ML20082C744

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Public Version of Rev 13 to Crisis Mgt Implementing Procedure CMIP-12, Classification of Emergency for Oconee Nuclear Station
ML20082C744
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1991
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML16148B016 List:
References
CMIP-12-01, CMIP-12-1, NUDOCS 9107220316
Download: ML20082C744 (20)
v • d • e


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'- ,:i,,,.n DUKEPOWER Juyly 1, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear ' tation Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-265 50-270, and 50-287 Crisis Management In,si: enting Procedures Gentlemen:

Attached for NRC 6:a and review is a revision to the following Duke Power Company Crisis Management Implementing Procedure:

CMIP-12 REV. 13 Please delete privacy material in the form of personal telephone numbers prior to placing in the Public Document Room.

By copy of this letter two revisions are being provided to NRC, Region 11, Atlanta.

Very truly yours, e '

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M. 5. Tuckman HAF:haf Attachment t

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DUKE POWER COMPANY CR. ISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES June 11, 1991 l

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j TABLE OF CONTENTS Volume 2 Igh Procedure Descrintion CHIP-8 Oconee Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 30)

CMIP-9 McGuire/ Catawba Crisis Phone Directory (Rev. 39)

CMIP-10 Emergency Classification - Catawba (Rev. 3)

'P-11 Emergency Classification - McGuire (Rev. 10)

CM t .'- 12 Emergency Classification - Oconee (Rev. 13)

CMIP-13 Notifications to States and Counties from the Crisis Management Center (Rev. 22)

CMIP-14 Crisis Management Data Transmittal System Access for Offsite Agencies - (Rev. 3)

CMIP-15 Reserved for future use CMIP-16 Crisis Management Data Transmittal Systein Access from the Crisis Management Center -

(Rev. 11)

CMIP-17 Reserved for future use CMIP-18 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness (Rev. 5)

CMIP-19 Communications Test for McGuire/ Catawba CMC (Rev. 16)

CMIP-20 Communications Test for Oconee CMC (Rev. 10)

CMIP-21 Quarterly Inventory Equipment Check (Rev. 35)

CMIP-22 Telephone Number Updates (Rev. 3)

June 11, 1991

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1 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE l CHIP-12 Classification of Emergency for '

Oconee Nuclear Station Rev. 13 June 11, 1991

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Approved By U Md c~ L Date

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7 CMIP-12

( CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION 1.0 SYMPTOMS 1.1 Notification of Unusual Event 1.1.1 Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

1.1.2 No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety occurs.

1.2 Alert 1.2.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of

-safety of the plant.

1.2.2 Loss of one fission product barrier.

1.2.3 Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.3 Site Area Emergency 1.3.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

1.3.2 Loss of two fission product barriers.

1.3.3 Releases do not, nor are they expected to, exceed EPA Protec-tive Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

1.4 General Emergency 1,4.1 Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potentiel for loss of containment integrity.

1.4,2 Loss of two fission product barriers and failure or imminent failure of the third barrier.

1.4.3 Releases, if made, could be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels outside the Site Boundary.

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l 2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS I.

2.1 Compare actual plant conditions to the Emergency Action Level (s) listed in Enclosure 4.1 then declare the appropriate Emergency Class as indicated.

If a change in the emergency class is made, perform steps 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 below.

2.2 Instruct the State / County Communicator to notify the state (s) and counties per CMIP-13 of any change in the emergency class. If the emergency class is SITE AREA EMERGENCY or GENERAL EMERGENCY, determine protective action recommendations per CPIP-1 and transmit these recommendations.

NOTE: Notifications to the state (s) and counties must be made within 15 minutes whenever there is a change in the emergency classification.

2.3 Announce the change in the emergency class to all CMC personnel and to the Emergency Coordinator at the TSC.

2.4 Instruct the NRC Communicator in the CMC Plant Assessment Group to notify NRC immediately and within one hour per CMIP-15, 3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS 3.1 To de-escalate the Emergency, compare plant conditions to the Initiating Conditions of Enclosure 4.1. To terminate the emergency, refer to the Termination Criteria in Enclosure 4.3.

Notify state (s), counties, and NkC by verbal summary of any reduction or termination in the emergency class followed by a written summary within eight (8) hours.

