ML20137L226
| ML20137L226 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1996 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137K821 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-485 JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96, JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020, JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-20, NUDOCS 9704070176 | |
| Download: ML20137L226 (12) | |
Text
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 1 of 12 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 Safety Evaluation Refueling Equipment' Underload and Overload Settings JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 May ll, 1996 Quality Related Nuclear Puel Nuclear Technical Support 9704070176 970402 PDR FOIA i
BINDER 96-485 PDR i
, i v.
i JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev.
2 Page 2 of 12 REVIEW AND APPROVAL RECORD PLANT St. Lucie UNIT 1
TITLE Refueling Equipment Underload and Overload Settings LEAD DISCIPLINE Nuclear Fuel / PSL Fuel Engineering
~
ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION Nuclear Technical Suoport REVIEW / APPROVAL:
R E
GROUP PREPARED VERIFIED APPROVED APP ED*
MMM MM M
MECH X
N/A N/A N/A ELECT X
N/A N/A N/A I&C X
N/A N/A N/A CIVIL X
N/A N/A N/A tmC" X
N/A N/A D
ESI X
N/A N/A N/A, L
/
V Il}
- For ;sntracter Evals A.s Determined By Frs:e:ts
" Seview terfa:e As A w s On A;. 'Xrt2".!t I.e.: ar.a P'Js a
FPL PROJECTS APPROVAL:
A.W uchChm DATE: 571ih /
-v 4
OTHER INTERFEES
o 4
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 3 of 12 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS DESCRIPTION Page 1.0 ABSTRACT 4
2.0 DESCRIPTION
AND PURPOSE 4
3.0 LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 7
4.0 ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON SAFETY 8
5.0 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 8
6.0 PLANT RESTRICTIONS 8
7.0 EFFECT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 8
8.0 UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DETERMINATION 8
9.0 ACTIONS REQUIRED 11 10.0 VERIFICATION
SUMMARY
11
11.0 REFERENCES
11 ATTACHMENT 1.
Siemens Letter TMH:96:032 2 Rgs 2.
Assembly and Equipment Weights 2 Rgs 3.
Refueling Equipment Weight Information 6 Rgs 4.
FSAR Change Package 4 Rgs 5.
Refueling Equipment Setpoints 1 Rign
i JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 4 of 12 1.0 ABSTRACT / PURPOSE:
The purpose of this safety evaluation is to develop St. Lucie Unit 1 (PSL1) refueling machine (Rc ri) and spent fuel handling machine (SEN) load cell settings.
The overload and underload setpoints will provide adequate margin during the refueling operations.
This j
margin will account for resistance encountered while lifting or lowering the fuel assemblies, without exceeding the fuel assembly and refueling equipment design limits.
The method used for setpoint calculation is similar to that used for St. Lucie Unit 2 (Reference 3) and the Vendor Technical Manual (Reference 4).
The new setpoints generated are summarized in.
Revision 2 of this evaluation is issued to change the evaluation to a safety evaluation, and identify appropriate FSAR changes to Section 9.1 and 7.6 related to the fuel handling equipment load limits.
It is shown that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question.
2.0 DESCRIPTION
Refueling Machine In Reference 1 (Attachment 1)
Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) provided the St. Lucie Unit 1 fuel assembly information to be used in determining underload and overload settings on the refueling equipment.
The allowable safety value or the force limit from fuel assembly damage considerations has been specified as 200 pounds for the St. Lucie Unit 1 SPC fuel.
This value is representative of the maximum spacer side plate shear strength, which should be accounted for in detemining refueling equipment load setpoints.
The I & C procedure 1-1400182 (Reference 2) currently has fuel only underload and overload limits as (1085 + 5) pounds and (1460 + 5)
- pounds, respectively.
The' lightest aiid heaviest fuel asseiEbly weights (wet) used are 1096 pounds and 1131 pounds, respectively.
The weighti data for the various components needed for the underload and overload setpoint calculations are defined in Attachment 2.
