been evaluated against the request of sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 of Enclosure 3 to your letter.
- 3. Lift height restrictions and use of mechanical stops, in addition to existing limit switches, assure the acceptability of operations of the cask handling crane in the spent fuel pool vicinity. Limit switch modifications are already engineered.
- 4. Lift restrictions will be imposed in the vicinity of the reactor vessel during refueling and cold shutdown to minimize the potential for a load drop which would not meet the intent of NUREG-0612.
- 5. Restrictions on lift height and load block travel above the refueling floor elevation in the Auxiliary Building, will preclude any possible problems. A drop of one of several of the loads from that elevation through the hatch to ground elevation could cause penetration of the load through the building. Crane and lift rig design reviews indicate
- that the potential for this drop to occur is very low. Based on l
l probable areas of impact, we have concluded the this drop would not inhibit safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
- 6. The general containment area has been evaluated based on all identified heavy lif ts being performed during cold shutdown. No heavy loads have been identified which are, by procedure, handled during a mode other than cold shutdown or refueling. A1:;o , no accident was l
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identified which resulted in complete loss of capability to cool the core or to inject boron.
- 7. Some limitations on lift height in conjunction with the area load paths will assure that lifts in the intake structure area can be acceptably performed.
- 8. Several areas have been excluded from consideration under the NUREG based on performance of load drop analyses on structures.
- 9. Discussions on criticality and of f-site doses are presented in the text. A table is presented showing parameters of the NUREG of f-site dose generic analysis vs. Calvert Clif fs values.
- 10. A summary table and discussion of the drop analyses is also included in Table 3.
- 11. We have concluded as a result of this review and in view of the results of our "6 month" submittal that with the changes discussed herein Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 heavy load handling operations meet the intent of NUREG-0612.
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Sacticn 2.2 II. Responses to December 22, 1980 Letter 2.2 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools
- 1. Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool.
Response
Item 1. Spent Fuel Handling Bridge -
Item 2. Spent Fuel Cask Crane - 150T/15T cap.
Item 3. Spent Fuel Jib Crane - 300# cap.
Item 4. Spent Fuel Transfer Machine Jib Crane - 6T cap.
Equipment is not assigned a particular designator.
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Saction 2.2
- 2. Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that for any failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel-storage pool.
Response
Item 1 (spent fuel handling bridge) is excluded on the basis that only spent fuel assemblies may be carried. Item 3 (spent fuel jib crane) in excluded based on its maximum capacity being less than that of a heavy load. A heavy load is defined as greater than 1600# per our 6 month submittal.
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, i H22vy Lords - -
Smetion 2.2
- 3. Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1 above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handlir.g-system (i.e., crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
?
Response
Calvert Cliffs has no single-failure-proof cranas. The purchase specification indicates that the cask crane shall have no loss of function at rated load during a seismic event. Additional discussion on cask handling around the pool with respect to likelihood of a load drop can be found in response to section 2.4.
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Hr.vy Lecds *
- Ssction 2,2
- 4. For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria 1 through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crano:
- a. Which alternatives (e.g., 2, 3, or 4) from those identified in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2. have been selected.
Response
In this area we have evaluated the cask handling crane, main and auxiliary hooks (Item 2), to Alternative 3 of Section 5.1.2 of NUREG 0612. The transfer machine jib crane (Item 4) has been evaluated under Alternative 4. These evaluations are discussed in Attachment 1.
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. 4 H rvy Leeds S2ction 2.2 4.b. If Alternative 2 or 3 is selected, discuss the crane motion limitation imposed by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops and indicate the circumstances, if any, under which these protective devices may be bypassed or removed.
Discuss any administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of bypass or removal, and provide any related or proposed technical specification (operational and surveillance) provided to ensure the operability of such electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
(NUREG Section 5.1.2, Alternate 3, item 6, is similar to the above and is answered in this response.)
Response
The spent fuel cask handling crane travel evaluated under Alternative 3, is presently being modified to be limited as shown on Exhibit 1.
These limitations are imposed by electrical interlocks which are verified during spent fuel cask handling operations, to be operable within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once every 7 days thereafter per Technical Specification 3.9.13.
As discussed under our Response to Question 2.2-4.d. " hot" spent fuel will be restricted to the containment end of the spent fuel pool. In order to limit crane proximity to the pool area during daily operations, mechanical stops will be installed on the bridge rails at a reasonable distance outside of the pool boundary (refer to Exhibit 1).
" Hot" spent fuel as used in this submittal is clarified from the NUREG definition to mean the group of irradiated fuel assemblies removed from the core within 45 day of the previous refueling.
Spent fuel pool area filters are operable whenever there is irradiated fuel in the pool per technical specification 3.9.12.
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Hasvy Lo do Section 2.2 Should it be necessary to remove these stops for any reason within 45 days of the last " hot" fuel movement (refueling), mechanical stops l will be installed to prohibit closer than a 25' approach by the l trolley to the area designated for " hot" spent fuel. The time limit specified above is conservative based on Figure 2.1-1 in NUREG-0612 and will limit of f-site dose to less than k of the 10CFR100 limits with as much as a full core of " hot" fuel damage. Mechanical stop and time restrictions will be imposed should a full core of " hot" spent fuel be placed in the pool.
The physical limitations of the crane will prevent the auxiliary hook from overflying the area designated for " hot" spent fuel based on the presence of a normal refueling complement of " hot" fuel. Those limits will not allow the trolley within approximately 15' of that area in Unit 1 and 20' in Unit 2.
The requirements discussed above will be incorporated into operating procedures and crane operator training. The procedures will also require the operator to verify fuel location and condition (i.e. decay time) prior to a load handling operation.
I The above considerations are over and above enforcement of load paths
, specified for heavy loads and implementation of technical specification 3.9.7 prohibiting loads over 1600 pounds from being
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handled over stored spent fuel. Also considered are both the recently modified Unit I storage rack configuration, soon to be implemented in the Unit 2 pool and the existing Unit 2 racks.
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. 4 Her.vy Lecds S2ction 2.2 4.c. Where reliance is placed on crane operational limitations with respect to the time of the storage of certain quantities of spent fuel at specific post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain
! valid.
I
Response
The time constraint on fuel handling operations is that 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> must elapse af ter shutdown prior to any handling of irradiated fuel, per technical specification 3.9.3.
The mechanical stop limitations on the cask crane discussed under our response to Question 2.2-4.b indicate that a limitation on trolley movement over " hot" fuel areas of the pool will not be required 45 days after completion of the last fuel transfer of a refueling.
Procedural requirements discussed in that response including the restriction of loads over 1600 pounds from overflying stored spent fuel and operator training will be relied upon to ensure compliance.
