ML19259B807

Responds to Issues in PSAR & Suppl 1 to Ser.Have Completed Review of Purchasing Uncontrolled Mineral Interests within Exclusion Area of Facility.Util Now Controls All Mineral Interests within Exclusion Area

ML19259B807
Person / Time
Site:	Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date:	07/19/1978
From:	Eric Turner HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19259B805	List: ML19259B804 ML19259B806 ML19259B807
References
AC-HL-AE-253, NUDOCS 7903230182
Download: ML19259B807 (13)

Text

PTW1 Houston i ll0$ 1 Lighting hI & Power il$l

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Company l \: Electric Tower l b PO. Box 1700 ifa l M Houston,fcxas77001 July 19, 1978 AC-llL- AE-253 Mr. Edson G. Case Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission b'ashington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Case:

ALLENS CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-466 Exclusion Area Control In Supplement No.1 to the Safety Evaluation Report of the 4. lens Creek Nuclear Generating Station (June,1975) the NRC Staff noted that ilouston Lighting 6 Power Company was continuing its efforts to purchase uncontrolled mineral interests within the exclusion area (p. 2-1). Upon reactivation of the Allens Creek project, llLf,P advised the NRC that the exclusion area boundary had been changed and IILGP was in the prot ss of determining whether ad-ditional mineral interests would have to be acquired in the new exclusion area (PSA.'. Section 2.5.4.1.2) .

IlLGP has now completed its reviei of this matter and has deter-mined that it now controls all mineral interests within the exclusion area for the Allens Creek project.

Very truly you

/ *d. /N M E. A. Turner, Vice President Power Plant Construction and Technical Services Rh'L/ deb cc: P. A. Ilorn C. G. Thrash (Baker G Botts)

R. G. Gooch (Baker 6 Pot ts)

J. R. Newman (Lowenstein, Newman, Reis f, Axelrad) 2.1-2b Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

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ACNGS-PSAR The LoVaca Gathering Company (operator of the Texas Utilities Company pipeline) stated that it would take between 30 minutes and one hour to close both 24-inch pipeline valves after notification of a leak. 3 Q2.5 In the event of pipeline rupture gas would be detected (odor, visual obser- Q2.6 vation, sound, etc.) at the site by operating personnel. Both pipeline operating companies would be immediately notified.

!!ouston Lighting 6 Power Company will verify annually with the owners of nearby industrial pipelines to confirm that the pipelines are carrying or 51 planning to carry the substances indicated by the PSAR analyses. Should more volatile substances be carried in these lines, HLGP will provide a new analysis to the NRC for review. This commitment will be incorporated in the administrative technical specifications for the plant.

The future uses of these lines are anticipated to be the same as at present.

The lines are not for gas storage at higher than normal pressures.

2.2.1.4 Railroads Two railways pass close to the site. The most heavily traveled route, a branch of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, parallels State Highway 36 and passes about 4,650 feet west of the station, just outside of the restricted area (see Figure 2.2-1). It carries from 25 to 30 freight trains daily, each with about 25 to 100 cars. It also carries one passenger train 36 (U) in each direction daily; the number of passengers carried varies greatly, but averaged 70 passengers per train during a recent month (April,1977)

(Re f. 2. 2-6 and 2. 2-7) .

The less heavily traveled route, a branch of the Southern Pacific Transpor-tation Company, parnllels Farm to Market Road 1093 and passes over three ,

miJes south of the station. In early 1977, there were from two to four a6 (U) freight trains daily through h'allis, each with about 50 to 150 cars. The principal cargo is sand and gravel. Other commodities, such as liquefied petroleum gas and chemical fertilizer, are carried from time to time 36 (U)

(Re f. 2. 2-7) .

2.2-2a Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

ACNGS-PSAR 2.2.3.2 Gas Pipelines When relocated, the 24-inch Texas Utilitics Company pressurized natural gas line will pass about 9300 feet northeast of the nearest Category I structure. 38 (U)

The six-inch Shell I>ipeline Company liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) line as well as the 8-inch crude line pass about 8000 feet northwest of the nearest Category I sturcture (see Figure 2.2-2) .

The 24-inch Texas Utilities Company pipeline operates at a maximum flow rate of 2.5 x 108 ft3 / day at operating pressures ranging from 750 psi to 900 psi. The design operating pressure of the line is 975 psi.

