ML20248H164

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Annual Rept Required by 10CFR50.59 for 1988
ML20248H164
Person / Time
Site: Farley Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1988
From: Hairston W
ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 8904140087
Download: ML20248H164 (49)


Text

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1 l; .1 4 L AUGAMA PNER CMPANY l.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED BY 10CFR50.59 Section 50.59 of Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, of the regulations of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission, . states that the holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility may (1) make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and (2) make changes in the procedures as. described in the safety analysis report, and (3) conduct tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report, without prior comission approval, unless the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change in the technical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety question (as defined in 10CFR50.59).

The licensee is required to maintain records of such changes, tests or experiments, and those records are required to include written safety.

evaluations which provide the basis for the determination that the changes, tests or experiments do not involve any unreviewed safety questions.

Brief descriptions and a summary of the safety evaluations of the changes, tests or experiments as described abov for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 which were completed in 1988, are provided in the following.

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Subject:

FNP-0-CCP-640, Revision 1

Description:

Added the use of a windowed 2!! internal proportional counter for radioactivity measurements at FNP. f Safety Evaluation: The low background windowed 2!! internal proportional l counter is suitable for use in the same applications  !

as the windowless 2ft internal proportional counter  ;

currently being used. The windowed counter provides for improved accuracy, precision and sensitivity of l gross activity measurements.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1908, 8-4-88

Subject:

FNP-0-CCP-708, TCN 3F, TCN 4A

Description:

TCNs 3F and 4A provided for the continuous chlorination of the service water system using sodium hypochlorite to reduce the number of corbicula (clams) in the system. The addition of sodium hypochlorite will be limited to one unit at a time, while chlorine dioxide will be added to the opposite unit during the hypochlorination.

Safety Evaluation: Sodium hypochlorite addition can be quickly terminated if deemed necessary. Emergency actions and precautions already exist in this procedure. The use of both chlorine dioxide and sodium hypochlorite for prevention of fouling in the service water system is already addressed in the FSAR. I PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1799, 1/7/88 PORC Meeting 1864, 5/3/88

Subject:

FNP-1-ETP-3660, Revision 3

Description:

Allowed the use of the ASEA Brown Boveri Failed Fuel Rod Detection System (FFRDS) to perform leak testing of feel assemblies.

Safety Evaluation: The Brown Boveri FFRDS has been utilized by Westinghouse for fuel leak detection at various sites l without detrimental effects to the fuel. The use of i FFRDS has been determined to have no adverse impact on the safety of the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1842, 3/31/88 i

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Subject:

FNP-1-M-046, Revision 1  !

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Description:

Revised valve closure times for certain containment isolation valves as stated in the FSAR so that they agree with the closure times stated in the Technical Specifications. Also, the valve closure times as stated in the FSAR for certain steam generator blowdown isolation valves has been revised.

Safety Evaluation: The revised closure tines for the containment isolation valves do not violate accident analysis assumptions or Technical Specification requirements.

Also, the design organization has determined that the revised closure times are acceptable.

The revised closure times for the steam generator blowdown valves would result in a negligible change in the steam generator inventory during postulated accident conditions.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1932, 10/11/88

Subject:

FNP-1-SOP-2.4, Revision 23

Description:

Changed the normal position of the valves which route the equipment drain water and valve leakoff water to the recycle holdup tanks (RHT's).

Previously, the normal position of these valves (one valve per RHT) had been " locked open" for all three RHT's. This safety evaluation allowed the position of the valves for the off-service RHT's to be changed to " locked closed".

Safety Evaluation: This change prevents inadvertent water addition to the off-service RHT's. Routing equipment drain and valve leakoff to one RHT instead of three has no operational consequences since normally this amount of water is insignificant when compared to the 28,000 gallon capacity of the RHT. If the leakoff becomes abnormally high, routine operational monitoring would detect this inleakage prior to overfilling the tank.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1874, 5/17/88

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Subject:

FNP-1-SOP-16.1, Revision 14

Description:

Revised Appendix 1 to allow defeating the low service water dilution flow trip of 1-BD-RCV-023B during any mode of operation.

Safety Evaluation: Service water dilution flow is continuously recorded in the main control room. When the trip is defeated, steam generator blowdown (SGBD) releases will be calculated and authorized on a batch release permit to ensure that the total dilution flow from both units is cufficient to prevent Technical Specification dose limits from being exceeded. SGBD will be caution tagged to require that blowdown be secured if the minimum dilution of the release permit is not met. The total dilution flow will be logged every 15 minutes while the low flow trip is defeated.

Defeating the low service water flow trip does not affect the ability of RCV-023B to close on high SGBD activity.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1939, 11/1/88

Subject:

FNP-1-SOP-23.0, TCN 18C

Description:

Added an appendix to this procedure to provide guidance for performing a feed and bleed evolution on the component cooling water (CCW) system. This evolution will be performed by diverting approximately 20 gpm of CCW from the off-service CCW train through a portable demineralized package to the floor drain system.

Safety Evaluation: This evolution will improve the chemical composition of the CCW system. CCW surge tank level indication will be monitored continuously using both trains of level indication. Feed and bleed activities will be suspended if CCW surge tank level cannot be maintained within the desired range.

The normal off-service train CCW flow is approximately 3500 gpm. Thus, diverting approximately 20 gpm wi. not affect system flow significantly. During accident conditions the feed and bleed evolution will be terminated immediately.

Thus, CCW flow during a postulated accident will not be affected adversely.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1882, 6/6/88 i

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Subject:

FNP Emergency-Plan, Revision 14, TCN 14B, and Revision.15 '

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-Description: Revision 14 to the Emergency Plan' updated telephone directories,.made title changes, ad made other' administrative changes. TCN 149 mlocated an

-emergency cabinet in the control room. Revision 15 deleted the responsibilities of the Manager - Nuclear Technical Support (MNTS) since that position no

' longer exists. Further, changes were made to personnel. designations for the Recovery Phase to use the available managers more efficiently.

Safety Evaluation: The administrative changes of Revision 14 do not decrease the effectiveness of the emergency plan and

the plan, as changed, will continue to meet the

. standards of 10CFR50.47(b) and 10CFR50 Appendix E.

With regard to TCN 14B, the contents and accessibility of the emergency cabinet will remain unchanged.

The responsibility formerly delegated to the MNTS

-was reassigned to the Menager - Nuclear Engineering-and Licensing. All changes to position _ designations ~

were reviewed to ensure that~the qualifications necessary to hold the newly assigned positions are- '

adequate..

PORC Review:- PORC Meeting 1795, 12/31/87' PORC Meeting 1945, 11/17/88 PORC Meeting 1953, 12/20/88 i,

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Subjects MD 88-1812

Description:

Changed the setpoints for the.1C diesel generator.

starting air pressure switches.

Safety Evaluation: The revised setpoints give more als for starting the diesel generator as well as. provide better indication of air pressure for the control room operator.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1825, 3/4/88

Subject:

MD88-1838.

Description:

authorized bypassing the auto shunt trip pushbutton on.the "A" reactor trip breaker. FSAR Section 7.2-30 )

will be updated to reflect this minor departure.  !

Safety Evaluation: ~ The auto shunt trip pushbutton is utilized only in testing of the reactor trip breaker. By installing a ,

jumper across the pushbutton, the jumper will provide l the continuity normally provided by the pushbutton.  ;

This minor departure. changes the test features in .l that the test function is. defeated. However, during  ;

normal operation, the test feature is not necessary.

Procedural guidance ensures that the jumper is removed for testing the shunt trip feature.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1819, 2/19/88

Subject:

MD 88-1841-

Description:

Authorized replacement of the Agastat-relay with a new relay for 600 volt breaker EK02. FSAR Figure 8.3-17 will be updated to' reflect this replacement.

Safety Evaluation: Replacement relays'have a new part number. The I replacement relay is similar to the device as required on the drawing and has nuclear grade documentation.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1823, 3/2/88 i

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Subject:

MD 88-1845 and MD 88-1985 l

Description:

Authorized the installation of jumpers to allow the operation of the radwaste area exhaust fan with the supply fan out of service. FSAR Section 9.4.3 will be updated to reflect this minor departure.

