ML17228B023

Plant Ref Simulator Certification Rept.

ML17228B023
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/31/1995
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17228B024	List: ML17228B023 ML17309A771
References
NUDOCS 9502230230
Download: ML17228B023 (29)

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Florida Power & Light Company, P.O. Box 128, Fort Pierce, FL 34954 0128 February 15, 1995 L-95-44 10 CFR 55.45 10 CFR 50.4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 RE: St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 1995 Plant-Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.45(b)(5)(ii) and 10 CFR 55.45 (b)(5)(vi),

attached is the 1995 Plant-Referenced Si mul ator Certification Report for St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. This report is required to be submitted every four years. The original certification was submitted on February 21, 1991, by FPL letter L-91-48. The report is to contain a description and schedule for correcting test failures, a description of the testing completed, and a description and schedule of testing, if different, to be performed during the next four (4) year interval.

The required information is included in the enclosed report.

Section 1 is a list of certification tests performed by year during the past four (4) years. Section 2 is a list of open deficiencies identified during the first interval tests and includes the scheduled completion dates. Section 3 identifies the single plant change/modification that has not yet been incorporated into the simulator. Section 4 is a list of additions, deletions, and revisions to the certification testing program. Section 5 is the testing schedule for the next four (4) year interval. Section 6 includes abstracts of new test procedures to be included in the next interval.

Please contact us if there are any questions about this submittal.

Very truly yours, D. A. ager Vice esident St. Lab ie Plant DAS/GRM cc: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant I

an FPL Group company

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort ST. LUCIE UNITS 1 AND 2 1995 PLANT REFERENCED SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 1 CERTIFICATIONTEST LIST FOR PERIOD 1991-1994

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1991 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 Reactor Trip TRN-002 Loss of all Feedwater TRN-003 Main Steam Valve Closure TRN-004 Loss of all RCP's TRN-005 Loss of one RCP TRN-006 Turbine Trip from (15% power TRN-007 Maximum Rate Power Ramp TRN-008 Large Break LOCA with LOOP TRN-009 MSLB inside Containment TRN-010 Failed open Pressurizer safety valve with no HPSI SST-001 Steady State Test at 1004 power SST-002 Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 75< Power SUR-002 Isothermal Temperature Coefficient, Determination SUR-003 Rod Worth Measurement SUR-004 ARO Critical Boron Determination SUR-006 Moderator Coefficient Determination at Power SUR-014 Turbine Valve Test NPE-005 Plant Shutdown from Rated Power to Cold Shutdown MAL-002 Rapid Gross Failure of Multiple Steam Generator Tubes MAL-005 Small Break LOCA MAL-006 Failed Open PORV with Loss of Offsite Power MAL-008 Loss of Instrument Air Compressors MAL-010 Loss of Offsite Power with Failure of Both Diesel Generators-MAL-015 Loss of all RCP's, Natural Circulation Cooldown MAL-017 Loss of Condenser Level Control MAL-031 One Dropped Bank of'EA's MAL-035 Trip Generator from 100% Power MAL-045 Large Feedwater Line Break inside Containment MAL-046 Wide Range NI Failure MAL-050 T~ input to RPS Failed High MAL-054 RCS Flow Instrument Failure MAL-058 Containment Radiation Monitor Failure MAL-062 Alarm Window Incorrectly Actuates MAL-068 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWAS)

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1992 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 Reactor Trip TRN-002 -

Loss of all Feedwater TRN-003 Main Steam Valve Closure TRN-004 Loss of all RCP's TRN-005 Loss of one RCP TRN-006 Turbine Trip from (154 power TRN-007 Maximum Rate Power Ramp TRN-008 Large Break LOCA with LOOP TRN-009 MSLB inside Containment TRN-010 Failed open Pressurizer. safety valve with no HPSI SST-001 Steady State Test at 100% power SST-002 Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 75~ Power SUR-005 Plant Heat Balance SUR-008 Surveillance requirements for shutdown margin SUR-011 Diesel Generator monthly test NPE-001 Reactor Plant Heatup Cold to Hot Standby NPE-002 Reactor Startup NPE-003 Turbine Startup and Generator Synchronization NPE-004 Reactor Trip and recovery to rated power MAL-003 LOCA outside containment in the letdown system MAL-009 Loss of Offsite Power MAL-012 Loss of the MA Instrument bus MAL-013 Loss of a non-safety related vital A.C. bus MAL-021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling from suction valve MAL-026 Loss of all Feedwater from 1004 Power MAL-030 One Dropped CEA MAL-032 Freeze Control Rod Drive System MAL-038 Pressurizer pressure and level control failures MAL-042 Main steam line break outside Containment MAL-047 Linear Power Range Channel failed high MAL-051 T~ input to RRS failed high MAL-055 Feedwater flow input to 3 element controller fails MAL-059 RWT level Instrument failure MAL-064 ESFAS failure with small break LOCA MAL-066 MSIS fails to actuate MAL-067 AFAS fails to actuate

