ML17212A279

Operations/Sys Difference Analysis Rept. Proposed Revised FSAR Sections 13.1,13.2 & 13.5 Encl

ML17212A279
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	07/01/1981
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17212A280	List: ML17212A279 ML17266A474
References
NUDOCS 8107070328
Download: ML17212A279 (236)

Text

PLORIDA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST ~ LUCIE UNITS 81 AND 82 OPERATIONS/SYS TEMS DIP PERENC E ANALYSIS REPORT PREPARED: JULY 1, 1981 REVISION 0

~ g wv/VJ g 8107070328

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE PLANT, UNITS 1 & 2 DIPPERENCES ANALYSIS TABLE OP CONTENTS TZTLE PAGE 1o GENERAL

SUMMARY

2e NUMERICAL

SUMMARY

OP DIPPERENCES & SIGNIFICANCE CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION 3~ UNIT 1 & UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM DIAGRAMS 4 RTGB 101/201 ELECTRICAL CONTROL BOARD 5~ RTGB 102/202 CONDENSATE & PEEDWATER CONTROL BOARD 6o RTGB 103/203 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CONTROL BOARD 7~ RTGB 104/204 REACTIVITY CONTROL BOARD 12 8 RTGB 105/205 WASTE MANAGEMENT & CHEMICAL VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL BOARD 9~ RTGB 106/206 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD 17 10 PLANT AUXILIARIES CONTROL PANEL 20 11 'INE REPEAT CONTROL PANEL 21 12 ~ HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING CONTROL 22 PANEL 13o METEOROLOGICAL PANEL 23 14~ HOT SHUTDOWN CONTROL PANEL 24 15 ~ REACTOR COOIANT SYSTBf 26 16 REACTOR VESSEL AND INTERNALS 27

17. CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL 28 18 'ORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 29 19 'IGH PRESSURE SAPETY INJECTION 30 20o LOW PRESSURE SAPETY INJECTION/SHUTDOWN COOLING 32 21 'APETY INJECTION TANKS 33 22m CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM 34 23m RWT RETURN'EADER 35 24+ COMPONENT COOLING WATER 36, 25m INTAKE COOLING WATER 38

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNITS 1 & 2 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE 26 'UXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM 39 27+ DIESEL GENERATORS 40 28 INSTRUMENT AIR 41 29e FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION 42 30+ MAIN STEAM 43 31 'XTRACTION STEAM 44 32 MAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION 45 33 '20 VOLT INSTRUMENT A C SYSTEM 47 34 120 VOLT VITAL A.C. SYSTEM 48 35+ 125 VOLT D C SYSTZR 49 36+ REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 50 37@ EXPLORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION 38 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEMS 52 39 CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM CONTROL SYSTEM 53 40e REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM 54 41 PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE CONTROL 55 42m PROCESS AND AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS 43 ~ SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 58 44 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM 59 45+ CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION 60 46+ CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY CLEANUP SYSTEM-

- ~ - --- 61-.

47 ~ ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM 62 48 INTAKE STRUCTURE VENTILATION 63 49 ~ FUEL POOL VENTIIATION 50m FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION 65 51 MISCELLANEOUS REACTOR BUILDING VENTIIATION 66

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNITS 1 6 2 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE 52 CONTINUOUS CONTAINMENT/H2 PURGE SYSTEM 67 53m COMPONENTS ACTUATED BY SIAS 68 54 ~ COMPONENTS ACTUATED BY CIAS 70 55e COMPONENTS ACTUATED BY CSAS 71 56 ~ COMPONENTS ACTUATED BY RAS 72 57m COMPONENTS ACTUATED BY MSIS 58e SHARED SYSTEMS 74 59>> INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 76

Page 1 GENERAL SUMMATE The basis for the Differences Analysis was to identify those differences which could affect the Control Room operators ability to make operating and emergency decisions. Systens with sign1ficant safety impact were reviewed.

Systems which in themselves do not have safety significance were not reriewed ~ The analysis identifies the differences by describing the Unit 1 and 2 arrangements, categorizing the significance of the differences as they relate to risk of error, and stating our position as to why the difference is acceptable in terms of the dual licensing concept. A numerical summary of differences and significance category distr1bution is included at the front of the analysis-Significance Categories are def1ned as follows:

l. H1gh Risk of error in Safety-Related activity.

2. Moderate risk of error in Safety-Related activity.

3. Low risk of error in Safety-Related activity.

4. High risk of error in Non Safety-Related activity.

5. Low risk of error in Non Safety-Related activity.

This analysis does not include the di,fferences 1n the Unit 1 and Unit 2 General Operating Characteristics. This information is not available to us at this t1me. We have requested a deta1led analysis from Combustion Engineering covering these differences but have not yet received this information. At this time, it is our feeling that these differences in the General Operating Characteristics for each Unit will have an insignificant effect on our dual licensing effort.

Page 2 NUMERICAL

SUMMARY

OP DIFFERENCES AND SIGNIPICANCE CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION System or Area Reviewed for Number of Differences Significance Differences Identified 1 2 3 4 5 RTGB 101/201 RTGB 102/202 RTGB 103/203 RTGB 104/204 RTGB 105/205 RTGB 106/206 Plant Auxiliaries Control Panel Line Repeat Panel HVAC Panel Meteorological Panel Hot Shutdown Control Panel Reactor Coolant System Reactor Vessel and Internals Chemical and Volume Control System Boron Concentration Control System High Pressure Safety Infection Low Pressure Safety Infection/SDC Safety Infection Tanks Containment Spray System t

Refueling Water Tank Return Header Component Cooling Water Intake Cooling Water Auxiliary Peedwater System

Page 3 NUMERICAL

SUMMARY

OP DIFFERENCES AND SIGNIPICANCE CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION System or Area Reviewed for Number of Differences Significance Differences 'dentified 1 2 3 4 5 Diesel Generators Instrument Air System Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification Main Steam Extraction Steam System Main Electrical Distribution System 120 Volt Instrument A.C- System 120 Volt Vital A C. System 125 Volt D.C. System Reactor Protection System Ex-Core Nuclear Instrumentation

\

Engineering Safety Peatures Actuation System Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System Reactor Regulating System Pressurizer Level and Pressure Control System Process and Area Radiation Monitoring Systems Shield Building Ventilation System Containment Cooling System Control Room Ventilation System Control Room Emergency Cleanup System ECCS Area Ventilation System Intake Structure Ventilation .System Puel Pool Ventilation System

Page 4 NUMERICAL

SUMMARY

OF DIFFERENCES AND SIGNIFICANCE CATEGORY DISTRIBUTION System or Area Reviewed for Number of Differences Significance Differences Identified 1 2 3 4 5 Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System Misc'eactor Building Ventilation Systems Continuous Containment/H2 Purge System Components Actuated on SIAS Components Actuated on CIAS Components Actuated on CSAS Components Actuated on RAS Components Actuated on MSIS Unit 1 and 2 Shared Systems Interconnections Between Unit 1 and Unit 2 TOTALS 183 139 0 39

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS Page 5 UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM GENERAL ARRANGEMENT DIAGRAM DDPS CONTROL REMOTE TERMINAL UNIT FIRE DETECTION

'EQUENCE OF CONTROL EVENTS CABINET DEH PANEL CONTROL CABINET LOOSE PARTS MONITORING HYDROGEN RECOMBINER CABINET CONTROL CABINET HVAC ANALOG DISPLAY SYS. CONTROL RTGB CABINET PANEL 202 201 203 HYDROGEN SEQUENCE OF ANALYZER 204 EVENTS RECORDER DDPS CONSOLE OPERATORS CONSOLE PLANT AUXILIARIES 205 AND LINE REPEAT PANELS POST 206 ACCIDENT RX PROTECTION PANEL SYS. PANEL RADIATION ENGINEERED MONITORING SAFEGUARDS COMPUTER CABINET CONSOLE RADIATION MONITORING PANEL RTGB'01 - ELECTRICAL CONTROL BOARD RTGB 202 - CONDENSATE & FEEDWATER CONTROL BOARD RTGB 203 REACTOR COOLANT SYS. CONTROL BOARD RTGB 204 - REACTXVITY CONTROL BOARD

,RTGB 205 WASTE MANAGEMENT & CVCS CONTROL BOARD RTGB 206 - ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD

..FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.

ST. LUCIE PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Page 6 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM GENERAL ARRANGEMENT DIAGRAM FIRE DETECTION SEQUENCECABINET'ETEOROLOGICAL OF PANEL CONTROL EVENTS DEH PANEL CONTROL SECURITY CABINET EQUIP.

PORTABLE DDPS LOOSE PARTS MONITOR POST ACCIDENT DDPS CONTROL CABINET RTGB CABINET PANEL 102 101 103 HYDROGEN RE COMBINER CONTROL 104 AUXILIARY CABINET CONTROL PANEL OPERATORS (FUTURE)

CONSOLE 105 LINE REPEAT PANEL 106 RZ PROTECTION SYSTEM PANEL ENGINEERED DDPS CONSOLE SAFEGUARDS CABINET SEQUENCE OF RADIATION MONITORING PANEL EVENTS RECORDER RTGB 101 - ELECTRICAL, CONTROL BOARD RTGB 102 CONDENSATE & FEEDWATER CONTROL BOARD RTGB 103 - REACTOR COOLANT SYS. CONTROL BOARD RTGB 104 - REACTIVITY CONTROL BOARD RTGB 105 - WASTE MANAGEMENT & CVCS CONTROL BOARD RTGB 106 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE NT, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 7 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 101 201 ELECTRICAL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Diesel Generator Megavar Diesel Generator Megavar Meters are 3 Although this difference between Unit 1 & 2 meters are located only on the located on RTGB 201 for each Diesel Diesel Gen- MVAR indications is an obvious localDiesel Gen. control Gen., in addition to the local MVAR improvement for the Control Room Operator, panels ineach Diesel Gen. Meters located on each of the Diesel Gen. control panels in each Diesel it has very little operational impact on Roomo the function of the Diesels as a Safety-

'hese Gen Room. Related piece of equipment.

2. Several Control Room Control Room ventilation 3 The different locations of the Control Room ventilation alarms are present alarms have been included on ventilation alarms does not have on RTGB 101 a separate panel (HVAC Panel) in the a great deal of operational impact and will not Unit 2 Control Room and are not pose any problems for this Safety-Related system.

present on RTGB 201.

3. Diesel Generators Fuel This alarm is not located 3 The different location of the Diesel Gen. Fuel Storage Tank lew level alarm on RTGB 201. It is included on a Storage Tank alarm has little on RTGB 101. separate panel (Plant Auxiliaries Pnl) operational impact.

'oth in the Unit 2 Control Room.

4. Condenser Vacuum indication Condenser Vacuum and condenser 5 Unit 2 Condenser Vacuum indications are an is read in the Control Room by backpressure can be read on separate improvement over Unit 1 indications on the RTGB.

a manometer located behind RTGB sigma meters on RTGB 201. This difference presents little operational 101. Condenser backpressure impact.

is read on a sigma meter on RTGB 101 5 Not included on Unit 1 Extraction Steam drain bypass level 5 The difference in the extraction steam control RTGB ~ control valves (6) have pushbutton systems between Unit 1 6 2 has little operational cntrls. 6 status lights located on impact due to the additional controls on RTGB 201 'larms associated with RTGB 201 '

high level in the "Drip Legs" of the extraction steam lines will alert the operator of valve actuation.

When the alarm condition clears the operator may reclose the valve using the pushbutton/status light controls on RTGB 201.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 8

'his DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 101/201 ELECTRICAL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

6. Turning gear "Oil inter- light indication has been This difference between RTGB 101 6 201 is of locks light indication on omitted on RTGB 201. minor operational significance since the light RTGB 101 indication was added to RTGB 101 to preclude a problem in the Unit 1 Turbine Turning Gear Operation. The problem has since been eliminated and does not exist in Unit 2.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 9 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 102 202 CONDENSATE & FEEDWATER CONTROL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS level level indications

'his 1 Wide range S/G Wide range S/G 3 This difference is only in location of inst.

indications located on RTGB 103. (sigma meters) and recorder are readouts The operational impact of the diff.

The wide range S/G level located on RTGB 202. is minimal.

recorder is located on the Post Accident Pnl. in Unit 1 Control Room ~

2. Manual warm-up steam Motor controlled warm-up steam valves 3 difference is an improvement over the Unit valves to the "C" Auxiliary to the "C" Auxiliary Feed Pump. The 1 Aux. Feed System. This allows the operator Feed Pump. control switches for these valves are on to have better control capability with the RTGB 202 Unit 2 system, with minor operational impact.

3~ Main Steam to "C" Aux Main Steam to "C" Aux. Feed Pump from 3 This is another design improvement for control Feed Pump from the S/G headers the S/G headers A & B has separate capability of Unit 2 Aux. Feed Sys. compared A & B is selected from the pump control switches (1 for each isol. val.) to Unit 1 Aux. Feed Sys. This will have a start switch. on RTGB 202. The pump start switch minor operational impact on the Safety-Related will operate the trip & throttle valve -

Aux. Feed System.

only.

4. Aux. Fdwtr. Hdrs. A, B, Aux. Fdwtr. Hdrs. A, B, & C flow 3 Location difference only, no significant

& C flow recorders located recorders located on RTGB 202 in Unit operational impact.

on the Post Accident Pnl. in 2 Control Room.

Unit 1 Control Room.

5. High level channel trip High level channel trip bypass switches 3 Location difference only, no significant bypass switches (4 re'd.) are (4 re'd.) are located on the back of operational impact.

located on front of RTGB 102. the RTGB in Unit 2 Control Room.

FLORIDA P & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 10 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 102/202 CONDENSATE & FEEDWATER CONTROL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

6. Two Atmospheric Steam Two Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves 3 Unit 2 has four Atmos. Steam Dump Valves, Dump Valves (100 X capacity (50X capacity each) controllers are Two per header (50K capacity each). The each) controllers are located located on RTGB 202. Two Atmos. Steam power supplies are split for redundancy on RTGB 102. Dump Valves (50X capacity each) and the two controllers on RTGB 202 are controllers are located on separate for two valves on separate hdrs. (A & B),

plant auxiliaries panel in Unit 2 the two controllers on the plant aux. pnl.

Control Room. are for two valves on separate hdrs. (A & B).

This difference poses only a minor operational impact.

7.The following alarm These alarm are located on separate 3 Different locations only, no significant are associated with RTGB 102 in panel in Unit 2 Control Rm. (Plant operational impact. Plant Auxiliaries Panel has the Unit 1 Control Room: Auxiliaries Panel) a number of Safety-Related alarms associated with it in Unit 2 Control Room.

A Intake structure low water level.

B. Discharge canal water level/

temp. off-norm. high cond.

diff. temp.

8. RTGB 102 has alarms These alarm have been eliminated 3 No significant operational impact. Containment associated with the following since Unit 2 does not have these air compressors have been eliminated on Unit 2.

components. City water storage tanks and water treatment A. Containment air compressors. plant are shared between Units 1 & 2, although they are located on Unit 1 side of plant.

B. City water storage tanks.

C. Water treatment plant.

0 FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCI T, UNITS 1 6 2 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS Page ll SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 103/203 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CONTROL BOARD SIGN IF IC ANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Low Range Pressurizer Unit 2 RTGB 203 has 4 low range przr. This difference is an improvement over the Unit pressureindications on RTGB pressure sigma meters from 4 seperate 1 control board indications and is of minor 103 (Two Sigma Meters). pressure transmitters. Two of these operational significance. This is discussed in indications are also read out on Rx Coolant System portion of the report.

two digital indicators located on RTGB 203 '

2. Temperature indicator for Two temp. indicators located on RTGB 3 This difference constitutes an improvement over combined power operated relief 203 indicate temp. on separate power Unit 1. There is no ma)or operational impact valve line to the quench tank. operated relief valve lines to the though the separate temp. ind. on Unit 2 would Both valves relieve into common quench tank. The temp. elements are provide a means of identifying a leaking or line to the quench tank. This is located on each of the two separate inadvertently open power operated relief valve.

a single sigma meter on RTGB 103. lines before they combine to a common line to the quench tank.

3. Not included on RTGB 103 Component cooling water from Rx Coolant 3 This difference ie an improvement over Unit l.

in Unit 1 Control Room. pumps flow/temp. indications (8 sigma These additional indications have no control meters) on RTGB 203. function and therefore present little operational impact.

4. Rx Regulating System Rx Reg Sys cold leg temp. selector 3 Minor operational impact. This difference is cold leg temp. selector switch switch not included on Unit 2 RTGB 203. discussed in the Rx. Reg. Sys. section of this located on RTGB 103. report.

Digital cold leg temp. indicators These are not included on the RTGB 3 No operational impact since cold leg temp.

on RTGB 103. 203 in the Unit 2 Control Room. indications are available on meters located on RTGB 203+

PLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 12 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 104 204 REACTIVITY CONTROL BOARD SIGN IP IC ANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Rx Core Mimic display on Rx Core Mimic display on RTGB 204 3 Minimal operational impact since control rod RTGB 104provides control rod provides only rod bottom indication position indications are provided by redundant position ind by means of a by means of a single colored light, 1 systems, utilizing reed switch indications (inputs-four quadrant split color coded for each control rod. Upper & lower to the Core Mimic on Units 1 & 2) and pulse light for each control rod. electrical limits are displayed on the counting indications from the digital data These lights ind. the following CEDMCS panel located on RTGB 204. processor control rod positions:

A. Upper electrical limit.

B. Lower electrical limit.

C. Rod bottom indication.

D. Operating band or exercise limit.

2. Metrascope Cathode Ray Tube Analog Display System Cathode Ray Tube 3 This difference is of minor operational display on RTGB 104 provides is functionally identical to metrascope significance The analog display sys. has visual control rod position on Unit l. It is located on RTGB 204 improved reliability design features as well as indication (reed switches) as and provides visual (color coded) improved human factors characteristics.

well as Dropsy alarm functions: control rod position indications, as well as the same alarm and interlocks A. CEA insertion limits functions as theMetrascope provides on Unit 1.

B. CEA & CEA group deviations.

C. Rod D. CEA Motion Inhibits

FLORIDA ER 6 LIGHT COMPANY Page 1 ST+ LUCIE PLANT, UNITS 1 6 2 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 104/204 REACTIVITY CONTROL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

3. Control Element Drive Control Element Drive Mechanism 3 The differences in these panels are System Control Panel on RTGB ControlSys. Control Panel also essentially insignificant and are 104 provides five modes of CEA provides 5 modes of CEA operation, discussed in the CEDS comparison operation by means of back- but uses selector switches for mode with the CEDMCS section of this lighted pushbutton selection. and CEA selection. Upper 6 Lower report. The operational impact electrical limits are displayed on of these differences will be the CEDMCS panel on RTGB 204 minimal.

(Displayed on Rx Core Mimic on Unit 1). The control rod withdrawal prohibit can also be bypassed from this panel.

4. RTGB 104 has four separate RTGB 204 has two separate indications 3 This difference is discussed in indications for counts per for counts per second from the control the Nuclear Instrumentation second from the Safety Channels channels of the Nuclear Instrumentation. portion of this report. The (RPS Nuclear Instrumentation) as There is no chart recording of these operational impact is well as strip chart recording parameters in the Unit 2 Control Room. insignificant of the selected channel.

5. Metra backup digital CEA CEA position back-up display panel on 3 No significant operational impact position indication panel on RTGB 204 provides digital CEA position due to this difference since these RTGB 104, allows operator to indication on its display as well as panels are used for back-up or check signal CEA position (Reed on the ADS display. The individual secondary CEA position indication Switch Indication) by means of CEA is selected by means of 2 switches thumbwheel selector switch. located below the panel on RTGB 204.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 14 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 104/204 REACTIVITY CONTROL BOARD SIGN IF ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

6. Many of the Reactivity Control Instruments on RTGB 204 are in 3 These differences have minor slightly different locations than those on RTGB 104. In most cases, operational impact and in most the different arrangement of these instruments is dictated by the cases are designed to enhance the differences between the CEDS & CEDMCS. The arrangement of instrumen- monitoring of the reactivity tation on RTGB 204 is an improvement over the design of the instrumen- control instrumentation tation arrangement on RTGB 104

7. RTGB 104 & 204 have some different alarms due to the differences 3 These differences have a minimal between the CEDS & CEDMCS. operational significance

'I E

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 15 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 105/205 WASTE MANAGEMENT & CVCS CONTROL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. CVCS Letdown Process This recorder has been eliminated on 3 This change has no ma)or Radiation Monitor Recorder Unit 2. All data concerning the CVCS operational impact. The Unit is located on RTGB 105. Letdown Rad. Monitor will be displayed 2 radiatiori monitoring system is on the radiation monitor computer an improvement over the Unit 1 console in the Unit 2 control room. system and is discussed in the Radiation Monitoring Section of this report.

2. Not Included On Unit 1 RTGB 205 has two control switches for 3 This difference is of minor two containment isolation valves V-2522 operational significance and is

& V-2523 which have been included in discussed in the CVCS section of the CVCS. this report.

