ML20137L389

Rev 0 to JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039, 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation, Temporary Configuration for CEDMCS Cooling Sys & Encl

ML20137L389
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/10/1996
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20137K821	List: ML20137K816 ML20137K910 ML20137K940 ML20137K961 ML20137K972 ML20137K998 ML20137L016 ML20137L023 ML20137L046 ML20137L065 ML20137L077 ML20137L081 ML20137L092 ML20137L116 ML20137L130 ML20137L141 ML20137L162 ML20137L191 ML20137L205 ML20137L226 ML20137L346 ML20137L359 ML20137L389 ML20137L786 ML20137M723 ML20137M926 ML20137N194 ML20137N205 ML20137N211 ML20137N220 ML20137N238 ML20137N278 ML20137N314 ML20137N327 ML20137N343 ML20137N366 ML20137N431 ML20137N791
References
FOIA-96-485 JPN-PSL-SENS-96, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-39, NUDOCS 9704070215
Download: ML20137L389 (91)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. _ _.. I I CR 96-1325, PAGE 1 OF 12 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT i 10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION TEMPORARY CONFIGURATION FOR THE CEDMCS COOLING SYSTEM AND ENCLOSURE J l ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION 0 QUALITY RELATED t> 9704070215 970402 B NDE1 6 485 PDR

_.. _ _. ~ _ e i JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION O PAGE 2 OF 12 REVIEW AND APPROVAL RECORD pL m sT TItefF UNIT ? TITLE TEMPORARY CONFIGURATION FOR THE CEDMCS COOLING SYSTEM AND ENCLOSURE LEAD DISCIPLINE MirelFAR ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION Mt rer FAR ENGINFFRING nWP REVIEW / APPROVAL: INTERFACE TYPE MM ND MON mmp GROLT -mmm-N >~ . Nbe Y-h 1 MECB XX [8 @. h /d F1ECT XX I&C XX A-a kb - 7 CIVIL XX NUC" XX M' M /4 'M M CSI XX NUC FLTL XX

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CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION O PAGE 3 OF 12 pum . lARTTRACT This safety evaluation provides for design evaluation and modification of the w.y configuration for the cooling system and enclosure of the Control Element Drive Mechanism Contml System (CEDMCS). The function of the cooling system and enclosure is to provule an air conditioned environment for the four CEDMCS cabinets on elevation 43' of the reactor auxihary building. This safety evaluation demonstrates the following:

1) 'Ihe design of the enclosure is acceptable, and exhibits no potential II/I concerns.

2) 'Ihe existing design for the cooling system is in conformance with FSAR mquirements with_

the excepoon of the mounting for the air conditioning units and one support for the ductwork. 'In this regard, modificanon details are pronded that involve a revision to the exi:, ting design to bring it into confornance with the PSAR. 'Ihis temporary configuranon involves modification to quality related systems, and therefore, is classified as quality related. 'Ihis temporary configuration is acceptable until a permanent design is available. This safety evaluadon concludes that the operation of the plant as described above does not represent an unrenewed safety quesnon as defined in 10CFR50.59, does not require a change to plant Technical Specifications and does not adversely affect plant operation or safety; therefore, prior NRC approval is not required. l

. _ ~ -.- -.~ - ~. - - -.- - -._.. CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION O PAGE 4 OF 12 i j DFERIFT10N 4 This safety evaluaion provides for design evaluation and modification of the @.ry ) i configuration for the cooling system and enclosure of the Control Element Drive Mechatism l Control System (CEDMCS). De function of the cooling system and enclosure is to provide an air conditioned environment for the four CEDMCS cabinets on elevation 43' of the reactor l l auxiliary building. i' His safety evaluation demonstrates the following:

1) ne design of the enclosure is acceptable, and exhibits no potential II/I concerns.

1 i

2) The design for the cooling system is in conformance widi FSAR requirements with the l

~~*ian of the mountmg for the air conditioning units and one support for the ductwork. In j this regard, modificaban details are provided that involve a revision to the existing design to bring it ir.to conformance with the FSAR. From measurements taken at doorway operungs and at openings made for penetrations, the existing enclosure consists of 9 foot high walls about 4 inches thick. Portions of the interior of the wall could be observed at penetration locations. From these observations, the wall was seen to be composed of standard drywall construction (light gauge cold-formed steel channels spaced at 24" on center, with drywall sheets approxiric.bly 1/2 inch thick on both sides of the wall. The exterior surface of the wall is covered with sheet metal (= 18 gauge). Members and sheet steel are secured together with drywall screws. From reference 4 (page 6-16), the weight of 1/2" gypsum board is approximately 2 psf. The weight of the 18 gauge sheet metal is approximately 2 psf. From these values, the total weight of the walls will be approximately 6 psf, or 54 pounds per hnear foot along the length of the wall. De majority of the CEDMCS enclosure is covered by a cethng composed of 1/2" drywall similar to that used on the walls (= 2 psf). De ceiling is supported from the walls, with intermediate support provided by the CEDMCS cabinets inside the enclosure. The cooling system consists of two separate air conditioning units and associated ducting. The design for the power supplpand ductwork is considered adequate with the exceptionA support @ Modificabons for restrauung the air conditioning units and one support ', for the ductwork are provided to ensure that safety related electrical equipment in the vicinity of the air conditioning units and cooling system ductwork does not suffer damage or spuriously actuate during a postulated seismic event. (See attachments 1 & 2 for details.) s-This temporary configuration involves modification to quality related systems, and therefore, is classified as quality related. His temporary configuration is acceptable until a permanent design is available.

. - ~. -.. f CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 4 REVISION 0 PAGE 5 OF 12 i l IlCFNSING RFl}IIIRFMFNTS Tachaieel Enmeinentiana (M*farence 1) ,i l ] He echnical spadarneinas do not contain requirenumes for the either the CEMCS or its cooling system and enclosure. Derefore, the subject temporary configuration does not require changes to the technical specifications. q, 7 g g4 l FR An (Rectinn 7 71 ? 1 Referener ?) i ne FSAR describes the features of the CEDMCS which are characterized as not safety related. The cooling system and enclosure are not described in the FSAR. Derefore, the subject temporary configuration does not require channes to the FSAR. ,p$ f / Although the FSAR does not desenbe the coohng system or its enclosure, the FSAR discusses the < requirement that non-safety related equipment not adversely affect safety related equipment. &g 'h x ,f(' \\ ANAT YSIS OF FSFFITli ON SAFF.TV / f'e Meismic AAmannev af Cnnline Ryttem Fncinence De wall enclosmg the CEDMCS cabinets is not designed to withstand seismic loads. However, it is concluded that the walls (and cethng) in quesnon will be able to withstand all postulated loads (including seismic), for the following reasons: This type of construccon (gypsum wallboard with metal channel frammg) is a standard design used in office and residential construction. The metal channels typically used in these applications provide good resistance to in-plane loads. The light weight of the gypsum wallboard facilitates the ability of the wall framework to carry all required loads. This enclosure is essentially a four-sided rectangular box which frames at one corner into a structural column of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAJ/RA2). This rectangular configuration results in the wall sections acting together as a frame to resist lateral loads. (Out-of-plane loading will be redistributed and transferred to the adjacent walls, which will act as bracing to resist the load via frame action.) The entire enclosure is bolted together with the sheet metal cover plates and/or gypsum wa11 board provxhng continuous support for the channels, thus enabling the wall system to act as a unit in resisting loads. ~ l

i i \\ CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96 039 REVISION O 4 PAGE 6 OP 12 During a emismic event, the aero period acceleration (horizontal) to which the enclosure walls would be subjected at the reactor wxiliary building, El. 43', is 0.29 g's (Reference 8, p. 266). From Reference 9, p.306, the coefficient of static friction of metal on stone (repreamtative of that for steel on concrese) is 0.300. , which would day remimmare values close to or greater than the anticipated g values. jg Nrs acc. wTreM Deze are a number ofitems which either penetrate the enclosure 1 or are routed adjacent i to it, as noted below: On the south side of the enclosure, an air conditioning duct (18" x 20") penetrates the wall at two locations approximately 10 feet apart. On the west side of the enclosure, ductwork from the CEDMCS air conditioning units penetrates the wall at two locations. On the north side of the enclosure, cable tray support members (consisting of angle 'sectxms) W-me wau at the west end. Also, a 6" conduit penetrates the wall near the entrance doorway. Finally, a tray support member is cantilevered off column RAJ/RA2, located very close to the face of the wall; this support is braced in the north-south direction. On the east side, there are seven 24" trays which run vertically in proximity to the g face of the wall. Dese trays are supported by a very substantial gang support consisting of braced 4x4 angle members; the support is attached to the RAB structural steel and an emhaMed plate on column RAJ/RA2. In addition, a portion of the support runs through the wall in question. 7 ,The items hsted above which are located adjacent to the walls twork, cable tray supports) I , are substantial items which will provide additional lateral restraint to the wall, ne items above which_peneinte the =__1 (&twork. conduit, and cable tray supports) will act ar to help prevent the wall from falline. 4 i

A

) From Reference 3, CEDMCS is a portion of a non-seismic, non-safety-related system. From engineering walkdowns, the only items of equipment inside the enclosure are the non-safety-related CEDMCS cab' ets. m Dere are a number of safety related items outside the CEDMCS enclosure in the vicinity of the wall. These safety-related items are protected by rugged / durable cabinets, boxes, etc. The CEDMCS enclosure walls, as indicated above, are composed of lightweight elements (gypsum wallboard, light gauge channels, and sheet metal cover plates. De discussion above has concluded that the walls will carry all pewi loads; however, even if the walls ~e postulated to collapse, the safety related equipment in the vicinity would not be dam: _ to the' ii i b i d s,ightweight wall construction and the protect on provided y the cab nets --

4 I CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 i REVISION O l PAGE 7 0F 12 For the reasons discussed above, the existing enclosure is considered acceptable without modification, and exhibits no potential II/I concerns. hi-u ihv af Air OmGinning nw +ing l As discussed above, there is a run of air conditioning ductwork which runs along the south side of the enclosure imawdimly adjacent to the wall. Below and slightly south of this ductwork are i several pieces of safety-related equipment (the ductwork is not directly over this equipment, but is offset by only a few inches. 'Ihe duct is supported by commercial-type sheet metal strap l hangers, =20 gauge, =1.25" wide, at spacings of not more than 6 feet. Assuming an allowtle ' tensile strength of 18,000 psi, typical sheet metal used for this application has an approximate ( strength of 800 pounds. Assuming 22 gauge steel, the weight of 18" x 20" duct would be l approximately 8 pounds per linear foot (excluding we to the capacity of the strap hangers, it is concluded that the straps are adequate to resist all postulated loads (including seismic); this will prevent any adverse interaction between the ductwork and safety-related equipment. 'Ihese hangers are demaned to provide only vertical support; however, smce the ductwork has several horiyanal 6nds-in-this-area, its horuontal ~ ~ 7 'denection Ebe'limIteid, as subh,'thcre is Esa~fety related eauipment that can be impacted by ~ horizontal deflection of the duct. f* $ With one exception, all of the strap hangers for the ductwork were supported from substantial senactural steel members which have sufficient capacity to carry the loads from the duct. At one . location the strap was tied off to a piece of tube track which spanned between two structural members; however, the tube track was not positively attached to either of these members. In order to provide adequate support for the ductwork at this location, the following actions are to be performed (see Attachment 1): k Remove the strap hanger from the tube track and the tube track from its as-found location. Attach a replacement strap hanger to the angle section shown on Attachment 1. In addition to the action iterr.s listed above, all of the strap hangers supporting the section of ductwork south of the CEDMCS enclosure shall be inspected to ensure that nuts are provided on the screws or bolts. Nuts shall be installed wherever they are missing. The ductwork with the modified support is considered acceptable, and exhibits no potential II/I concem. hitmic Adennev nf Air Innditinnino Unitt There are two air conditioning units located on the west side of the CEDMCS enclosure. Air I con 6 < 'ina units at this location were originally installed via Reference 3; the units presently ins al e a.: replacement units which took the place of the originals. The northernmost unit is in l ic esser unily the same locanon as the original; it is sitting on three channel members spanning acre tne skid I,apparently provided for shimming purposes). The southernmost unit has been rotated 90 deg,rees and partially supported on a new skid (it also utilizes part of the previously existing i e

CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION O PAGE 8 OF 12 However, the support of the existing units differs in two significant respects from that of the original units: De existing unitme not anchored to the skid; i.e., they are not restrained in any wAy. Bracing members installed on the original units to provide lateral restraint in the westerly direction have been omitted in the as-found installation. Dere are two safety related items incated just west of the air conditioning units: Isolation Cabinet SB and Isolation Box MD (SAS). Since the air conditioning units are not restramed, the potential exists foAr interaction with these_ safety reintad items in the event of a seismic occurrence. Wr this reason, seismic restraints are to be installed to prevent this adverse interaction. The ' details required to be installed are shown on Attachment 2; implementation of this modincation will prevent the air conditioning units from excessive movement during a seismic event, which willin turn ensure that no adverse interacoon with the safety related components occurs, ne new modifications have been qualified and documented in reference 7. k fore, the air conditioning units, with the modified restraints, are considered in conformance with FSAR requirements. < N-inw., in enmhnetiht, I nadine renm pnetncure and Air Cnnditinnine linitt 3 . De coohng system enclosure and air conditioning units were reviewed for potential increases in the combustible loading of the cable spreading room. The enclosure for the CEDMCS cabinets is constructed of wallboard, plywood, fiberglass and metal channels. With respect to the combustibility of the enclosure: ne metal channels are "not flammable", and therefore, do not add to the combustible loading of the room. De fiberglass is 3.5" R-11 Dow-Corning insulation (U.L. test per NFPA 259,1983). The combustible loadmg from the fiberglass is estimated to be 10 million BTUs (i.e., = 2000 ft' x 3.5" x 0.6 lb/ft' x 2360 BTU /lb). De combustible loedmg from the plywood (3' x 4' x 5/8") on the south end of the west wall is estimated at 0.3 million BTUs. The wallboard is constructed of gypsum and backing paper. The combustible loading from the wallboard is estimated to be 4.8 million BTUs (i.e., = 2000 ft' x 2 walls x 3/8" x 50.5 lb/ft' x 760 BTUnt - NFPA 220). g --.y ~

~. - - CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION O PAGE 9 OF 12 De air conditiomng units are constructed of metal and wire insulation. ney contain reirigeran't and small quantities of grease in the motor and compressor beanng housings. De metal and refrigerant are not combustible, and therefore, do not add to the combustible loading of the room. l De quantity of wire insulation and,m, ase are considered negligible, and therefore, do not add to the combustibility of the room. 1 Based on the above, the increase in combustible loading to the cable spreading room from the l I enclosure and air conditioning units is estimated at 15.1 million BTUs. This is a smallincrease when compared to the other combustibles in the room (= 550 million BTUs per reference 1). His l small increase in combustible loading does not affect the conclusions of the FSAR fire hazard analysis. Accentshility nf Air Innditinnine Pnwer Rimnly Per reference 4, the air conditioning units are connected to terminal box B2021 in parallel with power receptacle F247 which is powered from non-safety related enannel B. De power supply cable size and protection has been reviewed and is considered adequate for the connected loads. Therefore, the power supply is considered in conforence with FSAR requirements and is acceptable without modification. EADERF MODFS f ND FFFFITS ANAI YRIR ne temporary configuranon ensures the affected equipment is adequately supported and restramed such that it does not represent an interaction threat to adjacent safety related equipment under seismic conditions. Operation of the subject cooling equipment is not altered and no new failure modes or system interactions have been introduced. UNnF.v1FwFn RAFFTY OUFATION DETERMINATION hwi upon the above evaluations it can be demonstrated that an unreviewed safety question, as defined by 10CFR50.59, does not exist because each of the seven questions presented below can be appropriately answered:

1) Does the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR7 i

ne proposed activity does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously l evaluated in the SAR. The temporary configuration does not modify or otherwise adversely affect the operation of safety related equ' nt and does not impact any assumptions used in l accident analyses.

.~.. _ i CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION 0 PAGE 10 OF 12 l l

2) Does he proposed activity increase he consequenas of an scoident preniously evaluatedin be SAR?

i j 'Ihe consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. ] No fission product barriers are altered or affected and the operation of accident nutigating systems is not affected. The temporary configuration will not hinder the operation of safety l related equipment. }

3) Does he proposed activityincrease the probability of occurrence of a malftmetion of equipment important to safetypreviously evaluatedin Me SAR?

The probability of occurrence of a mm:ucction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety miysis report has not been increased. De temporary configuration does not impact the operation of safety related equipment and no new interactions are being introduced, thus the reliability of safety related equipment is not affected.

4) Does he proposedacM/ naease Me consequences of a malfunction of equipment i

important to saktypreviously evaluatedin he SAR? ne musequenas of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. As stated above, no fission product barriers are altered or affected and the operation of accident mitigating systems is not affected. De temporary configuranon will not hinder the operation of safety related equipment or affect its operation in any way.

5) Does he prtymad ac&wty amate he pc:,cbility of an accident of a different type Man anypreviously evaluatedin We SAR?

De possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created. There are no system interactions introduced by this temporary configuration and the operation of safety related equipment is not altered in any way. A failure modes and effects analysis has been performed which shows that there are no failure modes which could impact the safe operation of the plant or the ability of the plant to respond to a design basis accident.

6) Does the proposed activity create We possibility of a dinerent type of malfunction of equipment important to safety than anypreviously evaluated in the SAR7 ne possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report has not been created. Tbs are no :yste-Mteractions introduced by this temporary configuration and the corranon of safety relatee

- nt is not altered in any way. Thus, no new accident Lutiators are introduced

CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION 0 PAGE 11 OF 12

7) Does heprcposed scMytoduce he margin of safety as denned in be basis itv any technicalspecMcsbion?

This activity does not impact the operability or qualification of any equipment required by plant technical specificinann. The temporary configuration does not impact any assumptions in the basis for the Ta hnical Specificadae.s or Safety Analysis. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is not reduced. 10CFR50.59 allows changes to a facility as described in the SAR if it does not involve an unreviewed safety quesnan or a change in the Technical Specifications is not required. As shown in the preceding sections, the temporary configuration does not involve an unreviewed safety question and a change to a Technical Specification is not required. j cnNei IIMION i This safety evaluabon demonstrates that the temporary configuration by does not adversely affect nuclear safety, does not involve an unreviewed safety question, and does not require a change to the Technical Specifications. Therefore, prior NRC approval is not required. PflNT RFrt1timONE AND RFIjIIIBFD ACTIONS 1. Modifications for the temporary configuration must be complete before Mode 2. See attachments 1 & 2 for modification details. Any field changes to the attached drawings must be prior approved by engineering and documented in CR 96-1325.

