ML20248E571
| ML20248E571 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1988 |
| From: | Hairston W ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8904120285 | |
| Download: ML20248E571 (35) | |
Text
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ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED BY 10CFR50.59 )
l Section 50.59 of Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, of the regulations of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, states that the holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility may (1) make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and (2) make changes in the procedures as described in the safety analysis report, and (3) conduct tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report, without prior comission approval, unless the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change in the technical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety question (as defined in 10CFR50.59).
The licensee is required to maintain records of such changes, tests or experiments, and those records are required to include written safety evaluations which provide the basis for the determination that the changes, tests or experiments do not involve any unreviewed safety questions.
Brief descriptions and a summary of the safety evaluations of the changes, tests or experiments as described above, for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 which were completed in 1988, are provided in the following.
8904120285 881231 gDR ADOCK0500{g4 Tech Misc-3/6
Subjzet: FNP-0-CCP-640, Revision 1
Description:
Added the use of a windowed 2n internal proportional counter for radioactivity measurements at FNP.
Safety Evaluation: The low background windowed 2n internal proportional counter is suitable for use in the same applications as the windowless 2n internal proportional counter currently being used. The windowed counter provides-for improved accuracy, precision and sensitivity of gross activity measurements.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1908, 8/4/88
Subject:
FNP-0-CCP-708, TCN 3F, TCN 4A
Description:
TCNs 3F and 4A provided for the continuous chlorination of the service water system using sodium hypochlorite to reduce the number of corbicula (clams) in the system. The addition of sodium hypochlorite will be limited to one unit at a time, while chlorine dioxide will be added to the opposite unit during the hypochlorination.
Safety Evaluation: Sodium hypochlorite addition can be quickly terminated if deemed necessary. Emergency actions and precautions already exist in this procedure. The use of both chlorine dioxide and sodium hypochlorite for prevention of fouling in the service water system is already addressed in the FSAR.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1799, 1/7/88 j PORC Meeting 1864, 5/3/88 '
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hubjzet: FNP-2-ETP-4241, Revision 0
Description:
Provided guidance for the use of sulfur hexafluoride (Sr ) for. detecting leaking' tubes in the main-con!!enser.
' Safety Evaluation:- ' Sulfur hexafluoride will be used only for condenser leaks which cannot be found effectively using helium as the tracer gas. 'Ihe concentration of Sr, k W feedwater will be about 1 ppt during the SF, injection period. .The concentration of the potentially corrosive elements of sulfur and fluorine
.. formed by decomposition of SF,.is judged to be insignificant and is much lower than the sulfate or~
chloride levels permitted by EPRI and Westinghouse secondary side water chemistry guidelines.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1948, 11/30/88
Subject:
FNP-2-SOP-8.1, TCN 12B
Description:
'Added Appendix B to this procedure to provide guidance for controlling thermal cycling of the "B" reactor coolant loop cold leg safety injection line.
This is done by throttling the boron injection tank (BIT) bypass valve leakage to the BIT surge tank using valve Q2E21v057. During this operation, it is necessary to isolate both BIT recirculation pumps.
Safety Evaluation: The need for continuous operation of the BIT recirculation pumps no longer exists since the requirement for a concentrated boric acid solution in the BIT was dropped in 1983. All piping subjected to a potential backpressure of 1000 psig has a design rating of 2485 psig. Valve Q2E21V057 will be monitored periodically while it is being'used in the throttling mode to check for degradation of the
' valve.
.PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1874, 5/17/88 2
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Subject:
FNP-2-SOP-16.1, Revision 11
Description:
Revised Appendix 1 to allow defeating the low service water dilution flow trip of 2-BD-RCV-0238 during any mode of operation.
Safety Evaluation: Service water dilution flow is continuously recorded in the main control room. When the trip is defeated, steam generator blowdown (SGBD) releases will be calculated and authorized on a batch release permit to ensure that the total dilution flow from both units is sufficient to prevent Technical Specification dose limits from being exceeded. SGBD will be caution tagged to require that blowdown be
. secured if the minimum dilution of the release permit is not ryt. The total dilution flow will be logged every 15 minutes while the low flow trip is' defeated.
Defeating the low service water flow trip does not affect the abilit.y of RCV-023B to close on high SGBD activity.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1939, 11/1/88
Subject:
FNP Emergency Plan, Revision 14, TCN 14B, and Revision 15
Description:
Revision 14 to the Emergency Plan updated telephone directories, made title changes, and made other administrative changes. KN 14B relocated an emergency cabinet in the control room. Revision 15 deleted the responsibilities of the Manager - Nuclear Technical Support (MNTS) since that position no longer exists. Further, changes were made to I personnel designations for the Recovery Phase to use I
'the available managers more efficiently.
Safety Evaluation: The administrative changes of revision 14 do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan and the plan, as changed, will continue to meet the standards of 10CFR50.47(b) and 10CFR50 Appendix E.
With regard to TCN 14B, the contents and accessibility of the emergency cabinet will remain unchanged.
The responsibility formerly delegated to the MNTS were reassigned to the Manager - Nuclear Engineering and Licensing. All changes to position designations were reviewed to ensure that the qualifications necessary to hold the newly assigned positions are adequate.
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PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1795, 12/31/87 PORC Meeting 1945, 11/17/88 PORC Meeting 1953, 12/20/88
Subject:
MD 88-1812
Description:
Changed the setpoints for the 1C diesel generator .!
starting air pressure switches.
Safety Evaluation: The revised setpoints give more air for starting the diesel generator as well as provide better indication of air pressure for the control room operator.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1825, 3/4/88
Subject:
MD 88-1835
Description:
Authorized the installation of jumpers to allow the operation of the radioactive waste area exhaust fan with the supply fan out of service.
Safety Evaluation: The purpose of the radioactive waste area ventilation system is to maintain temperature between 65'F and 110'F when outside air is between 20'F and 95'F.