3. MOV-2161 (Boric Acid Pump V-2161 (Boric Acid discharge to the 3 This difference is of minor disch. to the CVCS) control CVCS) is a manually operated valve on operational significance and is switch is located on RTGB 105. Unit 2- There is no control switch discussed in the CVCS section of for this valve in the Unit 2 Control this report.

room.

4. Not Included on Unit 1 ESFAS Bypass Status Light Panel on This difference is a safety-related Control Board RTGB 205 provides a status of the improvement over Unit 1. This equipment necessary to ensure oper- added feature will give the operator a ability of the safeguards sys. The quick check on the safeguards equip.

panel receives signals from certain and all components that are needed annunciators throughout the RTGB during a safeguards actuation.

which are associated with this safeguard equipment. This signal will light all indicating lights on thepanel which depend on this piece of equipment that has a failure annunciator energized. The indicating lights on the panel can be manually operated by depressing them to turn them on or off'

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY Page 16 ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNITS 1 & 2 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 105/205 WASTE MANAGEMENT & CVCS CONTROL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

5. Some of the control switches on this portion of the Control Board have different locations from Unit 1 to Unit 2 although the 3 These differences are of little operational significance and in function of these systems is essentially the same. many cases, the arrangement of the Control Board on Unit 2 is an im-provement over the Unit 1 Control Board.

6. Alarm on RTQB 105 for The Alarm is located on a 3 This difference has no operational intake structure low water separate panel (Plant Auxiliaries impact. The separate panel in the level. Panel) in Unit 2 Control Room. Unit 2 Control Room contains a number of Alarms for safety related parameters.

7. Some different alarms on Unit due 1 RTGB 105 & Unit 2 RTGB 205 are to the differences of the systems associated with this 3 These differences have little operqtional impact.

portion of the Control Board.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIh NT UNIT 1 & 2 Page 1 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 106/206 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 2 This difference will have a moderate operational

a. The low pressure safety a. The LPSI & SDC sys on Unit 2 impact. Refer to LPSI/SDC report.

in) - and shutdown cooling utilizes separate LPSI pump disch.

sys. on Unit 1 utilizes hdrs. for SDC with a motor cont.

combined LPSI pump disch. flow cont. val- in each hdr., both for SDC with a single air controlled from RTGB 206.

operated flow control val.

(FCV-3306) controlled b. Each SDC supply line has two motor from RTGB 106. operated valves controlled from RTGB 206

b. Each SDC supply line has a manual operated valve c. 206 has

'TGB controls for 3 hot (no controls on RTGB 106) leg suction motor operated valves in each hot legs

c. RTGB 106 has controls for two hot leg suction motor d. RTGB 206 has control for motor operated valves in each operated cross-connect valve for hot leg hot leg suction.

d. No cross-connect e. RTGB 206 has controls for motor capabilities on Unit 1 operated warm-up valves.

hot leg suction.

e. Warm-up valves are man operated on Unit l.

2. Containment spray & caustic Hydrazine pumps are used on Unit 2 for 3 This difference will have minimal operational in) ~ sys on Unit 1 uses caustic in) ~ during containment spray impact. The design change is an improvement NaOH eductors and 4 solenoid RTGB 206 has the following indications: over the Unit 1 design. A listing of these operated valves. RTGB 106 system differences is included in the has control switches for each 1. Hydrazine Tank Level. containment spray system of these valves. NaOH spray portion of this report.

flow ind. and recorder is 2. Hyd. Spray Flow Ind. & Rec-located on the Post Accident Pnl. in Unit 1 Control Room. 3. Pump & Discharge valve indication.

(Both Headers A & B)

PLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE UNIT 1 & 2 Page 18 DIPEERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 106/206 ENGINEERED SAPEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

3. Component cooling water viva. CCW valves (4 valves, 2 valves per 3 This difference will have little operational to and from the fuel pool hdr) to and from the fuel pool heat impact. The design change is an improvement over heat exchangers are manual exchangers are motor operated valves the Unit 1 system. A discussion of the valves on Unit 1 and have no on Unit 2. There are two control differences in this system is included in the Control switches on the switches on RTGB 206 for these valves. CCW section of this report.

Control Board. The two valves on each hdr. are I I

controlled by the same key-locked switch on the Control board, with open & closed indicating lights for each valve.

I

4. Not included on Unit l. 4 flow indicating meters on RTGB 206 3 This difference is of minor operational to indicate component cooling water significance. Refer to RPS section of this flow from the Rx Coolant Pumps and the report'.

CEDM Coolers (combined flow) .

LPSI recirc. return line to Unit 2 has split hdrs. (A & B) for 3 This difference has minimal operational impact the RWT has two motor recirc. return to RWT. Each header has . and is discussed in the LPSI & SDC systems operated valves with two motor operated valves (Total of 4) portion of this report.

controls on RTGB 106. with controls on RTGB 206.

6. Differences in the High Differences in the High Press. Saf. 3 These differences on the Control Board will have Pressure Safety In'ystem In) Sys. controls on RTGB 206 are

~ minimal operational impact. The differences controls on RTGB 106 are listed below: in the HPSI system are addressed in that section listed below: a. Controls for 2 HPSI pumps. . of this report.

a. Controls for 3 pumps

b. Not included on Unit 2.

b. Shutdown Cooling Heat Exch. disch. to the HPSI c.. Two hot leg in) ~ lines with two pumps suction motor motor op. vlvs ~ in each line.

operated valves. (2) Controls for each valve at RTGB 206.

c. Not included on Unit l.

~gyps to hot leg flow ind. on d Not included on Unit 1. gg( uo as follows: 2 ind. meters 2 recorders

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI UNIT 1 & 2 Page 19 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: RTGB 106 206 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD SIGN IF IC ANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

7. Differences in the SIT's Differences in the Safety In) . Tanks Minimal operational impact due to the controls on RTGB 106 System controls on RTGB 206 are listed difference in these Control boards. The are listed below: below: differences in the SIT systems are discussed in that portion of this report.

a. Not included on Unit l. a. SIT to RWT/VCT has two solenoid operated valves on Unit 2, with

b. SIT sample valves (2) controls for each valve on RTGB have controls in the 206.

sample room on Unit l.

b. SIT sample valves (2) have controls

c. One level indicator for for each on RTGB 206.

each SIT on RTGB 106.

c Two level indicators for each SIT on RTGB 206.'

8. Lube water to circulating Lube water to circulating water pumps 3 This difference has little operational water pumps isolation valve on Unit 2 has two isolation valves with significance The differences in the Lube has one control switch on controls located on RTGB 206. Water System are discussed in the Intake RTGB 102 Cooling Water section of this report

9. Unit 1 has many controls, instrumentation and alarms 3 This difference is of minor operational associated with the HVAC system on RTGB 106. These have all been significance. The Unit 2 design is an improvement removed from Unit 2 RTGB 206 and are included on a separate HVAC over the Unit 1 Control board since all of the Panel in the Unit 2 Control Room. HVAC controls, instrumentation, and alarms are all located on a separate panel on Unit 2

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY STo LUCIE T>> UNITS 1 6 2 Page 20 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: PLANT AUXILIARIES PANEL SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. UNIT 1 Control Room does not Unit 2 has a separate plant auxiliaries 3 These differences are of minor have a separate plant aux- panel located in the Unit 2 Control operational significance. The iliaries panel. The equip- Room. The following instrumentation Unit 2 design, utilizing a ment which has controls on and controls are located on this panel: separate panel for plant auxili-the Unit 2 Plant Aux. Pnl. aries, as opposed to the Unit 1 has coats. located in various design, having plant auxiliary locations on the Unit 1 RTGB controls in various locations, and other separate pnls. is an operational improvement.

throughout Unit 1 Control Rm.

These differences are listed below:

a. Alarms for various a. Alarms for various safety related parameters safety related parameters throughout throughout the plant are the plant.

in several different locations on the Unit 1 RTGB.

b. Not on Unit 1 b. Steam Gen 2A 6 2B Atmos. steam dumps controllers

c. Outdoor lighting c. Outdoor lighting controls controls are located on the back of the RTGB.

d. RCB obstruction lights d. RCB obstruction lights and aviation and aviation beacon controls beacon controls located on the back of the RTGB

e. Not on Unit 1 e. Instrument air compressor reset controls

PLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 21 DIFPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: LINE REPEAT PANEL SIGN IP ICANC E UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Line Repeat Panel in Unit 1 Line Repeat Panel in Unit 2 Control 5 These differences are of minor Control Room has control Room has no control switches for any operational significance.

switches for all oil circuit oil circuit breakers in the 240 KV breakers located in the 240 switchyard. OCB position indicating i

KV switchyard except for the lights are available for all breakers generator isolation OCB's on the switchyard mimic.

(4 total, 2 for each unit) which have control switches on their associated RTGB (Unit 1-101, Unit 2-201).

Position indicating lights are provided for these OCB's on the Line Repeat Panel.

2. Line Repeat Panel in Unit 1 Line Repeat Panel in Unit 2 Control 5 No significant operational impact.

Control Room has a Control Room has a Control Switch and in-switch, and indicating lights dicating lights for Unit 2 Gen. dis-for Unit 1 Generator dis- connect "G" switch. Indicating lights connect "G" switch. In- are provided for the Unit 1 Gen. dis-dicating lights are provided connect "G" switch.

for the Unit 2 Gen. dis-connect "G" switch.

3. Line Repeat Panel in Unit 1 Line Repeat Panel in Unit 2 Control 5 No significant operational impact Cont. Rm. has a MWATT/MVAR Roan has a digital meter for MWATT meter for each of the three & a digital meter for MVAR for each of Midway High Lines leaving the three Midway High Lines leaving the the plant. A select. switch plant is provided for each meter.

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI UNIT 1 62 Page 22 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: HVAC CONTROL PANEL SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

l. Unit 1 Control Room does not Unit 2 Control Room has an HVAC control 3 This difference will have minor operational have an HVAC control panel panel which is separate from the RTGB. impact The Unit 2 arrangement is a design separate from the RTGB. All All HVAC controls for HVAC equipment improvement over the Unit 1 arrangement- The HVAC controls are located throughout the plant, as well as the controls and instrumentation that are different throughout the Control Room alarms associated with this equipment, from one unit to the other will be noted in the in various locations on the are located on this panel. HVAC systems portion of this report.

front and back of the RTGB.

PLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 23 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: METEOROLOGICAL PANEL CONTROL ROOM SIGN IP ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Meteorological information Meteorological information will be 3 Unit 2 Meteorological information is collected from Met. Tower available in Unit 2 Control Room is more easily accessable to the located North of Unit 1. Met. by means of the radiation monitoring Control Room Operator. This is an Panel in Control Room provides computer system. Operators will have improvement over the method by following information: access to all data displayed on Unit 1 which the Unit 1 Operators gather Wind Speed (2 elev's) Met. Panel thru the Rad. Monitoring the Meteorological Data. This Wind Direction Computer Console located in the Unit 2 difference will have very little Air Temp. (2 elev's) Control Room. operational impact.

Circulating Water Sys.

Parameters Trend Charts

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCI T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 24 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: HOT SHUTDOWN CONTROL PANEL SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 1 ) The Unit 1 Hot Shtdwn. Pnl. The Unit 2 Hot Shutdown Panel Controls 3 The differences between the gait 1 Controls and instrumentation and Instrumentation that differ from & Unit 2 Hot Shutdown Control that differ from those on the those on the Unit 1 Hot Shutdown Panel panels will have minimal operat-Unit 2 Hot Shtdwn. Pnl. are are listed below: ional impact since the operations listed below: from the panels are procedurally

a. Not included on Unit 2 addressed. The Unit 2 HSDP has a) Steam Generator wide range more controls and instrumentation level indication (S/G 1A & b. Not included on Unit 2 as its design would enable the operator S/G 1B) to not only maintain the plant in c Not included on Unit 2 a Hot Shutdown condition, (As is b) HIC 1110 letdown valve con- the design of the Unit 1 HSDP),

trol & Pzr level indication d. Not included on Unit 2 but to also monitor cooldown and achieve cold shutdown conditions c) HIC 1100 spray valve con- e. Not included on Unit 2 through the use of suitable trol & Pzr pressure indica- procedures tion f. PIC-08-1A1 & 3A1 S/G 2A Atmos.

steam dump valves d) CS 158 letdown valves 2110 PIC>>08-1Bl & 3B1 S/G 2B Atmos ~

P &go steam dump valves (Unit 2 has 4 Atmos. Stm. Dump Vlvs.)

e) CS 130 spray valves 1100 E&F ~

g Rx cold leg temp. indications (2) f) PIC-08-lAl S/G 1B atmos h. PZR pressure & level indications (2) stm. dump valve and PIC-08-1Bl S/G 1B atmos. i. Steam Gen. Pressure indications (2) stm. dump valve (Unit 1 has 2 atmos. stm. dump viva.) g ~ Shutdown cooling temp. & flow indications g) Unit 1 has only 1 Rx cold leg temp. indication k. Diesel Gen. (Both) Voltmeters &

wattmeters Items,H thru Q are not in-cluded on Unit 1 Hot Shut- 1. Neutron Power level indications (2) down Panel.

m. Charging line isolation valve V-2523 control switch

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST@ LUCIE T~ UNITS 1 Page 25 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: HOT SHUTDOWN CONTROL PANEL SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS These items are not included n. Charging line valve ISE-02-01 6 02 . 3 See preceeding page for comments.

on the Unit 1 Hot Shutdown control switches (2)

Panel.

o. SIAS block control switches (2)

p. Letdown Containment Isol. Valve V-2522 control switch

q. Steam from S/G to "C" AFP valves MV-08-12 & 13 control switches (2)

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST~ LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 26 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SIGN IF ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Unit 1 does not have Hot Leg in)ection line on each 3 With regard to the Rx Coolant System, this is dedicated Hot Leg Infection lines.

loop combines with SDC Hot Leg suction line.

a piping change only and it does not impact the control of the RCS from the RTGB.

2. Presently uses tygon tubing Two refueling level transmitters 3 This represents an improvement in design over for local level ind. only. have been included (LT 1117 and Unit 1 On Unit 1 the operators have no level

~

LT 1117-1). Either transmitter indication in the Control Room when the RCS is will provide remote level indication drained below the pressurizer. This change will on LI 1117 at RTGB 203. make monitoring of Rx Vessel level much easier at Unit 2.

3. Two low range pressure Four low range pressure transmitters, 3 The pressure transmitters in both units provide transmitters, PZ 1103 PT 1103, PT 1104, PT 1105, and permissive and interlock signals to the SIT and PT 1104. P1 1106. outlet valves and SDC Hot Leg suction valves.

This change will add two analog pressure indicators and two digital pressure indicators [fox accurate indication of SDC system entry pressure]

to RTGB 203 Not installed on Unit 1. Two pzr. level transmitters (LT 3 This change does not affect system operation 1104, LT 1105) provide level ind. from the Control Room. Refer to Hot Shutdown at the Hot Shutdown Control Panel control panel.

5. Not installed on Unit l. Two pressure transmitters 3 This change does not affect system operation (PT 1107, PZ 1108) provide pressure from the Control Room. Refer to Hot Shutdown indication at the Hot Shutdown control panel.

control panel.

6 Common PORV discharge temp. Each PORV disch. line has downstream 3 This represents an improvement over Unit 1 design.

indication and alarm temperature indication and alarm (TE The change will add one temperature indicator on (TE 1106) ~ 1106 and TE 1110). RTGB 203 '

0 FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 27 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: REACTOR VESSEL AND INTERNALS SIGN IF ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Design includes a thermal Not installed. All the Rx Vessel and Internals changes shield. represent minor design changes and do not change the operation of the plant.

2. 14 x 14 fuel array. 16 x 16 fuel array.

3~ 8 in-core inst. vessel 10 in-core inst. vessel penetrations. penetrations.

4. 73 control element assemb. 91 control element assemblies.

69 vessel penetrations. 91 vessel penetrations.

5. 45 in-core inst. assemblies. 56 in-core instrument assemblies. 3

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 28 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Not Installed. Letdown Isol. valve V-2522 added 3 This valve will be normally open and will function

[located outside containment upstream with valve V-2516 to provide containment isolation of LCV 2110 P 6 g. [one valve inside containment and one val. outside containment.] Operation of the CVCS will not be affected by this change.

2. RCP seal water bleedoff to Two air operated isolation valves. 3 RTGB controls are identical to Unit 1.

VCT isolation valves:

One air operated valve One solenoid operated valve

3. Not installed. Each charging pump has a motor operated 3 This is a significant improvement over Unit 1 recirc valve that ties into one return design (minimizes thermal transients), however, line routed to the VCT no new RTGB controls have been added by this change, and the recirc valve will stroke closed when the charging pump is started.

4. Not installed ~ Air operated charging line isolation 3 This change represents an improvement in design valve (V-2523) installed prior to over Unit l. A key operated control switch has containment penetration. been added to RTGB 205. Since this valve will normally be locked open, system operation is not affected by the change.

5. One isolation valve isolates Boronometer and Process Radiation 5 Both isolation valves at Unit 2 will isolate on flow to both components Monitor have separate isolation high temperature. The gross activity and selected (V-2521). valves (V-2468; V-2581) ~ isotope activity will not be indicated on RTGB 205. These parameters and their associated alarms will be available for display and annunciation from the Radiation Monitoring Computer console.

PLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 29 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM SIGNIPICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Air operated valve. Manually operated combined Boric Acid Unit 2 accomplishes isolation of the normal Boric discharge valve (V-2161): Acid Plow path by closing FCV 2210Y.

Unit 1 accomplishes the same function by closing V-2161.

PCV 2210Y does not close on SIAS. FCV 2210Y closed on SIAS. V-2161 control switch is not on Unit 2 control board (manual valve).

FLORIDA h LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 30 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS

'ot SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SIGN IF ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. 3 pumps 2 pumps Only 2 pumps are required, therefore the C HPSI pump and its associated motor operated cross connect valves are not installed on Unit 2.

No significant operational impact.

2. Manual valve lineup for Each HPSI header can be aligned Leg Infection will be manually initiated Hot Leg In)ection. for Hot Leg Infection through two at St. Lucie 1 or 2 within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after a motor operated valves controlled Loss of Coolant Accident. The St. Lucie 2 from RTGB 206. Each line has lineup represents an improvement in design pressure and flow indication at over St. Lucie 1.

RTGB 206

3. Shutdown cooling heat exch. No such lineup exists This is a preferred cooling mode on Unit 1.

outlet can be directed to the It is not required for the system to perform suction of the HPSI pumps its design function through 2 motor operated vals.

4. Charging pump disch. can be Charging pump discharge can be The extra line to B Hot Leg infection line manually aligned to the Aux manually aligned to either the A represents an improvement in design over (A) HPSI header HPSI header or the B Hot Leg Unit 1. No Control Room controls are Infection header. affected by this change.

5. These valves are not Each Hot Leg infection line has an 3 These valves are functionally identical to the required on Unit l. air operated Ck. valve leakage loop check valve leakage valves. They will be valve associated with it manually operated by the Control Room Operator (controlled from RTGB 206.) to determine if the Hot Leg infection line loop FCV 3571; FCV 3572+ check valves are leaking ~

6. Unit 1 does not have this An orificed 3" line in each HPSI 3 This feature will allow the operator to initiate feature. discharge hdr. allows concurrent concurrent Hot and Cold Leg infection from the Hot and Cold Leg in) ~ following a Control Room. This represents an improvement Loss of Coolant Accident. over St. Lucie Unit 1, which requires manual valve lineups outside the Control Room.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY STe LUCIE T~ UNITS 1 Page 31 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

7. One loop check valve in each All 6 infection lines (4 Cold Leg 3 The extra check valves represent an improvement in]ection line. and 2 Hot Leg) have 2 check valves in design over Unit 1. No RTGB controls or in series inside containment. indications have been affected by this change.

8. Not on Unit l. Extra Relief Valve (V-3570) added 3 This valve is necessary to protect the HPSI on charging line to Hot Leg in) ~ piping from possible over pressurization due line B. to mis-operation of the charging system. Plant operation is not affected by this change.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCIE Tr UNITS 1 6 2 Page 32 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION AND SHUTDOWN COOLING SIGN IF IC ANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Portions of the inj- flow Two separate and independent The changes incorporated into this system on path are common. Shutdown trains consisting of: Unit 2 represent an improvement in design over Heat Exchanger supply and Unit 1 in that:

return piping are common.

a. Manual Valves a. SDHX inlet and outlet motor a. The Unit 2 system is totally redundant.

operated valves.

b. Air Operated Valve. b. SDHX cooling flow outlet motor b. No single failure can prevent the avail-operated flow control valve. ability of at least one complete SDC train.

c. Air Operated Valve. c. SDC system recirc motor operated c. Instrument air failures do not affect the flow control valve. system.

d. Manual Valves. d. Motor operated warm-up valve. d. Fewer valve manipulations are required outside the Control Room to place the SDC system in service.

e. 2 Hot Leg Suction valves e. 3 Hot Leg Suction valves (2 All of the valves controlled from RTGB 206 that inside containment. inside containment and 1 outside have been added to the Unit 2 LPSI/SDC system containment). are designed as key operated or key interlocked for administrative control. This feature will minimize the likelihood of personnel error due to confusion between the two units.

f. One LPSI discharge header f. Separate LPSI discharge header relief valve relief valves.