The transfer machine jib crane operation analysis considers limitations as discussed above.
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. S H3:vy Lords Saction 2.2 4.d. Where reliance is placed on the physical location of specific fuel modules at certain post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.
(NUREC Section 5.1.2, Alternative 3, item a, is similar to the above and is answered in this response).
Response-Presently the most recently of f-loaded fuel assemblies are stored at the containment end of the spent fuel pool. This requirement will be incorporated into fuel handling procedures to ensure continuation of this practice.
Placement of spent fuel assemblies in the pool was considered in the response to Question 2.2-4.b and in the discussion of handling of heavy loads over the pool based on non-compliance with procedure requirements in Attachment 1. We feel that based on those discussions that controls discussed in this response will further increase the safety of those operations.
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'b Hecvy Locda Saction 2.2
- e. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III should conform to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3 or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed. ,
Response
Analyses performed to meet the intent of this NUREG required no exceptions to Appendix A. The information requested in your Attachments 2, 3, or 4, as required, is presented in Table 3.
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H2svy Lords S2ction 2.3 2.3 Specific Requirements of Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Containment 9
- 1. Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks of operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel.
Response
Polar Cranes 180T/25T (one per unit).
- 2. Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling-system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel.
Response
The polar crane hook must overfly the core during several phases of refueling and therefore is not excluded.
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H2cvy Lords Ssction 2.3 1
- 3. Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1, above, which you have :
evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612. Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
Response
Calvert Cliffs polar crancs are not single-failure-proof, however purchase specifications indicate a requirement that, no loss of function shall occur from scismic events while lifting the rated load (As requested in Section 2.4-2.d.1.).
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. i H uvy Lords Section 2.3
- 4. For cranes identified in 3.2-1, above not categorized according to 2.3-3 demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1 are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your response to Section 2.4 of this request.
With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of J
your evaluation of crane operation in the containment and your determinatf en of compliance. This response should include the fellowing information for each crane:
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- a. Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action.
j Discuss any related or proposed technical specification i concerning the bypassing of such interlocks.
Response
No mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are installed on the polar cranes to restrict travel.
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'Her.vy Lords Saction 2.3 4.b. Where reliance is placed on other, site-specific considerations (e.g., refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the continued validity of such considerations.
Response
Calvert Cliffs refueling sequence was used as a criteria in determining possible effects on the core due to a heavy load drop. This sequence is presently controlled by the Prerequisites sections of the various procedures and by outage schedules. We do not feel that additional technical specifications are required.
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H::vy Locd3 Sactica 2.3 4.c. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria 1 through III should conform with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.
Response
Table 2 shows a comparison of the NUREG and drop analyses premises with the Calvert Cliffs plant parameters. A review of that table indicates that our plant is encog assed by the generic analysis.
BG&E has not contracted with Combustion Engineering to perform drop analyses on their equipment. These lifts must be made as part of opening the vessel. We believe the additional precautions discussed below enhance the safety of those operations to the maximum extent practical.
CRITERIA I Based on figure 2.1-1 of the NUREG, at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after shutdown (3 days - the time required before irradiated fuel movement per technical specification 3.9.3), only the fuel rods of one complete assembly need be ruptured before is of the 10CFR100 guidelines would be violated (charcoal filters are not required to be in operation in containment by a technical specification).
l In addition, preliminary refueling operations may occur prior to l 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The equipment most likely to be involved in an accident which j might result in fuel rod rupture based on the close proximity of i
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H;cvy Locds Ssction 2.3 the load to the vessel, would be the RV head and its lift rig, the upper guide structure (UGS) and its lift rig, and the load block. These first two operations would only be of major concern during initial removal as refuelings generally last several weeks thereby allowirg greater decay times before these operations are repeated, and so decreasing, the potential of off-site doses exceeding limitations.
When the reactor vessel is open fuel is subject to possible direct impact from only the upper guide structure, the UGS lift rig, the par device, and the polar crane load block. The UGS and its lift rig would impact the UGS seating areas first -
UGS flange seat is at the top of the vessel. Any objects (not exclusively heavy loads) not listed above will be prevented by administrative controls from overflying the vessel when the head is removed, as discussed below.
Other heavy loads will not directly impact fuel. The vessel head, the head lift rig, neutron shielding framework parts, and the pool ring seal may impact the vessel but are physically too large to make initial contact with the core or are handled with the head installed. These latter objects have a lower magnitude potential for damage based on weight and configuration than the head drop which is discussed below.
The following discussion presents our approach to this problem and the steps we will implement to assure an increased margin of confidence.
Based on the statistics discussed in NUREG-0612 and controls on other aspects of the various lifts, we conclude that a reasonable and prudent measure to minimize the potential for occurrence of a load drop over the vessel vill be the exclusion of the load block from travel over the retueling canal while the vessel head is removed. Should the necessity to overfly the canal occur, travel Page 17
'H cvy Lords S2ction 2.3 over the end away from fuel transfer operations would be allowed.
A safe distance would be maintained from the vessel. That distance and a reference landmark will be indicated in the appropriate procedures. This precaution will also be included in ,
operator training.
. Combustion Engineering's CESSAR for their " System 80", similar to our CE NSSS, includes an analysis of various configurations of vessel head drops onto the vessel. These drops are based on a direct drop through water from 18 feet above the vessel. The results indicate only local damage is possible and no fuel damage would be anticipated.
Based on the " System 80" analysis results, we will restrict our lift height of the vessel head within one head diameter of the edge of the vessel. To assure conservatism, the lif t height will be well below that in the CE analysis. This will add a significant margin of safety for that move.
Lift height restrictions required to minimize the possibility of other heavy load drops over the vessel will be incorporated into heavy loads procedures. (Such a restriction presently restricts UGS lift height to approximately 18" over the canal floor in the vicinity of the vessel.)"
We believe that these restrictions will add sufficient overall confidence to the security of heavy loads movements, over and above existent precautions, to minimize the potential hazard.
CRITERIA II Criticality of the fuel due to a heavy load drop is deemed a low probability event in NUREG-0612. Exclusion of the load block from the canal area while the vessel is open will eliminate one Page 18
h nvy Lecds S2ction 2.3 of the major potential hazards to the fuel. The other restrictions discussed above, further reduce this already low potential.
The reactor vessel head and UGS must be moved over the open vessel. These operations, similar to the above discussion, would not result in direct impact on the fuel. As both lift rigs for these devices have been structurally evaluated during the 6-month submittal evaluation and found to be sound, although not in compliance with the later ANSI N14-6,- we feel that the reliability of these operations does not justify the expenditures required to assure single-failure-proof operation to further reduce the potential for criticality.