Safety Evaluation: The purpose of the radioactive waste area ventilation system is to maintain temperature between 65'F and j 110'F when outside air is between 20'F and 95'F.

While the supply fan is out of service the boric acid tank area temperature is to be monitored to ensure the temperature remains greater than 65' while the exhaust fan is being run. Also, the exhaust fans are required to be shut down when the outside air temperature is less than 20'F. Appropriate doors I between the radiation controlled area (RCA) and the outside air are opened to allow ventilation.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1828, 3/9/88 PORC Meeting 1956, 12/29/88

Subject:

MD 88-1862

Description:

Authorized the installation of a jumper to allow the operation of the containment purge exhaust fan with the containment purge supply fan out of service.

FSAR Section 6.2.3 will be updated to reflect this minor departure.

Safety Evaluation: Operating the containment purge system without the supply fan in operation eliminates refiltering and heating of the air and requires an alternate air supply path. Neither the refiltering capability nor the heating function are safety concerns. Supply air to the containment is provided by maintaining the equipment hatch, personnel access hatch, or other appropriate doors open.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1840, 3/29/88 PORC Meeting 1842, 3/31/88 6

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Subject:

MD 88-1869

Description:

Authorized jumpering out high energy line break (HELB) contacts on the steam generator blowdown isolation valves to allow operation of the valves during modes 5 or 6. FSAR Sections 3k.2.1, 3k.2.1.1 and 10.4.8 will be updated to reflect this minor departure.

Safety Evaluation:- Operation of these valves is needed to allow draining of the steam generators. The HELB sensors mitigate the consequences of a release of steam from the blowdown lines which contain high temperature, high pressure water during operating. conditions. In mode 5, the temperature of the reactor coolant system is required to be less than or equal to 200'F (less than-or equal to 140'F for mode 6). The steam generator secondary side is at atmospheric pressure during the draining process. Thus the high temperature, high-pressure condition does not exist in modes 5 or 6.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1850, 4/10/88

Subject:

MD 88-1915

Description:

Replaced the carbon steel flanges in the component -1' cooling water piping to the 1A, 1B, and 1C charging pumps' gear and bearing oil coolers with stainless steel flanges. A small section of carbon steel

,. piping was.also replaced with stainless steel to i facilitate this modification.

Safety Evaluation: The stainless steel flanges and.the small section of associated piping are made from steel of comparable tensile and yield strength with equal pressure and temperature ratings. The stainless steel flanges are geometrically identical to the carbon steel flanges so system flow characteristics will not be affected.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1891, 6/24/88 l.

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Subject:

MD 88-1916 j

Description:

Replaced the 75 foot sections of fire hose in fire hose cabinets D-108, D-122, and D-115 with 100 foot sections of fire hose.

Safety Evaluation: The 100 foot length fire hoses in these cabinets is necessary to provide adequate fire fighting  ;

capability for these areas.  !

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1892, 6/28/88

Subject:

MD 88-1969 4

Description:

Removed the internals from check valve Q1G22V009 to allow eductor flow from the recycle holdup tanks (RHT's).

l Safety Evaluation: The purpose of the check valve is to prevent suction pressure from passing to the discharge of the waste.

gas compressors when the system is shutdown. The check valve is not necessary since the manual valve downstream of the check valve is normally closed >

except when educting'RHT gas. Procedural guidance ensures the valve is closed upon completion of the eduction process.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1942, 11/10/88 8

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Subject:

PCR/PCN 80-703 (B80-1-703)

Description:

Replaced the volume control tank (VCT) purge flowmeter (FT-1094) and recycle holdup tank (RHT) eductor flowmeter (FT-252), which are both turbine type meters, with a variable area flowmeter (FT-1094) and a pressure transmitter (PT-252), respectively.

Safety Evaluation: These changes will provide a more reliable indication of VCT purge flow and RHT eductor performance. This instrumentation does not have a safety function.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1813, 2/9/88 PORC Meeting 1832, 3/18/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 82-1236 (B82-0-1236)

Description:

Replaced the control room air conditioning system fire dampers QSV49XV2782AC, AD, BC, and BD with Ruskin model FD-31 fire dampers. This change also removed the smoke release device (SRD) actuation circuits from the above referenced dampers and the control room pressurization system dampers QSV49XV2783A and B. Also, the lower restraining flange for the FD-31 fire dampers was deleted.

Safety Evaluation: The fire dampers were replaced because they would not close with normal air flow from the air conditioning unit. An engineering review performed by the design organization showed that the SRD circuit was not l necessary.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1728, 9/15/87 PORC Meeting 1805, 1/21/88

Subject:

PCN/PCN 83-1399 (B83-1-1399)

Description:

Replaced the existing battery pack type emergency lighting in containment with 30W incandescent lamp fixtures powered by two uninterruptible power supplies (UPS's) located outside of containment.

l Safety Evaluation: The previously existing lights, which were powered by battery packs, have experienced a short service life due to the high ambient temperature. The UPS's installed by this modification are outside i

containment where the temperature is lower. This change will upgrade emergency lighting in containment.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1884, 6/9/88 9

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Subject:

PCR/PCN 83-1463 (B83-1-1463)

Description:

' Complete the. installation of the combustion -

Engineering inadequate _ core cooling monitoring' system

(ICCMS). Installed by this design change are:

- Environmentally qualified connectors for the core exit thermocouple (CET's) at the reactoriand mineral insulated transition cables to connect with existing cables.

- Train oriented CET displays on the main control board.

- Subcooling margin inputs to the'ICCMS processor.-

- Train oriented subcooling margin' displays on the main control board. We existing subcooling margin -

monitors are to be removed.

Safety Evaluation: This upgrades the CET system to Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 1 requirements. This new system will provide the operator with the required information to monitor core cooling. Implementation of this design change will not adversely affect.any other system.

We capability to monitor conditions in the reactor vessel will be enhanced.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1760, 11/3/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 84-2866 (B84-1-2866)

Description:

Installed a new 3 inch gate valve (N1G21V915) between the containment sump pumps and containment isolation valve HV-3376 outside the bio-shield. Also, installed a new vent valve (N1G21v916) between N1G21V915 and HV-3376.

Safety Evaluation: These changes result in reduced radiation exposure to plant personnel.

.PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1748, 10/15/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 84-2914 (S84-1-2914)

Description:

Replaced various portions of small (2 inch diameter and under) carbon steel service water pipe. The ,

replacement piping is stainless steel. Also, valves and flanges were added or replaced as required to enhance maintenance and cleaning of the service water piping.

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Safety Evaluation: Replacing the carbon steel pipe with stainless steel pipe reduces corrosion and provides for enhanced service water flow. Other changes to the service water system, such as adding flanged connections and adding or replacing valves will make the service water system more reliable and easier to maintain.

The added components are consistent with the design and safety requirements of the service water system.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1563, 9/2/86 PORC Meeting 1568, 9/15/86 PORC Meeting 1690, 6/23/87 PORC Meeting 1728, 9/15/87 PORC Meeting 1810, 2/2/88 PORC Meeting 1904, 7/22/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 84-2923 (S84-1-2923)

Description:

Provided the design for the installation of a separate sensing line from each instrument air receiver to its compressor control station air pressure switch.

Safety Evaluation: A separate sensing line will provide for the proper unloading and loading of the compressor in the receiver mode.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1644, 3/3/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 84-2989 (S84-1-2989)

Description:

Assigned total plant numbering system (TPNS) numbers to the instrument air drain valves.

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

PORC Review: POR: Meeting 1900, 7/12/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 85-3117 (S85-1-3117)

Description:

Raised the setpoint of the boric acid batching tank high temperature alarm from 100'F to 120'F. This will prevent erroneous alarms during the summer months due to high ambient temperatures.

Safety Evaluation: This alarm switch provides no control function and serves as an annunciator only. By raising the setpoint from 100*F to 120*F, the batching tank high temperature alarm can indicate potential problems to operating personnel.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1900, 7/12/88 11 Tech Misc 3/2

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Subject:

PCR/PCN 85-3167, (B85-0-3167)

Description:

Replaced the spent fuel cask crane's stainless steel, non-lubricated hoist rope with a lubricated, carbon steel main crane hoist rope.

