ML20012D699
| ML20012D699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1989 |
| From: | Hairston W ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9003280254 | |
| Download: ML20012D699 (31) | |
Text
(- ' ~
y >
.[ : t --
1 ;f' Li 1 r .t'-
Alabama)ower Company ,
1
> . 40 inverness Center Parkw:y .
Post Off6ce Box 1295 :
- Birmingham, Alabama 35201 '
h Telephone 205 86&5581 -
7
. W. Q. Hairston, til .
Senior Vice President
' Nuclear Operations . gghgg g the southem electrc system March 22, 1990-10CFR50.59' w
' Docket No. 50-3641 U.'S., Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:- Document Control Desk
'Vashington,'D.C. 20555 .
Gentlemen:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit,2.
.-- 10CFR50.59 Annual Report Attache'd : for your- review 11s the annual report required by 10CFR50.59 for- < 1 1989..'This report summarizes changes to the plant performed.in accordance ,
.vith the' provisions of 10CFR50.59 for Joseph M. Parley Nuclear Plant Unit'2.
, y
'If you'have any-questions, please advise.
Respectfully submitted,:
,k.h
-V. G. Hairston, III WGH,III/DRCamd 13.24 Aftachment ;j cc: Mr..S. D. Ebneter .;
Mr. E. A. Reeves- ;
'Mr. G. F. Maxwell j 4
I .
3 ll 1
9003280254 891231 PDR Q ADOCK 05000364 Nis <t !
Pnr # -l 46 m ;
( *
. AIABNR POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PIANT ,
l LNIT:2 - Alt 3UAL REPORT REQUIRED BY 10CrR50.59 j Section 50.59 of Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization racilities, of the regulations of the United States Nuclear Regulatory
-Coasnission, states that the holder of a license authorizing operation of a u production or utilization facility may (1) make' changes in the facility as ~i described in the safety analysis' report, and (2) make changes in the '
procedures as described in the safety analysis report, and.(3) conduct tests or experiments not described in.the safety analysis report, without prior commission approval, unless the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change in the technical specifications incorporated-in the '
license or an unreviewed safety question (as defined in 10CFR50.59). :
'Ihe licensee is required to maintain records of such changes, tests or I experiments, and those records are required to include written safety evaluations which provide the basis for the determination that the changes, tests or experiments do not involve any unreviewed safety questions.
-Brief descriptions and a summary of the-safety evaluations of the changes, tests or experiments as described above, for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear ;
Plant Unit 2 which were completed in 1989, are provided in the following.
1
(
l l
Tech Misc-3/6
o
<Y, Subjtetsl -
ADIF 88 . .
. x Je :
Description:
- ' Revised FSAR Section 8.3;2.1.5-to more accurately reflect the testing actually-performed on safety related batteries that are purchased for use-at FNP. Safety related battery test-requirements for batteries in-service at FNP include both a performance test and a service test.
Safety Evaluation: This' change-corrects an existing error and clarifies
, that both tests are required. his does not change the FNP battery testing program.
PORC Reviews- PORC Meeting 2028, 6/20/89 3
Subject:
ADIF 88-72 l
Description:
Added a discussion of the updated main steam valve room (MSVR) high energy line break analysis to FSAR Appendix 3J. Also, redundant information already in Appendix 3J was deleted.
Safety Evaluation: A full spectrum of main steam line break sizes has a been analyzed.to determine the MSVR temperature and.
pressure response. We new MSVR temperature and pressure analysis combined with peak surface tenperature calculations verifies that existing safety related equipment located in the MSVR can be expected to perform its intended function under postulated accident conditions.
PORC, Review:- PORC Meeting 2022, 6/8/89 l
Subject:
ADIF 88-73
Description:
Changed FSAR Section 4.2 to reflect the fact that the combined-loadings (seismic and IDCA) on the fuel are less than the Inconel grid crush strength, whether original or redcced. - This became a concern when testing demonstated a reduction in fuel grid crush
~
le strength for Inconel grids, as compared to tests i performed in 1978. Recent Westinghouse testing indicated that the grid ~ strength for Inconel grids is 20% lower than the 1978 value. The reduction in strength has been attributed to various changes made l
L in the brazing process.
Safety Evaluation: The grid crush strength remains larger than the combined seismic and LOCA loads. Also, there is no additional fuel damage for any analyzed accident or any impact on shipping loads. Therefore, the conclusions of the FSAR remain valid and no decrease in safety margin occurs. .
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1973, 3/2/89 l-1 L
,a .
P3 subjtet:- , ADIF 88-81 * .-
i s
Description:
f Revised FSAR Appendix 98 to address'the fire l resistance of the boundaries 'of fire areas _1-34 (Unit'
- 1) and 2-34 (Unit 2)..-Each of the fire areas consists of two rooms and-two 18 inch stainless steel ducts which are encased in concrete and connect the.
rooms. At FNP, fire areas are to be bounded by three -
hour fire barriers. Barriers of less fire resistance ;
must be documented and approved.-.However, the fire :
- l. resistance afforded by the concrete is not addressed.
l in the FSAR. j Safety Evaluations: h e minimum thickness of concrete covering the ducts is 18 inches. According to the Southern Building- :
Code, this thickness of concrete of the_ type utilized '
at that location provides at-least a three hour fire a
resistance. Therefore, the ducts as well.as the. l remainder of the boundaries of fire areas 1-34 and 2-34 possess the required three hour. fire rating and ,
meet all fire resistance requirements. !
PORC Review PORC Meeting 2024, 6/13/89 1
1 .
Subject:
ADIF 88-87
Description:
Updated FSAR Table 3.11-l'to provide revised and-additional Auxiliary Building raditation dose values.- l Also, the parameter for relative humidity during the-post-accident condition in the Auxiliary Building area was revised from 100% to 50%. Other changes o provided administrative corrections only to FSAR- J Section 6.2.
Safety Evaluation: he change to the parameter for relative humidity was based on the determination that none of the Auxiliary Building areas except the main steam valve room experience increased temperature, pressure _or relative humidity following a LOCA or MSLB. Thus, the post-accident relative humidity is' equal to the normal value (50%). i 1 c The revised radiation doses are based on specific .
