ML18019A875

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Revised Emergency Operating Procedures/End Path Procedures, Including Rev 0 to EOP-EPP-1, Loss of AC Power to 1A-SA & 1B-SB Buses & Rev 0 to EOP-EPP-015, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators
ML18019A875
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/04/1984
From:
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML18019A872 List:
References
PROC-841204, NUDOCS 8606060086
Download: ML18019A875 (77)


Text

EOPHP3 CAROLINA POWER

& LIGHT COaifPATZ SHEARON FQKZS NUCLEAR POWER PLAVZ PLANT OPERATING USUAL VOLUME 3 PART 4 C) M

~1 g~~CQ

.CQ C)~

PROCEDURE TYPE:

VfZ'AGENCY OPERATING PROC DURE (EOP)

END PATH PROCEDURE (EPP)

NUHBER:

EOP-EPP-1..

" TITLE:

LOSS OF AC POWER TO 1A-SA AND 1B-SB BUSSFS REVISION 0 APPROVED:

SIGNATURE

/~-5'-W<

DATE TITLE:

0m~0 Bbobobgocv.

050oPDR b008b 8b 00400 pQR A

P~ge 1 of 17

EOPHP3 LIST OP EPPc.CTIVE PAGES Pace Revis'=

Ho.

0 ge, cjoy Roc

~/~y'P5 EOP>>EPP-1 Rev.

0 Page 2 of 17

~

1

~

e

~

a~,

~

~

~ ~

l. 0 PUQF;

~

S E This procecure provides ac nns to respond to a loss o

=o-'er.

I 2.0 OP""RATOR ACTIONS

'(

CAt:TTON Critical Safety Function status trees should be monitored for info

. ation only.

Do 40T ext th's procedure to implement any Function Restorat on Pr"c=."utes.

Ens true tions

Response

Not 0'==a=ned l.

acetify'eactor Trip:

Nanual.ly trip reac="r.

o Reactor tr p and bypass breakers OPEN o

Neutron flux DECREASZNG 2.

Ve ify Turbine Trip:

Hanually trip turbine.

a.

All turbine stop valves-CLOSED b.

Turbine speed>>

DECREASING

py 0

~

~

3.

Verify RCS Isolated:

t Chec'.'.

PZR POR::s -

CLOSED a.

Lr rZR pr ssur-

=.=s tncn 333

PSEG, THEN clos=

PZR PQRVs.

Verifv letdown isolat'on valves - CLOSED LCV-459 LCV-'460 Verifv excess letdown isolation valves - CLOSFD 8153 8154 d.

Verify reactor vessel head vent valves - CLOSED e.

Verify PZR vent valves CLOSFD 4.

Verify AFW Flow:

a.

AFV flow indicators - GREATER THAN 400 GPH.

a.

Perform the fo owing:

1)

Verifv S

-'v'umo running.

2)

Verify pr"=er emergency alignment af AFV valves.

'pQQ

<>

~

pane 4 o'f 17

~

~

CA~T1ON An unloac ='DG should be mon'tored for possible overheating anc tr'pped i necessary.

5.

ry To Restore Power To Any AC E...ergency Bus:

a.

Energize AC emergency bus with EDGs.

1)

Start EDGs from MCB.

1)

Start EDGs by actuating SI from the ~CB.

3P EDGs wi'l not start, go to ste 5b o

2)

Verify AC emergency 'bus automatically energ'ed.

2)

Energ

e AC emergency bus.

E: bus ca"..

NOT be energ'zec; THEN atte=pt to locally energize emergency busses at switchgear.

b.

Check AC emergency busses AT LEAST ONE ENERGlZED b.

Obsenre CAUTIO.'rior to step 6

AND go to step 6.

c.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

EOP-EPP-'ev.

O Page 5 of 17

CAl TZON o '7::-'.: power is restored to one AC emergency

bus, THE".recover'-=

ions shou d

con==nue starting with step 23.

o IP ~

SZ signal exists OR is actuated dur.'ng th's procedu e,

.-.=.i it shou d be rese=

to permit manual load'ng of comoonents on an AC e ergenc-bus.

c An E=>>

pump should be loaded on ene gize AC e ergency bus tc :rovide E

G cooing 6.

Dispatch Personnel To Locally Restore AC Power.

a.

Dispatch an operator to locally start EDGs using OST 10 1 3 )

URGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY."

b.

Check.

EDGs - AT LEAST ONE RUNVING b.

Attempt to star= diesel by locally adm:tt='-" startivo air bi depressing the solenoid bypass lever.

IP at least one EDG has NOT

started, THEN c"ntinue attempts to start EDGs ~iO go to step 7.

EOP-EPP-1 Rev.

0 Page 6 of 17

OP "3 c ~

At the EDG local con ro'ane's, close the EDG output breakers.

c.

C'cse EDG switchgea

< <<cake rc:

c.

Check AC erne gency busses-AT LEAST ONE ENERG::ZED d.

C"ntinue at=e;."ts to rest"re AC power from 'EDGs

"". offsite power.

Go to step

/o e.

Go to step 23 7.

Dispatch Personyel To Locally Close Valves To isolate RCP Se ls:

a.

Close RCP seal return CV isolation valve

'112 or 8100 b.

Close RCP seal injection outside CV isolat'on valves:

8102A 81023 8102C c.

Close RCP thermal barrier CCV return CV isolation valve:

9483

'R 9484 Isolde CST From Hotwell By Lac%,~y Closing Valve 7CE-V35-1 l

EOP-EPP-1 Rev.