Safety Evaluation: The original purchase specification for the cask crane called for a stainless steel, non-lubricated hoist rope but the manufacturer was unable to supply this. Substitution of a lubricated, carbon steel rope was proposed by the manufacturer and approved by Alabama Power Company before delivery of the crane.

The verbage. in the FSAR was updated to reflect this but a figure in the FSAR had not been updated.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1908, 8/4/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 85-3297 (S85-1-3297)

Description:

Assigned TPNS numbers to the main condenser basket tip connections. These connections were installed to facilitate local readings of condenser vacuum for daily calorimetric and routine testing.

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1491, 2/20/86

Subject:

PCR/PCN 85-3351 (S85-1-3351)

Description:

Replaced the existing digital electro-hydraulic (DEH) l turbine control system with a state-of-the-art microprocessor based DEH III turbine control system.

Safety Evaluation: The replacement DEH III system will provide for better control of the turbine, as well as improve plant availability, avoid maintenance downtime and provide operating flexibility. This will not adversely affect safe operation of the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1827, 3/8/88 12 1 Tech Misc 3/2 .

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Subj:ct: PCR/PCN 85-3431 (B85-1-3431)

Description:

Partial modification to the radiation access control area.

Safety Evaluation: This modification allows for more effective use of the space and facilities available in the access control area. It provides separate men's and women's hot showers and toilets, a janitor's closet, and a wonen's toilet outside the radiation controlled area.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1535, 6/17/86

Subject:

PCR/PCN 85-3431 (S85-1-3431)

Description:

Provide fire protection coverage (system 1A-52) to the newly modified radiation access control area.

Three sprinkler heads were installed and the suppression coverage for the disrobe area and Room 438 was removed.

Safety Evaluation: These modifications do not degrade the capability of the fire protection system to perform its intended function of protecting safety related or safe-shutdown related equipment during a fire.

Additionally, the failure of the non-seismic portions of system 1A-52 during a seismic event has been determined not to cause a failure of safety related cabling located above the fire protection piping or the seismically designed portions of system 1A-52.

The removal of suppression coverage from the disrobe area and Room 438 is acceptable because the remaining j combustible loading is insignificant in quantity and i no change to fire detection has been made by this modification. The modification of the sprinkler system will enhance sprinkler coverage of the women's toilet, the men's toilet, and the janitor's closet.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1538, 6/27/86 l

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Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3542 (B86-1-3542)

Description:

Installed a pressure switch to control the power to the carbon monoxide (CO) monitor for the breathing ,

air system. This pressure switch will turn off the power to the monitor if the pressure in the sample line drops below 20 psig.

Safety Evaluation: This change will extend the life of the CO monitor sensing heads. The CO monitor does not have any nuclear safety functions.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1790, 12/17/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3544 (B86-1-3544)

Description:

Provided for automatic sequencing of swing battery .

charger 1C to the diesel generators for a loss of  !

site power (LOSP).

Safety Evaluation: This change will eliminate operator action required during the shutdown of the plant following a LOSP, should battery charger 1C be in operation. As such, the safe shutdown capability of the plant will be enhanced.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1712, 8/7/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3545 (B86-1-3545)

Description:

Replaced the existing 3/8 inch valves on the blowdown lines for steam generator blowdown transmitters FT1171, FT1172 and FT1173 with 1/2 inch gate valves.

Also, a new 3/8 inch instrument valve was installed in each line. These instrument valves will be open normally.

Safety Evaluation: These changes will alleviate the problem with the isolation valves becoming plugged and inoperable.

Leaving the instrument valves open will prevent them from becoming clogged.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1748, 10/15/87 14 Tech Misc 3/2 l

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3681 (B86-1-3681)

Description:

Replaced cable and ccnnectors associated with the control rod drive modules and the digital rod position indication system.

Safety Evaluation: This change upgraded the previously existing cable l and connectors with equipment that is less susceptible to wear and reduced the potential for .

loose connectors. Testing was performed to ensure I that design requirements are satisfied. I PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1837, 3/25/88 PORC Meeting 1848, 4/7/88 ,

PORC Meeting 1866, 5/5/88 l PORC Meeting 1874, 5/17/88 l

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3692 (B86-1-3692) j

Description:

Upgraded the existing capacity of the new fuel 1 monorail hoist from 2000 pounds to 2500 pounds. This modification involved the installation of a new motor, load block, hoist cable, and capacity plates. i Safety Evaluation: This upgrade is needed in order to utilize the new  ;

fuel monorail to lift the ceiling hatches which weigh -

about 2400 pounds each. A structural evaluation was performed to ensure that the increased lift capacity would not impart an unacceptable lifting load on the new fuel storage racks. It has been concluded that the new fuel storage racks are capable of withstanding lifting loads in excess of the new hoist capacity of 2500 pounds without failure.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1715, 8/13/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3727 (S86-1-3727)

Description:

Changed the reducer on the condenser tube plate seal

, water system from a welded type to a screw type and I installed a union fitting upstream of the reducer.

Safety Evaluation: The condenser seal water system has no safety

{ function. The system is low temperature and low pressure so a leak or rupture would have a mini:nal effect on plant operation.

PORC Review: FORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88 l

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Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3739 (S86-1-3739)

Description:

Revised drawing D-170807 sheet 2 of the air start system for diesel generator 2C to show the as-built i valve orientation. l l

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only. The as-built valve orientation i is correct for proper system operation. J 1

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88 I

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3779 (S86-1-3779) i

Description:

Revised drawing D-175042 sheet 6 to delete a redundant hydrogen supply line. This line was never  !

installed in the plant and is not needed.

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3802 (S86-1-3802)

Description:

Changed two B-train service water pond temperature transmitters from "Q" (safety-related) to "N" (non-safety related). The existing transmitters were i replaced with high quality non-safety related )

transmitters. Also, new TPNS numbers were provided for the thennowells and elements associated with ,

these transmitters. l Lafety Evaluation: There are redundant temperature indicators on each train for both units. Therefore, there is sufficient redundancy to ensure that reliable service water pond temperature indication is available in the control room. These transmitters are not required for post-accident mon!toring and are not required to function following a seismic event. The pressure retaining capability of the service water system will not be affected.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1818, 2/16/88 16 Tech Misc 3/2

Subjset: PCR/PCN 86-3826 (S86-1-3826)

Description:

. Revised drawing D-175033 sheet 1 to show the previously installed steam generator (S/G) level transmitters LT-473 (S/G 1A), LT-483 (S/G 1B) and

-LT-493 (S/G IC).

! ' Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

-PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3836 (B86-1-3836)

Description:

Provided the design for the installation of the Westinghouse anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) electronics cabinet and two output relay panels, the addition and installation of new pressure transmitters and their associated signal conditioning circuits, as well as the AMSAC interfaces with the existing plant equipment and new pressure transmitters.

Safety Evaluation: AMSAC is a system which provides an alternate means for tripping the turbine and initiating auxiliary feedwater flow. It is diverse and independent from the existing reactor protection system (RPS) and was developed in response:to NRC requirements and 10CFR$0.62. The addition of the AMSAC system enhances the safe shutdown capability of the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1712, 8/7/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 86-3896 (S86-1-3896)

Description:

Revised drawings A-170255 sheet 9, B-170249 sheet 7 and D-170114 sheet 2 to reflect the replacement of a Leeds and Northrup model 1971 flow transmitter. The replacement of the transmitter had been accomplished by Minor Departure From Design 86-1610. ,

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88 17 E i - _ ______ __________ _ _ _ _ . _

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Subj ct: PCR/PCN 86-3911 (B86-1-3911) j

Description:

Replaced the existing containment temperature monitor (TISH-3192) and containment temperature recorder (TR-3188) with a Honeywell digital recorder.

Safety Evaluation: The previous monitor was obsolete and replacement parts could not be purchased. The new Honeywell recorder will provide all the functions that the previous monitor and recorder provided. The new recorder will give the plant operator more versatility and convenience.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1711, 8/4/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-3962 (M' l-3962)

Description:

Revised drawings D-177025 and D-181747 to correct the TPNS numb'r on breaker #5 and the loads on breakers 7, 13, 15 and 16 on 120V AC Distribution Panel 1K.