!- calculations. The calculated radiation doses are less than the qualified radiation dose values for the ~
safety related components in the area.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2024, 6/13/89 2
L
7
~
[ '
~*~ ; Subjdctti ,
. ADIF 88-1001 -
1.. .
h4
Description:
. Revised the primary coolant hydrogen concentration values stated-in FSAR Paragraph 9.3.4.1.2.2.2 to be
- consistent with those-stated in table 5.2-22. Table 5.2-22 specified a range of-25-50 cc (STP)/Kg H 2O
. while_ paragraph 9.3.4.1.2.2.2 specified 25-35 cc:
(STP)/Kg H Also, an editorial change was made-to the table a,0.nd paragraph to identify the hydrogen.
concentration as being applicable for:" power operation". This change makes the FSAR consistent with the terminology of WCAP-7452.
Safety Evaluation: A review of the Westinghouse _ specification for primary coolant hydrogen concentration verified the range shown in table 5.2-22 to be correct. Thus, this is an administrative change to ensure J consistency within the FSAR.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2024, 6/13/89
?
Subject:
ADIF 88-101 .
Description:
Changed FSAR Paragraph 5.2.2.4.4'to make ths discussion of ECCS blocking controls consistent with the logic shown on figures 7.2-6, 7.2-7, 7.2-8 and 7.3-1.
Safety Evaluation: This text change serves only to make the discussion
~
- of ECCS actuation blocks in Chapter 5 consistent with the logic shown on the referenced FSAR Figures.
Therefore, this text change does not affect the operation-of any safety related system or affect safe !
h shutdown of the plant.
1.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2024, 6/13/89 L
R ,
1 :.
T I
3
' __-- ___ _ _ _ = _ _-___ -
If [ e s
t g:;5 Subj1ct: ADIF 88-125 -
Description:
Deleted a statement in FSAR Section 6.5.2.1 which referred to "... a nonreturn valve" in the piping between the auxiliary feedwater pumps and the service water system. Were is not a nonreturn valve installed in the service water to auxiliary feedwater pump piping. A review of drawings indicated that the design of the plant never included nonreturn valves in these lines. Deleting the reference to these valves will correct the FSAR to be consistent with the design intent and with as-built conditions.
Safety Evaluation: Were is no need for the referenced nonreturn valves.
'No normally closed motor operated valves in this piping provide adequate isolation. The absence of the nonreturn valves between the service water and the auxiliary feedwater system and the deletion of the phrase in the FSAR stating that these valves are installed will not result in an unreviewed safety question.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1997, 4/25/89
Subject:
ADIF 88-132
Description:
Changed FSAR Section 6A.l.1 to refer to figures 6.2-1 through 6.2-41 rather than 6.2-1 through 6.2-46.
Also, this safety evaluation changed cection 6A.l.1 to indicate that one, not two, containment air cooling (CAC) fan is assumed to be operating following an accident.
Safety Evaluation: Figures 6.2-42 through 6.2-46 do not display CTMT post-accident pressure and temperature values, as was stated in section 6A.l.l. This change is adminirtrative and does not affect plant design or accident analyses.
The containment design basis accident analysis assumes that only the minimum complement of ESF equipment is operating. Therefore, it can be concluded that only one CAC fan should be operating.
Also, another FSAR section pertaining to this analysis clearly assumes that only one CAC fan is operating.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2023, 6/9/89 4
,, ,.y
+: =
Subject:
. -ADIF 88-134: *
Description:
1 ; Deleted the reference to the pH monitoring system
- t. from FSAR Section 10.4.8. This section had stated t
that a pH alarm is used_to signal exhaustion of the -
steam generator blowdown.(SGBD) domineralizer resin.' '
Safety l Evaluation: FNP performs a periodic sample analysis which o provides a better means of detecting resin bed'
/ : exhaustion than the pH monitoring system which is' :
L referenced in the FSAR.- Also,, failure of this portion of the SGBD system will not degrade the performance of any safety related equipment or affect the safe shutdown capebility of the plant.
PORC Reviews- PORC Meeting 2023, 6/9/89 .
[
Subject:
.ADIF 88-136 '
-Description: Changed FSAR Section 7.6.2.1 to match the residual -
heat removal (RHR) loop suction isolation valves with ;
the correct train. 'Ihis section of the FSAR had !
incorrectly specified which loop suction isolation !
p valves were associated with each train.
Safety Evaluation: This change is administrative only. It serves _to make the FSAR internally consistent in its description of the RHR system valve configuration.
, PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2023, 6/9/89-
Subject:
ADIF 88-138 l-l
Description:
Revised the closure times for several valves listed in FSAR Tables 6.2-31 and 6.2-32.
Safety Evaluation _ Each affected valve was analyzed by the design organization and the requirements applicable to-each '
valve were determined.- The revised valve closure '[
L -times stated in the FSAR reflect the minimum response '
L time. required by: (1) the accident analysis bases,- .
- l. (2) the guidance.given in the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800), and (3) the requirements of Technical l
Specifications. -
PORd Review:- PORC Meeting 2028, 6/20/89 i
I L- 5
~
- v .
L A- Subj:ct:} . ADIF 88-139' '
Description:
Corrected two inconsistencies in FSAR Figure 12.1-2.
his figure had indicated that radiation monitor RE-1 ~ '!
(control: room area monitor) provided a signal to ;
close the control room air intake on a high radiation '
signal;:however, RE-1 provides indication and alarm ,
only. Channels RE-35A and RE-35B provide the signal 4 for control room isolation on high radiation (in the fresh air intake). Figure 12.1-2 had also indicated-that there is a computer input from radiation monitor RE-1B (Technical Support Center area monitor);
however, RE-1B does not provide a couputer input.- ;
Safety Evaluation: %ese deletions make the FSAR internally consistent I
'in its discussion of=the radiation monitoring' system.
No change-is being made to the design of the plant.
