ML20217F284

Rev 7 to DPC Nuclear Security & Contingency Plan, for Oconee,Mcguire & Catawba Nuclear Stations

ML20217F284
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee, Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire
Issue date:	04/20/1998
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19044A111	List: ML20217F284
References
PROC-980420, NUDOCS 9804280118
Download: ML20217F284 (47)

Text

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Duke Power Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan Resision 7 Upon the receipt of Revision 7, remove all pages in the tabbed divider labeled Appendix 6 and insert all Revision 7 pages. Record the insertion of Revision 7 in the Record of Changes section. Upon implementation of the security modification and as directed by the Security Manager or designec, remove all the pages in Appendix 6 and insert the pages into the main body of the Plan in accordance with the following instructions.

Remove These Pages Insert These Pages Revision 6 Synopsis of Changes Revision 7 Synopsis of Changes LOEP LOEP l of 3 l of 3 ,

20f3 20f3 3 of 3 3 of 3 1

IQC- IQC 1

TOC-1 thru TOC-8 TOC-1 thru TOC-7

?

! Ir![roduction Introduction l

l l-2 1-2 i

Chapter 15 Chapter 15 l

f-1 thru 5-12 5-1 thru 5-15 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 6-2 thru 6-6 6-2 thru 6-6 Chapter 8 Chapter 8 8-15 thru 8-20 8-15 thm 8-20 Chapter 9 Chapter 9 9-11 9-11 I

9-12 9-12 9804280118 980420 PDR ADOCK 05000269 F PDR l

i 1

t Duko Power Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan Revision 7 Synopsis of Changes Item Section Page Description of Change 1 TOC TOC-2, Changed the page reference for various l TOC-3 sections that were affected by Revision l 7.

l 2 Intro 1-2 Added the drawing references for the Personnel Access Portal entry control

equipment previously located in section l 5.1.1.

l 3 5.1.1 5-1 1"* paragraph, 2nd sentence. Deleted l " automated" and added " access control".

This sentence was changed for readability only.

4 5.1.1 5-1 l paragraph, 3" sentence. Deleted "and are a component of the access control system." Although the hand geometry readers are considered a component of the access control system, this statement is considered unnecessary.

l l 5 5.1.1 5-1 2"* paragraph, 1** sentence. Added l " consecutive". Deleted "/ system". The reader rejects any additional attempts by the rejected hand. The system does I not reject any additional attempts.

Added sentence to state "The individual

, may select another reader in the PAP and i try again or wait until another individual uses the initial reader."

6 5.1.1 5-1 2"d paragraph. Added "if necessary" to the end of the sentence. Since the main j problem encountered is the improper I placement of the employee's hand in the I hand geometry unit, this problem is usually easily diagnosed and resolved ]

without requiring a security officer to )

be dispatched. The need to dispatch a j security officer to the area will be i evaluated on a case-by-case basis. l 1

Page 1 of 7

t Duko Powar Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan Revision 7 Synopsis of Changes 7 5.1.1 5-2 3" paragraph. Restructured the 3" paragraph for readability.

8 5.1.1 5-2 Deleted the "[Oconee] Except where glass

..." paragraph. As part of the access control system modification, these doors were removed and replaced with electrically operated entry turnstiles which meet protected area barrier criteria. Entry turnstiles allow personnel entry into the protected area.

9 5.1.1 5-2 Delete the bottom paragraph starting

" (Ca tawba ) The exit turnstile is mechanically operated...." It was replaced with an electric turnstile as part of the access control modification.

10 5.1.1 5-3 4" paragraph. 1"' sentence . Revised this sentence to indicate that the controlled doors have mechanical locking capability and turnstiles can be secured using a electro-mechancial lock that prevents a valid security badge swipe from unlocking the turnstile.

11 5.1.1 5-3 4" paragraph, last sentence. Deleted the word " Entrance" so this sentence is applicable to both entrance and exit turnstiles.

12 5.1.1 5-3 Deleted the [McGuire] paragraph on the North Personnel Access Portal (PAP).

After completion of the security modifications, the North PAP will no longer be used to process personnel into the protected area.

13 5.1.1 5-3 Deleted the drawing references in section 5.1.1. The Introduction section was revised to include these drawing references. The drawings referenced in the Introduction section are available at the site for review by the 1 C.

Page 2 of 7

i Duko Powar Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan Revision 7 Synopsis of Changes 14 5-4 There are no content changes on these thru pages. Due to the restructuring and/or 5-5 deletion of text in previous sections, the text on these pages was shifted.

15 5.2 5-6 2 "d paragraph. Changed the word

" capability" to " ability". The two-way intercom can be placed in the continuous

, mode.

l l 16 5-7 There are no content changes on these thru pages. Due to the restructuring and/or 5-8 deletion of text in previous sections, the text on these pages was shifted. j 17 5.3 5-9 "" paragraph, 5 th sentenCO. Added "and the turnstile rotated". The security l badge must be swiped in the card reader and the turnstile rotated for the security badge to be de-activated.

18 5-10 There are no content changes on these l pages. Due to the restructuring and/or I deletion of text in previous sections, the text on this page was shifted. l 19 5.3 5-11 In (5) section, changed the reference to RG 5.12, section c.8(a) to exclude the l twice per year change-out requirement.

l This change is based on the provisions of SECY-96-248.

20 5.3 5-12 Reworded the next to the last paragraph, last sentence to state "Upon discovery of a security badge being lost or stolen, that individual security badge shall immediately be prohibited from acceptance by the access control system." Action to prohibit from acceptance by the access control system is required for lost or stolen badges inside or outside the protected area.

l l Page 3 of 7 l

1 l

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Duko Powcr Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan Revision 7 Synopsis of Changes 21 5.3.1 5-12 Deleted the l't sentence. Multiplexers are not used in the new security system.

Access control hardware for the new access control system is operated in the computer control or local door control modes only. Revised the 2" sentence.

Compensatory measures are required in the event of failure or degraded operation beyond the local door control mode.

22 5.4 5-13 1"' paragraph. Changed the reference to RG 5.12, section c.8(a) to exclude the twice per year change-out requirement.

This change is based on the provisions of SECY-96-248. This same change was made in Revision 6. Section 5.4 text in the main body of the Plan was changed in Revision 6; however, the Revision 5 insert pages in Appendix 6 (section 5.4) was not changed. This omission was made in error.