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1925, 9/22/88 l

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-3975 (B87-1-3975)

Description:

Added an indicator on the main control board to provide indication of total auxiliary feedwater flow.

Safety Evaluation: This modification provided a reliable control room indication of total auxiliary feedwater flow on the main control board. This enables the plant operator to take action based on total auxiliary feedwater flow during emergency conditions as directed by Emergency Operating Procedures.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1787, 12/10/87 subject: PCR/PCN 87-3977 (B87-1-3977)

Description:

Revised Figure 9.5-6 of the FSAR to show the newly modified Gai-Tropics public address station at the main control W rd.

Safety Evaluation: This modification enhances the control room public address system.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1818, 2/16/88 18

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Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4018 (S87-1-4018)

Description:

Revised' drawing D-170119 to show the installation of

-stainless steel piping between the service water minimum flow bypass line 8-HBC-214 and valve OlP16V639. The installation was performed by Minor Departure From Design 86-1541.

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4052 (B87-1-4052)

Description:

Added header isolation valves to the 2.5, 3 and 4-inch service water branch lines to safety related coolers in the Auxiliary Building - This will E facilitate the subsequent replacement of the carbon steel branch header piping with stainless steel piping.

Safety Evaluation: The addith a of the header isolation valves will facilitate individual cooler isolation without having the service water system out of service. The.

replacement of this piping will improve the performance of these coolers and the service water system. This modification has no impact on the safe shutdown capability of the plant.

PORC Review: -PORC Meeting 1823, 3/2/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4076 (B87-1-4076)

Description:

Replaced the existing Type 4LCY-5 batteries with Type 4LCY-420 batteries for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDMWP) uninterruptible

power supply (UPS).

Safety Evaluation: The' replacement battery has at least the same capacity as the existing battery. Therefore, the operation of the TDMWP UPS is not affected and, the safe shutdown of the plant will not be adversely affected.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1858, 4/22/88

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l 19 Tech Misc 3/2 i

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Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4084 (S87-0-4084)

Description:

Revised drawing D-170084 (site plot plan) to remove reference to Units 3 and 4.

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1908, 8/4/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4093 (S87-1-4093)

Description:

Revised drawings D-170117 and D-170149 to designate the drain lines on the suction of the condensate pumps as an alt 9rnate means to add boric acid and other chemicals to the rteam generators.

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.

PORC Review: FORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4099 (B87-1-4099)

Description:

Modified the internals lifting rig to improv6 the method of latching the rig to the internals. The modification includes the addition of a triangular work platform with handrails at the top of the rig.

This platform is used to support three remote operating tools for latching to the internals. Also included in the modifications are removal of the protective ring pick-up assemblies and modification of the torque tube asserolles and tool engagement indicators.

Safety Evaluation: This modification did not affect the safe operation of the internals lifting rig. The modification improved the method of latching the lift rig to the reactor vessel internals.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1800, 1/12/88 PORC Meeting 1834, 3/22/88 20 Tech Misc 3/2

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I a

Subjzet PCR/PCN 87-4143 (S87-0-4143)

Description:

Revised drawings D-170114 and D-200013 to show the correct safety class boundary and location. Line No.

30 HBC-208 was changed from non safety related to a safety class 2B and line No. 24 HBC-209 was changed from safety class 2B to a non safety related line.

Also, the safety class symbol for line No. 30 HBC-211

at valve Q1P16V550 was rotated 180*.

Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only PORC Revi.ew: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4227 (B87-1-4227)

Description:

Replaced the existing bolts on all three steam generator primary manway covers with a stud and nut arrangement.

Safety Evaluation: The replacement studs and nuts are sized to require no modification of the covers, gaskets, or the threaded holes in the steam generator. The design, fabrication, materials, and inspection of the studs i and nuts meet ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements as specified in tne reference drawings.

The loads on the studs, nuts, washers, covers, gaskets, and the steam generator have been evaluated as acceptable. The stresses due to the preload on the studs and design loads of the steam generator are determined to be less than the allowable limits as specified in Section III of the ASME Code. Also, studs of a similar design have been assessed to have a fatigue life equal to or greater than the fatigue life of the original bolts.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1790, 12/17/87

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4229 (B87-1-4229)

Description:

Installed an additional walkway and handrail on the drive motor side of the manipulator bridge crane to provide for safer access to the drive motor area.

L L

l 1

21 i

i Safety Evaluation: This modification enhances the safety of personnel who need to access the manipulator crane drive line or operate the crane manually. A seismic evaluation of the crane with the added walkway was performed.

The evaluation concluded that safety related equipment will not be degraded as a result of seismically induced loads on the crane.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1804, 1/19/88 I

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4255 (B87-1-4255)

Description:

Installed a two-hour, 30 KVA uninterruptible power supply (UPS) for the new plant computer. This involved the modification of the ventilation system in rooms 463 and 464 due to the increased heat loads in the rooms. The modification in the ventilation system included the installation of a computer UPS I supply fan, a computer UPS primary exhaust fan, and a l computer UPS secondary exhaust fan.

~

Safety Evaluation: The computer UPS configuration is non-safety related.

Rooms 463 and 464 located in the Auxiliary Building '

fall within the boundaries of the non-radwaste area  !

ventilation system. This is not an engineered safeguard system and no credit is taken for its operation in analyzing the consequences of any accident. A fire analysis was performed and the results indicated that this modification will not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1805, 1/21/88 PORC Meeting 1837, 3/25/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4271 (B87-1-4271)

Description:

Replaced the existing manipulator crane Dillon load control system with a computer controlled load control system. The new system has data collection capabilities and improved control for reducing fuel assembly grid strap damage during fuel movement.

Safety Evaluation: This system allows monitoring and controlling of actual loads, plus providing a historical record of the loading on fuel handled by the machine. It automatically compensates for the constantly changing resistance to movement as the fuel assembly is raised or lowered, keeping the overload or underload trip limit on the fuel at a constant value, .

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1827, 3/8/88 22 Tech Misc 3/2

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Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4353 (B87-1-4353)

Description:

Removed two excess flow check valves 01E21V398 A and B from the chemical and volume control system letdown line.

Safety Evaluation: Other valves (HV-8175 A and B) are available to isolate the letdown line in case the line ruptures. (

Analyses showed that removal of the excess flow check valves will not adversely impact any affected area of the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1830, 3/15/88 i l

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4452 (B87-1-4452) .

Description:

Installed a flow interrupter downstream of fire l damper 1-116-15. Also, a plexiglass viewing window was installed to allow the flow interrupter to be seen without opening the duct.

Safety Evaluation: The flow interrupter enhances fire isolation capability by actuating in advance of the fire damper thus allowing the fire damper to close under no-flow conditions. The installation of the plexiglass viewing window increased the fire loading in the area but it is still under the limit for a 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> fire severity rating.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1818, 2/16/88 PORC Meeting 1823, 3/2/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 87-4490 (B87-1-4490)

Description:

Replaced the pipe spools on the service water piping to the containment air coolers with flexible hose assemblies to reduce the loads on the containment air cooler nozzles.

)

Safety Evaluation: The use of flexible hose assemblies has been '

evaluated and it has been determined that all containment air cooler nozzle loads are within the Iraximum limits provided by the cooler manufacturer.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1829, 3/11/88 j 23 l Tech Misc 3/2

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Subjrct: PCR/PCN 88-4763 (B88-1-4763)

Description:

Removed a section of the boron injection tank (BIT) bypass line and installed pipe caps on the line.

Also, the normal position of the BIT bypass valve was changed from " locked closed" to " closed".

Safety Evaluation: With the elimination of the high concentration boric acid from the BIT, the BIT bypass line is no longer needed. This modification will eliminate the potential for leakage of nornal charging past the BIT bypass valve into the reactor coolant system via the safety injection piping. The leakage could cause thermal cycling of the safety injection lines. Also, changing the designation of the BIT bypass valve from

" locked closed" to " closed" will not prevent it from

'etntaining the safety injection system pressure boundary.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1823, 3/2/B8 PORC Meeting 1851, 4/12/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 88-4826 (B88-1-4826)

Description:

Installed lockable wire mesh fe:.ees and barriers to prevent inadvertent and unauthorized entry into the spent fuel pool (SFP) demineralized room (Room 449) the SFP valve room (Room 450), and the SFP filter room, (Room 451). These rooms are classified as exclusion areas due to radiological conditions.