No suction cross connect Motor operated Hot Leg suction capability. cross connect valve.

2 Two press. transmitters ',

Hot Leg suction valve interlocks: 3 This change adds redundancy to the protective send protective signals,'o Each Hot Leg suction valve inside interlocks on Unit 2 ~ No significant impact.

4 vals. containment will receive protection signals from a separate pressurizer pressure transmitter.

coo ng req ~ or LPSI No externa cooling source required. 3 No operational impact.

pumps.

PLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 33 DIPPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: SAPETY INJECTION TANKS SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Normal operating pressure is Normal operating pressure is This change will have no significant effect on 200 psig ~ 600 psig ~ plant operation since the SIT's are a passive component.

2. Level switches for Hi-Hi and Separate level transmitter for Unit 1 uses capacitance probe level switches Lo-Lo Alarms. Hi-Hi and Lo-Lo Alarms, and for Hi-Hi and Lo-Lo Level alarm redundant level indication.

annunciation'hese probes have proven to be more suusceptible to failure than conventional level transmitters.

Redundant level indication on RTGB 206 for each SITo

3. SIT interlocks: SIT interlocks: This change prepresents an improvement over Unit 1 design. It will not have any effect on Interlock signals to the SIT Interlock signals are sent to the SIT operation since the discharge valves will be disch. valves are sent from SIT discharge valves from 4 administratively controlled.

two pressurizer pressure pressurizer pressure transmitters.

transmitters.

4. SIT Sample Valves: SIT Sample Valves: These valves are not routinely operated by the Control Room operator. They will normally be Control switches are locally Two control switches have been added left in the "REMOTE" position.

operated from the sample rm. to RTGB 206 to provide remote containment isolation capability.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 34 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 1 Utilizes NaOH subsys. for Iodine Removal System accomplishes 3 The I.R.S. on Unit 2 accomplishes the same post LOCA iodine control. this function. (Hydrazine) function as the NaOH system on Unit l.

a. Eductors used to provide a. Positive displacement metering The NaOH solenoid valves on Unit 1 RTGB have NaOH flow. pumps used. been deleted on Unit 2.

b. NaOH suction lines to b. Two solenoid operated discharge NaOH indications on Unit 1 RTGB have been c.

pumper'.

eductors open on solenoid valves).

CSAS Flow is directed to the (4

suction of the cont. spray valves (one for each header) ~

Flow is directed to the suction replaced by Hydrazine indications on Unit RTGB ~

2 of the cont. spray pumps.

2. Cont. spray pump requires Not required No operational impact.

component cooling water.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCI NT& UNITS 1 & 2 Page 3 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: REFUELING MATER TANK RETURN HEADER SIGN IF ICANC E UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. One recirc hdr. with two Two separate recirc headers with a 3 This change represents an improvement in design motor operated isol. valves motor operated valve and a solenoid over Unit 1. The added val. and switch controls in series. valve in series in each line. on RTGB 206 will not adversely impact the These two lines tie into a single operator since these valves are lined up in the RMT return line. locked open cond. and they will automatically close upon receipt of an RAS signal ~ On Unit 1, breakers supplying control power to the valves must be re-energized prior to the receipt of an RAS signal.

2. Not installed on Unit 1. SIT to RQT return header has two This change adds two control switches on RTGB solenoid operated containment 206 and will provide direct indication of the isolation valves in parallel inside status of the SIT to RVZ Header.

containment.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 36 DIPFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: COMPONENT COOLING WATER SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS Re uires CCW Coolin  :

a. Air cooled a. Control Room Air Conditioning 3 These changes do not affect the operation of the CCW system from

b. One Heat Exchanger b. Two S/G Blowdown Rad Monitor the Control Room.

sample heat exchangers.

2~ Does Not Re uire CCW Coolin

a. Required on Unit 1 a. LPSI pumps I

b. Required on Unit 1 b. Cont. Spray pumps (Same as above)

c. Required on Unit 1 c. Hydrogen Sample Cooler

3. Unit 1 does not have this Low CCW Surge Tank Level isolates 3 This change represents an improve-feature Header N from either Header A or B ment in design over Unit Pl ~ Unit fl CCW system is normally lined up with the CCW N Header aligned to both A & B CCW Headers. With Unit 2 CCW system lined up this way, a break in a vital CCW Header (AorB) will automatically be isolated from the other CCW Header. At Unit 1, the operator is instructed to isolate the non-essential CCW hdr. from headers A and B in the event of a CCW system rupture. [CCW off-normal operating procedure] ~

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCI T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 37 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: COMPONENT COOLING WATER SIGN IF ICANC E UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS Containment Coolers CCW Valves:

4

a. Combined supply and return a. Combined supply and return valves CCW is normally aligned to the valves are motor operated are manual coolers at the required flow rate and no furthur adjustments are necessary.

b. Individual containment b. Individual cooler supply and All containment cooler controls, cooler supply and return return valves are motor operated. indications and alarms have been valves. relocated on the HVAC control panel in Unit 2 Control Room.

5. Supplied from CCW N Header Fuel Pool Hx is supplied by either 5 This change adds two key operated through manual valves A or B CCW system through motor control switches to RTGB 206 operated valves [MV 14-17, 14-18, [CCW Section] The Heat Exchanger 14-19, 14-20] Outlet Valves [MV 14-19 will be lined up with the CCW Valves 6 MV 14-20] close on SIAS locked open on one Header and locked closed on the other Header.

6. Not installed on Unit 1 Four channels of flow indication This change provides:

added on combined CCW return from a. Low CCW flow from RCP's the Reactor Coolant pumps Reactor trip.

b. Four extra flow indicators on RTGB 206.

The Lo CCW flow Rx trip will trip the reactor 10 minutes after a loss of CCW to the RCP'st Unit 1 acheives the same result by procedurally directing the operator to trip the Rx. and pumps within 10 minutes after a loss of CCW.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI UNIT 162 Page 38 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM SIGN IP ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. One lube water supply Separate lube water supply isolation 3 This change is a design improvement over Unit l.

isolation valve separating valves on each lube water header. At Unit 2 the valve control switches have been seismic and non-seismic [MV-21-4A; MV-21>>4B] relocated on RTGB 206.

portions of the lube water E sys tern. [MV-21-4] This change does not significantly effect the operation of the plant since the valves will be open during normal operation and automatically close following SIAS.

PLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUC UNIT1 &2 Page 3 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: AUXILIARYPEEDWATER SYSTEM SIGNIPICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS C Aux. Feed um and i in : 2 Unit 2 APW system power supply changes make

a. Manual warmup valves. the system less suseptable to power supply ae Motor operated warmup valves. failures (eg. total loss of AC power.)

b. Utilizes dual function RTGB selector b. Separate RTGB selector switches At Unit 1 a dual function start switch will switch'. for steam supply valves to C open one of the steam supply valves and the Trip and throttle valve Aux. Peed Pump. trip and throttle valve. These functions are (MV-08-3) is powered from accomplished by separate selector switches at 125V DC bus 1AB, all c. All valves associated with C Aux. Unit 2.

other valves. are powered Feed Pump are powered from from 480V MCC lAB. 125V DC bus 2AB ~ These changes do not constitute a major change d.. Design speed - 3600 rpm. d. Design speed - 3750 rpm. in the operation of the Aux. Peed System from the Control Room.

PLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCI T$ UNITS 1 6 2 Page 4 DIPPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: DIESEL GENERATORS SIGNIPICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Generator Rating Generator Rating Continuous 3500 KW Continuous - 3685 KW 30 minute - 3960 ISl 30 minute 3985 KN Puel oil storage tank Puel oil storage tank capacity-capacity 20,000 gallons 40,000 gallons Day tank Day tank capacity capacity 180 gallons 343 gallons

2. One solenoid operated valve Separate solenoid operated valves for 3 controls fuel oil to both each engine day tank engine day tanks

3. Diesel Loading sequence Diesel loading sequence during during accident conditions is accident conditions is slightly slightly diff. than Unit 2. different than Unit 1

4. Diesel MVAR indication at Diesel MVAR indication on RTGB 201 local diesel control panel

• None of these differences will change the operation of the diesel generator.

Since the diesel loading sequence is completed in 30 seconds, the slight differences in diesel loading following accident conditions are not of immediate concern to the operator. Verification of running equipment will be addressed in applicable casuality procedures

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 41 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM SIGN IF ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Local Compressor reset Compressor reset switches are located 5 This change will allow the Control switches on the Plant Auxiliary Panel in the Rm. Operator to re-energize the in-Control Room. strument air compressors from the Control Room following a blackout.

At Unit 1 the reset switches have to be operated by the Turbine Operator.

2~ Motor operated containment Air operated containment isolation 5 No operational impact isolation valve (MV-18-1.) valve (HCV 18-1.)

3. Separate redundant contain- Not installed on Unit 2 5 The addition of the continuous ment instrument air system containment purge system on Unit 2 eliminates the need for a contain-ment instrument air system.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUC UNIT 1 &2 Page 4 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 1 Non-redundant fuel pool Redundant fuel pool level and 3 This change represents an improvement in design level and temperature temperature alarms. over Unit 1. The change does not affect system alarms: operation.

TE 4420 TE 4420 LS 4420 TE 4421 LS 4420 LS 4421

2. Fuel pool heat exchanger is Fuel pool heat exchanger is cooled from 3 Refer to CCW system.

cooled from the non- either A or B vital CCW Header.

essential CCW header.

PLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY STo LUCIE T, WITS 1 6 2 Page 43 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: MAIN STEAM SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

l. 2 lOOX Capacity pneumatic 4 50X capacity motor operated atmos. 3 Unit 2 provides redundancy to preclude single operated atmos. dump valves, dump valves (AC/DC powered) with failure of atmos. dump valves. DC power allows 1 per header. modutronic control, 2 per header. valves to be operated when all AC pwr. is lost.

2. Atmos. dump valves have Atmos. dump valves have motor operated 3 Improved sys. on Unit 2 provides means of man. operated block valves. (DC) block valves. administrative control of valve lineup. The block valves are normally locked open.

3. Check valve downstream of These valves are not included in the 3 The use of different MSIV's on Unit 2 is an MSIV'st Unit 2 design. improvement over those used on Unit 1. The Unit 2 air operated MSIV's are designed to hold steam pressure in both directions, therefore the check valves will not be needed. This diff. does not effect the Safety-Related Operation of the MSIV's .

4. Backfit on Unit li Unit 2 will have 4 additional temp. 5 Improved system on Unit 2 to be backfitted to control valves for the Main Steam Line Unit l.

to the Moisture Separator Reheaters.

They will be located on the bypass around the existing motor operated valves and associated temp. control valves.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 44 DIPPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM SIGNIPICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Not on Unit l. Extraction steam line "Drip Legs" 5 This difference has little impact on the have six level control valves which operation of the Extraction Steam System.

allow steam traps to be bypassed to the condenser automatically upon high level in the extraction steam "Drip Legs." The valves can be controlled by the operator from the Control Room.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI UNIT 1 &2 Page 45 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: MAIN ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS On-site power distribution on CEDM cooling fans 2HVE-21A & 21B are This difference has little operational impact Unit 1, CEDM cooling fans powered from the 4160 Volt vital on the on-site power distribution system.

HVE-21A & 21B are powered . switchgear 2A3 & 2B3.

from the 480 Volt Vital Load Centers 1A2 & 1B2. '

2. On-site pwer distribution on Containment Coolers are powered from 3 This difference is of minor operational Unit 1, Containment Coolers 480 Volt Vital Motor Control Centers. significance. The Containment Coolers HVS-1A & 1B are powered from 2 HVS-1A & 1B are powered from MCC operate slightly different on Unit 2 than on the 480 Volt Vital Load 2A9 and 2HVS-1C & 1D are powered from Unit 1 This difference is noted in the

~ HVAC Center lA2. Containment MCC 2B9 ~ portion of this report.

Coolers HVS-1C & 1D are powered from the 480 Volt Vital L.C- 1B2.

3. Some of the equipment on Unit Equipment on Unit 2 that may be 3 These differences will have minor operational 1 that requires a power different than equipment on Unit 1, impact and in most cases, will be noted in supply from the Main Elect. (due to differences in systems & those portions of this report dealing with each Power Distribution sys. may canponents) may require a different of the systems & components differences.

not exist on Unit 2 due to Main Elect. Power Distribution differences in sys.& comp. arrangement on some of the power from Unit 1 to Unit 2 supplies in the on-site dist. swgr.

4. Motor Control Center 1B9 The equipment located in the SGBTF is 5 No operational impact. The shared SGBTF is supplies power to the Steam shared by both Units. Therefore, a addressed in the portion of this report dealing Generator Blowdown MCC is not required on Unit 2 for power with the Unit 1 & Unit 2 shared Treatment Facility. to this equipment. systems'.

Motor Control Center 1B10 The Aux. Boiler and its associated 5 No operational impact. The shared Aux. Boiler supplies power to the Aux. equipment supply Aux Steam to Unit 2 and Aux. Steam Sys. is addressed in the portion Boiler Equipment- from Unit 1 when necessary. Therefore, of this report dealing with the Unit 1 and Unit a MCC on Unit 2 is not required for 2 shared systems.

this equipment.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE UNIT 1 & 2 Page 46 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: MAIN ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SIGN IF ICANC E UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 6 Not on Unit l. Motor Control Centers 2A10 & 2B10 are 5 Minor operational significance. The hypochlorite, used to supply power to the system will be a shared system between Unit 1 &

hypochlorite system and associated Unit 2 in the future.

equipment.

7. Motor Control Centers 1A4 & Since the Water Treatment Plant will -5 Minor operational significance. The Water 1B4 supply power to the Water be shared by Units 1 & 2, no MCC is Treatment Plant on Unit 1 is used to produce Treatment Plant. necessary for this equipment on Unit 2. demineralized water for Unit 2 This system is discussed in the shared systems portion of this report.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI T UNIT 1 & 2 Page 47 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: 120 VOLT INSTRUMENT A-C SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

l. 120 Volt Instrument A.C. Unit 2 does not have Maint. Bypass 3 This difference has a minor operational impact buses (IMA, IMB, IMCf IMD) Buses. Each 120 Volt Inst. A.C. Bus and is a design improvement over the Unit 1 have back-up power supplied (2MA, 2MB, 2MC, 2MD) has back-up power system. The Unit 2 design will provide improved by two maintenance bypass supplied directly from a Maint. Bypass capabilities of back-up power supplied to the buses. A mechanical Transformer & Voltage Reg. Units. instrument buses upon an inverter failure or interlock on the Maint. The 2A&2C Maint. Bypass transformer maintenance on the inverters.

Bypass buses (1A & 1B) will and voltage reg. units get their allow only one instrument power supply from the 2A5 480 Volt bus to be fed from its Vital MCC. The 2B & 2D Maint. Bypass associated Maint. Bypass Bus transformer & voltage reg. units get at a time. IMA & IMC inst. their power supply from the 2B5 480 buses may be fed from the 1A Volt Vital MCC.

Maint. Bypass Bus and IMB &

IMD inst. buses may be fed from the 1B Maint. Bypass Bus. The Maint. Bypass Buses receive their power from the vital 480 Volt MCC's 1A5 &

1B5 through their associated Maint. Bypass Transformers and Voltage Regulating Units (1A & 1B).

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI UNIT 1 & 2 Page 4 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: 120 VOLT VITAL A.Ce SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. The 120 Volt Vital A.C. The 120 Vital A.C. Static uninter- 5 These differences have minimal operational impact static uninterruptable power ruptable'ower Supply Cabinet feeds since these are non-safety related, Non-Class IE supply (SUPS) cabinet feeds the No. 2A and No. 2B Vital Buses and power supplies.

the No. 1 Vital Bus and its their associated Non-Class IE loads.

assoc. non-class IE loads. The 120 Volt Vital A.C. Security, Fire The 120 Volt Vital A.C. Fire Detection, and Radiation Monitoring Detection & Station Security Cabinet feeds the Reg. Vital Bus PP-237 Cabinet feeds the Regs Vital and its associated Non-Class IE loads.

Bus PP-137 and its non-class The back-up D.C. power supply for the IE loads; Plant Security Sys ,Sups cabinet is supplied by the 125

~

Fire Detection Sys. & Halon Volt D.C. Bus 2AB while the Security, Fire Extinguishing Sys. The Fire Detection, and Radiation Mon.

Back-up D.C. power supply for Cabinet gets its back-up power supply both the Fire Detection & from the 125 Volt D.C. Bus 2C.

Station Security Cabinet is provided by the 125 Volt D.C.

Bus lAB.-

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE UNIT 1 6 2 Page 49 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: 125 VOLT D.CD SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Not on Unit 1. Four D.C. Panels are provided for the 3 This difference is of minor operational measurement channels 2MA, 2MB, 2MC, & significance. This difference is a design 2MD. These facilitate maintenance and/ improvement over the Unit 1 system. Specific or periodic testing of each measurement details of system operation will be procedurally channel and minimize the possibility of addressed.

a spurious Rx trip.

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 50 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 1 Not Installed Low CCW flow from Reactor Coolant 3 This is an equipment protective Pumps Reactor Trip (10 minute trip only (not required by the time delay.) safety analysis.)

Unit 1 procedurally trips the reactor and RCP's if CCW flow is not restored in 10 minutes.

2. No fault protection fuses Unit 2 logic functions are identical 3 The addition .of the fuses and fuse or fuse test circuitry is to Unit 1 ~ Unit 2 however has fuses test circuitry will be addressed installed in all matrix inter-bay connections. in the matrix test procedure for Additional test circuitry has been Unit 2.

added for testing the matrix fault protection fuses.

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI UNIT 162 Page 51 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: EX-CORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

l. 4 wide range channels 4 linear power range/log wide 2 These changes do not affect the operation of the range safety channel drawers in the system.

Each channel utilizes one RPS. 2 startup/control channels B-10 proportional counter for non-safety operator functions The ma)or difference is that the 4 startup and one U-235 fission for startup and steady state safety channels at Unit 1 have been replaced chamber. power operation and load by two startup control channels on Unit 2.

4 linear/power range following.

channels comprised of dual (upper and lower) The Unit 2 source range (startup) uncompensated ion chambers. channels use BF3 detectors instead of the B-10 detector used on Unit 1.

2 power range uncompensated ion chambers for control channels.

2. ZPM bypass is initiated The zero power mode bypass 3 This change will not affect the operation of by the wide range log permissive is initiated by the the system. The only change will be in the channel. low power section of the linear bistable actuation setpoint.

power range safety channel.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE T UNIT 1 6 2 Page 52 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: ENGINEERING SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM ESFAS SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 1 Operator bypasses desired Individual key operated bypass 3 This change is an improvement in design over channel by removing the switches for bistable bypass Unit 1 and has no operational impact-bistable module. capability.

2. Main Steam isolation signal Main Steam Isolation Signal 3 This change is necessary to insure prompt S/G generated by low S/G generated by low S/G pressure or isolation following a high energy steam or pressure. high containment pressure. feedline break in containment since Unit 2 does not have check valves on each Main Steam line. This change has little operational impact since the Atmospheric Dump Valves and Auxiliary Feedwater System would be used for decay heat removal and/or RCS cooldown following SIAS.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE T UNIT 1 6 2 Page 53 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM CONTROL SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

l. Indications are located Unit 2 upper and lower CEA limits 3 This change is not operationally significant on the core mimic display. (reed switch) are functionally since identical information is displayed identical to Unit l. Indications in both systems.

of these limits are located on the Unit 2 CEDCMS control panel.

2. Metrascope (bar chart) Unit 2 incorporates the Analog 3 The Analog display system has improved used for CEA position display system which is functionally reliability design features as well as improved indication display. identical to the Unit 1 metrascope. human factors characteristics.

3. CWP (CEA withdrawal CWP can be bypassed from the 3 This change will enable the operator to move prohibit) can not be operator's console. control rods during MTC testing without having bypassed. to electrically pumper (bypass) the Local Power Density CWP.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 54 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS Two T cold selector switches Not installed on Unit 2 5 Unit 1 design allows the operator on RTGB 103. the option of selecting either of (Normal-Alternate positions) two cold leg RTD's for input to each Rx. Regs Sys.

Unit 2 design only utilizes one cold leg RTD from each loop as inputs to the Rx. Reg. System.

At Unit 2 with a RTD failure the operator must select the opposite Rx. Reg. System for control.

At Unit 1 the operator may continue to use the same Rx Reg.

System by selecting the Alternate T cold input to the system.

• Assumes selected T cold RTD has failed.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 55 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: PRESSURIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM SIGN IF ICANC E UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Both PORV s open at 465 psia Low Temperature over-pressure 3 One PORV is capable of terminating protection: the design over-pressure transient while cooled down.

In both cases, the PORV's will With increasing pressure one PORV close after the pressure decreases opens at 450 psia a nominal amount below the lift setpoint.