2. Prepare PC/M for the permanent design of the CEDMCS cooling system.

3. Evaluate past operability of the CEDMCS cooling system for potential reportability.

REFERENCFR

1. St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications, through Amendment No. 82.

2. St. Lucie Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report, through Amendment No. 9.

3. PC/M No. 54284, "CEDMCS Temporary A/C", Rev. 0 4.

AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 7th edition.

5. Attachment 1: IPN-PSL 96-039-001, Details of Support Modification (1 sheet).

6. : JPN PSL-96-039-002, Details of Air Conditioning Restrainin7 a

CR 96-1325, JPN-PSL-SENS-96-039 REVISION O PAGE 12 OF 12

7. Civil calculation PSL-2FSC-96-012, R0.

8. FPL Nuclear Engineering Department Discipline Standard STD-C-004, " Seismic Response Spectra - St. Lucie Units 1 & 2", Rev. O.

9. Beer, Ferdmand P., and E. Russell Johnston, Jr., " Vector Mechanics for Engineers - Statics",

c.1977. l j

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f '/re mi ',,,,, t 7, f,, fe- [ .l IIEfH SVIlftD ,/ { _ ) g gjg 'y y' I_ .fr e satis .-Il - cElstesG C4 "" ' I 'N' *

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'1 -t TM C4 C -- (. k* c_ \\_ I~ ng, g 3../ t/7 e (thi1% i sta,liur, w e grypg G Oftilt & IAP tust sTI(L FOR t/Jo m is SECTION G-G DE T All _6_ -DL. l All 3 r ~ DETAll 3 etoRio eo-tR = ucH1 co-Nr si stata Ptesse seer aso 2 p. 6 oto +.. I .+__ ... _ _,......i _ m c* sz.V. o,,,, 1

ort GW A L Tompon:;nt : SyJ: Trcin: Fcc: PSL Unit:E

.ssociate:

Assign Priority: AA DUPLICATE DA Name: TEMPORARY AC FOR UNIT CEDMCS EN Work Type: 3 WORK ORDER TASK'"7. CLOSURE. l Location: UNIT 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOM EL 43 @ LMD: C 96015303 01 RAK/RA2 Defect / Request: PROVIDE SEISMIC RESTAINT OF AC UNI ER/PWO: 60 / 0163 TS. Chg Loc: 915 PAGE 1 of 5 Detailed Explanation: PROVIDE SEISMIC RESTRAINTS TO A/C/ UNITS. A/C UNITS ARE NOT SEISMICALLY SUPPORTED. More: Work Request: 96010253 Def Tag: Loc: , Trbl/Brkdown: N LCO: N Unit Cond Reo: 4 NPRDS: Fail Date: Time: Det: Stat: Symp: Originator: WEJ0MYY JENKINS WE Date: 06/10/96 Dept: CONS i ' Approve By: WEJ0MYY JENKINS WE Date: 06/10/96 Tasx Determination Data: IST Required

N NCR/CR

96-1325 Safety Class: QR PMT Required

N PCM Q Group i

10 CFR 50.49

N EQ Doc Pkg Assign To Reg Guide 1.97 Seismic Cat Est M/H 160.00 ASME XI(ISI) Reqd Scaffold Req : N Crew Qty 4

Security Clearance: Fire Prot Reg: N Insul Rem

N Clearance Required: N Clearance No :

RWP Required: N RWP No: RCA M/H: L1: L2: L3: QC Requirements: QC Required

Y QL-A Q.C. HOLD POINTS PER THE TASK DESCRIPTION AND WELD TRAVELERS."FRG" APPROVAL REQUIRED PRIOR TO IMPLIMENTATION.

More: Work Order Task

Description:

SEE PAGE 2 FOR TASK DESCRIPTION. I More: Y Planned By

JXGOETB GOODRICH J

Date: 06/10/96 Pkg Appr By : JXGOETB GOODRICH J Date: 06/11/96 Time: 01:52 QC Approval DAGOAKC GINGRAS DA Date: 06/11/96 I

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • OPERATI S APPROVAL TO START ***********************

NPS Start Permission: b LCO(Y/N): M Start Date/ Time : L,-d R h / 69 C NPS completion Notif: Major Failure: Compl. Date/ Time: / Major Action reficiency Tag Removed Y/N)

k M q;gjhe.ine.uI Tc 4 /k cdC C,t9 WO E lE'M W %)MA21 Gm Q ENd 2.1 QUALITY INSTRUCTION REV' 1 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DA 3/30/96 (effecgtiv FPL 10CFR50.59 5CREDi1NG/ EVALUATION PAGE 1 OF 6 1.0 APPROVAL Approved by: 62 4 Date: Af f }LOfg 0 2.0 This procedure applies to the screening of proposed activities for 10CFR50.59 applicability, and to the subsequent 10CFR50.59 evaluation of all changes in the facility as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), changes in procedures as described in the SAR, and tests or experiments not described in the SAR. 3.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides requirements and guidance for performing screening to determine 10CFR50.59 applicability and, if applicable, for perfonning 10CFR50.59 evaluations to determine if a change, test, or experiment requires NRC approval prior to implementation. 4.0 ACCOUNTABilITIES 4.1 Engineers are accountable for preparing, verifying, and processing 10CFR50.59 screenings / evaluations in accordance with this procedure, and for completing applicable indexing (standalone evaluations only) and transmittal to Site or Juno Document Control. 4.2 Supervisors are accountable for approving 10CFR50.59 screenings / evaluations, ensuring their technical adequacy, and ensuring compliance with this procedure. 4.3 Project Licensing is accountable for providing independent reviews of 10CFR50.59 screenings (with the exception of IEEs and DCRs) and 10CFR50.59 evaluations (within EPs and standalones). See ENG QIs 1.1, 1.2, and 2.0. 4.4 The Chief - Document Management is accountable for ensuring retention of I all 10CFR50.59 screenings / evaluations transmitted to Juno Document

Control, and for ensuring that evaluation index sheet (Form 81) information is processed for standalone evaluations.

QUALITY INSTRUCTION ENG-QI 2.1 REV. 1 DATE 3/30/96 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING 10CFR50.59 BCREMf1NG/EVAIRETICIf PAGE 2 OF 6 4.5 The Manager - Nuclear Licensing ana Special Programs is accountable for all 10CFR50.59 programmatic interpretations, overall 10CFR50.59 policy decisions, and 10CFR50.59 training. 5.0 INSTRUCTIONS l 5.1 General l 10CFR50.59 permits FPL to perform the following activities without prior NRC approval if no Unreviewed Safety Question (US0) or Technical Specification change is involved:

1. '_o change 1_in the facility as described in the_.S W o

changes in M edures as dE5tribea in the SAR, or C e i.ests or experimentswescribed in theiAR-- ' If a proposed activity does not fall under any of the three criteria above.10CFR50.59 evaluation is not applicable. Section 5.2 discusses the rationale and requirements for " screening" proposed activities for 10CFR50.59 applicability. Activities that fall under any of the criteria above require a 10CFR50.59 evaluation. A 10CFR50.59 evaluation provides assurance that the documented information used and understood by the NRC as a basis for licensing the facility (i.e. - the " Licensing Basis") remains valid in light of the proposed activity. A proposed change, test. or experiment is considered to involve a US0 if any of the following conditions result from implementation of the activity: o The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR may be increased. o The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR may be created, o The margin of safety as defined in the basis for my Tech Spec is reduced. Proposed changes, tests, or experiments which are determined to involve a US0 or a change in the Technical Specifications must be submitted to the NRC as a Proposed License Amendment (PLA). The NRC must approve the license amendment prior to implementation. See ENG 01 2.7. Note that the terms "10CFR50.59 Evaluation" and " Safety Evaluation" are typically used intercnangeably by engineering and plant personnel; however, the term Safety Evaluation is more generic and can include evaluations other than 10CFR50.59 evaluations. For example, an operability evaluation is a " safety" evaluation which analyzes an interim or temporary plant condition (rather than a proposed change) that deviates, or is suspec,ted to deviate, from cer,ta,1n,desi,gn/ licensing

QUALITY INSTRUCTION ENG-QI 2.1 REV. 1 DATE 3/30/96 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING locrm50.59 scazernse/anrumeralf PAGE 3 OF s although in some cases (e.g., if a plant procedure change or temporary system alteration is required) it may include a 10CFR50.59 evaluation. 5.2 10CFR50.59 Screening All changes to plant design documents and hardware are screened for applicaDility of 10CFR50.59. Activities which " fail" the screening require a 10CFR50.59 evaluation in accordance with Section 5.3. 10CFR50.59 screening is conducted to ensure that all changes to plant documents and

hardware, however

minor, are considered for the applicability of 10CFR50.59.

The screening process is designed to determine whether the activity requires a complete 10CFR50.59 evaluation { by asking the following questions (or words of similar intent): '&,, y .. g 1) Does the change represent a change to the facility as described in , kd'p the._SAR? _. _ 2) the change represent a change to procedures as described in the A lJ 3) Is the change associated with a test or experiment not described in the SAR? '? 4) Could the change affect safety in a way not previously evaluated in the SAR? 3l 5) Does the change require a change to Technical Specifications? A positive response to any of the first four of the above questions ,r requires a 10CFR50.59 evaluation. A positive response to question five J requires a license amendment (10CFR50.90) to implement. Activities which do not represent a change to the facility or procedures 5 described in the SAR or a test or experiment not described in the SAR. do ^ not require a 10CFR50.59 evaluation. This screening decision is based on l' an understanding of what is meant by " described in the SAR" The term SAR as used in 10CFR50.59 incloces: the UFSAR. SER (issued at time of 2 license). NRC SEs (subsequent to the operatina license). QA Manual for 4., Operations, and Emergency Plan. Because the OFSAR has been updated to e include NRC SEs and since the FSAR was the basis for the SER, the UFSAR is s the principle document that should be reviewed during screenin] to 7d '? evaluate changes, procedures, and tests or experiments " described in the SAR". Because of the importance of the UFSAR and Technical Specifications io in making the screening determination, the sicnificant/Dertinent UFSAR and P j Technical Specifications sections revieweo snali be identified in tne 7 i iustification section of tne screenina form. d 'c. g 2 Responses to the screening questions should be justified within the I particular process document. The method and extent of justification is

QUALITY INSTRUCTION ENG-QI 2.1 REV. 1 DATE 3/30/9s NUCLEAR ENoiNEERING 10CFEt50.59 SMMERIIBG/EVALUATICII PAGE 4 OF s dependent on the particular process and the nature of the specific proposed activity. For example, the 10CFR50.59 screening responses in a Minor Engineering Package (MEP) are typically justified to a greater extent than those in a Drawing Change Request (DCR) which may simply rely on the administrative change description itself as justification. Justification for 10CFR50.59 screening responses is not a 10CFR50.59 or NSAC-125 requirement; however it is a self-imposed department policy. Note that Project Licensing review / approval of all MEP 10CFR50.59 screenings is mandatory. The 10CFR50.59 screening process is used in the Drawing Change Request (DCR), the Item Equivalency Evaluation (IEE). the Minor Engineering Package (MEP). and in certain general evaluations of plant procedure changes and temporary system alterations. Refer to the appropriate ENG OI for process-specific requirements related to 10CFR50.59 screening. Also see the 10CFR50.59 Guidance Document and the 10CFR50.59 Training Manual for additional detail and philosophy. Note that Engineering Packages (EPs) are considered to " fail" the 10CFR50.59 screening by default, and thus automatically receive 10CFR50.59 evaluations. See ENG 01 1.0. 5.3 10CFR50.59 Evaluation The purpose of a 10CFR50.59 evaluation is to determine if a proposed change, test. cr experiment can be implemented without prior NRC approval, and to document the basis for that determination. This is accomplished by determining if the proposed activity involves an Unreviewed Safety Question (US0) or a Technical Specification change, which in-turn is i determined by providing specific documented responses to the following questions. These "7 Questions" are an industry accepted (and NSAC-125 recormiended) expansion of the three basic criteria / questions in 10CFR50.59 l 1) May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR? 2) May the proposed activity increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR? 3) May the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR? l 4) May the proposed activity increase the Consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR? 5) May the proposed activity create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAR? 6) May the proposed activity create the possibility of a different type

l i QUALITY INSTRUCTION ENG-QI 2.1 REV. 1 DATE 3/30/96 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING ,,,,,,,3y,, 10CFR50.59 smHMEIEG/EVALTETION PAGE 5 OF 6 of malfunction of equipment important to safety than any previously evaluated in the SAR? 7) Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification? If the response to any of the above questions is "Yes". NRC approval is required prior to implementing the proposed activity. NRC approval is obtained by submitting a Proposed License Amendment (PLA) per 10CFR50.90. The level of detail required for a 10CFR50.59 evaluation is dependent on the specific nature of the proposed activity, however, the responses to the 7 Questions above shall be comprehensive and detailed to an extent necessary to thoroughly justify the conclusions reached. As a minimum, the 10CFR50.59 evaluation shall: o Provide bases for the Unreviewed Safety Question determination by specifically addressing the 7 Questions, o Provide a conclusion whether a Technical Specification change is

required, o

Analyze direct and indirect effects of the proposed activity for each applicable mode of operation. o Analyze the effect of failures associated wi th the proposed acti vi ty. o Specify any required restrictions placed on implementation or operation. 10CFR50.59 evaluations shall contain sufficient detail to allow for independent verification. This detail should include identification of appropriate FSAR/ Technical Specification sections, assumptions. references, calculations. and other pertinent technical bases used in i performing the evaluation. 10CFR50.59 evaluations shall be independently verified in accordance with ENG 01 1.7. Project Licensing review of all 10CFR50.59 evaluations (within EPs and standalones) is mandatory. All other reviews are at Lead Discipline discretion. See ENG 012.0 for review, approval, numbering, and processing requirements for standalone evaluations. Standalone 10CFR50.59 evaluations for temporary system alterations or temporary modifications should include an expiration date similar to that assigned to EPs (see ENG OI 1.1 for guidance and rationale). See ENG OI 1.7 for telecon approval restrictions / requirements for 10CFR50.59 evaluations. The Lead Discipline Chief shall concur (signature preferred, but may be verbal) with 10CFR50.59 evaluations which involve:

i QUALITY INSTRUCTION ENG-Ql 2.1 REV. 1 l DATE 3/30/96 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING 10CFR50.59 BCREMBmpS/ITAINTICEI PAGE 6 OF 6 o a change in design 3hilosophy or design approach, o a change in approac1 to accommodating an NRC requirement, o a unique or unusual interpretation of an NRC requirement, o operation with a leak in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), or o a recurring plant problem / equipment failure. See the 10CFR50.59 Guidance Document and 10CFR50.59 Training Manual for additional detail and philosophy. Note that the 10CFR50.59 evaluation formats in the 10CFR50.59 Guidance Document are mandatory. 6.0 RECORDS 10CFR50.59 evaluations within EPs are processed as part of the PC/M package (See ENG 011.1). and subsequently transmitted to site Document control for retention in accordance with ENG 01 3.0. Standalone 10CFR50.59 evaluations shall be transmitted to Juno Document Control via Form 81 (Index Input Sheet) for retention per ENG 013.0. Note that 10CFR50.59 requires a periodic submittal of 10CFR50.59 evaluation sumaries to the NRC. Although the information for the summaries is typically provided by Engineering in the form of abstracts, the periodic submittal is a plant accountability.

7.0 REFERENCES

. DEFINITIONS. AND ABBREVIATIONS 7.1 References 1. 10CFR50.59. Changes. Tests, and Experiments 2. NSAC-125. Guidelines for 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluations 3. Engineering 10CFR50.59 Guidance Document 4 Engineering 10CFR50.59 Training Manual 7.2 Definitions See Glossary 7.3 ADbreviations DCR Drawing Change Request EP Engineering Package IEE Item Equivalency Evaluation l MEP - Minor Engineering Package PLA Proposed License Amendment l SAR - Safety Analysis Report i US0 Unreviewed Safety Question SER - Safety Evaluation Report UFSAR - Updated Safety Analysis Report

Ol 5-PR/PSL-1 Revision 69 March,1996 i Page 5 of 93

3.0 SCOPE

(continued) 4 3.3 (continued) L 7. Letters of instruction (LOI): 1 NOTE If the content of a procedural document is not FRG Required (see definitions), consider creating a new Guideline rather than an LOI. Instructions which have a general but temporary application to the conduct of business and which require dissemination to the plant staff. These documents normally apply to a single department and are originated in the various departments by the Department Head. All Letters of Instruction shall be reviewed by the FRG and approved by the Plant General Manager. Letters of instruction may carry an expiration date which is concurrent with a milestone date (i.e. completion of refueling). Letters of Instruction which do not have an expiration date shall expire one year after the approval date. When the LOI is no longer needed or when the expiration date has been reached the LOI shall be automatically cancelled. /R69 8. Maintenance Procedures: Written instructions defining the policies and practices by which structural, mechanical, electrical and instrumentation and control systems of a nuclear power plant are kept in a condition of good repair or efficiency so that they may satisfactorily perform their intended functions. NOTE Material & Supply numbers are provided in procedures for reference information only. However, changes to M & S numbers used in a maintenance activity shall meet the requirements of the Nuclear Plant Work Order procedure. A. Electrical Maintenance Procedures (EMP): Written instructions for the repair, replacement, lubrication, periodic inspection and calibration of specific electrical components or specific electrical systems.