Also, lead blankets were placed between rooms 449 and 450 to prevent reaching 1 R/hr on the outside of the new exclusion area barrier.

Safety Evaluation: This modification allows for administrative control of these exclusion areas. Seismic considerations and the added fire loading as a result of this modification have been evaluated. It is concluded  ;

that the installation of these barriers does not affect the safe shutdown of the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1916, 8/23/88 PORC Meeting 1936, 10/25/88 24

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k-

Subject:

PCP/PCN 88-4848 (B88-1-4848)

Description:

Installed barriers to prevent inadvertent or i unauthorized entry into the primary spent resin storage tank room.

Safety Evaluation: This modification allows for administrative control of this area. The installation of these barriers does not affect the safe shutdown of the plant. ,

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1925, 9/22/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 88-4858 (B88-1-4858)

Description:

Installed barriers to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized entry into the secondary spent resin storage tank room.

Safety Evaluation: This modification allows for administrative control of this area. The installation of these barriers does not affect the safe shutdown of the plar.;. j PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1925, 9/22/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 88-4979 (B88-1-4979)

Description:

Installed a water loop seal in the piping between the residual heat removal heat exchanger and the suction of the charging pumps. Also, two new vent valves were installed.

Safety Evaluation: The purpose of these modifications is to mitigate the accumulation of gas at the suction of the charging pumps. The loop seal is intended to prevent the migration of gas to the charging pump suction. The vent valves allow venting of accumulated gas from the piping. There will be a negligible effect on the normal operation of the charging pumps. The modification complies with all applicable safety codes.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1851, 4/12/88 25 Tech Misc 3/2 i

Subject:

PCR/PCN 88-4997 (S88-1-4997)

Description:

Replaced the s 'gers on the steam generator feed pump recircula T lines. The supports for the spargers were u_.so modified.

Safety Evaluation: The previous spargers were found to be severely damaged. The revised design can better withstand the effects of a pressure transient in the system.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1852, 4/14/88

Subject:

PCR/PCN 88-5003 (B88-1-5003)

Description:

Reduced the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) overspeed trip setpoint from 125% to 115% of rated speed.

Safety Evaluation: The potential exists for overpressurizing portions of the TDAFWP discharge piping if the pump speed exceeds 115% of rated speed with the pump operating near minimum flow conditions. Tests were conducted to ensure that the reduction of the trip set point did not lead to spurious trips. Normal operating characteristics of the pump were not affected.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1867, 5/6/88 26 Tech Misc 3/2

' '1 s

w-

)

I Subjscts -- FSAR. Update, R3 vision 6'  ;

I# _

Description:

Annual updating of the FSAR as required by 10CFR50.71(e).-

1 Safety Evaluations :A11Lchanges have been, reviewed te insure that they do ]

not adversely affect the safe operation of FNP. <

These changes were found not to involve any unreviewed j p safety questions. _

PORC Review: .PORC Meeting 1896,-7/1/88.

Subject:

FSAR PC 88-05

Description:

Broaden the scope of existing health physics training as str.ted in section 12.2.5.2 of the-FSAR.

. Safety Evaluation: To make the FSAR consistent with the requirements of 10CFR19.12. This modified tra*. ing connitrent does:

not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PORC Meview. PORC Meeting 1896,'7/1/88

Subject:

FSAR Section 17.2

Description:

Added a footnote to FSAR Section 17.2 to note an

~ exception that the independent review and audit group (the NORB) shall consist of at least four persons, vice the five required by ANSI N18.7-1972.

Safety Evaluation: This.FSAR change does not change the minimum number 1

of NORB members as required by the FSAR or Technical-Specifications, it.only notes an exception taken to ANSI N18.7-1972.

PORC Review: -PORC Meeting 1911, 8/11/88
p.

Subject:

FSAR Section 9B'.1'

).

Description:

Clarified the status of Appendix 98 of the FSAR. The existing Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire protection license conditions reference the Fire Protection Program . .;

Reevaluation (FPPR) as the licensing basis. However, l since July 1987, Appendix 9B of the FSAR has *sen the current document describing the fire protectios program.

f 27 L

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' Safety Evaluation: This. resolves any ambiguity by explicitly stating that Appendix 9B embodies the FPPR. Appendix 9B was -

created in response to the requirements of Generic Letter 86-10. This does not decrease the effectiveness of the FNP fire protection program.

E PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1915,.8/17/88

Subject:

Changes Made to the FPPR-to Create Appendix 9B'of the FSAR

Description:

Documented the bases for several items in Appendix 9B of the FSAR. Prior to 1987, the FNP fire protection program had been documented in the Fire Protection Program Reevaluation (FPPR). This document has been incorporated into.the FSAR (as Appendix 9B) in.

accordance with Generic letter 86-10. This safety evaluation documents the change made to each'sectior.

of the FPPR prior to incorporation into the FSAR.-

Safety Evaluation: Information in the FPPR was changed to be in a format consistent with the FSAR. Bases for each change were stated. These changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the FNP fire protection program.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/17/88 The following five safety evaluations document other.

changes to the information in the FPPR.

Subject:

FSAR Section 9B, Attachment A

Description:

A conservative method has been used to calculate the fire loading due'to cable insulation. This method was documented in a safety evaluation which was approved by the PORC previously. However, the effects'of the new methods upon the Appendix R exemptions had not been evaluated. This safety evaluation considers the effects that an increase in fire severity would have on.the fire protection program including the exemptions granted by the NRC.

Safety Evaluation: Some rooms did not have an exemption. Also, some exemptions were not based on fire severity. The fire loading of many of these rooms is primarily due to cable insulation which has a relatively slow rate of heat release. Typically, the rooms are provided with fire suppression systems which are designed for a high rate of heat release. Therefore, the fire suppression systems are adequate to protect the rooms.

28 Tech Misc 3/8 I

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k For other rooms, the actual fire severity is not greater than the fire severity stated in the exemption requests. Therefore, the present fire protection measures are adequate.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88

Subject:

FSAR Section 9B.4.1.6

Description:

Compressible material (self expanding cork) is used to isolate the Auxiliary Building from the containment Building. .The FPPR originally stated that the compressible material is covered with a half-hour rated fire blanket in areas where the compressible material forms a part of a fire area boundary. This statement was deleted when the FPPR was incorporated into the FSAR.because the statement is not accurate.  !

Safety Evaluation: The statement was inadve~tently incorporated into the FPPR. However, APCo ha, concluded and documented to the NRC that the abseNe of a half-hour rated fire barrier does not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program. Testing has indicated that the cork will act as an adequate fire barrier.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88 l

Subject:

FSAR Section 98.4.2.5

Description:

The FPPR had stated that the Turbine Building is separated from the rest of the plant by a 3-hour rated fire wall and that the Turbine Building contains no equipment necessary for safe shutdown.

These statements were modified when the FPPR was incorporated into the FSAR since the statements are i not totally correct.

Safety Evaluation: Should a fire originate in the Turbine Building, safe 1 shutdown can still be accomplished using safe

! shutdown equipment located in the Auxiliary Building.

l The propagation of a fire from the Turbine Building ,

to the Auxiliary Building is not considered credible.

l PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88 1 I i o

r

! 29 Tech Misc 3/8 l'

a 4

'.Subjecti:' FSAR Section 9B.4.'1.19

-Description: The.FPPR had stated that all areas of the plant requiring personnel occupancy to bring the plant.to-

,.. safe shutdown were provided with 8-hour battery-powered emergency lights or essential AC lighting.' However, Appendix 9B of the FSAR states that all such areas are provided with 8-hour battery-powered emergency lights. his safety evaluation clarifies that the control room is provided with . .

lighting powered from the essential AC power. system and DC lighting powered from the station batteries.

Safety Evaluation: ' This revision is for clarification purposes. The.AC lights are powered from MCC's IF and 1G. In' case of a' loss of offsite power,.these McC's are powered by an emergency diesel generator. Emergency DC lighting for the control room is powered from the station batteries. %e DC lights come on automatically upon loss of AC power.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88

Subject:

FSAR Section 9B.4.1.26

Description:

This safety evaluation provides justification for not having fire breaks in the South, West, and inside cable chases.