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1993 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 'eactor Trip, TRN-002 Loss of all Feedwater TRN-003 Main Steam Valve Closure TRN-004 Loss of all RCP's TRN-005 Loss of one RCP TRN-006 Turbine Trip from <154 power TRN-007 Maximum Rate Power Ramp TRN-008 Large Break LOCA with LOOP TRN-009 MSLB inside Containment TRN-010 Failed open Pressurizer. safety valve with no HPSI SST-001 Steady State Test at 1004 power SST-002 Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 754 Power SUR-009 RCS Inventory Balance SUR-012 RPS Logic Matrix Test MAL-001 MAL-004 Complete Rupture if one Steam Generator U-Tube Large Break LOCA with LOOP MAL-007 Loss of Instrument Air Air header rupture MAL-011 Loss of a Safety related A.C. Bus MAL-022 Total Loss of CCW Flow MAL-024 'CS to CCW leak in an RCP seal cooler MAL-028 One Stuck Rod MAL-029 One Uncoupled Rod during startup MAL-034 Turbine trip from <15% power MAL-039 Reactor Coolant Volume Control Failures MAL-040 Reactor trip initiated by low S/G level MAL-041 Double ended MSLB inside containment MAL-043 Failed Open Main steam safety valve MAL-048 S/G Level Instrument Failure MAL-052 RCS Hot Leg RTD failure MAL-056 Steam Flow Input to 3 element controller failure MAL-060 Annunciator Panel failures MAL-065 RAS fails to actuate 5

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1994 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 Reactor Trip TRN-002 Loss of all Feedwater TRN-003 Main Steam Valve Closure TRN-004 Loss of all RCP's TRN-005 Loss of one RCP TRN-006 Turbine Trip from <154 power TRN-007 Maximum Rate Power Ramp TRN-008 Large Break LOCA with LOOP TRN-009 MSLB inside Containment TRN-010 Failed open Pressurizer. safety valve with no HPSI SST-001 Steady State Test at 1004 power SST-002 Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 75% Power SUR-010 Wide Range NI Functional SUR-013 Full Length CEA Periodic Exercise SUR-015 Hydrogen Recombiner Test SUR-018 Boron Flow Test MAL-014 Loss of 2B/2BB DC Bus MAL-016 Slow Condenser Vacuum Leak MAL-018 Loss of all CCW Pumps MAL-019 Rupture of one ICW Header MAL-020 Loss of Shutdown Cooling MAL-023 Rupture of "B" CCW Header MAL-025 Loss of Both Main feedwater pumps MAL-027 Failed Power Supply to one RPS channel MAL-033 Excessive Reactor Coolant Activity MAL-036 Inadvertent dilution at power MAL-037 Steam Bypass control system valve fails open MAL-044 Small Feedwater Line Break Outside Containment MAL-049 Containment Pressure transmitter failure MAL-053 RCS Hot Leg RTD failure MAL-057 Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter Failed Low MAL-061 Alarm Window fails to Actuate MAL-069 Hot Shutdown Control Panel Cooldown

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 2 OPEN DISCREPANCY REPORTS ON CERTIFICATION TESTS

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 920156 NPE-001 As S/G's approached saturation temperature during plant heatup Narrow range level dropped from 654 to 50% almost instantly. Scheduled Completion Date is July 1, 1995.

940066 MAL-018 On a loss of all ICW pumps the generator monitor

'I temperature alarm (D49) never cleared after 2C ICW pump was started on "A" header. Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940067 MAL-018 "A" ICW header pressure never came above 13g after 2C ICW pump was started on "A" header. Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940108 MAL-053 With TE-1112HA failed high the upper head saturation margin did not should. Scheduled Completion Date RCS show suspect is data as January 15, it 1996.

940109 MAL-049 With a containment pressure instrument failed high the ATI fault indicator did not show this.

Scheduled Completion .Date is January 15, 1996.