3 g, = i,16 e u;b i mL//. 3 /br)y W a l v l 'd i t, b.o m.gg '=f U.%Atas NP'R/PSL-1 ~ f' t Revision 69

3. llewe. cJt 5 4

/ March,1996 (f, e a n w 4 4, b [ Page 89 of 93 V f (4-d noe-w% D*- y> g g s vgfMqk$ 6 ^^ ' hJ C010 4 3J 7, h 4 INA-POVV H &IlGIN CO5 PANY SRN AL ~ '~ ST. LUCIE PLANT N & c A d.- 7 L 'REAc:TD4 CNGINsras DEPARTMENT mAww4c W TYL L O d LETTER OF INSTRUCTION NO. / OcLJh-D'>

1. TITLE:

U1 FUEL ASSEMBLN Nm6HT CMcK IN THE SFP Avs). 'J d 6780h pLn

2. PREPARED BY:

RAY M. KLebJ DATE 5 / ~7 /X 1

3. SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW BY:

u'dd. Ed TE f / 7 /d

4. DEPARTMENT HEAD:

N ATE f/ 9 / #6 ,f $

5. OC REVIEW FOR HOLD POINTS A DATE 8 / /0 /76

6. CHEMICAL CONTROL REVIEW: %b rW DATES /A/f dQ

7. (10 CFR 50.59 Screening Yes No N

J, NNNs[sk

1. Does the change represent a change to the facility as described

/ g n@ p in the SAR? ELV a-t $4 y,-

2. Does the change represent a change to procedures as described

,( ww in the SAR? k V3. Is the change associated with a test or experiment not desenbed in the SAR? ) F 4. Could the change affect nuclear safety in a way not previously / g f- .E evaluated in the SAR? / ,J d y,- 1 9'

5. Does the change require a change to the Technical Specifications?

/ f ni Ust FUSAR Sections reviewed M. I A /R69 nf t Y g- .? 4. 7 ~wu.n,:n e : r ~d@c HW / /R69 \\ ,u % d. w n - Jst T.S. Sections reviewed d fd $ t1 ( h,x

• m.. cW w -m ^..:,' ~. i,

u,2 6 [JOTE If the answer to ALL the above 10 CFR 50.59 screening questions are no, (Questions 1 - 5), then a safety evaluation is ngfequired. /fl/) T /Mll 4'I' ' ~)(- 5:AsLveuruTv) lib 4S/ 0 0 " 216 N n. Date .~' / 96 Initials 7 m.i.v u d v f. %.L O f.fA '~',' [<v fvnw.tt' o .,\\- Jf,ff) T B. FRG SECRETARY DATA BASE ENTRY DATE: DATE / /

8. INFORMATION SERVICES TRACKING:

DATE / / 5

9. FRG APPROVED BY:

DATE / / Plant General Manager

10. FRG NUMBER:

11. EXPIRATION DATE:

19

},te yetJ O M6b Void dE"W h,- Y O . Y

1.0 TITLE

b6 / U1 FUEL ASSEMBLY WEIGHT CIWCK IN THE SFP /

2.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this LOI is to provide guidance for determining the weights of fuel assemblies stored in the Unit 1 SFP. This information will provide supporting data for adjusting the refueling equipment hoist underload and overload setpoints.

3.0 DISCUSSIGN

The weighing operation will essent_i311v consist of lifting assemblies in place at their rack cell locations or if difficulties ^ occur with this crocess, taking these assemblies over the cask pit lo determine the free hanging weights at various elevations. Assemblies to be weighed will be identified by Reactor Engineering. A list of assemblies and the appropriate move sheets and maps will be provided to the Operations Department. All assemblies weighed will either be returned to their original SFP locations or loaded directly into the core if this procedure is being performed as part of the refueling operation.

4.0 INSTRUCTIONS

4.1 Precautions

1. Ensure the appropriate operational checke have been per-formed on the SFHM. The hoist load cell has been properly calibrated. If weighing assemblies in place and if the hoist load cell is not functioning properly a calibrated load cell may be substituted and installed between the hook and the SFHM grapple (ADD A LOAD CELL ONLY IF WEIGHING ASSEMBLIES IN PLACE DO NOT ATTACH A LOAD CELL IF MOVING ASSEMBLIES TO THE CASK

,PIT FOR WEIGHING). Inserting a load cell between the grapple and hook increases the distance from the top of the assembly to

he surface of the water thus ensuring shielding requirements are not compromised (i.e. minimum 9 ft water above top of assembly at hoist full up position.)

2. Check the cask pit for obstructions that may interfere with the weighing process and resolve these prior to moving assemblies into the cask pit area. 3. The appropriate move sheets and support data are available. Facsimile data and move sheets may be substituted provided the " prepared by" and " reviewed by" blocks are properly completed and all work is performed within the structure of this LOI.

4. Sufficient underwater lighting is functional.

5. A underwater camera system is operable and ready for

b l use if required. 1 6. Personnel performing this LOI have received the appropriate prejob briefing. 7. HP is available for supporting the underwater camera equipment installation / removal and other radiological activities should this become necessary,

8. Shield building ventilation is operable including full closure of the L-shaped door with boot inflated.

i

9. A copy of ONP 1-1600030, " Accidents Involving New or Spent Fuel" is available.

i

10. Ensure no obstructions exist over assemblies to be removed from spent fuel pool storage locations for weighing.

11. If the assemblies are not being weighed in place or as part of the reload sequence but are being returned to their previous locations af ter a trip to the cask pit then make sure a funnel is placed in the target storage location.

12. All personnel items, tools, etc shall be secured with tape or lanyard and are properly accounted for.

j

13. When moving assemblies in the spent fuel pool do not allow the SFHM mast to rotate, if necessary use a gloved hand to prevent mast rotation.

4.2 Instructions for Weighing Assemblies in Place:

1. Weigh the SFHM grapple at approximately 150" from the full down position if weighing assemblies in place, or weigh the

. grapple at the full up position if weighing over the cask pit. Record weight on data sheet 1. Weigh the grapple.in the full down position and record this weight on data sheet 1. This process should be repeated several times.

2. Using the assembly move list go to the first location and pick up the assembly.

If there is some reason that the assembly can not be moved then cross out that step and move to the next assembly listed.

3. Lift the desired assembly off the bottom of the rack, approximately 1 to 2 inches and record the weight in data sheet 1.

4. Next lift the assembly approximately 150 inches from the bottom of the rack. Record this weight in data sheet 1.

l Lifting the assembly 150 inches will prevent it from leaving l the rack cell location completely and avoid the need for a funnel for reinsertion. 4

4 5. Lower the assembly to its fully seated condition and ungrapple.

6. Repeat steps 4.2.3 through 4.2.5 until all desired assembly weights are determined. Perform data sheet calculations at a convenient time.

7. Complete Data Sheet 1.

8. Complete Work Sheet i using data sheet 1 values and forward the calculated setpoints to I&c.

4.3 Instructions for Weighing Assemblies Over the Cask Pit: 1. Complete steps 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 above, only, then proceed to step 4.3.2 below. 2. Next move slowly to the cask pit while actively preventing SFHM mast rotation.

3. Once over the cask pit ensure visually that no obstructions exist which would interfere with or catch on the assembly.

4. Record the assembly weight in the full up position along with the appropriato information on data sheet 1. Lower the assembly into the c sk pit to the full down position and record the hoist position and assembly weight on data sheet 1. 5. If returning the assembly to its original rack cell location, ensure a funnel is in the receiving cell. If taking the assembly to the core, as part of the reload, move into the transfer canal and place the assembly in the appropriate upender basket. 6. Repeat steps 4.3.2 through 4.3.7 as appropriate until all l the targeted assemblies have been weighed. Perform the calculations at a convenient time. 7. Complete Data Sheet 1. 8. Complete Work Sheet i using Data Sheet i values and forward the calculated setpoints to I&c. 1 l l l

t 4.4 Appendi:: 1 Move sheet 1: MOVE SHEET FOR ASSEMBLY WEIGHING STEP ASSEMBLY FROM TO STATUS j l 1 l i l l Prepared by Date / / Verified By Date / / l l

.d 4 i l l f 1 l DATA SHEET 1: ASSEMBLY WEIGHTS Grapple weight = Grapple weight hoist full up hoist full = down A8sembly serial Total wt. up assy wt up T tal wt. down assy wt own r.amoer posAtion - tot wt -grapple position = tot wt -grapple we w~ l l l t i l l 1 ^ l l i i-Precared By 3 Date / / 4 } Verified By Date / / I

T$ksheet1. Underload and Overload Setpoint Calculition RefueIEn'EN1achine-Maximum fuel assembly weight (MXAW) from Datasheet 1 =_ pounds If MXAW is a fuel assembly with a CEA then CW = 0.0 j If MXAW is a fuel assembly without a CEA then CW = 57 Minimum fuel assembly weight (MNAW) from Datasheet 1 = pounds / MXAW + CW + 130 - 200 + 5 ' Fuel Only Underload = = ~~ Pounds cJ '6 .W @o Fuel Only Overload MNAW + 130 + 200 - 5 = = pounds M Spent Fuel Machine d g Maximum fuel assembly weight (MXAW) from Datasheet 1 = pounds If MXAW is a fuel assembly with a CEA then CW = 0.0 -i G I g If MXAW is a fuel assembly without a CEA then CW = 57 l- \\ 'l : Minimum fuel assembly weight (MNAW) from Datasheet i = pounds -N )

a

~. V Fuel Only Underload = MXAW + CW + 293 - 200 + 5 ' = I Pounds f N_ S[NAW + 293 + 200 - 5 Fuel Only Overload = = pounds Prepared by Date / / Verified by Date / /

JPN PSL-SEFJ-96-020 Rev. 2 i. Page 1 of 1 Refueling Equipment setpoints Provided in this attachtrent is a surrmary of underload and everload setpoints for the refueling machine and the spent fuel handling machine, consistent with the safety margin limit specified in Reference 1. Refueling Machine Two sets of setpcirts are provided for the refueling machine - one set for typical fuel assemblies and the other for the, Vessel Flux Reduction Assemblies. Fuel Assemblies Fuel only (with grapple) underload setpoint 1147 5 pounds Fuel only (with grapple) overload setpoint 1430+5 pounds VFRA VFRA only (with grapple) underload setpoint 1240_+5 pounds VFRA only (with grapple) overload setpoint 1630:5 pounds Additionally setpoints are provided for fuel and the hoist. These setpoints cover all fuel asseelies. Fuel + Hoist (with grapple) underload setpoint 2170 5 pounds Fuel + Hoist (with grapple) overload setpoint 2807:5 pounds Spent Fuel Machine Tw sets of setpoints are provided for the SFP machine - one set for typical fuel assemblies and the other for the vessel Flux Reduction Assemblies. Fuel Assemblies Fuel only (with grapple) underload setpoint 1310:5 pounds Fuel only (with grapple) overload setpoint 1593:5 pounds VFRA VFRA oily (with grapple) underload setpoint 1403+5 pounds VFRA only (with grapple) overload setpoint 1793 5 pounds 1

O St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Deecription of Finding Onginator Supr. Review OperabMy Assessment Corrective Achon 2 5.4-20 Reference shou:d be made to FSAR Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Revising Sechon 5.4 7.1.2 I of the FSAR to Revue the test portion of Section Section 5 4.7.2.3 es e ocurce of include an addihonal cross reference 5 4.7.1.2.1 to state *(see Subsechons addihonellnformehon for Section enhances the overat utility of the document 5 4 72 3 and 6 3 2 2 6)". 54.7.1.2.1. The addtional informahon is editonal in nature and does not affect the operat#y of any structure, system, or m,-@ e-4. 2 5 4-21 Section 5.4.7.12 n of the FSAR states Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Revising Section 5 4 7.1.2.n of the FSAR to Revise Sechon 5 4 7.1.2.n to cleer9y that sufficient Indication exists in the clanfy the SDC_suctum piping arrangement that upon spurious closure of a control room to enable operators to enhant5EE 60veraR utMy of the document suction isolshon vatve (with cross-be detect a lose of shutdown cooling and to The addihonal informahon is editonal in valve V3545 closed);the operator stop the affected LPSI pump before nature and does not effect the operabikty of sees indcahon on the control room damage or overhearing occurs - impty:ng any structure, system, or m.mi. Instruments and shuts the affected that the SDC system is operated with LPSI pump before damage occurs. seped heeders. Operating procedure 2-0410022 requires that the suction headers be cross-tied to prevent a loss of shu'down cooling from occuring 2 5.4-21 Revise Section 5.4 7.2.1 of the FSAR to Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Revising Section 5 4.7.2.1 of the FSAR to Revise Section 5 4 72.1 of the include the correct Figure numbers include correct Figure numbers enhances FSAR to show the correct figure the overat utility of the document. The numbers Figure 6.3-1 should be addihonal bformation is editorial in nature 6.3-13.b.c; Figure 63-2 should be and does not affect the operabiNty of any 6.3-2d, and Table 6 34 should be structure, system, or w,w 6.3-4d. -) . c)

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings UnR Page Doocrtption of Finding Ortynetor Supr. Revtew OperabMy Assessment CorTectrve Achon 2 5 4-22 Revloe Secean 5.4.722.a of the FSAR Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Revtsing Sechon 5.4 722 of the FSAR to Revtse Sechen 5 4.72 2.s to show j oo that R pnwidos the proper cross include the proper cross referenu and the the proper cross reiarence for the reference for the LPSI pumps. It proper terminology enhances the overaR LPSIpumps. Revue Seebon cuneney steles that LPSI pump utdily of the document. The addIhonal 5 4 7.22 b to use the phrase *LPSI charsetertence are docussed in Section informenon is eetonne in nature and does not parm heat rather than safeguard 6 3. b. The LPSI pumps are desenbed affect the operatAty of any structure, pump heet". In Sa% 6.322 2. Wordmg in system, or - we-4. Secean 5.4.722.b of the FSAR should be rewteed to siste that the SDC heat enchangers remove LPSI pump heat rather then safeguard pump best. 2 5.4-24a Revloe Sachen 5 4.7.2.3 of the FSAR so Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Revising Secten 5 4.72 3 of the FSAR to Revise Sechon 5 4 723 to show the that R provides the correct cross mctude the proper cross reference enhances correct cross reference for the reference for Wie containment sump. It the overaR utiRty of the documert The contamment sump. currentpy states that the containment addstionalinformation is estorialin nature k g sump in descrbed in Section 6 2.2 2.3. and does not affect the operability of any The centsinment sump is ducribed in structure, system, or m.we-a. 4 Section 6.224 3. 44 I w W% i m. J .r

- St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Description of Fhding Originator Supt. Review OperabiNty Assessment Correcttre Action a 2 54-Revloe Swilon 5.4 7.2.5 of the FSAR to . Guth, MRch Noboe, Rick RevW Sectum 5 4.7.2 5 of the FSAR to Revise Sechon 5 4.7.2 5 to hetude include a reference to Section 7.4 for include the proper cross references appropnote cross references for the additionalinformation on SDC system enhances the overaR utMy of the document SDC system. Instrumentattort Sechon 7.4 describes The addhanal informahon is editonal h the role of the SDC system as a safe nature and does not affect the operatulity of ,(f shutdowr system and includes a any structure, system, or m g--A. descriphon of the SDC system instrurnentaban and controls. Section 5.4.7.2.5 of the UFSAR should also be j revloed to include a reference to Amends 3 9A forinformation on the setemic analyste of SDC system components Appendtx 3 9A includes a wmmary of the **=mic analyses l performed on the LPSI pump, motor, and ( system W. l 2 5 4-26 Revtse Section 5 4.7.2 6 of the FSAR to Guth, Mitch Buehrig. Chris Revising Section 5 4 7.2.6 of the FSAR to Revise Seebon 5.4.7.2 6 to match match the SDC augnment sequence include the correct ahgnmerd sequence the shgnment procedure with a specified h normal operating procedure enhances the overat ubhty of the document 50 59 safety evatus5on 24410022,*ShutdownCoccing" The As described in the FSAR, R is apperord that FSAR descrbes the necessary actions sequencing of steps were not part of the to eNgn SDC but the schon sequence is FSAR. Functiona#y the desenbed schans not h accordance with procedure 2-anew for SDC elignment. As such, an 0410022. operabilty concem dc.n not exist for any structure, system, or wp 4.

l St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urd Page Desatpean of Findng Originator Supr. Review OperabMy Assessment Corrective Acteri l A 2 5427 Revise Section 5.4.7.2 6 of the FSAR so Guth, Mirch Noth, Rick ReWsing Secten 5 4.7.2 6 to delete the Revise Secten 5 4 7.2 6 to remove j that R Irh that the connection descripten of a temporary connecten the desenption of a temporary betsmus SDC and CVCS to normonent between SDC and CVCS updates Chorder 5 w. , L between SDC and N}h The pfpin0 change wee implemented'. of the FSAR so that R agrees with changes CVCS. under PCM 373-78. The change h made to Chapter 9 back in 1973. The l pocke0s hcludes the requwed 10 CFR, requered word processang to editorial in - ' ~ nature and does not effect the operabMy of i is(L50_ h - ( any structure, system, or -# wg. k_j/ 2 5 4-27,5 4-28e Revloe Seceans 5.4.7.2 6 o and 5 4.7.4 Guth, Mitch Noble. Rick Revising Sechons 5 4.7.2.6 and 5.4 7.4 to Revise the FSAR to delete reference of the FSAR to duiste reference to the delete reference to the pre-euisting automette to automdtic bypass ulve operation automouc flow control function for SDC flow control fee ute for SDC updates Chapser The PCM contains the required 10 hed suchenger bypees volves FCV-5 of the FSAR so that it agrees with the CFR 50 59 evetuohon. 3301,3306. These volves were current plant configuration. The required ted originm8y designed for automatic cbanges are based on a previously approved trw=saman, similar to Unit 1, but the 10CFR50.59 eve 8ushan and do not affect the ayatom did not perform as egected operatsty of any structure, system, or during pre.op tests. The Modutronic" -w m. control system woe removed by PCM 030-283 and new 480V ac motor-operators were Instoned to permit remote-monumi cortrol. The to CFR 50.59 evd* noted that Sechon 5.4.7.2.1 i was offected because the flow indicating cordrollers were beinC dew (Sedient, 5.4.7.2.8 and 5.4.7.4 were missedy. The noted F5AR change w7es 7 hicismented./As Itume out, reference to me flow cordrosers wee recently deleted from Section 5.4.7.2.1 by a user comment submitted for Amendment 9.