23 5.4.1 5-14 l't paragraph. Deleted the sentence requiring all keys, locks and combinations to be changed or rotated at least annually. This same change was made in Revision 6. Section 5.4.1 text in the main body of the Plan was changed in Revision 6; however, the Revision 5 insert pages in Appendix 6 (section 5.4.1) was not changed. This omission was made in error.

d 24 6.2.1 6-2 3 paragraph. Security badges are no longer coded to indicate the areas of access. Revised the last sentence to reflect this change.

25 6-3 There are no content changes on this page. Due to the restructuring and/or deletion of text in previous sections, the text on this page was shifted.

Page 4 of 7 l

Duko Power Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan Revision 7 Synopsis of Changes 26 6.3 6-4 1"' paragraph, 2 "d sentence. Deleted

" coded to indicate authorized areas of access". The picture identification badge is not coded with this information. The security access control system computer database contains information on the authorized areas of access.

27 6.3 6-4 2 "d paragraph. Deleted the details on the old Honeywell 4400 access control system and described the features of the new security computer and video badge network. The new security badge is encoded with the users identification number in a secure, encrypted format.

The security badge does not visually indicate it is a Catawba, McGuire or Oconee Nuclear Station badge and does not provide color coding indicating either protected or vital area access authorization. This information is located in the security access control system computer database.

28 6.3 6-4 2 "d paragraph, last sentence. Added "except NRC personnel". Expiration dates will be not assigned to NRC personnel granted unescorted access to the protected area to ensure their security badges will not be placed on hold after 10 days.

29 6-5 There are no content changes on these thru pages. Due to the restructuring and/or 6-6 deletion of text in previous sections, the text on these pages was shifted.

30 8.4 8-15 Revised the entire section. Since alarm sensors and transmission lines are signal supervised, deleted the section pertaining to providing equivalency protection for alarm sensors and ransmission lines NOT supervised.

Page 5 of 7

Duke Power Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan Revision 7 Synopsis of Changes 31 8-16 There are no content changes on this page. Due to the restructuring and/or deletion of text in previous sections, the text on this page was shifted.

32 8.5.2 8-17 2 "d sentence. Replaced the word

" constructed" with the word " required".

The SAS is constructed to meet the criteria for a vital area but is not required to meet the criteria for a vital area.

33 8.5.2 8-17 Added a site specific sentence for McGuire and Catawba to state that the SAS meets the physical structure requirements for bullet-resisting. The SAS structure at McGuire has been upgraded to meet bullet-resisting criteria.

34 8.5.3 8-18 2 "d paragraph, 1*' sentence. Deleted "and hardwired to Beta annunciator panel located in the CAS/SAS." The Beta annunciators are not used in the new security system. 2 "d sentence. Deleted "and PAP" since output devices are now located in the CAS/SAS only. Due to changes in the access control system, a security computer output device is not needed in the PAP.

35 8.5.3 8-18 Added a new 3'd paragraph to address additional alarm monitoring capability for the perimeter intrusion detection system via a separate stand alone computer located in the Central Alarm Station.

"d 36 8.5.3 8-19 paragraph. Revised this paragraph to discuss the controls established to prevent unauthorized changes to security computer programs and tables. These controls are different from the controls used for the old Honeywell 4400 security computer.

Page 6 of 7

Duko Pow 0r Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan Revision 7 Synopsis of Changes "d

37 8.5.3 8-20 paragraph, last sentence. Deletect the last sentence that begins "If the security processor fails..".

This sentence discussed hardwired annuncimtor panels which are no longer used. These hardwire inputs have been replaced by an additional host computer alarm processing capability.

38 9.2.7 9-11 Added " performance" to the 1*' sentence to clarify this is a performance test.

Added a requirement for an operability test of the hand geometry units every seven (7) days.

39 9-12 There are no content changes on this page. Due to the restructuring and/or deletion of text in previous sections, the text on this page was shifted.

Page 7 of 7

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Revision Pace Revision Record of Chances 4-14 Rev. 2 4-15 Rev. 3 1 of 1 Rev. O Chapter 5.0 LOEP l 5-1 Rev. 7 1 of.3 Rev. 7 5-2 Rev. 7 2 of 3 Rev. 7 5-3 Rev. 7 3 of 3 Rev. 7 5-4 Rev. 7 5-5 Rev. 7 Table of Contents 5-5 Rev. 7 5-7 Rev. 7 TOC-1 Rev. 7 5-8 Rev. 7 TOC-2 Rev. 7 5-9 Rev. 7 TOC-3 Rev. 7 5-10 Rev. 7 TOC-4 Rev. 7 5-11 Rev. 7 TOC-5 Rev. 7 5-12 Rev. 7 TOC-6 Rev. 7 5-13 Rev. 7 TOC-7 Rev. 7 5-14 Rev. 7 5-15 Rev. 7 Chapter 1.0 Chaoter 6.0 1-1 Rev. 2 1-2 Rev. 7 6-1 Rev. 2 6-2 Rev. 7 Chapter 2.0 6-3 Rev. 7 6-4 Rev. 7 2-1 Rev. 2 6-5 Rev. 7 6-6 Rev. 7 Chaoter 3.0 Chaoter 7.0 3-1 Rev. 2 3-2 Rev. 2 7-1 Rev. 2 3-3 Rev. 2 7-2 Rev. 2 3-4 Rev. 2 7-3 Rev. 2 3-5 Rev. 2 7-4 Rev. 2 7-5 Rev. 2 Chaoter 4.0 7-6 Rev. 2 i 7-7 Rev. 2 4-1 Rev. 2 7-8 Rev. 2 4-2 Rev. 2 7-9 Rev. 2  ;

4 Rev. 2 7-10 Rev. 2 i 4-4 Rev. 2 7-11 Rev. 2 l 4-5 Rev. 2 7-12 Rev. 2  ;

4-6 Rev. 2 l 4-7 Rev. 2 Chapter 8.0 I 4-8 Rev. 2 4-9 Rev. 2 8-1 Rev. 2 .

