ML20070R746

Jm Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Annual Rept

ML20070R746
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	12/31/1990
From:	Woodard J ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9104010396
Download: ML20070R746 (62)

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March 27, 1991 10CFR50.59 Docket No. 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Vashington, D.C. 20555 Joseph H. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Annual Report Gentlemen:

Attached for your review is the annual report required by 10CFR$0.59 for 1990. This report summarizes changes to the plant performed in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.59 for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted, 1A iJ D. Voodard A\

JDV/DRCimapl3.24 Attachment cci Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. S. T. Hoffman I Hr. G. F. Maxwell 9104010396 901231 PDR R

ADOCK 05000364 PDR

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s ALABAMA POVER COMPANY JOSEPil H. FARLEY NUCLF.AR PLANT UNIT 2 - ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED BY 100FR50.59 Section 59 of Title 10, Part 50, " Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," of the Code of Federal Regulations, states that the holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility may (1) make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, and (2) make changes in the procedures as described in the safety analysis report, and (3) conduct tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report, without prior commission approval, unless the proposed change, test or experiment involves a change in the technical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety question (as defined in 10CFR50.59).

The licensee is required to maintain records of such changes, tests or experiments, and those records are required to include written safety evaluations which provide the basis for the determination that the changes, tests or experiments do not involve any unreviewed safety questions.

Brief des criptions and a summary of the safety evaluations for the changes, tests or experiments as described above, for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 2 vhich vere completed in 1990, are provided in the following.

also provided is a list of abbreviations and acronyms used in the summaries.

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i LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS FOR THE

! 1990 10CPR50.59 ANNUAL REPORT ADIF Author's Document Incorporated Form AFV Auxiliary Feedvater

! AHU Air Handling Unit ALARA As-Low As Reasonably Achievable -

ANSI American National Standards Institute-APC Alabama Pover Company ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers  ;

BAT Boric Acid Tank' 1 BTRS Boron Thermal Regeneration System CCV Component Cooling Vater i CDT Chemical Drain Tank CVCS Chemical and-Volume Control System D/G Diesel Generator ECCS ' Emergency Core Cooling System EPPY Effective Full Power Years i EOL .End of Life E0 Environmentally Qualified or Qualification +

ES Engineering Study FAHA Fire Area Hazard Analysis

FFRDS Failed' Fuel Rod Detection System Farley Nuclear Plant FNP FPS Fire Protection System FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GPM Gallons Per Hinute- -

HVAC Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers LCO Limiting Condition For Operation LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident-hSVR Main Steam Valve Room NFPA National Fire Protection Association NNS Non-nuclear Safety-NORB . Nuclear Operations Review Board OD. Outside Diameter ODCH Offsite Dose calculation Manual PAP Primary Access Point P&ID Piping and Instrument Draving .

PCN Production Change Notice-PORC Plant Operations Reviews Committee-PORV Pover Operated Relief Valve RACA . Radiation Access Control Area l RCS Reactor Coolant System RRR Residual Heat Removal l . Resistance Temperature Detector RTD' RVIS River Vater Intake Structure RVST Refueling Vater. Storage Tank SER Safety' Evaluation Report SG Safeguards SNC _ Southern. Nuclear Operating Company SSD Safe Shutdovn SVIS Service Vater-Intake Structure TDAFVP' Turbine Driven Auxili.ary Feedvater Pump'-

TPNS Total' Plant Numbering System TS ~ Technical Specification - - - - -

TSC Technical Support Center UL Underwriter's Laboratories

- UT Ultrasonic inipec!lon

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bei Hr. R. P. Mcdonald Mr. V. G. Hairston, III Hr. J. E. Garlington Mr. L. B. Long Mr. D. N. Morey Mr. C. D. Nesbitt Mr. J. V. McGowan Mr. T. T. Robin Mr. V. R. Bayne Commitment Tracking System (2) l l

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SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-001, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2120, 01/30/90 ,

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DESCRIPTIOHs Updated FSAR Section 7.3.2.1.5 which discusses  !

testing of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System. This section had been vritten prior to the  ;

issue of the FNP Technical Specifications. It was changed to refer to the Technical Specifications.

Redundant and conflicting information was remove 6.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These proposed.FSAR changes are considered administrative in nature since they represent a clarification to FSAR test and surveillance requirements rather than a physical change to the plant or to procedures. The Technical Specifications provide a detailed description of the testing requirements.

SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-004, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV:' PORC Heeting 2140. 03/27/90 DESCRIFtION: Added a description of the AFV temperature monitoring system to FSAR Section 6.5.5 to describe the equipment used.to monitor for AFV pump steam binding. LThe system was installed previously by-PCNs B84-1-2518 and B84-2-2519. FSAR Figure 6.5-1 vas updated by these previous PCNs, but no description of the system vas added to the FSAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change serves only to document an existing design in the FSAR text. The effects of the design -

on plant.safuty were evalunted in connection with the above PCNs. All design information included in the text change is_ covered by these safety evaluations, i

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SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-006 Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2130, 02,27/90 DESCRIPTION: Updated Chapter 12.3 of the FSAR to reflect current practice in the health physics program.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The proposed change involves modifying the description of the health physics program to reflect current plant practice and equipment storage. These descriptions do not relate to the plant accident analysis. Equipment changes do not jcopardize the ability to mitigate the consequences of a.7y accident.

SUBJECT:

ADIF d9-007, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2159, 05/11/90 DESCRIPTION Re-vrote FSAR Sections 13.2.2 and 13.2.3 to give an updated discussion of the training program for Operations, Technical and Maintenance personnel.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This update of Sections 13.2.2 and 13.2.3 vill ensure that the FSAR accurately reflects the current training programs at FNP. The training I programs satisfy all applicable NRC and industry requirements.

SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-008, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2130, 02/27/90 DESCRIPTION: Corrected FSAR Paragraph 9.5.4.5 to indicate that each underground 0/G fuel oil storage tank does not t

include a dips',1ck, but does include a dipstick insertion point. The FSAR had erroneously state 6 that each storage tank had a esnual dipstick gauge.

SA7ETY EVALUATION: Determination of feel volume is performed in accordance with TS requirements and procedural 1 guidance. The absence of a dipstick in the underground storage tanks does not adversely affect the ability to determine fuel level and comply with the TSs.

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SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-009, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2130, 02/27/90 DESCRIPTION: Changed Section 9.5.4.2 of the FSAR to agree with the as-built conditions of the vents on the D/G fuel oil storage and day tanks. These vents are not equipped with flame arrestors as it was stated in Section 9.5.4.2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The design documents for the tanks do not specify the fitting of flame arrestors on the tank vents.

The D/G fuel has a lov volatility and hence flame arrestors are not necessary. The existence of flame arrestors can reatrict tank venting through accumulations of dust, insect nests or icing on their surfaces.

SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-010, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2131, 03/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Changed FSAR Section 3K.4.2.1.4 by Seleting references to piping penetration roam flood sensors. Previously, this section had indicated that Ivvel sensors were installed in the piping penetration rooms at the 100' elevation to detect flooding and provide a control room alarm. These sensors were never installt? at FNP.

SAFETY EVL',UATION: An analysis indicates that c';tiicient instrumentation has been installed to alert the operator of a flooding problem.

SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-012, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2156, 05/03/90 DESCRIPTION: Updated chapters 11.2, 11.5 and Appendix 9B of the FSAR to reflect current practices associated with the radvaste system.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The changes involve the description of various health physics p;actices related to storage of radvaste, demineralizer operation, and process parameters. These descriptions do not relate-to the plant accident analyses. . The equipment involved is not required to mitigate the consequences of any accident.

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SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-016, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2156, 05/03/90 DESCRIPTION: Updated FSAR Section 11.4.2.20.0 to reflect actions

-taken with respect to the noble gas effluent monitors. The changes involve 1) the design of the monitors' power supply and 2) the development of procedures for the monitora since the section was written.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: The changes to FSAR Section 11.4.2.20.0 reflect the fact that the monitors are povered from; vital instrument busses and that procedures have been-developed for the use and calibration of the system and for the dissemination of release rate information. The changes do not affect the design or design basis of the monitors. The information.

being changed is largely historical information-concerning the design and installation process for these monitors.

SUBJECT:

ADIF 89 017, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2130, 02/27/90 Justified the adequacy of the current-distribution i DESCRIPTION:

of fire extinguishers in the plant _and provided the basis for revision of FSAP, Appendix 9B to clarify the fire extinguisher coverage requirements.- FSAR Section 98.4.1.17 states that Class A fire extinguishers are. located throughout FNP. The section also states that the extinguishers and locations are in accordance with NFPA-10. However, Class A fire extinguishers are not-located in.the Turbine Buildings or cable tunnels of.each unit or l in the Lov Level Radwaste Stt ,e Building.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The existing fire protection arrangement is.

adequate and f alls within the intent of NFPA 10.-

The existing fire protection equipment which

[ consists of various combinations of fire

extinguishers, hose stations and sprinkler systems is adequate to meet NRC requirements and NFPA i

guidslines.

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t SUBJECT ADIF 89-019 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2146, 04/12/90 DESCRIPTION: Updated the combustible loading in several_ fire i areas to reflect as-built conditions. -The combustible loadings are listed in Appendix 9B to the FSAR in the-individual FAHA. The combustible loading may also appear in the 10CFR50 Appendix R Exemptions discussed in Attachment B of FSAR Appendix 9B.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Despite the increases, the combustible loading _and fire severities of all of'the affected fire areas remain vell below the fire ratings of their area boundaries. Furthermore, the increased fire severities do not adversely impact the background.

data which the NRC utilized in formulating their-evaluations and conclusions regarding the Alabama Power Company Appendix R Exemptions. The exemptions-granted for those rooms are not dependent on the combustib?e loading.

SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-054,-Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2140, 03/27/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Sections 8.3.1.4.3 and 8.3cl.4.10 to indicate'that FSAR' Figures 8.3-51, 8.3-52, 8.3-53, and 8.3-54 are examples of typical drawings _and that these figures vill not be updatedffor subsequent design changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The drawings- that the subject figures are based on are, by nature, very active drawings and are nov so crowded vith information that they would not make good FSAR figures. Leaving the figures as they are would not violate their original intent vhich=vas to show typical FNP cable routing. drawings.. These changes to the FSAR do not involve physical changes to the plant and are editorial in nature.