CRITERIA Ill Based on the above restrictions, we believe that we are minimizing the potential for a load drop on the vessel and at the same time minimizing the potential consequences if such a drop were to occur. These restrictions also reduce the potential for vessel leakage.
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'Harvy Lozda i Section 2.4 2.4 Specific requirements for overhead handling systems operating in plant areas containing equipment required for reactur shutdown, core decay heat removal, or spent fuel cooling.
- 1. Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the l
likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all' loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG -0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
t Response None of the overhead handling systems at Calvert Cliffs are single-failure-proof.
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H2cvy Lords Saction 2.4
- 2. For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided.
Response
Table 4 is a matrix form presentation of potential impact areas due to load drops. References have been made to drawings submitted with Phase 1. Where additional clarification is necessary, refer to plant drawings.
Discussion of the potential impact areas are included in the below listed sections which follow.
2.4.a Containment
- 1. Polar Crane II. Equipment Hatch Hoist 2.4.b Auxiliary Building
- 1. Spent Fuel Cask Crane II. Filter Cask Monorail III. Solid Waste Disposal Trolley Hoist IV. Main Steam Room Monorails V. Component Cooling Water Room Hoist 2.4.c Turbine Building I. Main and Auxiliary Cranes II. Switchgear Room Monorail 2.4.d Intake Structure Gantry Crane 2.4.e Diesel Generator Rooms Monorail 2.4.f Machine Shop Crane i
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- I H avy Lorda S:ction 2.4.s 1
2.4.a Containment I. Polar Crane As previously indicated, all heavy loads are handled during cold shutdown.
For any load drop in containment during cold shutdown, the worst case occurrence would be rupture of any safety injection, refuelit g pool drain, or charging line, resulting in draining the primary system to the reactor vessel nozzles. These occurrences disregard any credit for floors and structure. In addition, no detailed structural analyses were performed to reduce the effects of these occurrences.
Thus the following evaluation is conservative.
Additional safety injection and charging lines located around the loop will remain available following a load drop for continued injection of borated water. The shutdown cooling return line will not be usable should it be impacted. However, the borated refueling pool water
( > 300,000 gal.) would be available for recirculation through the containment sump. Both cooling and sub-criticality would be maintained under any forseeable circumstance during refueling and cold shutdown.
Some heavy loads will have non-specific paths and will be subject only to the restrictions of Section 2.3. A drop of one of these loads would not affect systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal other than similar systems discussed in this response. A drop affecting other systems in containment would not affect the ability of the safe shutdown / decay heat systems to perform their functions.
Since all heavy loads identified are handled during cold shutdown, plant mode became a major consideration in our analysis. This consideration substantially reduces the safe shutdown raceway Page 22
H2svy Lords Saction 2.4.a 3
necessary to maintain the plant in a safe condition. At the same time it similarly reduces the number of piping systems to be considered.
In addition, restriction of load movemeat to cooldown and refueling sequences allows some additional credit for systems drained or items no longer installed during a given lift.
Refueling sequence, by procedure, is generally not subject to variation as far as heavy loads movement is concerned. Sequencing of other outage related tasks including refueling is performed by a team which is responsible for scheduling the entire outage.
We conclude therefore, with the restrictions discussed in Section 2.3, the load paths previously submitted are acceptable and, along with paths established as a result of the NUREG, will be incorporated into their associated load handling procedures. Any necessary deviations will be evaluated in conjunction with this review.
II. Equipment Hatch Hoist This device is used solely to raise the containment equipment hatch to allow access for large pieces of equipment during cold shutdown. This is an infrequent lift.
] Based on review of locations of equipment required for cold shutdown, we are adding this device to the list of excluded systems for the six month submittal.
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'Hacvy Lords Ssction 2.4.b 2.4.b Auxiliary Building I. Spent Fuel Cask Crane The elevation on which the cask crane operates does not contain any safe shutdown equipment or cable. The major hazards involve drops of the cask, superstand, or core support barrel lift rig (stored in this area) in ways which would affect lower elevations. Specifically these would be 1) drops through the general floor area on the fuel storage elevation, 2) a drop into the cask wash pit and 3) a drop through the equipment unloading hatch.
Item 1) above can be eliminated as a potential hazard based on the 6 inch (nominal) lift height restriction for the spent fuel cask required to preclude rolling. Analysis indicates that no damage to lower elevations would be expected from such a drop 7
(sec Table 3). Other heavy loads normally carried in this area are the CE Superstand upper and lower sections and new fuel shipping casks. Limitations of lift height to 18" above the floor would conservatively eliminate any possibility of floor penetration for these items.
The new fuel shipping cask may in addition be lifted to a height sufficient to clear handrails within a cask length of the equipment hatch without posing an additional hazard.
With these constraints, unrestricted travel of those loads over the floor will be allowed (within the cask crane travel limit switch and mechanical stop allowables discussed in Section 2.2).
Analysis of the drop of the cask into the wash pit (item 2) shows that no damage due to penetration or spalling would af fect the Page 24
Hezvy Lorda S2ction 2.4.b spent fuel pool cooling equipment located below the pit (see Table 3). The cask is the limiting case.
Lifting of a cask containing spent fuel over the equipment hatch (item 3) constitutes the hazard presenting the greatest potential for damage as the first twenty-six feet of the drop are free fall.
Evaluation indicates that the cask, if dropped, would penetrate down through the lower elevations. Exact prediction of the path is not possible, nor is the prediction of the result of the spalling that will occur. The equipment indicated on Table 4 for this drop is SSD/DHR equipment located directly below the area of the equipment hatch and is evaluated as the most likely to be impacted. That review indicates that loss of a charging pump and loss of the boric acid pumps would be the result of this drop as it would affect SSD/DHR capability. However, safe shutdown and decay heat removal could still be accomplished by alternate means (See Table 4).
Additional reliance is placed in the result of the lifting arrangement discussion presented below. The lifting device (yoke) leased from the Nuclear Assurance Corporation with the cask is certified prior to delivery of the cask to have been designed to and to be in continued compliance with ANSI N14.6.
Our 6 month submittal indicated that the crane substantially met the latest requirements (CMAA-70-1975). The finalized structural design review indicates that the crane completely meets that standard. In addition, as with the polar cranes, the cask crane was required by purchase specification to retain its functional capability during a seismic event.
We conclude, therefore, that the adoption of the measures discussed above and reflection of them in our procedures assures us of a safer handling operation which will meet the intent of Page 25
'H avy LcIda S2ction 2.4.b the NUREG. No other reasonable options which would significantly af fect the reliability of this move have been identified.