0 page 7 of 17

Check S/6 St tus:

Veri=v HSl~<s and bvoass valve

'CLOS"=D lose valves.

c'osed, TF!F:i Er v= 'es c-n "0: be loca.': close valves.

I Ve.fy Ew'solation and bypass valves - CLOSi'0 c.

Ve ify blovdo~m isolation valves CLOS:"D d.

Ve"fy sample line isolation valves - CLOSED d

~

~4 FOP-222-1 Rev.

0 pane 8 of !7

EOPHP3 LOSS OF AC PO~:"R TO 1A-SA AND 13-SB BUSSES CAUTION h

A faultec or ruptured S/G that is isolated should remain isolated.

S:earn supply to the SD A:-~ pump must be maintained from at least one S/G.

10.

Identify Any Faulted S/G(s):

a.

Check pressure in all S/Gs a.

Go to step 11.

o ANY S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED KQ ilER OR o

ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED b.

Isolate faulted S/G(s) b.

IF valves cannot be closed, THEN dispatch an opera=or to locally close or block va'ves.

o Isolate AH'low to faulted S/G(s) o Close faulted S/G(s) steam supply valve to SD AFV pump.

o Verify faulted S/G(s)

PORV - CLOSED o

EAL FLAG: If steam break outside CV and can NOT be isolated, THEN reference EAL, entry point V.

EGP==-P-1 Rev.

0 Page 9 of 17

EOPHP3 LOSS OF AC POVER TO lA-SA AND 1B-SB BUSSES ll.

Identify Any Ruptured S/G(s) o Condenser vacuum effluent treatment monitor - NORM-'.L Identify ruptured S/G while continuing with this procedure.

ruptured S/G idcuti"ed, THEN isolate the rupturec S/G:

'4"HEN o

S/G blowdown radiation monitor NORE' Isolate AFV flow to ruptured S/G(s) o Hain steamline radiation monitors - NORLQ.

o Close ruptured S/G steam supply to SD AH pump 0

%HEN S/G pressu"e less than 1155

PSIG, THEN ver"f".. ruptured S/G(s)

PORV closed.

g,C

~~ I J

12.

Check Intact S/G Levels:

o EAL FLAG:

Reference EAL; entry point U.

a.

Narrow range level GREATER THAN 10X (40Xl a.

Haintain maxi ~= AFV flow until narrow range le':el is greater than 10Z [40ZJ in at least one S/G.

b.

Control AFW flow to maintain narrow range level between 10X and 50Z [40Z and 50X]

b.

IF narrow range level in any S/G continues to increase in an uncontrolled ma er, THEN isolate the ruptured S/G 0

Isolate APV flow to ruptured S/G(s)

Close rupt"red S/G steam supply va'-.e to SD AEV pump.

VHEN S/G p"essure less than 1155 PSIG, THEN verify ruptured S/G(s)

PORV closed.

EOP-EPP-1 Rev.

0 Page 10 of 17

Hydrogen

~as will accumulate in battery room wne.. batteries are 1".a=ed "nd exhaust fans are '.operable.

13.

Check DC Bus Loads:

a.

Periodically monitor DC power supply o

1)

Monitor current and voltage on station batteries')

'onitor DC current to inverters.

14.

Check CST Level GREATER TK<%

10Z Establish an alte==-te AR'ater supply.

o Fire Protect'on System o

Deminerali"ed Pater System o

Temporary pip.-." to CST EOP-EPP-!

Rer.

0 page ll oz 17

Qcc (3

.,C 0,

Q I.

.; ~ '

~

f'SSES

~ ~

CAUiZOY S/G press."es should NOT be decreased to less than 165 PSIG to pre:e..t inject on of accumulator nitrogen into RCS.

ROTE:

The S/Gs should be depressuri ed at maximum rate t" =inim ze RCS inventory loss caused bv RCP seal degredation at hig:-.

RCS te peratures.

o PZR level may be lost and reactor vessel upper head voiding ma'ccur due to depressurization of the S/Gs.

Depressurization snould not be stopped to prevent these occurrences.

15.

Depressurize Intact S/Gs To 265 PSIG:

a.

Check S/G narro~ range levels - GREATER 1nAH 107

[407] IN AT LEAST ONE S/G a.

Perform the following:

1)

Maintain ~vimum ABv flow until narrow ranee level greater than 107 (407j in at least one S/G.

2)

Continue with step 16.

WHE'8 narrow rage level greate" than 10K [40@ in at least one S/G, iciE'.f do steps

15b, c,

d and e.

EOP-EPP-1 Rev.

0 Page 12 of 17

Dump steam at maximum rate using S/G PORVs.

b.

Local".: opera~:- '4 PORVs.

Check RCS cold leg te=pe atures - GREATER TRPB 310'F c.

Perzorm the foll=-.'ing:

1)

Control'S : PORVs to stop

.S/G depress

='zation 2)

Cont'nue vi=h step 16.

d.

Check S/G pressures-LESS d.

Cont nue vith s=ap 16.

bc-."=3 S/G TPMf 265 PSIG pressures dec"=ased to less than 265 PSIG, Ti:.:".': step 15e.

e.

Control S/G PORVs to mainrain S/G pressures at 265 PSIG

~.:. 16.

Check Reactor Subcritical:

o Inrermediate range channels e'tart-up rare - ZERO OR NEGATIVE Stop S/G depressu"i=at'n and allot:

RCS to heat up.

o Source range channels Start-up rate - ZERO OR NEGATIVE EOP-=~~-~

Rp'.

0 Page 13 oi 17

nc: i.- AC P

NOTE:

. Dapres suri-at ion of S I'Gs to pen'it manual loading vill resu~~

in SI ac:nation.