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Deecription of Finding Originator Supr. Review Operabihty Assessment Correctrve Achon 2 15 4-29e The response to bem A.2 of BTP RSB 5-Guth, Mitch Noble. Rick Revising Sechon 5 4 7.4 to incorporate the Update tf.e response to BT pSB 5-1 states that dw minimum amount of current boration and inventory rnakeup 1 to reflect the curreit boration stored boric acid in either BAM tank is scheme for RCS cooldowns upde es scheme for cooldown to cold s sufficient to bring the RCS to the cold Chapter 5 of the FSAR so that R agrees wth shutdown conditons The reysired shuldown boron concentratiori changes made to Chapter 9 back in 1990. 10 CFR 50 59 evaluation is However, due to the boric acid The requred text change is besad on a contamed in PC/M 176-290 concertration reduction effort, Jw previously approved PC/M and dues not required volume of boric acid needed for affect the operabdity of any structure boration and inventory makeup is stored system, or -, p 4,-i in both the BAM tanks and the RWT. The response also states that one charging pump is capable of borating the RCS to cold shutdown conditions during the period that the plant is held at het stanby. The response also contains a misspeRed word. the word " tanking" should be *taldng". 2 5 4-281 The response to porn C of BTP RSB 5-1 Guth. Mitch Noble. Rick Revising Section 5 4 7.4 of the FSAR to Revise the response to BTP RSB 5-steles that the LPSI pump d6scharge include a correct desenption of the LPSI 1 to show the proper relief vane thermal redet vatve has a setpoint of 500 pump descharge thermal relief vaive improves capac#y peig and a capacity of 180 gpm. the accuracy of the document The requwed Accordkig to Sec*6an 6 3 2.2.6.1.c. the text changes are editorialin nature and do rapwayle 5 gpm. The 180 gpm thermal nct affect the operabMy of any structure retof volves are located in the SDC system, or wcp m,L sudion piping.

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Una Page Description of Fhding Originator Supr. Review OperabMy Assessment CorredMr Acton 2 5 4-28n The response to item E of BTP RSB 5-1 Guth, MRch Buehrig, Ctris Revising Secten 5 4.7.4 of the FSAR k label Revloe the response to tem E oo doectbes the preoperational and startup informaton pertaevng to pionned that R states that the planned tests test programs that were conducted, or preopershonal tests and e@,a. as and expenments for natural planned to be conducted, for St. ' ucht "historicar enhances the overal utility of the crculsbon cooldown are"hrstoncar Una 2 to demonstrate naturni chw document The addRionalinformahon is Post-OL tests and expenments are coonng ref=htty. The response eddorial in nature and does not affect the conducted under the purwew of to containe references to Chapter 14 which operabMy of any structure, system, or CFR 50 59 no longer estats. The response should - -@ wa. be rewteed to state that R is *Hrotoricar and that procedures,leets, and e'9ertmorte conducted after ksuance of the operating teense are under the purview of 10 CFR 50 59 2 5 4-28p The roeponse to Rom G of BTP RSB 5-1 Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Typograpnical errors do not affect the Correct the t%4 a eners. contains two typographical errors. They operabilty of any system, structure, or are identified in the FSAR mark 49 m, g wa. l l

St Lucie FSAR Review Findings Uri Page C- ; f, of Fheng Originator Supr. Revieur Operstmy Asseeemert Correcthe Adion 2 9%363,9.5A-Fire endinguisher Irdermetion h the Wask, Chris Winnerd, Bob There is no operatMy concent The fire Field restored k match FSAR wf 364,9 5A-306 FSAR should be vowined to reflect the exbngumhers were weihed down and worthed emcephonof 20hCO2enhngusher proper floki _^.-..;~... The 2nd to be in complienu with the FSAR in the 2A DG bidg. No FSAR location Isling 9 4100V SWGR 2A2 descriphon with the excephon of the 20 b changes have been hibsted. Need should be changed to 2B2 (editorial) CO2 eWhngusher in the 2A DG bidg (South 50.59 ovaluehon to revise FSAR and The fire enskiguleher type should be WaE). This is a redundert euhn0uisher to anow atzwe changes. CR 964748 changed from dry themical to CO2 for the 15 h CO2 suhnguisher instated h the documents subpct (does not track re d and listed in the FSAR for that some FSAR changes). the entinguleher g 4160V SWGR 2B2. a The fire onlinguisher type should be locatuut 1S b CO2 ewhnguishers are used changed from dry chemicalto CO2 for throughout the DG buildeige Use of dry entinguleher G Esot End of SWGR chemcal or CO2 fire extinguishers are Roome et Col B-33. The CO2 20 b acceptable in the SWGR room (Cinee B & C l entinguleher Reled 9 South Wet of Bldg fire horard), although CO2 is preforTod 2A should be deleted Change "U L l Reling* to Minimum U.L Rehng"in Table 9 5A-8A, B, C, D & E (editorial) 2 9 5A-384 Fire extinguisher informehon in FSAR Wash, Chris Winnard, Bob There is no operability concem. The fire Field restored to match FSAR. No should be revloed to reflect the proper exteigurshers were wethed down and venfied FSAR changes have been iniheted fledd configurehen.. Change awhngursher to be in comphence with the FSAR Need 50.59 evolusten to revise type from dry chemicalto CO2 for descrgten. Use of dry chancal or CO2 fue FSAR and snow above changes extinguleher g A4ecert to Stehon exhngurthers are acceptable in the CR 964749 documents subpct Bettery 1C. Change entinguisher type switchgear room (Class B & C fire horard), (does not track FSAR changes). frem dry chemical to CO2 for athough CO2 is preferred extinguisher e West Door Near 4160V Swachgear 1 A2. i t

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Desertpean of Fhabg Ongmator Supr. Review Opersbety Ameseemert Corrective Action i 1 15.2.1-4,72-11 FinAng era==mario me origin of the high Wasik, Chris Noble, Rick Not required per ENG416 7. FSAR None required rete of change of power trip value (2 6. Reviews. DPM). This trip is e norw:redeed trip funceort Ev=h=n=n JPN-PSL-SENS-91 020. Rev.1 was e PLA vehich was never sort to the NRC; however, R provides a desertpuan of the Irty. Actualtrip value is inee men or equelto 2.49 DPM per Tech Spec.,Orish of estoint is not dos a d h me FSAR and is ngLclear. ,M:r pe reeserching Wie referenced C ev=hamari, CE wee contacted with no deAnitive snower. The boet anyone cet&l determirm was the value was an !i engheering judgement The value es stated h the FSAR la P Actumi setpoint can luo set lower than [ FSAR value to provide conservehem No changes are required to the FSAR or other documents 1 15.2.11-2, FSAR impass at 4 RCPs are manueny Wasik, Chris Winnerd, Bob There is no operabiNty concem. The general Nuclear Fuels should review the 15 2.11-20e1 tripped on SIAS due to low prosaurtrer recovery strategy in CEN-152 (C-E EOP FSAR % and add addeonel j pressure The EOPo esaw operation of Guidelines) for nosulepresourtretion events information regardeng the basis for t 1RCP W preneurehW is to trip two pumps and leave two operating the manuel RCP trip. ops,the ordy Sme 4 RCPs are in appa=4e loops. The piert safety analysis tripped is if =% < 20F. The assumes as 4 RCPs are tripped during the FSAR etatemertt deals with the leeue of excess toed evert because E meleos the post 4eoctor trip crtuceNiy during excess event worse. Section 15.0 4.3.A of the Unt load events. 2 FSAR explains that for a senem Ene break I (another ear=== load event) RCP trip I foRowing SIAS causes an incremos in poet-reactor trip reactMiy and a decrosse in post-i reactor tnp DNBR. l i t p S S

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urd Page Deecriphon of Finding Onginator Supr. Review Operatility Assessmert Correc2!ve Action 1 1524-3 FSAR d6scussion en baron Wasik. Chris Wannard. Bob Not required per ENG-Of 6 7. FSAR Revise FSAR to note 3000 gpm concentnution uniformity during a dMien Revwws. ensteed of 4050 gpm OR delete event notes a minimum shutdown specific flow value and state

• flow e, T-,

^4099gpnf Actual of one now pressure safetyinfection - -minknum fkiv per Tech Specs is 3000 pump __" Wm FSAR Table 9.3-27 lists nominal total SDC flow of 6000 gpm which would be consistart vr% the Tech Spec value ' of 3000 gpm/ pump FSAR discussion on baron mhdng is ste valid with 3000 gpm since 132 ypm max. dduhori rate is still << 3000 gpm. 1 1524-3 FSAR wording notes a merwmum of 2 Wasik. Chns Winnard, Bob Not required because status ts " Complete". Consider clanfication of FSAR RCPs rnust be operating before won $ng achieving criticality. Reviewer notes Tech Spec requires 4 RCPs. Tech Spec 3.4.1.1 requirse 4 RCPs for rnodes 1 & 2; Tech Spec 3.4.1.2 tequires 2 RCPs (1 Aoop) for made 3 Since the FSAR wording says"before acheving criticantf technically the plant is in mode 2 or 3 and the requirement of 2 RCPs as stated in the FSAR is not necessanty incorrect. FSAR vsarengsmuldbe_ -y ciertned._

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings cy$ 4._ ./ Unt Page Desertpean of Finding Origmator Supr. Review Operstmy Asseoement CorrecDve Action i 1 - 15.4.1-25 Does values en page 15 4 4-4e for dose Wesk Chris Wmnerd. Bob Not required per ENG-Ol 6.7, FSAR Requires further review. Liktdy need 15 4.4-3, O SRe Boundary de na match vesues of Reviews. to rewtee FSAR based on latest l 15 4.4.4e Tobis 15 4.1-5 for done @ 5100 ft. onelysis e Table 15 4.1-5 values are a values on pogos 15.4.4-3 and 15.4 44a. Note: She Boundary = Fur 6* Zone = 5100 ft. (therefore the dose values should be the sarne). 1 52-2 FSAR eletes 500 healup and cooldown Wes%, Chris Winnerd Bob Not required per ENG-QI 6.7, FSAR Requires further review -locate CE cycles during design afe of plant. Reviews. onelyses Reviewer betoves a more recent CE l analyste changed this voeue. L 1 6.2-55 FSAR etotes containment fan cooler Wesk Chris Winnerd. Bob No operatey concem exists. Tech Spec Further review required to determine bearings are lutwicolod every 6 motets suncedience 4 6.2.1.1 requires each fan unit if FSAR change is necessary. Reviewer questionedif this wes done to be started and operated for et least 15 } rrunutes every 31 days. TNs surveiRonce ensures fan rnators are operating propeviy 1 6.2-55 FSAR etetement notes that fan coolers Wed. Chris Wnnard, Bob Not required because status is " Complete

• None required. FSAR is stating are designed to operate in the post-design informehon and not currerd LOCA environmort for et least one year.

less restrictive W creeria. Reviewer commented that EQ post-LOCA period la now 6 months t

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings 3), x i / UnR Page Deecription of Finding Originator Supt. Review Opeg Assessmert Carrodsve' Action 1 6268 FSAR notes modifications to SBVS to Wesk, Chris Wrmord, Bob No operabety concem exists. The propeed FSAR change required to ether add humkRty cardrol of coonng air backft addihon of hesters for humidRy delete beckft requirement or to add through inoperative flher bank wig be controlis drowssed in FSAR Appenda 6B. bnet descussaan (if implemerged) done prtw to the first refueling outage. The NRC cleerty anowed peert opershon Requres further review to determine Revwwer questione if this was done and vnthat.d thes backfit. The Appendm notes the if back11t was performed if so, t should be deocnbed in FSAR. LOCA dose is the same with or w!thout the heaters. Note: the FSAR states the humdify controlis for air flow through an inoperstrve filter bank. 2 15 2-39 Table 15.2.1.24 contains inRiel Noble, Rick Winnard. Bob Table 15 2.1.24 contams poser level values This table should be identifed as conditte'~. for en analyzed event assotiated with Cycle 1 that are no longer hestoneal or updated to current (looistion of turbine at 102% power). vahd The cycle spectre reioed evolumhons vokses. The values listed are based on Cycle 1 have addressed tf e impact of the increase in %. e g, the value for 102% of licensed powe levet from 2560 MWt to v *ar is given es 2630 MWt, which is 2700MWt, therefore, this does not represent oseed on the Cycle 1 licensed power of a potential operabehty concern.. 2560 MWL Cycle 2 and subsequent cycles had a Rcensed power levet of 2700 MWL m-m

St Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urd Page Descrtpean of Fheng Originator Supr. Review Operability Assessmert Corrective Action 2 15 2-Se Fineng is e spW es to whether the Noble Rick Winnerd Bob Section 15 2.2.1 descrees a amming eesite None requeed analysis af me overd descrbed on page dose event (infrequent catagory) that hvolves 15.2-99 aneidered releases from the a reisese of steem through the MSSVs and ham electors. Page 15.2-60 states ADVs as a resut of a turbine isoinhan et that Wie steem dumped to the condeneer 20% power concurrent wth a atuck open cortrbutes to the see boundary dose via MSSV. The contnbuting sources of the air ejectors, but does not menhan the ra60ectMty to the sRe boundary does for thrs hogging spectors event are the normal (TS limit) adtvey in the S/Gs and the nommel primary to somndary leakage. The reeson that this event reouts in a higher dose then from a normal shutdown is that large volumes of steem are released droctly to the atmosphere vte the MSSVs and ADVs. Descheryng sleem wie the MSSVs resuRs in 10 times the reissee of redoectMty than does drscharge of steem through the condenser, due to a ten focid 6fference h decontamination factor (DF). The hogging ejectors would have e simmer DF to the MSSVs and ADVs since they are essmenba#y a once through system However, use of the hoggmg ejectors to establish a vacuum h the condenser is of short duration and there is no r=reamen fy v source to the condenser while thew are h use. Note that once a vacuum is e=8=6e=hed and steem con be bypassed to the condenser, the release will decreses by a factor of ten. Use of the hogging e$ectors h this event is ree#y no efferert from and does not result h any increened reisesed men for a normal plert startup. This is why Wie hogging erectors are not descrbed en a source of redlooctivey release for this event. Therefore, there is no operabilty concem associated with this finding m

I St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Doncription of Fhding Ortginator Supr. Revtew Opersbety Assessmert Corrective Acten 2 6 2-33 Finding etslos that the high-high Noble, Rick Wrnard, Bob The value of 5 4 psig cited on page 6 2-33 is None required containmort pressure signalis 5 4. The the system design number, which Technical Specmeathm value is 5 5. corresponds to the nommet set value. The The finding queettone why the FSAR Technicat Specmcation value 6s 5.5 peig anaSysis wee not done at the begher value. The difference between the values represents margin between the design vokse and technican specircation requrement. 5 4 psig is a design wwue not the analysed value as stated h the finding descriphon. Therefore the FSAR design value and Techncal Specifestion requirements are h agreement and no FSAR change is required nor is there art operability concern 2 82-5 Findtrig is a request to verify the wind Noble, Rick Winnard Bob The finding is a request to veRWe None loading design of the 240 kVlines informahon h the FSAR wkh no stated basis crossing the Indien River. There see no for questioning its veracity. No operatsty FSAR errors Ider# led concem exists, no FSAR change is required 2 83-1 The Unt 2 transformer ratings sta'ed on Noble, Rok Winnard, Bob The finding states that the Unit 2 stadihary None requred page 8.31 are different than the ratings transformer ratings ddfer from those on Unit spoemed for Unit 1.

1. This is a fact and does not not represent a concem with documentation or the equipment Accordingy, no operutsty concern ensts.

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Description of Finding Originator Supr. Review Operubety Assessment Corrective Actiori 2 8 3-21e The FSAR states that the sad densRy Noble, Rick Winnerd. Bob This is a records retenhon issue only and Ch4 to determine documentation tests for backfulng unencased ducts are does not represent en operablety canoem. requirementsof thesetests. FSAR documented and retrievable should be updated to reflect actual requirements. This finding queshons whether the teshng reports for beckfilhng unencased ducts are in fact documented and retrievable. 2 8 3-23 Page 8.3-23 stslos the medmum Noth, Rick Winnard, Bob The S/G transport weigN loedings described None required expeded landings on buried PVC in the FSAR are idenhfed as the bounding schedule 40 duct banks. The FSAR loads on the subject duct banks. The states that the medmum loading occures identifed finding asked that the the hoevy during roodney trenoportation of a S/G. loads procedure for electrical components be it corwh that the ducts can venfed against these FSAR " requirements" accomodste this loading. The finding Since the S/G foods bound any loads l questions ll the heavy load procedure for imposed by electrical w.y iJA and since electrical equipment meets these the ducts are evaluated as able to hende requirwnents these higher toeds, no operatAty concem essts relative to procedures that govem the mosement of electncal m,w e.ae over these duct banks. 2 8.3-24/ The FSAR states that the diesel Noble, Rick Winnerd. Bob There is no reason to believe or require that None. '/ generators are subject to a 100 start test the same rus%er of EDG start tests were by the manufacturer. Unit t states that a done for both Units by the rnanufmeturer 300 start test is done. The Unit 2 FSAR states that 100 start tests t were done. There is no basis to sy==Nm the s wracRy of this statement No FSAR change is required and no operatery issue edets

• l' relative to this Rem.