While the supply fan is out of service, the boric acid tank area temperature is to be monitored to ensure the temperature remains greater than 65'F while the exhaust fan is being run. Also, the exhaust fans are required to be shut down when the outside air temperature is less than 20'F.
Appropriate doors between the radiation controlled area (RCA) and the outside air are opened to allow ventilation.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1817, 2/15/88
Subject:
MD 88-1855
Description:
Removed the internals from the volune control tank (VCT) purge line check valve 02G22v004 temporarily to l allow for continuous VCT purge flow to the waste gas processing system.
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S:fsty Evaluation: Th3 ch:ck valva in the VCT normal purge lins was 1
- sticking closed and preventing VCT purge flow to the l waste gas processing system. Removal of the j 1
internals eliminates the ability of the check valve to prevent backflow from other gas sources to the VCT. However, these secondary sources of waste gas j are processed only intermittently.
In addition, these waste gases are supplied to the gaseous waste processing system (GNPS) at pressures below the normal VCT pressure. Therefore, it is extremely .
unlikely that any gas from these secondary sources !
could flow back into the VCT. Even if this should occur, it is an operational concern only, not a safety concern since the gases from these secondary sources are similar in nature to the cover gas in the VCT (hydrogen or nitrogen with trace amounts of noble gases).
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1833, 3/21/88 h
Subject:
MD 88-1917
Description:
Replaced the 75 foot sections of fire hose in fire hose cabinets D-108 and D-119 with 100 foot sections of fire hose. !
l Safety Evaluation: The 100 foot length fire hoses in these cabinets is necessary to provide adequate fire fighting capability for these areas.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1892, 6/28/88
Subject:
MD 88-1937
Description:
Installed a jumper to bypass a limit switch contact and enable the solid state protection function for MOV 3046.
Safety Evaluation: This limit switch contact is not required for any safety or control function in the circuit. Bypassing this contact has no effect on the operation of MOV l 3046 in its normal or emergency function.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1912, 8/12/88 5
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Subject:
PCR/PCN 82-1236 (B82-0-1236)
Description:
Replaced the control room air conditioning system fire dampers Osv49xv2782AC, AD, BC, and BD with Ruskin model FD-31 fire dampers. This change also removed the smoke release device (SRD) actuation circuits from the above referenced dampers and the control room pressurization system dampers QSV49XV2783A and B. Also, the lower restraining
Safety Evaluation: The fire dampers were replaced because they would not close with normal air flow from the air conditioning unit. An engineering review performed by the design organization showed that the SRD circuit was not necessary.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1728, 9/15/87 PORC Meeting 1805, 1/21/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 81-2175 (B81-2-2175)
Description:
Replaced the volume control-tank (VCT) purge flowmeter (FT-1094) and recycle holdup tank (RHT) eductor flowmeter (FT-252), which are both turbine type meters, with a variable area flowmeter (FT-1094) and a pressure transmitter (PT-252), respectively.
1 Safety Evaluation: These changes will provide a more reliable indication of VCT purge flow and RHT eductor performance. This instrumentation does not have a safety function.
a PORC Review: PORC Meeting 165F, /,/7/87
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PORC Meeting 169"i, !/7/87 PORC Meeting 1728, 9/15/87 6
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Subject:
PCR/PCN 84-2915.(S84-2-2915) 1
Description:
Replaced various portions of small (2 inch diameter and under) carbon steel service water pipe. The replacement piping is stainless steel. Also, valves and flanges were added or replaced as required to enhance maintenance and cleaning of the service water piping.
Safety Evaluation: Replacing the carbon steel pipe with stainless steel pipe reduces corrosion and provides for enhanced service water flow. Other changes to the service water system, such as adding flanged connections and adding or replacing valves will make the service water system more reliable and easier to maintain.
The added components are consistent with the design and safety requirements of the service water system.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1649, 3/19/87 PORC Meeting 1652, 3/30/87 PORC Meeting 1690, 6/23/87 PORC Meeting 1721, 8/27/87 l
Subject:
PCR/PCN 84-2922 (S84-2-2922)
Description:
Provided the design for the installation of a separate sensing line from each instrument air receiver to its compressor control station air pressure switch.
Safety Evaluation: A separate sensing line will provide for the prc,w r unloading and loading of the compressor in the receiver mode.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1644, 3/3/87
Subject:
PCR/PCN 85-3167 (B85-0-3167)
Description:
Replaced thrt spent fuel cask crane's stainless steel, non-lubricated hoist rope with a lubricated, carbon steel main crane hoist rope.
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l l S2faty Evaluation: Th3 original purchass specification for thm cask l l - crane called for a stainless steel, non-lubricated i hoist rope, but the manufacturer was unable to supply this. Substitution of a lubricated, carbon steel rope was proposed by the manufacturer and approved by l
Alabama Power Company before delivery of the crane.
The verbage in the FSAR was updated to reflect this ,
but a figure in the FSAR had not been updated. I PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1908, 8/4/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 86-3784 (B86-2-3784)
Description:
Revised drawing D-205009 sheet 2 to show the addition of a " Tee" assembly with two isolation valves on the effluent of the steam generator blowdown cation conductivity columns. This modification was made per Minor Departure From Design 86-1433 to facilitate routine sampling activities.
Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 86-3796 (B86-2-3796)
Description:
Changed the cooling water supplies to the gear oil and bearing oil coolers of the charging /high head safety injection pumps from service water to component cooling water.