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ADIF 89-055, Rev. O

SUBJECT:

PORC Heeting 2140, 03/27/90 PORC REVIEV:

Changed FSAR Sections 8.3.1.4.4 and 8.3.1.4.8.1 to DESCRIPTION:

clarity the cable tray layout in the cable spreading room and electrical penettation rooms Also,and address separation of redundant channels.

this ADIF corrected the size of the conduits used in the duct banks between the Cable Spreading Room and the Electrical Penetration Rooms.

The changes are editorial in nature and serve only SAFETY EVALUATION: to clarify the FSAR sections. The actual size of the conduits are adequate and reflect the as-built condition.

ADIF 89-056, Rev. O

SUBJECT:

PORC Heeting 2129, 02/20/90 PORC REVIEV:

Changed FSAR Section 6.2.4.2 to state the actual DESCRIPTION:

location of the containment isolation valve associated with the Unit 1 pressurizer pressure deadveight tester instrumentation line. Most containment isolation valves are in the penetration rooms as stated. However, this containment isolation valve (01B13V026B) is located in the Auxiliary Building. Also, this evaluation changed the pressurizer pressure deadveight tester penetration line size from 1/8 inch OD to 3/8 inch OD. The line consists primarily of 1/8 inch OD tubing except for the section where the line passes through the containn.c.Y vall. Finally, valves OlB13V026A and 02B13V02o.' vere deleted from the list of containment isolation valves in FSAR Table 6.2-39.

Having the containment isolation valve in the SAFETY EVALLATION:

Auxiliary Building near the deadveight tester minimizes the amount of time the valve needs to be open during pressurizer pressure instrument calibration. In addition, a certain amount of operator radiation dose is avoided by r,ct requiring an operator to enter the penetration room each time the tester is used. Tha dead veight tester is a closed system in containment and is a very small line. Thus transfer of a significant amount of radioactive material is very unlikely. General Design Criterion 57 requires only one isolation valve for this type of penetration.

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SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-100, Rev. 0 PORC Heeting 2168, 06/05/90 _j PORC REVIEV DESCRIPTION: Added the computer uninterruptible power supply to the list of loads'for 600V. load center 20. This- .i required a change to FSAR Figure 8.3-49. Changing power supplies for the computer was accomplished by PCNs B86-2-3925 and B87-2-4254, but FSAR Figure-8.3-49 was not updated as required by these PCNs.

In the process'of transferring FSAR dravinas which:

required changing from PCN 4254 to PCN1 3925, the figure above was inadvertently not listed in PCN 3925 as requiring revision.

It was l

SAFETY EVALUATIONt This change has no impact on plant safety.

evaluated-in the safety evaluation for PCN B87-2-4254, Rev. 8.

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SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-230, Rev. 1 .:

1 PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2144, 04/06/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Section 9.2.9 to state the correct.

mode of operation of vell #1 of.the vell water system.- The FSAR indicates that vell #1'is aligned ,

- for automatic starting. However,.this.ls not_the most desirable mode of operation- The well vater system supplies both-the sanitary--(drinking) vater and the fire protection vater tanks.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The water quality of vell #1 is not suitable for filling 1the sanitarynvater tank. However,'the-control for this pump was in the auto, position-

- which would have caused it to operate in the event of a fire. Therefore, it was desirable to remove  ;

l vell #1 from automatic control to ensure it did.not-contaminate the drinking vater supply. . This_ change requires the manual start of pump #1 in order for the-well: vater system-to maintain the required-level in the fire protection water storage tanks or to refill the fire protection storage tanks following a fire. This change does not affect the capability of the vell vater system.

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, i SUEJECT: ADIF 89-237 PORC REVIEV PORC Meeting 2161, 05/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Changed FSAR Table 6.2-32, " Steam Generator Isolation Valve Information", by deleting the 5-second closure time for the valves which isolate steam flow to the TDAFVP 01(2)N12V001A and - V001B.

SAFETY EVALUATIO. Valves 01(2)N12V001A and - V001B are normally closed. Their principal safety function is to open automatically on a TDAFVP actuation signal to start the TDAFVP. Consequently, the deletiot of the 5-second closure time value, from Table 6.2-32, for valves 01(2)N12V001A and - V001B has no impact on the safety function performed by the valves.

SUBJECT:

ADIF 89-247, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2145, 04/10/90 DESCRIPTION: Changed total integrated dose values of certain Auxiliary Building rooms listed in FSAR Table 3.11-1. Also, Note i of Table 3.11-1 was revised to clarify which Auxiliary Building rooms containing E0 components (equipment-or cables) do not have detailed dose calculations whose results are listed in the table and to explain the basis for excluding those rooms.

SAFETY EVALUATION: To allow for possible additions of E0 equipment to the affected Auxiliary Building rooms in higher dose areas and to ensure a consistent methodology, it was decided to recalculate the total integrated dose levels of these rooms. In lieu of the cagcelations,aroomtotalintegrateddosevalueof 10 rads was assumed for rooms containing only caale. The clarification of Note 1 of FSAR Table 3.11-1 indicates that no detailed dose calculations were done for these rooms.

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SUBJECT:

Cycle 8 Reload, Revs. O and 1 PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2216, 10/16/90 l PORC Hecting 2232, 11/08/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Sections 4.2 and 15.2.4 to incorporate the Cycle 8 reload design based on the Cycle 7 end-of-life burnup within a range of 15,600 to 17,200 MVD/HTU. The Cycle 7 operation was completed on October 12, 1990, with a cycle burnup of 17,050.9 HVD/HTU. The Cycle 8 burnup is also limited to 16,400 MVD/HTU vhich may include a power coastdown beyond the end of full power capability.

A total of 1 Region-5, 35 Region-8, 65 Region-9, and 5 fresh Region-10 fuel assemblies are used in the design. A total of 576 fresh Vet Annular Burnable Absorbers (VABAs) are used in clusters of 12 and 16. The Region-10 assemblies differ from the previous design in that they include rotated dimples on the inner grid straps of the top and bottom inconel grids, crowned dimples on the inner grid straps of the remaining grids, minor changes to the fuel assembly design due to Vestinghouse implementation of Updated Fuel Assembly Design features, changes to the VABAs as a result of an Updated Core Component Program, and a Hodified Debris Filter Bottorr Nozzle (HDFBN),

SAFETY EVALUATION: The Unit 2 Cycle 8 design does not involve an unreviewed safety question. In addition, no Technical Specification changes vill be required for Cycle 8. Hence, since no unreviewed safety questions or Technical Specifications changes are involved, the Cycle 8 reload design is licensable under 10CFR50.59 and requires no prior NRC approval.

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SUBJECT:

ECCSLFlov Modeling Inconsistencies PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2175, 07/03/90 l

DESCRIPTION: ' Evaluated the. effects of charging /SI flov' short-f all due to RCP seal injection and potential-line resistance imbalance on previously analyzed-LOCA analyses. The effect of excessive charging pump runout was also evaluated.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The analysis assumption changes resulted in no-change to the limiting LOCA event-calculated results. It 'vas also. determined that: adequate NPSH exists, and CCP runout was evaluated and found acceptable. Therefore,-all acceptance criteria are met.

CUBJECT: Effect of Open Containment Mini-Purge Valves on the- .

Emergency Core Cooling System Analysis PORC REVIEV: - PORC Heeting 2167, 06/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Determined, using the Vestinghouse 1981 Evaluation Model, that the effect of.the containment mini-purge valves.being open coincident-vith a LOCA vould continue.to be minor.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The'1981 Evaluation Model has demonstrated a reduced sensitivity to containment backpressure which would result in an increased calculated peak cladding temperature. . This increase, when combined with other peak-cladding temperature penalties- '

reported by Vestinghouse on Farley, restts in PCT-remaining below the 2200' F limit-stipulated in 10 CFR 50.46.

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SUBJECT:

ES88-1223: Cable Rerouting PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2248, 12/18/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the FSAR by adding a footnote that when referring to a Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.75 " fire barrier" to indicate that these barriers are not required for compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.

The term " culvert" as found in Section 9B.4.1.3.2 was explained since culverts are not used to route cables at FNP. FSAR Appendix 3A and Section 8.3 vere revised to explain how the inte, of the R.G.

1.75 requirement for 1" separation be ween redundant class 1E circuits and non-class 1E circuits is met. Information that was duplicated in FSAR Sections 8 and 9B vas removed from the appropriate section.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These changes do not involve any physical changes to the plant, but instead correct the descriptions of the plant within the FSAR. These changes are considered editorial in nature because they-eliminate unnecessary duplication of information i

vithin the FSAR, clarify'the term " barrier" with respect to its application to fire protection and R.G. 1.75, eliminate an incorrect statement concerning the routing of cables through culverts, l and clarify FNP's conformance with R.G. 1.75 for I

! separation between redundant class 1E circuits and non-class 1E circuits.

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SUBJECT:

FNP-0-AP-9, Rev'.'16 PORC REVIEV: PORC Meeting 2127, 02/13/90 1 3

DESCRIPTION: Expanded the responsibility for procurement reviews ,

to also assign tha General Manager-Nuclear Plant responsibility for-procurement reviews such that these revieve may be performed by either Nuclear Support personnel or-FNP Staff personnel.

Previously'the FSAR assigned this responsibility to the General Manager-Nuclear Support.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The General-Manager-Nuclear Support and the General Manager-Nuclear Plant are at the same level of-management. Procurement reviews by either Nuclear Support personnel or FNP' personnel are to be performed by qualified personne1~ utilizing administrative procedures or reviewed and approved-by the same level of management, Procurement reviews performed by-the FNP staff are the same level and extent of review as is being conducted by Nuclear Support personnel such that there is no decrease in the level or quality of the reviews.

Since this administrative change only involves . i allowing another organizational element the ability- i to perform procurement reviews under the appropriate controls, there is.no effect on-the accident-analyses, equipment malfunction:

. evaluations, and margins of safety as addressed =in 4 the FNP FSAR and Technical. Specifications.