2 Other FSAR s3ctions discuss the radiation monitors l that provide alarms to the control room air intake in high radiation conditions. Instrumentation to display area radiation monitor readings is provided independently of the plant conputer.-
i j PORC Reviews' 'PORC Meeting 2014, 5/18/89 t L
Subject:
ADIF 88-141
Description:
Revised-FSAR Paragraph 5.5.11.1 to restore internal !
consistency to the description of the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). Although paragraph 5.5.11.1 l- refers to the correct design basis for the PRT (i.e.,
" absorb...a discharge of steam equal to 110 percent of the volume above the full power pressurizer water ,
level setpoint"), the reference to a 10 percent step load decrease as the initiating event is incorrect.
Therefore, the reference to the 10 percent step load decrease was deleted.-
, Safety. Evaluation: This change makes the FSAR internally consistent. No change is being made to the design basis of the PRT.
The initiating event is a loss of load without >
turbine trip. Were is no change to equipment ,
installed in the plant.
l:
1
[ PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2028, 6/20/89 6
h
- y. ,, ,
- ;Subj;ct: . '
ADIF 88-144-Descriptions. Revised the discussion of fire breaks in the FSAR to-note that fire breaks are not required to be -
- installed to meet' current. requirements. VSAR:
Appendix 9B had stated that fire breaks had been.
- installed and that the fire breaks are maintained functional to satisfy the requirements of Appendix A-- ,
z to Branch Technical. Position 9.5-1 : 'l l
An analysis has shown that the functionality of fire
~
Safety Evaluations-breaks is not required by the fire hazards analysis-or the methodology used to satisfy.the requirements i of 10CFR50 Appendix R. 'Iherefore, fire breaks are .no longer required, a PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2024, 6/13/89
. i
Subject:
ADIF 88-146 L
Description:
' Revised FSAR Chapter 13.1 to provide additional f detail-on the Alabama Power Company organizational- ,
', 7 structure. J Safety Evaluation: These FSAR changes are administrative in nature and do not affect the operation of FNP.
PORC Review PORC Meting 2028, 6/20/89
~
Subject:
MD 89-1988
Description:
Authorized bypassing the low temperature alarm for L the boron injection tank (BIT).. .
l' The BIT was originally designed to contain a
~
Safety Evaluation:
concentrated boric acid solution. 'Ihe low temperature alarm was needed to alert the operator -
that the boric acid solution was reaching its ,
L solubility limit. Subsequent analysis showed that 1 the concentrated boric acid solution,was not needed. 3 in the BIT for accident mitigation, and the' boron !
.- concentration was reduced. Thus, the low temperature '
L alarm for the BIT is no longer required for the operation of the BIT. This portion of the safety .
injection system will function as designed.
.PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1960, 1/10/89' I
i I !
7
~ m,- .
OJ... . Subj;ct: E. ..
_MD 89-2002- ,
a p '?
,,4 4 (DeAcription: 2 Revised the setpoints for the Unit'2 residual heat l removal- (RHR) pump miniflow switches.-
~
1
. Safety Evaluation:. he. revised setpoints account for the post-seismic.
~
setpoint shifts of.up to i 10% determined during the- :
Barton flow switch qualification test. The revised setpoints assure that the mini-flow valves open when
. actual' flow falls below the low flow setpoint. h ere is no effect on the capability of the RHR system to--
perform its safety functions. .;
PORC Review PORC Meeting'1970, 2/21/89- i
Subject:
MD 89-2078 ,
Description:
Installed a drain line and isolation valve on the. '
chemical injection system strainer. mis is needed to provide a means of periodically flushing the
' chemical injection strainer. his will also provide- i
-a' point.for temporary connecticn of'a calibration i cylinder for-the purpose of-determining the chemical addition rate.
Safety Evaluation: he drain valve will be closed during normal '
operation and will be utilized only during maintenance on the strainer and during pump calibration. The chemical injection' system is not '(
required for safe shutdown of the unit. -
PORC Review: ,PORC Meeting 2039, 7/20/89; i
Subject:
MD 89-2095-
Description:
. Installed a ten second TDE Agastat relay on well water pump #1.-
1
. Safety Evaluation: This relay is designed to protect the system and the pump from overpressurization and was previously evaluated and approved by PCN S84-0-3057 for well 3 water pump #2, which is the same type as well water -
pump #1.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2096, 11/21/89-1 a
8
V b .
09 - > Subjects, -
N 89-2127 I. '
Description:
Authorized the installation of a temporary pressure reducin regulator and a hose at the drain valve on the dis harge of the condensate pumps. mis provided an alternate supply of tube sheet seal water during a
~
period of time that the domineralized water system was out of service.
Safety Evaluation: We hose was routed along the floor and under the.
condenser hotwell to avoid jeopardizing any active equipment. Should a failure of the regulator or hose occur, the hose would rupture and the water would
- i. discharge to the turbine building drain system which F has adequate capacity to handle the flow. It is unlikely that any water sprayed from a postulated
' rupture in this hose or regulator would damage any equipment.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2075, 10/12/89 subject: PCR/PCN 85-3114 (885-2-3114)
Description:
Provided a new room air handling unit for the control
' rod drive mechanism cabinets room. his design-
!' modification will maintain the room at 77'r and 50 to 70 percent relative humidity. Also, changed the P&ID to delete the pressure differential indicator (PDI) connection at the air filter inlet. Since there is no ductwork at the air filter inlet, the high side of PDI 2376B will be vented to the atmosphere.
Safety Evaluation: Wese HVAC system modifications are an improvement over the existing air conditioning system. his is a non-safety related non-seismic system. Failure of this system will not inpact plant operation or any safety related function. mese changes will not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program. Also, although the change to the P&ID is a clarification of actual PDI configuration, there is no change from the original intended installation of the PDI.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1978, 3/16/89 PORC Meeting 1979, 3/22/89 9
o :
- o. subject: .