Safety Evaluation: The conversion from service water to component cooling water for cooling of the charging pump gear and bearing oil coolers should prevent future problems from overheating due to clogging of the coolers. Evaluations were performed to verify that adequate cooling water is being supplied to the pumps.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1699, 7/10/87 PORC Meeting 1735, 9/24/87 PORC Meeting 1741, 10/8/87 PORC Meeting 1787, 12/10/87 PORC Meeting 1827, 3/8/88 8
Subjset: PCR/PCN 86-3803 (S86-2-3803)
Description:
Changed the four service water pond temperature transmitters from "Q" (safety-related) to "N" (non-safety related). The existing transmitters were replaced with high quality non-safety related transmitters. Also, new TPNS numbers were provided for the thermowells and elements associated with these transmitters.
Safety Evaluation: There are redundant temperature indicators on each train for both units. Therefore, there is sufficient redundancy to ensure that reliable service water pond temperature indication is available in the control room. These transmitters are not required for post-accident monitoring and are not required to i function following a seismic event. The pressure retaining capability of the service water system will not be affected.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1818, 2/16/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 86-3837 (B86-2-3837)
Description:
Provided the design for the installation of the Westinghouse anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) electronics cabinet and two output relay panels, the addition and installation of new pressure transmitters and their associated signal conditioning circuits, as well as the AMSAC interfaces with the l-existing plant equipment and new pressure transmitters.
Safety Evaluation: AMSAC is a system which provides an alternate means for tripping the turbine and initiating auxiliary feedwater flow. It is diverse and independent from the existing reactor protection system (RPS) and was developed in response to NRC requirements and 10CFR50.62. The addition of the AMSAC system enhances the safe shutdown capability of the plant.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1703, 7/21/87
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Subject:
PCH/PCN 86-3922 (B86-2-3922) l l
Description:
Replaced the reactor coolant drain tank pumps. The old pumps were built to ANSI B73.1 standards and the new pumps are built to the more rigorous API-610 specifications.
Safety Evaluation: The new pumps are built to more rigorous standards and have better bearing lubrication so that they should be more reliable than the old pumps. This replacement will improve the performance of the waste processing system.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1738, 10/1/87
Subject:
. PCR/PCN 86-3925 (B86-2-3925)
Description:
Removed the Westinghouse W2500 plant computer and the associated 2E inverter. The Westinghouse computer was replaced with a Gould 32/6750 computer.
Inverter 2E was replaced by a 30KVA computer uninterruptible power supply.
Safety Evaluation: The W2500 is obsolete and spare parts are difficult to obtain. Also, the W2500's reliability has been marginal at best. Installation of the new system will provide a more reliable means of computerized plant parameter monitoring and sequence of events capabilities.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1730, 9/17/87
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4077 (B87-2-4077)
Description:
Replaced the existing Type 4LCY-5 batteries with Type LCY-420 batteries for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
Safety Evaluation: The replacement battery has at least the same capacity as the existing battery. Therefore, the operation of the TDAEWP UPS is not affected and the safe shutdown of the plant will not be adversely affected.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1731, 9/18/87 10 Tech Misc 3/5
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4084 (S87-0-4084)
Description:
Revised drawing D-170084 (site plot plan) to remove reference to Units 3 and 4.
Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1908, 8/4/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4094 (S87-2-4094)
Description:
Revised drawing D-2000ll to designate the drain lines on the suction of the condensate pumps as an .
alternate means to add boric acid and other chemicals to the steam generators.
Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only, PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4106 (B87-2-4106)
Description:
Added header isolation valves to the 2.5, 3, and 4-inch service water branch lines to safety related coolers in the Auxiliary Building. This will facilitate subsequent replacement of the carbon steel branch header piping with stainless steel pipe.
Safety Evaluation: The addition of the header isolation valves will facilitate individual cooler isolation without having the service water system out of service. The replacement of this piping will improve the performance of these coolers and the service water system. This modification has no impact on the safe shutdown capability of the plant.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1741, 10/8/87 11 i Tech Misc 3/5 I
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Subject:
PCE/PCN 87-4143 (SS7-0-4143)
Description:
Revised drawings D-170119 and D-200013 to show the correct safety class boundary and location. Line No. '
30 HBC-208 was changed from non-safety related to a safety class 28 and line No. 24 HBC-209 was changed from safety class 2B to a non safety related line.
Also, the safety class symbol for line No. 30 HBC-211 at valve Q1P16V550 was rotated 180'.
Safety Evaluation: Drawing change only.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1902, 7/19/88
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4204 (S87-2-4204)
Description:
Replaced the carbon steel cross-under piping to the No. 5 feedwater heater with chrome-moly steel piping.
Safety Evaluation: The existing carbon steel piping has been identified ,
to have reduced wall thickness due to erosion and i corrosion. The replacement chrome-moly steel piping has a greater resistance to erosion and corrosion which extends the expected useful life of the line.
Additionally, this piping system is not a safety related system.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1678, 5/28/87
Subject:
PCE/PCN 87-4254 (B87-2-4254)
Description:
Installed a two-hour, 30 KVA uninterruptible power supply (UPS) for the new plant computer. This involved modification of the ventilation system in rooms 2462, 2463, and 2464 due to increased heat loads in these rooms. The modification to the ventilation system included the installation of a computer UPS supply fan, a computer UPS primary exhaust fan, and a computer UPS secondary exhaust
. fan.
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i Safety Evaluation: The computer UPS configuration is non-safety related.
Rooms 2462, 2463, and 2464 located in the Auxiliary Building fall within the boundaries of the non-radwaste area ventilation system. This is not an engineered safeguard system and no credit is taken for its operation in analyzing the consequence of any accident. A fire analysis was performed and the results indicated that this modification will not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1730, 9/17/87 PORC Meeting 1754, 10/27/87
Subject:
PCR/PCN 87-4584 (S87-2-4584)
Description:
Replaced a portion of the extraction steam piping to the No. 6 feedwater heater with chrome-moly steel piping.
Safety Evaluation: The existing carbon steel piping has been identified j to have reduced wall thickness due to erosion and corrosion. The replacement chrome-moly steel piping has a greater resistance to erosion and corrosion which extends the expected useful life of the line.
