ML20137L346
| ML20137L346 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1996 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137K821 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-485 JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95, JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023, JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-23, NUDOCS 9704070205 | |
| Download: ML20137L346 (26) | |
Text
.. _...
- l e
s i
I 4
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 1 of 26 1
\\
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR 1995 BORAFLEX BLACKNESS TESTING RESULTS l
/-
1-JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3 SAFETY RELATED NUCLEAR ENGINEERING FLORIDA POdER AND LIGHT Co.
JUNO BEACH, FL
/
9704070205 970402 PDR FOIA BINDER 96-485 PDR
1 JPN-PSL--SEFJ-95-023 REV 3 Page 2 of 26 REVIEW AND APPROVAL RECORD PLANT ST. LUCIE UNIT I
TITLE SAFETY EVALUATION FOR 1995 BORAFLEX BLACKNESS TESTING RESULTS LEAD DISCIPLINE St. Lucie Fuel Enoineerina ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION JPN/ NUCLEAR FUEL r*
REVIEWfhPPROVAL:
INTERFACE TYPE GROUP PREPARED VERIFIED APPROVED FPL APPkOVED*
INPUT REVIEV N/A mm-----
ME*H X
ELECT 1
!&C 1
CIVIL 1
NUC **
X
', k%
ES!
X s
MUC FUEL X
1 d
!A'
- 2 k
3 n~ tas x
r az> frQ Uu a ror Contractor Evals As Determined By Projects
- Review Interface An A Min On All 10CFR50.59 Evals and PLAs
{d FPL PROJECTS APPROVAL-DATE: 1/5/W OTHER INTERFACES SM
JPN-P8L-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 3 of 26
=,
~
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.O ABSTRACT Pace 4
2.0 DESCRIPTION
AND PURPOSE 4
3.0 DISCUSSION ON CAUSE OF MISSING BORAFLEX 5-8 4.O LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 8
5.0 ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON SAFETY 8-10 6.0 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 10 7.O PLANT RESTRICTION 10 8.0 EFFECT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS t~
10 9.0I UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DETERMINATION 10-12
10.0 CONCLUSION
12 11.O RECOMMENDATIONS 12 12.0 VERIFICATION
SUMMARY
13
13.0 REFERENCES
13-14 ATTACHMENT 1
.15 ATTACHMENT 2 16-25 ATTACHMENT 3 26 1
JPN-P8L-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 4 of 25 1
1 1.O A38TRA';T High density fuel storage racks were installed into the spent fuel pool (SFP) of St. Lucie Unit 1 (PSL1) in 1988.
The design of the high density racks includes use of the strong neutron absorption j
material, Boraflex.
The full length (143" in axial)
Boraflex panels are sandwiched between two adjacent storage cells of the I
storage rack.
The blackness testing was used to obtain in-service performance data of Boraflex panels in storage cells.
This evaluation reviews the results of the 1995 blackness testing program.
Ravision 2 incorporates clarifications and resolutions for comments made by the FRG members and adds an additional recommendation for the daily SFP silica monitoring.
Revision 3 incorporates the results of a review of the fabrication k reprdsofthePSL1SFPracks.
The conclusion and recommendation of the previous revision are still valid.
2.0 DE8CRIPTION AND PURPOSE During March 14 through March 17, 1995, a second blackness test l
(Reference 13.1) was conducted at the spent fuel pool of St. Lucie Unit 1.
The purpose of the test was to obtain updated in-service performance data of the Boraflex panels of the SFP storage cells j
since the first blackness test, (Reference 13.2) performed in 1989.
i The recent test results are reported in Reference 13.1.
s The report reveals expected levels of irradiation induced Boraflex degradation with the exception that a 15-inch portion of the 143-inch Boraflex panel was found missing from the top of the Boraflex
/
panel sandwiched between stai_less steel walls of storage cells AH12_ and AG17 in Region 2.
P ysically speaking, this meWast M e top 11.4T Ec~h-~ portion ~of one side of the stored fuel in cells, AH17/AG17, will not be covered by Boraflex. f Tnerefore, th seqRamce es une partial Forarlex coverage or fuel could lead to an overall rack effective neutron multiplication factor, K-eff, of Region 2 exceeding the limiting value of 0.95 (Reference 13.3), if spent-fuel assemblies are stored in these cited cells.
If the rack K-eff exceeds 0.95, this could create a situation o_f noncompliance with the limits described in Section 5.6 of Technical specification.
\\
. _ _ _ _ _l i
I l
i l
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 5 of 26 l
l The purpose of this evaluation is threefold: 1) to discuss the blackness testing results and define future testing r3quirements,
- 2) to discuss the effect of the missing partial Boraflex panel on the SFP safety, and
- 3) to recommend an action that provides a justification for SFP continued routine operations.
3.0 DISCUSSION OF CAUSE OF MISSING BORAFLEX 3.1 Cause of Missina Boraflex The blackness tests performed for St. Lucie 1 evaluate a sample of the fuel storage rack cells to verify that the Boraflex panels of the storage cells are meeting their required function.
As found, all the panels, except for one, fully satisfy the criticality requirements associated with Boraflex placement.