4.0 EHCLOSURES 4.1 Emergency Action Level (s) for Emergency Classes Event No. Pagels) 4.1.1 Primary Coolant Leak 1&2 4.1.2 Fuel Integrity 3 4.1.3 Steam System Failure 4 4.1.4 High Radiation /Radiciogical Effluents 5 4.1.5 Loss of Shutdown Function 6 4.1.6 Loss of Power 7 4.1.7 Fires and Security Actions 8 4.1.8 Spent Fuel Damage 9

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4.1.9 Natural Disasters and Other Hazards 10

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4.1.10 Other Abnormal Plant Conditions 11 & 12 4.2 Area Monitors and Process Monitors 4.3 Termination Criteria e

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CMIP-12 EHCLOSURE 4.1.1 PAGE 1 of 12 PRIMARY COOLANT LEAK SITE AREA Erf9CENCY CENERAL ENE9CENCY 17aEUAL EVENT ALERT E LEAfutE E3tEATER TMApt 1. " MALL ABER LAfEE s rirat MET 1B

1. RCS LEAKAGE CpfATER TMAN OR 1.
1. REACTUR SM.fTDO@f REEKf1Rf D BY RCS AVAILABLE MAKIW PtDP CAPACITY FAILLAEE OF ECCS-tEAAG.TD N II AIUlCE T*, 3.1.6 EillALL TD 50 CPM NLT Prismary or Pri g /* A' - IIEA SAE S1 EAL OPERATTDC 9mE: DE3T 9RITDED44 (PERATTDC IME: MDT $1RITIND98 ~ Ape ETTER THEU PortR EPfRATICM TNitt POER (PERATTtDG Loss of all injecticn or

- Full HPI tsiecle to musintain isseinant loss of inyection Priseery or PrismaryEmerwwiery st6ccoling >0* F ,

peacto, sNicken initiated capability j

$msesuan t to TS 3.1.6 2. STEAM LIK SIEEAft MITM F/S l

- Leak 2 50 gpm LEAst equal TD GR EMIEATER TMAN OR

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~~AMD ANY DK or TM f DLtEMDs ~

50 Crn E-. s y actions per EOP Ape inadequate core cooling

- Primary leakage etnidentifiede SeAccoling > 0*F section are unsuccessful -

GPERATI7C teDE: IEUT 9EJTDupes exceeds 1 gpm T15El MBER OPERATTGPG CETC 2 It00*F Ase Leak CAf*EUT be isolated. IWJDE CaffADeENT MTTM LDCA METM IMITIALLY aerswtg.

- Total prinary leakage --

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'T7erCAlltM OF-FAIUDftfL 2.

tsdeiniifiedI ewceeds 10 gun DMesa lane Pressure rapidly ECE5 ptITH SUERSE4ptR3tr F Altl.5IE OF

2. STEAM LIK PJtEAK OLITTJDE ECES KAT SDet Ape f AI115tE Or CIDETADOENT MITM P/S LIAK decreasing

- Total prinary leakage Ape CENTADetDET MAT 8tDENAL CptEATER TMAM OR teuRL TO 10 CPM i incitaling returesnble 4 SG ttbe lee 2 50 gue CAPA81tJTY exceeds 30 gp== Are Valid pla S for 58 alarm - LOCA SAE SI EAL

- SG tche leakaoe >.35 gpn OPERATDC SME: MGT S3EJTDCD M T751LI MBER (PERATTEDG Et.kiit 112 MICM - 630 RherB _Afe

- Failure on secondary side of SG sL>3it 3 ALERT - 286 R/hrt

- Any reactor coolant leakaa. results in a direct opening to Loss of LPI hast removel evaluated as sesafe GUTT.JDE CDptTADOOff the erwironment - Failure on secondery side of _ADSD Aped EITW R CF T K FOt1 D>tD C

- Any leakage exists through SG results in a direct waning Loss of heet reenovel the RCS strength txnsulary capability of RBCDs.

f encept SG ttees b Ttee leak 210 cpm in either to the erwirunment Ape sieme generator Out Tshe leek [50 grwe exists Actiwity deteeted at the in the same stease genereior Protected Aree Fe-ee:

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CPt1P-12 ENCLOGURE 4.1.2 PAGE 3 of 12 FUEL INTEGRITY SITE AR! A ENERGENCY GENERAL fNERGENCY UNtI;UAL EVENT ALERT

1. DEMADED CDIIE DETTDI POSSIBLE trm I. irm OF 2 OF 3 FISSItSt FWEET
1. C2IQt IECS ACTIVITY 1. SEVERE ED3S OF FML CNDE BARRIm stITM A POTEWrIAL F15t OF CDDtJetr CEGETRY t tr*- OF 3se SAdutITR

- Total f ailed ftel > 5% per - Avew of f rve highest CETC

- Total failed fuel is betwawi reading 3 70C*r 8035 OF CLAssDec aAsutITR 1% - 5% per Chmistry onelysis Chemistry analysis'-

Condition 1 - tDuble to emintain stbcooling - Total failed fuel is 2 5Z pee

- Total activity of RCS da. > 0* F Channistry onelysis -

to isotopes with half lives - Area ce process RI A sons tors ~

Cendition 2 lonuer than 30 einutes ir. the R9 anml or eweeed - RB bydrooses ccccentration exceeds 224/E pei/el 4wn lieits stated in Enclosure 4.2 > 0.5% and ircreesing at = - RIA 57 or 58 ALAfst the RX is critical ~rste of > C.1% per hour athit 152 ARIRT - 2500 R/he a ethit 3 IEIm - 1.2E 3 R/hr t

- I-131 on secondary side exceeds 1.4 pei/e1 - Aver.g of five hidwst

- valid RIA 57 or 58 Alare CETC reading 3 790*F (thit 182 BEIm - 430 R/hr B ttbit 3 AlfRT - 286 R/ bel LD35 CEDfTADOOfT SAflRITR Z. ARNusgMAL C00UtMT TEMYRAftstE AM3/ tnt PRESEEE GR51DE TS LIMITS - RB ponetratiW s I are cet isolated I OPERATING MODE: AROVE COLD

  • 2tittitDN - RB 99 2 c e tration is > 92

- An event has nocurred A ich - Contairww.st leak. age eweseds rwqsi_rm operstion in the E.6E6 el/hr Thermal Shock Operating Region - RB peessure > 5* psig

- TS pressure /teeserature *HDTI tocs Or aCs encam!E SAsutTTR limits violated

- LOCA 3 50 g- Inon-isolable fault 8

- SG ts6e leek 2 50 gzs I

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NA ENCLOSURE 4.1.3 CMIP-12 STEAM SYSTEM FAILURE PAGE 4 of 12 L'etfSUAL EvtNT ALERT SITE ARE A EMERGENCY GEPEERAL EMERGENCY

1. RAPID DEPerwarrraTitpe os' 1. STEMI LIBE SEAst WJSE 1. STEmt LDE 86 SETM SrtmeeWdrf SIDE EIBUTADeptr 8EITM F/S LDWL P/S 11Ast EMEATER TIGAN '

ssIEATER Titass OR EguRL in le Ern cR equal TD 54 EFM OPERATDC PEIDE: petrT SNnnarpse T19tU P(DE R EFERATitBG GPERATIDE DEeE: letN SseMDEBet (FEMATTIE DEeE: IENT SutNEGBS8 19mJ PtBER (FERATItBG TIM 3 PEBER EMBATitBE5

- Visual observation of rwn-isolable tank on semin s tespa - Failure on secondary side of SG _DE15E_CfDetADenft 98tTM line requiring plant shutck c results in a direct epaning to _Det_CA_Titse OF FAIB E0 FUEL the erwirtreamt - Steen line pressure rapidly

- Steam line pressure rapidly- cheerensing decreasing Ape EITWR OF TIE F13LitBEDG

_M SG ttee leek 2 50 gram

- Steam line besak requiring Tsaw le=A > 10 gpa in either _ase isolation purstent to the steam generator Valid RIA 57 or 58 alaru

a m p operating procedure, tur ILMit 182 90438 - 630 R/hrt

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t thit 3 ALFRT - 28. R/he t

Activity detected at the Protected Area fence
WJBE CIBfTADSOWT

- Failure on secondary side of 2 2 esR/hr DO SG results in a direct wening to the erwircrwent mee Tskm lenAT50 gror exists in the same steem omneratoe.