PCR/PO4 85-3420 (S85-2-3420) l
Description:
Relocated the tie-in point for the pilot air line for l the Pallmatic II automatic drain valve, which is on i 6
the inlet filter of the service air dryer. Also, l added a separate line number for the service air l filter drain line.
l Safety Evaluation: We air line originally was to tie-in to the
, discharge of the service air dryer. W is would have ;
required isolating the service air to the Auxiliary i Building and Containment in order to make the tie-in.. l Be new tie-in point will require isolation of the -
service air to the Turbine Building, but will not !
, affeet the Auxiliary Building or Containment. j i
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1934, 10/18/88 ;
I
Subject:
PCR/PCN 05-3422 (B85-2-3422) l
Description:
Removed the manual / auto stations for TIC-3042A, B, >
and C (controllers for service water flow to the :
, component cooling water heat exchangers) from the l main control board. Also, disconnected the automatic ;
pushbuttons on the manual / auto stations for FIC-3009A, B, and C and relabeled the stations as
, HIC-3009A, B, and C. !
l t
! Safety Evaluation: Wis change does not affect the operation of the I
' service water flow control valves. We modifications '
were made based on human factors engineering ;
requirements and to avoid operator confusion.. ;
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1932, 10/11/88 +
1 I
?
lr
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-3976 (B87-2-3976) l
Description:
Added an indicator on the main control board to
- provide indication of total auxiliary feedwater flow.
L Safety Evaluationt his modification provided a reliable control room !
l
~
indication of total auxiliary feedwater flow on the ,
main control board. Wis enables thL plant operator ,
to take action based on total auxiliary feedwater '
flow during emergency conditions as directed by Emergency Response Procedures.
l PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1979, 3/22/89 PORC Meeting 2049, 8/22/89 i
s P
l 10
- 1. t 4 a subject ,
PCR/PCN 87-3996 (B87-2-3996)
Description:
Provided the design necessary to change the delta flux deviation alarm setpoint from 60 penalty points to 50 penalty points to provide the operators a time margin prior to reaching the 60 penalty points which is a limiting condition for operation.
Safety Evaluation: his requires a software change only. Since the plant computer is a non-safety related system, this change will not affect ainy of the plant operating parameters. We new alarm setpoint will ingprove the operators capability to operate the plant within the set limits.
[ PORC Review PORC Meeting 1921, 9/6/8C
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4001 (B87-2-4001)
Description:
Reorganized the Monitor Light Boxes (MLBs) on the main control board. Indication for equipment associated with a safety injection (SI) is on MLB1, Phase A containment isolation is on MLB2, Phase B containment isolation is on MLB3, and Loss of offsite Power (IOSP) is on MLB4. MLBs 5 and 6 have been deleted. Additionally, the lights have been rearranged in a more informative configuration in-accordance with the Control Room Design Review.
Safety Evaluation: his modification enables the plant operators to quickly verify the automatic action of valves which receive signals due to SI, Phase A or B isolation, or IDSP. We MLBs do not perform a safety related function so the. modification does not adversely affect safe shutdown or any safety related systems or components.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1965, 2/2/89 l
1 l
11
r .
0 Subjects,
- PCR/PCN 87-4058 (m87-2-4058)
L'
. Descriptions Revised the htal Plant Numbering System (TPNS)-
I numbers for several indicators on the Unit 1 main-control board. 2ese TPNS numbers had indicated that the indicators were shared between Unit I and Unit 2 while there are actually separate indicators for each !
unit. Also, several instruments on the Unit 2 main .
control board were relocated. l safety Evaluation: Wese changes reflect the plant as-built condition !
and provide a separate TPNS number for each indicator. Wese changes will not affect the .
?
op? ration of any safety related system. We only L safety related instrumentation affected is the river
. water wet pit level indicators. Since these indicators are no longer relied on for safe shutdown, i these changes do not affeet the safe shutdown of the !
' plant. l PORC Review PORC Meeting 1975, 3/9/89 PORC Meeting 2052, 8/29/89
)
.l
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4107 (B87-2-4107) {
J
Description:
Provided a dedicated nitrogen supply, directly from the main nitrogen supply header, to the hydrogen i recombiner gas. analyzers to provide a more reliable r source of nitrogen. %e nitrogen is used to purge l i
the gas analyzers on the hydrogen recombiner during shutdown to keep moisture from entering the. ;
analyzers. Also, installed two filters on each '
recombiner skid on the analyzer purge gas tubing to ensure a dry source of purge gas. ;
Safety Evaluation: Wese changes will improve the availability of nitrogen purge gas from the hydrogen recombiner-gas analyzers and therefore decrease the chance of 5 moisture entering the analyzers causing them to fail. '
%e nitrogen supply to the analyzers is not safety related.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1946, 11/22/88 l
'I 12 e
< v v-
,5 .. :
' Lsubject
- PCP/PCN 87-4231 (887-2-4231) ,
Description:
Replaced the existing Sently Nevada (B/N) reactor' coolant pump vibration monitoring system with the B/N l 3300 series model. FSAR Figure 5.1-3 sheet 2 will'be !
if revised to reflect this change. ,
I me present model is obsolete and has been identified
[ Safety Evaluation:
as a plant maintenance problem. The replacement j model will perform the same functions as the existing i system and will be installed at the same location on >
l the reactor coolant pumps. ,
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1960, 1/10/89 PORC Meeting 2049, 8/22/89 I 1
I i;.
t
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4327 (B87-2-4327) ;
Description:
Installed an auxiliary access walkway and handrail. !
for the refueling machine. l safety Evaluation ne auxiliary walkway on the refueling machine '(
enhances the safety of personnel when they are called i upon to access the machine's drive line or operate the machine in the manual mode. We walkway provides 1 accessibility while the handrail provides additional safety. A seismic evaluation of the refueling machine, with the auxiliary walkway added, was .;'
performed and it has been determined that safety related equipment will not be degraded as a result of seismically-induced loads on the refueling machine.