Safety Evaluation: All these areas have detection and automatic fire suppression systems to limit the spread of fire. I Fire breaks in these areas are not required by the fire hazards analysis. Further,.. combustible loads in-these areas are due to cable insulation and all c cables in'these areas meet the requirements of IEEE 383, which requires that thes cables do not propagate flame and are sel -extinguishing when the

j. ignition source is removed.

j '.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88 l

l 30 Tech Misc 3/8 L._ _ ________ _ _ _ _ u__ _ _ _ . _ . _ ___ _ l

Subject:

FSAR Appendix 9B Changes

Description:

Revised the FSAR to refer to the "Vice President -

Nuclear" instead of the " Senior Vice President".

Also, the resrae of the " Engineer in Charge" was deleted from the FSAR and other editorial changes were made concerning titles for various positions.

Safety Evaluation: The FSAR change to reference the Vice President - Nuclear rather than the Senior Vice President may be considered administrative since. the NRC approved this change through issuance of Amendments 78 & 70 to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications, respectively. The other editorial changes reflect the current APCo organization previously incorporated in other FSAR sections.

Deletion of the resure for the Engineer in Charge does not alter the requirements for the designated individual.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1946, 11/22/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-05

Description:

Clarified that the fuel transfer tube gate valve is not a containment isolation valve.

Safety Evaluation: The fuel transfer tube is sealed with a blind flange during nornal operating conditions. The flange has two seals around the periphery and the seals can be checked for leaks. This meets the applicable requirements and there is no need for the gate valve to be a containment isolation valve.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-11

Description:

Revised FSAR section 6.4.1.1 to state that odorizers are not used for CO, hose reels.

Safety Evaluation: Not using odorizers is acceptable since odorizers are necessary only when there is the potential for unintentionally introducing CO irto occupied areas.

2 CO 2 hose reels are not located in s eas where leakage of In CO,ticular, par the hose reels referred to in sectionfrom thcr.' could adv 6.4.1.1 are located outside of the control room in a corridor area such that leakage from them could not affect the control room atmosph re. Therefore, odorizers are not needed.

t PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 31 Tech Misc 3/B L__-_ _ __ - )

Subject:

ADIF 87-30

Description:

Revised the fire area hazards analysis to include the l newly created fire area 1-S08.

Safety Evaluation: Fire area 1-S08 contains one safe shutdown cable.

Diverse means to accomplish the affected safe shutdown function are available and the boundary of the fire area has a sufficient fire rating. Hence, a fire internal or external;to fire area 1-S08 will not result in the unacceptable loss of safe shutdown functions.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-37

Description:

Deleted radiation monitors R-27A & B from Figure 12.1-2 in the FSAR. Also, Figure 12.1-2 was updated to show the differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2.

Safety Evaluation: Radiation monitors R-27A & B are different from the other area monitors listed in section 12.1.4.2.

Because of this difference, their functional block diagram is different from Figure 12.1-2. Therefore, R-27A & B are deleted from this figure.

The differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are already reflected in section 12.1.4.2. The figure is being updated to be consistent.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-67

Description:

Changed FSAR section 9,5.4.2 to correctly state the type of strainers installed in the discharge lines of the centrifugal pumps that transfer diesel fuel oil from the underground storage tanks to the day tanks.

The statement " Wye strainers fitted with 80 mesh screen" was changed to " Wye strainers fitted with type 316 stainless steel screen with 0.045 inch perforations".

32 Tech Misc 3/8 l

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Stefsty Evaluation: N . original specification for ths strainsrs: calls for 0.045_ inch perforations. Also,-each diesel-L.

generator has an additional filter downstream of'

?these Wye strainers. An 80 mesh strainer would be unnecessarily restrictive for the first of two filterstin series.-' This revision to the FSAR is considered a correction rather than a. change in a  !

specification for the strainer. This correction will I have no affect on the' safety or_ operation of the 1 plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 .)

e

Subject:

ADIF 87-92.

Description:

Described the anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC).

, Safety Evaluation: AMSAC has been designed to meet and fulfill the applicable requirements. This system will provide a backup to the existing protection system to initiate auxiliary feedwater and a turbine trip in the event that an anticipated transient results in the complete

~ loss of main feedwater while the power level is above a specified value. AMSAC actuation will ensure that the reactor coolant. system pressure will remain below the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Level C service limit stress criteria of 3200 psig.

Moreover, this system will operate as intended and will not' negatively affect the safety of.the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-97

Description:

Deleted the Regulatory Guide 1.21 exemption which states that the gross alpha analysis at FNP is performed to a minimum detectable activity of 1.0E-6 microcuries per milliliter rather than the Regulatory Guide 1.21 requirement of 1.0E-7.

Safety Evaluation: Removing this exemption will require the gross alpba analysis to be done to a more conservative sensitivity (1.0E-7 versus 1.0E-6). Also, this makes the FSAR consistent with the Technical Specifications.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1892, 6/28/88 9

, 33

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Subject:

ADIF 87-109

Description:

Corrected the values and sequences of events in the FSAR tables showing the results of the single reactor coolant pump locked rotor transient. These corrections are due to the discovery that the tables inadvertently incorporated information from two different analysis: one originally performed assuming 15 x 15 fuel and the other performed assuming the 17.x 17 fuel used at FNP.

Safety Evaluation: These corrections are typographical. The conclusions  ;

of the locked rotor analyses remain valid and no reduction of safety occurred.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-111

Description:

Changed Table 3.2-1 of the FSAR to show the refueling water storage tank (RNST) as having tornado ,

protection. '

Safety Evaluation: This change serves only to make the FSAR internally consistent in its description of the tornado resistance of the RWST. Section 3.3.2 " Tornado Loadings", states that all above-ground Category 1 structures are designed to withstand tornado loadings and tornado-generated missiles. Being a Category 1 above-ground structure, the RWST comes under this requirement. No safety issue is raised by this change.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-112

Description:

Clarified which portions of the sample system shown in FSAR Figure 9.3-2 are safety related seismic Category 1. The boundaries are specified in Figure 9.3-2.

Safety Evaluation: These changes were made to clarify the distinction in codes and standards applied to safety and non-safety related parts of the system. These changes are consistent with other design documents. These changes will not affect the safe shutdown of the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88  ;

l 34 l Tech Misc 3/8 ];

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Subject:

ADIF 87-114 l

Description:

Corrected FSAR references to the boron injection tank (BIT) and associated systems. Deletion of the Technical Specification Limiting condition for Operation and surveillance requirements for the BIT and the BIT heat tracing system was approved in License Amendment No. 30 for FNP Unit 1 and No. 22 for FNP Unit 2. FSAR section 6.3 was subsequently modified to reflect thece license amendments. This safety evaluation changes some items not previously identified.

Safety Evaluation: The changes covered by this; safety evaluation are consistent with the license amendments which were approved by the NRC.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1896, 7/1/88 l

Subject:

ADIF 87-118

Description:

Changed section 9.2 and Table 9.2-6 of the FSAR to state the correct coolant flow rate for the residual heat removal pump seals.

Safety Evaluation: The new flow rate (5 pm) is consistent with the i requirements stated by the pump manufacturer. This change is not a safety issue since it meets the manufacturer's prescribed coolant flow rate.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-ll8A

Description:

Changed section 9.2 Table 9.2-6 of the FSAR to state the correct coolant flow rate for the charging pump seals.

Safety Evaluation: The new coolant flow rate (5 gpm) has been approved by the pump manufacturer. Testing and operating experience has shown that the pump will operate satisfactorily with the flow rate.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 35 Tech Misz 5

_ _ _ = _ _

Subject:

ADIF 87-146

Description:

Modified section 3.9.4.1 of the FSAR to reflect that -

only valves that are so' designated by the FNP Inservice Inspection (ISI) program undergo the periodic inspection and operability testing specified in this section. Also, corrected typographical errors in Table 5.2-8.