Additionally, this piping system is not a safety related system.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1754, 10/27/87
Subject:
PCR/PCN 88-4989 (B88-2-4989)
Description:
Removed fire dampers 2-139-118-11 and 2-139-118-12 from service. These dampers are in the penetration room filtration system ductwork between rooms 2334 and 2317.
Safety Evaluation: These fire dampers are not required as fire barriers because the duct between the two rooms is encased in concrete and rooms 2334 and 2317 are in the same fire area.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1921, 9/6/88 13 Tech Misc 3/5 l
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'Subjsett FSAR Update, Revision 6 i
Description:
Annual updating of the FSAR as required by 10CFR50.71(e).
Safety Evaluation: All changes have been reviewed to insure that they do not adversely affect the saf; operation of FNP.
These changes were found not to involve any unreviewed safety questions.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1896, 7/1/88
Subject:
FSAR PC 88-05
Description:
Broaden the scope of existing health physics training as stated in section 12.2.5.2 of the FSAR.
Safety Evaluation: To make the FSAR consistent with the requirements of 10CFR19.12. This modified training commitment does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1896, 7/1/88
Subject:
FSAR Section 17.2
Description:
Added a footnote to FSAR Section 17.2 to note an exception that the independent review and audit group (the NORB) shall consist of at least four persons, vice the five required by ANSI N18.7-1972.
Safety Evaluation: This FSAR change does not change the minimum number of NORB members as required by the FSAR or Technical Specifications, it only notes an exception taken to ANSI N18.7-1972.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1911, 8/11/88
Subject:
FSAR Section 98.1
Description:
Clarified the status of Appendix 9B of the FSAR. The existing Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire protection licen e conditions reference the Fire Protection Program Reevaluation (FPPR) as the licensing basis. However, since July 1987, Appendix 9B of the FSAR has been the current document describing the fire protection program.
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Safety Evaluation: This resolves any ambiguity by explicitly stating that Appendix 9B embodies the FPPR. Appendix 9B was created in response to the requirements of Generic Letter 86-10. This does not decrease the effectiveness of the FNP fire protection program.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1915, 8/17/88
Subject:
Changes Made to the FPPR to Create Appendix 9B of the FSAR
Description:
Documented the bases for several items in Appendix 9B of the FSAR. Prior to 1987, the FNP fire protection program had been documented in the Fire Protection Program Reevaluation (FPPR). This document has been incorporated into-the FSAR (as Appendix 9B) in accordance with Generic letter 86-10. This safety evaluation documents the change made to each section of the FPPR prior to incorporation into the FSAR.
Safety Evaluation: Information in the FPPR was changed to be in a format consistent with the FSAR. Bases for each change were stated. These changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the FNP fire protection program.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/17/88 The following five safety evaluations document other changes to the information in the FPPR.
Subject:
FSAR Section 9B, Attachment A
Description:
A conservative method has been used to calculate the fire loading due to cable insulation. This method was documented in a safety evaluation which was approved by the PORC previously. However, the effects of the new methods upon the Appendix R exemptions had not been evaluated. This safety evaluation considers the effects that an increase in fire severity would have on the fire protection program including the exemptions granted by the NRC.
Safety Evaluation: Some rooms did not have an exemption. Also, some exemptions were not based on fire severity. The fire loading of many of these rooms is primarily due to cable insulation which has a relatively slow rate of heat release. Typically, the rooms are provided with fire suppression systems which are designed for a high rate of heat release. Therefore, the fire suppression systems are adequate to protect the l rooms.
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For other rooms, the actual fire severity is not greater than the fire severity stated in the-exemption requests. Therefore, the present fire protection measures are adequate.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88
Subject:
FSAR Section 9B.4.1.6
Description:
Compressible material (self expanding cork) is used to isolate the Auxiliary Building from the Containment Building. The FPPR originally stated that the. compressible material is covered with a half-hour rated fire blanket in areas where the compressible material forms a part of a fire area boundary. This statement was deleted when the FPPR was incorporated into the FSAR because the statement is not accurate.
Safety Evaluation: The statement was inadvertently incorporated into the FPPR. However, APCo has concluded and documented to the NRC that the absence of a half-hour rated' fire barrier does not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program. Testing has indicated that the cork will act as an adequate fire barrier.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88
Subject:
FSAR Section 9B.4.2.5
Description:
The FPPR had stated that the Turbine Building is separated from the rest of the plant by a 3-hour rated fire wall and that the Turbine Building contains no equipment necessary for safe shutdown.
These statements were modified when the FPPR was-incorporated into the FSAR since the statements are not totally correct.
Safety Evaluation: Should a fire originate in the Turbine Building, safe L shutdown can still be accomplished using safe shutdown equipment located in the Auxiliary Building.
The propagation of a fire from the Turbine Building to the Auxiliary Building is not considered credible.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88 1
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Subject:
FSAR Section 9B.4.1.19 l
Description:
The FPPR had stated that all areas of the plant requiring personnel occupancy to bring the plant to l safe shutdown were provided with 8-hour l battery-powered emergency lights or essential AC lighting. However, Appendix 9B of the FSAR states that all such areas are provided with 8-hour battery powered emergency lights. This safety evaluation clarifies that the control room is provided with lighting powered from the essential AC power system and DC lighting powered from the station batteries.
Fafety Evaluation: This revision is for clarification purposes. The AC lights are powered from MCC's IF and 1G. In case of a loss of offsite power, these MCC's are powered by an emergency diesel generator. Emergency DC lighting for the control room is powered from the station batteries. The DC lights come on automatically upon loss of AC power.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88
Subject:
FSAn Section 98.4.1.26
Description:
This safety evaluation provides justification for not having fire breaks in the South, West, and inside cable chases.