~ ~

of equipment on the emergency S" s-.ould be resa.

b =-ses.

17.

Check SI Signal:

a.

SI HAS BEEN ACTUATED a.

Co to step 2".

~=,::-N SI signa's

actuated, THEN

" steps 18, 19,.

20 and 21.

18.

Reset SI.

19.

Ver'fy Phase A isolation valves -

IF valve can NOT ba c'osed, Tii""Ã CLOSED locally close va'ves.

20.

Verify CV Ventilation Isolation Dampers CLOSED IF dampers can bOT '"e c'osed, THEN locally close ""mpers.

21.

Check CV Pressure HM R~<INED LESS THAN.12 PSIG E

Perform the follow=.-.g:

a.

Verifv CV spray signal. actuated.

b.

Verify Phase B 'solation va'ves closed.

IF va'ves can NOT be

closed, THEN locally cl.ose valves.

c.

Reset CV spray signal EOP-EPP-1 Rev.

0 l

Page 14 of 17

22.

Check If AC Eme.".gency Power Is Restored:

a.

Check AC emergency busses AT LEAST OiL'E E".ENERGIZED a

~

ntr Continue to co"..="ol RCS cond'ions a"c "onitor plant status

~

1)

Check 'stat s of local octionso o

Rest"re AC erne.",gency power o

Isolate RCP seals o

Isolate CV o

ifonit=r DC power supp's

~

o

<onitor SO AiV pump 2)

Check sta"us of spent fue

~

cooling:

o Ve"'=-. spent fuel pit(s) level greater than 23 feet.

3)

Return to step 14.

4

~

i

EOP P3

~ g 23'tab p c',5 g

p(v.

aQ'l

e~ S/G Pressures C

~

Coorcinate

"'th local I

operators to control S/G PORVs to maintain exist 'ng S/G pressures CAUTTQN The loads placed on the energized.

AC emergency busses should not exceed the c"paci"-:

of the power source.

24.

Veri"y Following Equipment Loaded On AC Emergency Bus:

~

480 volt busses b.

Emergency lighting.

25.

Load The Following Equipment On Emergency Bus a.

One air compressor b.

Battery chargers I

~4

~

14

rir ES!'ystem Ope=a=ion:

Ve.i.<"

ES'.~

and E:-:- pum"s running.

a.

Start ES B pu, ps on!" i~

required.

elect Recovery Proce='e:

RCS subcooling

.=:"-~TER TiLkiV a.

Go to EPP-3, "LOSS OF ALL AC 2S'F f3O'-]

POWER RECOV"RY PITH SI REQUIRE step l.

PZR level - GRE :..~. THAÃ 10K b.

Go to EP. -3, "LOSS OF ALL AC f45'.}

PObER RECOVERY VITH SI REQUIRED,'tep l.

Check SI equipme== - HAS NOT AUTOi~~TICALLYAC:ATEO UPON 0'HER RESTOR-".::ON.

~

~

~

c.

IF SI equipment has actuated, THEH go to EPP-3, "LOSS OF AL:.:

POtKR RECOVERY 4ITH SI REQUIRED<

step Go to EPP-2, "LOSS OF ALL AC POVER RECOVERY 4:THOUT SI REQUIRED," step FIVAL PACE

Attachment 6

Op:-:P 3 CAROLINA'O'WER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLAiXT PLANT OPERATING K4%UAL VOLUME 3 PART 4 PROCEDURE TYPE:

URGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE (EOP)

END PATH PROCEDURE (EPP)

~C al~

~me

~~cckf NUMBER:

EOP-EPP-O<5 TITLE:

UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS REVISION O

-APPROVED:

SIGNATURE DATE TITLE:

Page 1

EOi'.":! 3 L157 OF FFreCT]VE PAGES Pap.e Revision Ho ~

1 through 21 C

~This procedure currently de~s not contain a)) necessary ini'crmatic-...

The missir."

information in the af ected step (step 9 and 3L) is identified by usinp "(later)"

in the place <here information is missing.

The missing information must be added to this procedure prior to plant Fuel Load.

EOP-EPP-15 Re@.

0 Page 2 of 21

UNC'ONTROLI.ED DFi'RESSURIZATION OF kl.l. STEA."! C'""."ET~TV.

1.0 FURPOc

This procedure provides actions for a less of secondary coolan. vnich affects aII steam generators.

2.0, OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION o

EF ar.-

S/G pressure increases at any time during this proced.:-,

THEN po to EPP-14, "FAULTED STEA.i GENERATOR ISOLATION," step l.

o FRP-...I, "RESPONSE TO LO.S OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK" should be ='""lemented only if a total feed flov capability of 400 GPH or 192 KPPH is hO: a'ailable at ary time during this procedure.

o IF the SD AH pump is the only available source of feed flov, HEN steam supply to the SD AH'ump must be maintained from one S/G.

hiOTE:

Foldout F should be open I

Instructions

Response

Not O==ained l.

honitor Critical Safety Function Status Trees and Impl.ement Function Restoration Procedures, As Necessary.

en~

s'w".-1( Rnv.

O Page 3 of 21

I

UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSUR1ZA710N OF AI.L STEA..

GE."ERAT(1-',

Check Secondary Pressure Boundary:

1F valves can hOT be closed, THFN dispatch operator to locally close c

Verify HSIVs and bypass valves CLOSED valves.

c Verify F~ isolation valves-CLOSED c

Verify P'ontrol and bypass valves -

CLOSED Verify Steam supply va]ves tn SD AR'umps - CLOSED c

Verify S/G bio~do~~

isolation valves - CLOSED c

Verify S/G sample isolation valves -

CLOSED e

Verify hydrazine and ammonia isolation valves - CLOSED CAUTION A minirur feed flo~'f 25 GPH or 12 KPPH must be maintained to eac;.