Second PORV opens at 465 psia

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY STi LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 56 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: PROCESS & AREA RADIATION MONITORING SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Several different Complete system manufactured by Although the equipment is different, the manufacturers for Rad. Gulf General Atomic on Unit 2. operational function is basically the same for monitoring equip. on Unit l. both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

2. Remote rdout. for all Process Only Class IE safety related rad. 3 Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring Panel is an

& Rad. Monitors on Rad. Mon. monitors have readouts on Rad. improvement over Unit 1 with the digital readout Pnl. in Cont. Rm. Rad. Mon. Monitor Panel in the Control Room. capabilities and fewer readout modules (safety rdout. displayed on scaled These readouts are displayed on related only).

rate meters as well as multi- digital ratemeters and strip chart point recorders. Both safety recorders. The monitors with related and non-saf. related modules on the Rad. Monitor Panel monitors on Rad ~ Mon. Pnl. are as follows:

a. Same as Unit 2. a. CCW process Rad. Mon. (2)

b. Only 1 Plt. vent rad. mon. b. Plant vent effluent Rad. Mon. (2)

c. No ECCS area vent. exh. mon. c. ECCS area ventil. exh. mon. (2)

(Backfit Iten)

d. Only 1 cont. atmos. mon. d. Containment atmos. airborne rad ~

mon. (2)

e. Only 2 Cont. Rm. O.A.I. mon. e. Control Rm. O.A.I. airborne rad.

mon. (4)

f. No ECCS area vents airborne f. ECCS area vents airborne rad.

mon. (Backfit Item) mon. (2)

g. Same as Unit 2. g. CIS area rad ~ monitors (4)

h. Only 2 SFP area rad ~ mon. h. Spent fuel pool area rad mon.(6)

~

i. Same as Unit 2~ i. Post LOCA area rad ~ mon. (2) 54 total chnls. on rad. mon. pnl. 42 total chnls on rad ~ mon. pnl.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 57 DIPPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: PROCESS AND AREA RADIATION MONITORING SIGN IP IC ANC E UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

3. Some Process Rad. Monitors All Process Radiation Monitors- are Design of Unit 2 monitors is slightly different are in-line type monitors. off-line type monitors. Those which to Unit 1 Monitors This will have very little are safety related have redundant operational impact as the Unit 2 design is an pumps to preclude a single failure improvement over Unit 1, as well as being more of the pump and associated monitor. reliable.

4. Only CIS monitors get their All Class IE Safety Related Rad. Radiation Monitoring of Safety-Related systems power supply from safety Monitors get their power supply from and their associated Safety-Related power related supplies-'ill AC instrument buses. Class IE Safety Related AC sources. be procedurally addressed to minimize All Non-Safety Related Rad. Mon. get operational impact of power supply failures.

their power supply from non-safety related AC sources .

5. Unit 1 Rad. Monitor modules Unit 2 Monitor modules on rad. pnl. Setpoints for safety related Class IE Monitors on rad. pnl. in Cont. Rm. in Control Room also provide audio have some operational functions associated with prvde. audio & visual alarms. 6 visual alarms. (Class IE Safety them, as well as some of the non-safety related Stpnts. are set on the mod- Related) The setpoints are set on monitors. The setpoint operational functions ules by a variable resistor the modules by pushbutton controls are administratively controlled.

Process Mon. Alarms: or thru the non-safety related Alert Failure, computer kybd with administratively High Radiation controlled access codes.

Area Monitor Alarms: All Monitor Alarms:

High Radiation Failure Two Up-Scale Trips High Rad.

High>>High Radiation Down-Scale Trip Monitor Trouble

6. Not on Unit 1 (Some Backfit Non Class IE Rad Mon. computer 5 Provides redundant readout for safety-related Item Rad. Mon. will use based system will collect and process 6 area rad ~ monitors as well as readout digital ratemeters and will provide display and readout data for non-safety related monitors when acquisition have computer data on Unit 1 for all rad ~ monitors, both safety is required by the operator. The system itself Chem. Dept. Appendix I related and non-safety related. is non-safety related and provides no operational computer in the near future.) Keyboard 6 CRT consoles for computer functions.

system will be located in the Control Roan, Healty Physics Office, and Radiochemistry Lab.

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI UNIT 1 &2 Page 5S DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM SIGNIFIC ANC E UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Not installed on Unit l. Motor operated annulus isolation 3 These valves will be normally open. They are valves: needed to isolate the Annulus from the fuel pool in the event of high radiation conditions in the PCV-25-32 PCV-25-33 fuel pool area. The operator will verify proper system alignment during'ccident conditions IAW applicable procedures.

2. Not installed on Unit 1. Fuel handling building emergency 3 The operator will verify proper system alignment ventilation connection to SBVS filter during accident conditions IAW applicable train inlet through PCV-25-30 and procedures PCV-25-31.

3. Not installed on Unit 1. High radiation signal from fuel 3 (Same as above) handling bldg.

a. Closes annulus valve (PCV-25-32, FCV-25-33) ~

b. Opens PHB emer. ventilation valves (PCV-25-30; PCV-25-31) ~

c. Starts SBVS fans.

4. This capability does not Motor operated outlet dampers D-24 6 Post accident operation of these valves is exist at Unit l. D-23 can be controlled by a PIC (PIC identical to Unit 1. The operator has remote 25-20-Al 6 PIC-25-20-Bl) at the HVAC control capability for long term operation of control panel' the system. Differences in system operation will be procedurally addressed.

5. Unit 1 H2 purge system can Continuous Containment Purge/H2 purge 5 This change does not significantly affect the be aligned manually to the System exhaust line can be lined up operation of the system.

SBVS filter train inlet. to SBVS filter train inlet through PCV-25-29 and PCV-25

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCI T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 59 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT l UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS l.) Single Speed Cooling Fan Two Speed Cooling Fan Motor 3 Functional operation of the system during Motor (60,000 CFM) Fast-60,000 CFM (normal operating normal and accident conditions is the same condition) at both units.

Sloe-40,000 CFM (accident condition)

PLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE T UNIT 1 6 2 Page 60 DIPPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM SIGN IP ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Not installed on Unit 1. Two motor operated dampers added in 3 Specific differences in system operation and series (D-39; D-40) on return line from control will be procedurally addressed.

Control Room and kitchen area.

Two diff. pressure transmitters added for control of the above valves to automatically maintain a positive pressure in the Control Room.

2. Air cooled Air conditioning condensers are cooled 3 No Control Room controls are affected by this by CCWo change.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE T$ UNITS 1 & 2 Page 61 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY CLEAN UP SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Single filter train Redundant filter trains 3 This change is a design improvement over Unit 1.

Minimum operational significance.

2. Single manual damper Motor operated dampers at inlet 3 At Unit 2 the dampers fail open on loss of fAdministratively locked to each filter train (D-17A;-17B) power, therefore both systems acheive the open] same purpose.

3. Single Rad monitors on Two redundant radiation monitors on 3 Specific differences in operation during each line provide in- outside air intake lines provide accident conditions will be procedurally dication only. isolation of outside air intake lines addressed.

and auto start of 2 HVE 13A&2 HVE 13B 4 No similar feature on CIS signl from Unit 1 actuates 3 Specific control features affecting both Unit 1 presently exists. Unit 2 CRECS units will be procedurally addressed.

5. Not installed on Unit 1 Flow Indicator controllers on HVAC 3 Specific details of system operation will panel provide control of exhaust fan be procedurally addressed.

vortex dampers

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 62 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: ECCS AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Not installed on Unit 1 Redundant radiation monitoring 3 This change is a design improvement over Unit 1.

system on each exhaust line. Operation of the system is not affected by the change-

2. Not installed on Unit 1 Motor operated fan vortex dampers 3 Specific details of system operation will be can be controlled by Flow Indicator procedurally addressed.

Controllers on the HVAC panel.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUC UNIT 162 Page 6 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: INTAKE STRUCTURE VENTILATION SYSTEM l SIGN IF IC ANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Not installed on Unit l. Two redundant 100% capacity propeller 3 This system is not required on Unit 1 since exhaust fans, two pressure dampers and Unit 1 Intake Structure is not totally enclosed.

two screened openings.

Auxiliary operator verifies proper operation of The fans are manually actuated and the system.

thermostatically controlled.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI T UNIT 1 & 2 Page 64 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: FUEL POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. This capability does not High Radiation signal from spent 2 These changes represent a design improvement exist at Unit 1. fuel pool area radiation monitors over Unit 1. Specific differences as to system accomplishes the following: operation during accident conditions will be procedurally addressed.

a. Inlet and outlet dampers close

• fD-29; D-30; D-31; D-32] ~

b. Fuel hdlg bldg. and fuel pool vent system fans stop.

c. Emer. vent. is accomplished via the Shield Bldg. Vent. System.

• Fuel pool inlet and outlet lines have motor operated dampers inlet: D-29; D-30 outlet: D-31; D-32

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI NT UNIT 1 6 2 Page 65 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM

! SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 1 Not installed on Unit 1. Motor operated dampers added at These changes represent a design improvement supply outlet and exhaust inlet over Unit 1. Specific differences as to system operation during accident conditions will be Supply: D-33; D-34 procedurally addressed.

Exhaust: D-35; D-36

• Spent fuel pool area high rad.

signal closes these dampers.

PLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 66 DIPFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: MISCELLANEOUS REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEMS ~

SIGNIPICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 1 ~ CEDM Cooling: CEDM Cooling: These differences are of minimal operatinal significance, however they will be procedurally

a. 480 Volt power supply. a. 4160 Volt power supply addressed.

b ~ Normally one fan b. Interlocked to prevent operating no both fans from operating interlocks at the same time.

c. One fan continuously c. Fan starts and stops on runs. temperature control

2. Airborne Radioactivity Not installed 5 This system is not necessary at Unit 2. The Removal System Continuous Containment/H> Purge System provides the same capabiTity The operator manually operates this system when necessary

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE UNIT 1 6 2 Page 67 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: CONTINUOUS CONTAINMENT/H PURGE SYSTEM SIGNIPICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Hydrogen Purge System only. Continuous Containment Purge System 5 The Continuous Containment Purge System will that can serve as a Hydrogen Purge normally be operating providing continuous system if necessary. venting of the containment at 2000-2500 cfm.

The system will isolate on CIAS. Specific details of the system operation will be procedurally addressed.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 68 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON SIAS SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. C HPSI pump starts if the B No C HPSI pump 3 Minimal operational significance HPSI pump fails to start. since C HPSI pump is not required and will not start unless the B HPSI pump fails.

2. Feedwater pump discharge Two Feedwater isolation valves in 3 Unit 2 has two FW line isolation Valve and Feedwater iso- series on each header close valves. Unit 1 acheives redun-lation valve on each header dancy by closing the FWP discharge close valves. Minimum operational sig-nificance since the operator will verify closure of the applicable valves IAW appropriate procedures.

3. Intake cooling water lube Intake cooling water lube water isola- 3 Not operationally signif icant. The water isolation to the cir- tion valves to the circulating water operator will verify valves culating water pumps (MV- pumps (MV-21-4A; MV-21-4B) close closed IAW appropriate procedures.

21-4) closes In both units the end result is that the seismic and non-seismic portions of the lube water system are isolated.

4 Not installed on Unit 1. V-3571 and V-3572 close (HPSI 3 Not operationally significant.

Hot Leg infection check valve The operator will verify these leakage drain valves.) valves are closed IAW appropriate procedures.

5.) Not installed on Unit l. MV-14-17 and MV-14-18 close [CCW supply 3 Not operationally signif icant.

isolation valves to Fuel Pool Heat One of the two isolation valves Exchanger] will normally be locked closed anyway. The operator will verify closure IAW applicable procedures.

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 69 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON SIAS SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

6. Not installed on Unit l. I-SE-03-2A and I-SE-03-2B close (SIT 3 Minimum operational significance.

test line isolation valves to RWT) Manu'al isolation valve downstream of these valves is normally locked closed.

7. 3 Charging pumps receive 2 Charging pumps receive a start 3 Unit 1 operates with the 3rd charg-a start signal. signal. ing pump in off. Therefore the end result is the same at both units.

8. FCV 2161 closes (normal FCV 2210Y closes to accomplish this 3 The end result is the same at both Boric Acid makeup isolation function units, the normal Boric Acid make-valve up flow path is isolated.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE Tp UNITS 1 & 2 Page 70 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON CIAS SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. V-2515 AND V-2516 Close (let- V-2516 and V-2522 close [letdown 3 Minimum operational signif icance.

down isolation valves; both isolation valves; V-2516 is inside The containment is isolated from are inside containment) containment, V-2522 is outside contain- the letdown system in both cases ment]

2. Not installed on Unit 1 I-SE 03-2A and I-SE 03-2B close SIT 3 Refer to SIAS actuation d6.

test line to RMT isolation valves.

3. Not installed on Unit 1 FCV's 25-32 and 25-33 open [SBVS inlet 3 Minimum operational significance valves from shield bldg.] since these valves are normally open

4. Not installed on Unit 1 FCV's 25-20, 25-21, 25-26 and 25-28 5 Minimum operational significance close [Continuous Cont/H2 purge system The operator will verify proper isolation valves] isolation IAM appropriate procedures 5 Not installed on Unit 1 FCV's 25-30 and 25-31 close [Fuel Hdlg. 5 Minimum operational significance Bldg. Emerg- Ventilation Isol. valve] since these valves will normally be closed.

PLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCI T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 71 DIPPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON CSAS SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS 1 NaOH addition valves open - Two hydrazine pumps start and two 3 Minimum operational significance.

[4 solenoid operated valves) hydrazine pump discharge valves open Both of these subsystems perform the same function. The operator will verify proper operation of either system IAW appropriate procedures.

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE T, UNITS 1 & 2 Page 72 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: COMPONENT ACTUATED ON RAS SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. Not installed on Unit 1 V-3495 and V-3496 close (redundant 3 Minimum operational significance.

miniflow isolation valves.) Unit 1 closes two valves to isolate one header. Unit 2 closes four valves to isolate two headers.

The operator will verify closure IAW applicable procedures.

FLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST+ LUCI T, UNITS 1 6 2 Page 7 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: COMPONENTS ACTUATED ON MSIS SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

1. FWP Discharge Valves close: FW Isolation Valves close: 3 Minimum operational significance.

MV-09-1 MV-091A In both units redundant isolation MV-09-2 MV-092A capability exists.

MV-091B The operator will verify valves FW Isolation Valves close: MV-092B close IAW applicable procedures MV-09-7 MV-09-8

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCIE T UNIT 1 & 2 Page 74 DIPPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 SHARED. SYSTEMS SIGN IPICANC E UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS Pire and Domestic Water Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 will share a canmon fire and domestic 3 Details of specific operation will be procedurally water system. All ma)or components (fire pumps, city water service addressed.

tanks, hydropneumatic tank, danestic water pumps) will be operated and monitored from Unit 1.

2~ Ultimate Heat Sink The Ultimate Heat Sink barrier valves can be opened from Unit 1 or 3 Control switches for the. barrier valves are Unit 2 Control Room. located on identical sections of RTGB 102/202.

3~ Steam Generator Blowdown Treatment Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 will utilize the S/G Blowdown Treatment 5 This facility is designed to accomodate both Pacility for blowdown processing. Units. Specific details of system operation will be procedurally addressed.

4~ H ochlorite S stem The Hypochlorite system currently being installed at Unit 2 plant 5 Operating procedures for this system will be site will be used by both Units. (When fully operational, this developed.

system will replace the chlorine in)ection system currently used at Unit 1.)

5~ Water Treatment Plant 4

The Water Treatment Plant located at Unit 1 plant site will be 5 Specific details of system operation will be utilized by both Units. procedurally addressed

PLORIDA 6 LIGHT COMPANY ST LUC NT UNIT 1 6 2 DIPPER CES ANALYSIS Page 75 SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 SHARED SYSTEMS SIGN IP ICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

6. Turbine Oil Stora e Tank The Turbine Oil Storage Tank at Unit 1 will be utilized by both 5 This tank has adequate capacity to accomodate Units. both Units. Details of system operation will be procedurally addressed.

j 7~ Auxilia Bo iler The Auxiliary Boiler at Unit 1 will be used by both Units to provide 5 Specific details of system operation will be Auxiliary Steam for the Boric Acid and Waste Concentrators when procedurally addressed.

either unit is shutdown

FLORIDA & LIGHT COMPANY ST LUC T UNIT 1 & 2 Page 76 DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

'Condensate Store e Tank A tie between the two units has been provided from the Unit 2 3 The cross connect valves will be manually locked Condensate Storage Tank to the Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps in the closed position. Operation of these suction for a back-up tornado missle protected water supply. This valves will be under strict administrative control is normally isolated. The elevation of this tie connection on the St. Lucie Unit 2 tank assures that the minimum quantity of water required for safe shutdown is maintained at all times.

2. Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Store e and Transfer The fuel oil transfer pump discharge lines can be manually 3 The cross-connect valves will be manually locked cross-connected. closed and their use will be under strict administrative control.

3~ Instrument Air S stem The Instrument Air System is interconnected between units via automatically controlled valves.

5 The valves will be normally closed. If pressure decreases below a specific value at one unit, the valves will open. The system has automatic controls to prevent a loss of instrument air capability at one unit from disabling both inst.

air systems. Details of specific system operation will be procedurally addressed'

~ Waste Man ement S stems a Holdup Tanks The capability exists to pump water from Unit 1 Holdup Tanks 5 The cross-connect valves will be manually to Unit 2 Holdup Tanks and vice versa. locked closed and their use will be under strict administrative control.

b. Unit 1 E'quip. Drain pumps (1B & 1C) can be manually aligned to Unit 2 aerated waste storage tank

FLORIDA LIGHT COMPANY ST LUCI UNIT 1 & 2 Page 77 DIFPERENCES ANALYSIS SYSTEM OR COMPONENT: INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN UNIT 1 & UNIT 2 SIGNIFICANCE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 CATEGORY COMMENTS

5. Unit 1 & Unit 2 Startup transformers can be used to supply power 5 This interconnection between Units 1 & 2 will to the opposite Unit's 4160 Volt Switchgear for Plant Auxiliaries have minor operation impact. The switching This is accomplished by means of the 2A-4 or 2B-4 4160 Volt Tie- involved with the interconnection will be Breaker arrangement. The Startup transformers normally supply procedurally addressed and administratively power from the 240 KV switchyard to the 6900 Volt and 4160 Volt controlled.

Switchgear when off-site power is needed. In the event that a Startup transformer must be removed from service, power to its associated 4160 Volt Switchgear can be supplied by the other Unit's Startup transformer. The 2A-4 & 2B-4 Tie-Breaker cubicles are located at their associated Startup transformers. The three breaker arrangement must be manually manipulated to achieve the bypass of the Startup transformer via the Tie-Breaker. The Tie-Breaker itself is normally open and racked out for administrative control to preclude inadvertent paralleling of Unit 1 & Unit 2 Startup transformers.

Indicating lights which show the status of the 2A-4 & 2B-4 switchgear Tie-Breaker arrangement are located on both Unit 1 & Unit 2 Control Boards on RTGB 101 and RTGB 201.

Page 1 SL2-FSAR CHAPTER 13 13.0 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13.1 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF APPLICANT 13 '.1 MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATION FPL utilizes a Project Management Team approach to integrate the varied activities required to successfully complete the St. Lucie Unit 2 project.

The Project Management Organization is the responsibility of a Vice President who reports to an Executive Vice President. The Project General Manager reports to the Director of Projects and is responsible for coordinating all groups involved with the project both inside and outside the company. The Project Team is composed of staff representatives from supporting FPL departments and the architect-engineer. FPL team members report to the Project General Manager on a line basis. Team members representing the architect-engineer, for plant design and construction support, are responsible to the Project General Manager through contractual obligation. These Project Team members are responsible for bringing to the Project the expertise of their resident departments. Respective department heads are responsible for the quality of technical services provided by Project Team Members.

After St. Lucie Unit 2 becomes operational, the Project Management Organization has the responsibility for managing the implementation of certain specific modifications to the operating unit.

A brief description of FPL Engineering, Quality Assurance, Licensing, Construction and Operating (Power Resources) Departments is given below.

These functions are the responsibility of an Executive Vice President, who reports directly to the President. The reporting relationships are shown on Figure 13.1-1.

The organization of the Project Team is shown on Figure 13.1-2.

Page 2 SL2-PSAR Pro)ect design and engineering support is the responsibility of the Chief Engineer, Power Plant Engineering, who reports to the Vice President of Engineering, Construction 6 Projects who reports to the Executive Vice President. The Power Plant Engineering Department, through the Engineering Pro)ect Manager, and members of the Project Team, provides independent analyses and evaluations of key safety related aspects of architect-engineer and vendor designs and performance commensurate with licensing requirements, assures integration of nuclear design and operating experience from the Power Resources Department, evaluates problems and NRC action concerning other utilities which could affect FPL plants, and assists in evaluating bids for future nuclear plants.

Corporate quality assurance, nuclear plant licensing management, and coordination of research and development are the responsibliity of the Vice President-Advanced Systems & Technology, who reports directly to the Executive Vice President. Corporate Quality Assurance and Licensing Management are represented on the Progect Team. Details of the Quality Assurance Department organization are contained in Section 17.2.

The Power Plant Construction Department is the responsibliity of the Director of Construction, who reports to the Vice President of Engineering, Construction and Projects, who reports to the Executive Vice President. This department provides construction methods, handles construction contracts, and provides quality control and labor relations personnel.