940122 ALL Main generator Hz pressure is much to sensitive to temperature changes. Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940125 MAL-025 The SBCS did not. respond correctly after the plant tripped from TLOF at 504 power. Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940127 MAL-025 After the plant tripped AFAS-1 did not actuate as a Rupture ID was picked up on feedwater header D/P.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940137 MAL-014 2B steam flow increased to 4.2 E6 LBM/HR 50 seconds into the event, remained there for one minute, then became erratic and blew the S/G dry in approximately 250 seconds. Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940138 MAL-019 The CCW and TCW systems had virtually zero heatup from the loss of all ICW flow. Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 940163 MAL-069 Could not get either BAM pump to start locally and borate the RCS to cold shutdown conditions.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

940203 TRN-008 Plenum level dropped to zero then increased to 2.8 feet 20 seconds later and "FROZE" at this value.

Scheduled Completion Date is January 15, 1996.

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 3 PLANT CHANGES/MODIFICATIONS (PC/M)

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort PC/M 91174-2 The replacement of the DEH Operator Panel B in RTGB 201 has not been installed. This panel will be purchased and installed by January 15, 1996.

11

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 4 ADDITIONS, DELETIONS, AI'W REVISIONS TO THE CERTIFICATIONTEST PROGRAM

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-018 Loss of all ICW Pumps Change to- "Loss of One ICW Header" This will still meet the requirements of ANSI/ANS 3.5 Section 3.1.4 (6) Loss of Service water or cooling to individual components. There is no procedural guidance for a single loss of all ICW pumps but there is however a plant procedure that covers loss of a single ICW header. This will not only allow verification of simulator response to the malfunction (as the current procedure does) but will also test Simulator fidelity by combating the casualty utilizing guidance in the Off-Normal as would be performed in the reference plant.

MAL-022 Loss of all CCW Pumps Change to "Loss of One CCW Header" This will still meet the requirements of ANSI/ANS 3.5 Section 3.1.4 (8) Loss of component cooling or cooling to individual components. There is no procedural guidance for a single loss of all CCW pumps but there is however a plant procedure that covers loss of a single CCW header. This will not only allow verification of simulator response to the malfunction (as the current procedure does) but will also test Simulator fidelity by combating the casualty utilizing guidance in the Off-Normal as would be performed in the reference plant.

MAL-070 Creation of new Certification test "Loss of one Heater Drain Pump from 1004 Power" Plant data available for comparison, IHE-92-067.

MAL-031 One dropped bank of Rods Change to "One Slipped Rod" ANSI/ANS 3.5 has no requirement for a dropped bank of rods. This condition would either cause an automatic trip on Local Power density or require an immediate manual trip per plant procedures.

13

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 5 NEXT FOUR YEAR TESTING SCHEDULE

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1995 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 'eactor Trip TRN-002 Loss of all Feedwater TRN-003 Main Steam Valve Closure TRN-004 Loss of all RCP's TRN-005 Loss of one RCP TRN-006 Turbine Trip from <154 power TRN-007 Maximum Rate Power Ramp TRN-008 Large Break LOCA with LOOP TRN-009 MSLB inside Containment TRN-010 Failed open Pressurizer. safety valve with no HPSI SST-001 Steady State Test at 1004 power SST-002 Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 754 Power SUR-002 Isothermal Temperature Coefficient Determination SUR-003 Rod Worth Measurement SUR-004 ARO Critical Boron Determination NPE-005 Plant Shutdown from Rated Power to Cold Shutdown MAL-002 Rapid Gross Failure of Multiple Steam Generator Tubes MAL-005 Small Break LOCA MAL-006 Failed Open PORV with Loss of Offsite Power MAL-008 Loss of Instrument Air Compressors MAL-010 Loss of Offsite Power with Failure of Both Diesel Generators MAL-017 Loss of Condenser Level Control MAL-031 One Slipped MAL-035 Generator from 1004 Power CEA'rip MAL-045 Large Feedwater Line Break inside Containment MAL-046 Wide Range NI Failure MAL-050 T~ input to RPS Failed High MAL-054 RCS Flow Instrument Failure MAL-058 Containment, Radiation Monitor Failure MAL-062 Alarm Window Incorrectly Actuates MAL-068 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWAS)