S/G vith narro~'ange le'el less than 10Z [407].

Enp "PF 1S Rzq page 4 of 21

EOPHF.'NCONTROLLED DEPRESSi'R JZATJON OF ALL ST".". GFN"r.=='-.

~ -:.

3.

C ntrol Feed Flnw Tn Hinimize RCS Cc ol do~m:

Check RCS Conldown Rate-LESS THAN 100'F/HR a.

Decrease feed !:-'- tn 25 GPH or l2 KPPH to eat:

=/G.

Go to step 3c.

Check all S/G Narrow Range Levels - LESS THAN 50K b.

Contrnl feed i =- tn maintain narrow range level less than 50K in all S/Gs.

Check RCS hnt leg temperatures STABLE OR DECREASING c.

Contrnl feed ':-- or ste., dump to stabilize R.= not leg temperatures,

". possible.

ROTE:

eal injection flow should be maintained to'll RCPs.

4.

Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

a.

CSIPs AT LEAST ONE RUNNING a.

Go to step 5.

b.

RCS pressure LESS THAN 1360 PSIG

[1600 PSIG]

b.

Go to step 5.

c.

Stop all RCPs 5.

Check CST Level - GREATER THAN 10K Switch to altern<'te AFh water supply.

page 5 of 21

r.OPH)'z l'NCONTROLLEP DFPRI;SSllR] ZATION OF AL'TE' GENERAT(:-S CAl>710N 1F any FZ.-.. ORV opens because of high PZR pressure, THEN step 6a s'...

1d bc repeated after pressure decreases to less than the PZR PORV setpoint.

6.

~heck PZR PORVs And Block Valves:

PZR PORVs -

CLOSED a.

IF PZR pressure less than 2335

PSIG, THEN clos=

P..R PORVs.

IF any valve ca.-.

hOT be closed, THEN close its =lock valve.

b.

Block valves - AT LEAST OYE OPEN b.

Open block val;e unless closec to isolate an ope.".

PZR PORV.

j page 6 of 21

FOPHP3 liNCONTROLLED I)U'RF S SURI ZATION Or ALL STEA~ GEYERATOi;S I

CAVTION o

IF of.'site power is lost after SI reset, THEN manual action c.='e required tc restar" safeguards equipment.

o IF RC.

pressure drops below 190 PSIG,

[450 PSIG),

THEY RHR pu="s must be manua ly restarted to supply water to the RCS.

7.

Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

Check RCS pressure:

1)

RCS Pressure GREATER THAN 190 PSIG

[450 PSIG]

r 1)

Go to PATH-1, entry point C.

2)

Pressure STABI.E OR INCREASING 2)

Go to step 8.

b.

Reset SI.

c.

Stop RHR pumps FO~-~~"--IS Pnv 0

Page 7 of 21

EOPHi'3 UNCONTROLLED> DEPRFSSUR1ZA710N OF ALL STF/~".'CENERA70.;.'.

8.

Check If CV Spray Should Be Stopped:

CV spray pumps - RUNN1YG a.

Go to step 9.

CV pressure - LESS THAN 4.5 PSIG b.

Continue with step 9.

4'HEN CV pressure is less than 4.5

PSTG, THEN do step Sc and 8d.

Reset CV spray signal Stop CV spray pur:.Ps

+*

9.

Check Rt'ST Level GREATER TH"4 (later)

Go to EPP-10, "TM.':SEER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION," step 1.

10.

Check If SI Flow Should Be Reduced:

a.

RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN a.

Return to step 3.

25'F f30'F]

b.

RCS pressure - STABLE OR INCREASING b.

Return to step 3.

c.

PZR level GREATER THAN 107. t457]

c.

Try to stabilize RCS pressure with normal PZR spray.

Return tc step 10a.

~orr== lc Rv Page 8 of 21

EOPiiP3 Ul:CONTRO1.LFD DEPR1.. 5UR) ZAT)ON OF hLL S

I'.'.'.

GENERA CAUTION IF offsite poier is lost after SI reset,

'iHEY manual action may be required tn restart sa: eguards equipment.

)).

Reset SI.

)2.

Reset Phase A, Phase B, and Ft'solation Signal.

13.

Establish Instrument Air To CV.

)4.

Stop All But One CSIP 15.

Check RCS Pressure STABLE OR INCREASING Return to step 3.

16.

Establish Normal Charging Floe:

a.

Open normal miniflow isolation valves 8106 8109A 8109B 8109C page 9 of 21

chDu2Q Vr

~

COtyT>ALLER) pF j wr >Si~n I c Aj IO'r Ai.L 8 t r A".

Gc'itrd.-'lose charging floe: conero) valve FCV-122.

I c.

Open charging line isolation valve>>

8107 8108 17.

Isolate high head SI flo~.

Close BIT inlet isnlatior.

valves-8803A 88038

'b.

Close BIT outlet isolation valves 8801A 8801B c.

Close alternate cold leg injection valve 8885.

1S.

Control Charging Flov To Maintain PZR Level IF PZR level continues to decrease, THEN realign BIT flov.

Return to step 3.

15.

Stop RHR Pumps.

20.

Verify SI Flov Not Required:

a.

RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN a.

Realign BIT flov.

Return to step 25'F t30 F]

3.

EOP-E".".- - > ~

P e v 0

Page 10 of 2!

VYCO'.iTROLLFD DEPRFSSl:F,IZATION'F ALL STEA". C'ENFPJTi

'ZR level GREATER THAt 10'.