Power plant operation and maintenance are the responsibility of the Vice President-Power Resources who reports to the Executive Vice President. The Manager of Power Resources-Nuclear is responsible for all matters concerning the operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants. The Assistant Manager Power Resources-Nuclear is responsible for those operation and maintenance matters specifically related to the St. Lucie Plant. The Manager Power Resources-Nuclear Services reports to the Manager of Power Resources-Nuclear and is in charge of the nuclear support staff. The Nuclear Support Staff of the Power Resources Department is established to furnish technical support in those areas of technical expertise that are unique to nuclear power plants.

The Manager of Power Resources-Services reports to the Vice President-Power

~ sl i

Page 3 SL2-FSAR Resources and is responsible for staff technical support in areas common to both nuclear and fossil plants. The Services staff is composed of Operations, Maintenance, Administration, Instrument and Control, and Test and Perfoxmance groups which provide in-house technical support to operating plants in a broad spectrum of engineering, technical and scientific disciplines. Specific technical support areas assigned to various section supervisors are indicated on Figure 13.1-3 along with the authorized staffing level for each section.

Actual staffing levels may vary dependent upon the support required.

Regulatory requirements for plant support specified in ANSI/ANS-3.1-1978, Regulatory Guide 8.3, "Film Badge Performance Criteria" February 1973 (RO) and ANSI 8.7 are fulfilled by the Power Resources staff sections. During preliminary design, engineering and construction activities that are the responsibility of Prospect Management, Power Resources is represented by the Power Resources Team Member.

The Power Resources and Power Plant Engineering Departments have been expanded /R to support the design and operation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 and St.

Lucie Units 1 and 2.

13.1.1.1 S ecific Desi n and 0 eratin Activities The following paragraphs summarize the degree to which certain design, construction and preoperational activities are accomplished and describes the specific responsibilities and activities for technical support to operation. /R

Page 4 SL2-FSAR 13.1.1.1.1 Principal Site-Related Engineering Work a) Meteorology A meteorological monitoring program was established at the site to provide those meteorological factors that bear upon plant design, operation and safety. The program has been conducted by Dames &

Moore and is discussed in Section 2.3 ~ Direction and supervision of the program is provided by FPL.

Geology & Hydrology Law Engineering of Atlanta, Georgia performed the geologic and seismologic studies of the site.

During construction, Ebasco Services, Inc. soils engineers inspected the excavation and mapped any significant geologic features encountered. Geology, hydrology and seismology is discussed in detail in Sections 2.4 and '2.5.

.c) Demography Ebasco Services, Inc., performed demographic studies relative to population within 50 miles of the plant as discussed in Subsection 2'.1.3 Environmental Effects A preoperational monitoring program for St. Lucie Unit 2 was developed to enable the collection of hydrothermal, biological and water quality data necessary to determine possible impacts on the environment due to construction activities and to establish a preoperational baseline from which to evaluate future environmental monitoring data. This program is described in the Environmental Report and is performed by Applied Biology, Inc. and FPL.

Page 5 SL2-FSAR Design of Plant and Auxiliary Systems

~ An evaluation of engineering progress as of December 31, 1979 indicated overall completion of design and engineering of 95.2 percent.

Review and Approval of Plant Design Features Design control for review is performed in accordance with the quality assurance program in FPL Topical Quality Assurance Report (FPLTQAR) 1-76A.

Site Layout with Respect to Environmental Effects and Security Provisions.

A preoperational monitoring program for St. Lucie Unit 2 was developed to enable the collection of physical, chemical, and ecological parameters necessary to determine possible impacts on the environment due to construction activities and to establish a preoperational baseline from which to evaluate future environmental monitoring Applied Biology Inc.. has carried out the biological and water quality monitoring programs.

Security provisions in accordance with applicable NRC regulations are incorporated into overall site development by developing security criteria and incorporating these criteria into design drawings and specifications by FPL and Ebasco Services, Inc. Details of security provisions are provided in the security program in Section 13.6.

Development of Safety Analysis Reports Overall responsibiity for preparation of the FSAR rests with Power Plant Engineering. Preparation of the individual sections was assigned to the cognizant technical groups within FPL or to Ebasco Services, Inc. for balance of plant systems, and Combustion Engineering for Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) systems.

~ ~

Page 6 SL2-FSAR Review and Approval of Material and Component Specifications All safety related project specifications are reviewed in accordance with the quality assurance program in FPL Topical Quality Assurance Report (FPLTQAR) 1-76A.

Procurement of Materials and Equipment As of December 31, 1979, approximately 84.6 percent of the overall total procurement effort is completed.

k) Management and Review of Construction Activt.ties Management and review of construction activities are performed by the FPL Construction Department and Project General Management.

13.F 1.1.2 Preoperational Activities a) Development of Human Engineering Design Objectives and Design Phase Review of Proposed Main Control Room Layouts.

The human engineering design objectives were developed jointly between FPL project team members and Ebasco Services, Inc.

engineering design personnel and conform to NUREG 0770.

The control room layouts are designed to include all the features and components necessary for monitoring and controlling the operations of the nuclear power plant with a high degree of reliability. The control boards and panels act as a major tool in the operator's interface with all the plant systems. They house control, instrumentation, display and annunciation equipment and are arranged within the control room to facilitate the operator's task of control and protection. In addition, the control room layouts include advanced concepts such as video displays, computer based data acquisition, logging and analysis.

Page 7 SL2-FSAR The basic human engineering design objectives were to improve the operator's ability to maintain communication with all the systems in the plant. The control boards utilize a modular design concept with compact miniaturized devices for more efficient functional display.

The operator, having the control board information on a smaller area, will have better control of the plant operation.

b) Development and Implementation of Staff Recruiting and Training Program.

The staffing plan and implementation schedule is presented in Table 13.1-1. The training program is presented in Section 13.2.

c) Development of Plans for Initial Testing /R The St. Lucie Unit 2 Staxtup Group has the responsibility for the integrated operations of the Startup Program. The scope of the testing to be accomplished during the test program is defined in Section 14.2.

Development of Plant Maintenance Programs Plant maintenance programs for St. Lucie Unit 2 are developed by the FPL Power Resources Department by upgrading and expanding, as needed, the existing programs for St. Lucie Unit 1.

13.1.1.1.3 Technical Support for Operations Technical services and backup support for the operating organization are also discussed in Subsection 13.1. Backup and support for the operating organization in the specific capabilities of operating experience assessment, /A nuclear, mechanical, structural, electrical, thermal-hydraulic, meteorology and materials, instrumentation and controls, plant chemistry, fueling and /R refueling, operation engineering and analysis is available in FPL's Power Plant Engineering Department in addition to the staff support available within /D

Page 8 SL2-FSAR the Power Resources General Office Group.

Maintenance and backfit construction support is available through FPL's Power Plant Construction Department, providing management of contractor forces, in addition to the staff support available within the Power Resources General Office Group.

13.1.1.2 Or anizational Arran ement The FPL General Office Management and Support Department Organization is shown on Figures 13.1-1 through 13.1-8.

As shown on Figure 13.1-1, all departments, with their respective Vice Presidents, with responsiblity for the design, licensing, construction, quality assurance and operations, report to an Executive Vice President, who reports to the President of FPL.

Qualifications for key individuals within the organization are provided in Subsection 13.1.1.3.

For specific activities, FPL may elect to enter into a continual arrangement with a consulting organization in order to secure specific or specialized expertise or to solicit a recommendation on a course of action. FPL may also enter into contractural arrangement for construction services provided by a contractor for specific improvement or modification work. Extended organizations will be responsible to cognizant personnel within FPL.

After St. Lucie Unit 2 begins operation, the Project Management Organization may manage the implementation of specific major modifications of the plant or may manage a modification program for the unit if the program is extensive.

The operations of the Project Management Group is discussed in Subsection 13.1.1 ~

13.1.1.3 Head uarters Staffin For personnel within the FPL General Office Management and Support Departments

Page 9 SL2-PSAR who have duties and responsibilities relevant to St. Lucie Unit 2, as reflected in the organization charts of Subsection 13.1.1.2, summaries of function, expertise and education are presented below.

Page 10 SL2-FSAR 13 ' ' OPERATING ORGANIZATION 13.1.2.1 Plant Or anization Figure 13.1-9 provides a chart showing the title of each position, the number of operating shift crews, and the positions for which reactor operator and senior reactor operator licenses are required. Table 13.1-1 displays plant staffing changes to the existing St. Lucie Unit 1 organization to accommodate operation, administration and maintenance of St. Lucie Unit 2. These changes follow manpower requirements to support St. Lucie Unit 2 and may vary slightly dependent upon prospect progress and schedule.

13.1.2.2 Plant Personnel Responsibilities and Authorities The function, responsibilities, and authorities of plant positions are described below. These positions are indicated on the organizational chart of Figure 13.1-9.

a) Plant Manager The Plant Manager reports to the Assistant Manager Power Resources-Nuclear (refer to Figure 13.1-5) and has direct responsibility for operating and maintaining the plant in a safe, reliable and efficient manner. He is responsible for protection of the plant staff and the general public from avoidable radiation exposure and/or any other consequences of an accident at the plant. He bears the responsibility for compliance with the facility operating license.

He has the authority to take any action necessary, without consultation, to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident.

b) Operations Superintendent The Operations Superintendent reports to the Plant Manager and acts in his behalf during his absence. He is responsible to the Plant Manager for operating and maintaining the plant in a safe, reliable, and efficient manner. He will assume the duties and responsibilities of the Plant Manager as the primary alternate to that position.

Page 11 SL2-FSAR Operations Supervisor The Operations Supervisor has the responsibility for directing the actual day-to-day operation of the unit and holds a Senior Operator License. He reports directly to the Operations Superintendent and directs the plant operating staff. He coordinates operations related activities with all departmental supervisors. He assumes all of the Operations Superintendent's responsibilities and authority in his absence. He is responsible for overall supervision of fuel handling operations. He has the authority to shut down the unit, initiate the Emergency Plans, and issue standing orders on a day-to-day basis.

Plant Supervisor The Plant Supervisor is responsible for the actual operation of the plant on his assigned shift. He reports to the Operations Supervisor and directs the activities of the operators on his shift. He must be cognizant of all maintenance activities being performed while he is on duty. The Plant Supervisor on duty has the authority to shut down the unit if, in his opinion, conditions warrant this action. He has the authority and responsibility to initiate the Emergency Plans and to issue standing orders for operation in con)unction with the Operations Supervisor. The Plant Supervisor is the Emergency Coordinator when the Emergency plan is in effect. During fuel handling operations, he may direct the operation or operate fuel handling equipment. Responsibilities are specified by an administrative procedure'.

Watch Engineer The Watch Engineer is the working operating foreman and is responsible for plant operations on his shift. He reports to the Plant Supervisor. Upon assignment he may assume the responsibilities of Plant Supervisor. During fuel handling operations he shall direct or operate fuel handling equipment. He is also the fire team leader and maintains proper qualifications for this position. The Watch

Page 12 SL2-FSAR Engineer on duty has the authority to shut down the unit if in his opinion conditions warrant this action. He has the authority to initiate the Emergency Plans. Responsibilities are specified by an administrative procedure. /A Control Center Operator The- Control Center Operator operates controls and monitors instruments located in the control room containing reactor, turbine-generator and transmission line control boards, and under direct or general supervision directs the operation of all plant equipment as I

required to maintain proper operating conditions. He executes or directs the execution of orders received from the Plant Supervisor, Watch Engineer, and Dispatcher. He has the authority to shut down the unit if in his opinion conditions warrant this action. During fuel handling operations, he may operate fuel handling equipment under general supervision. He may operate radiation survey instruments. Responsibilities are specified by an administrative procedure. /A Shift Technical Advisor The Shift Technical Advisor provides an independent, dedicated concern for the safety of the St. Lucie Plant. This is accomplished by providing diagnostic support in an advisory capacity only to Operations personnel during off-normal events and by advising the Plant Supervisor on actions to terminate or mitigate the consequences of such events. The Shift Technical Advisor is responsible to the Technical Supervisor. Responsibilities are specified by an administrative procedure. The Shift Technical Advisor position may be eliminated if the Plant Supervisor meets the Shift Technical Advisor education, training and qualification guidelines. /A

Page 13 SL2-FSAR Nuclear Operator /R The Nuclear Operator operates nuclear reactor auxiliary equipment and turbine-generator auxiliary equipment under the direction of a licensed Operator or Senior Operator. He performs inspections of operating equipment and systems including but not limited to the Reactor Coolant System, Chemical and Volume Control System, Component Cooling Water, Shutdown Cooling and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Systems, Waste Management System, engineering safety features systems and components, radiation detection equipment, containment and radioactive area ventilation and purge systems, Primary Water Makeup System, refueling water tank, gas supply systems, liquid and gas sampling and analysis equipment, and chemical feed addition equipment. He performs operating adjustments and services, records operating data, and operates radiation survey instruments. During fuel handling operations he may operate fuel handling equipment under the supervision of a licensed operator. He may operate other plant auxiliary equipment under the direction of a Plant Supervisor, Watch Engineer, or Control Center Operator. Responsibilities are specified by an administrative procedure. /A Nuclear Turbine Operator /R The Nuclear Turbine Operator operates turbine controls and serves as turbine-generator attendant. He acts under the direction of a licensed operator or senior operator, may be assigned additional duties, can assist the Nuclear Operator, performs operating adjustments and services, and records -operating data. He is a member of the fire team and is properly qualified for this position.

Responsibilities are specified by an administrative procedure. /A Auxiliary Equipment Operator /R The Auxiliary Equipment Operator operates plant auxiliary equipment, such as the Water Treatment Plant and the Intake Cooling Water System equipment. He may operate other plant auxiliary equipment under the

Page 14 SL2-FSAR direction of a Plant Supervisor, Nuclear Watch Engineer, or a Control Center Operator.He is a member of the fire team and is properly qualified for this position. Responsibilities are specified by an administrative procedure. /A Technical Supervisor /R The Technical Supervisor reports to the Plant Manager and is responsible for supervision of the staff engineers and directs activities concerning technical analysis and advisory services. The Technical Supervisor is responsible for the operating experience feedback function. /A Reactor Supervisor /R The Reactor Supervisor conducts or supervises tests, accumulates and evaluates data and maintains records of the performance of all plant equipment including core performance and fuel records. He reports to the Operations Superintendent. He has the responsibility to recommend that the unit be shut down if in his opinion conditions warrant this action. He has the authority to initiate the Emergency Plans.

Health Physics Supervisor /R The Health Physics Supervisor conducts or supervises surveys and monitoring programs to detect, measure, and assess radiation levels within the facility and maintains records and reports of all radiation surveys and monitoring programs. He instructs or assists in the instruction of all personnel in the basic principles of radiation protection. He assists or supervises decontamination operations.

He has the responsibility to recommend that the unit be shut down if in his opinion conditions warrant this action, and he has the authority to initiate the Emergency Plans. The Health Physics

Page 15 SL2-FSAR Supervisor reports to the Operations Superintendent. He also has an authorized direct line of communication to the Power Resources Staff Health Physics Section Supervisor and to the Plant Manager. These lines of communication give him access to upper management to assure that exposures are as low as reasonably achievable.

Instrument and Control Supervisor /R The Instrument and Control Supervisor reports to the Maintenance Superintendent and is responsible for supervision of maintenance, calibration and installation of all instrument and control equipment and for mai'ntenance of instrument and control records. He has the authority to shut down the unit if in his opinion conditions warrant this action, and he has the authority to initiate the Emergency Plans.

Chemistry Supervisor /R The Chemistry Supervisor conducts or supervises the chemical and radiochemical analyses of water, gas, and solid samples. He evaluates test results and directs corrective measures incident to the analyses. He has the authority to initiate the Emergency Plans.

Maintenance Superintendent /R The Maintenance Superintendent reports to the Plant Manager and is responsible for supervison of the maintenance of all equipment and facilities and for maintaining all required maintenance records.

Assistant Superintendent-Mechanical Maintenance /R The Assistant Superintendent-Mechanical Maintenance reports to the Maintenance Superintendent and is responsible for supervision of the mechanical maintenance of all equipment and facilities and for maintaining all mechanical maintenance records.

Page 16 SL2-FSAR Assistant Superintendent-Electrical Maintenance /R The Assistant Superintendent-Electrical Maintenance reports to the Maintenance Superintendent and is responsible for supervision of the electrical maintenance of all equipment and facilities and for maintaining all electrical maintenance records.

s) Quality Control Supervisor /R The Quality Control Supervisor reports to the Plant Manager and is

'esponsible for the coordination of the overall quality control (QC) effort within the St. Lucie Plant organization. Refer to FPL Topical Quality Assurance Report (FPLTQAR) 1>>76A for a more detailed description of the Quality Control Supervisor's responsibilities.

The following describes the line of succession of authority and responsibility for the overall station operation in the event of unexpected contingencies of a temporary nature:

a) Plant Manager

1) Operations Superintendent

2) Operations Supervisor b) Operations Superintendent

1) Operations Supervisor

2) Plant Supervisor

3) Watch Engineer c) Operations Supervisor

1) Plant, Supervisor

2) Watch Engineer

)4 Page 17 SL2-FSAR 13.1.2.3 0 crating Shift Crews The normal operations shift for two units consists of a Plant Supervisor, Watch Engineer, two Control Center Operators, a Shift Technical Advisor, /A Nuclear Operato,, and Turbine Operator. The Plant Supervisor is directly responsible to the Operations Supervisor for all operations on his shift.

Personnel will hold NRC licenses as shown in Figure 13.1-9.

During and following initial core loading, a licensed Senior Operator will be on site at any time fuel is being handled in the refueling facilities and/or in the reactor, or when fuel is in either reactor.

During fuel handling operations on either unit, one senior reactor operator is assigned the responsibility of fuel handling with no other concurrent duties. A licensed operator operates the refueling machine and another licensed operator monitors fuel handling operations from the control room of the affected unit. The other refueling stations are manned by licensed and non-licensed operators as required to perform the evaluation.

The minimum shift crew has five menmbers dedicated to fight fires during a /R control room inaccessibility situation. The minimum shift crew composition is given in Table 13.1-2 for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2.

St. Lucie Unit 1 presently schedules qualified radiation protection men (RPM) on shift 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, per day, seven days per week. This schedule will be expanded to include Unit 2 when necessary.

13 ~ 1.3 QUALIFICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PLANT PERSONNEL FPL meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.8, "Personnel Selection and Training" May 1977 (Rl-R) which generally endorses ANSI N18.1-1971 (later approved by ANSI as ANSI/ANS 3.1-1978).

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Page 18 SL2-PSAR 13.1.3.1 ualifications Re uirements ANSI/ANS 3.1-1978 describes the minimum qualifications for several of the management, operating, technical and maintenance position categories specified in Subsection 13.1.2. In addition to these qualifications, senior reactor operator license candidates will have one year of experience as a reactor operator or equivalent experience. Table 13.1-3 provides the correlation /A between the position titles specified in ANSI/ANS 3.1-1978 and the actual St.

Lucie Plant Staff positions.

Qualifications for personnel not specifically addressed in ANSI/ANS 3.1-1978 are specified below:

a) The unlicensed operators, Nuclear Operator, Nuclear Turbine Operator, and Auxiliary Equipment Operator have a high school diploma or equivalent and possess a high degree of manual dexterity and mature

)udgement.

b) The Security Supervisor has a minimum of five years experience in industrial security, military security or related fields. At least nine months of this experience is in the field of nuclear security.

A maximum of three years of experience may be fulfilled by satisfactory completion of related technical training or a one-for-one time basis.

c) The Shift Technical Advisor shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline. Specific training is provided in response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents; details of the design, function, arrangement and operation of plant systems; and response of instrumentation and controls in the Control Room. /A 13.1.3.2 alifications of Plant Personnel The qualifications of incumbents in key plant supervisory positions and all licensed personnel are summarized in resume format below. The qualifications of the Startup Superintendent whose responsibilities are

Page 19 SL2-FSAR discussed in Section 14.2 are also included. /R TABLE 13 1-2 MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION ST. LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2 LICENSE APPLICABLE MODES**

CATEGORY 1,2,3 & 4 5&6 Plant Supervisor Nuclear SRO 1 Nuclear Watch Engineer SRO Nuclear Control Center RO Shift Technical Advisor /A Nuclear Operator Turbine Operator

• Does not include the licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Limited to Fuel Handling, supervising CORE ALTERATIONS after the initial fuel loading.

• • As defined in the Technical Specifications

MICHAEL GARRY ALTERMATT Nuclear Watch Engineer EDUCATION:

1965-1967 Liberal Arts Degree Program Completed equivalent 40 semester credits 1967-1973 U.S. Navy Nuclear Machinist Mate and Power training 1973-1981 Mathematics Degree Program Completed equivalent 40 semester credits 1973-1975 FPL St. Lucie Unit 81 Cold License Program EXPERIENCE:

1967-1973 U. S. Navy Nuclear Program 1973-1981 St. Lucie Reactor Control Operator, Nuclear Watch Engineer

\

WILLIAM J. BLOESER Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

3 years college Electronics technology, Aerospace technology.

Factory schools from Bendhc Corp , and IQ.ng Radio Dealing with Electronics Equipment.

EXPERIENCE:

Worked in Navy and civilian avionics field, in navigation, communication, radar, autopilot repair and calibration and installation.