In addition, no reasonable measures that would have a significant influence on the safety of this lift have been identified, therefore, we conclude that only the steps stated above and the reflection of those steps in procedures need to be implemented for the cask.
Lifting of the new fuel cask or the superstands over the equipment hatch constitutes a similar hazard to the spent fuel cask. Evaluation indicates that should a new fuel cask drop, the elevation (45') floor would successfully sustain the impact. A free drop of the superstand or the core support barrel lift rig would penetrate El. 45 in a manner similar to the spent fuel cask. The list of potentially damaged SSD/DHR equipment is the same for both.
The CE Superstand sections are brought on site during or just before a refueling. Their lift rigs are also supplied by CE.
The lift rigs have been tested to 125% of rated load by CE and are visually examined prior to each use. This is in accordance with plant procedures (CCI-219A).
The core support barrel lift rig is used very infrequently. When it is, the rig is lifted directly by the crane hook.
Based on this data and the qualification of the crane discussed above, we conclude that the safety of these lif ts would not be significantly increased by any reasonably additional measures.
Other heavy load lifts performed in the area will also be restricted to lift height of (nominal) 18" above the El. 69' floor in order to eliminate any possibility of penetration or spalling.
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. . . . - . . . - _ . . ~ _ _ . .
Hazvy Lords Szetion 2.4.b II. Filter Cask Monorail The drop analysis indicates that a filter cask drop anywhere under the monorail path from the maximum lift height will not penetrate the El. 45' floor. Any doses resulting from this drop will be as a result of fixed contamination in the local area.
We conclude therefore that this handling system will be considered excluded from the scope of the NUREG.
III. Solid Waste Disposal Trolley Hoist The only heavy loads handled by this hoist are the filter and resin casks. No damage other than local contamination will result from a drop of either of these loads.
As there are no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment or cable at the elevation or below it, we will consider this handling system excluded from the scope of the NUREG.
IV. Main Steam Room Monorails A drop from the maximum lift height will not penetrate the floor or cause spalling below. The lifts must occur with the plant in cold shutdown by the nature of the equipment. Damage, if feasible, to either main steam line would not affect the maintenance of safe shutdown or affect decay heat removal.
Damage to auxiliary feedwater turbine steam admission cables or piping will not affect safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability as the auxiliary feedwater system is not required when this lift would be made.
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'H cvy Lords Ssetion 2.4.b Based on separation between elevations and the presence of no SSD/DHR equipment for the associated mode of operation, this handling system is excluded from the scope of the NUREG.
V. _ Component Cooling Water (CCW) Room Hoist This hoist is used only to lift a spool of component cooling water piping. The train of CCW being worked on is already out of service. No penetration of the floor is possible and only the one train of CCW would be affected.
Therefore, we will consider this system as eliminated from consideration under the NUREG.
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Hnvy Lords Saction 2.4.c 2.4.c 1. Turbine Building As indicated in the Table 4, the hazards in the turbine building are salt water system piping and raceway located below the floor slab on El. 12'-0" (the cranes are located over El. 45'-0") and cable located at El. 39'.
Two areas of interest exist. The first is located along the Unit 1/ Unit 2 centerline and the second on the west side of the Unit 1 area.
In the first area, our analysis indicates that under the worst conditions of the lift, the piping and conduit below the basement floor would not be damaged. However, the tray (at El. 39')
containing cable for CV-5149 (one unit) would be affected. This valve is required to be closed for safe shutdown and fails in that position. An additional cable has been identified for this mode in this area _ subsequent to our original submittal. It is addressed in Table 4. A redundant instrument to that one will be installed as a result of the Auxiliary Feedwater Modification.
We conclude, that there is no effect on the area evaluation.
In the second area, the system piping comes above the floor elevation and would be damaged by a load drop. However, these lines are system return lines which are at the point of discharge to the circulating water canal to the bay. Damage to these lines would af fect enly Unit 1 should they be blocked off, however, cooldown of the unit could be effected using Unit 2's salt water and component cooling water systems.
We conclude therefore that restrictions on the turbine cranes are not necessary to assure safe shutdown and they are considered excluded from the scope of the NUREG.
Page 29
"Hzcvy LoIds Ssetion 2.4.c II. Switchgear Room Monorail These monorails are located above El. 45' (rail at El. 64')
outside each unit's switchgear room in the heater bay area (turbine hall).
A review of drawings for SSD/DHR piping and cable on the elevations below this hoist indicates that only service water piping on Elevation 12' might be affected by a load drop in this area. (Salt water piping (El. 5') will not be af fected based on the generator rotor drop analysis). The Turbine Building service water return is isolated from the main system by two. series non-return valves. The supply line only affects one train of service water and a break would be isolable.
We conclude therefore that a heavy load drop by either of these monorails would have no effect on safe shutdown or decay heat removal systems and we will consider it excluded from the scope of NUREG-0612.
Page 30
lh vy Lo2ds Szction 2.4.d 2.4.d Intake Structure Gantry Crane Results of the drop analysis shown in Exhibit 2 indicate the necessity to limit the lift height of a circulating water pump motor.
The inoperability of one unit's salt water system does not affect safe shutdown as the other unit's salt water and component cooling (CCW) systems can be lined up to the affected unit through the CCW system. This indicates that the area along the Unit 1/2 centerline, between circulating water system pumps 16 and 21, could be a problem. The potential for damage is the possibility of impacting the lines of both units in that area.
The circulating water pump motor lift is, however, straight up through the hatch. Once above the roof line crane travel is unrestricted by mechanical or electrical means and travel over the area discussed above is possible. The load path previously submitted (refer to Exhibit C, SK-ME-102 SH of 8) indicates all lifts over the intake structure pump room are restricted to east-west movement (parallel- to the centerline axis between units). This restriction is reflected in the procedure for this area. The load path east of that area, as indicated in the errata to that drawing, is unrestricted.
We conclude that the load path over the intake structure regardless of the equipment being lifted, is adequate. Lift height however will be restricted by procedure based on the drop analysis summarized in Table 3 as an added precaution.
1 Pnge 31
ibevy Lo:dn S:ction 2.4.o 2.4.c Diesel Generator Room Monorail Work involving the hoisting of heavy loads in this area would only be performed when the particular diesel in not available for service already. Any drop of a load, while doing local damage to the diesci, will not directly affect safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability.
Piping or cabic of another diesel would be affected by a drop in a particular diesel room. Cooling water is isolated prior to disassembly. We conclude that there is no further necessity to include these systems in the scope of the NUREC and we are considering them excluded.