The closest proximity of the line to any Category I plant structure is 9300 feet to the ultimate heat sink structure.

Neither the liquified petroleum gas line (LPG) nor the crude oil line be-longing to Shell Oil pass under the lake. The closest proximity of these lines to the lake is approximately 2500 ft from the lines to the dam. The 41 closes'. proximity between these lines and Category I plant structures is Q312.5 approximately 8000 feet. Q312.6 The consequences of a rupture in the LPG line at its closest point to plant Category I structures have been evaluated assuming worst atmospheric dis-persion as well as formation of a low lying non-dispersive petroleum cloud along the terrain depression outlined by the 140-foot isocline which fol-lows the Allens Creek into the lake.

The 6" LPG has been evaluated under the assumption of the line carrying pure propane and pure butane.

The hazards to the Allens Creek Plant Category I structures and cooling lake dike from detonations of gaseous clouds resulting from breaks in proximate natural and liquified petroleum gas lines have been analyzed using conservative but realistic models.

Results of the analyses which are presented in Appendix 2.2-A indicate that the plant's Category I structures will suffer no adverse effects from the consequences of any pipeline rupture and subsequent detonation of the cloud.

In the event that the applicant's analyses do not demonstrate the assurance recommended by Standard Review Plans 2.2.1-2.2.2 that the postulated rupture of the Shell 6" LPG line need not be considered as a design basis event, physical changes to the site and/or environs to provide such assurance will be made. No later than the submittal of the application for 51 an operating license, the applicant will provide for staff review and approval physical measures to cope with the potential hazard, if accep*.able resolution cannot be demonstrated by analysis or other alternate physical measures.

2.2-5 Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

ACNGS-PSAR EFFECTIVE PAGES LISTING CIIAPTER 3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SISTEMS Amendment No.

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ACNGS-PSAR EFFECTIVE PAGES LISTING CHAPTER 3 DESIv.i 0F STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS Page No. Amendment No.

3.7-28c 42 3.7-28d 42 3.7-29 35 3.7-30 44 3.7-31 35 3.7-32 35 3.7-32a 35 3.7-32b 35 3.7-32c 44 3.7-32d 44 3.7-33 (delqted) 37 3.7-34 (deleted) 37 3.7-34a (deleted) 37 3.7 '5 (deleted) 37 3.7.A-1 50 3.7.A-2 51 3.7.A-2a 51 3.7.A-3 49 3.7.A-4 48 3.7.A-5 49 3.7.A-6 48 3.7.A-7 48 3.7.A-8 51 3.7.A-9 48 3.7.A-10 48 3.7.A-11 48 3.7.A-12 48 3.7.A-13 48 3.7.A-14 48 3.7.A-15 48 3.7.A-16 48 3.7.A-17 48 3.7.A-18 48 3.8-1 35 3.8-2 35 3.8-3 41 3.8-4 35 3.8-4a 35 3.8-4h 35 3.8-4c 35 3.8-4d 35 3.8-4e 35

3. 8-4 f 35 3.8-4g 39 3.8-4h 35 3.8-4i 35 3.8-4j 35 3.8-5 35 8 Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

T E LF 5.2-1 (Cant'd)

LNi IROVDT nL CAPABILITY Quality UI scope ifr (d) g) of Safety. Jaality Compcnent Seismic Extreme gg) Tornado,gg) flood (g Assurance Supply raup Location Category nind Missile Protectior Prc, gram Co::nent s Princ yal Component C l a .s

c. Ult asite beat Sink Intake St ruct ure ,g Nn M I a ' a B l C2aseway P 3 3 NA M I b b a B Base Slab P b 22 P 3 NA P I a a B Structural halls 3 NA P I b b c B Structural floors P I b b c B 44 Pump Support s P 3 NA P f -

Liesel Fael C11 Prp Hmse St ructural Walls and Slabs P 3 N\ 0 I a a a a 33 g 4

d 22, 31 Ed

3. Rad *aste Building NA 130.16 4 M (gg) b N4 a Base Slab Ot he r NA P

Other NA h (gg) b NA b NA $

St ructural halls P NA Other NA h (gg) a NA c Structural Floors P XL Suppression Pool SLkeup System b c B