PORC Meeting 1960, 1/10/89 I
'PORC Review 1
l
[
o i
e l
8 13
a -, - ,A e . ;
y subjects ,
- PCVPQt 87-4675 (B87-0-4675) ,
Description:
Removed deactivated fire danpers NSV47XV072 and 74 l and their ductwork irom the supply duct of the l computer room air conditioning system. Also, drawing :
g D-205012 was revised by removing dampers NSV47XV079 .;
and 80 and relocating NSV47XV049 and 50. %ese i changes to the computer room air conditioning system j reflect as-built conditions existing in the plant. ,
Safety Evaluation: Fire danpers NSV47XV072 and 74 are not necessary i because they are located in the same fire area. !
_Danpers NSV47XV079 and 80 are not shown to be on a !
fire area boundary. %e new locations of NSV47XV049 !
and 50 are consistent with fire protection program i requirements. Wese changes do not affect fire area >
integrity, the fire protection program evaluation, or operation of the computer room air conditioning system. Moreover, twy will not inpair the operation of plant safety related systems or the safe slutdown of the plant.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1953, 12/20/88
Subject:
PCVPCN 88-4762 (B88-2-4762)
Description:
Removed a section of the boron injection tank (BIT) bypass line and installed pipe caps on the line.
Safety Evaluation: With the elimination of the high boric acid concentration in the BIT, the BIT bypass line is no longer needed. his modification will eliminate the potential for leakage of normal charging past the BIT p as valve into the reactor coolant system via the l
l safety injection piping. We leakage could cause thermal cycling of the safety injection lines..
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1810, 2/2/88
-PORC Meeting 1986, 4/6/89 l
L l.
l 14
4 o j subjcet ,
PCR/PCN 88-4805 (888-2-4805)
. Descriptions- Replaced the existing underfr ency relays on emergency buses 2r, 2G, 2H, 2J with a later model. '
relay.
Safety Evaluation: he existing model relays have demonstrated frequency pick-up drif ting problems due to degradation of the relays' operating capacitor. We replacement model relays are seismically qualified and have the same operating ranges as the existing relays.and will not affect the safe shutdown capability of the plant. ,
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1937, 10/27/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 88-4827 (B88-2-4827) ,
~
Description:
Installed lockable wire mesh fences and barriers to the spent fuel pool (SrP) demineralizer room (Room ,
2449) and the SrP valve room (Room 2450).to prevent inadvertent and unauthorized entry into these areas.- ,
Also, lead blankets were placed between these two ;
rooms to prevent: reaching IR/hr on the outside of the f new exclusion area barrier.
Safety Evaluation: his modification provides positive control of these areas. Seismic considerations and the added fire i loading as a result of this modification have been evaluated. It is concluded that the installation of these barriers does not affect the safe shutdown of .
the plant. '
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1916, 8/23/88 l' PORC Meeting 1936, 10/25/88 subject: PCR/PCN 88-4843 (B88-2-4843)
Description:
Installed a full heir /it barrier with a lockable gate '
in the back of the C/CS demineralizer valve access room (Room 2331) to prevent inadvertent and i unauthorized entry into this room. This room is ;
classified as an exclusion area due to radiological conditions. Also provides for additional modifications to prevret entry into the exclusion area. ,
l Safety Evaluation: This modification provides positive control of this It is concluded that the installation of this area.
locked barrier and wire mesh enclosure has no adverse impact on the safe shutdown of the plant.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1925, 9/22/88 l l-15 l
+ +Subjectt- PCR/PO4 88-4844 (B88-2-4844)
O' Descripti6n Installed lockablo wiro mesh doors et the entrances to the recycle evaporator domineralizar valve room (Room 2307) and the waste monitor tank / waste evaporator condensate demineralizer valve room (Room 2310), hese rooms are classified as exclusion areas
' during resin transfer.
Safety Evaluation: Wis modification provides positive control of the valve compartments when the radiological conditions warrant. We installation of these lockable wire mesh barriers does not affect the safe shutdown of the plant.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1968, 2/16/89 subject: PCR/PCN 88-4855 (B88-2-4855)
Description:
Installed a wire mesh barrier above door 2213 of the volume control tank (VCT) toom (Room 2217) to prevent unauthorized entry. his room is classified as an exclusion area due to radiological conditions. Also, blocked all other penetrations through which a person could gain access into this exclusion area.
Safety Evaluation: W is modification arovides positive control of this exclusion area. Tae installation of this barrier has no impact on the safe shutdown of the plant.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1925, 9/22/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 88-4857 (B88-2-4857)
Description:
Installed wire mesh barriers and a wire mesh roof enclosure inside the waste gas conpressor (WGC) room (Room 2153) to provide positive access control of the overall area. %e NGC area is an exclusion area due to the radiological conditions in the room, hese additional access controls are needed because the door which had previously been used to control entry into this area also controls access for routine entry to obtain air samples.
Safety Evaluation: Wis modification provides positive cont.ol of the exclusion area while still allowing personnel to obtain necessary samples. We installation of these lockable barriers has no adverse impact on the safe shutdown of the plant.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1932, 10/11/88 16 I I I I I I
i
-o ~
Subject:
PCR/PCN 88-4863 (B88-2-4863)
[ ,
Description:
Installed a wire mesh barrier with lockable gates in the waste gas decay tank (WGDT) valve ceapartment at
' the entrance to the WGDT room (Room 2152) to provide positive access control of the overall area. Also,
.:> locked ten wall penetrations through which a person
- could gain access to the area. %e WGDT area is an exclusion area due to radiological conditions. Wese additional access controls are needed because the door which had previously been used to control entry into these areas also controls access to the WGDT samle station located imediately inside the door.
Safety Evaluation: his modification provides positive control of the exclusion area while still allowing personnel to obtain necessary sagles. We installation of these lockable barriers has no adverse impact on the safe ,
shutdown of the plant.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1917, 8/25/88 i
Subject:
PCR/PCN 88-5055 (B88-2-5055)
Description:
Installed water locp seals in the pipe run connecting the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger outlet and the charging pug suction header. In addition, a high point vent valve was installed on the suction of the 2A charging pump.