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SUBJECT - FNP-0-EMP-1320.02, Rev. 1 PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2197, 08/31/90 DESCRIPTION: Provided guidance for transferring the feed for 600V load center 1B from its normal supply (4160V bus 1D) to load center 1F. Although not a routine evolution, such evitching can be. performed without deenergizing.the load center, i.e. " hot bus transfer".

SAFETY EVALUATION: The protection schemes for the 600V load centers

-vere reviewed and it was determined there-is adequate protection to prevent a single failure from jeopardizing both "A" and "B" trains of 'pover when-performing a hot bus transfer. Faults occurring downstream, upstream or. internal to load center breakers _can be isolated by protective.

relaying associated with the incoming line breakers and feeder breakers for-both the 4160V and 600V-switchgear. .In addition, adequate protection is-provided to meet both IEEE 379'(single failure criteria) and IEEE 334 (Independence of Class lE

_ Equipment and-Circuits), therefore, no-licensing or design concern exists.

SUBJECT:

FNP-0-E1 P-3016, Rev-.O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2198, 09/04/90 DESCRIPTION: Approved the addition of 011 Red B_ Liquid Dye, made

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by DuPont,_to the diesel fuel to determine by-test the' time needed1to achieve-a. homogeneous mixture in the D/G frel oil storage tanks. This is part of.a program to maintain the quality of the diesel fuel

-in long-term storage-for use in'the. emergency D/Gs.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Based on the manufacturer's data,-the addition of 011 Red-B Dye to the diesel fuel vill not adversely:

affect 1the_ energy content of the fuel or' engine performance.- Because1 the1 amount of treatment-is small, 0.00037Eveight,% of_the fuel,.it vill not affect any of the diesel fuel specifications. The Oil Red B Dye 1 diesel fuel oil treatment chemical has been-reviewed and found not to pose a' threat to control room habitability as_ defined by Regulatory '

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Guide 1.78.

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SUBJECT:

FNP-0-ETP-3660, Rev. 2: FFRDS-FSP-004(90)

PORC REVIEV: PORC Meeting 2218. 10/19/90-DESCRIPTION: Approved ultrasonic' inspection of the fuel '

assemblies to detect leaking fuel rods. The-ultrasonic technique is to be_used in lieu of the.

methods previously used.

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SAFETY EVALUATION: The responses;of the inspected-fuel assemblies, the- 1 RCS, the spent fuel pool, and the storage racks.to postulated accident conditions are not. adversely-altered by the operation of the.FFRDS. The most

i. cevere consequence which could be caused by_

improper operation of the FFRDS vould be to cause damage to the cladding-of an undamaged fuel rod or-to miss indications of fuel-rod cladding defects- .

These events could result in returning a fuel rod with a cladding. defect to the reactor- Operation with fuel rod cladding defects is limited by existing plant Technical Specifications on primary l

-coolant activity. . Operation'vith a-coolant l

activity level less than the Technical.

Specification-limits is bounded by previous analyses. The potential-for such an occurrence is minimized-by the quality assurance provisions which are part.of_the FFRDS operating procedure. The consequences ofLdropping the~FFRDS equipment in the spent fuel pool vould be bounded by the analysis ofl a dropped fuel assembly. Any activity released as a result of a postulated fuel rod' cladding defect resulting from inappropriate use of the inspection:

procedure vould be much11ess than that assumedLfor a' dropped assembly, i

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SUBJECT:

FNP-0-ETP-3660, Rev. 2: Hovement of UT Fuel Leak Detection Equipment PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2218, 10/19/90 DESCRIPTION: Addressed the structural aspects of the temporary installation of FFRDS equipment on top of the spent fuel racks as well as the movement of equipment across the spent fuel racks.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The largest piece of FFRDS equipment to be carried over the spent fuel pool veighs 1470 lbs., which is less than the weight of a fuel assembly. '

Theretore, FFRDS equipment is not subject to the NUREG-0612 requirements for movement of heavy loads. The structural analysis for the spent fuel racks har been reviewed to verify that the potential load drops associated with movement of the leak detection equipment do not result in damage to any fuel assembly or in damage to the spent fuel racks which could lead to criticality.

Also, the mounting of the equipment on top of the empty spent fuel racks vill not affect the structutal integrity of the racks even during a postulated seismic event.

SUBJECT:

FNP-0-H-72: Coating Manual PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2245, 12/11/90 DESCRIPTION: Approved the use of Ameron Amercoat 90 as an original coating system over bare steel and l concrete and as a re-coating system over the existing steel and concrete coating systems in the FNP containment buildings. FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.6 and the appropriate FSAR tables have been revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Amercoat 90 contains no aluminum and therefore vill not increase containment post-LOCA hydrogen levels.

Accic at analyses using the containment heat sink evaluation vill not be affected. Additionally, Amercoat 90 has been qualified for containment use by a test which meets the requirements of ANSI-N101.2 and FSAR Section 3.8.1.6.6, thus providing assurance that no failure of the coating vill occur post-accident which would adversely impact ECCS components.

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SUBJECTS' FNP-2-SOP-58.0, TCH '15A -(Permanentlyfincorporated under Rev. 16)

PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2203, 09/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Approved running a radvaste exhaust fan while'the radvaste supply fan is-inoperable.-

SAFETY EVALUATION: A log vill be established to maintain boric acid J tank room temperatures to ensure this area stays greater than 65' F vhile the exhaust fan is running .

and the outside temperature is-less than 65' F.

Administrative controls were instituted that required the exhaust fans-to be shut-down if the  ;

outside air temperature dropped to less than 20' F.  ;

1 The doors from the RCA entrance to outside air-located-in the dosimetry area vill also be propped-open to allow a source for makeup air to the -

Auxiliary Building to help decrease the pressure '

differential between-the Auxiliary Building and outside air, i

SUBJECT:

Formation of-Southern Nuclear Operating Company PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2226, 10/31/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Chapters 13 and 17 to reflect the various organizational changes made for the formation of SNC Phase II.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The changes to be made:are strictly administrative in nature so.no change vill be made to the basic organizational structure that currently-exists.

The responsibility of-the individuals.that provide support services for plant operation vill not' change. No changes vill be made to the_ design, operation, maintenance,~or testing of the. plant.

-There. vill be no degradation in the-current quality-assurance program. Clear reporting 5 11nes of communication within the structure-are maintained.

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c.

- SUBJECT Grout Repair PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2248, 12/18/90_. ,

DESCRIPTION: Approved gaps / cracks backed by a depth-of at least  !

6" of concrete / grout to be acceptable 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. fire barriers as installed. Small gaps / cracks (less ,

than 1" vide) and not backed _.by a' minimum depth of 6" of concrete / grout are acceptable-when filled with a minimum of 2" depth of either 3M Fire Dam 150 Caulk-or Dov~ Corning Fire Stop Sealant Cat. No.

- 2000.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The U.L. Fire Resistance Directory =and the Society of Fire Protection-Engineers Fire Protection Handbook indicate that structural-concrete that is; at least 6" thick-has'a fire endurance rating of.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Since the fire resistance properties of'-

grout are assumed ~to be similar to concrete, a 6" thickness of grout; constitutes a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire  ;

barrier. Also, 3M Fire Dam.lSO Caulk and Dov Corning Fire.Stop Sealant Cat.;No. 2000 have-demonstrated 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ~ fire performance -4 characteristics;at depths of less than 2" and vidths less than 1". Therefore,1these conditions-are acceptable at the penetration seal' assemblies because they satisfy the requirements of the--

original as-designed condition.

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+

SUBJECT:

MD 90-2199 l PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2140,_03/27/90 }

DESCRIPTION: Modified the basic. cork joint seal design which is '

used-in various places in the Auxiliary Building.

The modifications were performed because of degradation due to mechanical wear of the cork.

The modifications incorporate the addition of sheet metal flashing and insulation material to cover'the cork seal and minor gaps that have developed.

SAFETY EVALUATION: In accordance with the requirements of-Generic Letter 86-10, it .vas concluded that the cork joint assembly is adequate to withstand the effects of a fire and prevent propagation of a_ fire. Therefore, this modification vill not decrease'the effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program and vill not adversely affect the safety of_the plant.

.i

SUBJECT:

MD 90-2298 PORC REVIEV PORC Meeting 2235, 11/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Added temporary extensions from phones 2448.and 6014. - These~ lines are to be pulled -f rom junction box N2R51G395-N located'in the stairvell beside the TSC.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The addition of the two' extensions vill enhance the-overall communication system and vill _not adversely affect its performance. The telephone lines added are not safety related nor do.they_have any effect  ;

on any safety related equipment.

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SUBJECT:

Nonconformince Disposition Report NDR-80 PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2154, 04/30/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR page 6.2-54 to implement the use of a replacement motor in the 2B containment cooler fan on a temporary basis for purposes of cooling the containment during normal operation. Review of the replacement motor documentation revealed that the motor vindings were coated with an epoxy that is different from that described in the environmentally qualified test report. The 2B containment cooler vill be considered inoperable for accident mitigation purposes and technical specification LCO requirements for one inoperable containment fan cooler vill be applied.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The consequences of a motor failure due to lack of environmental qualification of the epoxy coating applied to vindings does not create any failure mechanism not previously evaluated and is ,

adequately compensated for by the existing electrical protection design.

SUBJECT:

PCN B84-2-2684, Rev. 1 PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Documented the replacement of temperature transmitters N2N11TET525 and N2N11TET526 on the main steam lines with remote temperature transmitters. This change decreases the unsupported load mounted on the steam lines and should reduce the probability of a steam line break. This change was made by Minor Departure 83-532. Because the temperature. transmitters are no longer mounted with the temperature elements,-

they have been assigned separate TPNS numbers.

This requires a revision of FSAR Figure 10.3-1 to show the transmitters and elements as sepa .:

instruments.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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SUBJECT:

PCN B85-2-3236, Rev. O  !

q PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2114, 01/11/90  !