Safety Evaluation: The ISI program was established following the guidance of Section XI of the ASME Code and has been accepted by the NRC as being adequate to insure the-operability of ASME Code Class Valves. Therefore, it is acceptable to revise the FSAR to refer to this program to specify which valves must be periodically inspected or tested. The other changes corrected errors of a non-technical nature.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-140

Description:

Corrected typographical errors made in the FSAR when Attachment B was added to Appendix 9B.

Safety Evaluation: Editorial change only.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88  ;

subject: ADIF 87-160

Description:

Revised the small break LOCA analysis results presented in the FSAR. The LOCA analysis assures ,

that all safety injection flow to a faulted cold leg l spills and is lost. A review had determined that the FNP LOCA analysis assumed that the safety injection flow to the faulted loop spills to reactor coolant system backpressure for all break sizes. This is inconsistent with the current small break LOCA

methodology which assumes that the safety injection flow to the faulted cold leg spills to containment backpressure for break sizes greater than the ,

diameter of the safety injection line. Other minor I corrections were made in the analyses.

36 Tech Misc 3/8 w_______-__

O l

Safety Evaluation: The small break LOCA analysis in the FSAR remains limiting for all small breaks except a break in the safety injection line equivalent to or larger than the double ended severance of that line. Revised calculations have determined that the changed backpressure.would result in a small increase in the peak cladding temperature. The revised peak cladding temperature has a considerable margin to the 2200'F limit. imposed by 10CFR50.46 and continues to be bounded by the large break LOCA results.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1802, 1/14/38 PORC Meeting 1892, 6/28/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-161

Description:

Changed sections 5.2 and 9.3 of the FSAR to correctly state the reactor coolant system (RCS) lithium range for 18-month fuel cycles. The lithium range of 0.7-2.2 ppm (Table 5.2-22), based on boron concentrations ranging from 0 to 1200 ppm was changed to 0.7-3.75 ppm, based on boron concentrations ranging from 0 to 2000 ppm.

Safety Evaluation: The extension of the lithium range is required to maintain the desired RCS pH. This change represents l an adjustment to chemistry control to assure correct pH control. Since the effect on fuel corrosion, RCS corrosion and primary stress corrosion cracking is negligible, the conclusions of the FSAR remain valid and no decrease in safety margin occurs. In addition, no margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is affected.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1896, 7/1/88 PORC Meeting 1921, 9/6/88 I

1

Subject:

ADIF 87-170

Description:

Corrected typographical and editorial errors in FSAR Appendix 9B.

Safety Evaluation: Editorial and typographical changes only.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 I

37 l Tech Misc 3/8 4

Subject:

ADIF 87-171 Section 9B.3.M

Description:

Changed the table on page 9B-45 of Appendix B of the FSAR to correctly identify the power level for the low power 600V cable trays.

Safety Evaluation: The FSAR revision serves only to clarify data.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-171 Section 98.4.1.16

Description:

Corrected the FSAR statement concerning electrical supervision of the total flooding CO fire 2

suppression system in the cable spreading room.

Previous revisions of the FSAR had stated that the cable spreading room CO 2 system had electrical supervision of the heat detectors and associated circuitry.

Safety Evaluation: The total flooding system in the cable spreading room is manually operated and does not have any heat detectors. Manually actuated systems do not require associated detectors or detection system electrical circuitry in order to function. This revision now reflects as-built and as-designed conditions. The revision will not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1895, 7/1/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-171 Section 98.4.1.3.3

Description:

Corrected the FSAR description of the insulating fluid utilized in all high-voltage, high-amperage transformers. The FSAR referred to the insulating fluid as a "high flash point fluid." The National Fire Protection Association now classifies the fluid as "less flammable."

Safety Evaluation: This revision was an editorial change only. There were no changes to the plant as-built status or to combustible loadings.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 38 Tech Misc 3/8 l

Subject:

ADIF 87-171 Fire Area 1-20 l.

Description:

Delete the word " channel" in the safe shutdown train column for fire area 1-20, Room 210, in Appendix 9B of the FSAR.

Safety Evaluation: This change corrects a typographical error. Room 210 contains no safe shutdown channels. This FSAR revision reflects as-built and as-designed conditions.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-177

Description:

Changed FSAR section 9B.4.1.26 to exempt fire breaks for vertical cable runs in containment.

Safety Evaluation: The fire hazards analysic did not require fire breaks since containment has a low combustible loading. The probability of a fire of sufficient magnitude to damage redundant cables or components is unlikely and the incorporation of fire breaks would not enhance this position. Also, since the containment is a large open volume, fire breaks would not be effective. This absence of fire breaks will not affect the safe shutdown of the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-180

Description:

Changed section 6.2.3.5.1 of the FSAR to indicate that only Unit 2 has a spray additive tank empty alarm.

Safety Evaluation: The change was enade for clarification purposes only.

FSAR Figure 6.3-3 sheets 1 and 2 currently reflect this clarification. This change will not affect the safe shutdown of the plant.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1993, 6/29/88 39 Tech Misc 3/8  ;

7:

i j

Subject:

ADIF 87-181

Description:

Corrected paragraph 15.4.2.1.2.2 of the FSAR. This

,,_ paragraph stated that, following a steam line rupture, safety injection would be initiated by high steam flow ceincident with low steam line pressure or low Tavg. The correction states that, following a steam line rupture, safety injection will be .

initiated by low steam line pressure or low I pressurizer pressure.

Safety Evaluation: The paragraph was not consistent with FSAR Figures 7.2-7 and 7.2-8 and Technical Specification Table 3.3-3. Since this change simply corrects the FSAR the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADic 87-182

Description:

Modified the FSAR statement that all fire protection water distribution and suppression systems meet seismic Category 1 requirements. Two Unit 1 wet pipe fire protection sprinkler systems (1A-21 and 1A-52) were determined to lack seismic Category 1 qualifications.

Safety Evaluation: The analyses conducted on both sprinkler systems indicated that although they do not meet seismic Category 1 criteria, their failure during a seismic event would cause no damage to safe shutdown equipment or cabling. Their existence does not involve an unreviewed safety question nor does their lack of seismic Category 1 qualification decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1896, 7/1/88 l

l l 40 Tech Misc 3/8

f

Subject:

'ADIF 87-183

Description:

Added additional exemptions to Regulatory Guide 1.21 on page.3A-1.21-1 of the FSAR.

Safety Evaluation: The additional exemptions are minor in nature and do not reflect ~a safety hazard.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-184

Description:

Changed item 22 on Table 6.2-31 of the FSAR from

" Containment Air Sample In" to " Containment Air Sample Out". Also, item 23 wac changed from

'" Containment Air Sample Out" to " Containment Air Sample In".

Safety Evaluation: The change was made to agree with the direction of the containment air sample flow as shown on Figures 6.2-91 and 6.2-124 of the FSAR.

PORC Review: PORC 1893, 6/29/88

Subject:

ADIF 87-184A

Description:

Revised the closure times for the following valves in the FSAR to agree with the values listed in Technical Specifications: Q1P13V301, Q1P13v302, Q1P13v303, Q1P13V304, 01E14W3657, Q1G21W3380, 01P14W3611, Q1P16V071, -Q1P16V072, Q1P16V081, 01P17W3067, and Q1P17W3095.

Safety Evaluation: This change involves increasing the FSAR specified closure time for the containment isolation valves listed above. The new closure time for each valve had been evaluated and it was determined that it will not increase dose levels outside the containment.

i PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 41 Tech Misc 3/8

o ,

l 0"

Subject:

ADIF 87-190

Description:

Removed the Turbine Building fire detection and sprinkler systems from the operability requirements in Tables 9B.C-1 and 9B.C-2 (for Unit 1; and Tables .

98.C-5 and 9B.C-6 (for Unit 2) of the FSAR' j (Attachment C to Appendix 9B). i Safety Evaluation: The fire detection and suppression systems in the Turbine Building are not required to achieve safe shutdown of the plant. The detection and sprinkler systems in the Turbine Building do not meet the applicable criteria and therefore are not required to be included in the operability requirements of ,

Attachment C to Appendix 9B. This deletion does not J decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.

j PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1895, 7/1/88 l

Subject:

ADIF 87-193

Description:

. Separated Unit 1 stairwell No. 8 from fire area 1-4 and designated it. fire area 1-S08.