1. Valses CE 2 D C I b g 2 B C I b b c B 22

2. Piping P e 3. Electrical modules with R 9 C1. 2 NA C,M  ! b b c safety function 0 2 NA C,M i b b c

4. Cables, with safety function P e

ACNGS-PSAR The design of structures is based on the maximum accelerations obtained at the various floor levels. These maximum accelerations are the peaks of the time histories obtained at the various floors and are identical to the high frequency range accelerations shown in the corresponding spectra. The differences in maximum accelerations presented in Table 3.7.A-3 are in the range of 25*, or less. 48 N130.6 Systems and subsystems located on a certain floor are designed for the corresponding floor response spectra. The floor response spectra com-parisons presented in Figures 3.7.A-3 through 8 indicate a more accentuated difference in ficor spectral accelerations in the frequency range of 3 to approximately 7 cycles per second which is caused by differences in the control motion input in the 3 to 6 cycles per second frequency range.

Nevertheless, the ACNGS analysis methodology for the Reactor Building will be as follows:

a) IIL6P will use Flush-b results (defined by Table 3.7. A-1) as design basis for those systems and components for which the design is such that the natural frequency of the system or component will oc in a region not lower than 8 liertz, or b) For systems and components for which the natural frequency remains between 4 and 8 liertz, llLSP will either (1) design to accommodate the envelope of horizontal floor response spectra values obtained from both Flush-b and Spring-a (defined by Tabic 3.7.A-1) approaches, or (2) us 51 the peak value of the Flush-b response spectra throughout the whole range from 4 to 8 liertz for the design of systems and components.

For each other seismic Category I Structure, liL6P will perform a comparative analysis similar to the one performed for the reactor building and follow the same design procedure as described under (1) above, except that for each structure, IIL6P "4 determine a frequency range corresponding to tha 4 to 8 liertz for ti.s eactor building, e.g. , 5 to 9 liertz. The highest frequency for that range will be selected such that at all higher frequencies the agreement of response between the two methods is within 20 percent. Also, IIL6P will provide the basis for this upper frequency limit in the FSAR.

3.0 EMBEDMENT EFFECTS AND STRUCTURE - STRUCTURE INTERACTION One of the reasons for selecting the FLUSil type finite element analyses to establish the soil-structure interaction effects is that the analysis comes closest to representing in a rational way all the important aspects of the problem.

While a FLUSil type finite element analysis allows for the adequate re- 48 presentation of structure-structure interaction and embedment effects, an N130.6 clastic half-space type approach does not.

3.7.A-2 Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

ACNGS-PSAR As an example, a FLUSH type analysis of the Reactor Building, where there is no embedment and no adjacent structures, was performed (FLUSH-c) and results were compared with responses obtained from an elastic half-space solution (Spring-c). A comparison of maximum horizontal accelerations 48 at various points is provided in Table 3.7. A-4, and comparisons of response N130.6 spectra are presented in Figures 3.7.A-9 through 14. The responses ob-tained from the two analyses are in excellent agreement in terms of both maximum accelerations and response spectra.

3.7.A-2a Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

ACNGS-PSAR TABLE 3.7.A-1 IDENTIFICATION OF TiiE VARIOUS ANAL 7SES PERFORMED FLUSil - a Finite element analyses using the FLUSil Code and Standard Review Plan methodology. For the ACNGS N-S cross-s three analyses are performed using AVE,getion G E"# * *^')'

AVE

• 1.5, (Refer ana AVEt /1.S, where 48 GAVE represents the shear modulus vs strain curves established for the various layers as shown on PSAR Figures 2.5.4-7A,7B,7D,71, and 7K. N130.6 Elastic lialf-Space Spring - a Elastic half-space analyses for the ACNGS Reactor Building using spring and damping parameters as indicated in Table 3.7.A-2. A spring type 51 approach will be used for the anlaysis of other seismic Category I s t ructures. The input time histories are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.60 response spectra.

Elastic Italf-Space Spring - b Elastic half-space analyses for the ACNGS Reactor Building using spring and damping parameters as indicated in Tabic 3.7.A-2. The input time histories were obtained from the FLUSil - a analyses at the base of the mat corresponding to the shear modulus considered.

Elastic IIalf-Space Spring - c Elastic half-space analyses for the ACNGS Reactor Building using the 48 spring and damping parameters as indicated in Table 3.7. A-2 for the N130.6 CAVE case. The input time history is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.60 responst, spectra.