'See Section 6 15

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1996 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 Reactor Trip TRN-002 Loss of all Feedwater TRN-003 Main Steam Valve Closure TRN-004 Loss of all RCP's TRN-005 Loss of one RCP TRN-006 Turbine Trip from <154 power TRN-007 Maximum Rate Power Ramp TRN-008 Large Break LOCA with LOOP TRN-009 MSLB inside Containment TRN-010 Failed open Pressurizer. safety valve with no HPSI SST-001 Steady State Test at 1004 power SST-002 Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 75% Power SUR-005 Plant Heat Balance SUR-008 Surveillance requirements for shutdown margin SUR-009 RCS Inventory Balance SUR-018 Boron Flow Test NPE-001 Reactor Plant Heatup Cold to Hot Standby NPE-002 Reactor Startup NPE-003 Turbine Startup and Generator Synchronization MAL-003 LOCA outside containment in the letdown system MAL-009 Loss of Offsite Power MAL-012 Loss of the MA Instrument bus MAL-013 Loss of a non-safety related vital A.C. bus MAL-021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling from suction valve MAL-026 Loss of all Feedwater from 1004 Power MAL-030 One Dropped CEA MAL-032 Freeze Control Rod Drive System MAL-038 Pressurizer pressure and level control failures MAL-042 Main steam line break outside Containment MAL-047 Linear Power Range Channel failed high MAL-051 T~input to RRS failed high MAL-055 Feedwater flow input to 3 element controller fails MAL-059 RWT level Instrument failure MAL-064 ESFAS failure with small break LOCA MAL-066 MSIS fails to actuate MAL-067 AFAS fails to actuate 16

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1997 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 'eactor Trip TRN-002 Loss of all Feedwater TRN-003 Main Steam Valve Closure TRN-004 Loss of all RCP's TRN-005 Loss of one RCP TRN-006 Turbine Trip from <154 power TRN-007 Maximum Rate Power Ramp TRN-008 Large Break LOCA with LOOP TRN-009 MSLB inside Containment TRN-010 Failed open Pressurizer. safety valve with no HPSI SST-001 Steady State Test at 1004 power SST-002 Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 754 Power SUR-010 Wide Range NI Functional SUR-012 RPS Logic Matrix Test SUR-013 Full Length CEA Periodic Exercise SUR-014 Turbine Valve Test SUR-015 Hydrogen Recombiner Test NPE-004 Reactor Trip and recovery to rated power MAL-001 MAL-004 Complete Rupture Large Break LOCA if one Steam Generator U-Tube with LOOP MAL-007 Loss of Instrument Air Air header rupture MAL-011 Loss of a Safety related A.C. Bus MAL-022 Loss of One CCW Header~

MAL-024 RCS to CCW leak in an RCP seal cooler MAL-028 One Stuck Rod MAL-029 One Uncoupled Rod during startup MAL-034 Turbine trip from <154 power MAL-039 Reactor Coolant Volume Control Failures MAL-040 Reactor trip initiated by low S/G level MAL-041 Double ended MSLB inside containment MAL-043 Failed Open Main steam safety valve MAL-048 S/G Level Instrument Failure MAL-052 RCS Hot Leg RTD failure MAL-056 Steam Flow Input to 3 element controller failure MAL-060 Annunciator Panel failures MAL-065 RAS fails to actuate

~See Section 6 17

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort 1998 CERTIFICATION TESTS TRN-001 Reactor Trip TRN-002 Loss of all Feedwater TRN-003 Main Steam Valve Closure TRN-004 Loss of all RCP's TRN-005 Loss of one RCP TRN-006 Turbine Trip from <154 power TRN-007 Maximum Rate Power Ramp TRN-008. Large Break LOCA with LOOP TRN-009 MSLB inside Containment TRN-010 Failed open Pressurizer. safety valve with no HPSI SST-001 Steady State Test at 100% power SST-002 Steady State Test at 30, 50 and 75% Power SUR-006 Moderator Coefficient Determination at Power SUR-011 Diesel Generator monthly test MAL-014 Loss of 2B/2BB DC Bus MAL-015 Loss of all RCP's; Natural Circulation Cooldown MAL-016 Slow Condenser Vacuum Leak MAL-018 Loss of one ICW Header MAL-019 Rupture of One ICW Header MAL-020 Loss .of Shutdown Cooling MAL-023 Rupture of "B" CCW Header MAL-025 Loss of Both Main feedwater pumps MAL-027 Failed Power Supply to one RPS channel MAL-033 Excessive Reactor Coolant Activity MAL-036 Inadvertent dilution at power MAL-037 Steam Bypass control system valve fails open MAL-044 Small Feedwater Line Break Outside Containment MAL-049 Containment Pressure transmitter failure MAL-053 RCS Hot Leg RTD failure MAL-057 Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter Failed Low MAL-061 Alarm Window fails to Actuate MAL-069 Hot Shutdown Control Panel Cooldown MAL-070 Loss of One Heater Drain Pump from 1004 Power4 See Section 6 4See Section 6 18