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E :vy Lords Szetion 2.4.f 2.4.f Machine Shop (Service Building)
Dropping of the rated load in this area from over 9' above the floor (maximum hook height is 14' above the floor), could result in penetration of the shop floor by the load. Should penetration to the basement floor occur, no damage to embedded conduit would be expected based on the results of the generator rotor analysis for the turbine building, i
Damage to cable at El. 39' for CV-5149 would cause it to fail in the position required for safe shutdown.
Based on this information, we conclude that this system can be excluded from the scope of the NUREG.
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Harvy Lecd2 Attachment 1 111. Attachment 1 To Section 2.2 NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.2 Response Spent Fuel Pool Area - PWR This attachment addresses requirements listed under the above section of the NUREG.
Option 3 - Cask Handling Crane (a) " Hot" spent fuel should be concentrated in one location in the spent fuel pool that is separated as much as possible from load paths.
Response
At Calvert Cliffs, the most recently off-loaded portion of the core or a completely off-loaded core if need be, will, by procedure, be stored at the pool end furthest from where any heavy load would be handled (nearest the fuel transfer system). Refer to our response to 2.2-4.d for additional discussion.
Page A-1
H:svy Lords Attachment 1 (b) Mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to prevent movement of the overhead crane load block over or within 25 feet horizontal (7.5 m) of the " hot" spent fuel. To the extent practical, loads should be moved over load paths that avoid the spent fuel pool and kept at least 25 feet (7.5 m) from the " hot" spent fuel unless necessary. When it is t.ucessary to bring loads within 25 feet of the restricted region, these mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should not be bypassed unless the spent fuel has decayed suf ficiently as shown in Table 2.1-1 and 2.1-2, or unless the total inventory of gap activity for fuel within the protected area would result in offsite doses less than % of 10 CFR Part 100 if released, and such bypassing should require the approval from the shift supervisor (or other designated plant management individual). The mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be verified to be in place and operational prior to placing " hot" spent fuel in the pool.
Response
Refer to our response to 2.2-4.b. for discussion of this item.
Page A-2
'Hsevy Lords Attcchment 1 (c) Mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to restrict crane travel from areas where a postulated load drop could damage equipment from redundant or alternate safe shutdown paths.
Analyses have demonstrated that a postulated load drop in any location not restricted by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops would not cause damage that could result in criticality, cause leakage that could uncover the fuel, or cause loss of safe shutdown equipment.
Response
Within the pool boundary, there is spent fuel pool cooling inlet and return piping for each unit. In the cask drop analysis, embedded piping has been shown not to be affected by that drop. Mechanical stops and electrical interlocks discussed in response to Question 2.2-4c will limit the potential to impact exposed ends of that piping, however as two of the suction nozzles are separated by about 20' system operability will not be affected.
The heavy loads listed in Table 3 which are handled in the spent fuel pool area by the cask crane have been analyzed for ef fects resulting from a postulated drop. These analyses in part consider accidental deviations from a designated load path which occur in areas not restricted by interlocks.
Section 2.2.5 of the NUREG discusses conservatism in the generic criticality analysis and concludes that the potential for criticality in a pool containing only spent fuel is negligible. The new Unit I racks at Calvert Cliffs contain poison, the pool water both units is borated, (* 2300 ppm), and any impacted array would be much smaller than half the pool capacity. Discharge enrichments range f rom 0.75 presently to about 1.0 once conversion to 4.05 enrichment fuel is cotyete in 1985 (all values in w/o U-235).
Page A-3
M nvy Lord:
Attcchment 1 We conclude that following a load drop into the spent fuel pool the potential for criticality is negligible.
Page A-4
liasvy Lords Attechment 1 (d) To preclude rolling, if dropped, the cask should not be carried at a height higher than necessary and in no case more than six (6) inches (15 cm) above the operating floor level of the refueling building or other components and structures along the path of travel.
Response
BG&E will restrict cask lif t height to 6 inches (nominal) above the floor which allows for curbing at the pool edge and other fixed obstacles. Lift height will at all times be restricted to 3'5" over the cask laydown area per the cask drop analysis.
Discussion of cask drop analyses on other areas of the refueling floor I (el. 69') can be found in response to Section 2.4.
1 Page A-5
"H rvy Lorda Attcchment 1 (e) Analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appendix A.
Response
The analysis performed required no exceptions to Appendix A.
Page A-6
Hacvy Lords Attcchment 1 Option 4 - Transfer Machine Jib Crane 1
This crane handles the spent fuel transfe- carriage. It is used to raise the carriage out of the pool. This is an infrequent operation which to date has not been performed. The following is our evaluation of this crane.
CRITERIA I As this is a straight lift of the carriage to place it on support beams which straddle the pool, no overflight of the spent fuel is anticipated, and as previously discussed, Technical Specification 3.9.7 prohibits such an overflight. Precautions in the existing procedure presently note this and will be amplified to assure the carriage remains parallel to the pool wall.
In order to preclude problems should the carriage be improperly handled the crane will be locked in position during the lift, assuring that only fuel stored for more than one refueling interval (18 months) could be impacted. Therefore, as previously discussed under section 2.2, k of 10CFR100 dose limitations would not be exceeded.
! CRITERIA 11 The discussion of criticality under section 2.2 - Attachment 1, Option
- 3. Item (c) is applicable to this section.
CRITERIA III The dropping of the transfer carriage has been a alyzed and that analysis indicates that no leakage from the pool is to be expected following such a drop (see Exhibit 1). Lift height however must be limited to two feet above the Eletation 69' level.
Page A-7 l - _ _ _
- _. ._ . _ _ . - _ . _ . , . - m.. . _ - _ .. . . _ _
Harvy Luda IV. Tables-
- Table 1 - Analyses per Section 5.1.2 Item C i
- Table 2 - Heavy Load Drop Accident Assumptions i
Table 3 - Summary of Drop Analyses (4 Sheets) i Table 4 - Components Potentially Affected By a Heavy Load Drop (13 l Sheets)
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H :vy Losds Table 1 - Analyses Per Section 5.1.2 Item C.
Within Specified Path Outside Specified Path (Within Interlocks / Stops)
Load Criticality
- Leakage Loss of SSD Criticality Leakage Loss of SSD Equip. Equip.
j 1 Casks (Spent Fuel Analysis Analysis Perform- No SSD Equip. Analysis Same as Within No SSD Equip.
c.nd Specimen) Required ** ed (Refer to Overflown Required ** Path Overflewn***
Attachment)
Spent Fuel Pool Analysis Analysis Within No SSD Equip. Analysis Same As Within No SSD Equip.
Divider Gate Required ** Scope of Cask Overflown Required ** Path Overflown ***
Analysis CE Superstand Analysis Analysis Within No SSD Equip. Analysis Analysis per- No SSD Equip.