Safety Evaluation: Pll these areas have detection and automatic fire suppression systems to limit the spread of fire.
Fire breaks in these areas are not required by the fire hazards analysis. Further, combustible loads in these areas are due to cable insulation and all cables in these areas meet the requirements of IEEE 383, which requires that these cables do not propagate flame and are self-extinguishing when the ignition source is removed.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1928, 9/27/88 17 Tech Misc 3/9
Subject:
FSAR Appendix 9B Changes
Description:
Revised the FSAR to refer to the "Vice President -
Nuclear" instead of the " Senior Vice President".
Also, the resume' of the " Engineer in Charge" was deleted from the FSAR and other editorial changes were made concerning titles for various positions.
Safety Evaluation: The FSAR change to reference the Vice President -
Nuclear rather than the Senior Vice President may.be considered administrative since the NRC approved this change through issuance of Amendments 78 & 70 to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications, respectively. The other editorial changes reflect the current APCo organization previously incorporated in other FSAR sections. Deletion of the resume' for the Engineer in charge does not alter the requirements for the designated individual.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1946, 11/22/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-05
Description:
Clarified that the fuel transfer tube gate valve is not a containment isolation valve.
Safety Evaluation: The fuel transfer tube is sealed with a blind flange during normal operating conditions. The flange has two seals around the periphery and the seals can be checked for leaks. This meets the applicable requirements and there is no need for the gate valve to be a containment isolation valve.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-11
Description:
Revised FSAR section 6.4.1.1 to state that odorizers are not used for CO2 hose reels.
Safety Evaluation: Not using odorizers is acceptable since odorizers are necessary only when there is the potential for into occupied areas.
unintentionally CO hose reels introducing are not CO,in areas where leakage located of 2CO2 from them could adversely affect habitability.
In particular, the hose reels referred to in section 6.4.1.1 are located outside of the control room in a corridor area such that leakage from them could not affect the control room atmosphere. Therefore, '
odorizers are not needed.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 18
Subjtcts ADIF 87-37
Description:
Deleted radiation monitors R-27A & B from Figure 12.1-2 in the FSAR. Also, Figure 12.1-2 was updated to show the differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2.
Safety Evaluation: Radiation monitors R-27A & B are different from the other area monitors listed in section 12.l'4.2..
Because of this difference, their functional block diagram is different from Figure 12.1-2. Therefore, R-27A & B are deleted from this figure.
The differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 are already reflected in section 12.1.4.2. The figure is being updated to be consistent.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-67 I i
Description:
Changed FSAR section 9.5.4.2 to correctly state the type of strainers installed in the discharge lines of the centrifugal pumps that transfer diesel fuel oil from the underground storage tanks to the day tanks.
The statement " Wye strainers fitted with 80 mesh l screen" was changed to " Wye strainers fitted with I type 316 stainless steel screen with 0.045 inch perforations".
Safety Evaluation: The original specification for the strainers calls for 0.045 inch perforations. Also, each diesel generator has an additional filter downstream of these Wye strainers. An 80 mesh strainer would be unnecessarily restrictive for t he first of two filters in series. This revisicn to the FSAR is considered a correction rather than a change in a specification for the strainer. This correction will have no affect on the safety or operation of the plant.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 19
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Subject:
ADIF 87-92
Description:
Described the anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC).
Safety Evaluation: AMSAC has been designed to meet and fulfill the applicable requirements. This system will provide a backup to the existing protection system to initiate auxiliary feedwater and a turbine trip in the event i that an anticipated transient results in the complete loss of main feedwater while the power level is above a specified value. AMSAC actuation will ensure that the reactor coolant system pressure will remain below the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Level C service limit stress criteria of 3200 psig.
Moreover, this system will operate as intended and will not negatively affect the safety of the plant.
t PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-97
Description:
Deleted the Regulatory Guide 1.21 exemption which states that the gross alpha analysis at FNP is performed to a minimum detectable activity of 1.0E-6 microcuries per milliliter rather than the Regulatory Guide 1.21 requirement of 1.0E-7.
Safety Evaluation: Removing this exemption will require the gross alpha analysis to be done to a more conservative sensitivity (1.0E-7 versus 1.0E-6). Also, this makes j the FSAR consistent with the Technical Specifications.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1892, 6/28/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-109
Description:
Corrected the values and sequences of events in the FSAR tables showing the results of the single reactor coolant pump locked rotor transient. These corrections are due to the discovery that the tables inadvertently incorporated information from two different analysis: one originally performed assuming 15 x 15 fuel and the other performed assuming the 17 x 17 fuel used at FNP.
Safety Evaluation: These corrections are typographical. The conclusions of the locked rotor analyses remain valid and no reduction of safety occurred.
DORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 20 !
Tech Misc 3/9
Subject:
- ADIF 87-111
Description:
Changed Table 3.2-1 of the FSAR to show the refueling water-storage tank ( WST) as having tornado protection.
Safety Evaluation: This change serves only to make the FSAR internally consistent in its description of the tornado resistance of the RWST. Section 3.3.2 " Tornado Loadings",. states that all above-ground category 1 structures are designed to withstand tornado loadings and tornado-generated missiles. Being a Category 1 above-ground structure, the RWST comes under this requirement. No safety issue is raised by this change.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-112
Description:
Clarified which portions.of the sample system shown in FSAR Figure 9.3-2 are safety related seismic Category 1. The boundaries are specified in Figure.
9.3-2.
Safety Evaluation: These changes were made to clarify the. distinction in codes and standards applied to safety and non-safety related parts of the system. These changes are consistent with other design docunents. These .
changes will not affect the safe shutdown of the l plant. i PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-114
Description:
Corrected FSAR references to the boron injection tank
-(BIT) and associated systems. Deletion of.the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation and surveillance requirements for the BIT and the BIT heat tracing system was approved in License Amendment No. 30 for FNP Unit 1 and No. 22 for FNP Unit 2. FSAR section 6.3 was subsequently modified to reflect these license amendments. This safety evaluation changes some items not previously identified.