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205004 and D-205208 to provide an option for capping one leg of the equipment ,

drain and one leg of the floor drain " running  :

traps" located in:the CDT room.- This vill facilitate exhausting-the drains to the radvaste area ventilation system. FSAR Figure 9.3-4 was revised-accordingly.-

SAFETY. EVALUATION: The modif' i cation vill facilitate the exhaust of the radioactive gases to the Radvaste Area Ventilation-System, which vill tesult in reduced contamination of. plant areas and provide less radiction exposure to maintenance personnel. This modification does not involve an-untsviewed. safety question.

SUBJECT:

PCN B86-2-3857, Rev.-0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Corrected the discrepancies-between_ single line drawings and their corresponding connection diagrams for the 120V A.C. instrumentation distribution system. FSAR Figure 8.3-23 was revised accordingly.

"-- SAFETY EVALUATION: This design-change results-in corrections to dre.vings contained in the FSAR.; These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant

-safety systems.

20

SUBJECT:

PCN B86-2-3932, Revs. 1 & 2 PORC REVIEV PORC Meeting 2216, 10/16/90 DESCRIPTION: Hodified the design of the temperature cutout switches that provide over-temperature protection for the blast coil heaters which are part of the penetration room filtration units. .The original design of the units call for manual and automatic cutout switches, but no setpoint was established for the switches. This PCN removed the manual reset temperature cutouts and provided setpoints and TPNS numbers for the automatic temperature cutout switches.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The cutout svitches which vere removed are not required by the ANSI /ASHE standard to which FNP is committed. The setpoint was provided by the heater-vendor.

SUBJECT:

PCN B87-0-4186, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2148, 04/17/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-175046 for the control room HVAC to show that the control room utility exhaust fan and discharge damper are tripped by the "B" train chlorine analyzer, not the "A" train analyzer.

FSAR Figure 9.4-1, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the.FSAR.- These corrections do not result in' functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN B87-0-4486, Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2159, 05/11/90-DESCRIPTION: Documented the replacement of a commercial grade Agastat relay,-part number 7012PC, in the B1G sequencer with a nuclear grade Agastat relay, part number E7012PC001 per Minor Departure 87-1708.

FSAR Figure 8.3-40 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds

~

the requirerents of the part being replaced.

21

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SUBJECT:

PCN B87-2-4082, Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the safety classification of valve.

N2E13V002 from 2B to NNS to correct an inconsistency with-the NNS classification of line

.1"-HCD-104. 1The valve is installed in the nitrogen-supply line to the spray. additive-tank 1"-HCD-104.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The loss of the nitrogen supply line to the spray-additive tank does not-impact the safety function of the spray additive tank.-

SUBJECT:

PCN B87-2-4125, Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2136, 03/15/90 DESCRIPTION:. Revised the combustible loading and fire severity tables in Appendix 9B of the FSAR for fire areas 2-12 and 2-15 to reflect the addition of combustible material in the form of paper in rooms-2202 and 2254. Desks were'also added to-these rooms. 1These rooms contain-the hot shut-down panels.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The combustible material added vill be _

approximately 200-lbs.-of paper at:8000 BTU /lb and-vill not increase the fire severity of rooms 2202 and 2215. The new desks are seismically mounted so that they-vill not damage the hot shut-down panels during a seismic event.- The implementation of,this PCN vill not'becin' conflict with the requirements-of Section 9.B.3, Appendix-9B of the FSAR.and vill otec 10 Program a FNP 22

i PCN B87-2-4130, Revs. 0, 2, Land 4'

SUBJECT:

PORC REVIEV PCRC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 PORC Heeting- 2177, 07/10/90 DESCRIPTION: Modified the-design of the mechanical seal-of the 2B charging pump. The_ modified seal design

' eliminates the need for.CCW cooling vater to the seals as well as the mechanical-seal heat-exchangers and the external piping associated with o the seals..:The internal seal components were reconfigured so that the quantity of internal parts Ehave been reduced. Theiseal housing _ design and;the:

shaft-sealing design vere-modified. FSAR Sections 9.2.2.'2 and 9.2.2.5 and Figure 9.3-6 were revised to delete references to_the seal cooling.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These modifications are an-enhancement'to the 1 charging. pumps.- This simplified design improves-charging pumpfreliability'and availability. Thus,-

these modifications do not degrade 'tlue operation' or.

safety-performance ofothe charging. pumps.

SUBJECT:

PCN.B87-2-4146,-Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Added TPNS numbers for the containment spray additive tank vacuum release valves to1the system P&ID._ _FSAR Figure 6.3-3B vas revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change-results in corrections to

' drawings = contained inEthe FSAR. -These corrections do notoresult in-functional modifications _to plant safety _ systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN B87-2-4177, Rev. O t

PORC REVIEV PORC Hecting.2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Made the appropriate valve line up changes to change the flow path of the steam generator blevdown effluent. -The FSAR'had indicated that the normal flovpath was to return the blovdown ef fluent to the main condenser. However, in practice, the effluent'is normally released to the environment consistent with ODCM limits. P&ID D-205071, Sheet 2, Rev. 12 incorporating these changes has been issued. The following sections of the FSAR vere revised to incorporate the preceding changes:

10.4.8.1, 10.4.8.2, 10.4.8.3.1 and 11.2.6.4. FSAR Figure 10.4-5A vas also revised to reflect these changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: 'The change in valve line-ups requested by the PCR vill not result in~the release of radioactive materials in' excess of FSAR allovables and vill 1 have no affect on the safe shut-down capability of-the plant. FSAR Sections 10.4.8.1, 10.4.8.2, 10.4.8.3.1, 11.2.6.4 and Figure 10.4-5A vill have-to be revised to delete reference-to the-discharge.

to the main condenser as the normal flow path for steam generator blovdown effluent. Continuous release of steam generator blowdown to the

~

environment is permitted by-the FSAR (see Section 10.4.8). On this1 basis, the valve line up requested by the-PCR is acceptable.

SUBJECT:

PCN B87-2-4267, Rev. 0:

PORC REVIEV FORC Heeting 2148,-04/17/90 DESCRIPTION: Corrected the Vestinghouse identificationLnumbers:

for the RHR mini-flov valves FCV-602'A 6.B on the RHR-system P&ID, D-205041,'and FSAR' Figure 5.5-6B.

These valves-vere changed _from globe to gate type under a previous design change. . The P&ID and FSAR

-figure vere changed to show the different valve type as a-part of the design change, but the- i identification numbers vere not changed.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This-design change results in corrections to drawings contained.in the~FSAR. These~ corrections '

do not result-in functional modifications to plant-safety _ systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN B87-2-4430, Rev.-0 PORC REVIEVt PORC Heeting 2148, 04/17/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Table _9.2-3, Sheet _1, to provide the correct service vater flovs through the steam generator blovdown heat exchanger-during various modes of operation.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained'in the FSAR.- -These corrections i do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN B87-2-4453, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2148, 04/17/90 l i

DESCRIPTION: Revised-FSAR Table 6.2-38, Sheet-3, and Figure  !

5.1-2B to show that the penetration that was previously listed as penetration number;64 is-actually two penetrations.- The table nov lists-penetration 64A (nitrogen-supply to the pressurizer relief tank) and 64'8-(pressurizer-dead-veight pressure-tester).

SAFETY EVALUATION: 'This design-change results'in corrections to drawings contained in the;FSAR. .These! corrections do not~ result:in functiona,' modifications to plent-

-safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN B87-2-4493,- Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 -i DESCRIPTION: Revised'FSAR Figure 5.1-3,-Sheet 2,;to show the.

correct TPNS number for an isolation valve on the RTD manifold. Valve OV044A vas!incorrectlyLshown as OV044B, a designation-inconsistent with the other valves shown'in the typical RTD loop.

illustrated.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to-drawings contained in-the FSAR. ?These' corrections do not result in' functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN B87-2-4577, Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90.

DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-205002, Sheet 2 for the CCV system to' add sample / drain valves on each side of flow indicator FI-3036. This was necessary in order for the drawing to depict the actual plant conditions.- FSAR Figure 9.2-6, Sheet-1~ was ,

revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR.- These corrections do not result in functional modifications to' plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN B88-0-5377, Rev. O., 1,.2 & 5 PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting-2127, 02/13/90.

PORC Heeting 2185, 07/31/90 -

DESCRIPTION: Replaced the existing eyevash' stations in the-Auxiliary Building with combination eyevash/ safety shower stations. Identification of eyevash .

stations and eyevash/ shover stations-vere deleted from the'following FSAR' Figures: 12.1-13, 12.1-23, 12.1-24, 12.1-25, 12.1-28 and 12.1-29..'P& ids-

-D-175047 and D-205047 vere revised to: provide TPNS numbers to the emergency eyevash/ shover stations and updated to show the actual configuration of the piping leading to.the~ stations.. FSAR Figures 9.2-7, Sheet 1, Land 9.2-7,-Sheet 2, were revised to reflect'these changes. .

Also,7P&ID D-175047.and:

FSAR Figure 9.2-7, Sheet 1, vere revised to reflect current: piping materials, sizes'and arrangements.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change 1results in corrections to drawings contained in the.FSAR.=- These: corrections do not result in functional: modifications'to plant '

. safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN B88-0-5476 (SG), Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2159, 05/11/90 DESCRIPTION: Provided design to modify the cardkey reader system and other miscellaneous equipment to work properly with the PAP modification. The combustible loading and fire severity tables were affected due to changes in room sizes and the addition of combustible material in the form of cable insulation.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The cable insulation added is considered in NFPA 803 to have a lov or slow rate of combustion. The automatic suppression system is designed in accordance with applicable codes and is sized to accommodate more severe fire types than those postulated here.

SUBJECT:

PCN B88-0-5479, Rev. O PORC REVIEV1 PORC Heeting 2159, 05/11/90 DESCRIPTION: Incorporated charging flow control valves 01E21V347 and 02E21V347 (FCV 122) into the Appendix R Safe Shutdown-Program. Also, the FAHA in the FSAR vere revised for fire areas 2-1 and 2-5.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change adds components to the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Program. The effectiveness of the Fire Prote.. ion Program is not decreased.