\\ h 4 e u

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Uri Page Dese 1ption of Findmg Originator Supr. Review Operatsty Assessment Corredive Action / 2 8 3-25 TNo fhding to a rupest for an enhanced Notde, Rick Winnard, Bob TNs Indng is essentia#y a request for en Provide enhanced desenptio'n of RG description of the RG 19 requirements enhanced desenption of RG 1.9 1.9 requirements lleled on page 8 3-25 of the FSAR. requirements Accordmgly there is no operabdity concem assocated with tNs radng. 1 2 94-4 in the centout of control room hetxtatxhty, Noble, Rick Wnnerd Bob The FSAR states that the evaluated effectrue [M an 8 hour T the FSAR states that the normal control temperature (ET) of 82 degrees F is less stuft on the effectne temperature room sNft is 4 hours. The finding states than the upper limit ET of 85 F for (ET) discussion on page 9 4-4 of the that a normel sNft is actuatty 8 hours moderately hard work actMties de9ned h the FSAR. Correct the FSAR to show ASHRAE Handboolof Fundamentais the correct normel sNft duration. (1972). Athough the FSAR states that the ET of 82 F is wet tolerated during the "ususal 4 hour sNft*, there is no correspondog time limit basis in the ASHREA Handbook of Fundamentats (1972). Therefore, this statement is valid regardlessof sNftduration. Consequentty tNs ;i-inisi does not represent an operabihty concem

St Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Descr1pelon of Fhdhg Originator Supr. Review Operaldity Assessment Corrective Action 2 g.44 The FSAR steles fut during normal Noble, Rick W1nnerd. Bob 104 degrees F corresponds to 40 degrees C None required operstlen the FHB lo hept below 104 F. uNeh is a common conhnuous temperature No operating prnrerhees were Imown by specificahon requirement for electrical the fIntAng originator to require that the equipment quebfication. This la genersey temperature be maintained at this level. renected in the design basis of air Also the temperature eierm setpoint is condehoning and wihilation equipment as defhed Iri Off Normal 2-0030131 as 110 explasned in the Design Basis Document degrees F. (DBD). The source of the statemenit is IEEE 97-1969, IEEE Recommended Practice for Specifying Service Condibons in Electrical Standards. The alarm setporit of 110 F is based on the 104 F design basis and is contained in several FPL calculebons referenced in the DBD. This statement does not represent an opernbMity concem, nor is R an equiptwit quehrication concent i L 1 7.2-12 FSAR descrees MSIS as actusHng from Winnard, Bob Noble, Rick The design of the MSNs closing on MSIS is Correct FSAR wth SE and FSAR 2/4 low preeeure on ofrected generator conservative compared to description h change packags ruousing h MSN closure on effected FSAR of MStS from affected generseer generator. Actual design is 2/4 pressure closing och MSIV on affected generator from other generator wit actuate MSIS The design is consedered conservative since, and MSN closure on both generators. with rnare pressure sensors feeding the same actuation circuit, there is better assurance of MSN closure, and main storm isolation wit occur at an earlier time in the event of a steem line break down stream of the MSNs. Therefore, no operablAty concem exists with this condition

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings e UnR Page Descrtpean of Finding Originator Supr. Revtsw Operabdity Assessmert Cctracthe Action 1 7.2 14 FSAR docusses the design of the Wrmard, Bob Week, Ctwis The pient practice of opershon with 4 pumps Corred FSAR with SE and FSAR I TWLP trip and the equatment of thermal is more conservatrve than opershon with less change package power with less then 4 pump operation-than 4 pumps. This requiremert is The operation of Unit 1, when the TM/LP conserysthe, for the same power level, since trip is required to be operable, requires with more pumps running there is better 4 pumps to be running assurance of flow and better flow symmetry Therefore, ro operabety concem exists with this condition. 1 7.2-33 FSAR docusses part4ength CEAs Winnard, Bob Wesik, Chris Removal of PLCEAs from the plant scenseng Correct FSAR with user commert i (PLCEAs). PLCEAs were removed from basis was reviewed and approved by NRC. that references PLA. the piort design,toch specs and Therefore, no operabihty concem ex6sts with con 9gurertion via a PLA. this condition. 1 7.2-14 FSAR describes the annulus high and Winnard, Bob Wasik, Chris Configuration is conservative with respect to Change FSAR with user commert to low pressure annunciation in the control the design. The configuration is conservatrve indicate that the mesomum design room as +5

• wg and -4* wg.

since the annunciation wie occur prior to the annulus high and low pressure respectively. The plert configuration is d(sign mrnrnum. Therefore, no operabdity annunciat6on in the centrol room is / +3" and -1*, +1-d,. concem exists with this condition. +5

• wg and -4 wg. respectively 1,

7.3-15 Verify that the high radiation setpoint for Winnard, Bob Guth, MRch The finding is a request to validate / CCW surge tank lootation is 4E-4 Cirec. information in the FSAR without a vehd basis for questioning its veracRy No operablNty concem exists, no FSAR change is required r

l St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Deecripean of Finding Originator Supr. Revtew Operatsty Assessment Correctrve Action

a..-

1 7.3-18 FSAR descrees the auto-start of EDGs Wnnard, Bob Wasik, Chrte PCM evaluated design as - User czmment which references on SIAS, CSAS, or CIS. PCM inaued Therefore, no operat2ty concem exists with PCM to correct FSAR. which eliminates signal to auto-etert this condition. l EDG on CIS. Funceonis redunderd to SIAS wnich actuales CIS and EDG auto-start. i 1 1 8 2-61 SBVS fan dampers are norme#y throttled Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick There is no operatAty concem, this is en Revloe FSAR to etarrify wordmg and (to - 70 degrees when 90 la fuH closed, administrative clartification. provide additional descriphon of 0 is open), open on start, tnen retum to damper operation throttled poellion - they can1 close fully. 1 6.3-2A FSAR Figtre 6.3-2A shows the low, low Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Not required because status is " Complete' None-A low pressurizer pressure pressurtzer setpoint as 1578 psia. The no FSAR error actualty existed. setpoint of 1578 psiis used SIAS netpoird in pia,t technical throughout Chap.15 (except specifications is 1600 psia or greater. SBLOCA which uses 1534 psi). The technical specification value of 1600 poi accounts for the analytical value plus channel uncertainty (see ESFAS DBD). l l 1 68-7 Appendtu 6B of the FSAR discusses Guth, Mitch Noble Rick Not required per ENG-Ot 6.7, FSAR Electic heaters for humiddy control humidity cxwWrol for an inoperative (or Reviews. were insteRed by PCM 270-177. S/D) futer trotn. There is no descriphon Thus, appropriate informahan can be of this equipmert in the SBVS section added to the FSAR bened on this (6.2.3). The equipment was insteRed PCM. Editorialchangesto circa 1977. 6.2.3.3.1,2, and 3, and Appendht 6B would alieviste a lot of confusion.

UnR Page Desaiptkm of Finding Originator Supr. Revtew Operability Assosement Corvective Action 1 7.1 -3 Ensure Chapter 7 cetde tray fill Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Not required because status is " Complete". None - the Chapter 7 cable fli statements agree with those in Section statements agree with those in 8.3.1.2.3 Chapter 8, Sedian 8.3.1.2.3. The cable filllimda are maintamed by drawing No. 8770-B-328,' Cable and Condun hst trtstar2stion Notes", Sheet 5 1 7.2-12 Section 7.2.1.2 c of the FSAR incorrectly Guth, MRch Noble, Rick Not required per ENG-Cl 17, FSAR Revise the FSAR to say a pretrip reintes low flow Rm trip to RCP Reviews. alarm is inRiated if the coolant flow combination. Plant designed for part approaches the minsmum required loop operation but never licensed for reactor operation (delete the (equipment still hotelled) - T.S. 3/4 4.1.1 quahfher *., at the correspondmg does not allow pwr operation wRh < 4 power level") RCPs. 2 4248 The CEA number in FSAR Table 4 2-10 Guth, MRch Noble. Rick Not required per ENG-Of 6.7, FSAR Revtse the FSAR table to show the should be 91 (not 83). Reviews. correct number of CEAs. (CEA number corrected on Table 4 2-10 as part of Ammendment No. 9, 10/94) i l l

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Description of FhsAng Originator Supr. Review Operebety Assosoment Conective Action 2 6.2-88 The test sentence of nom 6.2.5.3.2.b Guth, Mitch Notde Rick The finding is a request to m>W Determho the basis for the FSAR gives the amount af airceioy in the active information in the FSAR with now beeis value. Nodocumentationcouldbe core se 48,019 Run. This parameter for questioning te veracity. No operablery found h D6RS. A preeminary hand shoidd be nW as part of the reloed concem exists, rio FSAR change is required calcid=81an Indicates that R is e snelysis. A reviour should be performed bounding value R ewceeds the to see R is updeled or found to be weight of zircorwum claddmg h the bounded, etc. active core reg 60n for as fusi and poison rods. 2 6.2-226 Tetde 6.2-$6 gives tio H2 omount based Guth. Mitch Noble Rick Not required because status is " Complete". None - RCS H2 concentrahon is on the H2 concentreuen h the RCS and occurate per Chemistry Procedure the Zircolay weight (some info es stated C-SS. Preliminary hand casculation 3 in tout on pages 6.2-67 and 6.248), indscotes that the weight of vertry that the informoson is een zirconium is boundeg { 2 6.314,6.317 I beeswa the statement about current Guth, Mitch Noble Rick Not requ! red per ENG-Ol 6.7, FSAR Moke en edRorialchange to the occiderd condRions appNos to ALL OF Reviews. second sentence in Sechon 6.3.3.1 6.3.3, thru 6.3.3.4.4. IF NOT, page 6.3-stating that "The snelysis presented [ 17, as of 6.3.3.2.3 on S/G tube pluggmg in Subsectlans 6.3.3.2 throagh i noods revlolon. 6.3.3.4.4 were developed to support

• i i

2 6 3-26 FSAR Totdo 6.3 2 asys leur flow eierms Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Not required per ENG-Of 6.7, FSAR None-FSAR Amendment 10(7,96) for HPSI & LPSI piegs"we be Reviews. deleted reference to low How eierms Irwand the M.e.D. celumn takes cree for the Rou, pomalan to detect purg fesures. Theleur flow eierms were deleted by PCM 104-294. I

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings f I l Unit Page Description of Fhdho Originator Supr. Review Operabilty Assessment Correctrve Action 2 7.2-24 Verify that the color coding described h Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick The finding was e request to venfy that the None - Cedar coding maintained by [ FSAR Section 7.2.2.32 (tem 4.22, color ident ficebon fat cobies and RPS 2996 B-297,"St Lucie Plant - Unit 2

• ldentification")is used on cables and cabinets are used. No FSAR change is Electrical GeneralInstellehon RPS cabinets required since this requirement is maintained Notes", Sheet 7-1, Rev. 3 in current plant procedures. Accordingly this is not en operabilWy concem 2

7.3-22,7.3-25 Section 7.3.2.1.2.c states that the color Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick No FSAR change is required since this None-Color coding is maintoned by coding descreed in Section 6.3.1.3 is requirement is maintmaned in current plant 2996-B-297,"St Lucie Plant - Unit 2 used to identify redundant wiring and procedures. Accordmgly this is not en Electrical GeneralInstallebon circuitry for ESFAS instrumentation and operability concem Notes", Sheet 7-1, Rev. 3 controls. Verify that the color coding is implemented h the fleid. 2 7.4-6 Section 7.4.12.c of the FSAR should Guth, MRch Noble, Rick This change is eddonalin nature and The FSAR write-up should be stole that the BAMPs or the gravity feed therefore en operabihty evoluebon is not revised to state that "Either of these Anos can be used to transfer boric acid required per ENG-Ol 6.7, FSAR Reviews. methods can be used to transfer from each BAMT to the suction of the concentrated baric acid from each of charging purge (not the VCT). This the boric acid makeup tanks to the ammgemoed is descreed in detailin suction of the charging pumps." Sections 9.3 4.2.2.f. g, and k. 2 7.4-11, 7.4-13 Sedian 7.4.2.2 of the FSAR states that Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick No FSAR change is required, since this None-Color coding is maintained by color coeng is used to identify requirement is maintained in cummt plant 2996-B-297,"St Lucie Plant - Unit 2 Instrumentellan and control equipment procedures. Accordmgly this is not en Electrical GeneralInstallation and electric

• mmmehe d with operatulity concem Notes", Sheet 7-1, Rev. 3 e

redunderd systems required for este shuidown. verifyihet color coeng is maintelnad in the lleid.

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Una Page Descripean of Fhang Originator Supr. Revlow OperabMy Assessmerd Corrective Action 2 7.2-2 Figure 7.2-2 references an EMORAC Guth. Mitch Noble, Rick No FSAR change was required and no None - EMDRAC drawings are drawing rather than an FPL drawing operabMy concern exists for this issue. vendor drawings and are controlled Are these being updeled? and updated. Amendment 10 of the FSAR (7/96) deletes tNs figure and referenois the EMDRAC drawbg 2 7.2-8 Figure 7.24 references an EMDRAC Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick No FSAR change was required and no None - EMMAC drawings are drau4ng rather then en FPL drawing operabMy concern exists for this issue. vendor drawings and are contro#ed Are those being Lyduted? and updated Amendment 10 of the FSAR (7/96) deletes this figure and references the EMORAC drawing 2 7.2-15m, 7.2-Figures 7.2-1Se, b reference an Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick No FSAR change was required and no None - EMDRAC dravnngs are 15b EMDRAC drawin0 rather than an FPL operabilPy concern exists for this issue. wndor drawings and are controlled drawing. Are these being updated? and updated. Amendment 10 of the FSAR (7/96) deletes these figures and references the EMDRAC drawings 2 7.2-18 Figure 7.2-18 references an EMDRAC Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick No FSAR change was required and no None - EMDRAC drawings are drawing rather then en FPL drawing operabety concern exists for this issue. vendor drawings and are controlled Are these behg updated? and updated Amendment 10 of the FSAR (7/96) deletes this figure and references the EMDRAC drawing

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings i Unt Page Descrtpuun of Findhg Originator Supr. Review OperabERy Assessment Ccaedhe Action 2 7.2-19m 7.2-Figurse 7.2-19s, b reference en Guth, MRch Noble, Rick No FSAR change was required and no None - EMORAC drawings are 19b EMORAC % rather then an FPL. opersbety concem exrsts for this leeue. vendor drawings and are amtrosed l drawing. Are these being updated? and nW Amendment 10of the FSAR (7,96) deletes these figures and references the EMORAC p drawings 2 7.2 20 Figure 72-20 references an EMORAC Guth, MRch Noble Rick NNo FSAR change was required and no None - EMDRAC drawings are drowing rather then an FPL drawing opersbety concern exists for this leeue. vendor drawings and are contro8ed Are these being updated? and updated Amendment 10 of the FSAR (7/96) deletes this figure and references the EMORAC drawing 2 7 2-21 Figure 7.2-21 references an EMDRAC Guth, MRch Noble Rick No FSAR change was required and no None - EMORAC drawings are drawing rather then an FPL drawing operability concem exists for this issue. vendor drawings and are controNed i Are these being updeled? and updated Amendment 10 of the FSAR (7/96) deletes this figure and references the EMORAC drawing i l 2 8.1-1 Update T & D maps (Figures 8.1-1.2) Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick These figures are provided for informaman Either update Figures 8.1-1,2 or I or%. therefore this does not represort an delete them. operab5Ny concem 4

9 St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Desertplien of Findng Originator Supr. Rev6ew Operstmy Assessmerd Correceve Action 2 82-1 e-hi 8.2.1.1 of me FSAR eteles that Guth, Mitch Notme, Rick This is not en operstwhty leeue and on Determine the proper rating and theseentronomiestencircut-as eseesamert is not required per ENG-OI 6.7, revloe the effected FSAR me St. Lude 1^., -; with the Midway FSAR Reviews. Sa% is rated as 952 MVA. The Unt 1 FSAR states that the circut is rated at 1000 MVA. l 2 82-2 U1 emergency raths is 632 MVA. The Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick The finding points oli e minor dfrerence Verify correct ensin transformer U2 raths is stated as 635 MVA. between the U1 and U2 rnein transformer .a ~cgency rating and revise the ratings. The reviewer is requeehng that the appropriate Unit's FSAR. dfferenu be hvestigated. No operetsty concern exists, re FSAR change is required 2 8.2-3 The ut secondary winding is 2404.9-Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick This is on admrdstratrve change to the The mein orm drawings for Units 4.16 kV, and U21s 230 kV. FSAR based on approved engeneering 1 and 2 (2998-G-272 and 877M3-drawings, therefore, there is no operabMty 272) confirm that the etertup evolustion. transformers on both units are rated at 2304.9-4.16 kV. As a result, Sechon 82.1.3. of the Unit 1 FSAR needs to be revised to show the correct rating. 2 8.3-13 Vertry tut "mefety related [eeectrical] Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick The finding requests that safety related None-Color m9ng is maintained by eqidpment toiderelled by means of electrical equipment be property idersfied 2998-8-297.*St. Lucie Plant - Unt 2 re and celer coded tape, poirt Current plant procedures provide this Eisetrical GeneralInstallebon or tage h accordance with its respective function, therefore there is no operabMty Notes". Sheet 7-1, Rev. 3 safety nJeted system or channet

• concern

l St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings i i i Unt Page Descripean of Findng Originator Supr. Rev6ew Operab8Ry Assessment Corredive Action 2 8 3-41 VerWy procedure for merking cables Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick There is no operabilty concem. The color None coding is maintained by 2998-B-271,'St. Lucie Plant-Unt 2 Eledrical General Instanation Notes", Sheet 7-1, Rev. 3 2 8 3-48 VerWy ccear codin0 of safety groups Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick There is no operabilty concem The color None coding is maintemed by 2996-8-271,"St. Lucie Plant - Unt 2 Electrical General Installation Notes', Sheet 7-1, Rev. 3 2 8.3-48e/49 Verify switchyard DC system. Guth, Mitch Noble Rick There is no operabehty concem. The None switchyard de system does edst. PCM 046-186 removed the equipment from St. Lucie permanert plant drawmgs. The de equprnent is shown on Power Denvery Departmert drawings 2 91-1,2 New fuel storage radis designed to Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Thereisnooperetnutyconcem. The None. The FCP sttached te. PN-cortmin fuel up to 3.7 w% enrichment. analysis submitted for the SFP rereck effort PSL-SENS-9M121 should revloe Technkal SpecNksman 5.6.1b shows (T. S. Am. #7) justifies fuel storage with the FSAR es part of Amm. 810. enrichments up to 4 5 weigte percent enrichments up to 4.5 we. The analysis is documented in FPL to NRC letter L-84-219. The FCP sttached to JPN-PSL-SENS-95 021 should revise the FSAR as part of Am.

1. 10.

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Description of Findlng Originator Supr. Review Operabitty Assessment Correctwe Action 2 9.3-3.10 Revleudupdele Section 9 3.2 sempting Guth, Mitch Not required per ENG-Of 6.7, FSAR Review FSAR wreeap and identify system. Rev6ews. appropriatecomments Currert writNJp does not desenbe local sample posits and sinks (e g, BAM pumps; SFP purtt. pump; Equip., i Chem., laundry, and hoidup tank drain pumpe). Sample systemis non-safety related. 2 9 5-1,3d ReviewNpdate SecMon 9.5.1 to Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick There is no operabMy concem The FSAR None. The FSAR should be incorporate new communicahons change package is a" ached to PCM 81-993. updated as part of A,. e-4,e,t systems on site

1. 10(1996) 2 15 1-2,3 Charging not aligned to BAM tarAs to Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick The required changes are based on Revise to refied new reach shutdown margir., for cooldown previously approved cootdown procedures, cooldown/bornhon strategy. CEN Baron may be added to RCS via therefore, no operability concem exists.