Safety Evaluation: The changes covered by this safety evaluation are consistent with the license amendments which were approved by the NRC.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1896, 7/1/88 21 Tech Misc 3/9
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Subject:
ADIF 87-118
Description:
Changed section 9.2 and Table 9.2-6 of the FSAR to state the correct coolant flow rate for the residual a heat removal pump' seals. i Safety Evaluation: The new flow rate (5 gpm) is consistent with the requirements stated by the pump manufacturer. This change is not a safety issue since it meets the manufacturer's prescribed coolant flow rate.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 subject: ADIF 87-118A
Description:
Changed section 9.2 Table 9.2-6 of the FSAR to state the correct coolant flow rate for the charging pump seals.
Safety Evaluation: The new coolant flow rate (5 gpm) has been approved by the pump manufacturer. Testing and operating experience has shown that the pump will operate i satisfactorily with the flow rate.
I PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-146
Description:
Modified section 3.9.4.1 of the FSAR to reflect that only valves that are so designated by the FNP Inservice Inspection (ISI) program undergo the periodic inspection and operability testing specified in this section. Also, corrected typographical errors in Table 5.2-8.
Safety Evaluation: The ISI program was established following the guidance of Section XI of the ASME Code and has been accepted by the NRC as being adequate to insure the operability of ASME Code Class Valves. Therefore, it is acceptable to revise the FSAR to refer to this program to specify which valves must be periodically inspected or tested. The other changes corrected errors of a non-technical nature.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 l
l 22 Tech Misc 3/9
O *
Subject:
ADIF 87-148
Description:
Corrected typographical errors made in the FSAR when Attachment B was added to Appendix 9B.
Safety Evaluation: Editorial change only.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 l
Subject:
ADIF 87-160
Description:
Revised the small break LOCA analysis results presented in the FSAR. The LOCA analysis assumes that all safety injection flow to a faulted cold leg spills and is lost. A review had determined that the FNP LOCA analysis assumed that the safety injection flow to the faulted loop spills to reactor coolant system backpressure for all break sizes. This is inconsistent with the current small break LOCA methodology which assumes that the safety injection flow to the faulted cold leg spills to containment backpressure for break sizes greater than the diameter of the safety injection line. Other minor corrections were made in the analyses.
Safety Evaluation: The small break LOCA analysis in the FSAR remains limiting for all small breaks except a break in the safety injection line equivalent to or larger than the double ended severance of that line. Revised calculations have determined that the changed backpressure would result in a small increase in the peak cladding temperature. The revised peak cladding temperature has a considerable margin to the 2200'F limit imposed by 10CFR50.46 and continues to be bounded by the large break LOCA results.
1 PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1802, 1/14/88 PORC Meeting 1892, 6/28/88 l
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l 23 Tech Misc 3/9
.______-_-_____--_-_--____--_-__--____-_-_-_A
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Subject:
ADIF 87-161 l
Description:
Changed sections 5.2 and 9.3 of the FSAR to correctly state the reactor coolant system (RCS) lithium range for 18-month fuel cycles. The lithium range of 0.7-2.2 ppm (Table 5.2-22), based on boron concentrations ranging from 0 to 1200 ppm was changed to 0.7-3.76 ppm, based on boron concentrations ranging from 0 to 2000 ppm.
Safety Evaluation: The extension of the lithium range is required to maintain the desired RCS pH. This change represents an adjustment to chemistry control to assure correct pH control. Since the effect on fuel corrosion, RCS corrosion and primary stress corrosion cracking is negligible, the conclusions of the FSAR remain valid and no decrease in safety margin occurs. In addition, no margin of safety as defined in the basis
- for any Technical Specification is affected.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1896, 7/1/88 PORC Meeting 1921, 9/6/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-170
Description:
Corrected typographical and editorial errors in FSAR Appendix 9B.
Safety Evaluation: Editorial and typographical changes only.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-171 Section 98.3.M
Description:
Changed the table on page 98-45 of Appendix B of the FSAR to correctly identify the power level for the :
low power 600V cable trays. )i Safety Evaluation: The FSAR revision serves only to clarify data.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 l
24 Tech Misc 3/9
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Subject:
ADIF 87-171 Section 9B.4.1.5
Description:
Corrected the FSAR to show that a Class A fire door is installed in Unit 2 stairwell number 1. The FSAR had stated that, with some noted exceptions, all stairwell doors are fire-rated Class B.
Safety Evaluation: The Class A door has a higher fire rating than the Class B door. Therefore, the fire protection is greater than that previously stated in the FSAR.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-171 Section 9B.4.1.16
Description:
Corrected the FSAR statement concerning electrical supervision of the total flooding CO 2 fire suppression system in the cable spreading room.
Previous revisions of the FSAR had stated that the system had electrical cable spreading supervision of theroom CO, detectors and associated heat circuitry.
Safety Evaluation: The total flooding system in the cable spreading room is manually operated and does not have any heat detectors. Manually actuated systems do not require associated detectors or detection system electrical circuitry in order to function. This revision now reflects as-built and as-designed conditions. The revision will not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1895, 7/1/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-171 Section '.13.4.1.3.3
Description:
Corrected the FSAR description of the insulating fluid utilized in all high-voltage, high-amperage transformers. The FSAR referred to the insulating fluid as a "high flash point fluid." The National Fire Protection Association now classifies the fluid as "less flammable."
Safety Evaluation: This revision was an editorial change only. There were no changes to the plant as-built status or to combustible loadings.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 1
25 Tech Misc 3/9
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ J
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Subject:
ADIF 87-171 Fire Area 2-19
Description:
Corrected FSAR information for fire area 2-19, in Appendix 9B of the FSAR. The information in the columns for " shutdown trains" and " floor area" had been reversed. This data was exchanged to properly
) locate and identify it.