- Failure en s- " p side of ,

j SG results in a direct opening to the erwironment ase Tsee le=A T 50 g m ewists in the other steem generator s SG with the secondary side failurr a s being fed FDM fetxe the e rected snit.

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CMIP-12 ENCLOSURE 4.1.4 HIGH RADIATICM/ RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS PAGE 5 of 12 l SITE ARE A EMEPGDCY GEMRAL EMERGENCY ALERT '

L W SUAL EvtPfT ACCIgDdTAL REll.ASE OF GASES 1. ACCISDtTAL Ea rnes gr can

1. KIGDI RASI AT1tBf tiVEL m stTEug 1.
1. RADIDtOGICAL EFTitDG TS 13MTTS EXCEEDED AImosmE ODETaftDeLTIED6

- RI A 45 ftIGpt Alacw - RIA 45 IIIGN Alerw

- Geseous/11cpJad ef fluent being - Ae a or process RIA ennators released ==ceed SLC 16.11.2 or ==ceed limits s tated in ADED -Ase SLC16.11.2 limits as deterwined Enclosure 4.2 -

by RP or CNweistry Prtcerbres. l RIA 46 reading 2 3000 cpie RIA 46 reading 3 60.500 cpe

- Activity detected at the Protected Area fence: - Gose calculations or field

- Calamletions determine dose ts 12 e st/Sr te retes or Field Nnitoring Teams etmitorig team emess.

sumesure activity at the Site result in a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> dose

2. RADIDLEGICAL EFTL1DETS DCILCDC W: projection et the site 19 TIFES TS txandery ef:

2 50 mR/hr te ce 250 wiR/hr 2 1 Ree h ie Body

- Gaseous /Ligsid effluents being Thyroid released owceed 10 tiess SLC cut 16.11.1 or SLC 16.11.2 limits as determined try RP or Chemistry g 3 5 See Thyroid Procochmes I

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m DCLOSURE 4.1.5 OCP-12 t OSS OF SHUTD0 pet FUCT10pG PAGE 6 of 12 LMEUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMEWGENCY GDdEDAL EMEDGEACY

t. toss or n.cn0.o .ETw. 1. . m F n.cn.c -Em To 1. toss or n Cn.e .rEw. roR 1. n.sID.r D ET1A1E. = uns or TD MAIMT AIM P13987 CDtD 94kDtTAD8 PUWWT COtB SBENBOppt PUpgr sept $3ENBE308 FWsAge - TE SYSTB G SSEffBest _

EDLimEB SY FAIUK OF ETWC FWt M RATDG SEEBE: COLD SSEJTWEDSG OPERATDG PEME: NUT 53Eri3300 AttEXYD GES PERIM T W 8!Enft.DE TM PtBER EMRATItBG OPERATIDG PEIBE: CDLD - Innbalaty to feed steen SMllTDupee T354tJ REMEL.DC - tawnble to ammintain core - SSF feodang steers gesnerators panersters from mff source s e ture< 200*F tincludes the SSFt

- Loss of residual twat - MPI forced cooling snable -ABS removal for greater to musintain seccoling > 0*F MP3 forced cooling not than 10 aira.stes. 2. WEND FiscT1tBE OF SYSTDetSt swailable DEESFS TO HADtTAIN PUlfET BE3T - (kable to meintain reactor SSEJT3tpet CWeTTItBG subcritical 2. TRASCIDST SERNRDE EK TWIP DEETW FAlt1 K TO M ABS OPERATDs PDBE: SIUT 53EMBIBes 2. A8877CIPATED THASCIDfT DETTIERJT FAltl5E OF N run was T35El PtBER trEDATitBG SENMt

- 2 or more RFS channels trap

- No HPI ficne available OPERATDG SENE: C- wi +wn.rt autammHc reactor (EsERATitpG trap

- HPI forced cooling initiated _Aue

- 2 or more RPS dernels trip Em actions sw EOP

3. AffTICIPATED TResEIENT BEIT1ERJr withou". autosamtic reactor trip f ail to bring reactor

. SCRApt A88 subcritical Cen teci rods resumin with OPORATDG PEBE: POER and CApost be immnuelly trigynod

