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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20155C6391998-10-26026 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Tables 4.1-1 & 4.1-2,revised Surveillance Frequency of Refueling Outage to 18 Months ML20154C1021998-09-30030 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Changing UFSAR by Increasing Max Rod Internal Pressure in Spent Fuel Pool from 1,200 to 1,300 Psig ML20236V9611998-07-27027 July 1998 Corrected TS Bases Pages 3.5-30b of 961211 & 3.16-2 of 970205,correcting Amend Numbers ML20236T5171998-07-20020 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re one-time Extension to Functional Test Frequencies for Hydraulic & Mechanical Snubbers ML20236R1901998-07-16016 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Extending TS Surveillances TS 4.20.2(a), Table 4.20-1,items 1,2 & 4,TS 4.1-1,Table 4.1-1,items 8,9,10 & 11 & TS 4.5.1.2.1,item b(1) ML16141A8111994-04-20020 April 1994 Proposed Tech Spec Table 4.1-2, Min Equipment Test Frequency. ML20044C9581993-05-0404 May 1993 Proposed TS 4.7.1, Control Rod Trip Time Test. ML18032A3441987-05-29029 May 1987 Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying Trip Level Setting in Table 3.2.A for Standby Gas Treatment Sys Relative Humidity Heater ML16134A6761982-08-11011 August 1982 Proposed Tech Spec Revisions Re Reload Design Calculations for Cycle 7 ML16134A6731982-05-0303 May 1982 Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Core Protection Safety Limits, Protective Sys Max Allowable Setpoints & Rod Position Limits ML15223A7671982-01-12012 January 1982 Proposed Revisions to Tech Spec Section 3.1.2 Re Heatup Cooldown & Inservice Test Limitations for RCS ML16148A4421981-11-13013 November 1981 Proposed Tech Spec Revision Re Core Protection Safety Limits Protective Sys Max Allowable Setpoints & Rod Position Limits ML16148A4351981-10-28028 October 1981 Proposed Revision to Tech Spec Figure 3.5.2-4B2,allowing Cycle 5 to Run at 100% Full Power W/Axial Power Shaping Rods Fully Inserted ML16148A4281981-08-19019 August 1981 Proposed Revision to Tech Spec Figures 3.5-16a,3.5.19a, 3.5-22 & 3.5-25a Re Extension of Operating Limits ML15223A7321981-05-29029 May 1981 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1-2,2.1-3,2.1-7,2.3-5,3.2-1,3.2-2, 3.3-1,3.3-2,3.3-3,3.3-4,3.3-5,3.3-6,3.5-9,3.5-10,3.5-15, 3.5-15a & b,3.5-18,3.5-18a,b,c,d & e,3.5-21,3.5-21a & B, 3.5-24,3.5-24a & b,3.8-2 & 3.8-3 Re Core Protection ML16134A6651980-08-25025 August 1980 Proposed Tech Specs Revision for Cycle 6 ML16148A3351980-07-16016 July 1980 Proposed Revision to Tech Spec 3.3.1.c Allowing Continued Operation of Unit 2 of Full Rated Power While Maint Continues on HPI Pump Until 800718 ML19318B9731980-06-24024 June 1980 Proposed Tech Spec Interpreting Term Operable as Applied to Various Tech Spec Requirements ML16148A2691979-11-16016 November 1979 Proposed Changes to Tech Spec Pages 2.1,2.3,3.2 & 3.5. Changes Affect Core Protection Limits,Reactor Protective Sys Max Allowable Setpoints & Vol Requirements for Borated Water Storage Tank ML19317D2701978-09-25025 September 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 3.5.2 Re Control Rod Group & Power Distribution Limits & Table 4.1-2 Re Min Equipment Test Frequency ML19317D2621978-09-18018 September 1978 Proposed Revisions to Tech Specs 2.1,2.3,3.2 & 3.5 Re Core Protection Safety Limits & Protective Sys Max Allowable Setpoints ML19317D2731978-09-0606 September 1978 Revised Tech Spec Page,Figure 2.3-2A,re Protective Sys Max Allowable Setpoints ML19317D2491978-08-22022 August 1978 Proposed Revision to Tech Specs 4.18 Re Hydraulic Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) ML19322B9961978-08-21021 August 1978 Proposed Revision to Tech Spec 2.3 