Safety Evaluation: This is an editorial revision only. There was no change to the plant.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-171 Fire Area 2-70
Description:
Corrected the fire area hazard analysis (FAHA) for l
fire area 2-70. This had incorrectly shown the transformer askeral insulatipg fluid as contributing a fire load of 36,595 B'IU/f t to the fire area's combuspibleloading. The correct value is 38,841 BTU /ft . The FAHA will now reflect as-built conditions.
Safety Evaluation: The as-built combustible loading is only 2,246 B'IU/ft greater than that stated in Revision 5 to the FSAR. This is a relatively insignificant increase and does not raise the maximum fire severity above the current "< 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />." Currently installed fire protection features and systems are not adversely impacted.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-171 Fire Area 2-97
Description:
Corrected information in the FSAR for fire area 2-97.
Listings of paints and solvents, their quantities and their fire loading contribution had been omitted.
Also, calculational errors had been made in the combustible loading represented by other combustibles.
Safety Evaluation: The correction of the calculational errors and the identification of previously unlisted combustible materials enables the FAHA to reflect the as-built status. The correction of the fire loading required a downward adjustment in the maximum fire severity from < l.5 to < l.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. This will not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 26 Tech Misc 3/9 l
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Subject:
ADIF.87-171 Fire Area 2-98
Description:
Corrected information in the FSAR for fire area 2-98.
AppendixBofpheFSARstatedthearea'sfireloadas 140,427 B'IU/ft and its maximum fire severity as less than 3 The actual fire area load is 140,429 B'IU/f t, hours . Also, . the Fire Protection Handbook and the FSAR state that a maximum fire seve[ity of less than l 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is associated with a BTU /ft loading of 160,000 or less. Therefore, the maximum fire severity should be described as less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> vice less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Safety Evaluation: This FSAR revision reflects the as-built conditions and provides needed corrections. The changes are editorial.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-177
Description:
Changed FSAR section 9B.4.1.26 to exempt, fire breaks for vertical cable runs in containment.
Safety Evaluation: The fire hazards analysis did not require fire breaks since containment has a low combustible loading. The probability of a fire of sufficient magnitude to damage redundant cables or components is unlikely and the incorporation of fire breaks would not enhance '
this position. Also, since the containment is a large open volume, fire breaks would not be effective. This absence of fire breaks will not affect the safe shutdown of the plant.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-180
Description:
Changed section 6.2.3.5.1 of the FSAR to indicate i that only Unit 2 has a spray additive tank empty alarm.
Safety Evaluation: The change was made for clarification purposes only. 1 FSAR Figure 6.3-3 sheets 1 and 2 currently reflect ~
this clarification. This change will not affect the l' safe shutdown of the plant.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 1
27 Tech Misc 3/9 l l
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Subject:
ADIF 87-181
Description:
Corrected paragraph 15.4.2.1.2.2 of the FSAR. This paragraph stated that, following a steam line
. rupture, safety injection would be initiated by high steam flow coincident with low steam line pressure or low Tavg. The correction states that, following a steam line rupture, safety injection will be initiated by low steam line pressure or low pressurizer pressure.
Safety Evaluation: The paragraph was not consistent with FSAR Figures 7.2-7 and.7.2-8 and Technical Specification Table 3.3-3. Since~this change simply corrects the-FSAR the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-183
Description:
Added additional exemptions to Regulatory Guide 1.21 on page 3A-1.21-1 of the FSAR.
Safety' Evaluation: The additional exemptions are minor in nature and do not reflect a safety hazard.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-184
Description:
Changed item 22 on Table 6.2-31 of the FSAR from
" Containment Air Sample In" to." Containment Air Sample Out". Also, item 23 was changed from
" Containment Air Sample Out" to " Containment Air Sample In".
Safety Evaluation: The change was made to agree with the direction of the containment air sample flow as shown on Figures 6.2-91 and 6.2-124 of the FSAR.
PORC Review: .PORC 1893, 6/29/88 28 Tech Misc 3/9
u .
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_. Subjsct: ADIF 87-190
. .. 'l
-Description: Removed the Turbine Building fire detection and sprinkler systems from the operability requirements in Tables 9B.C-1 and 9B.C-2 (for Unit 1) and Tables 1 98.C-5 cnd 9B.C-6 (for Unit 2) of the FSAR (Attachment C to Appendix 9B).
Safety Evaluation: The fire detection and suppression systems in the Turbine Building are not required to achieve' safe shutdown of the plant. The detection and sprinkler systems in the Turbine Building do not meet the-applicable criteria and therefore are not required to be included in the operability requirements of Attachment C to Appendix 9B. This deletion does not decrease the effectiveness of the fire protection program.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1895, 7/1/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-195
Description:
Revised an organization chart (Figure 13.1-1) shown in the FSAR. The position of Executive Vice President - Nuclear Operations was added and the title of Senior Vice President - Nuclear Generation ,
was changed to Senior Vice President - Nuclear )
Operations.
Safety Evaluation: These management changes provide more focused upper management attention to Nuclear Operations. This reflects the continuing APCo commitment to safe and reliable operation of FNP. These organizational changes do not have an adverse affect on safety.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88
Subject:
ADIF 87-196
Description:
Deleted the Senior Vice President - Construction from Figure 17.2-1 of the FSAR.
l Safety Evaluation: The intent of Figure 17.2-1 is to reflect the APCo Nuclear Operations OA Organization. The Senior Vice President - Construction no longer reports to the Executive Vice President in charge of nuclear j operations.