SUBJECT:

PCN B88-0-5480, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2159, 05/11/90 DESCRIPTION: Incorporated service water dilution valves 01P16V549-A and 02P16V549-A and their associated circuits and equipment into the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Program. Also, FAHA vere added to the FSAR for fire areas 1-SVB3 and 2-SVB4.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change adds components to the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Program. The effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program is not decreased.

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SUBJECT:

- PCN B88-2-4832, Rev. 4 PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2186, 08/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Provided design for-a double leaf door.(door #2487) in the Drum Storage RoomLin lieu of a single leaf door. A fence barrier with a single leaf-door had been installed previously to prevent unauthorized-entry to an exclusion area._ The door was intended to facilitate crane operation and material handling.= However,_the single leaf door in-the drum storage room did not allow adequate-clearance for crane-operations. The-FSAR vas revised accordingly, i

SAFETY EVALUATION: The modification incorporated by this revision vill prevent unauthorized or inadvertent entry into an exclusion area and-vill have no adverse-impact on plant safety or the safe shut-down capability of

- the plant.

SUBJECT:

PCN-B88-2-4832, Revs. O, 1 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 1973, 03/02/89 DESCRIPTION: - Extended the installed chain link fence across the

' Unit 2 Drum Storage Roomfto a height _of1--thirteen feet, which includes'3

strands of cantilevered-

' barbed wire.- Installed'a vertical barrier'at the southeast corner of the exclusion area. -The-vertical barrier runs up the valls to the underside

' of the slab to prevent-someone-from scaling the fence and using structures above the: fence-to gain -

access. Added combustible loads,.in the form of cable insulation, to fire area 12-92. Changed lthe 4

original = door opening from 3'?3!1/2" to 7' 5" to -

allow full trave 1~of the trolley for; handling of

materials within1the. exclusion area ~.

SAFETY EVALUATION ' ' The enhancement of the existing barrier and_the

- installation of additional' barriers to prevent unauthorized or. inadvertent entry into.the

- exclusion. area has noLadverse' impact on the safe-

shutdown of the plant. The' additional combustible loads have not changed,the maximum-fire severity _

~

for fire area'2-92.

T 28

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SUBJECT:

PCN B88-2-4967, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2148, 04/17/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the appropriate dravings to show the as-built arrangement foc sampling the recycle evaporator. Drawings D-205039, Sheets 4 & 5, and FSAR Figure 9.3-8, Sheet 2, have been revised to depict the as-built configuration.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR.- These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN B88-2-4972, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2151, 04/20/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the appropriate drawings to depict the re.m oval of a temporary vall in the Unit 2 vest cable chase. Temporary block walls vere added to the plant for separation of Units 1 & 2 during construction and were removed when Unit 2 construction vas completed. Several FSAR figures were revised to show this change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections _to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications-to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN B88-2-5425, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2161, 05/15/90-DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-205033, Sheet 2, to show the instrument air valves, valve numbers and test connections for the pneumatic controls of valves HV-3235A & HV-3235B, the steam admission valves for the TDAFVP. This information was added for completeness. FSAR Figure 10.3-1 was revised to incorporate this change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. .These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant 4

safety systems.

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SUBJECT ' PCN B88-2-5472,-Rev. O FORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2159, 05/11/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised dravings D-205011, Sheet 3, D-205063 and D-205070, Sheet 2,-to correct several-errors ~

dealing with the RHR pump room coolers. The drawing errors involved the two coolers _being .

labeled backwards and an incorrect cooler TPNS number was referenced.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained _in the FSAR. These corrections i do not result in functional modifications to plantL i safety systems. .

SUBJECT:

PCN B88-2-5509, Rev. O.

PORC REVIEV - PORC Heeti g 2170, 06/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised iiavings D-205038, Sheet 2, and D-356355, Sheet 2, for the safety injection _ system to show the co:: rect location of the tie-in-of 10" line ECB-20. This line connects the low pressure safety -

' injection header and ' the' RVST. The tie-in is upstream of= relief valve 02E11V040 and vent' valves.

02E11V057A & 02E11V057B-rather than downstream.

This was necessary to reflect the as-built condition of the plant. FSAR Figure;6.3-2,fSheet-2, was revised accordingly..

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design. change-_results in corrections to-drawings contained-in'the FSAR. .These corrections

~do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

'30 c

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SUBJECT:

PCN B88-2-5537, Rev. O PORC REVIEV . PORC Hetting. 2041, 08/01/89-DESCRIPTION: Blocked'the opening into the Primary Spent Resin.

Storage Tank Valve Compartment. Room, Room #2220.

The existing half-height door.vas' replaced with a

- vire mesh door. This room is an exclusion area due-to radiological conditions.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This modification provides positive control of access to this exclusion area. The installation of the lockable door has no= impact on the safe shut-down capability of the plant.

4

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-0-5652 (SG), Rev. 0:

PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2046, 08/10/89-DESCRIPTION: Changed the power supply of the existing high mast lights'to a diesel backed-distribution panel..

SAFETY EVALUATION: The additional load to the motor control center was reviewed--from voltage drop and short circuit considerations and fourj acceptable. The additional-loading on.the diesel generator during-all design basis events was-also-reviewed.and found acceptable.- >

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-0-5652-(SG), Rev. 8-PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2097, 11/28/89 DESCRIPTION: Reduced the vent area:that existed from the HSVR.

- penthouse to atmosphere. A portion of the south vall was blocked-by installation of' conduits, conduit supports and associated lighting. The:

total amount of vent area blockage _is less than "

three' square feet.-

SAFETY EVALUATION: The safety-evaluation concluded that the= vent' area

• blockage has negligible effect on MSVR post -omain.

steam line break accident: analyses, vill not affect -

-the seismic qualification of the vall, and vill'not adversely affect any safetyLrelated components.

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SUBJECTi P d B89-2-5615, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2155, 05/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised steam generator blovdown processing system P&ID D-205071, Sheet 3, to include the equalizing valve for level transmitter LT-ll65. This valve had not been shown on the drawing. The alignment of several valves was also cortected. Several normally closed valves had been shovn as open and several normally open valves had been shovn closed.

FSAR Figure 10.4-6, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings cortained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN BC9-2-5616. Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Meeting 2155, 05/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-205038, Sheet 2, for the safety injection system to show the correct location of a 3/4 inch test connection and drain line. The subject 3/4 inch line has isolation valves 02E21V420A & 02E21V420B and is attached to the accumulator nitrogen supply line. The as-built location is inside of containment, upstream of check valve 02E21V058, rather than outside of containment as had been shovn. FSAR Figure 6.3-2, Sheet 2, vas revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in currections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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- . . - _ ~ . . . - _ . _ _ _ . _ - - - . . . _ - - - - .- - _-. . _ - _ _ . -.

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-2-$706, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2169, 06/07/90 DESCRIPTION: Modified the RHR pump miniflow control valve svitches setpoints to account for the post-seismic setpoint shifts of up to a 10% determined during the Barton flov svit;h qualification test. .

SAFETY EVALUATION: The revised satpoints ensure that the miniflov valves open when the actual flov falls belov $00 gpm and that the valves close before the range of the flov svitch is exceeded. The revised setpoints have no impact on the RHR system er;pability to perform its safety functions. These functions include controlled reduction in temperature of the reactor coolant during the second part of normal plant cooldovn and lov head safety injection and recirculation during a loss of coolant accident.

=_

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-2-5725, R9v. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2155, 05/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised draving D-205039, Sheet 2, for the CVCS to show the two drain valves. 02E21V906 and 02E21V907, which are installed approximately 8 inches downstream of valve HCV-142. These valves had not been shown on the drawing previously. FSAR Figure 9.3-6, 94eet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This fesign change results in corrections to dravings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

33

. - . . _- ._-_-__=_ _- . -- _ _ . . _ _ . .

1

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-2-5811, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2155, 05/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205039, Sheet 2, and D-356356 for the CVCS to depict the correct location of vent valve 02E21V433. The valve is located on 8" line HCB-17 downstream of 8" line HCB-15. FSAR Figure 9.3-6. Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION- This design change results in corrections to dravings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-2-5812, Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2161, 05/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205041 and D-356358 to depict the as-built valve arrangement of vent valves 02F'.1V072 A&B and drain valves 02E11V074 A&B on the RHR piping in containment. FSAR rigure 5.5-6, Sheet 2, was revised. The two sets of valves had bet shown at the same location. The revinion shova that the vent valves are actually upstream of the drain valves.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECTt - PCN B89-2-5813. Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2161, 05/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised dravings D-204038, Sheet 1, and D-356355 to depict the actual arrangement of through vent and drain connections in the safety injection system.

Also, the location of the containment missile barrier with respect to several components was corrected.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

34 1

e *-+=e-- r v - , , . . ,,g, , w,-- ,.,,y-c,. w.- , - , - _ , , n , ., ~ v-.- ,- - -

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-2-5845, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2156, 05/03/90 DESCRIPTION: Dovngraded the containment sump pumps from ASME i code safety class 3 to safety class NNS. The pumps can be dovngraded because the failure of the sump pumps vould not result in releasing gaseous radioactivity to the environment. Also P&ID D-205004, Sheets 1 & 2, which shov the containment sump pumps, vere added to the FSAR as figures in j Section 9.3. D-20$004, Sheet 1, and FSAR Table

! 9.3-4 vere revised to shov the dovngraded containtcent sutrp pump status.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to

! drawings contained in the FSAR.. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems, a

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-2-6124, Rev.-0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2175, 07/03/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised dravings A-203582, Rev. 8, D-203267, Rev.