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EPERATitDe or inserted frese ther control PCS S e coulTrwy < C*F

- 2 or *= ore R*S charnels trip room without automatic reactor trip AfS Centrol rods ~ere e=p= Ale of being inserted saanuel trip or desvent fec= the control room 4

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e ENCLOSURE 4.1.6 OGP-12 LOSS OF PONER PAGE 7 of 12 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENEDAL EMEWGENCY

1. . IRSS OF OFT *ITE AC PEBER tm a ant: . 1. Im OF EETSITE AC PEBER ABS 1. IN OF OFFSITE AC PtBER Age 1. FAI1M SF N MS FE OF sptGITE AC PtpeR CAPAIBILITY- HEES OF ALL (ptSITE AC PtBER am OF Att 13e5ITE AC PEBER AC PEBER RWE BETN M 19tAL q fR'i OF EFWDS MIWCHF CAPMLITY OfTRAT1DE 9mBE.: CDtB Span 30 pet ENEltATTNG SWEX: CDLB SsRFTWEDes trERATDE TEBE CDLS SetKSEmes Tiegt7 REFWLDE TymJ KF1KL1% TimJ NEf1ELDE trEmaTDS fEWE: MN SBENEpet

- MTB 1 and 2 & ;-.wgized for - MFB 1 and 2 de-erwrgized for - MFB 1 and 2 e - vized for

! >1 but <15 mamtes > 15 minutes >15 minutes - No AC pr=ser iBlach utI Age OPERATING teSE: AftoVE CDtB OPEltATDC 9EBE: ABOYE CDLS Temperature sn the core is _ ABS SMUTDopet $3EJTBEBet: s200* F j Inability to feed steen

- Shutdown initiated pursuant - MFB 1 and 2 a a +;gized EFERATDC IEBE: ASOWE CDL3 ponerators from ANY source to T.S. 5.7 for >l but <15 annutes Spanttgot sincludes the SSF5

- Loss of of fsite AC power 2. t er:": Or ALL VITAL EBCITE SC - MFB 1 and 2 O - - wired and usit auwiliaries being PEBER > 15 minutes powered through CTve or CT5 trERATDE DEBE: CDLS LSEMBEBet 2. 88M't OF ALL VITAL EDESITE SC LOSS OF ALL VTTAL EBCITE SC T15El WiFtELDE PtBER PtBE R

- Loss of DC power to all vital trERATDE 8WWE: CDL3 SISKDEBet OPERATDE MUDE: CDLD SPUratmos panelhoords for >15 minutes 7tm3 NEf1ELDE TlWIO IEEF1KLDS crutATTNG 9WWE: AnovE CDLS - Sustained loss of DC power to

- m nentary loss of DC power to SeanaDuet all vital panelbaards for all vital penalbomeds >l but >15 minutes

<15 minutes - Momentary loss of DC power _Afe to all vital panelboards Temperature an the core is

> 1 but < 15 mirutes >200*F

3. STEArt GOERATUR 7tBE LEAft et[TM GPURATDE DWWE AAOWE COLD n m Or OFFSITE AC PtBER SIRITDEBSE 4

OPERATDE 84BE: ASOWE CULB - Sustained loss of DC pcmer to

$senarset a11 vita 1 pan Ibo.eds for 4 .

> 15 minutes

- SG tsee leak > 10 gpm Ase S.bcooling Wegin > 0*r ,

Loss of 4900v prwer to i all PCPs i i

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CMIP-12 ENCLOSURE 4.1.7 PAGE 8 of 12 FIRES AND SECURITY ACTIONS SITE ARE A EMERGENCY CENERA: EMEPGENCY t#ULUAL EVENT ALERT

1. FIRE CDFWDPGSDE TK H.DCTIt3G 1. Aser 9tunut 1NTTEBent (Et EXTEtWent
1. FTRE MITNTM Pt#fr LASTDG 1. FTRE POTINTIALLY AFfTCTING SAFETY EWir seGC8 CsutA CMM saav3VE OF SAFETY SYSTDES ImRE TitRN 10 KiVTES SYSTTMS CIDTGM SAftpK TO TIE Pustr