365(L) states Chap 15 results not charging pump sudion using normal affected by new cooldown method makeup FSAR description only used because credt is not taken for RCS for SIAS. (Note: Tout referred as Normal barabon from BAMTs for reactrvity cocidown) control (T. S. say > *%pm,1720 ppm). Revise Table 15.1.2.1-1 2 15.2-2.33.87 Operator can use manuel or borate Guth, Mitch Not required per ENG-O! 6.7. FSAR Revise to reflect bornhon is mode for adding baron to RCS vis Reviews. concurrert w3 cooldown JPN-charging pump suction PSL-SENP-9tM03 m

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings una Page Descripuon of Fhding Originator Supr. Review Operability Assessmert Correceve Achon 1 3.7-45 Vertry that plant operators are provided Guth, MRch Noble, Rick The finding is a request to verify that None -Procedure EIP 3100024E with procedures and criteria to review guidance is prowided to acess sieerrde provides the required guidance any solemic accelerations recorded at accelerations at the plant. This guidance is the piert one, and that sumcient contained in current paart procedures, guldence le provided to estabhsh therefore, no FSAR change is required and P levels for continued plant there is no operabHty concern. operation 1 7.2-23 Vertfy occuracy of pressure a electronic Guth. MRch Not required because status is " Complete'. None - see PSL common ISC standards used to ceNbrate RPS procedure 1400067A. eenoors 1 7.2-23 Vertry standards are perioscally retumed Guth, MRch Not requwed because status is " Complete *. None - see PSL common t&C to calibretton facilities for recertirication procedure 1400067A. 1 8 2-4 Verify procedure to remotely trip Guth, MRch Not required because status is " Complete'. None - The breaker protection generator using remaining switchyard or scheme wig open remoirung E -W remoto Rne terminal breakers. switchyard breakers automahea#y (see PC/M 182-185; Dwgs. E-117188 and E-117192 per Mike Smith). 1 8.3-1 Verify EDG Imit2 on SBO tie Guth, Mitch Not required because status is

• Complete" None - see EOP-10 (Step 9e); EOP-99 (App V and Tbl11)

k St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings una Page Descripuen of Fhding Origir JMt Supr. Review Operabihty Assessmerd Corrective / ction i 1 83-1 Pnadure for connoceng (1 A2. 2A2).( Guth Ofch Not required because status hs " Complete

• None - see EOP-10 (Step 9b); EOP-2A4,284),(1B2,292)7 99 (App F).

1 8 M,4

• AB buses wiu be connected to either A Guth, MRch Buehrig, Chris Safety evaluation JPN-PSL-SENS-95437 None - safety evaluation JPN-PSL, buses or B buses
• True for fue power, demonstrates that operating the A and 8 SENS-95437 allows cross-what abod outages?

trains of the safety related 480 V electrical w.49480 V load centers system cross connected with one of the dunng Modes 5 and 6 safety 4.16 kV busees (2A3 or 2B3) outef-service for required maintenance whRe in Modes 5 or 6 neither involves an unreviewed safety quescon nor requires e change to plant Technical Spectications 7 I I 1 9.1 -3 FSAR discusees precedural condmons Guth, Mitch Not required because status is " Complete

• None - the administratrve controls for the use of fuel transfer hoist for new are located in AP 0010438, OP 1 fuel, RCP seeis and tooter.

0960020 1 9.1-9,12 FSAR diem Wie use of 2 fuel pool Guth, Mtch Not required because status is " Complete

• Procedure AP 0010145 has been pumps di. ring fut care off-loede. AP revised (revision 10)to require t

0010145 requires only one pump. opershon of two apent fuel pool cooling pumps during fur core off-loads.

St Lucie FSAR Review Findings t Unt Page Description of Fhding Originator Supr. Review Operatxhty Assessmert Corrective Action 1 9 1-16 FSAR discummas fuel pool makeup via Guth, Mstch Noble, Rick The recommended change le an editorial Primary water principesy used to RWT flowpath. OP 10350020 allows addshan and does ret represent an maintaan or top off fuel poollevel-use of RWT or primary water. operatzlty concem evoluhans requinng smas volume addshans. Large make-up evokJhons are accomphshed wth the RWT flow path. Minor word changes would enhance procedure and FSAR wree-up. t 9.1-17 Section 9.1.3.6 of the FSAR discusses Guth, Mitch Winnerd, Bob There is to operabihty concem The FSAR Add step to EIP 3100024E to verify an "eerthquake emergency pteri" that requirement to monitor SFP conditions after SFP level and temperature fonowing Includes perberemy monitoring fuel pool a seismee event is a defense in-depth an eartquake. level and temperature Emergency Plan response action and does not affect the 1 impiamenting Procedure No. 3100024F, operation or qualificahon of SFP equipment

• NATURAL EMERGENCIES", does ist Plant procedures require rnonitoring of SFP l

Instruct the operators to perform the level and temperature. A Condihon Report required level and temperature has been issued to review the frequency of monitoring following an earthquake. monitoring necessary to satisfy the FSAR Spent fuel pool terrporsture is currentfy m m A,s,L logged on a shiftly tiesis. Spent fuet pool levet la monitored on a weeldy basis in comptance wth plert technical specificabons L 1 9.3-43 Warm up of the SOC system is not Guth, Mitch Revising Section 9.3.5.2.2 of the FSAR to Revise the FSAR desenphon of the performed by opening low pressure include the correct augnrr:ert esquence SDC womHJp evolution with a 50.59 inledian volve(s). See OP 1-0410022. enhances the overall utility of the document. safety evolustion The described actions do not affect the operabilty of any structure, system, or component t

St Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Desenption of Fending Onginator Supr. Review Operability Asseeemord Cormcese Adion 1 9345 Sechon 9 3 5.3.1 of the FSAR states Guth, Match Noble, Rick There is no operabaity concern. Plerd Reales Iho FSAR desertpmen of sie that the SIT leoinhon veNes are closed technecei e adow SIT % et pierd oesMoen evehmen. when RCS pressure foes below 400 < 1750 pel0-psig. Plant proce.iuie OP 14D0127, Reactor Plant Cooldown, atows closure l when RCS temp < 500 degrees F and i f RCS press < 1500 psig r i 1 10 5-4 Venfy electrical ahgnment for transfer - Guth, Mach Noble, Rick Not requered because status is " Complete" None-required actione coered in recomrnend removal of operator action pierd, -- ' x OP 14110023 and detad. 1 rulenmn 1 15 2.4-1, CEAs & CVCS are not operated in Guth, Mach Noble. Rick Not required per ENG-Ot 6.7, FSAR Rswtos Secuen 15.2.4.1 to reemet the 15 2.4-2 automatic. Wu.G v/MWionneeds Reviews. curverd malhed of contraeng feedor to be revwwed & changed power and temperature eksin0 duumen everen and system need changes. JPN-PSL-SENS-SIM103 eddresses FSAR changes whiCVCS opereuen eksing RCS beren changes 2 6.1.4.14 TNs entire section describes rnetalhc Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick The findPg is e request to vehdote Motortels gnmap should reviser FSAR ~l materials, weld control and non metalthe infernv.m in the FSAR with no stated beeis vwee up and igulate em===ian es materials used in containtnent It ALL for quashoning ks veracity No operM needed i should be rewwwed for current concem exists, no FSAR cfienge Is required apphcabihty I 6

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urvt Page Descnptxn of Findmg Ongmator Supr. Review Opersbety Asseemmert Corredhe Adkm 2 6 1.4,14 Wekt control-I would hope weld control Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick The flnding la e request b vehdete OK-Malertets peup should rewtow and requirements have advanced since information in the FSAR with to stated beels FSAR write 4qe end update 1983. If so, current practk.e may wet for g_ .;. itsveracty. Nooperablaty seme=ammian as sw. differ, perhaps sigruficar Jy. concem exlets, no FSAR change is required. i l t 2 6 1.4,14 Table 61-2 hsts protectwe coatings used Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick The finding is a request to validate Malertels youp should revlow FSAR in contaantnent. Athough it has been information in the FSAR with no stated basis table and n@ protecttwo cooling updated ( Amendment 5,490) Venfy for questioning its veracity, No operability Ret as tw for current applicabildy. concem exlets, no FSAR change is required 2 6.2-65 Las* sentence before 6 2.5 2 3 says Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick Not required because status is " Complete". None - CEN 152 (Rev. 3) does not r;w procedures require operators to reference a particular start time. start the hydrogen recombmer within 24 Operellon or a recombiner et 24 hrs hours following a LOCA. Due to the CE we hoop hydrogen concentration guidennes, it is possibie stus is no ionger beesw the 4.0% nemmebaylever true. EOPs should be checked. epoc4Aed by me C-E EOP guidegnes 2 6.247 Item 6 2.5 3 2 m) at bottom of page gives Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Not required because status is " Complete". None - Pran='6*e C-55 requires H2 the range of H2 concentration in the he mahdoksed between 25-50 ccAg RCS as 10 - 50 cc (STP)/kg Verify durtnB plant ops; consistent wuf C-E against current requirements a predices Chern. Manuel Chem. Manuel eteles met conc. is rar6rart to 10 otAg prior to pierd eba% (C-55 does not quote a spec #c min. venue i for shedaem)

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Descripton of Findmg Origenstor Supr. Review Operately A=-w Corredhe Acdon 2 62-232,62-Tables 6 2-61,62 grve ILRT Guth, httch Pobie, Rck The finding is a request to v=Ert=sa Ptert ILRT gmup shoukt vertfy 234,6 2-235, requirements for var 6ous penetrations - information in the FSAR with no stated beeis socisacy of Wie FSAR teldes and 6 2-243 these are procedural requwements and for ?. 46 its veracey. No operetsty provide a marbsp of changes to should be venSed agamst the concem exists, no FSAR change is required PSL PEG - Nucteer for FSAR procedures. Updele l 2 6 3-13 Writ provides directions for post-Guth, Mitch Noble, Rck Revismg Sachon 6.3'2 8 of the FSAR to Review EOPS and add the LOCA operatsons, spectrees some include additional abgnmord mary =nces adelonalrecovery options or delete equipment (but ignores other posstuhtses enhances the overeE utility of the documor.t. Rome which do not have to be h tie (whch are menhoned later). The required word pr-x - "g is editorialin FSAR. i nature and does not affed the operabluty of any strudure, system, or component 2 6 3-18b,6 3-Section 6 3 3 41 of the FSAR grwes GWh. Mitch Noble, Rck Revising Section 6 3 3 4.1 of the FSAR to Review the FSAR write 4sp and 18c detaded procedure information and ird mia the correct sh0nmerd eary =nce submt necaneery changes to PSL references Figure 6.3-24 which gives a enhances the overet utility of the document. PEG-Nudeer Cheness would be sequence of events and a time schedule Any changes wlE be based on previously emortalin riature. for EOP type procedures. This probably approved NRC documents. This wlE not i has been superceded by the C-E affect the operabigty of any structure, gudehnes for EOPs which are NRC system, or component. approved - Add refereru to C-E document. i e

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Una Page Desenpton of Findog OrigmsW Supr. Review Operatuity Assessmert Cenedhe Action 2 6 3-18b Label these guidelmes as historical or Guth, Mdch Noble, Rck Rewming Section 6.3.3 4.1 of the FSAR to Review the EOPs and/or C-E EOP review them age:nst current EOPs. Inre via the corred toeponse or eN0nment GuhleArne and submt any sequence enhances the overas utiety of the necaseary FSAR dieness to PSL documert. The required word r-_--- ^ s is PEG-Nirkm. Anychangeswould edRortalin nature and does not affed the be edbortal h nature. operabety of any structure, system, or i 2 74-6 Venfy procedure for trutating SDC above Guth, Match There is no operabsty concern. The SDC Revene prw=es to asaw SDC 325 F and need to do so during system design snows inibehon up to 350 F Inlumaton at 350 F durbg arr66 st accidents. (see DBD-SDC-2). The procedure imit is conegans admmistratively set at 325 F. Per J. Kabadi (fuels), Chap 15 safety analyses do not model erw**wi to SDC entry-350 F vs. 325 F has no safety impact. i l 2 Q 3-24 Venfy that procedures exist for Guth, Mftch Noble, Rck Procedures exist therefore there is no error Nona - in= par *=i and testing inspectog und testing w.w e-as of and no operabsty concem. M wth severalplert the emergency auxihary power system in procedures accordance with GDC No 18. k 2 8.3-24a Add "automahc" (see sheet) Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Not requwed per ENG-Of 6.7, FSAR Add *autoristic* per the FSAR self-l Reviews. amassement mark-up. l i [

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Deecription of Findmg Origmator Supr. Review Operately Assosomert Ceneceve AcIlan I L 2 82-3 Venty that procedures are wntten to Guth, Mach Nct e. Rick Not required harmanna otetus is " Complete" No ecmen sospded. This tenue uns. f ensure the SAJ XFMR will not be brougM up einstig sto 01 EDSFI-overtonded if an scenket occurs while estesses not to use the the transforment is supplyng both units transformer in Stat conRprellen. An with 4.16 kV power. 300 4100 V crees 4e prar=6=e has been willen to bring power from one una no the alhar unR Astry acrJdert consens t f 2 83-4,8.3-5, Several issues reisted to srnuRaneous Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick Safety evetustion JPN-PSL-SENS-95437 No edlen regidred. Safety l 8.3-10,8 3-12, w.-Gi of AB bus to A and B buses demonstrates that operating the A and B evehastion JPN-PSL-SENS-95 037 [ 8.3-48 during piant momienance and refuerno trains of the safety reisted 480 V electncat esses asse<ennecano 480 V toed i outages. system cross connected wtth one of the caritore during ""'e== 5 and 6. 5 safety 4.16 kV busees (2A3 or 283) outef-l service for required mentenance while in i Modes 5 or 6 neither Irwolves an unrowtowed safety question nor requires a change to plant Technical Wh%. i I 2 8.3-19e Venfy survedance teshng and rehatxhty Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick Not required because status is " Complete" None - EDG reAmtely mannertrig is rnandonng program to track EDG procedurnererf in AP 0010022. performance is included in plant [ procedures l l f

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urut Page Desenpton of Findog Onganator Supr. Review Operabilny Aa==== ment Corveedive AcSon 2 8M Venfy records kept regardng "protectrve Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick The Anding is a request to M rnessures" for staten baneries hformation h the FSAR with no stoled beels for questioning to werecAy No operebmy conarn =h, no FSAR change is required. The cAed leeue is in regard to l records retenhon, this is not a potenbal operabildy concern. l 2 9 45 Admrustratsve controis are provided for Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick There is no operabdity ancem. The Revise Secmon 9 41.3 of Bus FSAR l all doors leadm0 to the control room to existance of securty alarms on ocme of the to stele 9tet some of the doore be closed when not in use. Some doors doors leading to the control room provides loodng to the cordrol room are are alarmed secunty doors. added assurance that the doors wW be alarmed escurty donts. closed durin0 W conditions 1 6 2-69 Reviewer questens the accuracy of the Guth, Mach Noble, Rick The SBVS single failure analysis correctly None -The reviewer has pass a SBVS single failure analysis presented assumes that the croes.annect wehe was two acewe fetures. The SSVS in FSAR Secten 613 31 The reviewer open upon loss of a finer train to rneinlein the shgie feture snelysis avskastes one claims that the 300 cfm coohn0 air now required coohn0 air flow. The croesconnecd acthe teBure. If one lher Wein Seas, that rnust be maintamed through a valve is powered from the AB swing bus per the croseconnect wolve is eseumed recently shutdown filter train we not be 8770-B427, Sheet 1178. Cor==T=ntly, to operate as designed estabhshed if the single cross-connect there is no operately concern W valve faits to open. with this finding. I r (

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings t Urd Page Descnptm of Fandmg Ongmator Supr. Review Operabety Aseseement Cervedhe Acton 1 94-1,94-10 The desenption of the control room vent Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick The chlonne source was removed from the None - User Comment edunkled to system in Section 9 41.2 of the FSAR is site via PC/Ms 19-181 & 44-182. delete sie m _; for e chlortne out of date. It refers to chiortne Consequertly, the NRC safety evoluehon % eystem bened en wie NRC detectors which are no longer in use, submitted with Technical Spec *= nan Soesty EWW Report leeued with admrustrative controis that keep the Amendment #57 concurs that the chionne Technical Specincetion Amendment control room doors closed, and detection system system is no longer 957. emergency procedures that requae the required. Sance no chlorine accidents are use of SCBAs withm two mmutes of a postulated, there are no operability concems chionne alarm. associated with this Rem. l 1 7.3-52, 7.3-54 Finding questions whether the S/G Guth, Mdch Noble Rack The findog is a request to vahdete Venfy CIS override testure on CWDs 7.3-55 blowdown valves and reactor dram tar.k informatnan in the FSAR with no steled beeis valves can overnde a CIS signal as for questioning Rs veracNy. No operatullty stated in FSAR Table 7.3-5, concem exists, no FSAR change is required Components Actuated on cts. 1 7.3-44 Fandsng questions the veracity of factnote Guth, Mach Noble, Rick The finding is a request to validate Verify that operator acean is needed No 5 related to the operating status of informahon in the FSAR wth no eteled beeis to retum tio equipment to normal the diesel generators and charging for questioning Rs veracNy No operubety foGowing ESFAS reest. pumps when ESFAS is reset. Footnote concern exists, no FSAR change is required No. 5 states the operator action is needed tc retum the s -es to their [ m normal status. j l i l

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings 1 Urd Page Descnption of Findmg Ongmator Supr. Rosww Operetsty Aseeeement Corredhe Acean 1 15.2.44 Section 15 2.4 2 2 d desenbos automatic Guth, Mitch Noble, Rick The reactor reguisting system is a nort-eafety Rowtoe Seccen 15.2.4.2.2.d to CEA inserten as the normel response to reisted control system. Its funchon is not sellect the currert method of reactor power and temperature credited in the pierd arrerit enetyees so cordregng reador power and mcreases during detution events (at there is no operability concern associated torsqlerature durh6 di1L4cn events power). The CEAs are no longer with operstmg the system in one mode and system load changes operated in automatic. versus another. Operatog the CE As manually reduces the potenhed for Tansents by ehminating sharp changes in core operating parameters and decreases the chances of dropped or misangewJ CEAs. 1 9 2-34 Section 9 2.7.3.1 of the FSAR does not Guth, Mitch Noble, Rock The design of t w ocean intoke piping is Rowene Secean 9.2.7.3.1 of the desube the 16-ft diameter ocean intake conservattwo compared to the desenption of FSAR to include the 16-ft diameter pipehne that was added dunng the system in t w FSAR. The design is oceaninteiospipeline No constructionof Urut2. Adescnptionof considered corxurvative he an documentation (PCMs or safety the 16-ft diameter pipehne was added to additsonal suppty of ocean water wtX be owmaih) could be four.d in Section 9.2.7.2 as part of As endment available to cordinuously fill the intake canal; PosePort that deocnbos the change No.11. providing greater assurance of an utimate heat sink during normal and emergency conditaans. Therefore, no operabihty concem exbts with this condition. u t