14 and D-203281, Rev. 14, to delete raceway AID 258 from the Safe Shutdown (SSD) Report and other SSD

racevay drawings. FSAR page 9B.B-200 vas revised to incorporate the change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Although conduit AID 250 was included in exemption request 2-B for fire area 2-005, a subsequent review of the cables in the racevay indicates that these cables are not required for safe shutdown of i

the plant. This PCN does not decrease the i

effectiveness of the Fire Protection Program and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Therefore, conduit AID 258 may be deleted from the Appendix R safe shutdown list of raceway.

l l

l 35

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-2-6297, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2155, 05/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised several CCV system drawings to shov the piping dovnstream of 02P17V014B, CCV to the 2B spent fuel pool heat exchanger inlet drain isolation va? /e, as cut and capped rather than routed to the floor drain tank. This vork vas performed under Hinor Departure 89-2162 to allow the chromated vater to be drained into drums in order to feel 11 tate its management. FSAR Figure 9.2-6, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT:

PCN B89-2-6308, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2172, 06/21/90 DESCRIPTION: Corrected drawing D-205047 by deleting one of the demineralized water drain valves, N2P11V896, which was erroneously shown tvice. This valve is on the condenser seal vater supply. FSAR Figure 9.2-7 Sheet 2, was revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

l t

36

- _ . , , - - , . . . - . ,, , , . . . , .,--g._ ,, , , , - , .v-.,-...

SUBJECT:

PCN B90-2-6386, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2195, 08/23/90 DESCRIPTION: Deleted eight main control board annunciators and their associated circuitry. This was done as part of the control room design review. These annunciators included items associated with the boron injection tank and the associated heat tracing, the spray additive tank, the boric acid tanks, the boric acid batching tank, and the BTRS demineralizer.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These annunciators do not provide input to the plant protection system. They are not used in emergency operating procedures. Removal of these annunciators does not increase the probability of failure of any other plant equipment. These eight annunciators are not required for normal operation or during accident situations. The boron injection tr ak no longer contains concentrated boric acid, so the associated annunciators are no longer needed.

SUBJECT:

PCN B90-2-6527, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2189, 08/07/90 DESCRIPTION: Changed the alarm setpoints for high and low pressure and level indicators in the accumulators.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Changing the alarm setroints to a more conservative value vill alert the operator that parameters are approaching TS limits. Currently, no alarm occurs until the TS limit is reached. Thus, corrective action can be initiated at a more conservative point, in most cases prior to entry into a TS Limiting Condition for Operation. The setpoint changes initiated by this PCN are used for annunciation only, and-do not af fect p? ant safety.

l l

37

..m- - - - -r . ,--. .- _ _ , . ., . , , , . . - - _

SUBJECT:

PCN P90-2-6585, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2165, 05/29/90 DESCRIPTION: Conducted combustible loading analysis on the TSC (Rooms 2453, 2454, 2455 and 2456). This loading analysis included current combustible loading and the proposed installation of carpeting and vall covering, including vall adhesives.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Installation of carpeting and vall covering in the TSC does not significantly alter the area's combustible loading or adversely impact any safe shut-down capabilities. Additionally, the resultant increase in combustible loading vill not adversely impact any FNP structure or system.

SUBJECT:

PCN P90-2-6976, Rev. O PORC REVIEV1 PORC Heeting 2246, 12/12/90 DESCRIPTION: Added test connections adjacent to the turbine steam chest to allov data acquisition by plant

, nersonnel. New piping test connections were added to existing instrument roots on the steam chest, existing sample roots on the turbine inlet piping and stud velded test connections on the steam chest inlet piping.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The new piping test connections meet the requirements of SS-1109-2 and approved configurations in FNP-0-PHP-302. The stud velded connections are surface mounted and do not penetrate the pipe vall. Plant safety vill not be adversely affected.

i l

38 l

. _ _ - - . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . - _ . ~ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ . . _ . . -

4 4

$UBJECT: PCN S86-0-3667, Rev. 1 PORC REVIEV: PORC Meeting 2147, 04/13/90

! DESCRIPTION: Updated FSAR Section 9.5.2.to reflect the communications equipment available to complete a safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire.

This change was based on the Fire Protection Communications By Fire Area Reports (A-180583 and A-203583) which contain the results of a study to determine the communications equipment (public .

• address, telephone, and sound povered systems) that could be inoperable due-to a fire in any given area of the Auxiliary Building,-the Diesel Building,_the '

SVIS and the RVIS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These changes are editorial in nature and serve only to clarify the FSAR sections. These changes do not result in a physical change to the-plant or functional modifications to plant safety systems.-

SUBJECT:

PCN S87-0-4393, Revs. 0 1, 2 PORC REVIEV PORC Meeting 2103, 12/12/89 PORC Meeting 2130, 02/27/90 DESCRIPTION: Deleted.the existing high point vent path from'the fuel oil system for D/G l-2A and added a new vent path from the fuel oil-filter to a vent line-utilized by the D/G day tank. Check valve QSR43V769 in the old-vent path van deleted since it vas-no longer needed. -A pipe guard was installed to prevent fuel oil'from spilling into the Diesel Building hallvay should a line. failure occur. The pipe class for this pipe guard was downgraded from class HBC to HBD-per revision 2 of this PCN.

SAFETY EVALUATION: .This change vill have no adverse effect on the seismic qualification or safety related function of the D/G, either in itslemergency standby mode or its operational mode. The vent-line. vill be seismically supported and the pipe guard vill be seismically qualified.

b 39 4

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. ~ . _ . , _ _ _ - . . _ _ . . . _..._.,__2_. ., w_._._;.___.a_._,,_,,_, , _ , , , . _ , , _ ,

. - - . -. - - - _ . . - . _ - = _ - . . _ . _ - .~ ._.-

l-E 'BJECT : PCN S87-0-4494, Rev. 0 l

PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised several nitrogen, oxygen and hydrogen system P6 ids to agree with the piping drawings.

Revisions vere necessary because some valves vere not properly shown as being in a valve box and others were not shown on the P61Ds at all. FSAR Figure 11.3-3, Sheets 1 and 2, were revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to dravings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S87-0-4556 Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2148, 04/17/90  ;

DESCRIPTION: Documented new setpoints for the air compressors ,

associated with the 2C D/G. Hinor Departure i 87-1729 provided new setpoints to prevent overlap between the start /stop setpoints for the air compressors and the setpoint for the normal air receiver pressure status light. FSAR Figure 9.5-20 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updetes FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S87-0-4567, Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting_2148, 04/17/90 ,

t DESCRIPTION: Documented changing the "A" train river water 1 system flow transmitter, NSP25FT504, from an L6N Century Model 470 to a Rosemount 1151DP per Minor ,

Departure 87-1751. This requires a revision of FSAR Figure 9.2-1, Sheet 2, because the instrument i number has been changed. l 1

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds the requirements of the part being replaced.

40

SUBJECT:

PCN S87-2-4394, Revs. O, 1, 2 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2103, 12/12/89 PORC Heeting 2130, 02/27/90 DESCRIPTION: Deleted the existing high point vent path from the fuel oil system for diesel generator 2B and added a nev vent path from the fuel oil filter to a vent line utilized by the diesel generator day tank.

Check valve 02R43V582 in the old vent path was deleted since it was no longer needed. A pipe guard was installed to prevent fuel oil from spilling into the Diesel Building hallway should a line failure occur. The pipe class for this pipe guard van downgraded from class HBC to HBD per '

revision 2 of this PCN.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This change vill have no adverse effect on the seismic qualification or safety related function of j the diesel generator, either in its emergency standby mode or its operational mode. The vont line vill be seismically supported and the pipe guard vill be seismically qualified.

SUBJECT:

PCN S87-2-4531, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2148, 04/17/90 DESCRIPTION: Changed setpoints for the air compressors associated with D/G 2B per Minor Departure 87-1731 to prevent overlap between air compressor start /stop pressures and the pressure range at which the normal air receiver presrure status light operates. FSAR Figure 9.5-19 vas revised to reflect these changes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR dravings, and does  ;

not involve an unreviewed safety question.  !

41

. i

SUBJECT:

PCN S87-2-4707, Rev. 0 l PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION Removed the mark number "In. 642-6" from main feed pump suction pressure switch N2N21PS627 on P&lD D-200011. The original pressure switch, which had the mark number, vas replaced due to maintenance problems. This modification of the mark number required a revision of FSAR Figure 10.4-3, Sheet 7.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems, i

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-0-4768, Revs. O and 1 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2148, 04/17/90 DESCRIPTIONI Revised domestic physical drawings (D-170331 D 1.70332 and D-170339) and the associated FSAR figures (Figures 9.4-10, Sheet 2, 9.4-9, Sheet 1, and 9.4-14) to shov the as-built configuration of IIVAC damper actuators in the Diesel Generator Building, RVIS and SVIS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifientions to plant safety systems.

l 42 l

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-0-4772. Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2148, 04/17/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the existing documentation for the sanitary water system to reflect as-built conditions. The documentation referenced drawings that did not exist. Also, the sanitary water storage tank drain valve vas incorrectly shovn open and the "C" sanitary vater pump vas duplicated on two separate P&ID's. Finally, the valving at the sanitary vater supply to the water treatment plant was incorrectly shown. FSAR Figure 9.2-0 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN $88-0-4779, Rev. 1 PORC REVIEV FORC Heeting 2169, 06/07/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Tables 6.2-31 (Containment Isolation Valve Information) and 6.2-38 (Containment Penetrations), various FSAR figures, and the applicable P& ids and drawings to reflect the cortect pe-atration numbers and ser,1ce information. There were no changes to valve arrangements, valve types, isolation signals, normal post-LOCA positions, valve positions with power failure, or valve closure times.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the PSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

l 43-

SUDJECT FCN S88-0-4920 Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Hecting 2150, 04/19/90 DESCRIPTION: Documented new setpoints for the air compressors associated with the 10 diesel generator. Hinot Departure 88-1812 provided new setpoints to prevent overlap between the air coanpressor start /stop pressure and the normal air receiver pressure status lights. FSAR Figure 9.5-20 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-0-4980, Revs. O and 3 PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2169, 06/07/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised plant documentation to shov that old model HFA relays have been replaced. 462 of 500 General Electric HFA51 auxiliary relays in use throughout the plant have been replaced with new " Century Series" HFA 100 relays. The old mode? HFA51 relays cracted under severe service conditions causing the coil insulation to melt and short to ground, preventing the relays from tripping properly. The associated FSAR figures vere revised to reflect the preceding changes.