- Observation of a fare causing the POTE: Mathan the plont means: - vasual obsN vataan of fire loss oii red edant traits of safety - Unst cannot be sumtntained at Aux Bldg. TB, PB,D.cowee poten+~-'Iv affecting s.afety ocp.sipement required by Tectnical hot shutdcaen frose any location egai. .%  ; e wirvd by Teck1r ical ifydro Spn: it su tw *s for current Specs. for current mode M operation

2. M OF PfrfSICAL CtptnUL OF TN y mode -f c,ec lion

- E f f orts to ewtirgsish a fire - Fire in Contml Room rm.p. airing Pl. ANT ISEI SUTEul within the plant last swacuation and thit carnot be

> 10 minutes - Fire in c -oritrol Roose requiring evacuttien and thit maintain >d at hot shstchwn from the auxiliary shutdcaes - Physacal attac$t resulting an keing maintainert at bot tsinuthorized pervnnel shutckwi f row the auxiliary panel

2. SEC15tTTY algtEAT OR ATTUW'TED ocercying the CR or any other ENTRY OR SARDTAE ESEE PUTEs t shutdown pariel vital areas
2. D9GMNT Im OF 79fYSICAL CtptinDL OF TE PLAffT (SEE DUTEul
2. (DE23DG SECUtI(Y CJPHmESE

- Diservery of bOPib within the (*.EE DUTEs t si te barwtary - Pnysical aitack e ,sulting

- Adversaries coresandeer an area in inseinent ocotpancy of

- Civil disturbance thostile s of the plant but not control control room or other vital over tnit shutdown capahility areas

- IntrusiorVAt teepted Intrusics (Protected Areal

- Disa.nery of breached barrier - Discovery of bcad> in the

- Hostage situation / extortion (security-relatede caused by vital Areas intrusion or sabotage in Vita' Area DCTEn: RP/D/B/1000/07 shall be used in conjtsiction with - Discovery of bos6 in the all sea.srity related Protected Area

n. r ,.f classifications

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W CMIP-12 ENCLOSURI 4.1.8 PAGE ? of 12 SPENT FUEL DAPtAGE SITE AREA EMERGENC( GEMRAL EMERGENCY LDAfSUAL EVENT ALERT I. treAE TD SPDfT fML MTTH 1. IEJOR DAPtAE TD SPDfT F1EL METH -

anJASE OF RADIDACTIVITY IEELEASE OF RADIDACTIVITY

- Activity at protected area fence: CDMTADOENT ,

> 2 mRAw >E Valid RIA 57/58 Alarm tLhit 142 MIQt - 630 R/hri CCMTAIWW3fT (thit 3 AtElff - 286 R/hr t l

- Valid RIA 49A > 1.13E6 cpas  !

- thit 152 valid RIA 2. 3, 4 1 or 49 MItat alarm - Dose rate inside RB cm4>1ed

- Lhit 3 - Valid RIA 3, 4, or with RB leak rate results in 49 MIDI alarm calculated dose rate at Site Boundary:

'~~Are

~> 50 mR/hr NB or 250 mR/hr Open flow path exists fron Thyroid coniairwennt FWL MApeLDC MIILSDE FWL MApellNG BUILDDE Valid RI A-6 IGO' ar RIA 41

- Valid RI A 6 HItal Alarm or A11RT Alarm RI A 41 ALERT alaru ***

~~ ape RIA 45 ALENT alarm RIA 46 HIGt Alarm iverified by RIA 458 _Afe Ape RIA 46 reading > 3000 ctwo Release rate calculations using vent secole analysis arvi ficw rate data are in excess of 10 times limits established by Tee nical Specifications

. M ENCLOSURE 4.1.9 CMIP-12 NATURAL DISASTERS AND OTHER HAZARDS PAGE 10 of 12 LNLfSUAL EVENT ALE RT SITE ARE A EERGENCY GOERAL EMERGENCY

1. EARTH 4UAKE DCTECTED 1. DESIE3 matit EAftTyganar 1. 3Apeng ratBt EAftTimanarr, ADIERAFT 1. Affr ftL3EBt INFEEWERL GR EXTUWERL romans, T1354A30, femiti OR EYHettSt ti.e., FI M S , Fi m .