Re Cycle 5 ML19312B7931978-07-17017 July 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 3.1.6.4,changing Steam Generator Leak Rate Limit ML19308D6271978-06-28028 June 1978 Tech Spec Change Request Re Paragraph 2.B(6),stipulating That Byproduct & SNM Associated W/Four Fuel Assemblies Acquired by Fl Power Corp from Duke Power Co Previously Irradiated in Oconee 1 May Be Possessed ML19317D2301978-06-26026 June 1978 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1,2.3,3.2,3.5 & 4.1 Required to Support Operation of Unit 1 at Full Rated Power During Cycle 5,including Core Protection Safety Limits & Protective Sys Mac Allowable Setpoint ML19316A6501978-06-22022 June 1978 Proposed Replacement Page for Tech Spec 4.1-2 Re Min Equipment Test Frequency ML19316A5381978-06-14014 June 1978 Proposed Changes to Tech Specs Re thermal-hydraulics Analysis.Revision to BAW-1486, Unit 3,Cycle 4 Reload Rept. ML19312B8161978-06-12012 June 1978 Proposed Tech Specs 3.8,4.4 & 4.6 Re Fuel Loading & Refueling,Structural Integrity & Emergency Power Periodic Testing ML19317D2341978-06-0909 June 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 3.9 Deleting Requirements Not Applicable to Liquid Effluent Monitoring Sys Due to Installation of Offline Monitor ML19317D2221978-06-0808 June 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 3.1 Allowing Max 1 Gallon Per Minute Leakage Through Steam Generator Tubes Prior to Initiation of Unit Shutdown ML19317D2121978-06-0202 June 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 4.2 Allowing re-insp of Reactor Coolant Outlet Nozzles at Future Refueling Outage ML19316A5271978-05-30030 May 1978 Proposed Revisions to Tech Specs 2.3,3.2 & 3.5.2.4 to Support Cycle 4 Operation at Full Power ML19312B7971978-04-27027 April 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 6.4,incorporating Operating Procedure Requirements Re B&W Small Break ECCS Analysis ML19312B8091978-04-20020 April 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 3.3 Incorporating New Tech Spec 3.3.8 Requiring Operability of Three HPI Pumps for Each Unit During Power Operation Above 60% Full Power ML19317D2001978-03-20020 March 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 3.5 Including 6.03% Quadrant Power Tilt Limit & Provision for Notifying NRC If Tilt Exceeds 3.5% ML19317D2131978-02-21021 February 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 3.1. Incorporating Revision to Pressurization,Heatup & Cooldown Limitations.B&W 780125 Ltr to Util Re Corrections to Errors Discovered in B&W Rept BAW-1436 Encl ML19317D2211978-02-16016 February 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 2.3 Deleting Loss of One Pump Trip Setpoint,Outdated Info & Setpoints Associated W/Single Loop Operation ML19340A2641978-02-0808 February 1978 Tech Specs 3.3.2 Through 3.3.5 for ECCS ML19316A4801978-02-0101 February 1978 Proposed Changes to Tech Spec 3.7 Re Limiting Conditions for Operation & Surveillance Requirements for 125 Volt Distribution Sys ML19317D2271978-01-23023 January 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 3.5 Incorporating Control Rod Position & Axial Imbalance Limits to Period After 100 Plus or Minus 10 Effective Full Power Days ML19312B7891978-01-0303 January 1978 Proposed Tech Spec 2.3-9 & 10 Re Computer Software Used to Process Incore Detector Signal.Includes Modified power-imbalance Trip Setpoints to Account for Bias in Positive Imbalance Measured by Incore Detector Sys ML19316A5081977-12-0202 December 1977 Amend to Tech Specs 3.9 Re Radwaste Discharge ML19312B8001977-12-0202 December 1977 Proposed Tech Spec 6.6.2.1 Providing Requirement for Prompt Written Notification of Certain ROs by Telephone,Mailgram or Facsimile Transmission ML19312B7771977-11-0909 November 1977 Proposed