Safety Evaluation: he purpose of these modifications is to mitigate the accumulation of gas at the suction of the charging pumps. We loop seals are intended to prevent free hydrogen migration from the charging puqs' suction piping to the RHR discharge piping and to the RHR supply line while any of the taree charging pumps is taking suction from the volume control tank (VCT).
%e vent valve can be used to vent gases manually from the high point in that line. A vent valve is ,
not necessary in the 2B charging pump suction line since any gas void that might accumulate in this line ,
segment would be bubbled back through check valve Cvl88 and up into the VCT where it will become part of the normal gas space or entrained in the charging system flow. .
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1964, 1/26/89 k
17
In
) ~
t 3ubject: . PCR/PCN 88-5119 (S88-2-5119) ,
' Descriptions. Replaced the existing main feed pump suction carbon ;
steel piping with chrome-moly steel piping. We existing main feed punp suction carbon steel piping ;
has been identified to have reduced wall thickness- i due to erosion and corrosion. !
Safety Evaluation he replacement chrome-moly steel piping has a ;
greater resistance to erosion and cc4rrosion and l extends the useful life of the line. he material ';'
substitution has been evaluated and found to be acceptable. his change does not si !
affect the current stress analysis, gnificantly j PORC Review PORC Meeting 1942, 11/10/88 )
Subject:
PCR/PCN 88-5120 (S88-2-5120) ;
Description:
Replaced the carbon steel high pressure extraction i steam supply piping between the high pressure turbine )
and the No. 6 feedwater heaters with chrome-moly i steel piping. %e existing extraction steam carbon !
steel piping has been identified to have reduced wall j l thickness due to erosion and corrosion. J Safety Evaluation: 2e replacement chrome-moly steel piping has a ]
greater resistance to erosion and corrosion and extends the expected useful life of the line. Se material substitution has been evaluated and found to be acceptable. %is change does not significantly :
, affect the current stress analysis.
1 .
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1940, 11/3/88 i
~
l l
l 1.
18
- 3. e '
1 Subjects . PCR/PCN 88-5122 (588-2-5122)
Description:
Replaced the existing carbon steel main feedwater piping at the outlet of all three main feedwater regulating valves with chrome-moly steel piping. We existing carbon steel piping has been identified to have reduced wall thickness due to erosion and corrosion.
Safety Evaluation: We change in piping material to chrome-moly will reduce erosion and corrosion, thus preventing plant downtime due to failure and extend the expected useful life of the line. his classification of piping differs from the existing class only by material. We pressure-temperature and code classification will not change. Additionally, the
.feedwater piping stresses,' including seismic loads, were evaluated and found to be within the-allowable stress.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1936, 10/25/88 subject: PCR/PCN 88-5123 (B88-2-5123)
Description:
Replaced the existing carbon steel drain piping on the extraction steam lines supplying feedwater.
heaters 6A and 6B and the first stage of the moisture separator reheaters (MSRs) with stainless steel piping.
Safety Evaluation: he carbon steel piping has been identified by the secondary Piping Inspection Progran/ Plan as requiring replacement to prevent leaks resulting from pipe wall erosion. he stainless steel piping will be less susceptible to erosion and thus will enhance plant safety and operation.
L PORC Review PORC Meeting 1917, 8/25/88 i
19
- . 3 *--
- o subject: . PCR/PCN 88-5213 (s88-2-5213)1 Descriptions. Installed radiation' monitors on the main steam lines to detect-N-16 gama radiation that would be present in the event of a steam generator tube leak. . his system will conpute the instantaneous leak rate as a function of N-16 concentration in the main steam system and reactor power.
Safety Evaluation: Installation of this system will result in the enhancement of the ability to detect steam generator tube leaks. W e new system is not safety related and does not affect the operation or integrity of any safety related system.
'PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1979, 3/22/89 , ,
PORC Meeting 1988, 4/11/89 PORC Meeting 2049, 8/22/89 i
Subject:
PCR/PCN 88-5279 (B88-2-5279) ;
Description:
Reduced the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump '
(TDMWP) overspeed trip setpoint f rom 125% to 115% of rated speed.
Safety Evaluation: he potential exists for overpressurizing portions of !
the mMWP discharge piping should the pump speed l exceed 115% of rated speed with the pump operating near minimum flow conditions. Tests were conducted -!
to ensure that the reduction of the trip set point did not lead to spurious trips. Normal operating .
characteristics of the pump are not affected.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1946, 11/22/88 /
4 t
I
\
F 20
- j. ;
- Subjects .'
FNP-0-CCP-203, Rev. 19' j
Description:
. Authorized use of the modified reactor coolant system i (RCS) water chemistry program.. % e new program -!
involves operating wit 1 an elevated pH in the primary ,
system when boron concentration is less than 1350 i ppm. We pH is controlled at a higher value than the pH produced by the coordinated regimen which had been .,
in use. his change is in accordance with :
Westinghouse guidelines. We modified program will l
reduce the rate of build-up of excore radiation i fields through minimizing deposition of corrosion products. -
Safety Evaluation: 2 e feasibility of this program has been demonstrated )
at a foreign nuclear plant. Westinghouse has ,
analyzed the effect of the new regimen on affected i components and the accident analyses and has determined that no adverse consequences will result.
We impact on the RCS materials, including the fuel, i is expected to be negligible. All equipment will _
continue to operate as designed.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 2002, 5/3/89
Subject:
FWP-0-CCP-202, 'KN 20A ,
Description:
Authorized return to the coordinat'ed reactor coolant '
p system (RCS) water chemistry program for Unit 2. Use of the modified chemistry program had been approved -
per Revision 19 of FNP-0-CCP-202. Newly available '
information led to the recommendation that plants
- with pre-existing cracks in steam generator tubes should not employ the increased lithium concentration associated with the modified program for boron
- l' concentration less than 1350 ppm. %e modified and coordinated programs are identical for boron concentrations greater than 1350 ppm. .
Safety Evaluation: We decision to go back to the coordinated arogram is a management decision and can be supported ay ,
Westinghouse. he potential increase in the i radiation source term is more than offset by the +
potential reduction in detrimental effects on the steam generator tubes.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 2037, 7/17/89 l
l l
l lI 21 1
c.