However, it was found that one panel was missing a 15 inch section of Boraflex.
The effect of this missingytion on the criticality is physically describackin RectionM.
We nave concluaed7 hat unis failWpane shared by two adjacent cells would still maintain the rack Keff less than 0.95 when the pool is flooded with unb rated water fil mee p ha danigned criticality recuirement_t e absolute plant actions have been taken to ensure that these two cells
- sure,
_are not utilized in the future.
ThemissingpartialBoraflexpanelmatterwasdiscussedwi service vendor (HOLTEC) who performed the testing.
Based on the strip chart data from the blackness test, Dr. Turner at HOLTEC interpreted that the cause of the missing partial Boraflex panel is k
most 14 M
d E erpr % 1y Ae to a manufacturing de act.
We concurred.with his etation based on physical cbnrvation that the blackness test data shows a
clear-cut data pattern that can only be attributed to physically missing Boraflex, contrary to the ragged data pattern usually found with the Boraflex degradation event.
The fact that one panel out of 154 panels that have been evaluated during the past two blackness testings was missing 15 inches of Boraflex does not mean that it is appropriate to draw the conclusion that 0.65% of the total number of Boraflex panels in SFP also have missing Boraflex panels.
- Given that ' the problem represents a manufacturing failure, the,
' / > question which must be answered is whether this in an inolated occurrence or is it oossztrie ie this ^to be a common-mode f ailure ehecuing a signMant number of panels.
Engineering's assessment is that this is an isolated incident and does not constitute a significant safety issue.
Our conclusion is based on the following:
1)
The manuf acturer adhered to an approved Appendix B QA program
l i
1 JPN-P8L-8EFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 6 of 26 f
4
)
which-was supplemented by FPL's direct oversight throughout 1
the manufacturing process.
)
l The rack manufacturing processes of the Joseph oat Corp. were reviewed Eo ensure adeouate adhsrence to QA/QC procedufes.
{
'Tne intent or this review ~was to eliminate the possibility s
t
- that ~a _ wrvsW of the Borafir; sheeting would go
4 undetected during the manufacturing prc.9ss.
Boraflex sheets were provided in individual precut pieces 143.25" long and l
labeled with the lot number of the Boraflex batch.
During 4
rack cell assembly a four sided channel was fabricated on cell walls that were to contain Boraflex.
4 The channel had the same i
inner dimensions as the precut Boraflex sheets, thereby providing a visual reference for both the mechanic assembling the rack, and the QC inspector inspecting the assembly, as to i
whether or not the Boraflex was of the right dimensions.
i Both the mechanic and the inspector were required to verify that j
the Boraflex was in good condition without any visual defects.
i The lot numbers of the Boraflex pieces were recorded on the poison installation log (Attachment 3).
After each row was' b i
f completed on.a rack, QC was required to initial a checklist and the traveler verifying that the row was properly assembled and the Boraflex inspected, l
with assembly of the next. row.and giving clearance to proceed Rack travellers for five racks j
from both Region I and Region II were reviewed (Racks C1, I.
C2, D1, D1, and E1).
Although weaknesses were identified in some of the documentation, adequate supporting evidence was
]
available to support the conclusion that there was no i
systematic deficiency in inspection and QC/QA of the PSL1
- racks, and that the inspection and QC/QA process was j
sufficient to have identified a widespread deficieny in the precut lengths of Boraflex sheet if it existed.
Furthermore, an FPL inspector, W.
Deck, was present in the j
Joseph Oat Corp.
facility and personally witnessed the
\\
manufacturing of all of the PSL1 spent fuel racks.
1 j
His report for the work performed the week of January 4, 1988, records 1
i N his i
observation of installation of Boraflex and
- cans,
\\ including QC inspections, for Rack C2, the rack with the missing piece of Boroflex.
He recorded the lot numbers of the Boraflex he witnessed being installed, including sheets from the same lot number as-the missing piece, and reported that all activities had been performed satisfactorily.
In our review of this data, it is clear that significant t
checks were made to ensure Boraflex and SFP rack manufacturing integrity.
Given the significant amount of oversight, both j
y the vendnr LToneph QAt Cor_p.) and FPL, it is unlikely that multiple defects could occur.
~
j t
m
i i
i-JPN-P8L-8EFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 7 of 26
') i The missing Boraflex panel incident is the 2
4 oniv observed
\\ incident not caused b7 degran=*ian
[
nne a ental of = ara noo pane ^ m (EPRI-TR-101986 Report) examined using blackneseth
l tests of w1Tich over 1700 were fabricated by the Joseph Oet i
corp.
No other defect has been observed.
Also Dr. Turner has
}
- never, in his extensive
- career, encountered another manufacturing failure which caused Boraflex to be missing.
1 This includes examination of panels manufactured by Josept. Oat for other utilities.
This provides assurance that the i
manufacturing procedures used by Joseph Oat were not producing i
a large number of defective panels.
t 3)
Other panels from the same Boraflex lot number as the panel
)
missing 15 inches were tested and found to be whole, except for the small gaps expected.