Tech Spec 3.5.2 Permitting Operation of Unit 1 During Cycle 4 in Unrodded Mode ML19312B8061977-10-31031 October 1977 Proposed Tech Specs 6.6-1,-2,-3 & -4 Deleting Redundant Info Currently Being Reported in Annual Operating Rept ML19312B8101977-10-26026 October 1977 Proposed Tech Specs 3.5-9 & 3.5-24a,deleting Existing Reactor Core Quadrant Power Tilt & Control Rod Position Limits & Instituting More Conservative Limits ML19312B8151977-10-0707 October 1977 Proposed Changes to Tech Specs 3.7 & 4.6 Re Auxiliary Electrical Systems & Emergency Power Periodic Testing ML19329A4011977-10-0606 October 1977 Revised Tech Specs,Table 4.1-3 Re Min Sampling Frequency 1998-09-30
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20211A9881999-08-18018 August 1999 Rev 5 to DPC Nuclear Security Training & Qualification Plan ML20204B4141999-03-27027 March 1999 Revised Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments, List of Effective Pages ML20155C6391998-10-26026 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Tables 4.1-1 & 4.1-2,revised Surveillance Frequency of Refueling Outage to 18 Months ML20154L7191998-10-0505 October 1998 Rev 8 to DPC Nuclear Security & Contingency Plan, for Oconee,Mcguire & Catawba Nuclear Stations ML20154C1021998-09-30030 September 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Changing UFSAR by Increasing Max Rod Internal Pressure in Spent Fuel Pool from 1,200 to 1,300 Psig ML20236V9611998-07-27027 July 1998 Corrected TS Bases Pages 3.5-30b of 961211 & 3.16-2 of 970205,correcting Amend Numbers ML20236T5171998-07-20020 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re one-time Extension to Functional Test Frequencies for Hydraulic & Mechanical Snubbers ML20236R1901998-07-16016 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Extending TS Surveillances TS 4.20.2(a), Table 4.20-1,items 1,2 & 4,TS 4.1-1,Table 4.1-1,items 8,9,10 & 11 & TS 4.5.1.2.1,item b(1) ML20217F2841998-04-20020 April 1998 Rev 7 to DPC Nuclear Security & Contingency Plan, for Oconee,Mcguire & Catawba Nuclear Stations ML20141F1521997-06-25025 June 1997 Rev 4 to Nuclear Security Training & Qualification Plan ML20134K5401996-10-31031 October 1996 Rev 6 to Chemistry Manual 5.1, Emergency Response Guidelines ML20117J0181996-08-15015 August 1996 Revised Chapter 16 of Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments Manual ML20095H1291995-12-0505 December 1995 Rev to ONS Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual, Revising SLC 16.6.1, Containment Leakage Tests to Reflect Current Plant Configuration & Update Testing Info ML20091P2461995-08-21021 August 1995 Rev to ONS Selected Licensee Commitments Manual ML16141A8111994-04-20020 April 1994 Proposed Tech Spec Table 4.1-2, Min Equipment Test Frequency. ML15224A3521993-10-26026 October 1993 Safety Assurance Directive 6.1, Oconee Nuclear Site Safety Assurance Emergency Response Organization. ML20044C9581993-05-0404 May 1993 Proposed TS 4.7.1, Control Rod Trip Time Test. ML20045F0721993-04-0707 April 1993 Rev 9 to Corporate Process Control Program Manual. ML20097D9451992-05-28028 May 1992 Rev 11 to Training & Qualification Plan ML20096C2561992-04-30030 April 1992 Public Version of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures (Cmip),Including Rev 46 to CMIP-1,Rev 39 to CMIP-4,Rev 45 to CMIP-5,Rev 49 to CMIP-6,Rev 48 to CMIP-7,Rev 42 to CMIP-9 & Rev 3 to CMIP-15 ML20096D5451992-04-0707 April 1992 Public Version of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures (Cmip),Including Rev 45 to CMIP-1,Rev 27 to CMIP-13 & Notification of Deletion of CMIP-8.Procedure CMIP-8 Reserved for Future Use ML20092M5891992-02-0606 February 1992 Public Version of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 43 to CMIP-1,Rev 43 to CMIP-5,Rev 33 to