Fl.USil - b Finite element analyses using the FLUSli Code. Design time histories (consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.60 respogse spectra) were applied at the bottom of the Reactor Building mat. AVE shear modulus values were used for the N-S cross-section.

14USil - c Finite element analyses using the FLUSil Code. The ACNGS Reactor Building model is used and no embedment or other structures are considered. The input motion is defined at the bottom of the mat. The 6AVE curves were used in the analysis.

3.7.A-8 Am. No. S1, 3/21/79

ACNGS-PSAR EFFECTIVE PAGES LISTING (Cont'd)

CIIAPTER 5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Page Amendment 5.2-50 34 5.2-51 34 5.2-52 ,34 5.2-53 34 5.2-54 34 5.2-55 9 5.2-56 32 5.3-1 34 5.3-2 0 5.4-1 -

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3 Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

ACNGS-PSAR The insulation is either the all-metal reflective type or the conventional asbestos type. It is prefabricated into components for field installation.

Removable insulation is provided at various locations to permit periodic inspection of the equipment.

Provisions taken to control those factors that contribute to stress corro-sion cracking are discussed in Section 5.2.

5.5.1.4 Safety Evaluation Reactor Recirculation System malfunctions that pose threats of damage to the fuel barrier are described and evaluated in Chapter 15, " Accident Analysis". It is shown in Chapter 15 that none of the malfunctions result in fuel damage. The recirculation system has sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during abnormal opera-tional transients.

Figure 5.5-4 shows the core flooding capability of the recirculation system. The core flooding capability of a jet pump design plant is dis-cussed in detail in the Emergency Core Cooling Systems document filed with the AEC as a General Electric topical report (see Reference 5.7-4) . The ability to reflood the BWR core to the top of the jet pumps as shown sche- 6 matica11y on Figure 5.5-4 and discussed in Reference 4 applies to all jet Q1-5.24 pump BWR's and does not depend on the plant size or product line.

Piping and pump design pressures for the Reactor Recirculation System are based on peak steam pressure in the reactor dome, appropriate pump head allowances, and the elevation head above the lowest point in the recircu-lation loop. Piping and related equipment pressure parts are chosen in accordance with applicable codes. Use of the listed code design criter a i

assures that a system designed, built, and operated within design limit: nus an extremely low probability of failure caused by any known failure mec' anism.

General Electric Purchase Specifications require that the recirculation pumps first critical speed shall not be less than 130 percent of operating speed. Calculation submittal is required and verified by General Electric Design Engineering.

General Electric Purchase Specifications require that integrity of the pump case be maintained through all transients and that the pump remain operabic through all normal and upset transients. The design of the pump and motor bearins a are required to be such that dynamic load capability at rated operating conditions is not exceeded during the Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

Calculation submittal to General Electric is required.

Past analyses of the consequences of a full double-ended pipe break (LOCA) in either the recirculation pump suction or discharge line have indicated that dest ructive pump and/or motor overspeed could occur with consequent generation of missiles. The response in the ACNGS docket had been adoption of topical report NEDO-10677, " Analysis of Recirculation Pump Overspeed in a Typical GE BWR", which entails use in the design of a decoupler between the pump and the motor. Applicant notes, however, that NRr has not approved 51 the present applicant design, and that discussions between NRC and be relating to this matter are currently under way. Upon completion of these discussions, the Applicant commits to provide a design for ACNGS in conformance with NRC requirement s est abli shed by the generic review.

5.5-5 Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

ACNGS-PSAR A related question concerns the consequences of recirculation pump impeller missile generation. (The previously referenced report, NEDO-10677 showed that no unacceptable consequences occur as a result thereof.)

This subject is dealt with in a GE report transmitted to NRC by GE by Ictter of May 1, 1978. If this method of analysis is approved by NRC, the 51 ACNGS analyses will be updated to reficct it, taking into account ACNGS-specific recirculation piping stress reports. Should the ACNGS-specific analysis indicate that corrective measures are required (e.g. use of additional pipe supports and restraints at specific locations) that will be done in conformance with NRC requirements established by the generic review now underway.

5.5-5a Am. No. 51, 3/21/79

ACNGS-PSAR Pages 5.5-5b and c have been deleted.

Am. No. 5), 3/21/79