This indicates that the missing g 15 inches does not affect an entire lot of Boraflex panels and i
supports that this is an isolated occurrence.
i on the basis of the above discussion, we can judge that the i
observed event is most likely due to a hidden storage rack manufe.cturing defect not scovered by QA/oc in=p-etic.e perfar-H b
a d Jos.eph is considered to be an isolated evenTheobserved15inchesofmissingBorafl]ex l
he ef fect of this isolatetr uves not require additional ant actions and does not affect l
the planned blackness testing frequency schedule.
j 3.2 Historic Storace of Fuel in Defective Storace Cell We reviewed the spent fuel status records (Reference 13.7) which i
lists the storage information for cells AG17 and AH17.
Storage Stored Cell Spent Storace Date ID Fuel ID P utym To I
AG17 K16 2/22/90 2/22/95' i
AH17 P66 11/9/94 2/22/95 No storage of fuels in AG17/AH17 prior to 2/22/90 4
The 2/22/95 date was a completion date for preparation of the blackness testing conducted at the SFP.
This means that both t
storage cells have been empty since then.
1 i
3.3 Boraflex Panels Dearadation d
We evaluated the Boraflex panels in-service performance data i
generated from the first (in October 1989) and second (in' March 1995) campaigns of blackness testings.
We found that in-service i
Boraflex panels in storage racks are slowly experiencing degradation mechanism since built in 1988.
Our bases for saying
._____._____.__m
.m i
1 i
JPN-P8L-8EFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page a of
'26 1
i this are:
Increase in total number of measurable gaps -(>0.5")
a.
b.
Maximum gap size 2.8" (from the previous 0.5") corresponding Boraflex shrinkage 2.35% (including 20% uncertainty, less than 4.0% assumed in the criticality analysis, References 13.14 and 13.15)
Steadily increasing silica level in the SFP c.
(Reference 13.8, for comparison, the silica level in PSL2 SFP is extremely low)
According to the present industry knowledge (Reference 13.11),
i i
these gaps are too small to produce
- a. significant effect on the i
storage rack reactivity.
Based on the estimated average gap
^
growth of 0.25" between first and second campaigns (References 13.1/13.2),
it is expected that the current SFP criticality analysis results (Reference 13.15) will be still valid through the third (next) campaign of blackness testing period.
To ensure our 4
affirmation, the following actions are required:
(
1) the third campaign of blackness testing or the equivalent in 1
the year 2000.
- 2) #
Reactor Engineering personnel should routinely contact the PSL chemistry Department for information on the silica laval_ g the SFR (see Reference 13.8 for example).
Based on the lata a TNPO significant event report (Reference 13.13),
n 1
I d
O(e[\\. engineering evaluation is deemed necessary for any 1
f observations of a silica level above 20 ppm (PSL1 current
@\\p@
level 12 ppm).
4.0 LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 1
The proposed action involves a restriction of spent fuel storage i
for storage cells AM17 and AG17 that contain the partially missing Boraflex panel.
Section 9.1. 2. 3 of the FSAR describes the SFP
{
Reg!.on 2 criticality methods and Boraflex material requirements for maintaining the SFP in a subcritical condition (K-eff 5, 0.95) when l
the pool is flooded with unborated water.
The proposed action is consistent with the FSAR's statements.
l 5.0 ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON SAFETY Discussion on SFP Criticality Physical Model The SFP Region 2 nuclear subcriticality condition is a safety requirement.
To maintain the SFP Region 2 in a suberitical condition, the strong neutron absorbing material, Boraflex panels were installed in the storage racks containing storage cells.
Boraflex panels are sandwiched between stainless steel walls of two u
~
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 9 of 26 l
adjacent storage cells.
Each cell in the storage rack has four (three in the rack periphery) full length Boraflex panels.
Spent fuel stored in each cell is fully surrounded by Boraflex panel walls with the exception of the peripheral cells.
Each storage cell containing a
fuel assembly constitutes a
neutronically isolated cell (so designed).
Therefore, Region 2 as a whcle can be visualized as a repeated isolated storage cell array in lateral extent.
In addition, there is no axial neutron leakage in the Z-direction assumed in the analysis.
k 5.1 Recountina Criticality for Defective Storace Cells Spent fuel assemblies K16 and P66 were adjacently stored in defective storage cells AG17 and AH17 in the past years.
Their burnup discharge data is listed below (Reference 13.9):
Minimum Cell Fuel Enrichment Dischrgd Required Burnup ID ID Burnuo Burnuo Marain
[. AG17 K16 3.398%
31.10 24.00 29.6%
AH17 P66 3.398%
31.65 24.00 31.9%
where the enrichment is an average initial assembly enrichment, the discharged burnup (including NF-Standards 6% uncertainty) is in the unit of GWD/T, and the burnup margin is a fraction of excess burnup relative to the minimum requirement burnup specified in Technical Specification.
The excess burnup margin provided a
large reactivity margin to offset any increase in k.tr from the missing 15 inches of Boraflex.
Additionally, assemblies K16 and P66 contain 6.0 and 9.008 (assembly average) inch axial blankets (Reference 13.10) at the top portion of the fuel, respectively.
Both blankets are located inside the affected section of the Boraflex panel.