CMIP-8,Rev 25 to CMIP-13,Rev 6 to CMIP-18,Rev 4 to CMIP-22 & Rev 38 to CMIP-4 ML20094H2391992-01-0101 January 1992 Rev 33 to McGuire Nuclear Station Odcm ML20094H2511992-01-0101 January 1992 Rev 34 to Catawba Nuclear Station Odcm ML20087F3931991-12-11011 December 1991 Public Version of Rev 13 to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedure CMIP-11, Emergency Classification - Mcguire. W/ 920121 Release Memo ML20086K8831991-11-18018 November 1991 Public Version of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures (Cmips),Including Rev 42 to CMIP-1,Rev 29 to CMIP-2,Rev 42 to CMIP-5,Rev 12 to CMIP-11 & Rev 37 to CMIP-21 ML20086G7711991-10-16016 October 1991 Public Version of Revs to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures (Cmip),Including Rev 41 to CMIP-1,rev 37 to CMIP-4,rev 41 to CMIP-5,rev 46 to CMIP-6 & CMIP-7,rev 32 to CMIP-8,rev 40 to CMIP-9,delete CMIP-12 & Rev 24 to CMIP-13 ML20082C7441991-06-11011 June 1991 Public Version of Rev 13 to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedure CMIP-12, Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station ML20076A7241991-06-10010 June 1991 Public Version of Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures, Including Rev 39 to CMIP-1,rev 28a to CMIP-2,rev 44 to CMIP-7,rev 39 to CMIP-9 & Rev 10 to CMIP-11 ML20081J9841991-06-10010 June 1991 Rev 3 to EDA-1, Procedure for Estimating Food Chain Doses Under Post-Accident Conditions ML20081K0101991-06-0606 June 1991 Rev 8 to EDA-3, Offsite Dose Projections for McGuire Nuclear Station ML20072S0521991-03-15015 March 1991 Public Version of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 9 to CMIP-11, Classification of Emergency for McGuire Nuclear Station & Rev 11 to CMIP-12, Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station ML20066G3621991-02-0101 February 1991 Public Version of Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures, Including Rev 28 to CMIP-2,Rev 34 to CMIP-4,Rev 38 to CMIP-5,Rev 43 to CMIP-6,Rev 42 to CMIP-7,Rev 29 to CMIP-8, Rev 37 to CMIP-9 & Rev 34 to CMIP-21 ML20082P7611991-01-0101 January 1991 Rev 30 to Odcm,Catawba Nuclear Station ML20072S9621991-01-0101 January 1991 Public Version of Rev 12 to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedure CMIP-12, Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station ML20082P7711991-01-0101 January 1991 Rev 31 to Odcm,Mcguire Nuclear Station ML20072P9621990-11-0808 November 1990 Rev 9 to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedure CMIP-12, Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station ML20028H2211990-10-31031 October 1990 Public Versions of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 37 to CMIP-1,Rev 27a to CMIP-2,Rev 33 to CMIP-4,Rev 37 to CMIP-5 & Rev 42 to CMIP-6 ML20059F4301990-08-22022 August 1990 Public Version of Rev 27 to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedure CMIP-2, News Group Plan ML20063Q2721990-08-14014 August 1990 Public Version of Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 36 to CMIP-1,Rev 32 to CMIP-4,Rev 36 to CMIP-5,Rev 41 to CMIP-6,Rev 40 to CMIP-7,Rev 27 to CMIP-8,Rev 35 to CMIP-9 & Rev 7 to CMIP-11 ML20043F4841990-05-23023 May 1990 Public Version of Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures, Consisting of Rev 20 to CMIP-13 & Deletion of CMIP-15 & CMIP-17 ML20043B2651990-05-0909 May 1990 Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 35 to CMIP-1,Rev 26 to CMIP-2,Rev 31 to CMIP-4,Rev 35 to CMIP-5,Rev 40 to CMIP-6,Rev 39 to CMIP-7,Rev 26 to CMIP-8, Rev 33 to CMIP-9,Rev 2 to CMIP-14 & Rev 10 to CMIP-16 ML20043F4621990-04-20020 April 1990 Rev 5 to Oconee-specific Process Control manual.W/900606 Ltr ML20006C0571990-01-18018 January 1990 Public Version of Rev 33 