6/76 to Present FPL-Electrician, Instrument and Control Specialist, Senior Plant Technician, Reactor Control Operator.

Currently in training for reactor operator license.

J. R. BOWEN Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate Bachelor of Science in Marine Engineering Massachusetts Maritime Academy 1978 Third Asst. Engineer License (USCG)

EXPERIENCE:

1978-1979 One Year sea experience on steam powered ships as a watch engineer. 600 PSI Boilers driving steam propulsion turbines and auxiliaries.

1979-1980 Auxiliary Equipment Operator at FPL Ft. Myers Plant 1980-1981 Reactor Control Operator at FPL St. Lucie Plant.

In training for Reactor Operator License. Expected license date March, 1982.

ANN V. BRAKQQ,L Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate AA Degree Edison Community College 1971 BA Mathematics Florida Atlantic University - 1973 Post Grad. Courses Florida Atlantic University 1974 EXPERIENCE:

1975-1980 FPL Power Plant Laboratory Technician 1980-Present Reactor Control Operator at FPL St. Lucie Plant.

In training for Reactor Operator License. Expected licensing on PSL Unit /Pl in March-1982.

C. L. BURTON Nuclear Plant Supervisor EDUCATION:

High School Graduate Oldham County High School, Oldham County, Kentucky College: University of Kentucky 40 semester hours U.S. Navy - Electronics Technical and Nuclear Power Training FPL St. Lucie Plant "Cold Licensed Operator Training Program" Combustion Engineering One week "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering accident analysis EXPERIENCE

-'969-197'.

S. Navy Reactor Operator 1975-Present FPL St. Lucie Nuclear Control Center Operator, Watch Engineer, Shift Supervisor CHARLES F. CALLAHAN Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate Southeastern Community College 39 Credit Hours 1978 to 1980 U. S. Navy Nuclear Power Training EXPERIENCE:

1973-1977 U.S. Navy Reactor Operator 1977-1980 Carolina Power 6 Light, Brunswick Units //1 & 2 Auxiliary Operator.

1980-Present FPL St. Lucie Plant Reactor Control Operator In training for Reactor Operator License; expected licensing in Sept. 1981.

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CHARLES RUSSELL GRIFFITH - Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

Attended Western Kentucky U. for 2 semesters (Aug. '71-May '72)

Attended two IRCC night classes (Aug. '80-Dec. '80)

USN Nuclear Power Program EXPERIENCE:

1976 to 1980 U. S. Navy Reactor Operator 1980 to Present FPL St. Lucie Unit 81 Hot License Class (May '80-May'81) Expected licensing in Sept. 1981.

ROBERT HAMILTON CLEMENTS Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

1971-1972 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br /> Central Florida Community College, Radiological Health 1981 6 hours Indian River Community College, Communications, Algebra 1973-1974 Navy Machinist Mate Nuclear Power Training EXPERIENCE:

1972-1979 U.S. Navy Machinist mate, engineering watch supervisor 1979 Ingalls Shipbuilding; submarine test engineer (Nuclear & Non-nuclear) 1979-1980 FPL Power Plant Mechanic 1980-Present FPL Reactor Operator Hot License Candidate

CARL G. CRIDER Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

3 years College (Ohio State, IRCC, Florida Institute of Technology) 1974-1979 Pursuing Industrial Engineering B.S.I.E.

16 months Hot License Training FPL EXPERIENCE:

1971-1974 Four Years Hydraulics Specialist apprentice-(Ford Motor Co.)

1975-1980 Power PLant Mechanic (FPL St. Lucie Nuclear Plant) 1980-Present FPL Reactor Operator J. CHARLES COUTURE Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

Graduated High School 1975 Attempted General Engineering at Florida Community Colleges PBJC 6 BCC completed 1/2 years.

Extra curricular training during high school in television production electronics EXPERIENCE:

Television production technical support, (electronic) for 1 CATV and 2 Cable TV stations FPL 2 years Mechanical Maintenance Dept.

3 years Operating experience in operating positions: Auxiliary Operator Boiler Attendant Turbine Operator Fossil Control Center Operator (1 year) 1980-Present Reactor Control Operator at FPL St. Lucie Plant in training for Reactor Operator License. Expected licensing on Unit 81 in March 1982.

PAUL MICHAEL CURRY Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION-'973-1977 University of California at Irvine B.S. Physics 1975-1976 Fullerton College - Statistics, Business Math Courses.

1978-1979 Southern California Edison Reactor Operator Training Program 1978 Atomics International-1 week reactor training program (L-85 Reactor)

Certificate received. Included 4 start-ups.

EXPERIENCE:

1978-1979 Southern California Edison Co. San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. Reactor Operator trainee. Approx. 4 start-ups performed.

1981 to Present FPL Co. Reactor Control Operator. In training for Reactor Operator License.

Expected licensing on Unit 81 in Sept., 1981.

JOSEPH BURNUM DELRUE Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School June 1976 graduated Michigan Technological University-BSEE 1980 University of Toledo-Summer 1979 Monroe County Comm. College (Mich) Summer 1978.

EXPERIENCE:

1978 Consumer's Power Plant Company-J R. Whiting Plant Maintenance 1979 Detroit Edison Company - Monroe Power Plant Student Engineer 1980-1981 FPL-Ft. Myers Plant Assistant Plant Engineer 1981-Present FPL St. Lucie Plant Reactor Control Operator. In training for Reactor Operator License. Expected licensing on Unit /$ 1 in March, 1982.

RICHARD S. GOLDSTEIN Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

28 credits State University of New York Stony Brook Jan. '75-Sept. '75.

EXPERIENCE:

1979-1980 FPL Itinerant Electrician 1980-Present St. Lucie Reactor Control Operator Expected licensing on Unit 81 in March, 1982 DENNIS D. DRYDEN Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

Stockton High, Stockton, Kansas, Graduated High School 1973 Ohlone Jr. College, Fremont Ca, 9/73 to 2/74, English, Psychology, Philosophy Basic Electricity Electronics. School, San Diego, CA USN 5/74-7/74 Interior Communications "A" School, San Diego, CA USN 7/74-10/74 Naval Academy Prep School, Newport, R.I., USN 10/74-6/75 U.S'.N.A. Annapolis, MD, 7/75-10/75 Nuclear Power School, Mare Island, CA 10/75-5/76 S5G Prototype, NRF Idaho 6/76-5/77 EXPERIENCE:

1974-1977 U.S. Navy-Nuclear Power Program 1981 St. Lucie Unit 1 Licensed Reactor Operator

I GREGORY A. EVANS Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate, Glendora High School, Glendora, CA Completed the following Navy Schools:

Navy Nuclear Power School-Graduated in the upper 50X Navy Nuclear Prototype (SSG) Prototype Training-Graduated in the upper 8X Interior Communication Electrician Class "A" school-Graduated in the upper 25X S8G Trident design course.

Completed other miscellaneous Navy courses such as Basic Electricity and Electronics, Sound and Vibration analysis, oxygen analysis, etc.

Completed the following Utility Schools:

FPL Licensed Operator Training Program 1980 Combustion Engineering PWR Simulator Training Program: 5 weeks of operations practice including, normal and emergency/off-normal operations and startup certification.

FPL Senior Reactor Operator Training 1981.

EXPERIENCE:

1975-1980 United States Navy Nuclear Power Program Electrician 1980-Present FPL Co. Reactor Control Operator Licensed at Operator Level on Unit /kl at PSL-MICHAEL BRUCE GILMORE Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate-Riviera Beach High School, Riviera Beach, FL.

Related Technical Training:

Hot License Operator Training at FPL St. Lucie Plant-1978 Combustion Engineering "PWR Simulator Training Course," including Reactor Startup Certification-1979.

EXPERIENCE:

1971-1972 Apprentice Electrician-Gilmore Electric Co.

1972-1975 Mechanic's Helper, Auxiliary Equipment Operator, Boiler Attendant, Turbine Operator 1975-1978 FPL St. Lucie Plant Nuclear Turbine Operator, Nuclear Control Center Operator

ROBERT S. GLAZE Plant Coordinator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate-Lyman High School, Longwood, Fl 1969 College-Seminole Junior College 1969-1971 A.A. Liberal Arts FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant "Cold License Operator Training Program" 1975 Combustion Engineering "Nuclear Steam Supply System" lecture series 1974 Combustion Engineering S~eek "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering general plant technology and operation Combustion Engineering 1-week "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering accident analysis Mr. Glaze has participated as required in the St. Lucie Plant "Licensed Operator Requalification Program.

EXPERIENCE:

1971 U.ST NAVY 1971-1972 Walt Disney World-Host 1972 Central Exterminating Co., Maitland, FL-Termite Pretreatment 1972-1973 Helper Sanford Plant-FPL 1973-1976 FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant, Nuclear Control Center Operator at St. Lucie Plant 1976-1980 Licensed Nuclear Control Center Operator involved in the power operation of St. Lucie Unit 81. SRO License 1980-1981 FPL St. Lucie Plant Training Instructor. Conducting training for licensed operator requalification training program and initial hot license operator training.

THOMAS A. GONZALEZ Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate-Weequahic High School, Newark, NJ 1957 College-Santa Maria Jr. College AA Degree 1963 FPL Co. Turkey P'oint Plant "Cold License Operator Training Program" FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant "Cold License Operator Training Program" Combustion Engineering 8-week "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering Plant Technology and Operation Combustion Engineering one-week "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering Accident Analysis EXPERIENCE:

1958-1966.

USAF, teletype operator, supply specialist and ground controlled approach radar technician 1968-1970 Instrument Technician at Pratt 6 Whitney Aircraft.

1971-1972 FPL Plant Results Technician, Aux. Equipment Operator, Boiler- Attendant 1972-1974 FPL Co. Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Operator 1974-Present Nuclear Control Center Operator at St. Lucie Plant

WILLIAML. HAGAR Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate Correspondence Course (Navy): Math Part I 1976 Math Part IIA 1977 Math Part IIB 1977 Diesel Engines 1976 Ship's Store Afloat 1977 U.S. Navy Machinists Mate and Nuclear Power Training EXPERIENCE:

1973-1981 U. S. Navy Nuclear Power Program Machinist Mate 1981-Present FPL Co. Reactor Control Operator in Training for Reactor Operator License.

Expected licensing on Unit 81 in March, 1982.

WILLIAMBRADFORD HALL Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

BSME-University of Florida 1968 Airframe & Power Plant Mechanic 1975 EXPERIENCE:

FPL 5 years Fossil Plant Experience 2 years performance testing 2 years plant retrofit 1 year maintenance planner Currently in training for Reactor Operators License at St. Lucie Unit 81 Expected licensing in March, 1982.

O'RIEN D. HAYES Nuclear Plant Supervisor EDUCATION:

High School Graduate 1964 College Lincoln College (Northeastern University) 1 year-no degree obtained U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School-1967 FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant "Cold License Operator Training Program" 1975 Combustion Engineering 1-week "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering Accident Analysis PPL Co. St. Lucie Plant "Licensed Operator Requalification Program" EXPERIENCE:

1964-1966 Chatam Mfg. Co.-Lab, Technician Textile Chemistry 1966-1974 U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Program Machinist Mate. Qualified Engineering Officer of the Watch.

1974-1975 Stone 6 Webster Eng. Corp., Engineering Associate 1975-Present PPL Co. St. Lucie Plant Control Center Operator, Shift Supervisor

R. L. HAYES Plant Engineer I EDUCATION:

Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL, B.S.M.E. 1974 EXPERIENCE:

1974 Rogers & Associates, Inc., Engineers and Surveyors, Palm City, Fl Business and Operations Manager 1973-1974 Various landscape architects in Palm Beach and Broward Counties. Free Lance Design Engineer 1973 American Irrigation, Inc., Boynton Beach, FL Design Engineer 1975-1977 FPL St. Lucie 1 Technical Staff Mechanical Engineer SRO License No. SOP-2957 1977-1980 KoHa, Inc., President, Ft. Pierce, Fl. Owner of Sporting Goods and Marine business 1980-Present FPL Co., St. Lucie Plant (CE-PWR) Shift Technical Advisor/Staff Engineer/License Training Instructor SOP 3771 PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

American Society For Mechanical Engineers Registered E.I.T., Florida Certificate No. 199ET76 GERALD J. IMBRIALE Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

U.S. Navy Electrician and Mate School Nuclear Power Training FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant Reactor Operator Hot License Training Program Combustion Engineering PWR Simulator Training course: 5 weeks of operations practice including normal/emergency operations.

EXPERIENCE:

1976-1980 U.S. Navy: Nuclear Power Electrical Operator 1980-Present FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant Reactor Control Operator in training for Reactor Operator License.

HUGH H. JOHNSON JR. Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate U. S. Navy Electronics and Nuclear Power Training EXPERIENCE:

1977-1980 U. S. Navy Reactor Operator 1980-Present FPL Co. Reactor Control; Operator in training for Reactor Operator License on PSL Unit Pl. Expected licensing in March, 1982.

GEORGE R. B. KAASA Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate Clinical Laboratory Course-U.S. Army-1970 EXPERIENCE:

1978-1980 Duke Power Co.-Power Plant Technician Nuclear & Fossil 1980-1981 Turkey Point Plant Nuclear & Fossil Maintenance Mechanic.

St. Lucie Plant Reactor Control Operator, in training for Reactor Operator License on Unit Pl. Expected licensing in March, 1982.

I I i

DENNIS J. KRING - Plant Coordinator EDUCATION:

Washington High School South Bend Indiana United Electronic Institute Louisville, Kentucky No Degree U.S. Army Basic Electronics Training Course-1967 Advanced Intercept Equipment Course-1967 Instructor Training Course-1969 Auxiliary Equipment Operator Training at FPL Turkey Point Plant 1971 Nuclear Operator Training at FPL Turkey Point Plant 1972 Watch Engineer Training at FPL St. Lucie Plant 1974 Hot License Operator Training at FPL St. Lucie Plant 1978-1979 C.E. "PWR Simulator Training Course," including Startup Certification-1979 EXPERIENCE:

1966-1970 U.S. Army Intercept Equipment Repairman 1970-1978 FPL Mechanics Helper, Aux. Equipment Operator, Nuclear Operator, Watch Engineer 1978-Present Sr. Plant Technician responsible for developing and conducting training programs for all non-licensed and licensed operator positions. NRC Operator Licensed on Unit 81.

CHARLES D MARPLE Nuclear Watch Engineer EDUCATION:

High School Graduate-Garfield High School, Akron, Ohio 1969 College-Brevard County College-61 credit hours in Elect. Eng. Tech.

FPL Co.-Introduction to Steam Power FPL Co. St. Lucie PLant "Hot License Operator Training Program" C.E. one week "PWR Simulator Training Course", including Startup Certification EXPERIENCE:

1973 FPL Apprentice mechanic, boiler attendant 1974-Present FPL St. Lucie Nuclear Operator, Nuclear Control Center Operator, Nuclear Watch Engineer RICHARD L. McELROY Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION High School Graduate U. S. Navy- and Nuclear Power Training Civilian: Indian River Comm. College 1980-Present Associate of Science (Mohegan Comm.College)1980 EXPERIENCE:

1976-1981 U. S. Navy Reactor Operator 1980-Present FPL Co. Inst. & Cont. Spec.

Reactor control operator, in training for Reactor Operator License on Unit 81.

Expected Licensing in March, 1982.

B. W.MIKELL - Nuclear Plant Supervisor EDUCATION South Broward High School 1947 Electrical School-U.S. Navy 1949 International Correspondence School-Mech. Engineer Course 1956 Westinghouse Reactor Operator Training Program Westinghouse Senior Reactor Operator Training Program C.E. Co. Nuclear Steam Supply Lectures 86 hours9.953704e-4 days <br />0.0239 hours <br />1.421958e-4 weeks <br />3.2723e-5 months <br /> 1974 One week training in Reactor Theory at University of Florida Three weeks training at C.E. Simulator in Windsor, CT.

EXPERIENCE:

1947-1948 FPL Co.-Auxiliary Operator-Lauderdale Plant 1948-1950 U.S.N. Electrician's Mate 1950-1951 Mikell Plumbing Co.-Hollywood, Fl: Plumbers Helper 1951-1972 FPL Co.-Auxiliary Operator, Fireman AA, Turbine Operator, Control Center Operator, Watch Engineer 1972-1973 Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Watch Engineer during much of the low power physics testing and initial operation 1974-1977 Participated in writing operating procedures for St. Lucie Plant Unit 81.

Operated Unit 81 through initial startup and operation.

1978-Present St. Lucie Plant Outage Coordinator, Responsible for scheduling and coordination of all outage activities, for St. Lucie Plant.

MILTON H. MOSLEY - Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

Rock Hill High School-Rock Hill S. Carolina Sacramento State University Miami Dade Jr. College Indian River Comm. College Miscellaneous U.S. Air Force Tech. Schools FPL Reactor Theory Course Observation Training at Turkey Point Plant University of Florida Reactor Theory Review C.E. Nuclear Steam Supply Lecture Series C.E. Simulator Training Program FPL 21 week series-Systems Training 12 week supervised self-study program covering the following:

Principles of Reactor Operation, General Operating Characteristics, Control Station Instrumentation, Safety and Emergency Systems, Standard and Emergency Operating Procedures, Plant Operation and Transient Response, Reading and Interpreting Control Instrumentation.

EXPERIENCE:

2 months helper at Turkey Point Plant. Involved in Rx preparation and initial cold load.

8 months Aux. Equip. Operator at Turkey Point. Operating Aux. equipment 7 months Turbine Operator, Miami Fossil Plant. Operating turbine generator and secondary equipment.

6 years St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. Cold license, NCCO Class and NCCO for cold hydro and hot Ops. Senior Reactor Operator Licensed on Unit 81.

JAMES EDWARD O'EIL Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

University of Hartford-1967-1968 Math Major Hartford State Technical College 1969-1971-AS-Nuclear Engineering Technology FPL Co. Reactor Operator Hot License Training Program 1980-1981 EXPERIENCE:

1972-1975 Knolls Atomic Power Lab Windsor, CT. Radiation Controls Tech.(H.P.)

1975-1980 FPL Health Physics Tech.

1980-Present Reactor Control Operator St. Lucie Unit 81..

L. W. PEARCE - Nuclear Plant Supervisor EDUCATION:

Crescent City High School 1965 St. John's River Junior College 1967 Westinghouse Operators Training Program 1970 Westinghouse Senior Operators Training Program 1972 C.E. Nuclear Steam Supply System Lectures 86 hours9.953704e-4 days <br />0.0239 hours <br />1.421958e-4 weeks <br />3.2723e-5 months <br /> 1974 C.E. Simulator Training 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> 1974 FPL Co. on-site training program 1975 EXPERIENCE:

1968-1970 FPL Helper, Aux. Equip. Operator, Boiler Attendant 1970-1973 FPL Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Control Center Operator, Watch Engineer 1973-Present FPL St. Lucie Plant Nuclear Watch Engineer, Plant Supervisor

MICHAEL ALLEN PERRY EDUCATION:

2 Years Of College (EE Major) 1970-1972 No Degree U. S. Navy Electronics and Nuclear Power training EXPERIENCE:

1972-1978 U. S. Navy Reactor Operator 1978-1980 Operator (non-license) at CPSL Brunswick Plant 1980 2/3 of Hot License Class at CPSL 1981-Present PPL Reactor Operator Hot License Candidate ALDO LOUIS RAMIREZ Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

U. S. Navy Machinist Mate and Nuclear Power training EXPERIENCE:

1977-1979 U. S. Navy Nuclear Power Program 1980-Present PPL Co. Maintenance Mechanic. Reactor Control Operator in Training for Reactor Operator License on PSL Unit 81. Expected Licensing in March, 1982.

LAWRENCE M. RICH Nuclear Watch Engineer EDUCATION:

High School Graduate-Munster High School, Munster, Indiana 1968 FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant "Hot Licensed Operator Training Program" 1976-1977 C.E. one week "PWR Simulator Training Course", including startup certification.

EXPERIENCE:

1968-1972 U.SoNi Machinist Mate Second Class-operated and maintained steam power components and auxiliaries.

1972-1977 FPL Apprentice Mechanic, Nuclear Operator, Nuclear Control Center Operator (unlicensed) 1977-Present St. Lucie f/1 Licensed Reactor Operator, Nuclear Watch Engineer JAMES J SHANNON JR~

EDUCATION:

U. S. Navy Machinist Mate and Nuclear Power Training Broward Community College (Assoc. in Business Administration) 1977 Johnson Pneumatic Controls School 1979 EXPERIENCE'965 USS Destroyer Forrest Sherman DD931 Steam Plant Operator 1967-1971 USS Submarine Nathan Hale SSBN 623(g), Steam Plant & Primary systems operator.

1981 FPL Boiler Attendant 1981-Present St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Reactor Control Operator Trainee.

HARK D. SHEPHERD Plant Coordinator EDUCATION:

High School Graduate-Farmingham North N.S., Farmingham, Mass.

1981-Bachelor of Professional Studies in Training Management in Nuclear Technology, Memphis State University Seminole Community College, Sanford FL, Earned Associate of Arts degree 1978 Northeastern University, Boston, MA, earned 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> College of Engineering.

Final average 3 .0. Disenrolled to complete military obligation.