The low reactive blankets due to their low initial enrichments (9 0.7%
w/o) and no burnup requirements are unlikely to create a strongly neutronical interaction between cells.
Reasons are 1) the ample spent fuel burnup margin and 2) the presence of steel wall for absorbing neutrons.
Therefore, the isolated single cell physical model described previously is still applicable.
The missing 11.4 inches Boraflex-panel in the active fuel region can be considered as an end shrinkage of the Boraflex panel in the storage rack.
Based on results of the recent EPRI Report (Reference 13.11), an end shrinkage of a sincle Boraflex panel would not increase substantially the rack reactivity.
Furthermore, the soluble boron concentration in the SFP was never below 2170 ppm during the period of 2/22/90 through 2/22/95 (Reference 13.8).
This soluble boron concentration exceeds the
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 10 of 25 minimum 1720 ppm specified in Section 5.6.3 of Tech Spec.
Thus, we conclude that the requirements of Technical Specification Section 5.6 have always been met for fuel storage.
5.2 Remedial Action The proposed action shall begin with the confirmation date for discovering the missing partial Boraflex panel of Storage cells AG17 and AH17.
in storage cells AH17The action prohibits the storage of fuel assemblies and AG17.
As discussed above, the storage restriction does not affect the Region 2
K-eff value for maintaining the region with a 5% shutdown margin. But, this action reduces the Region 2 usable storage capacity; 1364 cells to 1362 cells.
6.0 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ON ANALYSIS The proposed action neither changes nor modifies the SFP configuration or structures, therefore, it will not create any adyltional SFP failure modes.
as previously discussed.
Safety Analysis Limits remain valid 7.0 PLANT RESTRICTION Holdooint The holdpoint is the suspension of the spent fuel movement operation at SFP of PSL1.
The holdpoint will be removed upon completion of appropriate changes to administrative procedures and completion of mitigating actions that shall be implemented prior to resuming SFP routine operations (see Recommendation 11.1).
8.0 EFFECT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DESIGN FEATURES, Section 5.0 of Technical Specification has been reviewed and found that the proposed actions do not affect design features.
9.0 UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DETERMINATION In accordance with Section 5.1 of ENG-QI 2.1, the f'ollowing evaluation serves to determine whether the recommended action constitutes an unreviewed safety question or requires a change to the Technical Specification:
Y JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 11 of 25 9.1 Does the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR?
The proposed action reauires an imp 1=4tatica M appropriato
_administrativa preerd=m and mitigating actions.
Tne administrative procedures provide guidelines for confirmint and assuring that storaga ceAls, AH17 and AG17, W a t useg or storing spent fuels.
No h 11izing cells AG17 and AH1T f'or spent fuel storage'on a permanent basis is no different k from not using any other cells in the spent fuel pool.
Since each storage cell is a neutronically isolated cell, its presence or absence of the cell does not affect the overall K-eff value for Region 2.
Therefore, the proposed action will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated in the SAR.
9.2 Does the proposed activity increase the consequences of an 1
accident previously evaluated in the SAR?
The proposed action does not increase the consequences of C accident previously evaluated in the SAR, because the proposed
- action ensures that the configuration of the criticality analysis remains valid.
9.3 Does the proposed activity increase the probability of an occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR?
The proposed activity does not increase the probability of an occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the
- SAR, since appropriate administrative procedures are being changed to preclude fuel storage in cells AH17 and AG17.
No equipment whose malfunction has been assumed in the safety analyses will be J
affected by this change.
9.4 Does the proposed activit;y increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR?
The proposed action does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously kl evaluated in the SAR because no malfunction of equipment is affected by this change.
9.5 Does the proposed activity create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR?
Implementing the proposed action will physically leave two
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 12 of 25
~
l neutronically empty storage cells, AH17 and AG17 in Region 2.
Water in these cells will serve as a flux trap zone for high density fuel storage racks in Regions 1 and 2.
The presence of the flux trap zone is not an accident initiator and is no different from any other cell in which fuel is not stored.
kl Therefore, the proposed action does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously i
evaluated in the SAR.
9.6 Does the proposed activity create the possibility of a l
malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different i
type than previously evaluated in'the SAR?
}
The proposed action does not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different
- type, since the affected Region 2 can not introduce any failure modes to equipment important to safety of a different type.
9.7 Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety as l
j.~ defined in the basis for any Technical Specification?
The proposed action does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, because the restriction on the use of the storage cells, AH17 and AG17, will not affect the bases described in Section S.6 of Technical Specification.
Criticality analysis remains valid and there is no impact on other analyses.
Based upon the preceding evaluation results, the proposed action will neither involve an unreviewed safety question nor a change to any Technical ~
Specification and prior NRC approval for the implementation of the action is not required.
10 CONCLUSION On the basis of this safety evaluation, it is concluded that the proposed action when completed supports the SFP continued routine operations in accordance with Section 5.6 of Technical Specification.
11.
RECOMMENDATIONS 11.1 The plant Reactor Engineering personnel shall develop appropriate administrative procedures to preclude storage of fuel in cells AH17 and AG17.