4-10 Rev. 2 8-2 Rev. 2 l 4-11 Rev. 2 8-3 Rev. 2 >

4-12 Rev. 2 8-4 Rev. 2 4-13 Rev. 2 8-5 Rev. 2 8-6 Rev. 2 Rev. 7 l Page 1 of 3

Eagg Revision Pagg Revision 8-7 Rev. 2 Chapter 13.0 8-8 Rev. 2 8-9 Rev. 2 13-1 Rev. 2 8-10 Rev. 2 13-2 Rev. 2 8-11 Rev. 2 8-12 Rev. 2 Chaoter 14.0 8-13 Rev. 2 8-14 Rev. 2 14-1 Rev. 2 8-15 Rev. 7 14-2 Rev 2 8-16 Rev. 7 14-3 Rev. 2 8-17 Rev. 7 14-4 Rev. 2 8-18 Rev. 7 8-19 Rev. 7 Chanter 15.0 8-20 Rev. 7 15-1 Rev. 2 Chapter 9.0 15-2 Rev. 2 15-3 Rev. 2 9-1 Rev. 2 15-4 Rev. 2 9-2 Rev. 2 15-5~ Rev. 2 9-3 Rev. 2 15-6 Rev. 2 9-4 Rev. 2 15-7 Rev. 2 9-5 Rev. 2 9-6 Rev. 2 Chanter 16.0 9-7 Rev. 2 9-8 Rev. 2 16-1 Rev. 2 9-9 Rev. 2 16-2 Rev. 2 9-10 Rev. 2 16-3 Rev. 2 9-11 Rev. 7 16-4 Rev. 2 9-12 Rev. 7 16-5 Rev. 2 16-6 Rev. 2 Chaoter 10.0 16-7 Rev. 2 {

10-1 Rev. 2 ADoendix 1 10-2 Rev. 2 10-3 Rev. 2 I-1 Rev. 2 I-2 Rev. 2 )

Chanter 11.0 I-3 Rev. 2 I-4 Rev. 2 11-1 Rev. 2 I-5 Rev. 2 11-2 Rev. 2 I-6 Rev. 2 11-3 Rev. 2 I-7 Rev. 2 I-8 Rev. 2 Chapter 12.0 ADoendix 2 12-1 Rev. 2 12-2 Rev. 2 -II-1 Rev. 4 12-3 Rev. 2 II-2 Rev. 4 12-4 Rev. 2 II-3 Rev. 6 12-5 Rev. 2 II-4 Rev. 4 12-6 Rev. 2 II-5 Rev. 4 12-7 Rev. 2-12-8 Rev. 2 Rev. 7 Page 2 of 3 J

4 Pace Revision Page Revision Anoendix 3 IV-28 Rev. 2 IV-29 Rev. 2 III-1 Rev. 2 IV-30 Rev. 2 III-2 Rev. 2 IV-31 Rev. 2 III-3 Rev. 2 IV-32 Rev. 2 III-4 Rev. 2 IV-33 Rev. 2 III-5 Rev. 2 IV-34 Rev. 2 III-6 Rev. 2 IV-35 Rev. 2 III-7 Rev. 2 IV-36 Rev. 2 III-8 Rev. 2 III-9 Rev. 2 Anoendix 5 III-10 Rev. 2 III-11 Rev. 2 V-1 Rev. 2 III-12 Rev. 2 V-2 Rev. 2 III-13 Rev. 2 V-3 Rev. 2 III-14 Rev. 2 III-15 Rev. 2 Glossary of Terms III-16 Rev. 2 III-17 Rev. 2 GOT-1 Rev. 2 III-18 Rev. 2 GOT-2 Rev. 2 III-19 Rev. 2 GOT-3 Rev. 2 III-20 Rev. 2 GOT-4 Rev. 2 III-21 Rev. 2 Anoendix 4 IV-1 Rev. 2 IV-2 Rev. 2 IV-3 Rev. 2 IV-4 Rev. 2 IV-5 Rev. 2 IV-6 Rev. 2 IV-7 Rev. 2 IV-8 Rev. 2 IV-9 Rev 2 l IV-10 Rev. 2 l IV-11 Rev. 2 IV-12 Rev. 2 IV-13 Rev. 2 IV-14 Rev. 2 IV-15 Rev. 2 IV-16 Rev. 2 IV-17 Rev. 2 IV-18 Rev. 2 IV-19 Rev. 2 IV-20 Rev. 2 IV-21 Rev. 2 IV-22 Rev. 2 IV-23 Rev. 2 IV-24 Rev. 2 IV-25 Rev. 2 IV-26 Rev. 2 IV-27 Rev. 2 Rev. 7 Page 3 of 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1-1 2.0 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 2-1 3.0 ORGANIZATION 3-1 3.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY ORGANIZATION 3-1 3.2 SECURITY ORGANIZATION MANI.GEMENT 3-1 3.3 QUALIFICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT IN SECURITY 3-3 ,

3.4 STATION PERSONNEL TRAINING  !

3-3 '

3.5 SECURITY EQUIPMENT 3-4 4.0 BARRIERS 4-1 4.1 PROTECTED AREA 4-1 4.1.1 Compensatory Measures 4-2 4.2 CABLE TRENCH COVERS 4-3 4.3 VITAL AREA 4-4 4.3.1 Compensatory Measures 4-5 4.3.2 HVAC Penetration Protection 4-6 4.3.3 Bullet Resistant Material Qualification 4-7 4.3.3.1 Sample Size 4-8 4.3.3.2 Ballistic Specification 4-8 4.3.3.3 Sample Mounting 4-9 4.3.3.4 Environmental Conditions 4-9 4.3.3.5 Conduct of Test 4-9 i

4.3.3.6 Acceptance 4-10 4.3.4 Devitalization 4-10 4.4 SECURITY ACCESS AREAS 4-12 i

~

4.4.1 Compensatory Measures 4-13 4.4.2 Access Control During Unit Outages 4-13 Rev. 7 TOC-1

~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.5 ISOLATION ZONES 4-13 5.0 ENTRY CONTROLS 5-1 5.1 PROTECTED AREA 5-1 l

5.1.1 Personnel Access Portal (PAP) 5-1 5.1.2 Cargo Access Portal (CAP) 5-3 l 5.1.3 Vehicle Access Portal (VAP) 5-4 l 5.2 PERMIT / CONCUR FUNCTION 5-5 l 5.2.1 Permit / Concur compensatory Measures 5-7 5.3 VITAL AND SECURITY ACCESS AREA 5-8 5.3.1 Degraded CAD Key System 5-12 5.4 MECHANICAL LOCKS 5-13 l 5.4.1 Restrictions to Keys, Locks and Combinations 5-14 l 6.0 ACCESS 6-1 >

'6.1 PERSONNEL RELIABILITY 6' 6.2 PERSONNEL ACCESS 6-1 6.2.1 Unescorted 6-1 6.2.2 Escorted 6-3 6.3 SECURITY BADGES 6-4 l 1