to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedure CMIP-1, Recovery Manager & Immediate Staff & Rev 24 to CMIP-2, News Group Plan. ML16152A8951990-01-0202 January 1990 Rev 33 to Public Version of Crisis Mgt Plan for Nuclear Stations. ML15264A1571990-01-0202 January 1990 Revised Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 32 to CMIP-1,Rev 29 to CMIP-4,Rev 33 to CMIP-5,Rev 38 to CMIP-6,Rev 37 to CMIP-7,Rev 32 to CMIP-9,Rev 1 to CMIP-14 & Rev 30 to CMIP-21 ML20012A3801990-01-0101 January 1990 Rev 28 to, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual,Oconee,Mcguire & Catawba Nuclear Stations. ML20012A3791990-01-0101 January 1990 Rev 27 to, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual,Oconee Nuclear Station. ML20011D2441989-12-0101 December 1989 Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedures. ML20012A3731989-11-15015 November 1989 Rev 4 to, Process Control Program Oconee Nuclear Station. 1999-08-18
[Table view] |
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y , 3
- f- e 3.1.6 Lukaga Specification I
3.1.6.1 If the total reactor coolant leakage rate exceeds 10 gpm, the 1 reactor shall be shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of detection.
3.1.6.2 If unidentified reactor coolant leakage (excluding normal evapora-tive losses) exceeds 1 gpm or if any reactor coolant leakage is evaluated as unsafe, the reactor shall be shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of detection.
3.1.6.3 If any reactor coolant leakage exists through a non-isolable fault in a RCS strength boundary (such as the reactor vessel, piping, ,
valve body, etc., except the steam generator tubes), the reactor shall be shutdown, and cooldown to the cold shutdown condition shall be iritiated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of detection.
3.1.6.4 If reactor coolant system leakage exceeds 1 gpm through the steam generator tubes, a reactor shutdown shall be initiated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and the reactor shall be in a cold shutdown condition within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
3.1.6.5 If reactor shutdown is required by Specification 3.1.6.1, 3.1.6.2 or 3.1.6.3, the rate of shutdown and the conditions of shutdown shall be determined by the safety evaluation for each case and justified in writing as soon thereafter as practicable.
3.1.6.6 Action to evaluate the safety implication of reactor coolant leakage shall be initiated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of detection. The nature, as well as the =agnitude, of the leak shall be considered in this evaluation.
The safety evaluation shall assure that the exposure of offsite personnel to radiation is within the guidelines of 10CFR20.
3.1.6.7 If reactor shutdown is required per Specification 3.1.6.1, 3.1.6.2, 3.1.6.3 or 3.1.6.4, the reactor shall not be restarted until the leak is repaired or until the problem is otherwise corrected.
3.1.6.8 When t;he reactor is critical and above 2". power, two reactor coolant leak detection systems of different operating principles shall be operable, with one of the two syste=s sensitive to radioactivity.
The systems sensitive to radioactivity may be out-of-service for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> provided two other means to detect leakage are operable.
3.1.6.9 Loss of reactor coolant through reactor coolant pump seals and system valves to connecting systems which vent to the gas vent header and from which coolant can be returned to the reactor cool-ant system shall not be considered as reactor coolant leakage and shall not be subject to the consideration of Specifications 3.1.6.1, 3.1.6.2, 3.1.6.3, 3.1.6.4, 3.1.6.5, 3.1.6.6 or 3.1.6.7 except that such losses when added to leakage shall not exceed 30 gpm.