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Desenpton of Findog Origmator Supr. Review Operately Aseeeemort Cataceve Acdon 1 7.3-29 Finding questions the veracity of Guth, Mtch Wmnard, Bob The Inding is e request to validate Verry tiet wie eeneing unos are statements rnede in Secten 7.3 2 3 2 e informaten in the FSAR wth no stated bones reeded h opposto ebredians ffem related to the special esperetton and for ? - .:. Isweredty Nooperstmy tie preneusteer as stated h wie trussile protecten prowtded for the enneem exists no FSAR change is required. FSAR. Safety evolueRan JPN-PSL-pressunzer pressure sensing unes for SENP-95422 eddreseems removal STAS input. The reviewer requests that of tie mineAs shioid roof. L the sensing line route be verified to ensura that it is consistent with the FSAR description and to ensure that recent changes to the pressurizer missile shield have not impacted the degree of protection p ovided to the sensing knes inside the shield weg. f 2 10 2-2a Secten 10 2 2.2 of the FSAR states that Guth, Mtch Noble, Rick The low bearing ou pressure trip is designed Propero a 50.59 ov=h

• to asow the low turtune beenng oil pressure to prevent turbine damage under hur ou tie FSAR seepoint to be chen0*d switch willinp the turtune when ce pressure condRions tt is a turbine protecthe tem 8 pelg to between 5-6 pelg.

pressure decreases to 6 psag. The low trip (i e., provided for investment protection a bearing od pressure inp norma #y occurs purposes) and does not affed plert between 5 - 6 psig (see CR 96-927). operabiMy. Mnor setpoirt deviations do not i precent an operetsty concem. i 1 91-2 The FSAR discusses a maximum Guth, Mtch Noble. Rick The findog states that the new fuelis None required amtwent air temperature of 110 degrees subgected to a maximum ambiert F for new fuel. temperature of 110 degrees F. This is a fact and does not not represort a contem wth documentation or the equipment. The value is conservalswo reestrve to the maximum outreme temperature of 101 degrees F recorded for the area (see FSAR Sedian 2.3.2.2.b). AcconAngly, no operebaty concem esists. f i

St Lucie FSAR Review Findings Una Page Descnptson of Firdng Ongenator Supr. Review Operebey Aa====mert Corrodhe Adian 1 7.3-27 Firdng questions the veracdy of Guth, Mitch Buehrig, Chris The finding la e request to vehdate None reqidred.Wie contamment statements made in Section 7.3 2.3 e informehon in the FSAR without a valid beeis enelysis evehdated the effeds of a related to main steem line isotahon and for 7 ,l. ks veracity. No operabilty grah steem Ene break inalde the steam tre break event analyzed in concem exists, no FSAR change is required. containmort. Main steem lecidian Sechon 15 4 6. The reviewer requests is not rigoreuely tr==8=aad in this that the analyses vatues preserded in evert. Section 7.3 2.3 e be venfied against the currett steam line break analysts to ensure they are up to date. The reviewer suggests they may have changed as a result of the containment re-analysis performed in 1993. 1 7.3-27a Section 7.3 2.3.1 f of the FSAR states Guth, Mitch Buehrig, Chns Thereisnooperabmyconcem Plant Revies the FSAR so that t reflods that the auxthary feedwater system tectvucal specificahons clearly allow stantiary tie technical spacincation activates automaticalty upon low steam feedwater actuohon et greater then or aquel requiremert for AFAS ar** st generator level (19%). The reviewer to 19% NR eteem generator level greater then or equel to 19% NR bebeves that the setpoint is 19.5%. steem generator level. 1 1525-1, Sections 15 2.5.1 and 15 3 4.1 of the Guth, Mdch Buehrig, Chns There is no operabmy concem. The plant Aatd a footnote to Section 15.211 of 1534-1 FSAR state that the low coolant flow rate was dessgned to accommodate part loop tw FSAR kugeding that technical reactor trip is determmed by summing operation but never licensed for that specificatione do rat permR plert the steam generator hot to conq contingency (equipment stir in=8=a=d). aparallon wth less. han four pressure drops and compennk signal Technical Spec !lcahon 3/4.4.1.1 does not aparating RCPs. to a setpoint that is e funchon ot une allow power operet6on with < 4 RCPs. The number of energized reactor cooient prachce of operehng with 4 pumps is more pumps. Piard technical specificahons do conservative then operahng with less than 4 not allow opershon with less than 4 pumps. This requrement is conservelive, for RCPs. the same power level, since with more pumps running there is better assurena of flow and better flow symmetry i r I i i

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findinga Unit Page Desenption of Fmding Ongenator Supr. Review Operability Assessment Correceve Action 1 1523-1 Section 15 2 31 of the FSAR desenbes Guth, Mach Noble Rck Section 15 2.31 of the FSAR describes how _ Revloe Sechan 15 2.3.1 ao that t reactor regulatog system opershon the reactor regulating systern (RRS) would states that the automatic CEA dunng a CEA drop event. It also states respond to a dropped rod in the automatic withdrewt feature was sem=Nans by that the postson reed swdches and the mode. In general,i states that the RRS PCM 242-177. The pa awireed Nis are used to sense a dropped rod. would athempt to withdraw CEAs to raise ownches and Nis origmesy pnwided The reviewer notes that the reactor reactor power to meet turtune power. To rod drop input to the reactor regulatog system as no longer operated prevent thes conddion from occumng, the regulehng system automatic wahrewt in automate and that rod bottom reed FSAR explains that the postion reed kihibit. and posdion reed swdches are the two sweches and Nis provide a dropped rod means of detecting dropped rods. 6nput signal to the reactor regulating system automate withdrawl inhatut. It does not imply that the cornrot room operators use position reed switches and Nis as the fundamental method of detecting dropped rods. Current plant procedures do not permit automatic operation of the RRS, and the automate wdhdrawl was since disable 1 via PCM 242-177. As a result, there is no operabilty concem 1 7.2-14 Section 7.2.1.2 g of the FSAR should be Guth, Mdch Buehng Chris There is no operat#; concem. The plant Add a footnote to Page 7.2-14 revised to delete the d:scussson was dessgned to accommodate part loop IntNcating that technical regarding operation of the thermal power operation but never licensed for that nF ications do not permR pierd M calculator with less than 4 operating contmgency (equipment shN instated) operetton with less than four RCPs. Technical Specificahon 3/4 4.1.1 does not operating RCPs. allow power opershon with < 4 RCPs. The practce of operating wth 4 pumps is more conservative than operahng with less then 4 pumps. This requirement is conservative, for the same power level, since with more pumps runnsig there is better assurance of flow and better flow symmetry D

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urut Page Descrpion of Fmdog Ongmator Supr. Review Operatukty Assesement Corrective Action 1 7.34 Foding queshons the veracky of Guth, Mdch Buehrig, Chns The fedm0 is a request to validate Resolution documented in JPN-PSL-statements made in Secton 7.31.1.8 of informahon in the FSAR withott a val 6d basis SENS-06 063, Rev. O bened en CR the FSAR regardog SIAS actuahon of for questionin0 Rs werecNy. No operatMty No. 96-1464. the SIT MOVs. The FSAR states that concern exists. the valves recieve a SIAS to open if not m the fully open pose on. The reviewer beheves that the valves get a SIAS to open regarless of their present postion. 1 9 3-7 Finding requests that Section 9 3 2 of Guth, Mdch Buehng.Chns The reding is a request to validate Review Section 9.3.2 of the FSAR the FSAR be reviewed and updated. No information in the FSAR without a valid tesis and revise as needed FSAR errors are identifed for queshoning Rs veracty. No operab Aity concern exists, no FSAR change is required. i I 1 9 4-20 Section 9 4 6 of the FSAR states that Guth, Mdch Noble, Rock This finding will be corrected by a pendmg implement the FSAR change the FHB air temperature is FSAR change, therefore, no operabehty package attached k PCM 062-194. thermostatically kept at a menrnum of 60 assessment is requred per ENG-Ol 6.7 degrees F. This marumurn temperahJre FSAR Reviews. requirement was deleted by PC/M 062-194 t o 9 L

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings i 1 l l Unit Page Descrption of Finding Ongmator Supr. Revww Operabelty Assessment Correceve Addon l 1 7.3-37 Secten 7.3 2.4 of the FSAR describes Guth,IAtch Buehrig. Chris The finding is a request to vahdate None-No FSAR errors identined. the ESFAS bestable auto test informahon in the FSAR wahout a valid beeis instrument it states that the test for questioning Rs veracty. No operability instrument inserts two pubes, one after concem emsts, no FSAR change la required. l the other,into the tnstable input. The frst pulse is 5 percent less than that necessary to tnp the tnstable. The second is 5 percent greater than that necessary to tnp the txstable. The revwwer requests that the two percentage values be venfied. 1 7,2-44 Venfy that the reactor inp setpois d on Guth, Mrtch Noble, Rick The finding is a request to vandate None - The trip estpoint is high containment pressure is less than hformation in the FSAR without a vahd basis meirdained by pimrt *echnical or equat to 3 3 psig as stated in Table for questioning Rs veracty. The trp speclAcetions (see Table 2.2-1). 7.2-2 of the F3AR. setporits are controMed under the technical specifications. No operabiuty concem exists, te FSAR change is required. 1 7.2-48 Venfy that the reactor tnp setpoints Guth. Mdch Noble, Rick The rinding is a request to vahdate Compare Table 7.2-5 with the quoted in FSAR Table 7.2-5 for low informahon in the FSAR without a valid basis inchnical spednestione to determine pressunzer pressure and low steam for queshonmg Rs veracty. These values K en FSAR denGe is required. generator pressure are correct. are contained in the technical specificahons Therfore, no operatuidy concem entsts. O

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urut Page Desenption of Findmg Ongmator Supr. Revww Operabsley Assessment Corradhe Actort 1 7.2-24 Venfy RPS sensor delay times quoted in Guth, Mdch Noble, Rock The findog is a request to N Section 7.21.6 a of the FSAR. information in the FSAR without a valid basis for queshoning ta veracity The sensor delay tames listed, are provided as exemples to esWe that sensor delay times are smas compared with the total RPS trip deley tune assumed in the accidert analysrs No operatzhty concern exists, no FSAR change is required. 1 7.2-12 Venfy that the low steam generator water Guth, Mdch Buehng, Chris The findmg is a request to vahdete None requred levet reactor inp setpomt specirmed in information in the FSAR unthout a valid basis FSAR Table 7.2-2 assures that for questioning ts veracity. No operatuity sufficient water inventory vnll be in the concem emsts, no FSAR change is required. steam generator at the time o the trip to r provide at least 13 mmutes before adddional feedwater is required for decay heat removal 1 6 3-22 Section 6 3 3 5 b of the FSAR states Guth, Whtch Noble, Rick Not required per ENG-Ol 6.7, FSAR Revloe Sedian 6.3 2.2.7 ao that t that the SDC HXs are capable of Reviews. sietes that the HXs are designed to w.m.odatog the 10 sectnd accomodate the flow from one CS temperature transient imposed by the pump durin0 the switchover switchover to sump recrculation. The trenetert The HX Tech. Manuet tube side flow dunng the transient is states that the transient flow rate le specified as one contamment spray 12.75E5 R2r at 240 F which is pump. Section 6 3.2 2.7 states that the appnat 2700 gym. HXs are desagned to accommodate the flow t om two contamment spray pumps during the transient

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings tJnit Page Descriphon of Finding Ongmator Supr Review Operabahty Assessmert Corredive Action i 1 64-2 The reviewer questions the veracdy of Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick There is no operatukty concem Plert Revloe hr*m 6.4.1.3 of the FSAR statements made in Section 6 41.3 of ChangeModification 135-180 states that the to Inreute a sear ** of the TSC. the FSAR regarding the numtw of TSC is to be isolated from control room The required 10 CFR 50.50 control room occupants dunng an cookng if ordy one of the three CRAC units evolustion is br4 tert in PCM 135-acc4ent The habdabihty analysis are operable. The TSC can be isolated from 180. conservatruely assurr's that there will be the control room by closing manuel dampers ten. The reviewer indicdes that the D-41 and D-42. Air condenoning number win be greater than ten because components sendng the TSC are designed the TSC is in the control room HVAC non-nuclear safety and resessmic. envelope. 1 7.2-15 FSAR Figure 7 2-15 shows the RCP Guth, Mdch Wmnard, Bob There is no operabddy concem. The plant Revlee Figure 7.2-15 to state that comtxnation swdch as an inpte to the was designed to -c4o...We part loop technscal specificehons IImk piert delta-T power calculatson A note should operation but never licensed for that operation to 4 RCPs. be added to stipulate current operational w J.wi.cy (equipmert stid installed). config Jratsort Techrucal Spec 4fication 3/4 4.1.1 does not aNow power operation with < 4 RCPs. The practice of operahng with 4 pumps is more conservative than operahng with less than 4 pumps. This requirement is conservettve, for the same power level, since with more pumps running there is better assurance of flow and better flow symmetry r I

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Descnptonof Finding Onginator Supr. Revtew Operabsty Assessmord Corredive Adion 1 7.2-11 Reviewer questions the veracdy of Guth, Mdch Noble, Rack There is no operabsty concem. The Unit 1 .None information shown on FSAR Figure 7.2-control w6 ring degrams (8770-B-327 Shts 11 regardeng main steam hne isolation on 311,312,314,315) indcate that e km eteem low steam generator pressure. The generator pressure signal wW cause the figure indicates that low steam generator MSIV and bypass valve to close on the pressure signals will close tSe man affected steam generator. 'i steam isolation valve and bypass valve on the affected steam generator. The reviewer beleves that a low steam generator presaure sgnal on edher steam generator will cause both MSIVs and bypassess to close. -+---e.<-e e_s .eeei ,w-+_=., t i t I i

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Desenphon of Findog Ongmator Supr. Rev6ew Operatulsy Asesoament Correctve Action 1 9 2-11 The FSAR states that the reactor coolant Noble, Rock Guth Mach Review of the RCP VTM cefirms the Furtier investtete tw leeue to pump (RCP) rnenufacturer recommends recommendation found in Wie FSAR for not determine Die need to add Wie esten that the motor not be operated for rnare operating the motor if cootng water flow is mbiute Ome Amt for lose of osaAng then seven mmutes if coohng weler flow lost for more then seven minutes. The VTM to tio RCP malere to the Off-Normal is lost The FSAR also states that the also confirms the ten minute Operating pre s Revios s pump shou d not be operated for more recommendation relettre to the pump heat procedures or FSAR es required e than ten mmutes if cochng water flow to exchanger. Rev6ewof Off-NormelOperahng the pump heat exchanger is lost. RCP Procedure 1-0120034 ho coh that the Offatormal Operahng Procedure No.1 seven minute VTM requeement is not 0120034 requres that if CCW flowis reflected in the procedure. The safety lost the RCPs for ten mmutes, the RCPs fundion of the RCPs is to peservely meinten are stopped _ The procedure does not the RCS pressure boundary The reflect the seven mmute requremert to stop the pumps if cochng recommendation for the RCP motors. water is lost to the pump host exchanger for more than ten mmutes is dreded at ensuring there is no demoge to the pump seals. Seal integrity is required to mentoin the RCS pressure boundary sehty function The coohng water to the motor prevents demoge to the motor and motor hearings, which are not related to montainmg the pressure boundary Therefore this 6 ~p is not an opersbelty concom, h==== R deels with the non-sofety operation of the RCP motor and does not adversely effect the RCPs safety funchon of RCS Integrety l 1 82-3 The findog states that the windloadog Noble, Rick Guth, MMch The findmg is a request toe design CivE to webdate tie FSAR etolomert design of the 240 kv Rnes needs to be information stated in the FSAR relative to the and tehe edian honed on Wie i venfied. design wind loedng for 240 kw Enes. There endnge as appropstete i is no eteled reason to donet Wie informellen presented in the FSAR. There are rio documents stolod that contreeBd the FSAR etetements, Wierefore, Wils request for % of FSAR dele does not et tiin time represent en operehmy concorrt

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Desenption of Findog Ongmator Supr. Review Opernbey Assessment Corredhe Acton 1 82-5,824 The fww.hng states that a new transient Nots., "r k Guth, Mitch This findng concems outdeled Notencal. (1) Determine f the riew study is"kt 82-7 gnd stabdity study has been performed data that shotAd be rapi=rwewith avagabio wie pipmene" for the neid Trw= (2) subsequent to the 1975 study desenbed updated matertel. TNs is an edRortal Update FSAR wah new study. (3) on pages 8 2-5,6, and 7 of the FSAR. problem and therefore dnes not conettute an Delete the 4=r====lan of the 1975 operabihty concern study or cleertyidentify R as being "Historicar. 1 83-5 The findmg is a request to venfy that Noble, Rick Guth, Mdch There is a statemert in the FSAR on page None required. there are no overtoad alarms for MOVs. 8.3-5 that says the criteria for protecten and it also requests that the statement about groundog of he 480 V system is the same not havng overload alarms on 480 volt as for the 4.16 kV or 6 9 kV system exept for motors be deleted from the FSAR. four ksted excephons. One of these exceptons is

• no motor certoed alarm for MCC supphed motors". The finding refers to overload alarms for MOVs which is apparent!y a reference to the above quoted FSAR statement. This statement refers to criteria and is not a descrtphon of actual plant as built rap =hlihty. There is therefore no requirement to verify that these alarms do or do not exist. This finding does not require a change to the FSAR and does not represent an operabihty concem 1

11.5 8 Secten 115 6 of the FSAR does not Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick Not required per ENG-QI 6.7, FSAR Revise Secean 11.5 6 of the FSAR desenbe the Dry Storage Warehouse as Reviews. to kw* art = a description of the Dry a temporary storage location for km Storage Warehouse. CR No. 96-activey radoective wasfe. Use of the 1286 was i==a=r8 to incorporate the DSW for temporary low 4evet dry active tsoults of JPN-PSL-SECP-92-005. waste was just:6ed by Safety Evaluation JPN-PSL-SECP-92-055.