- 1 rem >r felt and strong motson - Treror. felt and sensmic EAufflamaAILE " EAfrpmannert StBSTAffr1 ALLY SEYEBS accelerograph actuates 40.01 gi trigger alarm actuales WES2438 LEVELSI DOEICIe metre 40.05 gl DPERATIDEG MDDE: ASUWE COLD penSSIVE CIBGEst BArthE TD PtJIffr

2. LAKE L1 VEL EKEODE~E l SSEUTWEDOS SYSTDES *
2. DaftmE flitDe AIRC3tAFT CatASft,

- Level < 780 ft. T1334400, IENTLE OR EXPtDSION - Damage c6 served to safety - Unit carvet be ausantaanori at Afe) ogsipment causing the inability . bot shutdram from any location Unit shutdom initiated per to establish and unintain hot TS 3.3.7 ILPSH operabilityl - Damage observed to shuidown from 'he control safety equipment causing room or the auxiliary i 3. DAMAGE FlIDM AIRCRAFT C3tASH the inability to establish stustdown panel TURNADO, MISSLE Oft EXPLDSION and emintain cold shut-do n - Tremor felt and peak acceleration

- Damage ancmarred to recorder reading > 0.10g equipment / structures evithin 3. IIAZAIEBERS MERSTAfCE OR FLAf9 taste the Site Bouviary GAS BEELEASE 2. learamatu r: SEERSTAfqCE OR FLAf9 TABLE CAS NELEASE 4 MAZAltDOLE $1ERSTANCE OR FtJRf9tASLE - 4.hcontrolled eritry of a GAS REtEASE toxic sthstance or flassemble GPERATDeGPEBE Alt 0VE CDLD gas into an area of the plant SpeK 3tpOE

- A spill or release determined ...ich jeopardizes the operation to be reportable pursuant to of equipment necessary - t.hoontrolled entry of a toxic RP/0/B/1000/17. Hazardous to establish and maintain stestance or flanumable gas.

Sahstance Release cold shutdown into any area of the plant eAich prevents the operatiro ,

of ocpipment necessary to establish and maintain hot stastdown i

_, sq A.

CMIP-12 EtCLOS:

T E 4.1.10 PAGE II of 32 OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CONDITIOpG SITE ARE A EMERGENCY GEMERAL EMERGENCY LDAEUAL EVENT ALERT OTER PLANT CGWITTIBES EXIST 1. OTER PUMT CEBeITIEDG bGST ECCS IMITIATED 1. OTER PLANT CIBeITIOp6 EXIST 1.

FREBt 9084TEVUt aumT TMAT MilEE

1. THAT MARRANT CLASS 3FICATIEDt OF A T1 TAT V W PitECAUTJtDeARY N F A K LEASE OF N CLASS JCATitDe OF A88 ALTNT SITE AAEA DEREE)CY ApelatT5 OF SEASIGACTIVITY IN A (PERATDE fG E: FDER MTRATitDG

- Esmerpecy Coordanator or Recovery SetDWT TIPE PERIOD

- ES systemiss required to be - Er .,rtrauncy Coordanator

  • ftanager judgn=nnt operable per TS judrpent - Emerspency actacns per the t.HC EVACUATTG4 OF (IDrillDL REXM EOP inedequate core cooling 2.

Automisc or marual ES 2. EVACUATTED4 OF CIDtTitDL RotDe section are msuccessful -

actuation on VALID sicpal er -

CETC > 1200* F

- Evacuataan of Control Room - Evacuat2on of Control Room indication Ape Ape Afe Heter injected to RCS or core unit beirwi mmintained at hot thit comot be sumintained at shutdown f rom the Ataciliary as a result of ES actuation hot shutdown from the shutdown Panel e.briliary shutdown panel

2. LfES OF EIDtTAD#ENT INTTCRITY Rf 4tJTRDE SIRTI1EDet BY TS 3. LOSS OF ASS [S3R3tT

- LMs t shutdown 2nitanted per EFERATDE teDE: HEIT SNJTDG94 TS 3.6 ICentainment Integrityi T15tU FGER OPERATICDG

- Loss of 50% or ow>re of a 1D55 OF ES ITAT1stE OR FIRE mit's applicable statalern 3.