(Upper and Lower) Required ** Scope of Cask Overflown Required ** formed (Refer Overflown ***
Analysis to Attachment)
- Analysis required as a result of tipping of loads during drop.
- Refer back to response to Question 5.1.7 Item c in Attachment 1.
- Spent fuel pool piping overflown - refer to above response.
, .H2cvy Locda Ttble 2 HEAVY LOAD DROP ACCIDENT ASSUMPTIONS Parameter NUREG CCNPP Power Level (Mwt) 3,000 2,700*
X/Q(gxclusionareaboundary), 1.0x10 ~1 1.3x10 ~
- sec/M 0-2 hour (Table 2.3-5 FSAR)
~
X/Q LPZ, sec/M 0-2 hour 1.0x10 ' 1 Based on*
above will_4 be 1.0x10 Peaking Factor 1.2E 1.62 @ 100%
Power (Normal)
No. of Assemblies in Core 193 (PWR) 217 Pool Water Decontamination 100- (for radioactive 1,000 per FSAR***
Factor iodines)
Filter Efficiency %: CTMT SFP Elemental Iodine 95% b 95% - *
- Organic Iodine 95% - ** 90%
Cooling Time (hours) 100 or greater 72 minimum (per technical specifica-tions) 1/
- Based on 5% worst meteorlogical conditions.
1 alue V is 1.2 for greater than one damaged fuel assembly. For a single assembly the value is 1.65.
E! See Reg. Guide 1.25 b See Reg. Guide 1.52
- NUREG evaluation is conservative for Calvert Cliffs
- Not specified by technical specifications.
- Refueling pool minimum water level above fuel = 23 ft. per technical specifications Spent fuel pool minimum water level above fuel = 21.5 ft. per technical specifications
Heavy Loads .
Table 3 Summary of Drop Analyses Handling Load / Weight Contact Drop Location Drop Floor Conclusion System Diameter (See Note 2) Height Thickness (See Note 3)
Spent Fuel Spent Fuel Cask 6" Cask Washdown 21' 8' Pit bottom sustains impact Cask Crane 50000# Pit El. 69' Floor 3'6" 2'4" With listed height as maximum.
Area floor sustains impact -
higher lift, cask penetrates Cask Laydown 3'6" 6' in With listed height as maximum, in Spent in air laydown fuel pool will retain Fuel Poo1* or 39' 5'6" in integrity In Pool Itself in water pool E1. 69' Equip. 30' 4' Floor slabs below will not Hatch El. 45' sustain impact - penetration loading to E1. (-)5' will occur area New Fuel 24" E1. 69' Equip. 30' 4' El. 45' Will Sustain Impact Cask 6000# Hatch Core Support 6" From Top of 18' 2'4" Restrict initial lift to l' Barrel Lift Stairwell to (nominal) above stairwell Rig 14,000# E1. 69' Floor roof before lowering to in Stairwell prevent floor penetration.
Vicinity
- From updated FSAR analysis.
Harvy Lords -
Table 3 Summary of Drop Analyses ( ** * }
Handling Load / Weight Contact Drop Location Drop Floor Conclusion System Diameter (See Note 2) Height Thickness (See Note 3)
Turbine Bldg. Generator Rotor 30" Turbine Bldg. 50' Grating All intermediate elevations Main Crane 351,300# E1. 45 or 10" damaged - impact in basement General Area Concrete does not affect encased salt water pipe or conduit Intake Cire. Pump 24" Intake Structure 20' 10.5" Limit carry height to l' over St ructure Motor Roof or El. 28'-6" Roof. Drop over Semi-Gantry 47000# checker- lower roof will impact only Crane plate one salt water pump bay Over Open Pump Drop will affect one pump only.
Removal Hatch Should either Pump 16 or 21 which are adjacent to '
each other drop - damage to other unit no sufficient to preclude safe shutdown of both units Filter Cask Cask 30" E1. 45' Any 15' 2'3" Floor Will Sustain Impact -
Monorail 10,000# Location Under No Spalling Monorail Machine Shop Miscellaneous 12" Machine Shop 14' 8" Limit of Lift Height to 9' Crane 10,000# Floor Above Floor to Preclude Penetration
8 envy Lenda Table 3 Notes:
- 1. Method of Analysis of Load Drops Load drop analyses perforced for Calvert Cliffs were done based on Bechtel Power Corporation's BC-TOP-9A " Topical Report on Design of Structures for Missile Impact". Weight of specific load was used. If only miscellaneous lif ts are made, a drop using crane capacity load was evaluated.
Each analysis was concerned with two situations - structural response and local effects (including spalling and penetration). Therefore, exceptions to BC-TOP-9A were taken in two areas -
local effects formulae and effective mass in structural response.
The ballistic local effects formulae given in BC-TOP-9A Section 2.1 are derived for low mass high velocity missiles. The data is not directly applicable to load drop (high mass low velocity) applications. The modified National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) formulas are recommended for checking local effects since they have been shown to be conservative in most missile applications.
The ef fective mass in BC-TOP-9A based on contact geometry has been liberalized to approximate effective mass based on the first mode shape. This is applicable to our load drop analysis since the travel time for stress wave between the impact location and the supports is significantly less than the duration of impact.
The resistance of a structural component to impact loading is based on its ultimate strength using the material dynamic strength properties for each structural element in concern. Impact limiters and drop forces caused by the environt.ent were not considered in this analysis except the drop into spent fuel pool, where buoyant and drag forces due to pool water are significant.
h:cvy Loads Table 3
- 2. Refer to Exhibit C. SK-ME-102 Shts. 1-8 for drop locations (6 month submit tal) .
- 3. Several of the load drop evaluations encompass other than the listed I load. These are itemized below. (Many of evaluations are very j conservative for the encompassed loads.)
I Listed Load Other Loads Covered 1
Spent Fuel Cask CE Superstands (contact diameter 48") - both i in and out of spent fuel pool Divider Gate l
New Fuel Cask - for all but drop through equipment hatch Core Support Barrel Lift Rig Irradiated Specimen Cask Generator Rotor All other heavy loads identified in 6 month response for this area
- Machine Shop Crane Loads l
I Cire. Water Pump Motor All other heavy loads identified in 6 month response for this area Filter Cask Monorail Floor Plugs 4
- _n. ,------? n.. -
Haavy Lords . Table 4 Sheet 1 Components Potentially Affected by A Haavy Loed Drop Polar Crane Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 LOAD
- IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY IMPACTED (See Note 6)
Reactor Head / Refer to Refer to Refueling Pool Drain - 8" C These components are not Lift Rig SK-ME-101 SK-ME-101 Vessel Head Vent Line required during normal cold (198,220f Total), Sh. 1 in Sh. 1 Safety Injection - 12" Shutdown. Redundant safety 1 Reactor Cavity 6 month 6 month Auxiliary Feedwater - 4" injections lines are available, Saal Ring response response Shutdown Cooling - 14" however.