U.S. Navy Electronics and Nuclear Power Training FPL Co. Senior Reactor Operator Training Program.

C.E. PMR Simulator training program: Four weeks of operations practice including normal, off-normal and emgergency operations and reactor startup certification.

EXPERIENCE:

1974-1978 U.S. Navy Reactor Operator. Qualified as Engineering Patch Supervisor 1979-1980 Instructor, Center for Nuclear Studies, Memphis State University, Memphis Tennessee. Responsible for the development, delivery and administration of various programs of study related to the Nuclear Industry.

1980-Present Instructor FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant.

Senior Reactor Operator License

LAWRENCE A. SPALDING Nuclear Watch Engineer EDUCATION:

High School Graduate-Miami Jackson High School 1962 College-University of Florida 1963-1966, 72 credit hours George T. Baker Aviation School, Miami, Fl, Airframe and Power Plant License 81551561 and Private Pilot's License /$ 1548856, 1962 FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant "Cold License Operator Training Program", 1975 C.E. Nuclear Steam Supply System" lecture series 1974.

C.E. 8 week "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering general plant technology and operation.

C.E. 1 week "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering accident analysis.

Mr. Spalding has participated as required in the St. Lucie Plant "Licensed Operator Requalification Program".

EXPERIENCE:

1966-1972 U.S. Coast Guard Reserves 1967-1973 Pan- American World Airways-airframe and power plant mechanic 1973 FPL Co. Turkey Point Plant aux. equip. operator.

1973-Present FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant Nuclear Control Operator, Nuclear Watch Engineer

JEFFREY A. SPODICK - Plant Supervisor II EDUCATION:

High School Graduate Forrest Hill High School 1966 College: Palm Beach Jr. College AA in Liberal Arts 1968 FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant "Cold License Operator Training Program" Mr. Spodick has participated as required in the "Licensed Operator Requalification Program" at St. Lucie Plant.

U.S. Navy Electronics and Nuclear Power Training EXPERIENCE:

1971-1974 U.S.Navy Reactor Operator 1975-1977 FPL-Nuclear Control Center Operator..

1977-Present FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant training staff instructor. Responsible for preparation and conduct of licensed operator training programs.

DEWARD K. SPURGIN Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

DeLand Senior'igh School 1966 Daytona Beach Community College-No Degree Embry Riddle Aeronautical Inst., Aircraft Airframe/Power Plant Certification 1969 Seminole Community College-completed requirements for AA in Education-Graduation not applied-for-1977'elated Technical Training:

Licensed Reactor Operator training, at St. Lucie Plant 1978-1979 C.E. "PWR Simulator Training Course," including Reactor Startup Certification-1979 EXPERIENCE:

1972-1978 FPL Mechanic's Helper, Aux. Equipment Operator, Apprentice Electrician 1978-Present Nuclear Control Center Operator at FPL St. Lucie Plant.

ROBERT A. STORKE Nuclear Watch Engineer EDUCATION:

High School Graduate Clearwater High School 1960 FPL Co.St. Lucie Plant "Hot License Operator Training Program" 1976-1977 C.E. one week "PWR Simulator Training Course" including Reactor Startup Certification, 1976.

EXPERIENCE:

1960-1968 U.S. Air Force Jet Engine Mechanic and Jet Engine Technician. Test run various types of aircraft, operated engine test cells and ground equipment>> included trouble shooting, repair and overhaul of various types of jet engines.

1972-1977 FPL Auxiliary Equipment Operator, Boiler Attendant, Nuclear Turbine Operator, Nuclear Control Center Operator (unlicensed) 1977-Present St. Lucie Unit 81 Licensed Reactor Operator, Nuclear Watch Engineer KEVIN HALL THOMAS - Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

Palm Beach Jr. College 1969-1971 Business Courses approx. SO semester hours.

U.S.Navy Electrician and Nuclear Power Training Palm Beach County Journeyman Electrician Licensed 1978 Air Conditioning/Refrigeration/Heating Correspondence Course Certificate 1980 EXPERIENCE:

1972 U.S. Navy Served aboard USS Alamogordo ARDM2 as a power plant electrician.

1974-1977 U. S. Navy Nuclear Power Program Electrician 1978-1980 FPL Electrician 1981-Present Reactor Control Operator. In training for Reactor Operator License on PSL Unit 81. Expected licensing in March, 1982.

KATHLEEN DOLORES WARD Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

Certificate Lowell Tech. Institute Health Physics Training, 1971 Degree Lowell Tech. Institute B.S. in Health Physics 1975.

License (Pending) Reactor Operator St. Lucie Unit I 1981 presently in progress, Florida Institute of Technology, M.B.A.

'egree EXPERIENCE:

1975-1978 Dosimetry Engineer Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Nuclear Services Div.,

Radiation Protection Group.

1978-1979 Radiation Physicist Yankee Atomic Electric Co., Nuclear Services Div.,

Environmental Laboratory Group.

1979-1980 Health Physics Senior Tech. St. Lucie Unit 1.

1980-Present Reactor Operator Training St. Lucie Unit 81.

ROGER D. WELLER Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

McCluer High School, Florissant, MO 1973.

Related Technical Training:

U. S. Navy Machinists Mate and Nuclear Power Training Utility: PPL Licensed Operator Training Program-1980 C.E. PWR Simulator Training Program: 5 weeks operations practice including normal and emergency/off-normal operations, and startup certification.

EXPERIENCE:

1973-1980 U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Program Machinist Mate qualified as engine room supervisor 1980-Present Reactor Control Operator at FPL St. Lucie Plant

JEFF A. WEST Reactor Control Operator EDUCATION:

1967-1972-B.S.E.E. Univ. of Tenn. (Control Systems & Computers) 1972-1974-30 hours graduate work on MSEE 8 Univ. of Tenn. Space Institute.

Topic: Network Theory. Joined Navy prior to completing degree 1980-Present-15 hours completed on MBA at Florida Institute of Technology.

Estimated degree date December 1982.

1972 Engineer In Training Certificate FPL St. Lucie Unit /Pl Shift Technical Advisor Training Program.

EXPERIENCE:

1975-1979 Navy Nuclear Power Program, qualified Engineering Officer of the Watch 1980 FPL St. Lucie Unit //1 Shift Technical Advisor 1980-Present FPL St. Lucie Plant Reactor Control Operator in Training for Reactor Operator License on Unit 81.

NORRIS D. WEST Nuclear Plant Supervisor EDUCATION:

Andrew Junior College 1 year 1960 U.S. Navy Electrician and Nuclear Power Training, 1960-1962 Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, 1962 C.E. Nuclear Steam Supply System Lectures, 86 hours9.953704e-4 days <br />0.0239 hours <br />1.421958e-4 weeks <br />3.2723e-5 months <br />, 1974.

C.E. Simulator Training,. 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />, 1974 Participated in the St. Lucie Plant On-Site Training Program FPL Reactor Operator Training Program PTP-1970-71 FPL Senior Reactor Operator Training Program PSL-1973-74 EXPERIENCE:

1960-1967 U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Program Electrician 1968-1974 FPL Helper, Auxiliary Equipment Operator, Reactor Operator, Nuclear Watch Engineer 1974-Present FPL Nuclear Watch Engineer, Nuclear Plant Supervisor; St. Lucie Plant.

1 KENNETH J. WIECEK Nuclear Watch Engineer EDUCATION High School Graduate-Hialeah Senior High School 1961 Pittsburgh Institute of Aeronautics AA Degree 1970 FPL Co. St. Lucie Plant "Cold License Operator Training Program" C.E. "Nuclear Steam Supply System" Lecture series C.E. 8 week "PWR Simulator Training Course" covering plant technology and operation C.E. one week "PWR Simulator Training Course", covering Accident Analysis.

University of Florida 3 week course in Reactor Operation and Reactor Theory Mr. Wiecek has participated as required in the St. Lucie Plant "Licensed Operator Requalification Program".

EXPERIENCE:

1962-1967 U.S.Navy Aircraft Hydraulics Mechanic Second Class Air Crew member on HU-46D Helicopter 1967-1968 U.S. Naval Printing Office, printers apprentice 1970-1973 Pratt 6 Whitney Aircraft. Jet Engine Test Cell Mechanic 1973 FPL Co. Riviera Plant, Mechanics helper 1973-Present St, Lucie Plant Nuclear Control Center Operator, Nuclear Watch Engineer

W. S. WINDECKER Supervisor Planning & Scheduling EDUCATION:

Fultonville Union Free High School 1949 FPL Co. Training Opportunities Program courses in mathematics, physics, chemistry, steam generators and auxiliaries, steam turbine and auxiliaries, simplified electricity.

Westinghouse Reactor Training Program, Turkey Point Plant C.E. Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Lectures, 86 hours9.953704e-4 days <br />0.0239 hours <br />1.421958e-4 weeks <br />3.2723e-5 months <br />, 1974.

Reactor Theory Review, University of Florida, 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> Participated in the St. Lucie Plant on-site training program FPL Co. Reactor Theory Course, 3 weeks.

EXPERIENCE:

1957-1970 FPL Co. Helper, Auxiliary Equipment Operator, Fireman, Turbine Operator, Control Center Operator, Watch Engineer 1970"1973 FPL Co. Control Center Operator and Watch Engineer, Turkey Point Plant 1973-1979 FPL Co. Watch Engineer and Nuclear Plant Supervisor, St. Lucie Plant 1979-Present PSL Unit 82 Planning & Scheduling Supervisor

Page 1 SL2-FSAR 13 ' TRAINING Plant personnel have a combination of education, training, experience, health and skills so that their decisions and actions that affect the plant are such that the plant is operated in a safe and efficient manner. The training program supplements the individual's background to give him the required knowledge and ability.

13 ~ 2 ~ 1 PLANT STAFF TRAINING PROGRAM The overall objective of the training program is to provide technical development, specialized training and operating experience to FPL operating and maintenance personnel. The Plant Manager is responsible for the conduct and administration of the initial onsite training program and for the training of replacement plant personnel. Plant training programs are conducted under the direction of the plant training staff. Those programs conducted for licensed operator candidates will be supervised by personnel with Senior Operator Licenses on Unit 81. Where special knowledge or expertise is available, non-licensed instructor personnel may be used for teaching portions of license training programs. The Plant Training Supervisor provides direction and assistance to departmental personnel where needed to insure implementation of training plans.

FPL has over 10 years of nuclear unit startup and operating experience with Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 and St. Lucie Unit 1. Functional and ongoing training programs, primarily conducted onsite, are developed for the St. Lucie Plant and are based on the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.8 "Personnel Selection and Training" May 1977 (Rl-R) which generally endorses ANSI N18.1<<

1971 (later approved by ANSI as ANSI/ANS 3.1-1978).

I Page 2 SL2-FSAR 13.2.1.1 Pro ram Descri tion 13.2'.1.1.1 Licensed Personnel Training Objective It is planned that cold license personnel for St. Lucie Unit 2 will be drawn from personnel licensed on St. Lucie Unit 1 and that all licensed personnel at the St. Lucie Plant will be licensed on both units. To this end, all of the initial group of cold license candidates will have obtained an NRC reactor operator or senior reactor operator license on St. Lucie Unit 1. Cold license candidates will be drawn from the following list of personnel who currently hold NRC operator licenses on Unit 81 or are in training for licensing on Unit

81. See section 13.1.3 for experience summaries of these personnel.

Page 3 SL2-FSAR J. H. Barrow Operations Superintendent (SRO)

D. A. Sager Operations Supervisor (SRO)

C. L. Burton Nuclear Plant Supervisor (SRO)

F. G. Davis Nuclear Plant Supervisor (SRO)

0. D. Hayes Nuclear Plant Supervisor (SRO)

L. W. Pearce Nuclear Plant Supervisor (SRO)

N. D. West Nuclear Plant Supervisor (SRO)

M. G. Altermatt Nuclear Watch Engineer (SRO)

C~ D. Marple Nuclear Watch Engineer (SRO)

L M Rich Nuclear Watch Engineer (SRO)

L. A. Spalding Nuclear Watch Engineer (SRO)

R. A, Storke Nuclear Watch Engineer (SRO)

K. J. Wiecek Nuclear Watch Engineer (SRO)

W. J. Bloeser Reactor Control Operator J. R. Bowen Reactor Control Operator A. V. Bramhall Reactor Control Operator C. E. Callahan Reactor Control Operator.

R. H., Clements Reactor Control Operator C. J. Couture Reactor Control Operator C. G. Crider Reactor Control Operator P. M. Curry Reactor Control Operator J. B., Delrue Reactor Control Operator D. D. Dryden Reactor Control Operator G. A. Evans Reactor Control Operator M. B. Gilmore Reactor Control Operator R. S. Goldstein Reactor Control Operator T.. A. Gonzalez Reactor Control Operator C. Griffith Reactor Control Operator W. L. Hagar Reactor Control Operator W. B Hall Reactor Control Operator G. J. Imbriale Reactor Control Operator P B. Esaacs Reactor Control Operator H. H. Johnson Reactor Control Operator

Page 4 SL2-PSAR G. R. B. Kassa Reactor Control Operator R. L. McElroy Reactor Control Operator M. H. Mosley Reactor Control Operator J. E. O'eil Reactor Control Operator M. A. Perry Reactor Control Operator A. L. Ramirez Reactor Control Operator J. J. Shannon Reactor Control Operator D. K. Spurgin Reactor Control Operator K. H. Thomas Reactor Control Operator K. D. Ward Reactor Control Operator R. D. Weller Reactor Control Operator.

J. A. West Reactor Control Operator P. L. Pincher Training Supervisor B. W. Mikell Outage Coordinator N. Gi Roos Quality Control Supervisor R. L. Hayes Plant Engineer J. A. Spodick Plant Supervisor R. S. Glaze Plant Coordinator D.J. Kring Plant Coordinator M. D. Shepherd Plant Coordinator W. S. Windecker Planning & Scheduling Supervisor Following licensing on St. Lucie Unit 1, a minimum of three months operating time will be provided, if possible, for these personnel to gain operating experience prior to cold licensing on St. Lucie Unit 2. Subsequent hot license candidates will be trained for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 concurrently. /A Initial Trainin a) The training program for license candidates follows the format for hot license training used for St. Lucie Unit 1 but also includes information pertinent to Unit 2 licensing. Special classes emphasizing differences between the two units are held for those personnel already licensed on St. Lucie Unit 1. Refer to Subsection 13.1.2 for a description of position titles and license status.

Page 5 SL2-FSAR The licensed operator training program encompasses the following outline for Cold License Candidates:

Phase I: Hot license training on Unit //1 in accordance with St.

Lucie Plant Administrative Procedure "Hot License Operator Training Program".

Phase II: Three months of Unit 81 operation, where possible, to gain operation experience prior to cold licensing on Unit 82.

Phase III: Unit 81/82 differences training program. A training program describing design differences between units 1 and 2 will be prepared and presented to each candidate covering the following areas:

(a) Core Mechanical Design (b) Core Thermal and Hydraulic Design (c) Reactor Physics (d) Instrument and Control Systems Design (e) Mechanical Systems Design (f) Electrical Systems Design (g) NSSS Response (h) Safety Analysis and Technical Specifications (i) Operating and Emergency Procedures (j) Startup Test Program Time will be available during this phase for candidates to accomplish appropriate field study and equipment familiarization.

Phase IV: Simulator training: Since all cold license candidates will have been licensed on Unit 81, no special simulator training will be given for Unit 82 cold license training. Normal annual simulator requalification sessions will serve this purpose.

Simulator examinations may be conducted by the NRC at the end of these sessions. Sequencing of simulator sessions will be dependent upon availability of the simulator and may occur out of sequence with the program phases.

Phase V: Screening and NRC licensing examinations: An examination similar in type and content to an NRC

Page 6 SL2-FSAR examination will be given at the completion of the program to determine each candidates readiness to take the NRC examination.

The schedule for the above training is indicated by Fig. 13.2.1 The scheduled start dates and activity durations may change if the core load date changes.

Prior Experience Credit Some license candidates may have received training in military service, other reactor locations, college, or other specialized training. For these individuals some of the training program may be eliminated based upon review of credentials, transcripts, or testing at the plant site. This will be done on a case by case basis and must be approved by the Training Supervisor and Plant Manager. The following list represents those areas of training which may be eliminated:

1) Reactor Theory

2) Principles of Reactor Operation

3) Thermodynamics

4) Heat Transfer

5) Fluid Mechanics Training Program Evaluation Periodic examinations are given throughout the program to gauge the candidate's progress and overall performance. The Training Supervisor determines the frequency of these examinations. A final comprehensive exam is given to each candidate to determine his readiness for the NRC examination. This examination is comparable to an NRC examination, both in scope and content. Grade criteria for the final comprehensive examination shall be an overall score of >80X and>70X on each examination category. License candidates are certified as ready by NRC examination by the Vice President Power Resources.

TMI action plan (NUREG 0737) items have been integrated into Unit fkl training activities. Since cold license candidates will have been licensed on Unit 81 these requirements will have been met. As additional requirements are established, they will be factored into Unit I/1/2 training activities concurrently.

Page 7 SL2-FSAR 13.2.1.1.2 Non-Licensed Personnel Training Non-licensed operators are trained for their positions through a combination of classroom lectures, on-the-gob training and participation in the system checkout and plant startup effort.

Shift Technical Advisor training is described in Administrative Procedures "Shift Technical Advisor Training Program" and "Shift Technical Advisor Requalification Program". The Shift Technical Advisors- will participate in the classroom portion of the licensed operator differences training program. /A The Mechnical and Electrical Maintenance Supervisors and supporting staff receive training in appropriate maintenance procedures when assigned to the St. Lucie Plant. They participate in maintenance functions during the startup and checkout of St. Lucie Unit 2 systems and equipment. They participate in a lecture series conducted by FPL pertaining to appropriate mechnical and electrical maintenance functions.

The Reactor Engineer has received extensive experience and training at St.

Lucie Unit 1. He attends appropriate sections of the operator training program including the NSSS lecture series.

Instrumentation and control, radiochemistry and health physics technicians are assigned several months prior to initial fuel loading and are trained as required in their respective responsibilities. For radiochemistry and health physics personnel the training includes mitigation of accidents involving a degraded core. /A Selected supervisory and maintenance personnel attend applicable portions of the NSSS lecture series. Maintenance personnel meet the requirements of the FPL/IBEW Joint Apprentice Training Program. /A Handouts of the NSSS lecture series are used by St. Lucie Plant departments as deemed applicable to job functions in an on-going departmental training program for the St. Lucie staff.

All personnel receive training in radiation protection and emergency procedures prior to fuel loading.

Page 8 SL2-FSAR Personnel who are not required to hold an NRC operator's license, including supervisors, engineers, technicians, operators, maintenance personnel and others, whose duties require them to work within the radiation controlled area or on systems associated with the nuclear plant, receive training in Radiation Protection. Upon completion oz this training the individuals concerned are required to pass an examination signifying that they have basic understanding of the principles involved. Personnel with previous training are required to pass this examination but may not participate in the formal training program. All plant personnel are required to either have read, the plant Radiation Protection Manual or attend the Radiation Protection course. The Radiation Protection course covers the following sub)ect material:

a) Radiation and Radioactive Materials b) Biological Effects of Radiation and Exposure Limits c) ~

Radiation Detection and Personnel Monitoring d) Principles of Protection e) Site Emergency Plan and Radiation Protection f) Radiation Control Area Work Guidelines Personnel assigned to the St. Lucie Plant, in an administrative capacity and whose duties would preclude their presence within the Radiation Control Area, receive training in Radiation Protection. The Radiation Protection Training Program provided for these individuals covers the same material as the non-licensed personnel training program although not as detailed and generally on a more basic level. Emphasis is placed on the site emergency plan and the St.

Lucie Plant Radiation Protection manual.

Industrial safety and first aid training is provided as part of the general employee training program. Each employee is issued a copy of the FPL Safety Rule Book which covers first aid practices and safe work practices related to the utility industry. Included in this book are the latest first aid techniques and industrial emergency procedures. Employees may also attend first aid" classes These standards and procedures are developed and administered by the Joint Advisory Safety Committee. This program is augmented by the Plant Safety Program which will include regular monthly meetings with emphasis placed on. the nuclear plant aspects as well as the latest industrial safety practices.

Page 9 SL2-FSAR All new plant personnel assigned to the St. Lucie Plant are given an orientation to general plant facilities, Health Physics policies, quality assurance, and the emergency and security plans. This orientation is usually conducted during the first week of employment at the St. Lucie Plant and provides them with the minimum practical training they need until they can attend the Radiation Protection class or complete the Radiation Protection Program examination.