Bases '
Every reasonable effort will be made to reduce reactor coolart leakage in-cluding evaporative losses (which may be on the order of .5 gpm) to the lowest possible rate and at least below 1 gpm in order.co prevent a large 3.1-14 7911250 0 6 O
a -
x m ) ,
~
- 1erk'from masking th. presence of a smaller leak. Water inventory balances, radiation monitoring equipment, boric acid crystallina deposits, and physical
'insptctions can disclose reactor coolant leaks. Any leak of radioactive fluid, whether from the reactor coolant system pri=ary boundary or not can be a serious problam with respect to in-plant radioactivity contamination and cleanup or it could develop into a still more serious problem; and therefore, first indications of such leakage will be followed up as soon as practicable.
Although some leak rates on the order of GPM may be tolerable from a dose point of view, especially if they are to closed systems, it must be recog-nized that leaks in the order of drops per minute through any of the walls of the primary system could be indicative of materials failure such as by stress corrosion cracking. If depressurization, isolation and/or other safety measures are not taken promptly, these small breaks could develop into much larger leaks, possibly into a gross pipe rupture. Therefore, the nature of the leak, as well as the magnitude of the leakage must be considered in the safety evaluation. ,
1 When the source of leakage has been identified, the situation can be evaluated i to determine if operation can safely continue. This evaluation will be per-formed by the Operating Staff and will be documented in writing and approved 1 by the Superintendent. Under these conditions, an allowable reactor coolant system leakage rate of 10 gpm has been established. This explained leakage rate of 10 gpm is also well within the capacity of one high pressure inj ection pump and makeup would be available even under the loss of off-site power condition.
If leakage is to the reactor building it may be identified by one or more of the following methods:
- a. The reactor building air particulate monitor is sensitive to low leak rates. The rates of reactor coolant leakage to which the instrument is sensitive are .10 gpm to greater than 30 gym, assuming corrosion product activity and no fuel cladding leakage. Under these conditions, an increase in coolant' leakage of 1 gpm is detectable within 10 minutes after it occurs,
- b. The iodine monitor, gasecus monitor and area monitor are not as sensitive to corrosion product activity.(1) It is calculated that the iodine monitor is sensitive to an 8 spm leak and the gaseous monitor is sen-sitive to a 230 gpm leak based on the presence of tramp uranium (no fission products from tramp uranium are assumed to be present). However, any fission products in the coolant will make these monitors more sensitive to coolant leakage,
- c. In addition to the radiation monitors, leakage is also monitored by a level indicator in the reactor building normal sump. Changes in normal sump level may be indicative of leakage from any of the systems located inside the reactor building such as reactor coolant system, low pressure service water system, component cooling system and steam and feedwater lines or condensation of humidity within the reactor building atmosphere.
The sump capacity is 15 gallons per inch of height and each graduation on the level indicates 1/2 inch of. sump height. This indicator is capable of detecting changes on the order of 7.5 gallons of leakage into the sump. A 1 gym leak would therefore be detectable within less than 10 minutes.
3.1-15
N m.
- d. Total reactor coolant system leakage rate is periodically determined by comparing indications of reactor power, coolant temperature, pressurizer water level and letdown storage tank level over a time interval. All of these indications are recorded. Since the pressurizer level is main-tained essentially constant by the pressurizer level controller, any coolant leakage is replaced by coolant from the letdown stecage tank resulting in a tank level decrease. The letdown storage tank capacity is 31 gallons per inch of height and each graduation on the level recorder represents 1 inch of tank height. This inventory monitoring method is capable of detecting changes on the order of 31 gallons. A 1 gpm leak would therefore be detectable within approximately one half hour.
As described above, in addition to direct observation, the means of detecting reactor coolant leakage are based on 2 different principles, i.e. , activity, sump level and reactor constant inventory measurements.
Two systems of different principles provide, therefore, diversified ways of detecting leakage to the reactor building.
The upper limit of 30 gpm is based on the contingency of a ecmplete loss of station power. A 30 gpm loss of water in conjunction with a complete loss of station pcwer and subsequent cooldown of the reactor coolant system by the turbine bypass system (set at 1,040 peia) and steam driven emergency feedwater pump would require more than 60 minutes to empty the pressurizer from the ecm-bined effect of system leakage and contraction. This will be ample time to restore electrical power to the station and makeup flow to the reactor coolant system.