(45~]

b.

Control chnrpfrr fio~'o maintain PZR level.

IF PZR Ieve1 ca-...'OT be maintained, THE! realign BIT flov AYD return to s:-:- 3.

21.

~heck RCS Hot I.eg Temperat'ure-S:ABLE OR DECREASING Contro]

feed f3.ov, a-..; steam dump to stabilize RCS hot le'emperature, if possible.

22.

Cneck All S/G I'arrov Range Levels LESS TPW4 50:,

Control feed flov t: maintain narrov range level less th-=-.. 50K in all S/Gs.

23.

Check PZR Level - GREATER THAR 25K f50X]

Control charging f::;..

24.

Establish Letdo~m By Performing Steps a through e Belov:

Establish Excess 1 tdovn By Performing Steps a through d belov:

a.

Open LCV-459 and LCV-460.

a.

Open the folio-~ng isolation valves o

HV 8100 o

HV 8112 o

HV 8153 o

HV 8154 b.

Open letdown isolation valve b.

Position HV-8 43 to divert flov 8152.

to seal vater return line.

FOF-F.PP-! 5 Rev.

0 Page ll of 2:

EOPHP3 UNCONTROL].E'> DEPRESS1.'-RI RATIO.: Or ALi STEAM G"-Nr.RATi'.:

c.

Ploce Pl'-145 in AUTO.

c.

Ertablish flow by opening HCV-137, c.

Open one nri fice isolation valve 8149A (60 GPM) t OR 8149B (60 GPM)

OR 8149C (45 GPM) d.

Maintain less t';.an 150 PSlG as measured by PT-: 38.

Verify letdo~w flow and proper operati.on of PCV-145.

25.

Check VCT Makeup Control System:

Set makeup for greater than RCS boron concentration to prevent dilution b.

Set makeup for automatic control 26.

Align CSIP Suction To VCT 27.

Establish RCP Seal Vater Return Flow a.

RCP seal water return flow NOT PREVEOUSLY ESTABLlSHED a.

Go to step 28.

EOP EP I 5 Rei 0

Page 12 of 2]

EOPHP3 UNCONTR011FD D~PRFRRVR17AT10."

OF All ST"A.

G=XEF='TO."-

Check RCP seal condi t ion CCV OR SEAL INJECTION COOLING TO RCPs CONTIÃl>OUSLY M'ilNTAINED b.

Evaluate RCP sea's for possible damage using AOP-18, REACTOR COOLANT PlPP ASN~".-ML CO':DTTlONS." I: RCP seals

damaged, THEN F..- to step 28.

c.

Verify CCk available to seal water return heat exchanger.

c.

Go to step 26.

Open seal return CV isolation valves 8112 810G e.

Verify number 1 seal leakoff valves OPEN 8141A 8141B 8141C f.

Verify proper seal leakoff.

2S.

Control PZR Pressure:

a.

Energize PZR heaters and operate normal spray to maintain pressure stable'.

a ~

IF normal spray hOT available and letdo~m in se=.ice, THEN use auxiliary spra"..

XF NOT, THEN use one PZR PC.".V.

2c.

Check RCP Cooling NORMAL o

RCP CCV system flow Establish normal cooling to RCPs using AOP-18, "R>>CTOR COOLANT PlMP ABNOR1fAL CONDITIO."S

't o

RCP seal in)ection flow

~<~-~P-->5 Rrv.

0 Page 13 of 21

E'..'H: 3 UNCONTROLLED DE."RESSiiR17ATION OF A' S EL, G NE".':O."-.=

3O.

Verify A]1 AC Busses ENERGIZED EY OFFSITE POVER Try to restore offsite power.

IF necessary, THEN perfo

... the following:

a.

Verify EDGs have started.

b.

Verify EDGs have assumed the prcper loads.

c.

Verify turbine D: lube oil pu".:-

and a r side sea. oil beet.up p "p is running.

d.

Verify adequate EDG capacity ard load the follow="..g equipment or.

the emergency diesels:

o One instrv=ant air compressor o

Battery chargers e.

Determine the ca se of the loss of offsite powe=. If due to z failure of the startup transformer, request assistance from maintenance crews to restore power from either the main or spare startup transformer.

If the loss of power is the result of a loss of grid, obtain assistance fro= the load dispatcher.

EOP-EPP-15 Rev.

0 Page 14 of 21

EOPH 1'3 UYCOYTROL ED DE: RFSSURI ZAT70*'F AL.. STEA~ GFYiR..Ti.'.

CAUTION o

IF seal cooling had previously been lost, Tii !: the affected F..."(s) should not be started prior to a status evaluation.

o On na:ural circulation, RTD bypass temperatures and associate=

interlocks vill be inaccurate.

1iOTE:

RCPs should be run in order of priorit, tn provide nor ='ZR spray.

31.

Check RCP Status AT LEAST ORE Try to start one F-:.":

a Establish con =tions for starting RCP (s) using C:-100, "REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

while continuing vith this proc=dure.

L'AD L

9 1 5 R<qv 0

Page 15 of 21

i

LOFH: 0 UNCONTRO'ED DEPRFSSURIZATlON OF ALL S EJ'l GENF.."-J'.

Start RCP(s).

IF a RCP can hO:

be started, THEN verifv natural c'.rculation frorr.

trended valuer:

o RCS subcocli;,g -

GREATER THAN 25'F [30'F) n Steam pres=-

re -

STABLE OP.

DECREASING o

RCS hot leg temperature-STABLE OR DECREASING.

o Core exit ;/Cs STABLE OR DECREASING.

o RCS cold leg temperature TRENDING T OP. AT SATURATIC".:

TEHPERATUPE FOR S/G PRESSURE.