PORC Review: PORC Meeting 1893, 6/29/88 29 1
- . 4 ,
, Subj;ct: . GO-EIP-112, Revision 8
Description:
Revision 8 to the procedure: updates telephone numbers, personnel titles, and names of people holding positions; and prompts Emergency Operations Center personnel to obtain the radio call numbers of the security vehicle from Security instead of relying on a listing of security vehicle call numbers.
Safety Evaluation: This procedure revision will maintain the accuracy and efficiency of the procedure.
Subject:
GO-EIP-114, Revision 7 !
I
Description:
Revision 7 to the procedure includes: a change to make it clearer that it is the Engineering and Licensing Support Director's responsibility to draft NEINORK informational releases; a change that gins the Engineering and Licensing Support Director guidance on what should be included in the NEINORK release; and a change that provides for only one notification of the Public Information Organization of an impending release instead of three.
1 Safety Evaluation: This revision will make the procedure clearer and more efficient.
Subject:
GO-EIP-116, Revision 5
Description:
Revision 5 to the procedure involves: changes to ensure all Emeroency Operations Facility telephone .
operator positions are manned and that all plant l telephone operators are provided with an updated Emergency Operations Facility phone number list; a change to ensure the Engineering and Licensing Support Director reviews the status of NETWORK news releases on turnover; a change to indicate the new telecopier number for the Dose Assessment Room; a change to more accurately reflect the present telecopier equipment used in the Dose Assessment Room; and changes to ensure the Dose Assessment Director obtains offsite agency J status for the Recovery Manager.
Safety Evaluation: This procedure revision will maintain the accuracy and thoroughness of the procedure.
I 30 l
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,'Subjset: GO-EIP-117, Revision 6
Description:
Revision 6 to the procedure involves: changes that clarify the Administrative support Director's responsibility to coordinate the manning of the telephone operator's position in the Emergency Operations Facility; changes that will direct the Emergency Operations Facility telephone ;perator to screen only calls that ring directly to him; an addition to the procedure that assigns responsibility to the Administrative Support Director for the rerouting of the two dedicated state information lines to the Emergency Operations Facility once it has become fully operational; an ,
update to the " Blanket Purchase Orders and Service Contract" table; and a change that ensures all l telephone console operators are provided a current telephone listing during an emergency.
Safety Evaluation: This revision will serve to maintain the accuracy for the procedure and allow the most efficient method of communications coordination.
Subject:
CO-EIP-120, Revision 3
Description:
Revision 3 to the procedure involves title changes and the incorporation of the Public Information Emergency Coordinator as one of the approval authorities.
Safety Evaluation: This revision will maintain the accuracy of the procedure and allow the most efficient approval for news releases.
Subject:
GO-EIP-132, Revision 6
Description:
Revision 6 to the procedure involves title changes and a change which will reference GO-EIP-102 for Corporate Communications Department responsibilities rather than having the responsibilities in EIP-132. Thus changes can be made to EIP-132 without Corporate Communications Department approval for each revision.
Safety Evaluation: This revision will maintain the accuracy of this procedure and streamline the revision process.
31
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,. Subjects GO-EIP-134, Revision 7 I
Description:
Revision 7 to the procedure involves: changes that take the Corporate Communications Department training requirements out of this procedure since they are already listed in GO-EIP-102; and changes that remove Corporate Communications Department responsibilities for the News Media Orientation i Program from this procedure since they already !
exist in GO-EIP-102.
Safety Evaluation: This revision will remove duplication of requirements that are listed in two procedures.
Subject:
GO-EIP-136, Revision 4
Description:
Revision 4 to the procedure changes the name of the alert radio from NOAA Weather Radio to Alert Radio; and includes reference as to how the Corporate Communications Department will maintain records of ,
Safety Evaluation: This revision will maintain the accuracy of the procedure since the NOAA Weather Radio is no longer in use.
Subject:
GO-EIP-137, Revision 3
Description:
Revision 3 to this procedure involves: changes that reflect the Alert and notification System title description being changed from the " Prompt Notification System" to the " Alert and Notification System"; a change that takes the Corporate Communication Department's responsibility for lowering the siren activation testing signs out of the procedure since it has been incorporated in GO-EIP-102; a change to increase the full cycle activation testing frequency to semi-annual vice annual testing.
- Safety Evaluation
- This revision will maintain the accuracy of the procedure and increase the reliability of the siren system with the increased testing frequency.
32
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. A t
..e- Subject GO-NG-1,. Revision 8A
Description:
Revision 8A acknowledges the creation of the position of Vice President-Nuclear.
Safety Evaluation: This revision enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of the support services provided.to Farley Nuclear Plant.
Subject:
GO-NG-26, Revision 5
Description:
Revision 5 to the procedure incorporates the requirements of 10CFR73.57 for access to Safeguards Information and makes minor corrections to titles and addresses.
Safety Evaluation: This procedure revision addresses NRC requirements and establishes methods for access control to Safeguards Information.
Subject:
GO-NG-5, Revision 4 !
Description:
Revision 4 to the procedure involves: a change which more accurately defines the actual transmission of river flow data-from Andrews Dam to Farley Nuclear Plant; and an editorial correction of the title of-Senior Vice President to Vice )
President Nuclear.
Safety Evaluation: The revision does not change, modify, nor create any additional requirements or responsibilities.
33
[{: g . -3' s Alabama Power Company.
600 North 18th Street s - Post Office Box 2641 ..
Birmingham, Alabama 352914400
- Telephone 2052501837 W. G. Hairston,Ill Senior Vice President Nuc; ear Operations AlabamaPower thesouthern electnc system March 29, 1989 10CFR50.59-j .-
Docket Nos. 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: ' Document Control Desk Vashington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen Attached for your review is the annual report required by 10CFR50.59'for
-1988. This report summarizes changes.to the plant performed in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.59 for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Respectfully submitted, y).) .ll i d +
V. G. Hairston, III l
VGH,III/ JAR: dst-6.37 Attachment cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. G. F. Maxwell l'
!