(12,000f) 27' TE-122CA Cable Refer to discussion of general 27' TE-122HA Cable containment area in response 27' TE-112HD Cable to Section 2.4.
27' TE-112CD Cable 27' CV-506 Cable 45' CV-103 And its cable 45' LT-1123A Cable 45' PT-1013D Cable 45' LT-1113D Cable
]
45' PT-102D Cable 45' PT-103-1 And its cable 1 45' PT-102C And its cable 45' PT-100Y And its cable
] *Each of the listed loads would affect the listed equipment.
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Hasvy Lords Table 4 Sheet 2 i Polar Crane Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 LOAD IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY i IMPACTED (See Note 6)
U.G.S. Lift Rig Refer to Refer to RCP Bleed-Off C With the exception of the Lsydown To/From SK-ME-101 SK-ME-102 Charging - 2" shutdown cooling and charging Reactor Vessel Sh. 1 in SH. 1 in Safety Injection - 12", 6" lines, these components are (14,000#) 6 month 6 month Shutdown Cooling - 14" not normally required for Response Response cold shutdown. Redundant lines to the safety 27' TE-112 HC Cable injection listed here are 10' TE-112CC Cable available for core cooling and 27' TE-122HB Cable boron injection. Refer to 27' TE-122HD Cable discussion of general contain-27' TE-112HB Cable ment area in response to 27' TE-122CB And its cable Section 2.4.
27' TE-112CD And its cable 27' TE-115 And its cable 4
Hasvy Loads Table 4 Sheet 3 l Polar Crane ,
Calvert Cliffs i Unit 1
?
LOAD IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATECORY 4
IMPACTED (See Note 6)
I
- Refueling Pool Refer to Refer to Charging - 2" C Refer to discussion on Sh. 2 I Stair SK-ME-101 SK-ME-102 Pressurizer Spray - 3" of this table.
(8000#) Sh. 1 in Sh. 1 in Safety Injection - 12" j 6 month 6 month RCP Bleed-Off response response Pressurizer Sample j for piping Pressurizer Surge - 12" ,
Vessel Head Vent l Auxiliary Feedwater - 4" f 10' CV5465 And its cable !
10' CV5466 And its cable 10' CV5467 And its cable 27' CV506 Cable 27' TE-111X Cable 27' TE-115 Cable 27' TE-122CA Cable 27' TE-122HA Cable 27' TE-112HA Cable 27' TE-112CA And its cable 27' TE-112CC And its cable 27' TE-111Y And its cable 27' TE-112HD Cable 27' TE-112CD Cable
, 45' CV-103 Cable 45' CV-104 Cable 10' CV-105 And its cable 10' CV-106.And its cable I
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Hrsvy Lords Table 4 Sh2et 4 Polar Crane-Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 LOAD IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY-IMPACTED Refueling Pool Refer to 45' PT-1013C Cable C Refer to discussion on Sh. 2 Stairs (Cont'd) SK-ME-101 45' LT-1113C Cable of this table. !
Sh. 1 in 45' LT-1111 Cable 6 month 45' LT-1105 Cable response 45' LT-1113B Cable 45' PT-1013B Cable 27' TE-112HB Cable 27' TE-112CB Cable 27' TE-122HB Cable 27' TE-122CB Cable 45' PT-102D Cable 45' PT-1013D Cable 45' LT-1115D Cable
. 14 5 ' PT-1013A Cable 45' LT-1113A Cable 45' PT-102C Cable 45' MOV-403 Cable 45' ERV-404 Cable
, 45' MOV-405 Cable 45' ERV-402 Cable
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H:cvy Lords Tcble 4 Shrat 5 Polar Crane
- Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 _
LOAD
- IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY IMPACTED (See Note 6)
Reactor Cavity Refer to Refer to Auxiliary Spray Pipe - 2" C These components are not Seal Ring SK-ME-101 SK-ME-101 Refueling Pool Drain - 8" required during normal (12,000#), Sh. 2 in Sh. 2 in Auxiliary Teedwater - 4" cold shutdown. Redundant ICI Removal Bridge 6 month 6 month Safety Injection - 6" safety injection lines are (7,500#), response response Vessel Head Vent - available, however.
RV Head Stud for piping RCP Bleed Refer to discussion of Tensioners (2250#), Pressurizer Vent - general containment area par Device / Hoist in response to Section 2.4.
(6,000# Total), 10' CV-506 And its cable Core Support 27' TE-122CV Cable Berrel Lift Rig 27' TE-122HB Cable (14,000#), 45' LT-1123B Cable or 45' PT-1023B Cable UCS/ Lift Rig 45' PT-1023A Cable to Pool Storage 45' LT-1123A Cable From Vessel 45' PT-102D Cable (110,000# total) 45' SV-106 And its cable 45' SV-105 And its cable 45' SV-104 And its cable 45' LT-1123D Cable 45' LT-1113D Cable 45' PT-1013D Cable
- Each of the listed loads would affect the listed equipment.
. Heavy Los.ds Table 4 Sheet 6 4
Polar Crane Calvert Cliffs j Unit 2
! LOAD IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS
- HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY j IMPACTED (See Note 6)
UGS Lift Rig Refer to Refer to Charging - 2" C Refer to discussion on Sh. 2
- (14,000f) Sh. 2 in Sh. 2 in Safety Injection - 12"
, 6 month 6 month Shutdown Cooling - 14" l response response RCP Bleed-Off 4
45' LT-1113C Cable
! 45' PT-1013C Cable
- 45' PT-102C Cable a
45' MOV-405 Cable 45' ERV-402 Cable l 27' TE-111X Cable
- 27' TE-112HC Cable i 27' TE-122CA Cable 27' TE-122RA Cable
, 10' CV-507 Cable 27' TE-111Y And its cable 27' TE-112CA And its cable 27' TE-112CC And its cable 4
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Hsavy Lords . Tabis 4 Shest 7 Polar Crane Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 LOAD IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY IMPACTED (See Note 6)
Rssctor Vessel Refer to Refer to Same As Seal Ring Plus The C Refer to discussion on Sh. 2 Head /RV Head SK-ME-101 SK-ME-101 Following: of this table.