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urut Page Descnptonof Findog Ongma*;r Supr. Review OperabMy Assessment Corredhe Action 1 1541-2, PMAI 96-03-750 (from ST AR 960171} Noble, Rick Wonard, Bob The interrn response to STAR 960171 Update tubios for ESF w.,~.-.: 1541-5 identifies errors in the assumptons of provdes an operability evsluston that lenhage to inctude the leakage the suporting dose calculatons for Table concludes that the impact on done rates descreed in the finding. 15 41-2 and 15 41-5 Specifcally, the would be sman such that the revised doses ECCS pumps mecharucal sealleskoffs would remain a very smad fracton of are directed to the equipment drain tank 10CFR100 hmits. (EDT)(ECCS pump leakage is used to determme dose rates post LOCA) However the actual plant configuration does not have a leakoff conectron to the EDT. Sealleakoff win actualty coPect on the pump skid rnount arki overflow to a floor dram and collect in the ECCS sump and than go to the EDT. 1 8 3-26 SectKvi 8 31.2.3 of the FSAR states Goth, Mitch Buchtig, Chns There is no operabihty concern. Secten Delete the erronious statement frorn matter of factly that any water entering 8.3.1.2.3 of the FSAR states that there is a the FSAR. the electncal tunrW ' 6 containment we six inch high curts surroundmg the eledrical drain to the reactor cavdy sump via the tunnel at the 18 ft. elevaton. The FSAR reactor cavdy. The normapy closed acknowledges that the vedume of water reactor cavity pressure relier dampers requered to saturate the drains and at the however, wift prevent any water from same bme flood the 18 ft. floor elevahon to a reaching the cavity sump. The damper height of six inches does not exist inside blade jambs will prevent the blades from containment openrng under the force of the water. 2 Q.3-30c Venfy that *R" rated fuse assembly Guth, Mdch Noble, Rck Not required because status is " Complete *, None required. Fuse quehfication is purchased Ctass 1E and quahfied to and no FSAR change is requred docasmented h PC&t 015-283. IEEE 323-74 & 344-75.

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urut Page Descrption of Findog Orig nator Supr. Review Operabday Assessment Correceve Acnon 2 8 3-38 Venfy that Class 1E wwe bundles or Guth, Mtch Noble, Rick The findmg is a request to validate design VerWy that knaAy quehfled % cables intemal to the control boards are information stated in the FSAR reistive to are used to separate redundant identified in a distnet permanent rnanner electrical separation in the Class 1 E centrol Class 1E ckcults that are terminated and that locally quahfied esolators are boards. There is no stated reason to Md at a common point. Color codn0 IB used to separate redundant Class 1E the information presented h the FSAR. malntained by 2996-B-297,*St. circuts that are termmated at a common There are no documents stated that Lude Plant - Unit 2 Electrical posnt. contradd the FSAR statements, therefore, General 1% Notes", Sheet 7-this request for validation of FSAR data does 1, Rev. 3 not at this time represent en operability concem 2 8 3-42,8 3-42a Venfy thermal overloads are either Guth, Mdch Noble Rsk The foding refers to the design of thermal None required bypassed on STAS or normally go to over!aad circuits for safety-retated MOVs. alarm in an overload state. This statement refers to design enteria contained in Regulatory Guide 1.106. The reviewer has requested that the design of the vatwes be venfied agamst these criterte. No evidence or imphcation is provided that would bring hto question the actumi design. This findmg is essenhagy a request to validate FSAR design criteria and as such does not represent an operatAty concem. 2 824,82-13 The foding states that a new transient Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick This findmg concems outdated historical Incorporate the reeuts of the new gnd stabilty study has been performed data that should be replaced with avatable grid egetAry/evatebilty study h the subsequent to the study described on updated matenal. This is an edmonal FSAR,or labelthe enesting writup pages 8.2-6, and 13 of the FSAR. problem and therefore does not constituie an " Historical". operebday concern. [

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Urut Page Desenptm of Freng Origmator Supr Review Operabehty Assessment Corrective Action 1 9 3-43 Sectm 9 3 5.2 2 of the FSAR states Guth, M:tch Buehng, Chris Not requred per ENG-Ol 6.7, FSAR Review FSAR write-up and tfut ". shutdown coohng is conhnued Reviews. determine if changes are needed through the entre pened of plant shutdown to rnatntain a refueling water temperature of 135 F or less." Operations interprets this statement to rnean that SDC can not be interrupted Plant technical specircations permd SDC to be interrupted for a period of 1 hour. 1 57-4 Sectm 5 7 21.1 of the FSAR states Guth, Mitch Buehrg, Chris There is no operability concern. The valves Review PCM 056-80 to determine that electrcal power is removed from at are energized dunng Modes 1 - 4 in the basis for the admrnistrative t of the RCGVS vatves during normal accordance with plant techncal centrols. If poselble,deletethe plard operation to prevent inadve tant specircahons. Redundard isolshon valves requiremord to remove power from actuate. This statement confhets weh and redundant vent paths are provided to 45e RCGVS velves dunng normal plant technmal specta.catms which ensure that the vent capabilty is preserved plivi operabon. require the RCGVS valves to be closed dunng a single active w.,~, 4 failure. and operable during Modes 1 - 4. 2 9 3-45e,9 3-45f Sections 9 3 7.1.2 and 9 3 7.2.1.1 of the Guth, Mdch Buehrg. Chris There is no operabdity concern The valves Review post-TMI Ecensing FSAR state that electrical power is are energiired during Modes 1 - 4 in documords and commitmorts to removed from the RCGVS solerod accordance with plant technical determine the beeis for the vatves during normal plant operation to specircahons Redundard Innishnq vglygg admlnigtrglhe Controls lf pnamada, i prevent inadvertant actuaton. This and redundant vert paths are prtuded to delete gie FSAR requirement to l statement confhets wth plant techncat ensure that the vent capahdity is preserved remove poner Itern the RCGVS specircahons which require the RCGVS during a single active component faGure. vehes dtstle ruhmal pierd operation valves to be closed and opewbie during Modes 1 - 4.

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u St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Una Page Desenption of Freng Ongenator Supr. Review OperabMy Assosament Correceve Acekm 3

8 3-12 Venfy that a test transfer of the auxihary Guth, Mdch Buehng, Chne The findug is a request to veEdete buses to the startup transformers is information in the FSAR wahout a webd beeis rnanua#y accomphshed without tnppeng for questioning ta veracNy. No operatulity the und concem exists, no FSAR change is required 1 1544-4 Section 15 4 4 51 of the FSAR states Guth, Mitch Winnard, Bob There is no operability concam. The FSAR None requred that the reactor is ass;rned to operate analysis uses a more conservatne TMILP dunng a steam generator tube rupture setpoint value than allowed by plant technical event untd the low pressure floor of the specirscations. A low Tu1P setpoint is used TMtP tnp is reached at 1850 psia The to maximtre the amount of coolant that is reviewer indcates that 1850 psia is not a trar* sported from the primary system to the recognized value - possibly 1887 psia secondary system and to marrnize the amount of radioactivity that is released to the atmosphere. 1 6 3-36 Section 6 3 4 2.1 states that the injection Guth, Match Noble, Rck Not required per ENG-Of 6.7, FSAR Redse the FSAR so that t p check valves are functionalty venfied at Reviews. that viis method of testing is no normal operating tempera'ure and longer performed. Note that the pressure by use of the charging pumps. hee Ang for Secdon 6.3.4.2.1 is Unit 1 stopped this rnethod of testing in Tn,.;L ; Tests"whichimpses the 1970s due to thermaltransient that the information is historical concems l j 1 824 Verify swichyard testing and inspection. Guth, Mdch Winnard, Bob The finding is a request to vobdete l Informebon in the FSAR without a vond beeis j for ? _-4., as verscay. No operebMy concem extets, no FSAR change is required l l

St. Lucie FSAR Revicw Findings Unt Page Desenpton of Findog Onginator Supr. Review OperatWy Assessment Corredwo Adion 1 10 3-5 Venfy MSIS closure testog is consistent Guth, Mdch Buehrig Civis The findmg is a request to whdote with the FSAR information in the FSAR wthout a welld beeis for questioning to werecty. No operabilty concern exists, no FSAR change is required. 1 10 2-4 FSAR discusses NDT exams on the Guth, Mitch Buehng, Chns Not required per ENG-Q! 6.7. FSAR Consider revising Section 10 2A of turboeajenerator at 5 year intervals. Reviews. the FSAR to explain how the inapar4aan intervels are matched to planned refusing outages 1 6.1 -3 The revewer states that Secten 616 of Guth, Mdch Noble, Rick Sece it was decided not to use because of Labelthe informahon on H2 purge the FSAR provides a discussion of NRC concerns regarding any rolesse for H2 as historical hydrogen purge system testeg The control purposes, procedures do not cal for reviewer notes that hydrogen purge ts use, and the plant design was changed system testing is not performed. The (before licensmg) to include two 100% intent of the reviewer comments was that redundert and independent H2 recornbiners, the FSAR states the system is/can be there is no safety or operatulity concem, used for H2 purge. Since 'he system is NOT tested for filtration or iodme removal effecsency, it should not be used and, use is not called for in the plant EOPs. r 1 7.3-57,7.3-58 Venfy that the test procedures desenbed Guth, Match Buchng, Chris The rmding is a request to validate in Table 7.3-6A are consistent with the informehon in the FSAR withold a valid beeis current 18 month ESFAS survedlance for questioning ts veracity. No operability test. concem exists, no FSAR change is requirect 4

St Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unt Page Desenpton of Fendmg Origmator Supr. Rev6ew Operabihty Assessmert CorrecRho Action = 1 Table 7.3-2, Cornments made by K. Thomas, Jennings, Richard Guth, Mich PURELY EDITORIAL - flems A, B, C, G. I, Prepare FSAR package to correct j pages 7.342 - Reviewer malung operatx'ity assessment J, K, L, M. O, NO CHANGE REQUIRED - mese ednertalerrors. 7.347 is R. R. Jennsngs identmers (A, B, etc ) D,E.F,N.P,Q. As apnined in the are from the comment Est by finding section these comments are either Thomas. A-purely editorial or help clartfy the informehon paginahon, as pages should be the same preserted. Only the locahon of Note 3 layout (at landscape or all portraR) (applied to the last two items [ input to SAS] versus the existing rrwx of landscape and of page 7.M2) is truly " incorrect" In that portrait. Based on "readtb4 ty, ether the Note three does apply to the last two items format of 7.3-42 OR 7.MT would be [Desel Gererefor 1 A and 1 B] of page 7.3-acceptable; B - header

43. This is likety an"edRorier type ermr l

Is garbled on page 7 3-42, as pages also The equipment functions as desired should have headmg hke 7 M5; C - in (incluchng Bugetsn 8046) and is W header, move identifier for note (12) to desenbed by the table so no operabilty after *Normar as follows "Retums to concem exists, Normal (12) Upon ESFAS Reset"; D - table correct as wntten, breakers do nothing on ESFAS reset; E - table correct as wntten, pumps do not changes status (stop) on S!AS; F -is duphcate of L and discussed there, G - Note 2 is unclear as wntten, suggest "When needed for shutdown, operators can close va8 e with swich if p essurizer v pressure is low"; H-table correct as written Unit 1 MVM1 and MVM2 do not recetve AFAS signal; I, J, K - aR are part of B, garbled header; L - move table entry for S 1. Tank 1 A1 Isolation Vaive V3624 to top of page 73-43 soit is not separated from the other three SIT valves; M-Note 3 is misplaced, it does not apply to the status signal" Input to SAS", the last 2 items on page 7.3-42, it DOES apply to the 1 A and 18 Diesel Generators, the last two llems on page 7.343; N -the STAS actuahon signal was added by an early 1980s PCM as an input (initiating signal) to CIS). This is from STAS module to CIS module, so designating which safety channel ao suggested by KT is not necessary or appropriate in my opinion. AR of the SIAS CWDs shown are involved in this

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Una Page Desenptonof Frdng Ongnator Supr. Review Operabdey Assessment Corvedive Action so addng the number (s) of the CWD(s) on this entry would not be appropriate edber in my opruon, O - in Note 12, REPLACE *See Section 7.31.15" with "Ttws informaton included pursuant to it E Bunetn 8006* which is the pertment part of 7.31.1.8, P - based on a review of the Bulletn 8006, the revWs comment is not appropnate. Also, see Q belour, O - the reviewer suggests the wordng should be changed, based on his percepton of Bunetin 80M and suggests reviewng 804)6 to ensure we understand the intent. I have reviewd the bulletn. It was based on a the fact that some plants had found that the act of resetting ESFAS actuation signats actua#y caused w.@ e-as to change status acay from the " safety or emergency mode to their normal mode

• The bullete required crcut review and testing to venfy that ESFAS w,@ e as dd not change status upon signal reset.

If wi@w-as were found to change state, the bulletin required corrective action to ehrninate this

• change" or to justify R. As explaned by the notes, some of the SIAS wi@ eis can be controlled by operators after reset but none changes state in an adverse rnanner. No change required.

l

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings tJnit Page Desenptionof Findmg Ongenstar Supr. Review Operatukty Assesamort Corredive Action 1 to42 Feeng was by C. Buehrig. Reviewer is Jennogs, Richard Guth, Mitch The gases are montored as speeded in the Revise FSAR as suggested above. R. R. Jenrungs idenhfier *R* % from FSAR. This change simply derNes Buehrig's list. B - The last paragraph howAvhere. The ultimate decharge is to the section 10 4 3 says noncondensatde atmosphere as spaceed in the FSAR. The gases from the gland steam condenser choice to use the vert stock for discharge are monitored for radioactmty. If morvtoring and accounhng, even when radioactmty is detected the gases are radioactmty has not been detected, is routed to the plant vent instead of being conservatrve since the operators are directly drscharged to atmosphere. required to use the vent stock if any activty is Refer to Section 114 311. This is not detected. In that event R is phely other fup desenptrve of the system. Based problems would require operator attenhan y on system walkdown, P&fD review and and this reduces the burden on them and operator discussions, I suggest the ensures the rerouting of the air ejector following wording: *Nwa able d:scharge wig not be inedewertently gases from the gland steam conde tser overlooked. are routed to the steam jet air ejector d scharge kne where both are monitored for radioactmty. The comtnned gases can then be discharged either to the atmosphere or routed to the plant vent system. If radioactmtyis detected,these gase are routed to the plant vent instead of bemg drscharged to atmosphere. Refer to Sectson 11.425* Related to ttus, Sect on 10 4 2, also on page 10 4-2, states that the air ejector gases are discharged to atmosphere. And if radioactmty is detected, they would be routed to the plant vent. Normalty, the plant has chosen to drscharge through the plant vent which does go to atmosphere. This provides redunde t rnonitoring, improves accounting of discharges and elenstes the need for operator action should radioactivey be detected in the SJAE dscharge. I recommend the first sentence on page 10.4-2 be revised to i reed: "The steem jet air ejector pan=== the evacuated motture of air and water vapor through as Inter-and after. condensers wher most of the weler i vapor is condensed and the remainsng

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings Unit Page Descriptionof Firdng Originator Supt. Review Operately Assessmerd CorrectNe Action i.vicure.atAe gases are drscharged to atrnosphere, either directly or through the plant vent? In both these section there is a reference to Section 11.4 (wtuch desenbes the radiation mondors). In both cases the exact reference is 114 2.5 for the Condenser Air Ejector Mondor. The 114 3.11 rnentioned is in error as that section discusses the Waste Concentrator in the Reactor Aumdiary Building 1 9 2-19 This finding was by J Baysinger. Jenrungs, Richard Guth, Mitch This es a statement which possibly should Prepare FSAR change package to Revwwer ts R. R. Jennings The have been clanfied at the time of stretch add the clarification atsove. suggestion was to update the maximum power irrplementation. As noted above allowable temperature nse in the main regarding Figure 10.1-4 this Ekely was condenser as the value geven appear to included in the onginal corsjoneer be for the onginal power level. I assumptions, in any case, since the suggest this be handled as were the condenser has NO safety funchons, there is " design data'in Chapter 10 of the no operabihty or safety concern UFSAR. See page 10.1-3 for an example. Add astenk to the the maxrnum (26 degree F) and expected (24 degree F) condenser temperature nse values Add note * *These values may increase as a resuR of stretch power (2700 Mwt) operation begun dunng Cycle 5 " NOTE THAT the design heat balance, Figure 101-4,irt the FSAR is admendment 0 and states that S/G thermal output is 2710 9 Mwt (includes Reactor Coolant Pump Heat) so ongenal FSAR did consider some aspects of stretch power.

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings UnN Page Desenptionof Finding Onginator Supr. Review Operabehty Assessmert Carroceve Action 1 6C 12A Page 6C-12A discusses valves on wtuch Jennings, Richard Guth, Mitch. The information questioned on 6C-12A is in NndsigM page 6C-12A does the NRC had EQ questens in 1975. Nstoncal and there is a tres, wie section 3.11, refer to 3.11 for currard EQ The discussion appears outdated to the current approved EQ program Information no R already impsee However, R does refer to t&E Bulletin 79-documentation. TNs historical data (on NRC Historical and FSAR change is not 01 on EQ and references section 311 questions for und 1 bcenomg) has been reaty required. which was not reviewed dJring the indial supe" Ceded and there is no operatWhty FSAR review. Upon review of section concem regarding R. 311, I find that it discusses EQ, specifies that EQ equipment is now hsted in drawing 8770-A-450 with details provided in the doctsnent packages. It then states that the REMAINDER of section 311 discusses the ORIGINAL EQ design of the und h

St. Lucie FSAR Review Findings I Unit Page Descnption of Findog Ongmator Supr. Revww Operatmy Assessment Cerveceve Adlon i 2 8 3-3ti Category is not entered as this item Jennogs, Richard Guth, Mitch Since the statement is true for the speclAc NONE as siis appears to be an covers two FSAR pages potentiallyin case morfened in the paragraph on 8.3-36, overtyconsensgueseedngof a confbct. Ongmal findog was by d. and since other areas of the FSAR do parayaph spectAc to one case. Parker, reviewer is R. Jennengs Page descuss safety and run-sofety related cabling 8 3-36 does say that safety related cable in the same recewey,WITH APPRC?RIATE is not run with Non-safety related cable. CONTROLS, there is no confhet and no However, this is in a paragraph operathy concem. discussing safety related busses which i i power BOTH safety related and non-safety related loads and the critena used IN THIS CASE. It does not appear any plant wide imphcations were intended in this paragraph of the FSAR. Additenalty, page 8.3-32, regardog general separation criteria per Reg. Guide 1.75 DOES mention associate i circuits which are non -safety related and are run vnth safety related catAng This page (8 3-32) discusses the cable type (safety related), design controls and isolaten used to ensure this presents no safety problem. .}}