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort SECTION 6 ABSTIUCTS OF NEW TEST PROCEDUXUN

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-018 LOSS OF ONE INTAKE COOLING WATER (ICW) HEADER APPROACH This test examines a loss of one ICW header due to a breaker failure on the "A" ICW All of the alarms and indications will be verified. Datapump.

will be collected to demonstrate the correct response of the simulator to the loss of one ICW header. After the response is verified the "C" ICW pump will be started on the "A" ICW header to reestablish cooling water flow.

INITIAL CONDITIONS 100% Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon FINAL CONDITIONS 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon with the "C" ICW pump running on the "A" ICW header.

OPTIONS The simulator is capable of several different malfunctions in the ICW system. The traveling screens can be failed or overloaded, the ICW pumps can have a sheared shaft or any degree of bearing wear, and the ICW pump breakers can be failed in either the open or closed position. There is also local start/stop capability of the pumps.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS This test only involves the loss of one ICW header and does not include any other possible malfunctions. No emergency procedures will be used, however, Off-Normal Procedure 2-0640030 is referenced.

TEST OBJECTIVES Verify the proper response of the simulator to the loss of one ICW header. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.2)

Ensure that the operator was required to take the same action on the simulator to mitigate the consequences of the loss of 20

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort one ICW header as would have been required on the reference plant using the plant procedures. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3)

Verify that the operators/instructors did not observe a difference between the response of the simulator control room instrumentation and the reference plant. (ANSI 3.5, Section

3. 1)

Ensure that the malfunction showed plant operations of the reference plant which occurred continuously and in real time.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.)

Verify that the critical parameters and the other parameters which were important to the successful completion of this evolution were displayed on the appropriate instrumentation, and provided proper alarm or protective system action or both.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1.)

Verify that the loss of one ICW header interaction with the other simulated systems provides total system integrated response. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3.3.1)

Verify that the simulator does not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action that would occur in the reference plant and, conversely, does not cause an alarm or automatic action that would not occur in the reference plant for this malfunction.

(ANSI 3.5, section 4.2.1 (c)).

Verify that the operator was able to control the malfunction to a steady state condition provided that the simulator operating limits were not exceeded. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3).

21

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-022 LOSS OF ONE COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) HEADER APPROACH This test examines the loss of one CCW header due to a breaker failure on the "A" CCW pump. All of the alarms and indications will'e verified. Data will be collected to demonstrate the correct response of the simulator to the loss of one CCW header. After the response is verified the "C" CCW pump will be started on the "A" CCW header to reestablish cooling water flow.

INITIAL CONDITIONS 100% Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon FINAL CONDITIONS 100% Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium the "C" running on the "A" CCW header.

Xenon'ith CCW pump OPTIONS The simulator is capable of several different malfunctions in the CCW system. The CCW pumps can have a sheared shaft or any degree of bearing wear. The CCW pump breakers can be failed in either the open or closed position. There is also local start/stop capability of the pumps.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS This test only involves the loss of one CCW header and does not include any other possible malfunctions. No emergency procedures will be used, however, Off-Normal procedure 2-0310030 is referenced.

TEST OBJECTIVES Verify the proper response of the simulator to the loss of one CCW header." (ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.2)

Ensure that the operator was required to take the same action on the simulator to mitigate the consequences of the loss of one CCW header as would have been required on the reference plant using the plant procedures. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3)

Verify that the operators/instructors did not observe a difference between the response of the simulator control room 22

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389

• L-95 44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort instrumentation and the reference plant. (ANSI 3.5, Section

3. 1)

Ensure that the malfunction showed plant operations -of the reference plant which occurred continuously and in real time.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.)

Verify that the critical parameters and the other parameters which were important to the successful completion of this evolution were displayed on the appropriate instrumentation, and provided proper alarm or protective system action or both.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1.)

Verify that the loss of one CCW header interaction with the other simulated systems provides total system integrated response. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3.3.1)

Verify that the simulator does not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action that would occur in the reference plant and, conversely, does not cause an alarm or automatic action that would not occur in the reference plant for this malfunction.