6.4 VEHICLE ACCESS 6-5 7.0 SEARCH 7-1 I 7.1- PERSONNEL 7-1 7.2 PACKAGE / MATERIAL 7-4 7.3 UTILIZATION OF SECURITY SEALS 7-5 7.4 VEHICLE 7-12 Rev. 7 TOC-2

TABLE OF CONTENTS 8.0 DETECTION AIDS 8-1 8.1 ILLUMINATION 8-1 8.1.1 Exceptions to Illumination Requirements 8-2 8.1.2 Compensatory Measures for Degraded Illumination 8-3 8.2 CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION 8-3 8.2.1 Compensatory Measures for Degraded Closed 8-5 Circuit Television 8.3 INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 8-5 8.3.1 Protected Area Perimeter IDS 8-5 8.3.1.1 Degraded Protected Area Perimeter IDS 8-7 8.3.1.2 False and Nuisance Alarm Rates 8-8 8.3.2 Protected Area Portal IDS 8-8 8.3.2.1 Degraded Protected Area Portal IDS 8-9 8.3.2.2 Duress Alarm 8-9 8.3.3 Vital Area Portal IDS 8-9 8.3.3.1 Degraded Vital Area Portal IDS 8-10 8.3.4 Security Access Area Portal IDS 8-10 8.3.4.1 Degraded Security Access Area Portal IDS 8-11 8.3.5 Security Power System 8-11 8.3.5.1 Degraded Security Power System 8-14 8.4 TAMPER INDICATION AND SELF-CHECKING CAPABILITIES 8-15 8.5 CENTRAL ALARM STATION AND SECONDARY ALARM STATION 8-15 l OPERATION 8.5.1 Central Alarm Station Physical Structures 8-15 l 8.5.2 Secondary Alarm Station Physical Structures 8-17 l 8.5.3 Alarm and Surveillance Monitoring Hardware 8-18 l 8.5.4 Staffing 8-19 l Rev. 7 TOC-3

• 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS  !

l 9.0 PATROLS. TESTING AND INSPECTIONS 9-1 9.1 PATROLS 9-1 l l

9.1.1 Owner Controlled Area 9 -1 .

1 9.1.2 Protected Area 9-1 l 9.1.3 Vital Area 9-2 9.2 TESTING 9-3 9.2.1 Protected Area IDS 9-3 9.2.1.1 Operability Test 9-3 9.2.1.2 Performance Test 9-3 9.2.1.3 Tamper Test 9-4 9.2.2 Vital and Security Access Area IDS 9-4 9.2.2.1 Operability Test 9-4

- 9.2.2.2 Performance Test 9-5 9.2.2.3 Tamper Test 9-5 l 9.2.3 Special Purpose Detectors 9-6 9.2.3.1 Walk Through Weapons Detector 9-6 I 9.2.3.2 Hand Held Weapons Detector 9-8 9.2.3.3 Walk Through Explosives Detector 9-8 9.2.3.4 X-Ray Equipment 9-9 j j 9.2.4 Communications Equipment 9-9 I 9.2.5 Closed Circuit Television 9-10 l

9.2.6 Firearms 9-11 l 9.2.7 Hand Geometry Units 9-11 9.3 INSPECTIONS 9-11 9.3.1 Protected Area, Vital Area, and Security 9-11 Access Area Rev. 7 TOC-4 L.._..

. TABLE OF CONTENTS 10.0 COMMUNICATIONS 10-1 1 10.1 CENTRAL ALARM STATION AND SECONDARY ALARM STATION10-1 10.2 TELEPHONE SYSTEM 10-1 10.3 OTHER COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 10-2 10.4 COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR DEGRADED ONSITE RADIO 10-2 10.5 COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR DEGRADED OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS 10-3 11.0 AUDITS AND REVIEWS 11-1 11.1 SECURITY PROGRAM AUDITS 11-1 11.2 STATION PROGRAM REVIEW 11-1 11.3 SECURITY AND CONTINGENCY PLAN, TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PLAN AND PROCEDURE REVIEWS 11-2 12.0 RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 12-1 12.1 GENERIC PLANNING BASE 12-1

12.2 BACKGROUND

AND GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 12-2 12.2.1 Perceived Danger 12-2 12.2.2 Purpose of the Plan 12-3 12.2.3 Scope of the Plan 12-4 12.3 RESPONSE PLANNING 12-4 12.4 LICENSEE PLANNING BASE 12-6 12.4.1 Response Force Availability 12-6 12.4.2 Authority Of Armed Security Officers To Use Weapons 12-6 12.4.3 Local Law Enforcement Liaison 12-7 13.0 SPECIAL SITUATIONS AFFECTING SECURITY 13-1 13.1 REFUELING / MAJOR MAINTENANCE 13-1 13.2 CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE 13-2 Rev. 7 TOC-5

l TABLE OF CONTENTS 10.0 COMMUNICATIONS 10-1 10.1 CENTRAL ALARM STATION AND SECONDARY ALARM STATION 10-1 10.2 TELEPHONE SYSTEM 10-1 10.3 OTHER COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 10-2  !

I 10.4 COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR DEGRADED ONSITE RADIO 10-2 1 10.5 COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR DEGRADED OFFSITE 10-3 COMMUNICATIONS i

11.0 AUDITS AND REVIEWS 11-1  !

l 11.1 SECURITY PROGRAM AUDITS 11-1 11.2 STATION PROGRAM REVIEW 11-1

)

11.3 SECURITY AND CONTINGENCY PLAN, TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PLAN AND PROCEDURE REVIEWS 11-2 12.0 RESPONSE CAPABILITIES 12-1 12.1 GENERIC PLANNING BASE 12-1

12.2 BACKGROUND

AND GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 12-2 12.2.1 Perceived Danger 12-2 12.2.2 Purpose of the Plan 12-3 i

12.2.3 Scope of the Plan 12-4 l 12.3 RESPONSE PLANNING 12-4

! 12.4 LICENSEE PLANNING BASE 12-6 l

12.4.1 Response Force Availability 12-6 12.4.2 Authority Of Armed Security Officers To Use 12-6 Weapons 12.4.3 Local Law Enforcement Liaison 12-7 13.0 SPECIAL SITUATIONS AFFECTING SECURITY 13-1 l 13.1 REFUELING / MAJOR MAINTENANCE 13-1 f 1