Minimum Fuel Assembly Wet Weight =
1105 pounds Maximum Fuel Assembly Wet Weight (except VFPA) 1155 pounds
=
VFRA assembly Wet Weight 1305 pounds
=
O k
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 5 of 12 Grapple Wet Weight = 130 pounds Holst Box Wet Weight'= 1130 pounds Holst Box Partially Dry Weight = 1220 pounds P
The.se fuel' assembly weights are comparable to those in Reference 2.
Per Reference 2, the part strength CEA wet weight is 57 pounds.
The following load setpoints are calculated for the refueling machine.
' Fuel-Only Underload Max Assy Wt.
CEA Wt
+ Grapple -
=
+
(Includes Grapple)
Safety Margin 1155 + 57 + 130 - 200
=
1142 pounds
=
For a
vessel fluence reduction
- assembly, the underload setpoint is calculated by using the.VFRA weight without the CEAs.
The underload setpoint becomes (1305 + 130 - 200)
=
1235 pounds.
Using a margin of 5 pounds for calibration (Reference 2), the Fuel-Only Underload Setpoint becomes --> 1147 pounds.
For VFRA, the underload setpoint is 1240 pounds.
Fuel-Only Overload Min Assy Wt.
+ Grapple Safety
=
+
(Includes Grapple)
Margin 1105 + 130 + 200
=
1435 pounds
=
For VFRA, the setpoint is (1305 + 130 + 200) = 1635 pounds.
Using a margin of 5 pounds for calibration (Reference 2), the Fuel-Only Overload Setpoint becomes --> 1430 pounds.
For VFRA, the overload setpoint is 1630 pounds.
The fuel plus hoist underload setpoint provides protection to prevent fuel assembly movement - out of the hoist.
This condition'may occur if the hoist box becomes jammed during lowering of the hoist with the fuel assembly inside.
The overload setpoint provides protection for the machine against damage by lif ting weights above certain limits.
The formulae provided below are obtained from Reference 4.
The setpoints are calculated conservatively without accounting for the VFRA weight.
J JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 6 of 12 J
Fuel + Hoist Under-load Wet Hoist Wt. + Min Essy Wt.
=
+
(Includes Grapple)
Grapple - Margin for Operation 1130 + 1105 + 130 - 200
=
= 2165 pounds Using a margin of 5 pounds for calibration (Reference 2), the Fuel + Hoist Underload Setpoint becomes --> 2170 pounds.
3 1
Fuel + Hoist Overload Partial dry _ Hoist Wt. + Max Assy Wt.
=
(Includes Grapple)
CEA Wt.
+
Grapple t Margin for
+
i Operation 1220 + 1155 + 57 + 130 + 250
=
2912 pounds
=
Using a margin of 5 poun.ds for calibration (Reference 2), the Fuel +Holst Overload Setpoint becomes --> 2807 pounds.
l Spent Fuel Handling Machine l
The I & C procedure 1-1400183 (Reference 8) currently has underload and overload limits as (1283 + 5) pounds and (1575 + 5) pounds, 4
respectively.
The weight data for the various components needed for the underload j
and overload setpoint calculations are defined in Attachment 2.
I Minimum Puel Assembly Wet Weight =
1105 pounds Maximum Puel Assembly Wet Weight -(except VFRA) 1155 pounds
=
VFRA assembly Wet Weight = 1305 pounds SFM Tool Wet Weight = 293' pounds The following load setpoints are calculated for the spent fuel machine.
SFM Underload Max Assy Wt. + CEA Wt. + Tool Wt. -
=
(Includes Tool)
Safety Margin 1155 + 57 + 293.- 200
=
1305 pounds
=
For a
vessel fluence reduction
- assembly, the underload setpoint is calculated by using the VFRA weight without the CEAs.
The underload setpoint becomes (1305 + 293 - 200)
=
1398 pounds.
Using a margin of 5 pounds for calibration (Reference 8), the Underload Setpoint becomes --> 1310 pounds.