F5tDTECTICM SYSTDI T1DCTION panels for > 15 minutes RE*JtfINDE SMITDGee BY TS APPtJCABLE STATALAfEH PAfELS

- Unit stoicbwn initiated per TS 3.3 IES systeest (MIT 143 1 sal-9, 14-16, 16

- Unit shutdown initiated per 3SA1-9, 14-16, 18 TS 3.17 (Fire Prefection LMIT 2 Systems includes groowee 2 sal-9, 14-16 Hydrol fctrwi innperable l

i l

z,

..~

,.m _

i- .

ENCLOSURE 4.1.10 - CPGP-12 ~

..OTHER ABNORMAL PLANT CtmOITIONS - PAGE 12 of 12? -

LNf2JAL EVENT ALERT SITE ARE A EPERGENCY GENERAL EFENGOCY ' '~

?

  • A 23GHf 3CAffT LIISS OF N 3. TMDE MKLMBE FLN a DR CIB98DelCA11tBI CAPABILITY

- TB flood regtJarang use of AP/1.2,3/A/1700/10 procedtsre

- Loss of accident monitoring in- unecntrollable Flooding of Turbine Building

  • strsmentation iTable 3.5.6-1:

and init shutdown initiated per TS 3.5.6

- Loss of ONS comwamications capability with all Offsite Agencies from the' Control Room

5. TREA17HET OF P' TMpeEL AT-

, .OFFSITE MGSP.aAL

- Decontamination offorts fail to reduce enternal contamination below 150 com l beta-gama j - M-Rad Protection determines that

, radiological antrols are required for offsite medical

, treatment

- Interrini contamination t requ'eing medical assessment / '

trea ment

- Extemal exposure recpJiring medical assessment / treatment 4

i

- - -,1 e. r

CMIP-12 7

Enclosure 4,2 Page 1 of 1

( AREA MONITORS Mr/Hr Monitor Number Unf1_1 Unit 2 Unit 3 RIA-1 10 10 (RB) RIA-4 40,000 55,000 80,000 RIA-7 25,000 RIA-8 40,000 RIA-9 15,000 RIA-10 15,000 35,000 50,000 RIA-11 10,000 20,000 RIA-12 35,000 40,000 RIA-13 45,000 50,000 RIA-15 NIS 25,000 PROCESS MONITORS CPM Monitor Number un11_1 Unit 2 Unit 3 RIA-31 1,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-47 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-48 10,000,000 10,000,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-49 1,400,000 1,400,000 1,000,000 (RB) RIA-49A 5,000 5,000 5,000 RIA-51 1,000,000 1.,000,000

1

  • CMiP-12

. Enclosure 4,3 4

TERMINATION CRITERIA f-

1. Existing conditions no longer meet the emergency classification criteria and it appears unlikely that conditions will deteriorate further.

2, No surveillance relative to off-site protective actions is needed, except for the control of foodstuffs and water, and off-site contamination, or environmental assessment activities.

3. Radiation levels in affected in plant areas are stable or decreasing to below acceptable levels,
4. Releases of radioactive material to the environment greater than Technical Specifications are under control or have ceased.
5. The potential for an uncontrolled release of radioactive material is at an acceptably low level.
6. Containment pressure is within Technical Specification requirements.
7. Adequate long-term core cooling is available.
8. Adequate shutdown margin of the core has been verified.

9, A fire, flood, earthquake or similar emergency condition is controlled or has ceased.

10. Offsite power is available per Technical Specifications.
11. Any contaminated / injured personnel have been transported offsite and are receiving appropriate medical care,

, 12. All emergency action level notifications have been completed.

L 13. Access to radiologically controlled areas of the plant necessary for I

operation during recovery are being monitored by the Radiation Protection Section.

l 14. Offsite conditions will not limit access of personnel and support l resources.

15. Discussions have been held with the News Director to determine the impact of termination on public information management.

l

16. Discussions have been held with Senior NRC and State Representatives to determile the impact of termination on their activities.

l

, - ..w-.

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