11.2 Conduct third campaign of blackness testing (or the equivalent) in the year 2000.
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 13 of 26
/
/
/
11.3 Daily monitor the SFP silica level, should the silica level elevated to 20 ppm or above, an engineering h{_
evaluation is deemed necessary for studying impacts.
12.
VERIFICATION
SUMMARY
This safety evaluation, prepared per ENG-QI-2.0/2.1/2.9 (Reference 13.6), has been logically developed and used the design data and references to support the above cbnclusion.
Per Section 5.0 of ENG-QI-2.1, this evaluation has been properly classified as Nuclear Safety Related.
13.
REFERENCES 13.1 W.
E. Bustynowicz, Blackness Testing of Boraflex in Selected j
Cells of the Spent Fuel Storage racks of St. Lucie Unit 1, Holtec Report HI-95-1303, HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL, April 1995.
)
13 /3 Stanley E. Turner, Blackness Testing of Boraflex in Selected l
Cells of the Spent Fuel Storage racks of St. Lucie Unit 1, j
NST-89112, NUSURTEC INCORPORATED, December 1989.
13.3 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 FSAR, Am.8-7/89, Section 9.1.2.2.3.
13.4 FPL QA Audit Files - Joseph Oat weekly reports on the PSL1 SFP Racks manufacture (Filmed in Reel #92 and Reel #103 from 11/23/87 through 4/26/88).
13.5 CC-KAIL from Sandy Trepanier to J.B.
Sun, "10CFR21 Request,"
dated June 1 1995 (ATTACHMENT 1).
13.6 SEWR NO 95 16563 STAR NO 1-950548,.ITLE Boraflex Shrinkaae Gao Formation, DEPT dLE.
13.7 St. Lucie Unit 1 Discharged Fuel Status Records, Books 1,2, and 3 available from site Reactor Engineering or site Nuclear Records vault-Document Type Form 5467.
13.8 St. Lucie Unit Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration Log Sheets from February 1990 through February
- 1995, Site Chemistry Department (or from site nuclear records vault as 90131/91131... Log, CHEM and CCW), Attachment 2.
Private Conversation with Mr.
R.
J.
Frechette, supervisor at Chemistry Department on 7/18/1995.
13.9 Calc. PSL-1FJF-94-189, REV 0, "St.
Lucie Unit 1, Cycle 9 ANC Model," Spent Fuel ID=K16 discharge burnup data obtained from microfiche:ANCJOB300, JOB-
- S19ANC, Date-07/29/94, USER
\\
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 14 of 26 t
- rrodrigu, page
- 0006, REF BU=15881, REF TIME =11375.8 at location (6,3).
Calc. # PSL-1FJF-95-065, "St.
Lucie Unit 1 Cycles 12 and 13 ANC Models," Rev 0, Spent Fuel ID=P66 discharge burnup data obtained from page 14 at (4,3). May 1995.
St.
Lucie Unit 1 Cycle 8 Safety Analysis Report, XN-NF ;
169, January 1987.
13.10 St. Lucie Unit 1 Cycle 11 Safety Analysis Report, SNP-91-150, September.
Calc. # PSL-1FJF-91-023, "St.
Lucie Unit 1 Cycles 8,9,10 and 11 Core Physics Models," Rev 0, November 1991.
13.11 Boraflex Test Results and Evaluation, EPRI Report # TR-101986, February 1993.
13.12 Calc.
PSL-1FJF-92-057, Rev 0,
" Minimum Soluble Boron Concentration in the PSL1 Spent fuel Pool without Boraflex Absorber," October 1992.
13.l13 INPO SIGNIFICANT EVENT REPORT (SER), SER 12-95. Revision i
" Boron Carbide Material (Boraflex) Degradation in Spent Fuel Pool Racks."
13.14 FPL letter to NRC, C.
O. Woody to Gentlemen (NRC), St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335: Spent Fuel Pool Rerack - Boraflex and Pool Cleanup, L-87-424, October 20, 1987.
13.15 NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board - Initial Decision (authorizing Spent Fuel Pool Reracking), Docket No. 50-335-OLA, St. Lucie Unit 1,.(ASLBP No.88-560-01 LA), Dated May 9, 1989.
l 4
\\
gpy.pgL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 15 of 26 t
ATTACIOG2fT 1 I
DKT:
1 i
50567S/# YELLOW CM M NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2, TENNESSEE VALLEY RPT:
REF:
10CFR-50.55E RN#1:
PT21-83/?
AN#1:
OREILLY J P 1
RA41:
MILLS L M REFAFFIL:
NE R2/SREGION 2 (POST 820201)
EDTTVA/9 TENNESSEE VALLE i
AA41:
PACKAGE:
830128-8302030551 10023/752262 ACN:
\\
DATE:
8104220206 810407 I
DTC:
DEFR/* DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10 PART 21)
DTC:
l EST PAGES:
TR/* TEXT-SAFETY REPORT 2
L1:
i COMPONENT COOLING PART 21 REPT RE WELDS ON JOS
. L2:
1[A;0306. VENDOR MATER HEAT EECHANGERS INITIALLY L3:
INSP REVEALED THAT DEFECTS APPE i
SURFACE L4:
j W-POSSIBLE REMOVAL BY GRINDING.