1 JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 7 of 12 For VFRA, the underload setpoint is 1403 pounds.
SFM Overload Min Assy Wt.
+ Tool Wt.
+ Safety
=
(Includes Tool)
Margin 1105 + 293 + 200
=
1598 pounds
=
Fo r VFRA, the setpoint is (1305 + 293 + 200) = 1798 pounds.
Using a margin of 5 pounds for calibration (Reference 8), the 1
Overload Setpoint becomes --> 1593 pounds.
For VFRA, the overload setpoint is 1793 pounds.
Expected variations in water temperature and boron concentration would have a very small ef fect on the wet weights; well within the applied margin.
3.0 LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FSAR FSAR Section 9.1.2.2.3 states that the spent fuel handling machine i
hoist load interlock limits the maximum uplift load to ten percent above load.
The statement is revised to allow the overload and underload limits to be based on the fuel assembly design.
A similar change is incorporated in FSAR Section 9.1.4.3 for the 1
refueling machine loads.
FSAR Section 7.6.1.2 states that the refueling machine interlocks interrupt hoisting (or insertion) of a fuel assembly if the load increases (or decreases) more than 10 percent above (or below) the i
set point.
This is changed to state that the refueling machine interlocks interrupt hoisting (or insertion) of a fuel assembly if the load increases (or decreases) above (or below) the overload (or underload) set point.
These changes do not af fect any of the design considerations of the fuel handling equipment nor require any physical hardware changes to the fuel handling equipment.
Technical Specifications Technical Specification 3/4.9.7 requires that loads in excess of 2000 pounds be prohibited from travel over irradiated fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
The changes proposed do not af fect this Technical Specification.
J
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020
)
Rev 2 Page 8 of 12 4.0 ANALYSIS. OF EFFECTS ON SAFETY The changes proposed are consistent with the equipment and fuel assembly design limits.
The equipment setpoints developed in this evaluation will involve loads much less severe than those analyzed in the FSAR Section 9.0.
The analyses of the fuel handling accident and the cask drop event continue to remain bounding.
The increase in the loads for hoist interrupt from 10 percent toh
/
200 pounds (-18% for regu1Tr* fuel assemblies) will not diminish the 1
degree of protection for the fuel assemblies.
Reference 1 provides 200 pounds excess load as a
safe limit from fuel damage considerations.
5.0 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 4
No new failure modes are created by the setpoint changes.
The e m in FSAR Table 9.1-5 is not affected.
6.0 PLANT RESTRICTIONS There are no plant restrictions due to the proposed changes.
i 7.0 EFFECT ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS j
As stated in Section 3.0 of this evaluation, there is no effect on any Technical Specification or bases due to the proposed changes.
l 8.0 UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DETERMINATION 10 CFR Part 50.59 permits the holder of an operating license to make changes to the facility and procedures as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and to conduct tests or e.xperiments not previously described in the FSAR without prior NRC
- approval, pre.ided they do not involve an unreviewed safety question and do not require a
change to the Technical Specifications.
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.59, the following evaluation serves to determine whether this modification constitutes an unreviewed safety question:
8.1 Does the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR?
4 JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 1
Page 9 of 12
~ The proposed changes to the FSAR allow the load limits to be consistent with the equipment and fuel assembly design limits.
The degree of protection provided to the fuel assembly is not diminished by changing the excess load limit from 10% to 200 pounds
(-18%).
200 pounds excess load has been specified as a safe limit for the fuel assemblies in Reference 1.
As such there is no increase in the probability of any accident evaluated in the FSAR.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in.the FSAR is not increased.
8.2 Does the proposed activity increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR?
The changes proposed do not affect any systems, structures, or components related to the mitigation of an accident nor does it adversely affect the performance of any system or component designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
The consequences of accidents related to the fuel handling system analyzed in the FSAR remain bounding.
Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increase ~d.
8.3 Does the proposed activity increase the probability of an occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR?
The changes to the FSAR will allow the load limits to be consistent with the fuel assembly design limits.