13.2 CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE 13-2 l Rev. 7 TOC-5

TABLE OF CONTENTS 14.0 SUSPENSION OF SECURITY MEASURES 14-1 14.1 DURING STATION EMERGENCY 14-1 14.1.1 Authority 14-1 14.1.2 Conditions 14-2 14.1.3 Types of Measures That Can Be Suspended 14-2 14.1.4 Reporting Suspension of Security Measures 14-2 14.1.5 Use of Escorts 14-3 14.2 DURING RESPONSE DRILLS OR EXERCISES 14-3 14.2.1 Conditions 14-3 14.2.2 Types of Measures To Be Waived 14-4 15.0 STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM 15-1 15.1 DEGRADED STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY OPERATIONS 15-1 16.0 RECORDS 16-1 16.1 DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY 16-1 16.2 SECURITY JOURNAL 16-1 16.3 ALARM OCCURRENCES 16-2 16.4 UNESCORTED ACCESS 16-2 16.5 ESCORTED ACCESS 16-3 16.6 VITAL AREA ACCESS LOGGING 16-3 16.7 MONTHLY ACCESS REVIEW 16-4 16.8 KEY CONTROL 16-4 16.9 LLEA LETTERS OF ASSISTANCE 16-4 16.10 RECORDS OF AUDITS 16-4 Rev. 7 TOC-6

TABLE OF CONTENTS 16.11 PERSONNEL RECORDS 16-5 16.11.1 Training 16-5 l 16.11.2 Personnel Screening l 16-5 16.11.3 Abnormal Behavior Training 16-5 16.11.4 Security Personnel 16-5 16.11.5 Records Required For Standby Shutdown 16-6 Facility Compensatory Measures 16.12 SECURITY EQUIPMENT RECORDS 16-6 16.12.1 Maintenance 16-6 16.12.2 Weapons Test Firing 16-7 16.12.3 Bullet Resisting Material 16-7 Appendix 1 List of Vital Areas, Equipment, Function I-1 or Material Appendix 2 Vehicle Barrier Systems .II-1 Appendix 3 Contingency Event Planning III-1 Appendix 4 Contingency Event Responsibility Matrix IV-1 Appendix 5 Safeguards and Information Control V-1 Glossary of Terms GOT-1 Acronyms and Abbreviations GOT-4 l

1 Rev. 7 TOC-7 l

l

General arrangement and site plot plan drawings which depict the

overall station protected area layout and vital /SAA boundaries are maintained at each nuclear site and are available upon request.

l The general arrangement and site plot plan drawings maintained are as follows:

l l CN-1399-01.35 MC 1040-1 0-5 CN-1100-2.3 MC 1040-2 0-6 CN-1300-04.03 MC 1040-3 0-7 CN-1040-18.1 MC 1040-4 0-8 i

CN-1001-01 MC 1040-5 0-9 l

CN-1300-04.02 MC 1040-6 0-10 CN-1040-6 MC 1040-7 0-11 l CN-1040-6.1 MC 1040-7.1 0-3-10 1

CN-1040-5 MC 1001-1 0-798-11 l l CN-1040-5.1 MC 1003-1.1 CN-1200-9.5 MC 1272-01.08 CN-1040-4 i

CN-1040-3 CN-1040-2 CN-1003.1.0 CN-1003-1.1 CN-1796-12.01-01 Each site's general proximity to nearby towns and site layout is depicted in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for each station.

Rev.7 1-2 I

l 5.0 ENTRY CONTROLS 5.1 PROTECTED AREA Points of personnel and vehicle access into the protected area I shall be controlled. Identification and search of all individuals, unless otherwise provided herein, shall be made and authorization shall be checked at the Personnel Access Portal (s) (PAP) prior to entry into the protected area.

5.1.1 Personnel Access Portal (PAP) )

i Personnel access portal (s). (PAP) shall be established for positive control of personnel by identification, badging and search prior to entry into the protected area.

Identification and access authorization is controlled by a security access control system consisting of redundant computers, local and remote control panels, encoded security badges, card readers, and hand geometry readers. Hand geometry readers are biometric identification devices which use hand geometry as a basis for identification. The hand geometry reader is tamper indicating and self checking. The system will perform to provide 90% probability of detection with 95% confidence as required by Regulatory Guide 5.44.

Protected Area access is controlled by security badges and card readers in conjunction with hand geometry readers, electrically controlled single access locked turnstiles, and member (s) of the security force.

Rev.7 5-1

If a hand geometry reader does not validate a hand and badge combination after three consecutive attempts, the reader rejects any additional attempts by the rejected hand and badge combination, an advisory alarm is annunciated in the CAS/SAS and a security officer is directed to the area for problem resolution, if necessary. The individual may select another reader in the PAP and try again or wait until another individual uses the initial reader.

Personnel access portal structures are designed and constructed such that the strength and integrity of the protected area barrier is not compromised. Electric locks utilized at these portals are provided with an independent source of power which will supply backup power to the locks within one second in the event of loss of normal power. A one way exit turnstile (does not allow access) and alarmed emergency exits are provided, as necessary, to allow free egress from the protected area.

In addition to access control hardware and alarms, all controlled doors are provided with mechanical locking capability. Turnstiles are provided with a electro-mechanical lock that can be placed in the locked mode which prevents a valid card swipe from unlocking the turnstile.

Electric locks on controlled doors automatically unlock upon loss of power; they are provided with mechanical locks with keys under the control of the security force when needed to

, Rev.7

compensate for degraded access control hardware or alarm function. Turnstiles fail to a mechanically locked position upon loss of power.

5.1.2 Cargo Access Portal (CAP)

Protected area cargo access portals (CAP's) provide for receipt of packages and other cargo into the protected area.

Positive entry control shall be maintained for all personnel, cargo and vehicles accessing through protected area cargo portals.

The cargo access portal is designed so that either exterior or interior building walls may be used as the protected area barrier, as operational needs dictate and shall be secured when not in use. During periods of inactivity at the CAP (no material being delivered into the protected area) the exterior wall, including portals in the wall, shall normally i

be designated as the protected area barrier.

I When operational necessity dictates, the interior / exterior '

building wall may be designated as the protected area barrier. Prior to the receipt of deliveries into the protected area, an armed security officer shall be posted at the CAP.

Rev.7 5-3

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i Packages / materials to be left unattended inside the CAP l

1 (exterior to the PA) shall be searched to the extent necessary to ensure they do not contain an individual /

intruder unless an intrusion detection system is installed adjacent to the interior walls.