KEY:
APPEARANCES KEY:
}
KEY:
ADEILIARY WATER SYSTEMS DEFECTS KEY:
KEY:
GRINDING KEY:
HEAT EXCHANGERS i
INITIAL KEY:
KEY:
INSPECTION REMOVAL KEY:
SURFACES KEY:
WELDING FICHE:
PFL:
08326:073-08326:075 LPDR:
ADOCK-5000566-s-810407 i
Y-DKT:
TENNESSEE VALIZl 50566S/# YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT, DET:
"JNIT 1, TENNESSEE VALLc~Y 50567S/# YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT, RPT:,
"JNIT 2 RPT:
10CFR-50.55E PT21-81-400 RPT:
YCRD-50-566-81 REF:
RN#1:
PT21-81-400-000/?
i OREILLY J P AN#1:
MILLS L M 1
RA#i:
REFAFFIL:
NOIR 2/9 REGION II, IE (720101-810228)
EDTTVA/6 TENNESSEE VALLEY AA41:
PACKAGE:
810407-8104220206 O END
1 I
i i
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 16 of 26 d
1 ATTACHMENT 2 f
a 1.0 SFP Boron Concentration Records 2.0 SFP Silica Level Data Sheets l
3 4
i 3
l' s
.I
\\
?
I i
i i
i LEAVE REOunST FORM WITH RECORDS TECHNICIAN DOCUMENT REQUEST FdRM N A M E:
h-Oh TIME OF DAY:
[8' /6 -nr -
i DEPARTMENT:
EXT Nb 7//9/15 D
_ ATE:
, Or RECORDS ReOuesTED:
g jp
- OF RECORDS NOT FOUtJD:
REFILMED RECORD:
CARTH,lDGE: ;* S FRAME: 1/
2 ALL RECORDS ARE THE PROP $RTY OF FLORIDA POWER & UGHT COMPANY. UNAUTHORIZED COPY e
/
RESULTIN DISCIPLINARY ACTtori.
E UNIT:
l' 2
E d,i 8
?
DATE:
l' f 5
jE cf
()$()l L Fc"" f)
DOCT:
y 4 W p/
I DOCN:
$. p f f/
g w
p tii/
qU33 e
e sys:
840'i1 d/e )Y
~
C0MP:
1 ITM:
RETRIEVAL C.OPY TOTAL
'ROCESSED BY:
- OF COPIES:
(PAGES)
- - - - - - - - ' " ' ' ' - ~ ~ * * ' ' ' ~ ~ ^ ^ ~ ~ ~ ' ' ~
i I
f JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
l
[
L jj' k
I t
e k
s-P.y.
1.
or 2.
2 e.
]
!l g
l L
i
.li 1;l!!il!
a.
i s
_\\
~
I V
C U
I E
jllllll i
=
1 n i
{
8 f C
,C C
l 1 1
's, w e
a 1!
r s
s
=
a x
U l
ga a Q C 1 1[f w
e o
a E
O i
'e g
o N' 8
5'.
O C
7 I
i A
ll kk E
5 d -t..
'E. d
!.i
., e
~
~
~
~
{
.J b
i 4
b I
e a
n M
Z h
D h
Q q
m w
a w
g i
e is2 5
5 h
h 5
1 Mb %
l
}
e m
[,E k M M g
l k
1 I
i t
I i
i 2
o 1II lI i @ f 3 @ [
i YU f
lll3'
~
i ms 5 @ i f @ ! ! ;
s-3 g
g li!
nil,l i
s h
? 0t 2-c O. 9 8
s a
e 8
5 R
2 d'
W 5
3
$ v[
f, 1
3 i
a x
d
=
2 II l l1
~3 5 3
3 5
jI.IIl
~
Q j
w Q s
b u
o 1 ;!2 u
a W
e
~
o n
l
@v o
M vs sd e
T s
)
't d-
- ggg, 6 lV (
3 0
'[--
D 3
N D
g g
M e
r?
E I
t
=fgIllN B
=
U
_ l _- l
~I l
I y
.s a,
~<
]f hN-l i
e i
I
(
l I
lh
)
- ~.
i 2
k i
G JPN-P8L-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
a
.j l5 i-T T
i j-
,.y.
1, or 2.
s 4
a 5
s i.
I !!hl!
i
,~t l 'M 3 t'
?
1
! ililil!
- 1 E i
m u
}
g v,E u
4 i
M v
e i
c o
g i
- t_
g i
a
~
~
5 E
g l !!l E
]
g 1 4:
w t'z I
s
~.
11 y
3 2
i 55is 3
0 l ll II o
E E
A
\\h.g 1
$ l IL g &
a l*
Q
~$.$19 l,!
(
l IaIl ok k v
o R
g n
g a
3*o
- 8*s 5
R 4
!Y 7
u-E g
il E
f 1 E. I flu i
- 7 a,
si
-a ~
R m
=X k
h n
~
r m
a n
5 gE
.E F
tll l l1 8
1 i 3
l'.i l'll s
s l g;ii b i 5i 5
i i.
t t
e a.
u 1
2
.e 4 x
i Ist i.