- 'subj:ct -
FNP-2-ETP-1034, Rev.0
Description:
Provided guidance for maintaining essential turbine building loads energized when the normal and alternate feeds to 600V load center (LC) 2G are'both out of service.
Safety Evaluation: his procedure will be performed only when the' unit is in Mode 5 or 6 or is de-fueled. %e design capacity of affected components will not be exceeded-since all unnecessary loads will be disabled and tag p . he normal and alternate feeds to 600V LC 2G will be racked out and tagged while this procedure is in effect. Protective relaying for 600V LC 2P (the tenporary feed) and 2G is not affected since there are no relay schemes for individual loads that-trip the supply breakers.
PORC Reviews. PORC Meeting 1985, 3/31/89
Subject:
FNP-0-ETP-3102, Rev. O
Description:
Provided procedural guidance for using a negative pressure unit-(NPU) to exhaust running traps in the floor drain and equipment drain systems. Wis reduces migration of radioactive gas through the drain systems and reduces airborne radioactivity levels in the Auxiliary Buildings.-
Safety Evaluation: Engineering tests have been performed to show that use of the NPUs will not affect operation of the l' penetration room filtration system or degrade the
- existing water seals in other portions of the drain.
systems. We operation of ventilation systems will-not be affected.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 2021, 6/7/89 22
o O
Subject:
FNP-2-M-008, 'K:N 9C -
Description:
Changed the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) bypass-valve stroke time shown in FSAR Table 6.3-32. his safety evaluation analyzed the MSIV bypass valve stroke times shown in the FSAR, Technical
-Specifications'and FNP-1-M-046 (Second Ten Year Inservice Testing Plan). We proposed stroke time of 10 seconds was shown to be acceptable. It was determined that the 5 second stroke time shown in FSAR Table 6.2-32 should be designated as a procurement and design criteria and not a required value to be used in determining operability.
Safety Evaluation: We effects of flow through the MSIVs and the MSIV bypass valves were compared. We flow through the MSIV bypass valves would be much less than the flow through the MSIVs due to the smaller flow area of the
~
bypass valves. Wus, the consequences of a 10 second stroke time for the bypass valves would be much less than the consequences of the MSIVs stroking in this !
required time.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1970, 2/21/89
Subject:
FNP-2-SOP-21.0, Rev. 27
Description:
Provided procedural guidance for supplying condenser tubesheet and condensate pump seal water from a 1 temporary source. Wis seal water is normally l supplied by the demineralized water system. . We temporary source of seal water is needed when the domineralized water system is out of service and is obtained from the discharge of the condensate pumps
- l I-through a temporary hookup. ,
Safety Evaluation: The systems involved are not safety related. Failure of either of the above systems would not affect safe operation of the plant. he temporary hookup is fashioned and routed so that potential damage to nearby equipment is unlikely.
i PORC Review PORC Meeting 2091, 11/10/89 i
f 23
N
- j.
- Jo " subject: . FNP-0-SOP-2502, 'Im 15A
Description:
Provided guidance for establishing temporary !
lubrication and cooling water supplies for the river ;
water pumps while the normal supply header is being- l cleaned. Water is to be supplied from the vent valve 4
'of the discharge header of the affected river water i
, , train.
- Safety Evaluations here are no hchnical Specifications associated with l the river water system. W e river water system is '
not required for safe shutdown of the plant.
PORC Review PORC Heeting 2029, 6/22/89 p Subject ENP-2-SOP-36.3, Rev. 8 )
1
Description:
Added eppendices one through four to provide l procedural guidance for maintaining either 600V load ;
center 2D or 2E energized while the 4160V bus which normally feeds the load center is deenergized for j maintenance, j u
a safety Evaluation mis procedure will be performed only when the unit J is in Mode 5 or 6 or is de-fueled. . nehnical Specifications require only one electrical train to be operable during these operational modes.- Since all components will operate under conditions j equivalent to their normal operating conditions and -J have protection equal to the protection provided in j their normal alignment, there will be no reduction in ;
plant safety. '
L PORC Review PORC Meeting 1979, 3/22/89 :
f
Subject:
PNP Emergency Plan, Rev.16 I
Description:
)
Chanc{ed port ons ofto incorporate the Site Plan, recently revised Medical Plan andindividual annexes
- II and III. ,Each revision was designed, written and L provided by the respective entity having cognizance over the development of their plan.
1 Safety Evaluation: he changes are administrative in nature and do not i i decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. l We 'mergency Plan will continue to meet the standards of 10CrR50.47(b) and 10CFR50 Appendix E.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 2010, 5/12/89 l
l-l L
l 24 l
j,, *
+ Subject . FSAR Section 6.2 d
Description:
Corrected the tenperature and pressure ratings for j the containment spray pumps in FSAR Table 6.2-24.
1 Safety Evaluation: The correction provides an accurate representation of
.the equipment as it is installed in the plant. We !'
changes to the FSAR are bounded by the design- j parameters of the pumps and do not inpact any of the current FSAR safety analyses. )
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1967, 2/14/89, Rev. 0 [
PORC Meeting 2049, 8/22/89, Rev. 1 ;
?
Subject:
TSAR Section 6.2 ,
i
Description:
Revised the stroke times of several containment i isolation valves. We stroke times stated in the FSAR were revised to agree with the stroke times i stated in the Technical Specifications. {
Safety Evaluation: he effect of changing each of the stroke times was \
analyr.ed by the design organization. It was i determined that the revised stroke times do not adversely affect safe operation. .
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2002, 5/3/89 l
)
Subject:
FSAR Sections 6.2 and 6A !