Lift Rig Sh. 2 in Sh. 2 in (198,220# Total) 6 month 6 month Response Response Charging Line - 2" 27' TE-125 Cable 27' TE-122CD Cable 27' TE-122HD Cable 27' TE-121X Cable 27' TE-121Y Cable d
H2svy Lorda Table 4 Sheet 8 Polar Crane Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 LOAD IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY IMPACTED (See Note 6)
Refueling Pool Refer to Refer to Pressurizer Spray - 3" C Refer to Discussion on Sh. 2 Stair Tower SK-ME-101 SK-ME-102 Safety Inj ection - 12" of this table.
(8,000f) Sh. 2 ta Sh. 2 in Pressurizer Surge - 12" 6 month 6 month RCP Bleed Response Response Pressurizer Sample 27' TE-122CV Cable 27' TE-122HB Cable 27' TE-112CV Aad its cable 27' TE-112HB Cable 27' TE-112CD And its cable 27' TE-112HB Cable 27' TE-112CD And its cable 27' TE-115 And its cable 27' TE-112HD Cable 10' CV-507 And its cable 10' CV-5465 And its cable 10' CV-5466 And its cable 10' CV-5467 And its cable 10' CV-506 Cable 45' MOV-405 Cable 45' MOV-403 Cable 45' ERV-402 Cable 45' ERV-404 Cable 45' PT-102C Cable 45' PT-103-1 Cable 45' PT-1013D 45' LT-1113D 45' PT-102D
Hrevy Lords Table 4 Sheet 9 Turbine Building Main and Auxiliary Cranes '
Calvert Cliffs ,
Unit - Common LOAD
- IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY IMPACTED (See Note 6)
Generator Rotor Refer to Below Salt Water System Piping E Drop analysis indicates no (351,300#), SK-ME-102 El. 12' And Raceway damage to buried piping or Sh. 7 in Floor raceway (separation).
6 month response Turbine Rotor El. 27' Salt Water Sys. Raceway - E This valve is required to be (L.P. 260,000f) 2mergency Discarge to Bay closed during shutdown - valve (H.P. 113,200#) Valves fails in closed position.
or El. 12' Salt Water Return to E As this is a return line the Casing Parts Discharge Structure system will retain .s (176,000# max.) function. '
El. 27' 1-LT-5610 Cable ** C A redundant instrument is being installed as a result of the Aux. Feedwater System Modification.
- Each of the listed loads would drop in the area of the listed equipment.
- Not previously identified - other SSD cable also in the area were not previously identified. All but LT-5610 cable will be rerouted out of this area as a result of relocation of the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels under the Auxiliary Feedwater System Modification.
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Heavy Loads Table 4 Sheet 10 Spent Fuel Cask Crane
- Calvert Cliffs Unit - Common LOAD
- IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS HEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATECORY IMPACTED (See Note 6)
Spent Fuel Refer to Refer to Spent Fuel Pool Cooling C ALL lines are located on Cask (50000#), SK-ME-101 SK-ME-101 return and Supply Lines, elevation below crane Shts. 3 & 4 Sht. 3 in Pumps and Heat Exchangers operating ele ation. Limiting CE Superstand in 6 month 6 month Service Water lift heights will eliminate
! (Lower - 13000#) response response the possibility of penetration.
(Upper - 8000#), for piping System equipment below cask pit will not be affected as Fuel Pool pit floor absorbs impact.
Divider Gate (3,300#)
Irradiated Component Cooling C Lines are located similar to Specimen Cask the above. The limitations on (10,000#) lift height precludes penetration in this area also.
45' Diesel Generator Cable C 27' Spent Fuel Pool Cooling C Cable
- Each of the listed loads would drop in the area of the listed equipment.
Hasvy Lords Table 4 Sheet 11 Spent Fuel Cask Crane -
Calvert Cliffs A
Unit - Common LOAD IMPACT AREA ELEVATION SAFE SHUTDOWN / DECAY ELIMINATION ELIMINATION BASIS IlEAT REMOVAL COMPONENTS CATEGORY IMPACTED (See Note 6)
Spen: Fuel Cask Area below 5' Boric Acid - 1" (Unit 1) B Both unit's boric acid pumps Cask (50000f), El. 69' equip. S' Boric Acid - 1" (Unit 2) B will be unavailable as a result CE Superstand hatch down to of this drop. MOV-501 and 504 (Lower 13000#) El. (-)10'. S'/(-)10' 1MOV-501 Cable B in both units will be available i (Upper 8000#) Refer to 5'/(-)10' 1MOV-504 Cable B for manual operation. Also SK-ME- 5' 2MOV-501 Cable B MOV-508 and 509 are unaffected, ,
Sh. in our 5' 2MOV-504 Cable B so gravity feed lines are 6 month available.
response and Drawings:
E-267 (-)10' Charging Pump #12 Cable B Redundant pumps are available.
E-262 This cable is being rerouted E-271 out of this area.
M-306 M-307 M-309 M-305 1
=
1
He vy Leeds
- Tchle 4 Shast 12 Notes:
- 1. Areas discussed in detail under Section 2.4 are not represented in this table. They are:
- a. General containment area load movement,
- b. All systems which have been excluded based on this review:
Filter Cask Monorail Solid Waste Disposal Trolley Main Steam Room Monorail Component Cooling Water Room Hoist Switchgear Room Monorail Diesel Generator Room Monorail Machine Shop
- 2. Service water and component cooling water are not required in containment for safe shutdown. Service water and CCW containment piping are isolable following a break.
- 3. Equipment listed in containment was prepared during completion of SK-ME-103 (in 6 month response) and some conduit may not be listed as a result. The discussion referred to under
" Conclusions" considers all equipment shown on those drawings.
- 4. Elevation column refers to plant floor elevations.
- 5. Elimination categories refer to those listed in the NRC letter as listed below:
- a. Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
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- b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.
- c. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load / equipment combination.
- d. Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e., section 5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satisfied).
- c. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.
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IV. References
- 1. Letter for A. E. Lundvall, Jr. , of BG&E to D. G. Eisenhut of the NRC dated January 4, 1982, and enclosure. (Transmittal of BG&E 6-month response.)
- 2. Letter from A. E. Lundvall, Jr. , of BG&E to D. G. Eisenhut of the NRC dated and enclosure. (Transmittal of errata to reference 1.)
- 3. Combustion Engineering, Inc., " System 80" Final Safety Analysis Report (CESSAR).
- 4. Letter for D. G. Eisenhut to all licensees of operating plants, applicants for operating licenses and holders of construction permits.
- 5. Letter from BG&E to the NRC dated June 29, 1981, transmitting the interim response to reference 4.
- 6. Letter from BG&E to the NRC dated September 30, 1981 which transmits the Alternate Safe Shutdown Analysis and Interactive Cable Analysis in response to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
- 7. Bechtel Power Corporation Topical Report BC-TOP-9A, Revision '
" Design of Structures for Missile Impact".
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