SAFETY EVAL'JATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds the requirements of the part being replaced.

l i

I 44

SUBJECTr PCN $88-0-5038 Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Meeting 2156, 05/03/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-170110 and FSAR Figure 9.2-25 for the vell vater system to show an additional existing isolation valve in the discharge line of vell vater pump #2. This valve is on the underground portion of the piping and had not been shown previously. Also, the label on tank NSP27T501 vas changed to Filtered Vater Sterage Tank" for consistency with other references.

SAFETY EVALUATI0h This design cha.:ce results in corrections to drawings contained 4.' i'- F6AR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-0-5156, Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Redrev plant general arrangement draving D-17"004 to a quality such that legible prints can be made.

This drawing had deteriorated over the years and had become illegible. FSAR Figure 1.2-1 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These changes are editorial in nature and serve only to clarify the FSAR sections. These changes do not result in a physical change to the plant or functional modifications to plant rafety systems.

45

SUBJECT:

PCN $88-0-5331, Rev. O PORC REVIF.W PORC Heeting 2156, 05/03/90 DESCRIPTION: Approved Automatic Switch Company model SA11AR-TF10A44R for use to replace river Vater header pressure switches OSP25PS$12, PS513, PS$14 and PS515. Replacement parts are no longer available and the vendor who originally supplied the existing switches can no longer provide a seismically qualified switch. The replacement switches have seismic and performance specifications which meet or_ exceed those of the existing switches. FSAR Figure 9.2 1, Sheet 1, was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION This design change authorizes use of a replacement part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds the requirements of the part being replaced.

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-0-5350, Rev. O j PORC REVIEV PORC Heating 2151, 04/20/90 DESCRIPTION: Installed a 4" sample connection with threaded cap

on the manvay of the 20 D/G fuel oil storage tank, i OSY52T504. This connection provides a method to perform routine bottom sampling of the tank without removing the manvay.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The addition of a 4" threaded sample connection has been evaluated and meets the requirements of the applicable codes. Therefore, this modification

vill not invalidate the existing seismic qualification of the tank nor adversely affect its safety related function.

1 i

1 46

SUBJECT:

PCN $88-0-5352, Rev. O PORC REVIEVi PORC Heeting 2151, 04/20/90 DESCRIPTION: Installed a 4" sample connection with threaded cap on the manvay of the 1-2A and 1C D/G fuel oil storage tanks OSY52T501 and OSY52T503. This connection provides a method to perform routine bottom sampling of the tank without removing the manvay.

SAFETY EVALUATION: The addition of a 4" threaded sample connection has been evaluated and meets the requirements of the applicable codes. Therefore, this modification vill not invalidate the existing seismic qualification of the tanks nor adversely affeet their safety related function.

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-0-5559, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2163, 05/18/90 DESCRIPTION: Corrected computer room and control llVAC P&ID D-205012 to show actuator HV3622 installed on OSV47V002A and actuator ilV3623 installed on OSV47V002B. The drawing had actuators IIV3622 and IIV3623 swapped. QSV47V002A and OSV47V002B are the isolation dampers for the computer room IIVAC return fan. FSAR Figure 9.4-1, Sheet 2, was revised accordingly. 3 This design change results in corrections to [

SAFETY EVALUATION:

drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant-l safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-4884, Rev. 0 l PORC REVIEV PORC Hecting 2148, 04/17/90 ,

DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR= Figure 9B-44 to correct the [

description of room 2168 in the Auxiliary Building.

The figure had shown a laundry and hot shover tank

• pump in room 2168. However, this pump exists on Unit 1 only.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to  !

i i

drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections

' do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

~

l 47 l .

w - - - - - m.-. , - . - , - . , - - - - - , --..we.- , , . -n,~ w

- - _- - - -.-._. -- - - . _ - _ - - . .. - _ - - - . - - = . -

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-4922, Rev. O

,' PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2151, 04/17/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised dravings for the Auxiliary Building to identify room number 2324 as the " Primary Chemistry Lab". The associated FSAR figures were revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-4996, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings D-205019 and D-205161 to reflect the addition of a nev line number, HCB-102, in the post-accident containment venting system. Line number HCB-102 was created in order to describe actual service conditions downstream of throttling valva PCV-3532 and up to the filtration unit. FSAR Figure 6.2-104 vas revised to reflect this drawing change.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-5063, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Hecting 2151, 04/20/90 ,

DESCRIPTION: Revised the radiation zone maps and post-LOCA radiation zone maps to reflect current expected dose rates and radiation zone classifications.

FSAR Figures 12.1-12 through 12.1-20 and 12.1-27 3

through 12.1-31 vere revised to reflect the new dose rates and radiation zones.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

48

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-5238. Rev. O i PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2147, 04/13/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the Auxiliary Building fire barrier delineation dravings and fire zone data sheets to depict rooms 2404, 2403, 2420/2421, 2447, 2150, 2167, 2179, 2601, 2602 and 2603 as " Combustible Storage Rooms". The following FSAR figures were revised to depict the preceding changes: 9B-49, 9B-54, 9B-58, 9B-59, 9B-45, 9B-44, 90-60. FAHAs for fire areas 2-4 and Tables 9B.C 5 and 9B.C-6 vere also revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to dravings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN $88-2-5243. Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2151, 04/20/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Sectioa 9B.4.1.9 and several plant drawings to reflect that Auxiliary Building fire hose cabinets D-108 and D-119 have 100 foot fire hoses installed instead of the original 75 foot hoses. The replacement hoses vere installed per Minor Departure 88-1917 because of the requirement that all interior areas of the Auxiliary Building  ;

must be within reach of a hose stream from at least [

one permanently installed fire hose.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings,'and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

49 l

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-5333, Rev. 2 i PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2117. 01/19/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised P61D D-200019. Sheet 1, to depict the installation of Pacific model 6-180-U-VE(40) check valves as replacements for Valvorth model 5341 check valves. These 6 inch check valves are used in several non-safety related applications. The Valvorth valves are no longer available and vill be replaced as needed. FSAR Figure 9.3-1, Sheet 4, vas revised to reflect this change.

l SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change authorizes use of a replacement j part. The replacement part either meets or exceeds

the requirements of the part being replaced.

1

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-5344, Rev. O

}

PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2161, 05/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-205034, Sheet 4, to depict i

as-built conditions. The revised drawing shows an instrument air isolation valve for instrument air i

pressure indicator PI-2228 and an instrument air drain valve for the line that supplies backup air to the PORVs. Also, this PCN assigned TPNS numbers

to the valves. FSAR Figure 9.3-1, Sheet 8, was revised.to depict these changes.

i SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to

drawings contained in the PSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant t

safety systems.

i n

l l

l i

50 l

1

- 1

SUBJECT:

PCN $88-2-5351, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2151, 04/20/90 DESCRIPTION: Installed a 4" sample connection with threaded cap on the manvay of the 2B D/G fuel oil storage tank, i 02Y52T503. This connection provides a method to i perform rcutine bottom sampling of the tank without removing the manvay.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Addition of the 4" threaded sample connection has been evaluated and meets the requirements of the applicable codes. Therefore, this modification vill not invalidate the existing seismic qualification of the tank nor adversely affect its safety related function.

i l

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-5387, hav. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2155, 05/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-205012, !!VAC in the control room and computer room, to depict the input from radiation monitors RE-35A and RE-35B to the TSC HVAC system.

This PCN revised FSAP Figure 9.4-1. Sheet 2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant 3 safety systems, i

i

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-5474, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2161, 05/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Created P&ID D-205042, Sheet 6, for the hydrogen recombiner skid package and assigned TPNS numbers to the skid valves.- FSAR Figure 11.3-3 was revised to reflect this change. Aleo, existing-documentation vill be revised to reflect the as-built location of PI-1107A.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

51

c

SUBJECT:

PCN S88-2-5557, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2169. 06/07/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the appropriate drawings to shov a small rion-designated room above the No. 2 stairvell and to clarify the voll rating of the vest vall of room 2192 (auxiliary feedvater pump room). The room has been designated Room No. 2431 and has been incorporated into Fire Area 2-4. FSAR Appendix 9B, Figure 9B-60, vas revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to dravings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems. Also, this design change reflects analyses required to demonstrate compliance'vith Appendix R. The effectivent of the Fire Protection Program is not decreased.

SUBJECT:

ICN S89-0-5620. Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2170, 06/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised seventeen FSAR Fire Zone Data Sheets and their associated plant drawings to reflect as-built 4 conditions and to enhance their usability by operations and fire brigade personnel. The drawings contained errors in room and door identification, lacked some as-built architectural detallo and needed some clarifying notes on various room configurations. Additionally, two architectural drawings, D-176060 and D-206060, vere revised to provide fire area designation to a duct chase.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN $89-0-$814. Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2161, 05/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Figure 9B-29 (D-508500), Fire Zone Data Sheet for the Service Vater Intake Structure, to identify clearly the train A and B disconnect switches and to shov all of the existing bottle racks for the high pressure carbon dioxide systems which provide fire protection to various '

svitchgear.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional moditications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S89-0-5916, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2163, 05/18/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the vell vater system P&ID D-170110 to show a sample valve and pressure svitch needle valve ,

installed on the discharge of each vell vater pump as indicated on the instrument detail sheets A-170254, Sheets 60, 92 and 93. FSAR Figure 9.2-25 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant j safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN S89-0-6029, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2169, 06/07/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the fire protection annunciator list, drawing D-170353 and FSAR Figure 9B-37, to reflect as-built conditions. Previously, the list had indicated that high pressure C07 system 1-SV-99 provided coverage to "500 V" svItchgear Bus 1-2K and 5KV disconnect svitches "No. 1 & No. 2". In fact, coverage is to "600 V" svitchgear Bus 1-2K and 5KV disconnect svitches "1A" and "1B".