-c _.s %.<' M et g
i 8
4
\\ l i
t w
gg 3
8" l!
b g -)
N (e
C i
t g
m i
! d I.
- T 4
3 e
i I
i E3lEbi I
g ILPI E""
1 JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 r
REVISION 3
i o g'8 l k'
i E
s 1
,./
1 m
Page 20 of 26
~ '
t
+
i N
g s
v S
}
a l
l
\\
l l
~
I Q
I' l l
(
it! I!!
D n
1 w
i ld l "3
i i
i
$ i lt h
t
? 2 9 i
g Ug.
3 1 a
D i
a
^
3 4
a
~
^
g{
I-II b
{,':
U e
.d L
- b b
s
=
s a
s v
I s
D
- -]
ps gg 4[
d 9
0 4
9 a
s-h, 1 l, x
4 2
s 3
b 2
I wa 1 u,
,x
- a a Isll.l..il a
'2 I N 5
h ! d d
~.
E-X
-4 :s 4.A -:d dg 1 X NA 1 s 9
e ms 19 1 l (l!
2:
i t
2 e 1
" U Is
= 1. I o
O h d
Y N
$ b I
((
J Ig ttul i
S -~
f ! [
31 t.
.$C Mc n
=-
=
II I
4 2
M O
C r it e
e 2
e
[
N n i.,
Iv[
g i
i s
8 gll'i ai 11 a
3 i ta w
a i
li.1lI 1 h! : 1 5A lrll.111, l
e e
u I
p;
&i l i6
.i-flll
=
l ! I.
k n
W IN t I
c5 i
ys a
i
i 1
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 21 of 25 Mckmd. 2 PREVIOUS g ^. MPLE RESULTS i
Page 1
DATE: 18 uUL-1995 l
1 SAMPLE PT. DATE/ TIME Boron Silica j
i
-- _-.. ---------.--. -_- --_ ___--f P1~SFP 28-JAN-1993 08:45 2432
?.
- ~SFP 21-JAN-1993 09:00 2454 i
SFP 14-JAN-1993 09:10 2448
~
e1.,SFP 6-JAN-1993 09:00 2426 7955.00 l
l
/*
F l
l
)
I O
6
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 22 of 25 NdMIM/*t$
L
~
PREV: OUS SAMPLE RESULTS Page 1
DATE: 18-JUL-1995 s.
SAMPLE PT. DATE/ TIME Boron Silica
--__...-_____---------__-----_--__------_--__(. PPM---__-_--------_---..
_ ppm ol_,SFP 27-JAN-1994 08:45 2494_---------_-__-.. -_-_____ - __ --------_-__--.
"SFP 20-JAN-1994 13:05 2494 SFP 13-JAN-1994 09:05 2458 P1_,SFP 6-JAN-1994 09:10 2493 9300.00 1
9 4
JPO-POL-SKFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Pago 23 of 26 AOdMI 2-PREVIOUS SAMPLE RESULTS Page 1
DATE: 18-JUL-1995 SAMPLE PT. DATE/ TIME E iron Silica
.-------------------------------------q1.U-------------------------
PP=
el_SFP 13-JUL-19 95 12 : 3 0 2242
.~SFP 6-JUL-1995 09:25 2247 12000.00 SFP 29-JUN-1995 09:05 2236 P1_SFP 22-JUN-1995 09:10 2221 P1_SFP 16-JUN-1995 12 : 42 2280 P1_SFP 15-JUN-1995 14 :10 2220 P1_SFP 8-JUN-19 95 10 : 45 2287 P1_SFP 1-JUN-1995 08 :45 2273 11525.00 P1_SFP 25-MAY-1995 09 :10 2291 P1_SFP 18-MAY-1995 08:25 2247 P1_SFP 11-MAY-1995 08:35 2238 P1_SFP 4-MAY-1995 08:00 2247 10600.00 P1_SFP 27-APR-1995 01:59 2238 P1_SFP 20-APR-1995 02:20 2272 n1._SFP
/. 13-APR-1995 08:20 2229 "SFP 6-APR-1995 08:10 2258 10900.00
~SFP 30-MAR-1995 08 : 40 2247 Pl_SFP 23-MAR-1995 09 : 40 2267 P1_SFP 16-MAR-1995 13 :10 2245 P1_SFP 9-MAR-1995 01:50 2236 P1_SFP 2-MAR-1995 00:50 2256 10700.00 P1_SFP 23-FEB-1995 02 : 50 2245 P1_SFP 16-FEB-1995 08:25 2247 P1_SFP 9-FEB-199 5 15 : 3 0 2247 9800.00
'P1_SFP 3-FEB-1995 13 :3 0 2221 P1_SFP 26-JAN-1995 01:10 2225 P1_SFP 19-JAN-1995 04 :20 2247 P1_SFP 18-JAN-1995 18 : 45 2234 SFP 12-JAN-1995 11:00 2242
~~
'SFP 5-JAN-199 5 08 : 30 2220 9700.00
Unit i SFP A - Sitica 12000 o
I E
e i1500
/
i 1
E 11000 i e
5 10500 m x
a n
t' se %
10000 7 I
g i
9500 ri-m 5
9000 h
st 8500 i D
E as 6000 }
N y
7500 i H
7000 ~
6500]~
u I A 1 J f 1 J & 4 h A ik h A h ik h A A A A A A A A A a4 A A A di
~
u 1-JAll-1993 22-MAY-1993 j
Honths from 1-JAN-1993 a
JPN-P8L-8EFJ-95-023 REVISION 3
Page 25 of 26
&MknAe$
2-PREVIOUS SAMFLE RESULTS Page 1
DATE: 18-JUL-1995 SAMPLE PT. DATE/ TIME Boron Silica
............--.....--.......................--(.P.P.b..>........................-
ppm P2_SFP 26-JAN-1995 01:57 2191
' SFP 18-JAN-1995 22:10 2196
~
SFP 12-JAN-1995 15:00 2200 e2[SFP 5-JAN-1995 10:30 2204 378.00 kit 1 kf l'
h
- -. -. -.. _ ~
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-023 RNVIDION 3
Page 26 of 25 A7rAeMu6cr 5 Q
"c ' m JOSEPH OAT C O R P OR ATIO N man v
casam
= 4 asio.