IF natural circulation hOT

verified, THEN increase dumping steam from intact S/Gs.

32.

Check If Source Range Detectors Should Be Energized:

a.

Check intermediate range flux LESS THAN 10 AHPS a.

Continue vith s ep 33.

hHEN flux

-10 less than 10 A.'PS, THEN do steps 32b and c.

b.

Verify source range detectors

- ENERGIZED c.

Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale FOP-EPP-15 Rev.

0 Page 16 of 21

EVPHi J t.'NC'ONTROLLFP DEPRFSSUR17ATiON OF ALi, STE' GENE:"'.T.".'-

33.

Check If EDGs Can Be Stopped:

IF BOTH of the following conditions are satisfied a.

Trv to restore cffsite power to AC emergency bu=-.ses.

1) 1A-SA AND 1B-SB busses energized by offsite power 2)

Starting air receivers are repressurized, I

THEN stop the EDGs.

CAi.'7 ION Realignce-..t of equipment in step 34 assumes that steam breaks dic not occur in CV.

IF adverse CV conditions are present, THEN system realignment as c=rected in step should be modified as appropriate.

34.

Realign Plant Systems for Normal Operations, As Appropriate:

o PRT (later) o Reactor Coolant Sampling System (later) o RHR System (later)

(

o S/G Blowdown System (later)

EOP-EPF->5 Rrv.

0 page 17 of 1

EOP1:P3 UNCO'TROLLED DF;PRESS1lRIZA710N OF ALL S7EAi'.

GENER '

S/G Chemical Addition (later) r Service h'ater (later) c Screen Mash System (later) c CCV System (later) c Essential Service Chilled Mater System (later)

Reestablish fire protection to CV (later) c Align EDG and support systems (later) o Reestablish normal CV ventilation (later) o Reestablish normal CV cooling (later) o Reestablish normal RAB ventilation (later) o Reestablish normal control room ventilation (later) o Reestablish nornal EDG building ventilation (later) o Reestablish normal diesel fuel oil transfer pump room ventilation (later)

EOP-E'P".--15 Rev.

0 page 18 of 21

UNCONTROLl FD D

PRES SURI ZATION OF ALi STEAli GE 1 ERATOr ~ ~

35.

maintain PIant Condftions-STABLE c

PZR pressure c

PZR level c

RCS temperature 36.

Verify SI Flov, Not Required:

RCS subcooling - GREATER TH'4 a.

Realign BIT flo-.

Return to ste=

25'F [30'F]

3.

PZR level - GREATER THAv 10K

[457. j b.

Control charging floe to mainta=-..

PZR level.

IF PZR level can hOT be maintained, THEN realign BIT AND return to step 3.

flc..

37.

Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:

a.

Check the follo~ing:

a.

Go to step 38.

o RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 25oF

[30oF o

PZR level - GREATER THAN 107

[45Z) b.

Close SI Accumulator isolation valve breakers.

EOP-EP.--15 Rev.

0 Page 19 of 21

UNCO."TROLLEi) 1)E: RFSSURiZAT10N OF ALI. STrA,, GENERATORS c.

C)ose S1 Accumulator isolation valves 8808A 88088 8808C c.

Vent any unisolahle accumu1ator while continuing with this procedure.

d.

Open SI Accumulatcr isolation valve breakers.

38.

Check RCS hot leg Temperatures-LESS THAN 350'F [330'F Control feed flow to establish a

cooldovn rate less than 100'F/HR.

39.

Check RCS Pressure LESS THAN 400 PSIG F100 PSIG]

Use normal PZR spray.

IF normal spray NOT available and letdown in

service, THEN use auxiliary spray.

IF NOT, THEN use one PZR PORV.

40.

Check If RHR System Can Be Placed In Service:

a.

Check the folicwing a.

Return to step 36.

o RCS temperature LESS THAN 350 F [330'F]

o RCS Pressure - I.ESS THAN 400 PSIG

[100 PSIG]

b.

Place RHR Sys t em in service using GP-007, "NORMAL PLANT COOLDOhX."

EOP-FPP-15 Fev.

0 page 20 of 21

41.

Continue Cooldown Tt Cold Shu tdocwi:

a.

Maintain RCS cooldcc-.. rate LESS Tish 100'F/HR b.

Check all S/G narrow range

. levels

-LESS THUD 50K b.

Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level less than 50."

in all S/Gs.

I 42.

Check RCS Temperatures a.

Any RCS cold leg te,perature a.

Return to step 41.

- LESS THAN 250'F b.

Rack out all but one CSIP breaker.

c.

RCS tempe ature LESS THAR 200'F c.

Return to step 41.

43.

Consult With Plant Operat'ons Staff Concerning Long Term Plant Status.

~

~

+0 1

'1

~

FINAL PAGE A

~

1

~

+h

Attachment 7

REASON FOR SO FEW CATEGORY I HEDS The initial design review of the SHNPP-1 Control Room was conducted from April 1980

~

~

~

to 3anuary 1981.

During the April to 3une period the MCB was reviewed using layout drawings and the simulator. A total of 130 discrepancy reports (pre-NUREG/CR-1580 and pre-NUREG-0700) were written: 09 against the MCB and the remaining against component and environment based on the simulator.

These 09 discrepancy reports concerning the MCB addressed grouping and sequencing problems (the only feature that could be adequately addressed on drawings).

The reports were written at the system/sub-system level and, if written in today's NUREG-0700 environment would result in substantially more HED reports.

As an example, what is now the charging and letdown "systems" (or sub-systems) on the lA2 section of the MCB, originally had their related controls and displays interspersed with each other such that these separate functions could not be visually separated nor easily operated.