13.2.1.1.3 Fire Protection Training Fire protection training is described in Subsection 9.5.1.

13.2.1.2 Coordination Pith Preo erational Tests and Fuel Loadin Table 13.2-1 shows the schedule of each part of the Training Program in relation to the schedule for preoperational testing and expected fuel /D loading. This schedule also shows expected time frames for examinations and any vendor supplied training. Should fuel loading be delayed from the date indicated, the licensees will supplement the St. Lucie Unit 1 operating staff as well as support St. Lucie Unit 2 startup and preoperational testing activities. Section 14.2 describes the pre operational and startup test program. /A 13.2 ~ 2 REPLACEMENT AND RETRAINING 13.2 2 1 Licensed 0 erators Re ualification Trainin The requalification training program for licensed operators complies with Section 5.5 of ANSI/ANS-3.1-1978, "American National Standards for Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel," to implement the requirements of Appendix A of 10CFR55. This program is described in Administrative Procedure, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program". /A

Page 10 SL2-FSAR 13.2.2.2 Non-Licensed Personnel Retrainin Refresher Training Plant personnel not included in the Licensed Personnel Training Program receive refresher training in radiation protection and occupational safety as a part of the FPL ongoing safety program. Training programs are established for each department to ensure that its personnel maintain familiarity with their job specifics and keep abreast of changes in the plant equipment, policies and procedures which could affect their job function. This training is conducted periodically at a frequency specified by the respective department heads.

13.2.2.3 Re lacement Traini 13.2.2.3.1 Replacement Training - Licensed Personnel A continuing training program during the life of the plant assures that each replacement employee who requires an NRC operator license receives the same general material, follows the same fundamental program used for the initially licensed personnel and knows his specific duties and responsibilities for normal and emergency operations. Personnel from other FPL plants are considered for these replacement positions on a selective basis. The supervisory and technical staff are the primary source of instructors for the continuing training program, but outside assistance may be obtained as necessary to assure competent replacement personnel.

13.2.2.3.2 Replacement Training Non-Licensed Personnel /R Training programs are established by each department to insure that new personnel are trained sufficiently to meet the minimum requirements for their job, These...programs provide new personnel with the required familiarity with the job specifics, such as plant equipment, procedures, and policies affecting their job function 13.2.2.3 Plant Drills Drills are conducted periodically to provide training in plant evolutions such as site evacuation, response to fires, breaches of security, and emergency medical response. /A

Page 11 SL2-FSAR 13.2.3 APPLICABLE NRC DOCUMENTS The 'following NRC regulations, regulatory guides and reports are discussed in the referenced sections:

Section 10"CFR Part 50 3.1 10 CFR Part 55 10 CFR Part 19 Regulatory Guide 1.8 13.1, 13.2 Regulatory Guide 1.101 13.3 Regulatory Guide 8.2 12.5 Regulatory Guide 8.8 12 '

Regulatory Guide Regulatory Guide 8 '3

i SL -FSAR ST>> LUCIE PLANT TRAINING -SCHEDULE 1981 1982 1983 6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 5/1 6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1 10/1 ll/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 COLD HOT CORE HYDRO OPS LOAD REVIEW 1/2 DIFF.

0 0 DESIGN 1/2 DIFF.

PROGRAM UNIT 81 HOT LICENSE TRAINING OPERATING EXPERIENCE PREP 1/2 DIFF. TRAINING MATERIALS SIMULATOR TRAIN UNIT 1/2 DIFFERENCES/UNIT 1 REQUAL. TRAINING GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 NRC OEj09fg ONGOING DEPARTMENT 1/2 DIFFo TRAINo 1/2 DIFF'RAIN 1/2 DIFF TRAIN TRAINING 6 RETRAINING UNIT Pl/2 HOT LICENSE TRAINING PROGRAM FIG 13.2-1

Page 1 SL2-FSAR 13 5 PLANT PROCEDURES This section describes administrative, operating and maintenance procedures that are used by the operating organization to ensure that routine operating, off-normal and emergency activities are conducted in a safe manner. This section is based on the Procedures Program utilized for FPL's St. Lucie Unit 1, an operating unit.

The following is a list of categories of procedures to be utilized for St.

Lucie Unit 2:

a) Administrative Procedures b) Chemistry Procedures c) Emergency Plan Implementation Procedures d) Environmental Test Procedures e) General Maintenance Procedures f) Health Physics Procedures g) Instrument and Controls Department Procedures h) Letters of Instruction i) Maintenance Procedures

3) Off-normal and Emergency Procedures 1c) Operating Procedures l) Pre-operational. Procedures m) Security Procedures n) Quality Instructions In order to simplify procedures writing and to increase operators familiarity, basic formats are chosen for the procedure writing effort, as described below.

General Administrative and Security Procedures:

1.0 Title 2.0 Review and Approvals 3.0 Scope 4.0 Precautions 5.0 Responsibilities

Page 2 SL2-PSAR 6.0 References 7.0 Records and Notifications 8.0 Instructions Operational Procedures 1.0 Title 2.0 Review and Approvals 3.0 Purpose 4.0 Precautions and Limits 5.0 Related Systems Status 6.0 References 7.0 Records Required 8'0 Instructions Off-Normal and Emergency Procedures; 1.0 Title 2.0 Review and Approvals 3.0 Purpose and Discussion 4.0 Symptoms 5.0 Instructions 6 0 References 7.0 Records Required Letters of Instruction:

1.0 Title 2.0 Approvals 3.0 Purpose and Discussion 4.0 Instructions Quality Instructions:

1.0 Approvals 2.0 Purpose

Page 3 SL2-FSAR

.3.0 Scope 4.0 Responsibilities 5.0 Instructions Because of the nature of plant operations, any specific task may involve selected procedures from the categories (a) through (n), as listed above.

This overlap is necessary to successfully integrate the required work activity with necessary controls and provide adequate documentation. Where required these procedures will cross-reference administrative, operation, maintenance or other procedures.

13.5 ~ 1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 13.5.1.1 Conformance with Regulato Guide 1.33 The St. Lucie Plant procedure program described in this section meets the intent of this Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)" January 1977 (Rl), as described in Section 17.2.

13.5.1.2 Pre aration of Procedures The plant staff prepares, within approximately six months prior to core load, the procedures necessary for plant startup, operation and emergencies.

Section 14.2 describes the startup and preoperational test procedure program. The cognizant plant supervisor ensures that these procedures are properly reviewed by the Facility Review Group (FRG) and approved by the Plant Manager.

Procedures shall be adhered to and any changes necessary are handled as follows:

a) Routine changes must be submitted on Change Form for FRG review and Plant Manager approval.

Temporary changes approved by two members of the Plant Staff," one of which holds a senior operating license. Temporary changes may not be

Page 3 SL2-FSAR 3.0 Scope 4.0 Responsibilities 5.0 Instructions Because of the nature of plant operations, any specific task may involve selected procedures from the categories (a) through (n), as listed above.

This overlap is necessary to successfully integrate the required work activity with necessary controls and provide adequate documentation. Where required these procedures will cross-reference administrative, operation, maintenance or other procedures.

13.5 ~ 1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 13.5.1.1 Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.33 The St. Lucie Plant procedure program described in this section meets the intent of this Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)" January 1977 (Rl), as described in Section 17.2.

13.5.1.2 Pre aration of Procedures The plant staff prepares, within approximately six months prior to core load, the procedures necessary for plant startup, operation and emergencies.

Section 14.2 describes the startup and preoperational test procedure program. The cognizant plant supervisor ensures that these procedures are properly reviewed by the Facility Review Group (FRG) and approved by the Plant Manager.

Procedures shall be adhered to and any changes necessary are handled as follows:

a) Routine changes must be submitted on Change Form for FRG review and Plant Manager approval.

b) Temporary changes approved by two members of the Plant Staff, one of which holds a senior operating license. Temporary changes may not be

Page 4 SL2-FSAR made which change the intent of the procedure. Temporary changes must be reviewed, within 14 days (or as specified in the license) by the FRG and approved by the Plant Manager.

Changes to procedures which conflict with the operating license are not made without NRC approval.

13.5.1.3 Procedures "Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Shift" prescribes the minimum number of licensed operators per shift, control room access and access limitation criteria, shift and relief turnover procedures and operator's authority and responsibilities, e.g., SRO directing return to power, shutting down the plant when safety of the reactor is in jeopardy, adherence to license requirements, review of routine data, etc. This procedure will contain the requirements of 10CFR.50.54 (i), (j), (k), (e) and (m). Figure 13.5-1 shows those areas specified as "at the controls". "Overtime Limitations for Licensed Operators" defines the overtime policy. /A Normally there shall be no Administrative Procedures providing for special orders of a transient or self-cancelling character.

Administrative procedures, as a minimum, shall be provided which address the administrative control of valves, locks and switches and for the control and use of jumpers and disconnected loads in safety related systems.

To control work, as a minimum, procedures are provided which cover: Removal of safety related equipment from service and restoration; verification of performance of operating activities; plant work ordexs; the preventive maintenance program; maintenance of seismic category I system; control of backfit work; preliminary and conditional acceptance of system by FPL Power Resources, and the Facility Review Croup. /A Administrative procedures are provided covering the ASME code testing of pumps and valves; the schedule of periodic tests, checks and calibration; the reactor engineering schedule of periodic tests and reports; and the schedule of maintenance surveillance requirements.

Page 5 SL2-PSAR References to logbook usage and control are provided for procedures in other categories.

Normally there are no Temporary Procedures in the Administrative Procedures Category.

13.5 ' OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES 13.5.2.1 0 crating Procedures Operating procedures cover the normal operation of all systems and components and off<<normal operation of safety related systems and are classified into these two categories. The Operations Supervisor is responsible for the generation of operating procedures.

Operational procedures cover the normal operation of a unit from a cold shutdown condition to power and return to cold shutdown. Additional procedures cover startup, operation, testing, and shutdown of individual systems and components. These include check lists for establishing the necessary condition of system components to perform the specific procedure, and precautions to be followed during the procedure.

Off-normal/emergency operating procedures cover the range of equipment and system troubles. These are procedures that describe actions to be taken when equipment malfunctions or to prevent a perturbation from resulting in a situation of- more. serious consequence.. Typical conditions included are excessive system leakage, pump failure, loss of off-site power, instrument air failure, and a stuck or faulty control element assembly. The Combustion Engineering Operating guidelines will be incorporated where applicable. /A The operating procedures describing control room activities are listed below by title. Procedures may be deleted, revised, combined, or added based on actual op'crating experience. /A

Page 6 SL2-FSAR S stem Related 0 erational Procedures Estimated Critical Conditions and Inverse Count Rate Ratio Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation, Periodic Channel Check and Selector Switch Position Verification CEDM MG Set Operation Coupling and Uncoupling of CEA Extension Shafts Full Length CEA Periodic Exercise Draining the Reactor Coolant System Leak Test Following RCS Opening Reactor Coolant Pump Normal Operation Pressurizer Steam Space Venting Quench Tank Operation Steam Generator Wet Lay-up Neutron Shield Installation 6 Removal Charging and Letdown - Normal Operation Volume Control Tank Hydrogen and Nitrogen Concentration Control H2 System Normal Operation N2 System Normal Operation Liquid Nitrogen Dewar Operation Boron Concentration Control Normal Operation Boric Acid, Batching and Transferring Component Cooling Water Normal Operation Turbine Cooling Water System (TCW) Normal Operation Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System Normal Operation HPSI/LPSI-Normal Operation Safety Infection Tank Normal Operation Containment Spray Initial Valve Alignment Oxygenated Waste System Waste Concentrator Operation Radioactive Resin Replacement Solid Waste Baler Operation Drumming of Concentrator Bottoms Waste Gas System Operation Controlled Gaseous Batch Release to Atmosphere Boron Recovery System Lineup

Page 7 SL2-FSAR Boric Acid Concentrator Operation Operation of the Cathodic Protection System Condenser Air Removal System Operations Circulating Water System - Normal Operation Intake Chlorinator Operation Intake Cooling Water System Operation Condensate and Feedwater System Operation Auxiliary Feedwater Normal Operations Feedwater Heaters - Placing in or Removing from Service Condensate Recovery System Operation Feedwater Recirculation Line Filter Operation Auxiliary Steam System Placing in Service Blowdown System Operation Removal 6 Restoration of a Startup Transformer Back Feed Through Main Transformers Boric Acid Heat Tracing System Operation 125 V DC System Normal Operation Instructions for Switchyard DC System Operation Balance of Plant 125 V DC System Normal Operation Operation of the 120 V Instrument AC System (Class lE) 120 V Vital AC System Operation (Non-Class 1E)

Instrument Air System Operation Station Air System Operation Operation and Calibration of MSA-701 CO Alarm Operation and Calibration of MSA-704 CO Monitor Process Monitoring System Operation Radiation Monitoring System, Operation of Primary Sample System Valve Alignment Gas Analyzer Operation Secondary Sample System Valve Alignment Fire Protection System Operation Fire Detection System Operating Procedure Auxiliary and Control Building Ventilation System Operation Containment Cooling System Operation Continuous Containment Hydrogen Purge System Operation /A Shield Building Ventilation Operation

Page 8 SL2-FSAR Hydrogen Recombiner Turbine Seal Oil System Operation Generator Gas System Operation Turbine Oil System Operation Containment Building Access Hatches Operations RAB Fluid Systems Periodic Leak Test Sequence of Events Recorder Operation Domestic Pater System Operation Vacuum Degasifier Operation Primary Water System Filling and Draining the Refueling Canal and Cavity Source Handling and Installation New Fuel Elevator Operation Spent Fuid Handling Machine Operation Fuel Transfer System Operation Refueling Machine Operation CEA Change Fixture Operation New Fuel Handling Crane Operation Emergency Diesel Generator Standby Lineup General Plant Related Operational Procedures In-Plant Equipment Clearance Orders Equipment Out of Service - Class 1 Prestart Check-Off List Reactor Plant Heatup Cold to Hot Standby Reactor Startup Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes Turbine Startup Zero to Full Load Turbine Shutdown Full Load to Zero Load Reactor Plant Cooldown Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown Reactor Shutdown Reactor Trip Records Secondary Plant Operating Checks and Tests Initial Criticality Following Refueling

Page 9 SL2-PSAR Filling and Venting the RCS Reactivity Deviation From Design RCS Flow Determination by Calorimetric Procedure Controlled Liquid Release to the Circulating Water Discharge Alignment for Pumping From Reactor Cavity Sump to Spent Resin Tank at the Steam Generator Blowdown Treatment Facility Heater Drain and Vent System Alignment Main Steam System Initial Valve Alignment Instrument Air System Initial Valve Alignment Refueling Operation Refueling Sequencing Guidelines Receipt and Handling of New Fuel Axial Shape Index Control Off-Normal/Emergency Operational Procedures Shutdown Resulting From Reactor Trip or Turbine Trip Blackout Operation Control Room Inaccessibility RCS Cooldown During Blackout CEA Off-Normal Operation and Re-Alignment Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage Excessive Reactor Coolant System Activity Reactor Coolant Pump-Off-Normal Operation Pressurizer Pressure and Level-Off-Normal Operation Pressurizer Relief/Safety Valve-Off-Normal Operation Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow Steam Generator Tube Leak Failure Loss of Reactor Coolant Charging and Letdown-Off-Normal Operation Emergency Boration Boron Concentration Control Off-Normal Component Cooling Water-Off-Normal Operation Component Cooling Watex Excessive Activity Turbine Cooling Water System-Off-Normal Operation Fuel Pool Cooling System-Off-Normal Operation

Page 10 SL2-FSAR Operational Requirements for the Ultimate Heat Sink High Pressure Safety Injection-Off-Normal Operation Shutdown Cooling/Low Pressure Safety Injection-Off-Normal Operation Uncontrolled Release of Radioactive Liquids Waste Gas System-Off-Normal Operations Uncontrolled Release of Radioactive Gas Condenser Tube Leak Loss of Condenser Vacuum Circulating Water System"High delta T and High Discharge Temperature Intake Cooling Water System-Off-Normal Operation Loss of Feedwater or Steam Generator Level Main Steam Line Break Startup Transformer Off-Normal Operation Main Transformer Off-Normal Operation Auxiliary Transformer Off-Normal Operation Boric Acid Heat Tracing System Off"Normal Operation D.C. Ground Isolation Loss of Instrument Air Off-Normal Operation of Radiation Monitoring Syst: em Wide Range Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Malfunction Linear Power Range Channel Malfunction Loss of Containment Integrity-Off-Normal Operation

'I Airlocks-Off-Normal Operation Primary Water System-Off-Normal Operation Accidents Involving New or Spent Fuel Auxiliary and Control Building Ventilation Off-Normal Operation Loss of One Fan In Either Reactor Cavity Cooling System or Reactor Support Cooling System Loss of Reactor Cavity Cooling Systems and/or Loss of Reactor Support Cooling Systems

Page 11 SL2-PSAR Alarm Response Procedures An annunciator verification list indicates th'e actions to be performed should off-normal conditions occur in,the operation of systems or equipment. This list provides the guidelines for a preplanned course of response to alarms under certain conditions; however, the particular situation governs the extent to which each action is carried out. These guidelines include (a) the possible cause of the alarm; (b) alarm set points and signal source; (c) immediate action to be taken by the operator; and (d) subsequent action based on off-normal procedure.

e) Temporary Procedures Temporary control room operating procedures are used only to a limited extent. These are in the form of letters of instruction.

Letters of instruction are issued depending upon specific plant operating conditions. Example of such procedures may include personnel authorized to hold clearances, jurisdiction of systems during startup, or pump base line data collection.

13.5.2.2 Other Procedures Other procedures are included with the categories listed in Subsection 13.5.1.3 The responsibility for the initiation, development and implementation of these procedures are as indicated below.

The Operations Department is responsible for:

a) Health Physics Procedures The general objective and character of these procedures is described in Section 12.5. These procedures describe radiation protection and the Health Physics Department Supervisor is responsible for ensuring these procedures are followed.

Page 12 SL2-PSAR b) Emergency Plan Implementation Procedures The general objective and character of these procedures support the St. 'Lucie Site Emergency Plan and are described therein. The Emergency Plan is'ontained in a separate volume. These procedures describe emergency preparedness and are the responsiblity of the Operation Superintendent.

c) Chemistry Procedures Chemistry procedures are provided for chemical and radiochemical control activities. They include, for example, the nature and frequency of sampling and analyses; instructions for maintaining coolant quality within prescribed limits; and limitations on concentrations of agents that could cause corrosive attack, foul heat transfer surfaces, or become sources of radiation hazards due to activation.

Procedures shall also be provided for the control, treatment, and management of radioactive wastes and control of radioactive calibration sources. The Chemistry Supervisor is responsible for ensuring these procedures are followed.

The Maintenance Department is responsible for:

a) Maintenance Procedures Maintenance procedures are written for maintenance of equipment expected to require frequent attention and do not have sufficient details in the instruction manuals. Examples of such equipment are control rod drives, pump seals, important filters and strainers, diesel generator sets, major valves and steam generators. As experience is gained in operation of the plant, routine maintenance is altered to improve- equipment performance, and procedures written for repair of equipment are improved, if required. Since the probability of failure is usually unknown and the time and mode of

Page 13 SL2-PSAR failure are usually unpredictable for most equipment, specific procedures cannot be written for repair of most equipment before failures. /R Radiation protection measures are prescribed before the task begins as necessary.

Permission to release equipment or systems for maintenance is granted by responsible operating personnel. Prior to granting permission, such operating personnel verify that the equipment or system can be released, and, if so, how long it may be out of service.

After permission is granted, equipment is made safe for work.

Measures provide for protection of equipment and workers. Equipment and systems in a controlled status are clearly identified. 'Strict control measures for such equipment is enforced.

Conditions considered in preparing equipment for maintenance include, for example, shutdown margin; method of emergency core cooling; establishment of a path for decay heat removal; temperature and pressure of the system; valves between work and hazardous materials; electrical hazards; and physical barriers, as required.

The procedures contain enough detail to permit the maintenance work to be performed safely and expeditiously.

Instructions are included for returning the equipment to its normal operating status. Operating personnel place the equipment in operation and verify its functional acceptability. Special attention is given to restoration of normal conditions, such as removal of signals used in maintenance or testing, and to systems that can be defeated by leaving valves or breakers mispositioned or by leaving switches in "Test" or "Manual" positions. All jumpers are controlled. When placed into service, the equipment receive special surveillance until a run-in period has ended.

Page 14 SL2-FSAR The Instrument and Control Department Supervisor, the Assistant Superintendent Electrical Maintenance, and the Assistant Superintendent Mechanical Maintenance are responsible for ensuring their respective procedures are followed.

b) General Maintenance Procedures General Maintenance Procedures are provided to cover welding, inspection, personnel training and other concerns generic to the implementation of a comprehensive maintenance program. The Maintenance Superintendent is responsible for ensuring these procedures are followed.

c) Instrument and Control Department Procedures Instrument and Control Department Procedures are provided for testing and periodic calibration of plant instrumentation such as interlocks, alarm devices, sensors, signal conditioners, and protective circuits. The procedures have provisions for meeting surveillance schedules and for assuring measurement accuracies adequate to keep safety parameters within operational and safety limits. The Instrument and Control Department Supervisor is responsible for ensuring these procedures are followed. The general objective and character of these procedures are described in Section 17.2.

Other Plant Staff Departments are responsible for:

a) Quality Instructions-Quality Instructions are provided to cover plant quality related matters including material control. The Quality Control Supervisor is responsible for ensuring these procedures are followed. The general objectives and character of these procedures are described in Section 17.2.

Page 15 SL2-PSAR Security Procedures Plant Security Procedures describe specific plant related security matters. The Security Supervisor is responsible for ensuring these procedures are followed. The general objectives and character of these procedures are described in Section 13.6 and in the St. Lucie Plant Security Plan.

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