Safety Evaluation: The designation of the stairwell as a separate fire area does not result in a modification to the plant's '

physical or functional features nor its fire protection program. This is an administrative change only. q PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 I

Subject:

ADIF 87-195 4

Description:

Revised an organization chart (Figure 13.1-1) shown in the FSAR. The position of Executive Vice President - Nuclear Operations was added and the title of Senior Vice President - Nuclear Generation was changed to Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations.

Safety Evaluation: These management changes provide more focused upper management attention to Nuclear Operations. This reflects the continuing APCo commitment to safe and reliable operation of FNP. These organizational l changes do not have an advm e affect on safety. I I

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/86 42 Tech Misc 3/8

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ __ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ -------_a

L -

)

Subject:

ADIF 87-196

Description:

Deleted the Senior Vice President - Construction from Figure 17.2-1 of the FSAR. l Safety Evaluation: The intent of Figure 17,2-1 is to reflect the APCo Nuclear Operations OA Organization. The Senior Vice )

President - Construction no longer reports to the i Executive Vice President in charge of nuclear )

operations.  ;

I PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 1

Subject:

Cycle 9 Reload Safety Evaluation

Description:

Provided the design for the Cycle 9 core which is based on a Cycle 8 end-of-life burnup within a range i of 15,000 to 16,400 MWD /MTU. A total of 28 Region-9, l 61 Region-10, and 68 fresh Region-11 fuel assemblies are used in the design. A total of 704 fresh wet annular burnable absorbers (WABAs) are used in clusters of 4, 12, and 16. The Region-11 assemblies differ from the previous design in that they have standardized fuel pellets, reconstitutable top nozzles, a modified fuel rod end plug, and a modified top nozzle holddown spring and screw.

Safety Evaluation: Based on the reload safety evaluation and the analyses performed by Westinghouse and Southern company Services, Inc., this reload does not involve any unreviewed safety questions.

PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1823, 3/2/88 l

PORC Meeting 1855, 4/19/88 l

1 43

Subjzet: GO-EIP-112, Revision 8

Description:

Revision 8 to the procedure: updates telephone numbers, personnel titles, and names of people holding positions; and prompts Emergency Operations Center personnel to obtain the radio call numbers of the {'

security vehicle from Security instead of relying on a listing of security vehicle call numbers.

Safety Evaluation: This procedure revision will maintain the accuracy and efficiency of the procedure.

Subject:

GO-EIP-114, Revision 7

Description:

Revision 7 to the procedure includes: a change to make it clearer that it is the Engineering and Licensing Support Director's responsibility to draf t NE'INORK informational releases; a change that gives the Engineering and Licensing Support Director guidance on what should be included in the NL'INORK release; and a change that provides for only one notification of the Public Information Organization of an impending release instead of three.

Safety Evaluation: This revision will make the precedure clearer and more efficient.

Subject:

GO-EIP-116, Revision 5

Description:

Revision 5 to the procedure involves: changes to ensure all Emergency Operations Facility telephone operator positions are manned and that all plant telephone operators are provided with an updated Emergency Operations Facility phone number list; a change to ensure the Engineering and Licensing Support Director reviews the status of NEINORK news releases on turnover; a change to indicate the new telecopier number for the Dose Assessment Room; a change to more accurately reflect the present telecopier equipment used in the Dose Assessment Room; and changes to ensure the Dose Assessment Director obtains offsite agency status for the Recovery Manager.

Safety Evaluation: This procedure revision will maintain the accuracy and thoroughness of the procedure.

1 44 1

I

c...

{ .s .

Subjsct: GO-EIP-ll7, R3 vision 6

Description:

Revision 6 to the procedure involves: changes that clarify the Administrative Support Director's _j responsibility.to coordinate the manning of the, -

telephone operator's position in the Emergency j Operations Facility; changes that will direct the j Emergency Operations Facility telephone operator to ,

screen only calls that ring directly to him; an-  !

addition to the procedure that assigns responsibility to the Administrative Support Director for the' rerouting of the two dedicated state information lines to the Emergency Operations Facility once it has become fully operational; an update to the " Blanket Purchase Orders and Service Contract" table; and a change that ensures all telephone console operators are provided a current telephone listing during an emergency.

Safety Evaluation: This' revision will serve to maintain the accuracy for the procedure and allow the most efficient method of communications coordination.

Subject:

GO-EIP-120, Revision 3

Description:

Revision 3 to the procedure involves title changes and the_ incorporation of the Public Information Emergency Coordinator as one of the approval authorities.

Safety Evaluation: This revision will maintain the accuracy of the procedure and allow the most efficient approval for news releases.

Subject:

GO-EIP-132, Revision 6

Description:

Revision 6 to the procedure involves title changes and a change which will reference GO-EIP-102 for Corporate Communications Department responsibilities rather than having the responsibilities in EIP-132. Thus, changes can be made to EIP-132 without Corporate Communications Department approval for each revision.

i i

Safety Evaluation: This revisior will maintain the accuracy of this j procedure and streamline the revision process.

45

)

l Subjact: GO-EIP-134, Revision 7 l

i

Description:

Revision 7 to the procedure involves: changes that i take the Corporate Communications Department j training requirements out of this procedure since l they are already listed in GO-EIP-102; and changes that-remove Corporate Communications Department responsibilities for the News Media Orientation Program from this procedure since they already j exist in GO-EIP-102.

I Safety Evaluation: This revision will remove duplication of  ;

requirements that are listed in two procedures. i

Subject:

GO-EIP-136, Revision 4

Description:

Revision 4 to the procedure changes the name of the alert radio from NOAA Weather Radio to Alert Radio; and includes reference as to how the Corporate Communications Department will maintain records of tone alert radios.

1 Safety Evaluation: This revision will maintain the accuracy of the procedure since the NOAA Weather Radio is no longer in use.

Subject:

GO-EIP-137, Revision 3 i

Description:

Revision 3 to this procedure involves: changes  !

that reflect the Alert and notification System title description being changed from the " Prompt Notification System" to the " Alert and Notification System"; a change that takes the Corporate Communication Department's responsibility for lowering the siren activation testing signs out of the procedure since it has been incorporated in GO-EIP-102; a change to increase the full cycle activation testing frequency to semi-annual vice annual testing.

Safety Evaluation: This revision will maintain the accuracy of the l

procedure and increase the reliability of the siren system with the increased testing frequency.

46 l - - - - - - - - - - .)

44 P

i Subjects GO-NG-1, Revision 8A {

4 I

Description:

Revision 8A acknowledges the creation of the position of Vice President-Nuclear.

I l

Safety Evaluation: This revision enhances the efficiency and J effectiveness of the support services provided to j Farley Nuclear Plant. <

i l

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Subject:

GO-NG-26, Revision 5

Description:

Revision 5 to the procedure incorporates the requirements of 10CFR73.57 for access to Safeguards Information and makes minor corrections to titles and addresses.

Safety Evaluation: This procedure revision addresses NRC requirements and establishes methods for access control to Safeguards Information.

Subject:

GO-NG-5, Revision 4

Description:

Revision 4 to the procedure involves: a change f which more accurately defines the actual transmission of river flow data from Andrews Dam to Farley Nuclear Plant; and an editorial correction of the title of Senior Vice President to Vice President Nuclear.

Safety Evaluation: The revision does not change, modify, nor create any additional requirements or responsibilities.

1 1

47

e 6

' . . . . . .< ! 'l

.p' [ Alabarna Power Company -

600 North 18th street

, -. Post Office Box 2641.

t Birmingham, Alabama 35291-0400 f' >

- Telephone 205 250-1837

. W. G. Hairston, til Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Alabama Power .

thesouthern electrcsystem u.

March 29, 1989 .10CFR50.59.

< t Docket Nos.'50-348 a

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: . Document Control' Desk Vashington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Attache'd for your review is the annual report required by'10CFR50.59 for' l 1988. This report summarizes changes to the plant performed in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.59 for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear: Plant' Unit 1.

If you have any questions, ple'ase advise.

Respectfully submitted, V. G. Hairston, III

.VGH,III/ JAR: dst-6.37 Attachment cc: Mr. S.-D. Ebneter Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. G. F. Maxwell I

J' I

v I C _ _ _ _ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_j [. ___J