There were r

approximately 20 dislocations of controls and.'12 to 15 dislocations of displays from what was considered an acceptable arrangement.

Some of these dislocations were grouping I

and others were sequencing problems.

This example would be typical of the 09 system

~

~

~

~

level reports.

As'can be determined, if written on a basis that documented an average of five components'per HED (a reasonable number of components on an arrangement problem involving both controls and displays) there would result approximately 300.or more HED reports.

As has been reported in past documents, letters and Section 3.0 of the Final Summary Report, CPRL's re-design approach was to eliminate, if possible, the identified problems before attempting to categorize or prioritize them.

Taken in light of the absence of any reasonable HED assessment techniques in the mid-1980's, this was an acceptable and expeditious approach.

However, this approach precluded an attempt to accurately establish the number of highly significant problems as opposed to the trivial ones, as the 09 identified system level problems were adequately eliminated in the MCB re-design effort.

The 09 sequencing and grouping HEDs were categorized in 1985 when all the other HEDs were assessed.

Because all of these 09 HEDs had been corrected during the MCB rearrangement, the HEDAT assessed each of the HEDs individually without addressing

{5705AWS/ccc )

interactions between them. It was felt that a fullassessment of these HEDs for interactive issues of safety significance would not be meaningful since the components were rearranged during re-design.

The rearrangement eliminated the pre-existing interactions. It is quite possible that a number of the interactions would have resulted in a Category I classification.

(3705AWS/pgp

)

SHNPP COHPLI ANCE WITH ANSI N14,6 PROCEDURE SECTION COMPL I ANCE/EXCEPT ION Verification by records furnished by the designer.that the performance criteria has been met by the design specification, and ~ ~ ~

None None Exception:

The Spent Fuel Rack Lifting Fixture has been analyzed and fabricated to meet the intent of NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14,6 ~

CPilL will conduct a

150$ static load test of the

device, This includes a factor of 255 of static load to account for dynamic loads, An evaluation of the Internals Lifting Rig has been performed which demonstrates the acceptability of the device in meeting the intent of NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14,6 ~
However, as stated in our earlier submittal, the rig was load tested to 125$ of its static load design capacity rather than 150$,

It should be noted that this device was fabricated and certified in 1976.

Both of these devices were designed,

procured, and fabricated under the Westinghouse pA Program.

Verifying by acceptance and functional testing.

~.observed by himself'that the performance criteria has been met, None None

~fxce tion:

See Item 5.1.I above.

Verifying by scheduled periodic testing that the special lifting device continues to meet its performance criteria. ~.and providing a system that indicates the date of expiration of the validity of the test.

HHM-21 C~gm Iiance:

Sisoal inspections, magnetic particle examination or other non-destructive examinations, and test lifts are generally required by procedure, code, standard, specification or purchase order.

NDE inspections are checked to ensure they are current and the rigs correctly identified, Providing an operating procedure for the use of the specially lifting device. ~ ~

MHH-20 MHH-21 Compliance:

General operating guidelines are contained in specific maintenance and fuel handling procedures.

The use of the subject special lifting devices will follow the safe load path required for heavy-load-handling

systems, in accordance with maintenance procedure HMH-20.

(3752JDKa/ccj

)

P E

SECTION COMPLIANCE/EXCEPTION u

Identifying subparts or subassemblies that may PMC-001 be exchanged,

~,or replaced,

~ ~

5,2,1

~Ccm liaiice:

The procurement of initial npare parts for the plant Is the responsibility of the CPKL, Engineering Technical Support Section (Spare Parts Group) ~

This will be accomplished with the following guidelines:

1.

The Spare Parts Group of Engineering Technical Support will prepare New Item Request Form 36012 (NIRF ), with the required CMHS data elements to allow entry into the system.

2.

The spare parts group will determine the procurement requirements for the recommended spare parts and indicate on the New Item Request Form (NIRF) ~

3 ~

QA will review and approve the procurement requirements and retain a copy for their information.

4 ~

Management will review and approve spare paris recommendations and procurement requirements.

5 ~

The approved New Item Request Form 36012 (including procurement requirements) will be forwarded to Materials Control for procurement, 6 ~

The original of the approved NIRF (including procurement requirements) will be sent to Document Control and maintained as the permanent QA file, 7,

When procurement requirements must be changed, the changes will be reviewed and approved by QA.

The original of the change.NIRF reflecting the revised and approved procurement requirements will be forwarded to Document Control and maintained as the permanent QA record.

(3752JDKa/ccj

)

P SECTION CONPLI ANCE/EXCEPTION Marking each special lifting device with its load limit.~ ~

MMM-21 5 ~ I C~ca liaace:

Special Ilftiag riga for the reactor internals and the spent fuel storage rack shall be identified with a unique 10 number with its applicable load limit, Maintaining a full record of the history of the special lifting device or components..

~

S ft R~moving from service any special I I ftlng device or component for which the period of test validity has expired'

MMM-21 MMM-21 5.2,2 Compliance:

Certification for equipment and rigging shall be retained for the lifetime of the particular item while it is installed in the plant or stored for future use, Compliance:

See wording as detailed in 5,1,3, Since the special lifting device may be

'employed by users other than the owner, ~ ~

delegate some of his responsibility to a

user, In such cases, the owner,. ~

Exception:

Not applicable.

The special lifting devices will only be employed by the o~ner, Prior to its initial use, each device shall be subjected to a load test equal 150$ of the maximum load to which the device Is to be subjected'fter sustaining the load for a period of not less than 10 minutes, critical areas.