Description:
Revised the FSAR description of post-accident procedures for use of the NaOH solution in the spray ,
L additive tank (SAT). Previously, the FSAR had I
allowed the injection of NaOH from the SAT into the containment spray flow during the recirculation mode. ;
l Also, there was no time limit specified for isolation t of the SAT after the contaiunent spray system was placed in the recirculation mode. Review of this
- practice showed that there was a potential for exceeding the licensing basis pH limit of 10.5. {
Safety Evaluation: Changes to the post-accident procedures were !
identified to resolve the above concern. An E evaluation has demonstrated that the conclusions stated in the original FSAR analysis remain valid. ;
he changes affect only the timing and sequence of '
operator actions after an accident. Normal plant l
operation is not affected and the consequences of :
L postulated accidents are not increased.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 2053, 8/30/89
-1 l
i 25 C . . -
v 9-e ,
- ' subgets . TSAR Sections 6.2 cnd 6B (FNP-0-M-72)
-Description: Approved the use of the FNP Coating Manual which provides a single source of information and-procedures for performing coating work in all areas of the plant. We Coating Manual permits an increase in the thickness of paint applied to steel (excluding galvanized steel and stainless steel) and concrete in the containment. his has the potential to affcet the containment accident pressure and temoerature profiles since coating thickness is a parameter specified in the FSAR's containment heat sink tables and is an input to the supporting pressure and tenperature calculations.
Safety Evaluation: Containment accident pressure and temperature profiles were recalculated using the maximum paint thicknesses permitted by the Coating Manual. No changes to t u design basis accident profiles were found to be necessary. Werefore, the use of the FWP Coating Manual will not increase the consequences of any design basis accidents and will not increase the-probability of failure of safe shutdown equipment ,
located in the containment.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1987, 4/6/89 s
26
.p O i V . Subjects . FSAR Chapt;r 7 L'
Description:
Revised the FSAR requirement,for response time
'b testing of reactor trip systems and ESTAS-instrumentation when a conponent affecting the. time L .; ,.- response has been replaced during maintenance. Now, response time testing is performed in accordance with the plant Technical Specifications.
Safety Evaluation he requirement to perform response time testing upon component replacement during maintenance was part of the original FWP FSAR and was provided as an alternative to the IEEE-338 (1971) requirement for periodic response time testing. Subsequently, tle Unit 1 h chnical Specifications were issued which included provisions for periodic response time testing. Wese r,pecifications are considered to be sufficient to achieve coupliance with the provisions of IEEE-338 (1971) without reliance on response time testing of components replaced during maintenance.
Since the intent of the FSAR was to show alternative compliance with IEEE-338 (1971) and this compliance is now provided by the Technical Specifications, the l FSAR may be revised to reflect the periodic testing l- now performed, h sting of conponents after maintenance is covered by procedures already in place.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 2058, 9/12/89 L
Subject:
FSAR Section 9.5
Description:
Revised the requirements for diesel generator fuel L oil as stated in FSAR Section 9.5.4. Previously, j' diesel fuel with_ a heating value of 19,000 BW/lb and
! a specific gravity of 0.9 had been specified as the basis of the fuel oil storage tank capacity. Fuel which meets these criteria is not readily available.
Also, the capacity of the diesel generator day tanks l;. was corrected.
Safety Evaluation: h e capacity of the diesel fuel cil storage tanks was l: reassessed based on the BW content per gallon of currently available fuel. It was found that all requirements for diesel fuel oil storage capacity are met, he operation of the diesel generators is not affected. The correction of the day tank capacity is considered administrative.
L PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2041, 8/1/89 27 I
,-e *
subject - FSAR Section 1104 L
Description:
Revised the rSAR to address the releases which In occur f' when the condensate hotwell is " blown down".
l; order to remove inpurities from the condenser, flow L is directed from the discharge of the condensate pumps to the turbine building sunp punp discharge line and ultimately to the river. This represents a ptential radioactive effluent release pata and must
- e sanpled.
Safety Evaluation: Sampling as required by the FSAR revision will ensure compliance with General Design Criterion 64. We sanpling of the pathway is merely the taking of a water sample for analysis. No safety related equipment or procedures are affected.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 2099, 12/1/89 subject: Cycle 7 Reload Safety Evaluation
Description:
Provided the design for the Cycle 7 core which is based on a Cycle 6 end-of-life burnup within a range of 15,000 to 16,400 MND/MW. We Cycle 7 burnup is-limited to 17,100 MND/MW which may include a power coastdown beyond the end of full power capability. A total of 8 Region-6, 20 Region-7, 64 Region-8, and 65 fresh Region-9 fuel assemblies are used in.the design. A total of 684 fresh wet annular burnable absorbers (WABAs) are used in clusters of 4, 12, and
- 16. he Region-9 assemblies differ from the previous design in that they have standardised fuel pellets, snag resistant grids, a modified top nozzle fuel assembly holddown spring and screw, and additional extended burnup features. We additional extended burnup features are longer fuel rods, longer assembly skeleton, and thinner bottom nozzle.
Safety Evaluation: Based on the reload safety evaluation and the analyses performed by Westinghouse and Southern Company Services, Inc., this reload-does not involve any unreviewed safety questions.
PORC Review PORC Meeting 1983, 3/30/89.
l
)
28 J
s 9 o- subjects, 00-lG-33, Revision 7 I
Description:
Revision 7 incorporates a change made in the procurement area when forming the SONOP00 Project. A Procurement Department dedicated to purchasing support of the system's nuclear units was created.
his Procurement Department has been formed under the cognizance of the Southern Company Services Manager, Procurement - Nuclear, and has been authorized as the agent responsible to Alabama Power Company for purchasing activities associated with Farley Nuclear Plant.
Safety Evaluatior.: Wis revision provides a change in organizational responsibilities, as discussed above. Were is no change in the performance of quality-related
-purchasing activities.
NORB Review NORB Meeting 89-03, 09-21-89 subjects operations Quality Assurance Policy Manual, Revision 27
Description:
Revision 27 incorporates a change made in the (A area when forming the SONOPCO Project. A Corporate Quality Services section was established with the responsibility for quality evaluations of suppliers for the system's nuclear units.
Safety Evaluation: Wis revision provides a change in organizational responsibilities, as discussed above. Were is no change in the performance of quality-related activities for supplier evaluations.
NORB Review: NORB Meeting 89-04, 12-18-89 29
,