(ANSI 3.5, section 4.2.1 (c)).

Verify that the operator was able to control the malfunction to a steady state condition provided that the simulator operating limits were not exceeded. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3).

23

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-070 LOSS OF ONE HEATER DRAIN PUMP FROM 1004 POWER APPROACH This test examines a loss of one heater drain pump from 1004 power due to a breaker failure on the "B" heater drain All of the alarms and indications will be verified. Data pump.

will be collected to demonstrate the correct response of the simulator to the loss of one heater drain pump. After the response is verified the malfunction is corrected and the heater drain pump is restarted.

INITIAL CONDITIONS 100% Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon FINAL CONDITIONS 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon OPTIONS The simulator is capable of several different malfunctions in the heater vent and drain system. Heater normal and alternate drains can be failed open or closed. The heater drain pumps can have a sheared shaft or any degree of bearing wear, and the heater drain pump breakers can be failed in either the open or closed position. There is also local start/stop capability of the pumps.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS This test only involves the loss of one heater drain pump from 100% power and does not include any other possible, malfunctions. No emergency procedures will be used, however, Off-Normal Procedure 2-0700030 is referenced.

TEST OBJECTIVES Verify the proper response of the simulator to the loss of one heater drain pump from 1004 power.

Ensure that the operator was required to take the same action on the simulator to mitigate the consequences of the loss of one heater drain pump as would have been required on the reference plant using the plant procedures.

Verify that the operators/instructors did not observe a difference between the response of the simulator control room 24

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort instrumentation and the reference plant. (ANSI 3.5, Section

3. 1)

Ensure that the malfunction showed plant operations of the reference plant which occurred continuously and in real time.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.)

Verify that the critical parameters and the other parameters which were important to the successful completion of this evolution were displayed on the appropriate instrumentation, and provided proper alarm or protective system action or both.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1.)

Verify that the loss of one heater drain pump interaction with the other simulated systems provides total system integrated response.

Verify that the simulator does not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action that would occur in the reference plant and, conversely, does not cause an alarm or automatic action that would not occur in the reference plant for this malfunction.

(ANSI 3.5, section 4.2.1 (c)).

Verify that the operator was able to control the malfunction to a steady state condition provided that the simulator operating limits were not exceeded. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3).

25

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort MAL-031 ONE SLIPPED CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY (CEA)

APPROACH This test examines a slipped CEA at 100% power. All of the alarms and indications will be verified. Data will be collected to demonstrate the correct response of the simulator to the slipped CEA. After the response is verified the CEA is withdrawn to it's proper position.

INITIAL CONDITION 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon FINAL CONDITIONS 1004 Power, Steady State, Middle of Life, Equilibrium Xenon OPTIONS The simulator is capable of several different malfunctions in the Control rod drive system. Any number of CEA's can be partially or fully inserted, the drive system can be frozen or move without operator control, and the rod block circuitry can be failed.

LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS This test only involves the slippage of one CEA from 100%

power and does not include any other possible malfunctions.

No emergency procedures will be used, however, Off-Normal Procedure 2-0110030 is referenced.

TEST OBJECTIVES Verify the proper response of the simulator to the slippage of one CEA.

Ensure that the operator was required to take the same action on the simulator to mitigate the consequences of the slipped CEA as would have been required on the reference plant using the plant procedures.

Verify that the operators/instructors did not observe a difference between the response of the simulator control room instrumentation and the reference plant. (ANSI 3.5, Section

3. 1) 26

k ~

St. Lucie UnitS 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 L-95-44 Plant Referenced Simulator Certification Re ort Ensure that the malfunction showed plant operations of the reference plant which occurred continuously and in real time.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.)

Verify that the critical parameters and the other parameters which were important to the successful completion of this evolution were displayed on the appropriate instrumentation, and provided proper alarm or protective system. action or both.

(ANSI 3.5, Section 3.1.1.)

Verify that the- slippage of one CEA interaction with the other simulated systems provides total system integrated response.

Verify that the simulator does not fail to cause an alarm or automatic action that would occur in the reference plant and, conversely, does not cause an alarm or automatic action that would not occur in the reference plant for this malfunction.

(ANSI 3.5, section 4.2.1 (c)).

Verify that the operator was able to control the malfunction to a steady state condition provided that the simulator operating limits were not exceeded. (ANSI 3.5, Section 3).

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