~,shall be subJected to non-destructive testing.

None None

~Exec tioa:

Spent Fuel Rack Lifting Rig CPIIL does not intend to routinely rearrange the spent fuel rack modules within the pools.

Even when the rack modules are lifted it is very unlikely they will be lifted over spent fuels However, if the occasion should arise where it is necessary to liftmodules over spent fuel, the spent fuel rack lifting rig will be static load tested to 150 percent which includes a factor of 25 percent of static load to account for dynamic

loads, Internals Lifting Rig - The internals lifting rig is
designed, tested, and fabricated to lift both the upper and lower reactor vessel internals.

The lower internals are the design lifting weight for the internals lifting rig.

The lower internals weight approximately 202,500 lbs.

The lower internals will never be lifted over spent fuels The upper internals are lifted each refueling outage (or any time access (3752JDKa/ccj

)

P SECTION COMPLIANCE/EXCEPTION is required to the fuel within the reactor vessel)

~

Thus, the maximum critical load for the internals lifting rig is the weight of the approximately 93,200 lbs.

The internals lifting rig has been tested and certified by Westinghouse to 345,000 lbs.

Additionally, CPS,L has performed analysis demonstrating that a drop of the upper internals (with the internals lifting rig and the crane block attached - an additional 45,000 lbs.) results in no fuel damage or loss of core cooling.

Therefore, when the upper internals are lifted, the lifting rig experiences only 46 percent of its design lifting weight and only 27 percent of iis tested capacity.

Additionally, the internals lifting device will be ittested<< at approximately 217 percent of the upper internals weight each time the lower internals are removed from the reactor vessel in preparation, for the normally scheduled reactor vessel inservice inspection.

This >>testtt is more than adequate to ensure the continued integrity of the lifting rig for lifting the upper internals, Based on the above stated conservatisms in design (both hardware and analytical ), periodic testing of the lifting device Hill not add to plant safety, CPE,L will, however, inspect the lifting device prior to use for visible degradation (rusting, pitting, etc,),

Also, the lifting rig Roto Lock mechanism will be functionally checked on a periodic basis (each refueling outage prior to lifting the upper internals) ~

~ ~.Replacement parts fabricated to the same

~ ~,that have successfully passed the load

test,

~,may be qualified, ~ ~

THH-104 9,).4 a

Appendix B-2'

~gcm liarlce:

Replacement parts mill be of the design required material, size and configuration, and shall be considered as <<off-the-shelf<< Items, Non-load-bearing functioning parts shall be tested according to written procedures prior to initial use to verify that they perform according to their purpose, None None Exception:

The spent fuel rack lifting fixture has been used to install the rack modules in the SHNPP new fuel pool (prior to receipt of fuel).

The non-load-bearing functioning parts performed as designed.

The internals lifting rig has also been used to lift the SHNPP upper and lower internals in (3752JDKa/ccj

)

P SECTION COMPL I ANCE/EXCEPTION preparation for hot functional testing (prior to receipt of fuel) ~

The non-. load-bearing functioning parts performed as designed, Each special lifting device shall be subjected annually (period not to exceed 14 months) to either of the following:. I) Same as 5,2',

2) In case where;surface cleanliness and conditions permit, the load testing may be
omitted, and ~

nondestruct,ive testing may be omitted, and.nondestructive testing of major load-carrying welds and critical

areas,

~,shall suffice, 3) If the device has not been used for a period exceeding one year this testing shall not be required,

However, in this event, the test shall be applied before returning the device to service, HMH-20 5.9.2 '

Excepti'on:

The exception taken is that, in lieu of annual testing and inspection, testing and inspection shall be performed prior to use and service, The basis of this exception is that these special lifting devices will be used during fueling and refueling operations, typically on an 18-month cycle, and testing/inspections prior to use will qualify the equipment for use'nd satisfy the intent of ANSI N14,6 ~

The load testing prescribed in 5.2.1 shall also be repeated prior to use following any major maintenance or alteration,

~,heating above 300'F welding other than for surface repair. ~ ~

MMM-20 5.9.2.6 See wording as detailed in 5.2.1.

The load testing.shall be performed following any incident in which any of the load-bearing components of the special lifting device may have been subjected to stresses substantially in excess of those for which it has been qualified. ~.

HMM-20 5.9.2.6 Exception:

See wording as detailed in 5',2.

Functional testing prescribed in 5.2.3 shall be repeated annually...lf the special lifting device has not been used for a period exceeding one year. ~.the test shall be applied before returning the device to service.

HMM-20 5.9.2.2

~Exes tion:

gee wording as detailed in 5.3.l.

(3752 JDKa/cc J )

P SECTION COHPL I ANCE/EXCEPTION Functional testing prescribed in 5,2,3 shall be repeated following any incident in which repairs or alterations have been required on non-load-bearing functioning components,

~ ~

None None

~gxne tion:

sion-ioad-bearing parts xiii be repaired, installed, and Inspected in accordance with standard maintenance practices.

The basis for this exception is that the failure on non-load-bearing parts does not effect functional load bearing capability of the lifting devices, Special lifting devices shall be visually inspected by operating personnel for Indications of damage or deformation prior to each use, HMH-20 5,9,F 1 Compliance:

Special lifting equipment shall be visually inspected for damage or defects prior to

use, Special lifting devices shall be visually Inspected by maintenance,

~,at Intervals not to exceed three months in length, None None Exception:

See wording as detailed in 5.3'.

Each special lifting device shall be tagged or the record system updated after annual testing. ~ ~

HMM-21 3.2.5

~gno iianne:

gee xording as detaiied in 5.i.3.

(3752JDKa/ccj

)