Locks on Cargo access portal / doors shall be locked and alarmed and shall not automatically unlock on loss of power.

In addition, CAP roll up doors which are operable only from within the protected area may be used on cargo access portals.

Cargo access portals shall be operated by permit / concur I

control function between the armed security officer l l

physically attending the access portal and the security l officer stationed in the CAS or SAS.

5.1.3 Vehicle Access Portal (VAP)

Protected area vehicle access portals (VAP's) provide for receipt of packages and other cargo into the protected area.

( Positive entry control shall be maintained for all Rev.7 5-4

personnel, cargo and vehicles accessing the protected area vehicle portals.

Vehicle portals (gates) in the protected area fence shall be installed in a manner such that the integrity of the protected area barrier is not compromised.

Locks on vehicle access portals shall be of the electric lock type. On loss of power, locks shall not automatically unlock. In addition, motor operated gates operable only from within the protected area may be used on vehicle portals.

Vehicle access portals shall be operated by permit / concur control function between the armed security officer physically attending the access portal and the security officer stationed in the CAS or SAS. Where installed at vehicle access portals, hand geometry readers and card readers may be used for final access control of personnel (after completion of search requirements) with a security officer posted and under observance of the alarm station operator in the CAS or SAS.

5.2 FINAL ACCESS CONTROL FUNCTION Access to the protected area via the PAP is by electrically controlled, locked, full length turnstiles which operate in Rev.7 5-5

conjunction with the card readers and hand geometry readers.

Each entry into the protected area is under the observance of the final access control officer from within a bullet-resisting enclosure by direct observance or by dedicated closed circuit television. When final access control is performed from within an alarm station, the officer operating the alarm station shall not perform the final access control. The final access control officer has the ability to lock the turnstiles and summon response.

When final access control is performed from an alarm station (via dedicated CCTV), the final access control officer shall have the ability to hear, as well as, see activities at the PAP entrance turnstiles area.

For non-routine entry such as visitors, handicapped, etc.,

permit / concur may be accomplished by a security officer physically attending the turnstile / door and requesting an access from the final access control officer.

Cargo access portals (CAP's) and vehicle access portals (VAP's) shall be operated by permit / concur function between an armed security officer physically attending the portal and a security officer stationed in the CAS or SAS.

Personnel access through protected area gate (s) may be allowed by permit / concur function between the armed security officer attending the gate and a security officer stationed in the CAS or SAS. After initial entry through the PAP, Rev.7 5-6

1 4

operational needs may require an individual to exit the PA, i.e., VAP, CAP. If an individual exits the PA beyond the administrative boundary, and the badge is not read offsite, security must maintain control of the individual's security badge. Prior to Protected Area re-entry, security must make positive ID of individual (s) prior to re-issuing the badge.

5.2.1 Final Access Control Compensatory Measures I

j Compensatory measures for the lack of, or degraded operation of, the final access control function on a protected area portal shall include, as applicable, but not limited to:

I (a) Locking the portal with an electric or mechanical lock, or (b) Posting two (2) security officers, one of which will be armed - having continuous communication capability with the CAS and SAS, at the portal.

l Identification and authorization is performed using the security badge and a current access list.

Note: If permit / concur is degraded at a VAP/ CAP and personnel re-entry is required following initial entry at the PAP (and the security badge was retained by security upon exit),

1 utilization of access lists shall not be required at VAP/ CAP.

Rev.7 5-7

5.3 VITAL AND SECURITY ACCESS AREA l

All vital and security access area personnel access portals l

l shall be locked and alarmed to prevent unauthorized ingress to the vital area or security access area from the protected l

l area.

l Access portals shall be of substantial construction such that l the integrity of the vital area or security access area l barrier is not compromised. Where specific criteria, such as fire protection, personnel safety, or pressure boundaries exists for a vital area or security access area access portal, these considerations shall have precedence in the design of the portal. In the absence of other criteria, vital area personnel access portals may be constructed in accordance with accepted industry standards for doors in industrial / power station applications.

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\  : P' >--auma, s' ' ': L: ' : 4 There are no routine security posts associated with vital area I

or security access area personnel access portals.

Vital area vehicle portals shall be attended by an armed security officer when opened for access. The compensatory officer shall not be the vehicle escort if an escort is required for the vehicle.

Access to vital and security access areas is controlled by card readers or members of the security force. Individuals granted unescorted access are issued a security badge which functions as a key card for system card readers.

The security badge contains no access information. Procedures, software, hardware and physical controls are in place to preclude unauthorized access to, or a change to, the data bases. The PA is entered using both the card reader and the hand geometry at the entry turnstile. Egress is accomplished by using an exit card reader or through use of the security operator panel. Once the card reader has been used at the exit turnstile and the turnstile rotated the badge will not allow access to any system doors. The attempted use of the badge at l l

l Rev.7 l 5-9 l l

l i

other than the entrance card reader will create an alarm in the CAS/SAS.

Vital and security access area personnel access portals shall be provided with access control hardware which:

(1) Provides positive control of personnel access.

(2) Provides via the security processor a log indicating personal identification number, time of entry and exit and access portal identification. Manual logging is required when the access control system is inoperable.

Logging requirements do not apply to the Control Room or Security Access Areas.

(3) Provides warning of unauthorized access attempts.

Locks on personnel access portals shall be of the electric lock type designed to automatically unlock upon loss of power excluding gates which shall be mechanical locked and alarmed.

In addition to access control hardware and alarms, all vital and security access area portals shall be provided with a ,

mechanical lock and key system. These locks may remain unlocked with the keys under the control of the security force l unless needed to compensate for degraded access control hardware or alarm function. Electric locks shall " fail open" l

upon loss of power to the locks based upon the following '

justification:

(1) Reliable and uninterrupted power is provided to the locking system. Power feeders to the locks are from i

Rev.7 5-10

within the protected area. Locks will relock upon restoration of power provided that the door is closed and latched and the lock did not cause the power loss. Status of locked / unlocked position is provided.

(2) A separate independent sourcs of power shall be provided to the locks (fused in groups of not more than eight locks) which will supply backup power to the locks within one second in the event of loss of the power referred to  ;

in (1) above.

(3) Locks are mounted on the interior of the vital area portals and will alarm if opened.

(4) The security processor provides an indication in the CAS and SAS of locks which are being unlocked.