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to 3 ravings contained in the FSAR. These corrections cS not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN 589-0-6065, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2151, 04/20/90 DESCRIPTION: Updated D-173490, 0-173491, and FSAR Section 9.".9.3 to show the installation of a 10 second Ar.atat time delay relay for the #1 vell vater pump. Hinor Departure 89-2095 made this change to prevent the pump from tripping due to periodic system pressure spikes.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR drawings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

SUBJECT:

PCN S89-0-6273, Rev. O PORC REVIEV: PORC Heeting 2172, 06/21/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised drawings and FSAR Figures 9B-40 and 9B-42 to show clearly that a portion of the south vall of the Unit 1 Turbine Building is shared with the Service Building and that this common vall'has a three hour fire rating.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections-to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN S89-2-5608, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Meeting 2145, 04/10/90 DESCRIPTION: Powered the main generator hydrogen instrumentation from a different 600V bus to prevent nuisance alarms caused by voltage transients. This_vas achieved by svapping the normal and standby feeds to 208V switchgear 2A, which feeds the instrumentation. Following the change, the normal feed to this switchgear is from 600V load center 2P and the standby feed is from 600V load center 2G.

FSAR Section 8.3.1 and FSAR Figures 8.3-49 and 8.3-50 were revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This configuration vill provide more reliable power to 208V switchgear 2A loads and vill also align the 208V 2A switchgear in a manner similar to Unit 1 208V 1A switchgear. Both 600V buses 2P and 2G are non-safety related and are isolated from safety related buses so that equipment failures vill not affect safety related equipment. The 208V svitchgear 2A load vill be added to 600V bus 2P and 4KV bus 20 which are non-safety related. Since load center 20 is fed from a safety-related bus, this vill result in a decrease in load on the safety related buses.

SUBJECT:

PCN S89-2-5633, Rev. 1 PORC REVIEV PORC Meeting 2170, 06/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised FSAR Figure 9B-59 (drawing D-508946) and the FAHA for fire area 2-4 to reflect the correct room numbers assigned to the demineralizer compartments. The numbers vere inconsistent with the architectural floor plan drawings which are the controlling documents. The rn ision vill result in uniformity between Auxiliary Building drawings.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to dravings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN S89-2-5634, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2155, 05/01/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-200189, Unit 2 fire suppression and detection annunciator list, to depict FPS 2A-101 as an automatic preaction sprinkler system as well as a fire hose station. This brings the documents associated with FPS 2A-101 in agreement with each other. FSAR Figures 9B-38 and 9B-45 vere revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S89-2-5697, Rev. 0 l PORC REVIEV1 PORC Heeting 2170, 06/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the instruction manual for the motor driven AFV pumps (U-214855) to replace a superseded vendor drawing. Also, FSAR Table 6.5-1 was revised to correct the material shovn for the motor driven AFV pump impeller and shalt.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifica; ions to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S89-2-5802, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Hecting 2155, 05/01/90 PESCRIPTION: Revised drawing D-508945 Fire Zone Data Sheets, to depict the existence of door 2463 between rooms i 2445 and 2450 in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building.

This configuration is consistent with the architectural and Auxiliary Building door schedule l

drawings. FSAR Figure 9B-58 vas revised.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN $89-2-5818, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2161, 05/15/90 DFSCRIPTION: Revised draving D-508955 to depict the coverage area of fire protection sprinkler system 2T-121 and the location of the control station for 2T-121.

Sprinkler system 2T-121 provides fire suppression coverage for the Unit 2 Turbine Building system operator vork station.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These correct .

' do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT:

PCN S89-2-5855, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2161, 05/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised the appropriate FSAR figures and FAHA 2-6 to show that the phosphate tank and pump area is assigned room number 2199. Also, the HCC 2C room nteber was corrected to be 2448 rather than 2447 as previously shovn.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to dravings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN S89-2-5963, Rev. O  ;

PORC REVIEW PORC Heeting 2170, 06/15/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised P&ID D-205000, Sheet 2, and FSAR Figure 10.3-5, which show the chemical injection system, to incorporate the changes made by Hinor Departure 89-2078. A drain valve was added to each of the five chemical injection strainers and five additional drain valves were noted as normally closed.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change updates FSAR dravings, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

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SUBJECT:

PCN S89-2-6080, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2172, 06/21/90 DESCRIPTION: Corrected several discrepancies and omissions on the hydrogen recombiner P& ids, D-205042, Sheets 9 &

10. PSAR Figures 11.3-2, Sheet 2, and 11.3-3.

Sheet 2 vere revised accordingly. Some connections, labels and other information vere inadvertently missed-or not shown properly when these P& ids were developed from the vendor's dravings.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in correctior.s to drawings contained in the ISAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

SUBJECT PCN S89-2-6201, Rev. 1 PORC REVIEV PORC Hecting 2130, 02/27/90 DESCRIPTION: Relocated the three existing swake detect,ts and installed two new smoke detectors for FPS 2A-39 in room 2346, motor-generator set room, in order to meet the requirements of NFPA 72E.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Implementation of these modifications vill bring the systen, into compliance with applicable codes, regulatory requirements and licensing commitments.

SUBJECT PCN S90-0-6447, Rev. O PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2175, 07/03/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised.the diesel generator compressed air start system documentation to delineate the break between safety-related and non safety-related piping and components. FSAR Figures 9.5-19 and 9.5-20 vere revised accordingly. Also, FSAR Section 9.5.6 vas revised to clarify the air start system design basis.

SAFETY EVALUATION: These changes are editorial in nature and serve only to clarify the FSAR sections. These changes do not rasult in a physical change to the plant or functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

PCN S90-0-6654, Rev. 0 PORC REVIEV PORC Heeting 2194, 08/21/90 DESCRIPTION: Revised dravings A-170750, B-175968 and D-170110 to clarify the lov level alarm setpoints for the fire protection water storage tanks. Additionally, draving B-170249, Sheet 670, was revised to show the start-stop setpoints for the primary vell vater pump which supplies the fits protection water tanks. FSAR Figure 9.2-25 was revised accordingly.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This design change results in corrections to drawings contained in the FSAR. These corrections do not result in functional modifications to plant safety systems.

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SUBJECT:

GO-NG-9, " Administrative Control of Plant Services Approved Suppliers List," Revision 7 NORS REVIEV NORB Heeting 90-1, 03/09/90 DESCRIPTION: Revision 7 presents the changes involved during the formation of Si4C. This includes an SNC Procurement

! Department totally dedicated to supporting purchasing for Southern company's nuclear units, and the establishment of the Corporate Quality Services section for quality evaluations of suppliers for the system's nuclear units.

, SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision provides chanFes in orgtanizational  ;

ret' asibilities as discuss,sd above. There are no

, el .; in the perfr.rmance of quality-related

, pu. -asing or evaientions of suppliers for the system's nuclea: unt 's.

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SUBJECT:

GO-NG-12. " Procurement and Procurement Document Control," Revision 11 i NORB REVIEV NORB Heeting 90-1, 03/09/90 DESCRIPTION: Revision 11 presents the changes involved during the formation of SNO. This includes an SNC .j Procurement Depattment totally dedicated to supporting ourchasing for So'Jthern Company's-nuclear v its, and the establishment of the Corporate Quality Services section for quality- J evaluations of' suppliers for the system's nuclear unit:

SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision provbias changes in organitational responsAbilities as discussed above. - There are no changes in the : performance of quality-ralated purchasing or ev. u tions of suppliers for the system's nuclear u 'i.

SUBJECT:

G0-NG-33, " Operational Procurement Interface for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant," Revision 8 HORB REVIEV: NORB Meeting 90-3, 09/19/90 DESCRIPTION: -This procedure provided-guidance for operational procurement interfaces with.FNP. -Revision 8 deleted G0-NG-33 because the-basletresponsibilities  ;

for the Procurement Department-which-had been covered by-this procedure are now addressed by the SNC Procurement Department GA Program.

. Responsibilities of other-organizations involved in operational-procurement for FNPiare-described in--

administrative procedures listed :on the- Operations -

Quality Assurance Policy Implementation: List-(00APIL).

SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision deletes G0-NG-33 because-its activities are addressed.by otherl approved procedures and/or manuals.-

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SUBJECT - " Operations Quality Assurance Policy: Implementation List," Revision 17 _

NORB REVIEV NORB Hecting 90-2, 06/22/90 DESCRIPTION: Revision 17 provides theLehanges in the corporate organization and transfer of responsibilities resulting from the formation of-SNC. The changes include a transfer'of responsibilities-for certain i aspects of the Quality Assurance Program. Sinco

~SNC Corporate Quality Services is committed to maintain a program for review and audit of vendor  !

quality assurance programs'in compliance with the ,

requirements of:10 CFR 50, Appendix B,- this does l l not reduce the scope of audit coverage _ described in-the FSAR. Also, the responsibility for performing'. ,

specification reviews has:been~ transferred from-  !

Nuclear Administration to Nuclear Engineering._- _;

This transfer.of responsibility does not change the quality assurance program commitments-for'- r specification reviews described.in the FSAR.

• SAFETY EVALUATION: Thisrevisiontransfers'theresponsibility[for-reviewing the auditing ofLquality assurance programs of suppliers'of material and.servicest for.

FNP from APC's Manager of: Safety Audit and

[

Engineering-Revievito SNC-Corporate _ Quality Services, and transfers specification: reviews from Nuclear Administration to-Nuclear: Engineering.-

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SUBJECT:

" Safety Audit and Engineering Review Administrative Procedures Manual," Revision 18 NORB REVIEV: NORB Meeting 90-2, 06/22/90 DESCRIPTION: Revision 18'provides the changes in the corporate organization and transfer of responsibilities resulting from the formation of SNC.- The changes 4 include a transfer of responsibilities for certain .

aspects of the Quality Assurance Program. Since  !

SNC Corporate Quality Services is committed to maintain a-program for review and audit of vendor quality assurance programs in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, this does not reduce the scope of audit coverage described in the FSAR.- Also, the'responsibillty for processing FNP purchase orders has been-transferred from APC's

-Purchasing Department to'the SNC Procurement Department. This transfer of responsibility does not change the quality assurance program commitments for procurement document control as described in the FSAR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This revision transfers the responsibility for reviewing the auditing of quality assurance programs of suppliers of material:and services for k FNP from APC's Manager-of Safety Audit and Engineering Review to SNC Corporate Quality Services, and transfers the-responsibilit.y for processing FNP purchase orders from the APC Purchasing Department to'the SNC Procurement-Department.

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