QRCN a.
2
(
Reswa3I coa Lecmpu k Pctsou racu\\Miw LC C, CECCED CE ll [c Aul WmEme. J
$t'd FEoM EN M RW ThgAuCD Poth.o LcE*
iu e;ge.g pppetopin,s,s vom cewinw cast i.ei /aer o urs --.,,i t
o.e acerinu w.srnuet cd" Ar rm.s.sucrrw wnc cc-At St to A us WCAT70s4 wHesn.
j I
w.s ecww e
t r
i i
i 1
.. =
i
'e E
_.. L.
l j
-e t
i 2
r l
l r
L l
s.
.T w
i L
L 7-W 3' ' 1 1u
- T 14 smftsT vl cny ex4 s 2,3-74 s.,1
- s.,.i s-7Y f)Sf,ujt2__blylfil-lM2)NC,IIs.r *1 A//!.d.1t&2/ COrbhD 2 M9 V 2 Mft, -
21If, J f 3 HY:
M
.s 7 4'.s T ?,
179 T M 7'3If T '!f f P 7fM' F 1-y p 1 ?y P T-
.c
. s.
s-14 e.aq z-m 4 s<s w s 1 -11 x
c.y.y c.s.
G'-
3<!.s 011so % na z urt son - HN) wa r. -h4t siIst 2nte sina M
( 4/
rp
~.
e W
og AleT _hsaw<4 r
st u c aise >103:cu 31
_Mwsni 5%9 ya op.rTqt.
21js. uusjt. a.,r) wwt sye..w/n Q
, tJ - *-. f a
- n.oc.: : r< d 3
c' W splA s
s*
o pf s
n-r
-*1x*
C,,styjf.<utyy
- 2y y1tt?9 snW Stf4 v.ent' emL
.M bein
' fro 2.
~g
$ 14x/s. x ff rsfL Gyf)(Gy[rWlA r u c v 1-c T Vp. r3 nssoy 1M4Gr g
es s '., s. m yn
- z. gog s. w
,.y e sgo
- 3. a.-o1 5 _
y
_ SW
- s. s -
- f)I1n
- n ?a
-Y 2Ia% A1 r1t
- > t 3 c. 21oG 2to4 1II35 1r 129 11las UK.W 9".
i: w T-34c -q T31.1/x r.T2 T.TLS9 nWft 1: 5.ty y 5 tMn r.: ssg WM/l.a S-h s..~ if(r o
n.cs W. ra
..rq $.,. y 2-e s -2 11 S-JT s,7 7 1-1 ?f s.-x c4 s-s-*Y 3 21 o H *e~r are r ww sm
.x r ew stors s tatt 2ioso Jr
- s. sted nio u 1312-
?
g. 7.fei T' M 4T' '!'
Y 3G '; 7-* %T-1In F-E'*% !; 7-?*YW7 n
g,- g[y VI WWAF " 'G'sk f.7.yy 5 3 vi s-s w ' 3
- 7h
.'J Y
. &,,y I at e
- 5 N/4 par.,y E p.e4 pv 7 F.T-H tJM/ cJ/eW 1944 I cM. 3/047.1994 'ust A991 1/ayf itove zioyrwatA
~2H7 p74. 2typy.6*/pi-My{*7 str G j.g 4 'I k.g,0,;.. 73 7 n. gps.4g 577%F,yg a
349 ts sa: y palog sMo't 3/Idat rKo# FM81 4-A-4 5M*
NCv sewa4 :rfo*t D3tf t/hte) mfg'
/
^;
'dGC < 199/
1496 Ac,y jggs, og(g ogg agq y
K-3'4%Vie 3A W//.
YJlo46 74 G(0*f fX W)9Vf dWTd" Wn s& _
p s win s. a.+ 1+ *1 s s *< S.p. 1 s.p.oq s-se q s-sot S.s s-k g cg* 1 W 5.s 3 9 k1} <.1 ss4 v sr1 1 m M ta. ; > n 2071 Mov 2s uson,,asN 2*^S LM b,
. l. '
.