REFEREh[CES
?SAR Section 11.1.2.4.1 3.1-ic 7/19f74
N 4.17 STEAM GENERATOR TUBING SURVEILLANCE Applicability Applies to the steam generator tubing surveillance.
Objective To define the in-service surveillance program for steam generator tubing.
Specification 4.17.1 Examination Methods In-service inspection of steam generator tubing shall include non-destruc-tive examination by eddy-current testing or other equivalent techniques.
The inspection equipment shall provide a sensitivity that will detect defects with a penetration of 20 percent or more of the minimum allowable as-manufactured tube wall thickness.
4.17.2 Selection and Testing The selection and testing of tubes shall be made on the basis of the following:
- a. The examination =ay be from one steam generator and shall include 1 1/2%
of the total installed steam generator tubes for the unit.
- b. Every inspection shall include all tubes which previously had detectable wall penetrations (greater than 20 percent and not including plugged tubes), and shall also consider tubes and those areas where design and experience have indicated potential problems.
If the inspection indicates more than 10 percent of the inspected tubes have detectable wall penetrations (greater than 20 percent), an additional inspection encompassing 3 percent of the tubes in both steam generators shall be examined, concentrating on areas of the tube array where the tubes with defects were found. In the event the inspection of these additional tubes indicates that more than 10 percent of the tubes examined in any single steam generator have detectable wall penetrations (greater than 20 percent), an additional inspection encompassing 3 percent of the tubes in both steam generators shall be examined.
4.17.3 Insoection Intervals
- a. The inservice examinations of steam generator tubing shall be performed during 40 month periods except as indicated in Specification 4.17.3.b and 4.17.3.c.
- b. If in any examination of steam generator tubing an excess of 10 percent of the tubes exhibit indications in excess of 20 percent of the wall thickness, the next two inspections shall be performed at 12 to 24 month intervals. If, in these examinations, no more than 10 percent of the tubes examined exhibit either additional degradation (greater than 10 percent of wall thickness) of previously degraded tubes, tubes
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with new dsiccts ... exessa of 20 percent of w211 thickness, or a combin -
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tion of both, thn inspection interval may continus at 40 months.
- c. Additional inservice examinations shall be performed during the shutdown subsequent to any of the following conditions:
- 1) a seismic occurrence greater than the operating basis earthquake,
- 2) a loss-of-coolant accident requiring actuation of the engineered safeguards system,
- 3) a main steam line or feedwater line break.
4.17.4 Acceotance Criteria
- a. If less than 10 percent of the total tubes inspected have detectable wall penetration (greater than 20 percent), operation may resume af ter required corrective measures have been taken.
- b. If more than 10 percent of the total tubes inspected have detectable wall penetrations (greater than 20 percent), operation =ay resume after required corrective measures have been taken, and the situation and remedial action shall be reported to the NRC.
4.17.5 Corrective Measures All tubes with unacceptable bufects (greater than 40 percent wall thinning) shall be plugged.
4.17.6 Reports
- a. Following each inservice inspection of steam generator tubes, the number of tubes plugged in each steam generator shall be reported to the NRC within 30 days.
- b. The results of the steam generator tube inservice inspection shall be included in the Annual Operating Report for the period in which this inspection was completed. This report shall include:
- 1) N:.mber and extent of tubes inspected,
- 2) Locatien and percent of wall-thickness penetration for each indication of an imperfection.
- 3) Identification of tubes plugged.
Bases The program of periodic in-service inspection of steam generators provides the means of monitoring the integrity of the tubing and to =aintain surveil-lance in the event there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive deterioration due to design, manufacturing errors, or operating conditions.
In-service inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that correc-tive measures =ay be taken. In-service inspection includes non-destructive examination using a suitable eddy-current inspection system (or other equivalent techniques), capable of locating and identifying defects due
- 3 ]
, . .to , stress corrosion cracking, mtchnnical damage, chemical wistage, or othsr causes.
An unacceptable defect is defined as one which would result in not satisfying the calculated acceptable minimum tube wall thickness that can sustain a loss-of-coolant accident in combination with a saf e shutdown earthquake.
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