(5) Portals can be secured by mechanical locks that meet the requirements of section 5.4.1 of this Plan and Regulatory Guide 5.12, section B.2(a), (b), (c) and C.7, 8 (a) and (b) except for the twice per year change-out requirement in C.8.(a).

Specific details regarding the security processor and access control system are addressed in the Design Basis Document for the security system.

Security badges are uniquely encoded with an identification number and an encrypted validity code. Security processor logic requires security badges to be validated by the security computer system thrcugh the use of an entrance card reader in Rev.7 j 5-11 1

l conjunction with the hand geometry reader prior to allowing access. Security badges shall be assigned to a specific l individual. Authorized individuals retain possession of their assigned security badge when they exit the PA. Upon discovery of a security badge being lost or stolen, that individual security badge shall immediately be prohibited from acceptance by the access control system.

l The ACS and security computer rooms are administrative 1y controlled and do not meet vital area portal requirements.

5.3.1 Degraded Security Badge System l

In the event of failure or degraded operation beyond the local door control mode, compensatory measures shall be provided. Compensatory measures shall include, as l

applicable, but not be limited to:

l (a) Locking the portals to preclude access causing an alarm whenever the portal is opened, or I (b) In the event of limited failures, station security officers at the portal (s) utilizing personnel available for compensatory action, or (c) In the event of further degraded operation of the security badge system such that all security officers available for compensatory action are posted per (b),

Rev.7 5-12

4 establish a continuous patrol utilizing these security officers such that each vital area portal which cannot be secured, is patrolled at least once every seven (7) minutes and at least once every fifteen (15) minutes for security access areas. j 5.4 MECHANICAL LOCKS The mechanical lock and key system used for compensatory i

measures shall meet the requirements of section 5.4.1 of this Plan and Regulatory Guide 5.12, section B.2(a), (b), (c) and C.7, 8 (a) and (b) except for the twice per year change-out requirement in C.8.(a). . Mechanical locks and keys used for securing the protected area, vital areas or security access areas locks shall be controlled as follows:

(a) Keys shall be stored, when not in use by designated personnel or in the possession of security personnel, in a locked or sealed key locker in locations designated by the Site Security Manager or designee.

(b) Spare keys and locks shall be under the control of the Site Security Manager or his designee; storage of spare keys, and cores shall be in a facility secured by a lock meeting the requirements of USNRC Regulatory Guide 5.12 if stored outside the protected area. Spare keys, cores, and locks shall be inventoried annually (c) Keys shall be issued to authorized personnel only.

Rev.7 5-13

4 (d) Keys shall remain on site except when under the physical control of the station security force.

(e) Keys stored in sealed key containers shc11 be inventoried and accounted for each time the seal is broken, or at least annually. Keys stored in locked key containers shall be inventoried and accounted for once each seven (7) days. Locks and seals on key containers  ;

shall be checked at least once a day to insure their i

integrity. I 5.4.1 Restrictions to Keys, Locks and Combinations Keys, locks, combinations and related access control devices used for securing the protected area, vital areas or security access areas shall be issued only to those authorized individuals having unescorted access.

Whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock or combination has been compromised it shall be changed or rotated. Suspicion may be interpreted as the reasonable belief that compromise has occurred even though physical evidence has yet to be uncovered.

t Whenever an individual's unescorted access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness, reliability or inadequate work performance; keys, locks and combinations to which that person had access shall be changed or rotated.

Rev.7 5-14

The individual's security badge shall immediately be prohibited from acceptance by the access control system. In the case of an individual's involuntary termination for cause, the individual's unescorted access, security badge, and all entry devices shall be revoked prior to or simultaneously with notifying the individual of termination.

i

+

Rev.7 i

5-15

}

{

l l

an acceptable contractor / vendor access authorization I program. Establishment may be verbal. NRC personnel previously designated, in writing, by the Regional Administrator, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region l

II, as necessary for inspection of the station pursuant to 10 CFR 50.70, shall be considered authorized persons. In lieu of specification of need and authorization for access by the Regional Administrator, NRC Region II or his designee, determinition of authorizati(n and necessity for access shall be exercised by the Site V;ce President or designee (s).

Persons allowed access to the protected area shall bc identified prior to entry. Such identification shall include comparison of the individual with photo identification, such as photo drivers license or other similar document. Where such documents are unavailable, the Site Security Manager or designee (s) may verbally authorize access using other means of identification except for temporary cl.earance authorization which requires photo identification. ,

1 l

Need for unescorted access shall be re-established at least once each 31 days by cognizant licensee or non-licensee individuals designated by the Site Vice President.

Individuals granted unescorted access shall be issued a picture identification badge and assigned access to the following areas, as applicable:

Rev.7 6-2

i I

Area 1 -PROTECTED AREA ONLY. l l

Area 2 -VITAL AREA - Includes all vital areas and security access areas excluding control room and security areas.

Area 3 -CONTROL ROOM ONLY.

l Area 4 -SECURITY AREAS - Allows access to security areas which are IEEGYUYMd5bdEE((II$A[TEC;

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' ' Au> m- m s Individuals not authorized unescorted access to areas 2, 3 l

or 4 shall be escorted while within the area (s).

Administrative procedures are in place describing the methodology for personnel enrollment in and deletion from the electronic access control system. Administrative procedures ensure the names of personnel whose employment is terminated, for whatever reason, are purged from the system and that their security badge or other entry devices, if l applicable is/are retrieved. Any security badge which is i not recovered shall be treated as lost or stolen and shall be invalidated.

6.2.2 Escorted All persons requiring escort into the protected area shall be escorted by a person or persens allowed unescorted access.

The escort ratio shall not exceed one (1) to ten (10) for protected area access and one (1) to five (5) for vital and

(

f SAA access. The Site Security Manager may, in accordance Rev.7 6-3

4 with procedures, approve provisions allowing escort of more individuals than specified above provided an equivalent degree of protection against acts of radiological sabotage is assured.

6.3 SECURITY BADGES All personnel allowed access to the protected, vital areas, security access areas or security areas of the station shall be provided with a security badge, except under emergency conditions or during emergency response drills. Persons authorized access without escort shall be provided with a picture identification badge. Persons not allowed access without escort shall be badged to indicate an escort is J required. These (visitor) badges will be assigned a number which will be used for tracking by the security access control system. Visitor badges do not unlock security doors; however, visitor badges unlock exit turnstiles to allow protected area exit.