The increase in excess load will provide equivalent protection for the fuel j
assembly during refueling operations.
The performance of the fuel handling equipment is not affected, nor are there any interactions with other systems, structures or components important to safety.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence of any equipment 4
malfunction important to safety previously evaluated in the i
FSAR will not increase.
8.4 Does the proposed activity increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR?
The changes proposed do not affect the performance of any equipment important to safety.
The consequences of the fuel handling accidents analyzed in the FSAR contihue to remain bounding.
Interactions with other structures, systems and
e JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 10 of 12 components important to safety are not changed by this activity.
Therefore, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased.
8.5 Does the proposed activity create the possibility of an accident of a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated, in the FSAR?
<g6
() The changes proposed will not lead to loads exceeding the Q,' equipment design limits.
Additionally, dg c % P less severe than those analyzed in the FSAR.these loads are much t[%',
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously pi evaluated in the.FSAR.
8.6 Does the proposed activity create the possibility of a
malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than a~ny previously evaluated in the FSAR?
No new f ailure modes or. system interactions are introduced by the proposed activity.
The changes merely allow load limits to be set consistent with the design limits.
There is no effeet on any system performance.
Thus, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
8.7 Does the proposed. activity reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification?
As stated in Section 3.0, the changes proposed do not affect any Technical Specification or bases.
Additionally, the load settings on the fuel handling equipment do not adversely interact with any component or system covered by the Technical Specifications.
The consequences of the fuel handling accidents analyzed in the FSAR continue to remain bounding.
Therefore, the proposed change does not reduce the margin of
~
safety as defined in the bases for the Technical Specifications.
CONCLUSIONS The above discussion justifies that there is no unreviewed safety question associated with the changes to the FSAR sections related to the fuel handling machine load settings.
s 1
JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 11 of 12 9.0 ACTIONS REQUIRED 4
j Equipment load setpoints developed in this evaluation for the refueling operations are provided in Attachment 5.
FSAR changes are provided in Attachment 4.
10.0 VERIFICATION
SUMMARY
j This safety evaluation, prepared per ENG QI 2.1, has been logically i
developed and used the necessary design and reference materials to i
support the conclusions derived.
The underload and overload settings evaluated here do not affect the safety of the plant.
These settings, however, are used on the refueling equipment as trip setpoints to maintain loads on the assemblies within the desired values for safe fuel handling operations.
Therefore, this engineering evaluation has been classified as Quality Related.
11.0 REFERENCES
1.
Letter, T. M. Howe (SPC) to R. J. Rodriguez (FPL), TMH:96:032, Spacer Side Plate Shear Strength Value for SPC Fuel in St.
Lucie Unit 1, February 14, 1996 (Attachment 1) 2.
I & C Procedure 1-1400182, Revision 1, Refueling Nachine Load i
Cell Calibration 3.
JPN Evaluation JPN-PSL-SEFJ-95-043, Revision 3,
Refueling Nachine Underload and Overload Settings 4.
Tech Manual B220-5810 Vol 1, R9, Refueling Equipment Vol I 5.
JPN Calculation PSL-lFJF-91-060, Revision 0, Core Design and Isotopic Inventory Input Data for the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) St. Lucie Unit 1
\\
6.
Glasstone
- Sesonske, Nuclear Reactor Engineering, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co.
2 PC/M No. 054-194, Fuel Reload for Cycle 13 (St. Lucie Unit 1),
Revision 0 8.
I & C Procedure 1-1400183, Revision 2, Spenc Fuel Nachine Load Systems Calibration 9.
St. Lucie Unit i Cycles 12 and 13 Refueling Log (Attachment 3)
i I
1 JPN-PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev 2 Page 12 of 12 10.
Mark's Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers,
~
4 Seventh Edition, McGraw Hill Book Company (Page 6-80) 11.
St.
Lucie Unit 1
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report' 3
Amendment 14 j
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