Picture badges shall be encoded with the users ID number in a I

secure, encrytped format for accountability. The badge consists of a photograph with the individual's name and badge number. The photograph provides a pictorial identification of the individual. The security computer badging information program shall indicate a badge expiration date for non-licensee personnel only, except for NRC personnel.

Rev.7 6- 4

Badges shall be displayed while inside the protected area.

The badge should be worn on the upper front portion of the body so as to be clearly visible (except when operational or l

Radiation Protection reasons dictate otherwise). I Authorized individuals retain possession of their assigned security badges when they exit the PA.

1 i

Security badges shall be assigned and controlled by approved '

procedures. Procedures shall include, but not be limited to, retrieval of terminated badges and accountability for lost and stolen badges.

6.4 VEHICLE ACCESS The site Security Manager or designee (s) shall designate those j vehicles pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 as not requiring escort while within the protected area.

Designated licensee vehicles shall be limited in their use to onsite plant functions and shall remain in the protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security and emergency purposes. l l

l I

l l

Rev.7 6-5

Licensee or contractor owned vehicles that are not normally assigned to onsite plant functions may be so designated as l

licensee vehicles temporarily for short periods (but not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) provided they are searched prior to entry and are subjected to the same controls as permanent licensee l

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l vehicles.

l l

All vehicles not designated for unescorted access shall be escorted by a security officer while within the protected area except under sciergency cotiditions. A vehicle escort is not required if the vehicle is immobilized.

l l

I I

l Rev.7 6-6

(b) In the event of loss of single or multiple security system components due to degradation of the security power system, compensatory measures shall be implemented at the affected systems as described in the~ appropriate

! section.

l 8.4 TAMPER INDICATION AND SELF-CHECKING CAPABILITIES Alarm sensors, transmission lines, and associated terminal boxes and cabinets shall be tamper indicating and self checking. Alarm sensors and transmission lines are signal supervised.

8.5- CENTRAL ALARM STATION AND SECONDARY ALARM STATION OPERATION Although equipment located in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) is not designated vital, the CAS shall be considered a viL61

[ area. Although not designated as a vital area, the Secondary l

l l

Alarm Station (SAS) shall be controlled as a vital area.

I 8.5.1 Central Alarm Station Physical Structures 1

i Personnel access portals into the Central Alarm Station shall be alarmed and provided with vital area access control hardware.

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Although not required to meet the criteria for vital areas, the SAS shall be controlled as a vital area. SAS personnel access portals shall be alarmed and provided with vital area access control hardware.

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8.5.3 Alarm and Surveillance Monitoring Hardware All intrusion detection hardware and associated tamper alarms required by this plan shall cause within one second of receipt of a stimulus, an alarm to occur in the CAS and SAS. The location and type of alarm shall be indicated.

Upon receipt of an alarm in the CAS, the CAS operator shall acknowledge the alarm, take immediate action to initiate an assessment of the alarm and direct appropriate response.

Alarm and surveillance monitoring hardware systems for intrusion and tamper alarms are integrated into a central processor. Output devices for the security processor are located at the CAS/SAS providing each location with that information necessary for efficie:2 operation.

All alarms required for security system implementation are monitored and initiated by a dual computer system which has )

i automatic failover capability from a host or current i operating computer to a back-up computer if a failu:re to the host is detected. In the unlikely event of a loss / degrade of both security computers (host and back-up), the perimeter intrusion detection system (IDS) is afforded additional alarm monitoring via a separate stand alone computer (PC) which is located in the Central Alarm Station. This PC also receives power from the uninterruptable security system power source. Due to the unlikely occurrence of the loss of

'Y' 8-18

both security computer systems, this stand alone PC does not have redundant alarm output capability to a secondary alarm station location. If necessary to implement IDS alarm monitoring utilizing this PC system, at least two alarm station operators will be assigned in the functioning alarm station (CAS).

Controls are established to preclude changes to programs and tables without proper authorization and control to include system application software development and maintenance performed by Duke Power Company personnel. The host security computer is located inside the protected area within an access controlled room. The computer is located in a locked and alarmed cabinet. The key to the cabinet is controlled by security. Personnel authorized to make changes to the computer must notify the CAS/SAS of the changes to be made and check out the key from security. A tamper alarm will be received in the CAS/SAS when the  !

security computer cabinet is opened. The alarm can be cleared after the cabinet is secured. The security system has several operator permission levels. The computer programmer must review the proposed changes to the computer with the appropriate security personnel prior to any changes. If security personnel agree with the program changes, security will allow the programmer access to the host computer. The programmer must log onto the host computer before changes can be made. Security processor 8-19 Rev. 7 l

1

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input / output terminals are located in the CAS and SAS and are under the control of station security personnel. Alarm points may be placed in access, secured or similiar modes from the CAS or the SAS. However, the non-controlling station shall be notified via the security processer (computer) of any changes to alarm status executed by the i

controlling station.  !

8.5.4 Staffing The Central Alarm Station shall be staffed by at least one (1) security officer at all times. Functions which would interfere with the continuous monitoring of alarm systems shall not be conducted within the CAS.

1 The Secondary Alarm Station shall be staffed at all times by at least one security officer; duties in addition to alarm j monitoring may be assigned to the SAS operator.

8-20 Rev. 7

s Full function cameras need not be tested except when they are i used as compensatory measures for degraded fixed cameras.

9.2.6 Firearms All firearms, whether individually issued to armed security officers or maintained under control for use in response to contingencies shall be test fired at least annually.

9.2.7 Hand Geometry Units l

All hand geometry units utilized for protected area access j shall be performance tested in accordance with manufacturers specifications annually or after repair / major maintenance.

The test shall ensure the unit will perform to provide 90%

probability of detection with 95% confidence. All hand geometry units shall be tested for operability every seven i

(7) days.

9.3 INSPECTIONS 9.3.1 Protected Area, Vital Area, and Security Access Area Barriers and portals shall be inspected at least once every seven (7) days except when operational, radiological or safety conditions prevent access. Station security procedures shall indicate these vital area portals which Rev. 7 9-11 l

4 cannot be inspected due to permanent radiological or safety hazards. In addition, security procedures shall provide a system to document vital area portals which cannot be inspected due to temporary radiological or safety hazards.

These inspections ensure physical barriers and access points are maintained in an operable and effective condition.

Inaccessible subterranean yard drain barriers shall be inspected at least once each quarter and after maintenance.

Accessible subterranean yard drain barriers when designated as a portion of the protected area barrier shall be inspected at least once every seven (7) days.

Rev. 7 9- 12